|July 1994 - Present||Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research|
|July 1993 - Present||Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, UC Berkeley and Richard Jennings Professor, Berkeley Law|
- Industrial Organization
- Antitrust Law and Policy
Department of Economics #3880
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
School of Law (Boalt Hall)
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
Recent Works (4)
What's in a Denial? Bayesian Analysis Shows that Kavanaugh Lied about Denials under Oath and Trump was Foolish to Believe MBS (2018)
Trump has been putting a lot of stock in denials: MBS's, Putin's, and Kavanaugh's. We argue, based on Bayes, this is foolish. Kavanaugh in turn put stock in a different kind of denial, claiming that ...
Conservatism and Switcher's Curse American Law and Economics Review (2017)
This paper formally models the virtues of Edmund Burke's conservatism, characterizes the optimal level of conservatism, and applies the model to management, law, and policy. I begin by introducing ``switcher's curse,'' a trap in which ...
Featured Works (4)
Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others Rationality and Society (2007)
For voters with "social" preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are ...
The Accident Externality from Driving Journal of Political Economy (2006)
We estimate auto accident externalities (more specifically insurance externalities) using panel data on state-average insurance premiums and loss costs. Externalities appear to be substantial in traffic-dense states: in California, for example, we find that the ...
Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment American Economic Review (1996)
In bilateral trading problems, the parties may be hesitant to make relationship-specific investments without adequate contractual protection. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely renegotiate them after ...
Antitrust, Industrial Organization, and Competition Policy (28)
The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice Rutgers University Law Review (2015)
In FTC v. Acta vis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not ...
Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics Faculty Scholarship (2014)
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and ...
Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (2013)
Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process ...
Predatory Pricing Research Handbook on Economics of Antitrust (2012)
Judge Breyer famously worried that aggressive prohibitions of predatory pricing throw away a bird in hand (low prices during the alleged predatory period) for a speculative bird in the bush (preventing higher prices thereafter). Here, ...