About Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin specializes in antitrust economics and antitrust law, and is the co-founder of bepress. He holds the Richard Jennings Chair and professorships in both the economics department and law school at UC Berkeley and is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has published in the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and numerous other venues. He is co-author with P. Areeda & L. Kaplow of "Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases," one of the leading casebooks on antitrust. He served on the 2008 Obama Presidential campaign’s competition policy committee, and as Senior Economist at the Council of Economic Advisers in the Clinton White House covering industrial organization, regulation and antitrust. He has been a visiting professor or researcher at Stanford, Yale, Harvard, Columbia, and Georgetown. He received tenure at UC Berkeley in 1997, his Ph.D. and J.D. from Stanford in 1993; and AB Summa Cum Laude from Princeton in 1988.
|July 1994 - Present
|Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research
|July 1993 - Present
|Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, UC Berkeley and Richard Jennings Professor, Berkeley Law
Antitrust, Industrial Organization, Law and Economics, Business Strategy, Microeconomic Theory, and Public Economics
- Industrial Organization
- Antitrust Law and Policy
Department of Economics #3880
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
School of Law (Boalt Hall)
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
Recent Works (3)
Conservatism and Switcher's Curse American Law and Economics Review (2017)
This paper formally models the virtues of Edmund Burke's conservatism, characterizes the optimal level of conservatism, and applies the model to management, law, and policy. I begin by introducing ``switcher's curse,'' a trap in which ...
Featured Works (4)
Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others Rationality and Society (2007)
For voters with "social" preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are ...
The Accident Externality from Driving Journal of Political Economy (2006)
We estimate auto accident externalities (more specifically insurance externalities) using panel data on state-average insurance premiums and loss costs. Externalities appear to be substantial in traffic-dense states: in California, for example, we find that the ...
Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment American Economic Review (1996)
In bilateral trading problems, the parties may be hesitant to make relationship-specific investments without adequate contractual protection. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely renegotiate them after ...
Antitrust, Industrial Organization, and Competition Policy (28)
The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice Rutgers University Law Review (2015)
In FTC v. Acta vis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not ...
Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics The Antitrust Source (2014)
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and ...
Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (2013)
Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process ...
Predatory Pricing Research Handbook on Economics of Antitrust (2012)
Judge Breyer famously worried that aggressive prohibitions of predatory pricing throw away a bird in hand (low prices during the alleged predatory period) for a speculative bird in the bush (preventing higher prices thereafter). Here, ...
Exclusion or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling of Academic Journals Antitrust Law Journal (2004)
Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large ...