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Unpublished Paper
Superregulation: Competitive Approved Private Regulators
(2017)
  • Gillian K Hadfield
Abstract

In this paper, I explore the potential for developing markets for regulation as a means of producing regulatory methods and technologies that are better adapted to the characteristics of a complex, digital, and global economy.  This model expands the new governance concept of outcomes-based regulation, in which government monitors the achievement of established targets (such as an accident rate or release of toxins) but does not prescribe the means of achieving those targets.  In standard outcomes-based regulation, regulated entities design their own approach to achieving regulatory targets.  In the model I propose, private regulators compete to provide regulatory services to regulated entities; these private regulators, however, must be authorized (approved) by government, evaluated on the basis of their efficacy with which they achieve the regulatory targets.  In this model, government becomes a regulator of regulators:  superregulation.  In this preliminary paper, I explore the possibilities and limits for such a model.
Keywords
  • regulation,
  • standard-setting,
  • global regulation,
  • private regulators,
  • private ordering
Disciplines
Publication Date
2017
Comments
This is a preliminary note that draws in part of the discussion of superregulation in Gillian Hadfield Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans Invented Law and How to Reinvent It for a Complex Global Economy
Citation Information
Gillian K Hadfield. "Superregulation: Competitive Approved Private Regulators" (2017)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/ghadfield/63/