论文以公共选择理论为框架，文讨论了罗马尼亚公共行政中的官僚选拔。全文由两部分组成，第一部分是理论部分，包括:关于官僚制的韦伯式路径、公共选择理论关于官僚制论述的回顾、制度变迁和公共官僚选拔的理论构建和关于方法论的总结。第二部分是应用部分，作者对1990至2009年期间的公务员体系立法进行了深度考察，改良了里德和库尔特 (Reid & Kurth，1988; 1989) 的组织变迁理论，并将改进后的理论应用于罗马尼亚的案例。这个新理论预测，罗马尼亚政治家在加入欧盟时将低效率地维持一个高度政治化的公务员体系，因此人们应该在2007年1月之前观察到一个去政治化 (de-politicization) 的公共官僚选拔系统，以及随之而来在2007年1月之后的再政治化 (re-politicization)。论文的文献研究确认了这个预测。

This paper deals with the selection of bureaucrats in the Romanian public administration basing its inquiry on the Public Choice Theory. This paper can be divided into two parts: the first one (A). the theoretical one, the authors present: A1) the Weberian approach on bureaucracy; A2) a review of the public choice theory on bureaucracy; and formulate: A3) a theory of institutional change and public bureaucrats selection. The part ends by A4) describing the research methodology. In the second part (B), the applied one, the authors perform an in-depth examination of the civil service legislation of 1990-2009.The authors’ contribution to extending knowledge in the field of civil service research consists in their refinement of Reid and Kurth theory of organizational change (1988), (1989) and in the application of this refined theory to the Romanian case. The new theory predicted that Romanian politicians faced inefficiency in maintaining a highly politicized civil service while accessing the European Union and, for that reason one should observe a de-politicization of the public bureaucrats’ selection system up to January 2007, followed by a re-politicization after January 2007.The authors’ documentary research confirmed the prediction.