On the Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union

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Richard Hellie and a small army of coders have produced an enormous and pioneering annotated catalog of prices and commodities in Muscovy and early-modern Russia. The aim of the work is to collect available (published) data on everything expressed in monetary terms: agricultural and horticultural products, products from forests, waters, and extracted from the earth, imported and manufactured goods, real estate, taxes, wages, transportation costs, and services and income transfers. The data base includes 350 published volumes containing 107,000 records reflecting prices. Identifying what and how much of an item was being priced necessitated arduous subsidiary excursions into etymology — in seventeenth-century Muscovy the naming of things was a difficult matter — and into the diverse weights and measures used long after the Ulozhenie initiated the slow process of standardization.

Hellie would, I am certain, insist that the importance of the book resides primarily in the retrieval and plotting of prices found in the data base, but he also offers a number of major conclusions. The state played a relatively minor role in the economy, rarely setting prices, regulating manufacturing, or establishing interest rates, although it did control the land market and foreign trade, and did set the price of slaves. By the seventeenth century, with serfdom growing apace, agriculture was becoming part of the cash economy, and by 1725 the impact of extractive industries can be measured. The wage economy was well developed, and although in many respects the Muscovite economy was autarkic, Muscovy was fully plugged into the global economy. Prices rose across the economy in 1613 (war), 1663-64 (currency manipulation) and 1700 (war), and Hellie’s price data permit a glimpse into the pace of recovery. State-sponsored innovation long antedated Peter the Great. Concerning Peter — and the study was deliberately extended to include his reign — the hardships imposed by war seem to have somewhat ameliorated by 1715, and perhaps most controversially, the influence of the Petrine era on the material culture of Russia was trivial.

One reads many of these pages, however, with varying measures of scepticism, misgivings, and even incredulity, even when one heeds Hellie’s cautions about the generally elite, and therefore skewed origins of the bulk of his records. Despite repeated assurances that the data are reliable, and would not change significantly with access to archival sources, one must often wonder whether they are representative, and precisely of what. These suspicions pertain not to the prices quoted or analyzed, but to Hellie’s frequent interpretations of the role of the commodity in the economy, based on the number of times it appears in the records. The Muscovite population at the birth of Peter the Great was probably ten or eleven million, but the data base contains only four references to coffins, 1623-1674, and none thereafter. Hellie insists that Peter’s reforms did not penetrate very deeply into Russian society, but the sole appearance of the entry “razor” in the data base for 1641 twitches the ends of one’s moustache; likewise the reference to a wig in a 1690 inventory. If the grain drier [ovin] was a necessary (my emphasis) accoutrement of Russian agriculture because of
the shortness of the growing season and the likelihood of precipitation after the grain was cut and before it was threshed, why are only two recorded in 125 years? Professor Hellie judges the Petrine impact to have been minimal on the broad swath of Russian society — in quite different contexts I have argued similarly — but the artificial closing date of 1725 eliminates the inventories of effects of everyone who survived Peter's death. I would not wish to make his task even more demanding, but numerous political arrests under Anna and Elizabeth produced such inventories where "westernization" can really be judged at elite levels. Furthermore, some inventories do not include estimated or assessed prices; are they therefore not part of a data base used to draw cultural conclusions other than the history of prices? Reading page after page, chart after chart, such anomalies and puzzles multiply.

The bulk of the book is necessarily ponderous enumeration, with scores of tables and charts showing the movement of prices. But Hellie has done his best to lighten the reading, often with his hallmark irreverent wit and humor (Muscovy had a rudimentary pension system. Those somehow in the government sector were expected to serve until they could no longer stand up or be propped up, a tradition that continued right through the reigns of Chernenko and Brezhnev, and perhaps even El'tsin. [p. 532]); sometimes with blasphemy that fails to respect the essence of the culture he studies (The rarity of the payment [for Baptism] in the extant records forces one to believe that church personnel typically provided baptisms without charge, rather like Polaroid's selling cameras at a very low price to encourage subsequent purchases of film. [p. 500]); and occasionally with obfuscation (The government was convinced that the only way it could get people into the customs house and into the state tavern was to create a monopoly for itself and to allow no competition. . . . A similar problem (butin reverse) was faced by Disneyland in California. . . . The Muscovite government tried to create a Disney world situation, but in a different setting. [p. 403]).

At times Professor Hellie's reasoning appears ahistorical and tortured. Sometimes one wishes for the impossible, an even bigger book with more sophisticated contexts provided by a wider range of reading the history of the fork, of water-mills, and of the published and manuscript books are cases in point. One wishes that David Hackett Fischer's Great Wave or Gary Marker's work on literacy (the former neatly summarized, the latter cited in the background chapter), would have appeared in the bibliography. One wishes often that Hellie was content with arguing that the prices cited were typical of a larger number of invisible transactions, and that would have avoided suggestions that the number of surviving recorded transactions in his data base mirrored social or economic realities apart from price history. But the overall import of the book is groundbreaking and significant. As with the works of his mentor Arcadius Kahan, this becomes instantly a fundamental reference work for the era, the essential starting point for future work.

Max J. Okenfuss
Washington University

Historians for several years now have been re-examining a number of interpretations that had come to be commonly accepted about the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Russia. Broad generalizations about the growing influence of the secular in seventeenth-century Muscovy and about the Russian adaptation of its own variant of “the Enlightenment,” offered initially by Soviet historians and then accepted for the most part elsewhere, have come under scrutiny in the form of detailed studies of specific issues or individuals. With this brief book, well written and cogently argued despite its daunting title, Max Okenfuss renders many of the commonplace generalizations untenable.

The kind of secularism and enlightenment that supposedly gained predominance in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Muscovite and Russian culture owed their origins to ideas that had become current two and three centuries earlier in more westerly parts of Europe. The new thinking resulted from increased reading of classical (non-Christian) Latin authors and a new understanding of their works embodied in the concept of humanism. In short, European literate culture had been transformed by the Renaissance, an awakening in which Muscovy had not participated at the time. To test the premise that in the early modern period Russian culture opened up to secularism and enlightenment, Okenfuss asks a simple question: what concrete evidence is there that the essential ingredient for secular and enlightened thinking — knowledge of classical Latin authors — existed in early modern Muscovy?

The answer should not be surprising. Seventeenth-century Muscovy closed itself off from West European Latin culture, just as surely as it had rejected virtually everything not fully Christian and orthodox from Greek culture. The evidence to support this conclusion Okenfuss finds in Muscovite book culture. Muscovite libraries simply did not include classical Latin authors. Nor is there evidence that literate Muscovites were conversant with the ideas of classical authors, if only from secondary sources. Muscovite students were not asked to read works from the classical tradition as part of their education. What gives Okenfuss’s argument poignancy is the fact that Muscovy consciously rejected Latin learning although it clearly was offered to Muscovy by way of Ukrainian scholarship.

Learning in seventeenth-century Ukraine was steeped in Latin humanism, received through the intermediacy of Poland. Through such institutions as the Kievan Academy and such personages as Simeon Polotckij, Muscovy too had access to Latin authors — if it had valued them. Other cultural influences from Poland were accepted. The court of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich was even Polonized to a significant extent. In the end, however, the guardians of Muscovite book culture — principally the Russian patriarchate and the church hierarchs — rejected these inroads. Okenfuss holds up Archpriest Awakum as the typical Muscovite bookman. To emphasize the distinct differences between Ukrainian and Muscovite receptivity to classical Latin writers and humanism, Okenfuss identifies the Ukrainian bookmen by spelling their names according to Ukrainian orthography, even when they may have spent the major portion of their active careers in Muscovy: thus Simeon Polockij, Teofan Prokopovych, Havryjil Buzyn'skijy, Stefan Javors'kyj, for example. Okenfuss provocatively suggests that Muscovy’s ultimate rejection of Latin
learning in the seventeenth century, despite the fact that a thin stratum of elite had been Polonized if not fully "Latinized," may have been evidence of the strength of Muscovite culture. Unlike many West European scholars from the fourteenth century on, dissatisfied for whatever reason with the intellectual tradition that had been handed down to them and in search of something newer and better, the typical representative of Muscovite learning was satisfied with the orthodox legacy and saw no need to change.

The reign of Peter I, taken almost universally by Soviet historians to mark an even greater divide between old Russian religious culture and modern Russian secularism, reflected no such shift in the libraries of educated Russians. Through the first half of the eighteenth century the fundamental rift continued between a Latinized and humanized Ukrainian educated elite and a traditional Russian book culture. Only after 1750 did the Latin classics finally begin to appear in Russia, either in the original or in translation. Even then, the classics did not sell. Russia remained for the most part uninterested in it. It remained for Catherine II to have the last word during this extended period of time, when she opted for a program of public education that largely ignored Latin authors for a more orthodox reading content in schools, perhaps in part as a manifestation of a religious revival Okenfuss sees in the last two decades of Catherine’s reign.

Okenfuss draws several important conclusions from his study, among them the following. News of a Russian enlightenment has been much exaggerated, a result of a confluence of the work of East German and Soviet historians, sustained especially by the interpretations of Eduard Winter and P. N. Berkov and their followers. The degree to which Russia’s learned elite became secularized has in particular been far overstated. A few Russians, in addition to the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and West Europeans living among them, did absorb humanistic texts, but those Russians stemmed less from the nobility than from the non-noble sons of clerical, military, and raznochintsy status. In the second half of the eighteenth century Latin authors were beginning to appear in Russian libraries and to influence the thought of significant Russians such as M. M. Shcherbatov, Paul Demidov, and A. N. Radishchev, but their number was not great.

This book is a significant piece of research and interpretation that merits more attention than it is likely to receive because it has not been advertised widely and its price is high. It is a model of how painstaking research into an obvious but heretofore unasked question can result in a fundamental recasting of what we thought we knew.

George E. Munro
Virginia Commonwealth University


Martin Malia’s new book takes on a fundamental issue in the historiography of Russia: is there “an inherent difference of civilizations between ‘Russia’ and ‘the West’” (4)? The search for an answer leads him to a wide-ranging investigation of Russian and European history from the eighteenth century to the present.

His analysis stresses four points. First, Russia is not a distinct civilization but rather an integral part of Europe, though it resides at the bottom of a European “West-
East cultural gradient or declivity” in which Great Britain and France occupy the highest level, and Central Europe, the intermediate. Thus, Malia argues, major societal developments usually reached Russia about fifty years after occurring in Brandenburg-Prussia. Second, Western thinking about Russia’s “Europeanness” reflects mainly the West’s own ideological preoccupations. Third, Western policies toward Russia have been driven by perceptions that were often out of step with Russian reality. Fourth and last, Western views of Russia have fluctuated along two conceptual axes: “enlightened despotism” versus “Oriental despotism,” and convergence with the West versus the primitive, vital Russian soul.

Russia’s initial entry into the European state system under Peter I was made possible, Malia argues, by the transformations that created both the “concert of Europe” — an international system based on an equilibrium of several roughly equal powers — and the “enlightened” Old Regime with its “well-ordered police state.” In this environment, Russia became a strategic partner to European powers, while the philosophes were entranced with the Romanovs’ rhetorical commitment to the Enlightenment. While the Ottomans’ formal allegiance to militant Islam perpetuated their exclusion from Europe, the far more aggressive Russians were accepted because Europe considered them an exemplar of “enlightened despotism.”

After 1815, though Russia itself remained internally unchanged and even became a status-quo power internationally, the European mirror in which it was reflected was completely transformed. On the one hand, the tenuous victory of liberalism in Great Britain and France provoked hatred toward the regime of Nicholas I, the avowed enemy of liberalism. As a result, whereas Voltaire had supported “enlightened” Catherine II’s attack on Polish independence, his liberal heirs later excoriated her “reactionary” grandson for doing the same. On the other hand, the new Romantic conception of history began situating “Europe” in the historical tradition of the Roman Empire, Catholicism, and the Germanic migrations, which suggested that Russia was not only reactionary but not even really European in the first place. Consequently, the Western liberal (and socialist) mood shifted from adulation for Russian “enlightened despotism” to hatred and fear of its supposed “Oriental despotism,” and the liberal powers’ foreign policy likewise became viscerally Russophobic.

With Russia’s Crimean defeat, the Great Reforms, and the stabilization of liberal power in Western and semi-constitutional monarchies in Central Europe, European views of Russia shifted again. Russia again appeared as a “normal,” if backward, European country on which both liberals and socialists could pin hopes for the future. A Russian “convergence” with Europe thus seemed likely. However, while Enlightenment utopianism had shaped eighteenth century Western thinking on Russia, it was a radical form of Romanticism that increasingly molded the Russian-European intellectual dialog of the fin-de-siècle, as the West of Baudelaire and Nietzsche opened up to the Russia of Dostoevskii and the Symbolists. To Western thinkers in the anti-rationalist tradition, the “Russian soul” appeared as an antidote to the decadence of modern society. As Malia sees it, this Russian anti-rationalism fell on particularly fruitful soil in Germany, whose own intellectuals — Marx and Nietzsche, for example — had earlier found Russians an especially receptive audience.

Out of this fateful German-Russian intellectual encounter arose the twentieth century’s twin scourges of National Socialism and Leninism-Stalinism. The Hitlerian movement was linked to Russia through the intellectual mediation of Artur Moller van
den Bruck (who translated the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and coined the phrase Third Reich), Alfred Rosenberg, and others. Leninism, meanwhile, was a logical extension of Marxism, whose secular eschatology of salvation-by-revolution drew on both the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Malia emphasizes the centrality of revolution to Marxist thought and argues that, with a spontaneous proletarian revolution anywhere increasingly unlikely, the Lenin-Trotsky conception of revolution was the logical next step in the pursuit of the fantastical "unicorn" that was socialism. With the failure of world revolution after 1917, the Soviets’ only remaining options were either giving up on the unicorn or undertaking the further escalation into Stalinism.

The Third Reich and Stalinism were both rooted in the 1790s French tradition of warlike revolutionary nationalism, which had revived in force among the embittered mass-conscription armies of the defeated “old regimes” of World War I. However, Germany’s economy was powerful enough that the National Socialists could quickly direct their revolutionary energies outward, thereby causing World War II and their own destruction. The Soviets on the other hand, defeated in their initial pursuit of world revolution, were forced to put domestic transformation first, and therefore their regime survived. Malia argues that both Soviet communism and National Socialism, perversions of Enlightenment and Romantic ideas made possible by unique historical conditions, were incapable of genuine creativity and doomed to wither or self-destruct. That this quickly became clear to Western observers in the case only of Nazi Germany, but not the Soviet Union, was due to various factors: failure to distinguish between Soviet socialism and the Western movements that wrongly retained the same designation; the misguided identification of Hitler with “fascism” that obscured the much more important similarity of his regime with Stalin’s even while it gave the Soviet Union a sham “antifascist” legitimacy; and sheer ignorance of conditions in the Soviet Union. Uncertain and poorly informed, Westerners reverted to prerevolutionary interpretive categories such as “Oriental despotism” (to describe late Stalinism), modernization theory (an updated variant of the “enlightened despotism” concept), and East-West “convergence.”

In the end, however, the crumbling of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev — whose popularity among Western progressives Malia likens to the earlier adulation for Catherine II — proved that the regime’s key feature was instead the catastrophic legacy of Marxism-Leninism. With the end of communism, Malia concludes, Russia has returned to its “normal” condition as a backward member of Europe. As for the socialist unicorn, it continues to be chased by starry-eyed intellectuals (particularly at American universities), whose theories have replaced the Marxian proletariat with other “oppressed” groups whose liberation promises to bring about humanity’s salvation.

This book’s sweep of vision, and breadth and depth of erudition, are remarkable. In a time of often narrowly specialized and purely “academic” scholarship, it is refreshing to see a masterful overview of so many countries, centuries, and historical subfields, and one that connects the distant past with the pressing issues of our time. By the same token, Malia’s positions are often highly polemical and best seen in light of the ongoing debates about “totalitarianism” and the “normalization” of the history of Stalinist Russia. Malia certainly leaves no doubt of where he stands on these issues.

Alexander M. Martin
Oglethorpe University

This collection of essays provides an accessible introduction to major Russian and significant non-Russian historiographical traditions created in the Russian Empire. The work draws upon a pool of reliable and diverse contributors, including established and younger scholars, Western and Russian historians, and specialists on Imperial Russia, Ukraine, Russian Jewry, and Central Asia. Given the revival of history and the opening of historical archives in many parts of the former Soviet Union, this anthology comes at an opportune time to evaluate salient trends in the historiography of Imperial Russia and to suggest new lines of inquiry. The volume promises to become, in the words of editor Sanders, "a point of first reference for those interested in the subject" (xi).

Along with an introduction and two concluding essays, the tome consists of nine chapters on the evolution of modern Russian historical writing, eight chapters on individual Russian and Ukrainian historians, and three chapters respectively on Russian Jewish historiography, Central Asian historical consciousness, and Ukrainian historical writing. Ten of the essays have already been published in journals or as portions of books, such as Cynthia Whittaker's analysis of the concept of autocracy in eighteenth-century Russian historiography; Thomas Sanders's description of the academic and social importance of the public dissertation defense; Terence Emmons's discussion of Kliuchevskii's influence on his pupils; Marc Raeff's investigation of Russian historians and history-writing in the emigre world of "Russia Abroad"; the late Robert Byrnes's article on Kliuchevskii's interpretation of the seamless, organic flow of Russian history; Melissa Stockdale's treatment of Miliukov's themes and approaches; and Frank Sysyn's chapter on Hrushevskyj's magnum opus History of Ukraine-Rus' and scholarly legacies.

Each reader will no doubt select different essays as highlights of this collective enterprise. I will limit my remarks to the most engaging of the new pieces of scholarship. Gary Hamburg argues that the so-called "state school" of historians, comprised of Kavelin, Solov'ev, and Chicherin, was a mythical concept invented by critics of these particular scholars. The state school was indeed no school at all, in view of the divergent stances on several historical issues in the writings of the assumed members of the "juridical" constellation. In examining the intellectual outlook of Solov'ev, author of the twenty-nine volume History of Russia, Ana Siljak explores the great historian's intertwining beliefs in Christianity, science, and progress. For Solov'ev, faith in historical progress and the scientific method was inspired by belief in a benevolent God and attachment to the Russian Orthodox religion.

Zenon Kohut demonstrates how Ukrainian historiography reflected and was nourished by a Ukrainian cultural and national awakening. The quest for a distinct Ukrainian identity found expression in the efforts of Kostomarov, Antonovych, and Hrushevskyj to document and record a distinct history of Ukraine and its native inhabitants, a people marginalized in the nationalistic narratives of Russian and Polish historiography. Separate essays by Thomas Prymak and Bohdad Klid amplify the scholarly contributions of Kostomarov and Antonovych, in particular the influence of Romantic nationalism, Ukrainian patriotism, and Russian populism on their ethnographic and historical writings.
Benjamin Nathans discusses the origins, growth, and practitioners of Russian Jewish historiography, underscoring the extraordinary challenges facing historians of a stateless people who resided in an ethnically mixed region of Russia, who were territorially and culturally divided from Jewish communities in Western and Central Europe, and who experienced varying degrees of anti-Semitic discrimination and persecution in the late imperial period. The pioneering works of cultural patriot and nation builder Dubnov focused on Jewish communal organizations and institutions as the core of Russian Jewish national consciousness.

The most important and renowned historians treated in this volume — Solov'ev, Kliuchevskii, Miliukov, Platonov, Kizevetter, and Hrushevskyj — shared sundry qualities and characteristics in their scholarly and teaching activities. These included mastery of sources, breadth of vision and intellectual rigor, prolific scholarship, and a lasting impact on the profession through their writings as well as their mentoring of subsequent generations of chroniclers of Russia's historical past. Another similarity that marked their careers was the influence of politics, ranging from tsarist censorship, imperial state-funding, government control of archives, Soviet ideological and political repression to Russocentrism and state restrictions on the expression of cultural and political identity in the writings of Ukrainian and other non-Russian historians. The fate of many historians during the secret-police fabricated "Academic Affair" of 1929-31 — arrest, imprisonment, exile, labor camp incarceration — is a chilling reminder of the precarious position of academics who chose to remain in (or return to) the USSR. Ukrainian scholars in the Russian Empire had to deal with any number of dilemmas and obstacles, above all the reality that the written Ukrainian language was banned until after the 1905 Revolution and the condescending phrase "Little Russia" had to substitute for the forbidden "Ukraine" in historical scholarship.

While individual pieces are stimulating and lucid, the volume as a whole is less than the sum of its parts. Because ten of the twenty-two essays have appeared earlier as journal articles or as parts of books, I am not sure why anyone would want to spend $98.00 for an anthology that includes so many previously published items. Another drawback is that many of the essays overlap in subject matter and content. More careful editing might have eliminated the repetitions and thereby provided space for essays on additional non-Russian historical writing (where is the historical consciousness of Poles, Armenians, Georgians?) or on regional historiography in Siberia, Tver', and Novgorod, locales which were developing a distinct historical writing tradition by 1917. Marc Raeff notes in his thoughtful and cogent conclusion that regional historical studies had little impact on the narrative schemes of Kliuchevskii and other grand synthesizers, which is all the more reason to cover such local endeavors in an anthology on the variety of historical perspectives produced in the Russian Empire.

The most serious weakness of the tome is the absence of conceptual clarity or coherence. The editor writes that he "had no desire to write a 'prequel' to the volume, replete with more or less easily recognizable references to the contents to follow," and that he chose "to discuss in general terms the topography of historical writing and the profession, to provide a general lay of the land to the reader, who can then consult the individual articles for more precise bearings" (12). I am sure readers would not want the redundant prequel he describes, but the editor's amorphous introductory essay does not offer sufficient frame or analysis. A more useful introduction might have elucidated some of
the unifying links, themes, and topics in the disparate pieces, for instance the craft and the politics of history writing, the question of identity in a multinational state, and the relationship between national consciousness and historiography.

These encumbrances should not prevent the volume from reaching a wide readership of graduate students and professional historians of Imperial Russia as well as scholars of the empire's multiethnic cultures and assorted intellectual legacies. As contemporary historians continue to integrate a variety of concepts, resources, and disciplines in their perspectives of Imperial Russia, the works of Solov'ev, Kliuchevskii, Hrushevskyj, and other prominent figures still merit serious attention. This collection of essays not only reminds us of their enduring contributions to the profession and writing of history, but sheds light on their participation in a vibrant community of academic and non-academic scholarship during the imperial era.

Theophilus C. Prousis
University of North Florida


Tom Barrett has produced an important and timely history of the Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier. Important because it shifts our understanding of imperial adventures away from the metropolis to the frontier to allow us to see what imperial dreams actually translated to on the ground. Timely because as Russia launches yet another war into the North Caucasus, it exposes the nationalist myths and stereotypes for the nonsense that they are.

This book takes Russian history into new territory conceptually and empirically. The frontier is at the heart of the book's analysis not as a line on a map but almost as a living organism. With its own geography, ecology, culture and history, the frontier becomes an independent constituent of Russian history, imposing its own logic on all who lived in or sought to have control over it. Drawing on recent scholarship of the American frontier, Barrett concludes that the North Caucasus rather than being the place of confrontation of alien cultures became the point where these cultures collided into each other. Peoples, cultures, religions and goods passed freely through the frontier, blurring and negating what were supposed to be rigid boundaries. The result was a diverse, complicated and animated area that bore little relationship to the hopes of imperial planners in St. Petersburg. Viewed through this prism, Russian imperial expansion becomes a series of encounters, brutal enough at times, in which Russian power and culture is introduced into the North Caucasus. At the same time, the diverse cultures of that frontier leave their own indelible imprint on Russian culture and history.

If the frontier was the zone of interaction, then the Cossacks were the agents of interaction. They were supposed to be the vanguard of the Russian Empire, establishing first military control, then economic dominance and finally transmitting Russian culture and civilization into the conquered areas. The book meticulously and convincingly shows how each of these aims was subverted. The Cossacks themselves were ambiguous agents of imperialism. For the first two centuries of their existence they
were outside of state control, cooperating only sporadically if at all with their imperial masters. By the time the Empire was in a position to exercise more pressure on the Cossacks, it was dealing with a people and way of life that already belonged far more to the North Caucasus than the Russian Empire. The interests of the Cossacks and those of the state were frequently at odds with each other, which added to the unreliability of the Cossacks as instruments of imperialism. Economically, the Cossacks were in no position to dominate the surrounding peoples. Because of the demands of military service, the Cossacks were substantially poorer than their neighbors and relied on them for everything from firewood to firearms. A dependent relationship existed, but not the one intended by St. Petersburg. Far from imposing Russian civilization on the North Caucasus, the Cossacks became the primary route through which elements of the cultures of the North Caucasus entered the mainstream of Russian culture.

As well as being an important contribution to the history of the Russian Empire, this book makes a substantial contribution to the history of the Cossacks. It leaves behind the tired stereotypes of the Cossacks as one-dimensional patriots or romantic warriors. Instead it stresses the social and cultural world of the Cossacks who often had far more in common with their supposed inveterate enemies than the state which they were supposed to serve. Cossack warfare, for example, had little to do with imperial conquest but everything to with honor, booty and revenge. This was exactly as warfare had always been conducted in the North Caucasus. Another stereotype to fall is that of the Cossack as the embodiment of Russian machismo. Unlike rural women in Russia proper but like their Don Cossack sisters, Terek Cossack women possessed real power and authority in their communities, controlling the economy and their men. The Terek Cossacks emerge as a complex, variegated community who lived in an equally complex and variegated environment.

In sum this is a fine book which deserves to be widely read. Its strengths lie not only in its theoretical approach but also in the way this is grounded so solidly in archival evidence and wide secondary reading. This study makes a major contribution to the history of Russian imperialism, the history of the North Caucasus and the history of the Cossacks. Finally, and not least, this is a humane book, demonstrating how peoples of different traditions can exist in a symbiotic and mutually rewarding relationship.

Shane O'Reourke

University of York


Like the many other volumes in the "Cambridge Companion" series, this collection of essays provides an introductory reference tool for students and non-specialists. The Companion to Modern Russian Culture brings together an array of distinguished specialists to provide insight on the complexities and ambiguities of the Russian cultural
experience as well as overviews of the major developments in specific areas of artistic endeavor.

The first part of the book addresses the nuances and evolution of Russian "cultural identity" from the vantage point of language, Russian Orthodoxy, Russia's relationship with Asia and the West, ideology and popular culture. Those not already familiar with the story's main contours or having a background in linguistics will find Dean S. Worth's overview of the history of the Russian language rewarding but difficult. Dmitry Likhachev's essay on Russian Orthodoxy emphasizes the centrality of the spiritual values and commitment to tradition promoted by the non-possessors and adherents of Old Belief to Russian religiosity. Minimizing the problematic relationship between the official church and state authority, Likhachev attributes the European character of Russia to Christianity rather than to Peter the Great, and presents the intelligentsia as the "true representatives of the religious element in culture" (55).

In one of the volume's strongest chapters, Mark Bassin examines the significance of Russia's relationship with Asia. Dissecting the "geo-schizophrenia" that has played such a prominent role in the evolution of Russia's self-consciousness, Bassin looks both at the "tangible historical legacy of social interaction, conquest and defeat, and state building," and "the perceived meaning of these contacts" (58). While Bassin shows how Russia's vision of Asia and Russians' relationship to it has been profoundly ideological, Pierre Hart's discussion of Russia's ambivalence about "the West" emphasizes the philosophical and artistic borrowings that shaped Russian national identity and creative traditions. Abbot Gleason's examination of "ideological structures" traces the dominant intellectual currents that engaged educated Russians from eighteenth-century Pietism and Freemasonry, through the later visions of Slavophiles and Westernizers, to the "village prose" movement in the late Soviet period.

Catriona Kelly's engaging essay on popular culture concludes the first part of the book. After a perceptive discussion of the problems inherent in using the term "popular culture" in the Russian context, Kelly goes on to trace the complex history of Russian popular culture as both a concept and a reality before examining a range of urban cultural forms dating to the turn of the century. Kelly offers cogent insight into the persistent appeal and selective definition of Russian "folklore" (magic tales, epics, laments, lyric songs, and so on), for those who value art as a source of beauty. Acknowledging that the prejudices of educated Russians toward urban popular culture are often justified by the crudity, anarchism and chauvinism of that culture, Kelly also emphasizes that many of Russia's most brilliant artists have been attracted to and inspired by the "roughhewn, ironical and ugly self-presentation" of popular forms.

The second part of the book consists of brief histories of Russian contributions to the arts, emphasizing developments from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Noting the centrality of literature to Russian national identity and cultural mythology, David M. Bethea seeks to provide the analytical and interpretive keys that the non-specialist would need to read and understand modern Russian literature. Building on Lotman's concept of a "semiosphere" that situates all human communication in a cultural ecosystem, Bethea uses the image of a CAT scan to map the psychic tendencies that have most shaped the Russian "literary brain." These formative influences and salient themes include religious sensibility (dukhovnost?), maximalism, the writer as secular saint, heterodox literary forms, belatedness, literature as social consciousness, the problem of personality (lichnost?), space/time oppositions (East/West, old/new)
and the Eros-cum-national myth. The second part of Bethea's chapter provides an overview of major periods, genres and literary figures.

John E. Bowlt charts the evolution of the visual arts from the emergence of critical realism in the 1860s, to the turn-of-the-century avant-garde, the advent and hegemony of Socialist Realism and the emergence and main trajectories of dissident art after Stalin's death. The non-specialist will be well served by this chapter, and by Harlow Robinson's essay on music, which emphasizes the influence of the Orthodox Church and "folk tradition" on the development of Russian art music. Unlike the other chapters in this section, Robinson's survey focuses predominantly on pre-revolutionary trends, with a mere four pages devoted to "the three major composers of the twentieth century" (Stravinsky, Prokofiev and Shostakovich), and one brief paragraph on developments since Stalin's death. Laurence Senelick emphasizes the contributions of Meierkhol'd and Stanivslavskii in his chapter on theater, while Nikita Lary's discussion of film dwells on the accomplishments of the "avant-garde" directors who achieved prominence in the twenties. Both of these chapters also provide good coverage of the post-Stalin and post-Soviet eras.

With its focus on the creative and intellectual traditions of educated Russian elites, the Companion to Modern Russian Culture represents a more traditional and less holistic approach to culture than comparable volumes on Russian culture recently published by Oxford University Press. Readers will find considerable overlap in content and subject matter among the various essays in the volume. This could be an advantage or weakness in the Companion's suitability for undergraduates. Most of the essays emphasize overview and summary, leaving issues of critical interpretation aside. Points of convergence or contradiction between different chapters are unacknowledged in the text, but might be addressed advantageously in the classroom. For example Kelly's perspective on the way that particular types of "folk" creativity have been identified and appropriated could easily be brought to bear on the material presented in chapters dedicated to the individual "arts," including Bowlt's discussion of the activities and orientations of the artists working at Abramtsevo in the late nineteenth century. The volume's value as a reference work is enhanced by a detailed chronology and bibliographies for each chapter. Although the Companion adheres to traditional notions of "art," "culture" and Russian identity, students and non-specialists will find it a useful tool and valuable source for further study.

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William Craft Brumfield. Landmarks of Russian Architecture: A Photographic Survey. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1997. ix, 246 pp., $75.00 cloth; $35.00 paper.

In this small volume Professor Brumfield has combined a broad knowledge of Russian architecture and cogency in description with his artistry as a photographer. The result is a well-documented account of Russian "landmarks" chronologically arranged in historical context.
That this work appears in a series entitled "Documenting the Image" certainly elevates Russian architecture to a select circle, for only English art is so treated in the volumes previously published.

Although it is doubtful that Brumfield treats anything of substance here that did not appear in his monumental *History of Russian Architecture* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), this work does have merit as a handbook for the architecture buff bound for Russia or for one seeking a succinct introduction to the field in a history or an art history course.

In one respect the present work surpasses the older one in organization: it begins with a discussion of wooden architecture instead of having that important topic relegated to the appendix. Otherwise, the book's structure is much the same as that of the *History*. An introductory chapter that surveys the field is followed by a chapter on wooden structures. Succeeding chapters touch upon masonry building in medieval Kiev, Novgorod, and Vladimir; Muscovy through the seventeenth century; and eighteenth-century baroque. Three concluding chapters treat neoclassicism, nineteenth-century eclecticism, and Russia's multifaceted styles of our own century.

This reviewer especially appreciates Brumfield's concise manner for architectural description with appropriate digressions for technique and function. This is evident when he describes "the simplest type of wooden church" that "resembles the basic unit of the peasant house, with its pitched roof and rectangular structure. The plan is linear, along an east-west axis, with one part for the service and another, the trapeza, as a vestibule. Such churches often have two additional components: an apse containing the altar on the east, and a bell tower attached to the west end of the vestibule" (1). In such a manner the author disposes of the basics of Russian wooden architecture used for both habitation and worship.

Not surprisingly, the book's single greatest concentration is on the architecture of individual masonry churches. This focus is justified because such buildings are important in their own right and have survived Russia's wars and weather comparatively well. Monasteries, even fortified ones, are mentioned but sometimes barely more than that. The famous Solovetski, on the Solovki Islands in the White Sea, receives scant attention. Of Russia's citadels only the Moscow Kremlin and the Piatnitskii Gate of the Kolomna kremlin are noted. Brumfield's treatment of provincial architecture since 1700 is minimal compared to the emphasis on Moscow and St. Petersburg. Notable exceptions include the exquisite Zolotarev house (1805-1808) in Kaluga and the commercial arcades and fire tower in Kostroma (1820s).

If the book is intended to appeal to would-be travelers or for use in the classroom, then it could do more than it does. For one thing, it is skimpy on maps. There is only one: a simple line drawing of Central Russia preceding the title page. It would have been immeasurably helpful if maps of Moscow and St. Petersburg and their respective environs had been included. Although architectural line drawings -- plans and elevations -- do appear, they are less frequent than one would wish. Absent are axonometric projections such as those of the Church of the Ascension of Kolomenskoe, Moscow, and the Church of the Archangel Michael and of the Annunciation in the Trading Side, Novgorod, both of which appeared in Brumfield's *History*. The illustrated architectural elements in the appendix are certainly helpful and would have been more so had baroque, classical, and modern styles been similarly treated. A glossary of terms for persons uninformed about Russian architecture would have been a huge bonus as well.

*Albert J. Schmidt*  
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This is, in the author's words, the “story of a story” — a study of the “consciousness” myth that evolved within the radical post-secondary student community, or studenchestvo, in late nineteenth-century Russia. Inspired by rising revolutionary consciousness to make the university “the hearth of democracy” in 1905, student corporate activism then went into a decline and dissolved completely when Communist control was established over higher education following the civil war. The author focuses particular attention on the city of St. Petersburg in two contrasting periods: the triumphant climax of the consciousness narrative in 1905, and its longer, less heroic and more complicated anticlimax. Structurally, the book follows the story of the myth, which is also the story of studenchestvo and how studenchestvo perceived and communicated its identity and mission, from creation in the 1890s to disintegration in the early 1920s.

The author’s method of studying studenchestvo and its ongoing narrative of consciousness is to deconstruct the mythology, examining the disparate elements that shaped it — not only the students themselves, their faculty and administration, but also the larger context of Russian society, government, politics, and culture. She also considers in depth some “deviations and exclusions” from the myth: Women students, for example, a segregated minority that often participated in radical activism in higher proportions than men; and everyday life (byt), as opposed to the ideal life (bytie) of the consciousness narrative. Neither with regard to gender issues nor in their everyday behavior did the male students who by and large constituted studenchestvo shine, most noticeably in the years of the movement’s denouement. Although their ideology acknowledged women’s equality, in reality male students tended to treat women less respectfully, whether the women were auditors (seen as competitors) in the university after 1905 or prostitutes. The students’ much vaunted concept of “honor” was in fact contradicted by their drunken revelries and use of prostitutes.

The strongest, most textually rich and insightful chapters of this work center on the student movement during the revolution of 1905 and its disappointing aftermath. So skillful and compelling is the narrative of the complex developments of 1905-11 that faculty readers may find themselves wondering how they would handle a student body that demanded the power of academic appointment and subsequently criticized liberal professors as “lackeys of the state”! The author argues that students ended their strike in 1905 not because they put academic interests (i.e., graduating) ahead of political goals (the liberation of the country), but because they saw the strike as a “passive” response that was actually harmful to their corporate solidarity. Moving on to the “active” and “collective” forms of revolutionary involvement that they preferred, the students of 1905 “democratized” their universities by organizing political lectures and meetings for private citizens. Yet the author emphasizes that the essentials of studenchestvo transcended political categories, despite the Bolsheviks’ appropriation of the consciousness narrative after 1917. Neither liberal nor socialist, student activism existed somewhere between the two after 1905, rejected by both — by liberals because students chose the methods of disorder, by socialists because students gave priority to academic goals and “civic values.”
Another strength of the book is its commendable use of deconstructionist analysis to interpret the story of studenchestvo, within a theoretical framework that pays tribute to Hayden White, Roland Barthes, and others. In addition to handling this intellectual challenge with confidence and clarity, the author demonstrates a thorough grasp of the complexities of her period and bases her conclusions on a massive array of primary sources. However, the book has a few weaknesses, relatively minor in view of its overall achievement. One is the uneven and sometimes syntactically confusing first chapter on the beginnings of the radical student movement, from the 1860s to the 1890s; the other concerns the author's treatment of primary material. In deconstructing a mythology, it would seem effective to contextualize the variety of sources that employ the myth. A student proclamation issued in the heat of a strike will differ from a later published narrative memorializing that strike, even if both came from the same pen. Also, the period in which a narrative was published (1904, 1922, or 1930) and the political affiliation of the memoirist (Socialist Revolutionary or Bolshevik) are surely matters for consideration.

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Much has happened in Russia, and in Russian culture, since the contributors presented the original versions of these papers at a conference in late 1990. As a result, this volume offers some excellent specific studies, but will leave readers in the post-Soviet era with the sense that some vital questions remain unresolved and/or are improperly posed.

Such reservations have more to do with the nature of Russian studies in America than with individual scholars. As a case in point, ten of the fourteen contributors are professors of literature, although the title of Laboratory of Dreams does not refer to literature. Now that the Russians have — and watch avidly — their own quiz shows, soap operas, and home shopping networks, it is easier to understand the inadequacies of literature studied in isolation from the rest of the culture.

Perhaps that explains why all the essays in the volume that seem unconvincing and/or inappropriate are by professors of literature. Michael Holquist's "Tsiolkovsky as a Moment in the Prehistory of the Avant-Garde" takes the career of rocket pioneer Konstantin Tsiolkovsky as an excuse to launch into an extended meditation on narratology. His debatable conclusion, that science and literature share a need for narrative, finally breaks away from Tsiolkovsky altogether, and seems headed for another volume, where it belongs. Like Holquist, Ronald Vroon and Thomas Scifrid, who contribute essays on the novelists Dmitrii Furmanov and Andrei Platonov respectively, find it difficult to connect their essays to the theme of the volume. After conceding that their subjects did not belong to the avant-garde, they arrive at some not uninteresting conclusions about them. Unfortunately, they follow Soviet criticism in reading back onto the avant-garde the effect of the revolution. In his essay on the unlikely topic of the notorious Soviet biologist Trofim Lysenko and the avant-garde, Boris
Gasparov observes, "Sometimes it seems as if the polemics against the 'formal method' in literature and in biology stood as metaphorical paraphrases of each other" (138). However, Gasparov does not satisfactorily explain what he means. More problematically, he says that one of critic Mikhail Bakhtin's associates, "refuted ... what he called the 'abstract objectivism' of Saussurean linguistics" (139). Gasparov should have said, "rejected," not "refuted"; outside of Russia, where national identity is not so conflicted, linguists still consider Saussure the founder of modern linguistics. It never occurs to Gasparov to ask why a Russian critic would want to refute Saussure, or dismiss his extraordinarily influential work by following the Soviet practice of labelling it an "-ism." This tendency to offer as analysis an account that hardly goes beyond "X said ... and then Y said" vitiated much of American and Soviet Russian studies during the Cold War.

Fortunately, the best papers in Laboratory of Dreams do relate their subjects to a larger context. Some of them make for exciting reading, precisely because the authors do not push their conclusions as far as they might have. One wants to say, "Yes ... and what about this? And what about that?" Yury Tsivian's essay on X-rays persuades this reviewer that they had a widespread cultural impact in Russia. As he says, "Disrobing, unmasking, laying bare was a fixation the avant-garde culture of the 1920s shared with nightmarish fantasies provoked by Röntgen" (99). X-rays seem to have inspired the Formalist critics' key phrase "the baring of the device"; what Tsivian doesn't say is that the empowering effect of X-rays also made Stalin dizzy with success as his need to "unmask" enemies fed on itself.

Similarly, Sarah Pratt's thoughtful, well-documented study of the declaration of principles by Oberiu, a neo-Dada group, persuasively relates it to the Orthodox liturgy. In another excellent paper, Irene Masing-Delic relates several major Soviet artists to the philosophy of eccentric Russian thinker Nikolay Fyodorov. Here again, one wants these sober scholars to push their insightful analyses further, and to articulate the generalization implicit in their work: much of Soviet culture in the 1920s (and long afterward as well!) amounted to a secularization of Orthodox ideas and practices.

Such a generalization would have enriched Olga Matich's "Remaking the Bed: Utopia in Daily Life," an ingenious essay that discusses the avant-garde's concepts and use of the bed. Noting the importance attached to the single bed and celibacy, she traces it to "the intelligentsia's fear of the 'bourgeoisification' of Russian life" (62). Like Gasparov, she doesn't ask an obvious question: What are the cultural origins of this fear? A careful reading of Pratt's essay might have prompted Matich to ask why the Russian avant-garde thought of utopia as a celibate life, rather than sexual license, and to answer that question by conceptualizing much avant-garde culture as a secularization of monastic Orthodox practices. Certainly, Moisei Ginsburg's much-discussed Narkomfin House-Commune (1930), with its controversial cafeteria for group meals, a photograph of which is reproduced here, now seems like nothing so much as a secularized Orthodox monastery, complete with refectory.

To make such an assertion, however, is to fly in the face of generally accepted scholarly practice in America, which emphasizes rupture in cultural evolution — and by no means just in Russian studies. To suggest that much of Soviet culture amounted to a secularization of Orthodox religious practices — no matter what the participants, up to and including Lenin, said — is to emphasize continuity.
Such continuity appears in the essays by Boris Groys ("The Birth of Socialist Realism from the Spirit of the Avant-Garde") and Alexander Zholkovsky ("Eisenstein's Poetics: Dialogical or Totalitarian?"). Groys' essay represents a part of the larger argument presented in his 1992 book *The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond*. Rather than presenting Stalin as the opponent of the avant-garde, Groys makes the opposite argument: "Socialist Realism may be said to be the continuation of the avant-garde's strategy by different means" (196). One can interpret Zholkovsky's innovative essay on Eisenstein's identification with Ivan the Terrible (and beyond him, Stalin himself) as a case study that applies Groys' provocative and productive thesis.

A detailed reading of *Laboratory of Dreams* suggests that Russian studies in America needs to lay greater emphasis on integrating and conceptualizing the meaning of artifacts and practitioners' statements about them. Such a procedure would involve integrating Russian culture after 1917 with Russian culture before 1917 (as Masing-Delic and other contributors do), and ignoring revolutionary rhetoric, with its proliferation of abstract nouns. It would also involve an integration of Russian culture with Western culture, as in Groys' statement, "Socialist Realism is just one of the ways in which world art in the 1930s and 1940s reverted to the figurative style after the period of the relative dominance of avant-garde trends" (194). Thus, one might consider the Moscow Hotel in Moscow the Soviet version of Art Deco, and treat Soviet monumental propaganda in the context of the Mexico muralists such as Diego Rivera. Although Russian studies in this country may not yet be ready to take such bold steps, the best essays in *Laboratory of Dreams* anticipate them.

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The idea systems of Freud and Marx seemed earlier in this century to be in direct opposition to one another and therefore impossible to reconcile the one finding its great explanatory principle in the individual, the other in the laws of social development. At the height of the Stalinist witchhunts, this dichotomy was institutionalized in the denunciation and persecution of any sign of commitment to psychoanalytic ideas. Such ideas were labeled as the product of decadent Western culture, anti-proletarian, idealist, and therefore absolutely forbidden to Soviet psychological theorists or psychiatric practitioners. The supposedly purely materialistic approach of Ivan Pavlov became the only officially tolerated line in psychology. This ban was projected backward to the earliest period of Bolshevik control and continued officially in effect through the last days of Communism.

Historians of the Soviet period in general, and of Soviet science in particular, such as Loren Graham and David Joravsky, have certainly been aware that Freudian ideas were part of the rich debates of the 1920s, and that they have recently reappeared. Yet many details of the story have been inaccessible.
The recent opening of the archives along with the end of government thought control has made it possible to tell this complex story much more fully. Martin Miller's admirably concise and authoritative tracing of the fortunes of Freudian and other psychoanalytic schools from their beginnings in the pre-World War I era through the changes of the 1980s does much to set the record straight, in several cases bringing new archival evidence to bear.

The resulting book fills in an important aspect of twentieth century Russian history, and also should go far to correct what Miller sees as the almost total neglect among the main historians of psychoanalysis of Russian participation in that enterprise. Given the course of twentieth century Russian history, the story told here is necessarily one of major discontinuities and many promising beginnings unfulfilled.

Miller begins with a chapter reviewing the development of psychiatry in Russia up to the end of the nineteenth century. He then sketches in some detail the activities of the handful of individuals who constituted the "movement" in its earliest beginnings. Early translations of Freudian works (1904), formation of a psychoanalytic society and publication of a journal (1909), and visits to Vienna or to Jung in Switzerland, training analyses, and referral of patients to Freud (the "Wolf Man") resulted in the Russian group by 1914, according to Miller, having reached the point of offering treatment and becoming a center for promulgation of the new ideas, as well as contributing to the ongoing development of theory. Nicholas Osipov, the leading figure in this group, made the pilgrimage to Vienna in 1910 to work with Freud. Several warmly encouraging letters to him from Freud are published here for the first time in an appendix. Others members of the group included Tatiana Rosenthal, its only Bolshevik sympathizer, Sabina Spielrein, who worked with and had an affair with Jung, N. A. Vryubov, Professor of Medicine at Moscow University, Moshe Wulff, O. B. Fel'tsmann, and F. Berg.

These promising beginnings were disrupted by World War I and the events of 1917-1921. However, in the period 1921-1923, several of its members reemerged to reform the Russian Psychoanalytic Society, which then became the country's first Institute for Psychoanalysis. With conditional approval from Freud's Institute, it could now offer psychoanalytic training. It had the dual distinction of being one of only three such Institutes, the others being in Vienna and Berlin, and also the only one ever to be supported by the state, including financially, as shown by new archival evidence of support from the highest party leaders. One of its major efforts was a school for disturbed children run on psychoanalytic principles, at which, it has been reported, Stalin's son Vasily was a pupil. An extensive program of publication was also planned and begun. Both the school and the other plans were cut short by growing opposition, based on philosophical objections to Freud's ideas as opposed to those of Marx, objections to the perceived emphasis on sexual freedom, and to the school's failure to be sufficiently proletarian. As in other areas in the mid-1920s, there were vigorous debates and discussions attempting to reconcile contrary positions, which were only cut off in the 1930s, when formulaic adherence to Pavlov as the model of psychological science was rigidly enforced. This policy was maintained for more than two decades. During this period, a number of adherents of the banned belief lost their positions and sometimes their lives, but many bent to the wind and continued to practice or to write in areas less problematic or mouthed the prevailing orthodoxy. It became clear, how-
ever, when a measure of freedom of discussion returned, that Freud's ideas had not been eradicated. In some cases ideas such as the unconscious were reintroduced under other terminology and presented as native Russian contributions. Among these the ideas of Lev Vygotsky, his follower Alexander Luria, and the Georgian Dmitri Uznadze, have received considerable recognition in the west also. Some clinicians reported that they had always found some of Freud's approaches necessary in their clinical work.

During the height of the Stalinist repression, Freud's work could not be discussed even to be criticized but, with the post-Stalinist Thaw, discussion under the guise of criticism once more became possible. And with the coming of glasnost' in the 1980s, rich discussion bringing in recent developments from the outside world once again flourished.

Miller has threaded his way through an extremely complex subject in a mere 168 pages of text, keeping a clear focus on the innovative parts of his factual narrative and briefly but effectively summarizing the rich intellectual discourse which was involved at a number of periods, especially pre-1914, throughout the 1920s, and in the post-Stalinist period. Necessarily, much is covered less than fully, but this work will remain a key source and reference point for anyone focussing on either the history of psychoanalytic thought and practice or the history of psychological thought in twentieth century Russia and the Soviet Union.

Beverly S. Almgren


This volume belongs to the genre "collected articles from a scholarly conference," in this case, a conference on Russian religious thought held in Madison in 1993. Often in such volumes the high energy, spontaneity and passion of the event are drained out in the printed version. Russian Religious Thought, however, is a fortunate exception to this rule. Here the ideological antagonisms, conflicts and vigor have been kept aflame by the editors, who, instead of seeking unanimity and resolution - in keeping with the spirit of Russian thought - have opted for freedom and self-expression.

The articles reflect a fissure among American academics concerning the productive sources of Russian philosophy of the end of the last century and the first half of this century: is it the Russian Orthodox tradition or Western philosophy which inspires and nourishes Russian philosophy? On the one side, we find the work of Richard Gustafson, who connects Vladimir Solov'ev to Eastern Orthodox dogma. Professor Gustafson writes, "Origen, the first systematic Christian theologian and coiner of the term 'Godman,' created the first metaphysical theory of Creation and Redemption in the Christian tradition, a theory that served as a model for Solov'ev in the Lectures on Godmanhood" (33). On the other side, we have Philip Swoboda's article on the philosopher Semen Frank, in which Swoboda claims that Frank ultimately did not embrace Christian dogma in its entirety, since he favored "the pretensions of specula-
tive philosophy to offer an independent witness to man's potential for divinization" (246).

The opposition, Western philosophy versus Orthodoxy, is crucial for understanding the meaning and goals of Russian thought of this period. As Professor Swoboda puts it, "[The opposition] has a direct bearing on the question of the unity of the religious-philosophical movement in twentieth-century Russia, and on the kindred question of this movement's ultimate sources of inspiration" (235). All the essays in one way or another deal with the issues of influence, Quellenforschung. The issues of East and West, Slavophile-Westernizer, Orthodoxy versus secular philosophy, however, have variable subtleties which complicate the subject, preventing any final resolution. This volume succeeds in bringing out paradoxes, contradictions and complexities.

How can one reconcile the three articles about Vladimir Solov'ev? In contrast to Professor Gustafson, Judith Komblatt roundly ignores Orthodox sources, convincingly demonstrating that Solov'ev in his "Short Story of the Antichrist" created a "clever examples of self-parody, instead of self-negation" and that he did not suddenly abandon his former faith in human cooperation in our own salvation" (70). In contextualizing her position, Professor Komblatt links Solov'ev with Russian poets adept in the use of irony, such as Pushkin and A. K. Tolstoi, and with the parodic intentions embodied in the dialogues of Plato. Similarly, Maria Carlson battles against both Professors Komblatt and Gustafson in her piece, "Gnostic Elements in the Cosmogony of Vladimir Solov'ev," where she claims that Solov'ev's work reflects first and foremost his belief in gnosticism. Solov'ev, she explains, was "by no means the first intellectual to be seduced by the poetry of the gnostic cosmogony, by the concept of the primacy of Sophia Wisdom over the Creation, or by the psychic power of gnostic imagery and mythology" (50). These examples point to genuine disagreements. Nevertheless, the passion and vigor of these articles have the effect of drawing the reader vicariously to experience the intellectual excitement which was inevitably present at the original conference.

While Professor Swoboda has a comrade in arms in George Kline, who points to the parallels between Semen Frank's thought and that of Hegel, Professor Gustafson is joined by the first-rate articles of Robert Slesinski, Michael Meerson and Bernice Glazer Rosenthal. The latter point to the multifaceted and mutating relationships between modern Russian thought and Orthodoxy. Additional support paradoxically also comes from Professor David Bethea, who indicates the dissimilarity of Pavel Florenskii's thought from the Catholic religious tradition. Relying on the ideas of Iurii Lotman and Boris Uspenskii, Professor Bethea juxtaposes Florenskii with Dante in their view of salvation, discovering that Florenskii exactly lacks the "middle ground over which one makes one's way to the destination of salvation/revelation" (120). The absence of this middle space, a space which is neither all sacred or entirely profane, denies for Florenskii the value of freedom, love or openness, which are so important to Dante. Professor Bethea, not wanting "to suggest that Dante's Catholic vision of revelation is superior to Florenskii's Orthodox [views]," does assert the "somewhat startling fact that Dante is already, even in the early fourteenth century, deeply humanist, while Florenskii . . . is rather anti- (or perhaps better, 'otherly'?) humanist" (126). One wishes that this open challenge to Florenskii and by analogy the entire Orthodox tradition would have been answered somehow in the volume.
Another instance of unpredictable, unresolvable complexity can be found in Paul Valliere's article, "Sophiology as the Dialogue of Orthodoxy with Modern Civilization." Professor Valliere has long been promulgating the solitary view that modern Russian philosophy is genetically related to Western liberal theology, and that Solov'ev and Sergei Bulgakov can be best understood by the attempt to embrace modernity with the apparatus of Orthodox dogma. "In a theological context liberal Orthodoxy refers to the work of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian Orthodox thinkers who sought a mutually productive synthesis of Orthodox theology and modern thought -- a synthesis of dogma and freedom, Christian faith and modern 'creativity,' ecclesiastical tradition and contemporary culture" (178). Professor Valliere presents Sophia functionally as the mechanism by which humanity freely participates in the work of salvation, "elaborating positive religious ideals" (190). Sophiology implies that dogma is unfixed and mutates, just as the world-process is forever in flux. "A sophiology that is true to itself, a constructive sophiology, will be forever in process" (190). In this connection, Valliere translates Bogochelovechestvo not as "Godmanhood," not as "the synthesis of commensurate or complementary entities," but as "the humanity of God," thus asserting that God condescends to the human condition," since "humanity can never reach God" (191).

These views inevitably spark controversy. Why is Sophia important if the final resolution of world history ultimately relies entirely on divine condescension? Does humanity have an active role to play in the drama of salvation? If not, even Valliere's position that dogma is unfinished and capable of being modified cannot console a humanity which is ultimately condemned to wait. In this instance, Sophia perhaps merely aids us in interpreting the place where "dogma meets experience, Church meets world, Christianity meets culture, Orthodoxy meets modernity" (190). Needless to say, the tricky issue of Sophia, which has been interpreted in turn as the feminine element in the divine, as the fourth hypostasis and as the mother of God, is not fully resolved by Valliere's very creative perspective.

A more fully satisfying interpretation of Sophia is offered by Bernice Rosenthal, who claims that "Bulgakov regarded Sophia as the living link between God, man, and nature; she is that which endows the created world with divine force, gathers chaos into cosmos, and forms an organic, living whole. . . . Through her, the wholeness of creation shattered by the Fall will be restored at the end of history, when the heavenly Sophia and the earthly Sophia will be reunited with one another, and with the Logos, Jesus Christ in a new heaven and a new earth" (155). From this article, a remarkably clear extrapolation of Bulgakov's views, one grasps Bulgakov's world-historical, maximalistic function for Sophia. In addition, one also understands why Bulgakov has been accused of heresy and unacceptable innovation in his interpretations of Orthodox dogma.

The volume, one should note, contains an introduction and afterword and featured twelve scholarly articles, three in each of four sections, which are devoted exclusively to studies of Vladimir Solov'ev, Pavel Florenskii, Sergei Bulgakov and Semen Frank. In their introduction, the editors admit that they have excluded Lev Shestov, Nikolai Berdiaev, Vasilii Rozanov, and many others, holding that "their views do not flow as consistently from those of their nineteenth-century mentor, Solov'ev" (5). I would argue that, exactly by excluding those voices that do not flow from Solov'ev, one gives
the impression of thematic unity, of a small circle of pertinent issues, which Russian philosophy did not possess. Having made that single caveat, I strongly recommend this stimulating and valuable book to scholars and readers.

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In 1971 the Presses Universitaires de France published Michèle Beyssac's La vie culturelle de l'émigration russe en France. Chronique (1920-1930). Although this chronicle was welcomed and often cited by researchers in the field of the history of the Russian emigration, it was never enhanced, nor followed up in other countries. On the one hand, this was partly due to the hard, long and dull labor such a chronicle inevitably brings to the author. On the other hand, such work does not seem to enjoy the general support of the scientific establishment. Chronicles, like bibliographies, are often regarded as simply a work of compilation that can easily be handed over to a secretary, and this is certainly the case when those chronicles concern the twentieth century. Moreover, a chronicle of the Russian emigration definitely does not fit in with the interests of national historiography: the phenomenon goes beyond the geographical borders of a given country, draws too much attention to an important, but politically unpopular issue in twentieth century history (refugees), and focuses on an émigré community that deeply influenced cultural life in the West and thereby undermined the egotism of the West.

It took twenty years and the fall of the Soviet Empire before things started to change. Both in Russia and the West the Russian emigration has been rediscovered as a source of cultural and spiritual revival. In the last few years the harvest of studies on the subject and appropriate resource tools has been immense. One of the latest fruits is the Chronik russischen Lebens in Deutschland 1918-1941, compiled by Karl Schlögel and his collaborators. This impressive and beautifully edited chronicle looks like a German response to the four volumes of the French L'émigration russe. Chronique de la vie scientifique, culturelle et sociale en France 1920-1940 (Paris-Moscow, 1995-97), but in fact it is not. The German research group was conscious of the ongoing work elsewhere. Apart from the French chronicle, the Russian journal Rossiiskii literaturovedcheskii zhurnal published chronicles of the Russian emigration in both France and Germany, and the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences published Istoricheskaia nauka rossiiskoi emigratsii 20-30-x gg. XX veka (Khronika) in 1998. However, the German group definitely went its own way. Unlike the French and Russians, who had their contributions published in Russian, and notwithstanding the fact that Beyssac's initial publication served as a model, the Germans preferred to write their chronicle in German. No doubt, this choice will reduce the number of potential users of this chronicle and it is actually at odds with the editors' statement that the Russian diaspora should be considered "als ein nicht nationales, sondern internationales Phänomen" (11). Fortunately the editors have stuck to this programmatic idea while compiling their volume. The introduction reflects the editors' awareness of what was published in the past and what research
tors' awareness of what was published in the past and what research has been conducted outside Germany (the French, who saved their introduction for their last volume, definitely lack this 'Grundlichkeit'). Reading this introduction, however, one is struck by some (minor) omissions: Gleb Struve's *Russkaia literatura v izgnanii* has already seen its third edition (Moscow, 1996); by the time this *Chronik* was published, the French *Chronique* had already been completed; and Johannes Baur's dissertation on *Die russische Kolonie in München 1900-1945* was published in 1998. In this last case, as for other publications that appeared in the second half of 1998, one has to be indulgent. The editors point out the technical and practical problems they met (and they are even economical on this point compared with the French, who devote their entire 'introduction' to these problems), and some delay between writing the 'Einleitung' and the actual production of the book seems normal and fully understandable.

The information offered in this volume and spread over more than 670 pages is impressive. Apart from the 8,109 entries on meetings and other things that have to do with the cultural and political life of the Russian emigrants in Germany (mostly Berlin), the present volume also contains a survey of the *Russische Verlage und Druckereien in Berlin 1918-1941* (501-69), an enhanced and updated version of Gottfried Kratz's 1987 contribution (Thomas R. Beyer, Gottfried Kratz & Xenia Werner, *Russische Autoren und Verlage in Berlin nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* [Berlin, 1987]). It includes extensive comments on and numerous bibliographical references to publishing houses. It is a pity, however, that this list should be confined to Berlin alone. And it is an even greater pity that the different indexes at the end of the present volume do not cover this part of the book! Unless you know the publishing house you are looking for, or unless you are prepared to read this list completely through, Kratz's work serves no purpose. And why is it that the name index contains some pseudonyms (Sirin-Nabokov), but not all of them (Gor'kii-Peshkov; Chatskii-Strakhovskii)? This again causes considerable problems, unless, of course, you are already completely familiar with the subject you are investigating.

This *Chronik* is definitely meant for an audience of scholars who have already acquired a considerable knowledge of the history of the Russian emigration. Karl Schlögel even proposes a possible approach to the subject: apart from his conviction that the emigration should be considered an international phenomenon; he suggests using his chronicle to conduct inquiries into the networking capacities of Russian émigrés. On the one hand, this complies with the studies Schlögel himself did in the past (*Die grosse Exodus. Die russische Emigration und ihre Zentren 1917 bis 1941* [München, 1994]); on the other hand it follows current trends in the fields of social sciences and cultural history. Taking at heart Schlögel's suggestion, one may wonder how both the French and German chronicles may serve this purpose. First of all, a thorough comparison of the name and organization indexes will reveal which structures and individuals were at work in both countries. This may tell interesting facts about the mobility of Russian emigrants, the popularity of certain people, and so on. The comparison of both chronicles definitely throws a light on the relation between the Russian colonies in France and Germany, but immediately brings to the surface new problems. The mere existence of both chronicles suggests the need to compile similar chronicles for other countries, so as to establish the Russian emigration as a really international phenomenon. In addition to this, one may wonder whether
Schlögel's choice (and that of the French team) not to include Soviet or pro-Soviet meetings in his chronicle, does not undermine his initial research proposal. The number of defectors among Russian émigrés in Germany was considerable, as was the number of organizations that at a certain time were hovering between capitalism and communism (e.g., the Smenovekhovstvo-Movement).

These remarks, however, cannot impair the importance of Schlögel's Chronik, and are not meant as such. They merely confirm the complexity of the task the editors faced. Moreover, in proposing a methodological approach of their subject and thereby risking the whims of a disagreeable reviewer (which I am not), the editors of the German Chronik have shown more courage than their French colleagues, who confined themselves to a Chronique tout court. This volume will unquestionably last and be one of the cornerstones of the historiography of the Russian emigration.

Wim Coudenys


Students of the Soviet 1920s and the history of economic thought will find this book helpful. Its contribution lies in providing the first detailed treatment of the intellectual development and policy impact of N. D. Kondrat'ev (1892-1938). Kondrat'ev spent the core of his tragically short life attempting to make the New Economic Policy — especially as manifested in agriculture and foreign trade — serve as a vehicle for the development of a socialist society. Rather than the brief discussions of Kondrat'ev's intellectual work and policy advisement activities (such as one finds in the works of N. K. Figurovskaia, V. V. Simonov and Naum Jasny) this book makes a concerted attempt to: a) show how Kondrat'ev and his colleagues at the Conjuncture Institute "contributed to the development of long-cycle analysis" (5) and; b) demonstrate that this group of economists offered "a real but neglected alternative" to the Stalinist model of industrialization (13). It is a portrait of NEP policy formation not from the floor of the Central Committee plenum, but from the closer spaces of the conference rooms where experts with varying backgrounds attempted to repair the damage of war and forge ahead into the future.

The third and sixth chapters lay out the heart of the argument (readers especially interested in Kondrat'ev's formulation of the long-cycle theory should take note of chapter five). In these chapters, the book does three things. First, it establishes the degree of influence that Kondrat'ev had in policy circles. The book demonstrates that his influence on policy (within the People's Commissariates of Finance and Agriculture and through L. B. Krasin) peaked between 1923 and 1926. The outcome of the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925 marked the beginning of its decline. Second, the book evaluates this influence by examining several policy issues in which Kondrat'ev played a major role, especially his participation in a number of special commissions on peasant tax policy, peasant farms, and grain exports. It also (in chapter six) examines his conception of the role planning should play in economic development.
Kondrat'ev believed in basing development strategy on the optimization of two things: the strengths of regional and developmental differences in the Soviet economy and the intake of investment capital through foreign trade. He argued that the Soviet Union could accomplish the latter by virtue of its comparative advantage in the production of certain goods — especially if careful expert observation of market trends helped identify the commodities with the greatest potential. State policy should aim at encouraging these things with the instruments at its disposal, namely tax incentives and the advancement or restriction of credit. Planning was to consist not in development by decree, but in the selective use of these tools. In every case, policy was to be based on an assessment of past and current economic trends. Kondrat'ev "favored neither collectivization nor the status quo," and he never advocated allowing the economy to develop "spontaneously" (167). Instead, he envisioned the socialist path of development as one in which the socialist state, guided by the experts of the Conjuncture Institute, used policies to gain the maximum advantage from various conjunctures.

The book lays out this "third path" and illustrates the clash between Kondrat'ev and the denizens of Gosplan. As an intellectual biography it also integrates Kondrat'ev's thought into the general intellectual milieu of the period, spending a substantial amount of time connecting Kondrat'ev's work with economists such as Wesley Mitchell, R.G. Hawtrey and others. There are several points where the book might have situated Kondrat'ev's empirical work within Russia's own tradition. The book carefully explains the similarities and differences in theoretical outlook between Kondrat'ev and his teacher, M. I. Tugan-Baranovskii. Yet, there were clearly times when he and other economists were making assumptions and fighting the same battles that had occupied students of Russia's rural economy for a generation. For example, one notices in Kondrat'ev's emphasis on raionnost' something akin to zemstvo statisticians' preoccupation with the need to consider regional peculiarities in the evaluation and use of data. Questions about how to measure the peasant economy for taxation — whether to count horses, cattle, or sown area — also hearken back to a tradition of investigation that could not have been unfamiliar to Kondrat'ev (67-68). More discussion of Kondrat'ev's early development, at the expense of the discussion of his trip overseas, would be helpful. Finally, a larger window into the activities of the Conjuncture Institute itself — its practical and theoretical pursuits — would not only shed more light on Kondrat'ev himself, but also on how the institute as a whole contributed to policy formation.

One wishes that the publisher had taken more care in the preparation of the manuscript. The number of typographical and other errors (e.g., the chapter heading at the top of pages 179-87 belongs to the previous chapter), is excessive, especially for a book that sells for $80.00. The content of the book, however, is to be commended for tracing the influence of one of this century's most inspiring economic thinkers.

David Darrow
University of Dayton
Students of Russian history should be aware of the centrality of science in twentieth century Russian culture, a role comparable in importance only to that played by classical literature during the preceding century. A relatively young academic discipline of science studies, however, has not been paying sufficient attention to serious lessons that can be derived from the phenomenon of Russian, and especially Soviet, science and technology. Loren Graham in his new book sets out to repair the field’s oversight.

The main debate currently raging among science analysts deals with the issue of whether scientific results and theories are independent from society or affected by it. Precisely the fact that Soviet science developed in a sharply different social and political environment, while achieving an advanced level that rivaled that of the United States, makes it the best available test case for a comparative study, at least if one looks at the twentieth century. The extreme and often seemingly paradoxical Russian experiences can offer revealing evidence and insights on the discipline’s most fundamental questions, yet the task also requires a departure from some deeply ingrained Cold War ideological stereotypes. The book’s chapter titles effectively summarize the main problems discussed by Graham: “Is science a social construction?” “Are science and technology westernizing influences?” “How robust is science under stress [political and economic pressure]?” “How willing are scientists to reform their institutions?” “Who should control technology?”

Arguing against some widely held prejudices, Graham shows that many venerable Soviet scientists were influenced — sometimes all the way down to the core of scientific work — by their sincerely accepted Marxist views, in particular the philosophy of dialectical materialism. However, he does not subscribe in full to the now fashionable motto, “science is a social construction,” pointing out that science manages to transcend political and social boundaries of its local origin. Some of the peculiarly Soviet scientific claims, in particular the infamous Lysenko doctrine, were ultimately abandoned within their own social context in favor of other approaches borrowed from the West, while some other works inspired by Marxism, such as Lev Vygotskii’s psychological theories, gained widespread acceptance in the United States, although in an ideologically censored form.

From the fact that Soviet science achieved its arguably greatest successes during the worst years of Stalinist dictatorship but was decimated during the last decade’s democracy by the withdrawal of state support, Graham concludes that money is more important for the development of science than freedom. In contrast to rapidly changing scientific theories, social institutions of science are by far among the most conservative parts of modern societies. In the Russian case, changes in the system of scientific institutions were usually delayed and far less abrupt than the notoriously extreme zigzags of political history. One thus should not be ultimately surprised, as Graham shows, that of all the post-communist institutions, the Russian Academy of Sciences has managed to survive so far as the closest replica of its Soviet predecessor, even if deprived of a large part of its prestige and finances.
The book's last chapter shows that technological megaprojects flourished with mutual reassurance in both the United States and the Soviet Union during the larger part of the century, yet hardly anywhere had technocratic thought come to dominate social decision making as thoroughly as in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, where Politburo members were typically engineers rather than lawyers by training. The appeal of "scientific management" of nature and society eroded since the 1960s along with the appeal of the Soviet system, yet it is still represented by the Three Gorges Dam, the major project in contemporary China. American construction planners have meanwhile been learning ways to coopt the public into their projects and to manage public opinion along with nature.

A comparative analysis of Russian science and technology, concludes Graham, is thus ultimately not only about Russia but also about America. The book raises some very important questions for Russian history as well as for science studies and hopefully will help to reshape the discourse in both fields.

Alexei Kojevnikov


Deconstructing Russian identity by dispelling myths about Russian music and composers, Richard Taruskin's *Defining Russia Musically* represents an engrossing and eminently readable work that defies easy categorization. A well-known musicologist and professor of music, Taruskin has produced in this volume not only a fascinating study of the development of Russian art music, but also a deeply captivating story concerning the creation of Russian identity through music, against the backdrop of literature, politics and history. The result is an intelligent, witty and well-written foray into Russian culture which reads like a novel that you hate to see come to an end.

Since the book's fourteen chapters cover assorted topics, spanning over three centuries, Taruskin begins with a detailed explanation of the book's unifying principle: what he calls "the myth of otherness." He writes that Russian art music has always been "tinged or tainted ... with an air of alterity" (xiv). Outsiders have always mocked and derided Russian music, rarely considering it on par with their own, in part because of its late start. "Only since the 1770s at the earliest had there even been such a thing as a Russian who worked professionally at music as a European fine art" (xii). Likewise, Russian musicians and composers also considered themselves "different" as a result of their feelings of either inferiority or moral superiority. Consequently, Taruskin argues, Russian national identity has long been constructed on this sense of "otherness," built from perspectives both from within and from outside. He insists "that as scholars we treat otherness not as immutable or essential fact but as myth ... as an operational fiction or assumption that unless critically examined runs a high risk of tendentious abuse" (xxix). It is precisely for such critical examination that Taruskin boldly combines close textual readings and hermeneutics in order to develop a more accurate image of Russian identity through music.

Part one, entitled "Defining Russia Musically," consists of seven short chapters that explain how, why, and in what historical and musical contexts Russian national-
ity, national consciousness, and national character developed. These delightful essays explore a variety of intriguing subjects including N. A. Lvov’s "Collection of Russian Folk Songs with Their Tunes" from 1790, the "official nationalism" of M. I. Glinka’s first opera, A Life for the Tsar, music as ironic narrator in P. I. Chaikovskii’s operatic version of Pushkin’s Evgenii Onegin, Musorgskii’s interpretation of the Holy Fool in Boris Godunov, Soviet musical tendencies as traced back to the stylistic conformity of the nineteenth-century Beliaev school, and the "polystylistic" manner of Alfred Schnittke, Shostakovich’s musical "heir and torchbearer." In all of these essays Taruskin thoroughly grounds his detailed technical analysis of the music in supporting historical information, consistently arguing convincingly against generally accepted conventions about Russian identity. Although disparate in topic, this section provides a wealth of interesting information and unique perspectives for both slavist and musicologist alike.

The next three chapters make up part two, "Self and Other," which takes up Russia’s age-old problem of trying to define herself as either Eastern or Western through her sense of self and others’ perception of her. These chapters trace Russia’s attempt to define herself musically against "the West" of both Italy and Germany. "German music was all dukh, brains without beauty; Italian music was all chuvstvennost’, beauty without brains." According to Taruskin, Glinka wanted Russian music to be both (67). And although to Western Europe Russian represented "the East," to Russia "East" was to be found in the exoticism and sexual passion of the Caucasus. Thus, Taruskin warns that "what is 'Russian' — hence, too, what is 'Western' and what is 'Eastern' — can be more reliably gauged on the basis of reception than on the basis of provenance or original intent" (105).

In the final and longest section of the book, "Hermeneutics of Russian Music: Four Cruxes," Taruskin turns his attention to individual composers: Chaikovskii, Scriabin, Stravinskii, and Shostakovich. By devoting a lengthy, separate chapter to each one, Taruskin allows himself room to develop more fully his interpretations of characteristics found in each composer that he views as specifically Russian and unique to the era. Discussing these four against the backdrop of the particular historical circumstances in Russia at the time allows Taruskin to better define these composers as individuals rather than as members of a homogeneous group. These chapters show Taruskin at his best, as an original thinker, who skillfully writes both for the specialist as well as the generalist.

Despite the close musical analysis, replete with technical jargon that can get a tad heavy at times for the non-specialist, this multifaceted book remains generally accessible to a wide audience and should be useful to anyone interested in a well-balanced and thoughtfully argued text by a musical scholar who is clearly at home in Russia. Indeed, it is refreshing to find an erudite and challenging text that truly aims to clarify and explicate rather than obfuscate and which demonstrates such depth of understanding of Russian society and culture. By deconstructing the myths of the center, Taruskin reminds us — no matter what our field of specialization — of the dangers of generalization, simplification, and mythologizing.

Erika Haber

Syracuse University

One of the most difficult tasks for a historian must be writing a textbook that will be received well by scholars and students. In essence, we educators want to assign textbooks that we will never write ourselves. Chris Ward, however, has given us something much more that the standard survey study of Stalin and his regime. This volume of the *Reading History* series gives us the opportunity not only to reveal the "facts" of the Stalin period, but also to teach how historians interpret these "facts" to create history.

Chris Ward's ability to synthesize the most important aspects of the Stalin era is impressive, but not the chief strength of this work. The format of *Stalin's Russia* lends itself well to the undergraduate classroom. Ward has divided each chapter, based on a theme (e.g., industrialization, collectivization, foreign policy, culture and society), into three discreet, yet interconnected parts: "narrative," "interpretations," and "evaluations". In the narrative section we find the "facts" of history: what happened when and by whom. Although a recitation of factual history can be frustrating for the alert reader because of its lack of analysis, Ward more than makes up for it in the "interpretations" sections. Here he provides a detailed analysis of historiographical debates with subsections for each major "school". In the "evaluations" sections Ward either provides the reader with his opinion on the debate or tries to adjudicate between competing interpretations. Each chapter is then concluded with a brief (and sometimes too much so) list of suggested readings. Although far from comprehensive (yet how can one be when limited by the size of a textbook), his discussion of the issues and how various historians have approached them and interpreted the past provides an invaluable lesson for students. Historians create history; it is not merely a recitation of things past. This textbook allows for the teaching of history (the "facts") as well as the historian's craft. Had this been a full list of the book's merits it would have been sufficient, but Ward has added maps, a glossary that deciphers the alphabet soup that is "Soviet-speak", and copious footnotes to elaborate on events, provide biographical information, and track historiographical debates.

Ward's skill as a scholar and writer is clearest in his even-handed discussion of purge historiography. In addition to providing a successful survey of the literature from Soviet to totalitarian to revisionist, Ward urges his readers to look carefully at all sources in order to avoid both totalitarian anecdotal history gathered from Russian émigrés and the uncritical acceptance of Soviet newspapers and published party documents that sometimes plagues revisionism. However, in the same chapter in a subsection entitled "The culture of terror", Ward suggests that the purge mentality developed from the recently escaped "medieval political economy" and a world of demons, spirits, and magic. While trying to show that pre-revolutionary culture and the superstition of village life conditioned much of what we consider "Soviet" — a recommendation that we should all heed — Ward posits that Russia in the 1930s (which he compares to fourteenth-century England) was not equipped to deal with a world that was not black and white. Therefore, conspiracy theories and plots, he argues, spread like ancient tales of cabals and bewitching. In a chapter so brilliantly constructed around a diverse body of history, Ward would have done better to avoid the
language of "backwardness" and rather cite recent scholarship on the social implications of rapid urbanization by David Hoffmann, Moshe Lewin, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stephen Kotkin, and others.

While it is unfair for the reviewer of what is essentially a magnificent textbook to criticize the author for minor omissions, there are a few themes that could be expanded for the third edition. The present volume has included a complex, yet much needed, chapter on interwar foreign policy, but Ward, and nearly all textbooks on Soviet Russia, give short shrift to social and cultural events. Much of the blame must be placed on the profession, which has yet to investigate these elements of Russian history fully; Chris Ward cannot summarize a body of literature that is scant. For example, the chapter entitled "Culture and Society, 1928-1953" provides narratives on education, religion and ethnicity, law, social policy, science, the arts, and the Zhdanovshchina; an elaboration of three historiographical interpretations; and an evaluation of the period in seven subsections. These topics so important to our understanding of Russians and their lives are developed in a mere thirty-five pages.

The few minor distractions in Chris Ward's magnificent book should not deter all of us from making it required reading in our Modern Russian History courses. We have here the best textbook available in English for the Stalin period. Chris Ward and the editors of the Reading History series should be commended for leading the way, and all historians writing textbooks would do well to learn from this seminal piece.

Karl D. Qualls

University of Missouri


This new book by Sheila Fitzpatrick is an outstanding contribution to the existing body of research into the Soviet past. Extensive use of archival material, combined with a wide range of published sources, and highlighted by references to the contemporary press cuttings, reveal an absorbing picture of everyday life under Stalinism. Against a rich variety of locations that stretched from workers' barracks and communal kitchens to the apartments of senior officials and closed access stores, there unfolds before our eyes an impressive array of characters. Bosses and outcasts, patrons and clients, activists and absconding husbands, elite wives and homeless children, are depicted in a multitude of activities and relationships that characterized the turbulent life of 1930s Russia.

As the pervasiveness of the state was a defining feature of Soviet life, the book starts with an overview of the system, including not only a description of institutions and practices of the Stalinist regime, but also the Communist Party's self-conception, attitudes, and rituals, as well as its uneasy relationship with its own administrative apparatus. It is against this background that shortages, overcrowding, patronage, police surveillance, denunciations and other aspects of contemporary reality are thoroughly investigated, giving account of their causes and consequences (sometimes planned but often unforeseen) and revealing a complex interplay between official ideology, leadership style, policy measures and popular sentiment. This is intelligently paralleled by
references to contemporary caricatures from *Krokodil*, which always reflected the official line, sometimes captured the popular mood, and often represented a combination of both.

The acute scarcity of food and consumer supplies that characterized Russian urban life during the decade is placed into the context of the relevant policies (the abolition of the market, destruction of artisan production, collectivization of agriculture and a disproportionate emphasis placed by the state economy on heavy industries). A painstaking depiction of the ways in which ordinary citizens strove to lead normal lives in these abnormal circumstances is followed by a discussion of how the shortages affected further development of Soviet society. Thus the campaign against "wreckers in the distribution chain" initiated by the government in the early 1930s was internalized by parts of the population and later mirrored by the scapegoating "from below" during the outbreak of acute shortages in 1939-40. The shortages also led to the emergence of closed distribution, patronage, and blat, which were to remain a constant feature of Soviet life. This in its turn, brought along new privileged groups and, most importantly, sealed the strategic alliance between leaders and Soviet intelligentsia, which constituted a crucial support base for the regime.

*Everyday Stalinism* thus moves onto the terrain of ideological and cultural analysis, revealing the ways in which material reality is capable of transforming attitudes and ideological positions, and is itself transformed by them. One of its most provocative propositions concerns the widespread stigmatization on the grounds of social origins or dubious political convictions, and the concealment of social identity by its victims. Stigmatization produced not only embitterment on the part of the victim, but often a sense of inferiority, self-doubt, and a desire to belong, blurring the boundaries between misrepresentation of identity and remaking oneself as a "new Soviet man," and possibly contributing to the prevalence of a "certain type of anxious, intense, exaggerated Soviet patriotism" (138).

Fitzpatrick gives generous space for differences between and within various sectors of the population: alternative experiences, perspectives, functions, motives and techniques of survival and advancement are not only presented but also intelligently explained. Fresh insights and often neglected nuances abound. Informative and accessible, provocative and sophisticated, it raises the discussion of Stalinism on a qualitatively different level.

It therefore comes as something of a surprise to encounter on its pages the tired cliché of "Homo Sovieticus". In her notes to the introduction, the author explains that her usage of the term "is not meant to be pejorative but rather to call attention to the existence of a characteristic set of 'Soviet' practices and behaviours related to the peculiarities of Soviet institutions and social structure" (fn. 1). It is, however, highly debatable whether a value-free usage of this kind of a term is at all possible (aren't Homo Sovieticus and Homo Sapiens different species by definition?). This superb work of social history does not need stereotypes to call the reader's attention to the specificity of its subject matter. Let "Homo Sovieticus" rest in peace where he belongs — in the world of anti-utopian fiction and polemical journalism.

Oksana Fedotova

University of Sheffield
Revelations from archival documents on the history of the Soviet nomenklatura are relevant to all trying to understand Russia at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The nomenklatura survived communism and inherited the country. Its members became the new governing elite of the 1990s and the legal owners of Russia's assets and property. Five years in the making, this key work in Yale's Annals of Communism series has long been awaited by students of Soviet history. The work contains translations and analyses of 199 documents, including secret transcripts of Central Committee meetings, letters, directives and memoranda, minutes of closed party meetings and correspondence between higher and lower party bodies. The majority of these documents are from the files of the Party Central Committee and its Politburo and Secretariat. Nearly all are recently declassified and previously unpublished. These were the forums where party leaders spoke, discussed policy, and even debated with one another.

One finds Stalin's signature on documents authorizing mass executions, and his remark to Nikolai Bukharin that a possible decision to shoot him should be regarded as "nothing against you personally." There are many documents about Nikolai Ezhov who ran the secret police during the Terror. The documents contain no "smoking guns" telling us who organized the murder of Sergei Kirov. They do not indicate exactly when mass terror was necessary. The documents are ambiguous and may lead different historians to contradictory interpretations. The reviewer wonders whether Getty disagreed with Naumov on interpretation. Indeed, the author of the interpretation is not indicated. These documents are mostly internal political records of the upper Communist Party and do not discuss foreign policy, agriculture or industrial affairs, or cultural matters. Nearly all the documents are from the Central Party Archive of the Soviet Communist Party. The collection includes dossiers of the liquidated Soviet elite, police reports, and private letters from victims and purgers.

More than Stalin's personality is revealed in the documents. They also reveal social and class conflict, as shown when Bukharin is called a bourgeois lawyer. Stalin's cult is shown to cloak nomenklatura privilege behind a banner of wise leadership and teachings. Bolsheviks provided a united front for the outside world and the non-party Soviet public. However, the documents reveal cracks between party leadership and rank and file party members. The documents reveal attempts by the Moscow elite and Stalin to centralize all elements of political and social control, conflicting with their fellow bosses in the provinces seeking to protect their local patronage and power network. Stalin's Politburo sided with centralization-minded elements of the elite nomenklatura when their interests coincided and at times united with the regional chiefs and even the rank and file membership, as shown in the destruction of Pavel Postyshev and his wife in Ukraine. Getty and Naumov show that in the 1930s the Stalinists never really felt they controlled the vast country, beset by poor transportation and communication with few communists in the regions.

Victimization is also revealed. Even though they could not define the term kulak, the regime continued to attack and denounce kulaki and even to specify quotas for re-
pression. Likewise, the vast majority of those accused and persecuted as Trotskyites had no allegiance to Trotsky or connection to any Trotskyite program. Bolshevik logic told them if you opposed the Bolsheviks, you opposed the revolution, you opposed socialism, you opposed human welfare.

The documents reveal a Central Committee sense of corporate identity till the summer of 1937, when Stalin tore apart the nomenklatura elite and struck out at enemies in the country. Getty and Naumov found no documentation proving the existence of stable elite factions. The documents reveal no grand design of terror as shown in the fits and starts of the campaign against Postyshev and Bukharin. The Politburo criticized Postyshhev, fired him, rehired him, dismissed and fired him again. The documents reveal that Stalin's immediate lieutenants appear to have as much if not more to gain by the full elimination of the Old Bolshevik opposition as Stalin.

The most surprising document is Document No. 198, Nikolai Bukharin's letter to Stalin from December 10, 1937, asking to be spared and exiled to the United States for a number of years to applaud Stalin's trials and to combat Trotsky. If guilty he asked to be sent to Pechora or Kolyma where he could set up a university, a museum of culture, or technical stations. The fact that Bukharin was able to write while in Stalin's prison must have deluded him about his friendship with Stalin. Nevertheless, this is a most puzzling document, especially the line in which Bukharin told Stalin that he was not a Christian. It is interesting that a leading Bolshevik would think of Christianity at the end of his life.

This volume should be read by all historians, political scientists, and policymakers dealing with Russia. Getty and Naumov and Sher are to be congratulated for this splendid volume.

The work is moderately priced and would be useful in senior history or political science seminars on the USSR in the 1930s or on Stalin and Stalinism. The reviewer only regrets that he did not have this fine collection of documents last year when he taught two seminars on Stalin and Stalinism.

This work does not integrate the vast memoir literature of camp survivors, which is a task left to future historians. The survivors lacked knowledge of the people in the center who initiated the repressive policies. The volume will be a useful supplement to the University of Toronto project, conducted with the University of Pittsburgh under the direction of Lynne Viola regarding documents on collectivization in the periphery.

Gary Alan Hanson University of Saskatchewan


The authors of these two important, but in many ways contradictory, studies have each contributed to our understanding of the USSR under Stalin. Each work suffers flaws reflecting the intellectual agendas of its author, and others deriving from the
baleful legacy of the Soviet secrecy which made imprecision an occupational hazard of Western scholarship. Though many questions remain to be clarified, both Parrish and Thurston model a society and polity composed of real people facing complex historical situations.

Michael Parrish has brilliantly summarized the vast information that came to light in the first years after glasnost', coordinating data from hundreds of publications to make a significant contribution to the literature. In particular, Parrish shed light on a number of less well-known, but quite important, episodes in the history of mature Stalinism. Many historians will appreciate Parrish's treatment of the repressions of officers as scapegoats for Stalin's bungling early in World War II; of the notorious wartime counterintelligence agency SMERSH ("Death to Spies"); of the 1948 "Leningrad Affair"; and of several other chapters of this gloomy period. Though the fall of Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov in 1938 often is regarded as the end of the worst phase of Stalinist terror, Parrish's chapter "Beriia Takes Over" brilliantly summarizes the continuation of repressions perhaps less frenetic but surely as fantastic.

Perhaps most important, Parrish surveyed for the first time the evolution of secret police agencies and their leading personnel from Ezhov's fall to that of Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria. Central are short political-biographical sketches of such odious but murky figures as V. S. Abakumov, V. N. Merkulov, B. Z. Kobulov, L. F. Tsanava, M. A. Suslov, V. V. Chernyshev, I. A. Serov, S. N. Kruglov, and others.

Despite its numerous contributions, the book is flawed. The subject of the "punished peoples" deserved more attention, not to mention collectivization and the liquidation of the "kulaks" in the territories annexed in 1939, 1940, or 1945. More regretfully, because the author relied on a flood of publisistika, long-suppressed memoirs, and popular scholarship, his text suffers numerous errors of detail inevitable when an author works in such media. No one could have avoided all such mistakes, given the dizzying rapidity with which the cast of the drama changed: only a team of archivists could have checked every first name and patronymic; every promotion, demotion, or arrest; every date, every location, every relationship. For this the reader should see Lubianka: VchK-OGPU-NKVD-MGB-MVD-KGB, edited by A. I. Kokurin, N. V. Petrov, and R. G. Pikhioha (Moscow: Mezdunarodnyi fond "Demokratiia," 1997).

The saddest thing is how poorly Parrish was served by his publishers, who have produced one of the sloppiest editions imaginable: the volume literally crawls with errors that would bewilder any reader. While some are merely annoying (spelling well-known names differently each time they appear, or, in the case of "Igant'ev" and others, misspelling them every time), others range from confusing (jumbling first and second initials of less well-known names) to downright obnoxious (mistakes in the citation of sources that make it difficult to identify the provenance of data). A house with academic pretensions might have found an editor familiar with Russian, or short of this one less ignorant of grammar ("The Leningrad Affair probably claimed more than 1,300 victims, including over 100 who were shot, nearly 2,000 people who were dismissed, and many arrested. As late as August 15, 1952, the 50 former Leningrad Party officials were arrested and sentenced to prison" [218]).

Unfortunately, the author must bear part of the blame. In a misplaced demonstration of modesty, Parrish opts not to footnote every jot and tittle, thereby amplifying the editors' crime and denying other students the chance to fully exploit his
work as the starting point for further investigation. Did Leningrad NKVD chief Zakovskii indeed author "a manual on torture"? We would like to see it, too! Some chapters list fewer than two dozen sources, clearly only a fraction of those consulted. One senses that both author and publisher rushed to see the volume into print. While it mobilizes a greater sheer mass of sources than Robert Conquest's Inside Stalin's Secret Police — its apparent model — Conquest's work represents the finer craftsmanship.

Openly despising the politically correct mores of a left-leaning professorate who hold their punches when treating the Stalinist brand of totalitarianism (327), the author undermined his cause by failing to meet their scholarly standards. Some will surely arraign Parrish's "Cold-War" approach, adherence to the "totalitarian model," and overlooking contributions of recent Western scholarship. On the other hand, many will admire the elegance with which he all but demolishes the "revisionist" historiography that grew up in the 1980s ("the fact that terror came to an end with Stalin's death also points out that he, and he alone, was the moving force" [23]).

Be it noted that Parrish frowns on more than just the crypto-Marxist nonsense that finds acceptance in university departments:

There are of course other theories, one blaming Stalin's father for the terror since he supposedly beat the young Josef in his formative years. This, of course, does not answer why Lenin, who had a happy childhood, was equally fond of terror. We get these theories, as well as others (such as blaming Auschwitz on Hitler's toilet training) courtesy of something called "psychohistory," an example of science fiction and humbug that thrives in academe (22).

If, as Parrish points out, Cold-War apologists made Nazi collaborator Vlasov a "closet democrat," recent research has shown his communist role under Stalin, when he was praised for "vigilance" in 1937 and 1938 (148). The author compares the CIA's "Phoenix" program in Vietnam to the Stalinists' suppression of Ukrainian nationalists after World War II (224). And elsewhere Parrish ironically castigates the "anti-evil empire coalition" which persisted in characterizing the USSR as a behemoth long after it had become moribund (280-81, 325-26, 327).

Robert Thurston's book distills as much research as Parrish's, though the two volumes could hardly differ more. If Parrish documents a polity cannibalizing itself, Thurston pictures a society of relative normality. Thurston set out to debunk the "model" of a society groaning under the all-pervading oppression of "totalitarianism." As he put it, "The state's use or threat of force did not result in a 'broken' people" (xx). The gist is that most people led ordinary lives and didn't worry much about the terror affecting the higher spheres: personal life, the struggle to make ends meet, and hopes one's children might enjoy a better future absorbed the moral energy of average working folk. A majority either believed the regime's propaganda or received it as Aesopian fairy tales to be deciphered as one might.

All true, as far as it goes. The worst of the Stalinist repressions were indeed widely interpreted as a settling of scores among the rulers. Some bought the official version hook, line, and sinker; others saw the purges as Stalin's effort to eliminate "the Jews" from the leadership; yet others created more or less fantastic rationalizations. Despite some blunders and some corruption, the country was, after all, on the move: the shin-
ing future beckoned. Thurston has mined hundreds of firsthand accounts to show what ordinary people were thinking from day to day; many of the voices come from published memoirs, though a large percentage derive from such collections as the Hoover Institution Archives, the Bakhmetev Archive at Columbia, and the autobiographical statements making up the Harvard Interview Project. Thurston’s may well be the most thoroughgoing project of this sort, excepting only Solzhenitsyn’s *GULag Archipelago*. Many years in preparation, *Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia* marshals a thousand voices (including a limited number of Soviet archival sources) into a smoothly flowing case for a Soviet society not fundamentally unlike others (2).

And yet the author frequently seems at pains to impress upon the reader his thesis, reiterating it at the beginning and end of every chapter, not to mention every other place, appropriate or inappropriate, where it can be made to emerge from the sources. How ironic that someone so fervently arguing the “totalitarian model” wrong on every score would allow it — and in its most procrustean 1950s version at that — to dictate the architecture of his own work! Worse, while Thurston mined the sources as few others, he remained selective enough that one can charge him with the same Procrusteanism.

One wonders what certain of the objects of Thurston’s research would make of his argument. The author recounts an episode in which NKVD agents, after a period of increasing intimidation, severely beat future Cold-War icon Victor Kravchenko but did not arrest him: proof the NKVD was concerned with evidence, for their lack of “anything on him” is why they didn’t arrest Kravchenko (84)!; if the plan had been to terrorize the population, we are told, no such concern would have stayed them. Memoirs, of course, especially those penned long after the event, are tricky sources. That they often do not represent “hard evidence” is obvious; even if they do offer windows onto how individuals experienced history, they nonetheless tell us as much about how the author made sense of history when he or she was writing as at the moment the events were originally experienced. But little suggests that Thurston was particularly cautious in sifting his firsthand accounts except insofar as he weeds out what does not support his case, and many of his memoirists would turn over in their graves if they learned to what use he bends them: Valentina Bogdan, Markoosha Fischer, G. A. Tokaev, and many others. One need only flip through some of them to find people saying quite the opposite of what Thurston attributes to them. As the authors of one summary of the State Department interviews Thurston often cites generalized,

Again and again, the sources spoke of the feeling of isolation experienced by the individual . . . who knows that he is against the regime himself but who fears that he is alone in his convictions. . . . Soviet propaganda methods, the fear of talking openly with others because of the danger of informers and the lack of information from the outside world all . . . contribute to this feeling (Hoover Institution Archives, U.S. Department of State Office of External Research, The Soviet Union as Reported by Former Soviet Citizens: Typescript Report Series, 1951-1960, Report No. 3, p. 2).

Not only in the employment of quotations does the author venture far, but still more in his argumentation. Thurston makes a strong case that the incompe...
derstaffing, and paranoia affecting most Soviet institutions also weakened the organs of repression; nevertheless, the "organs" remained the pampered pets of the regime, worked better than other institutions, and remained infinitely better organized than their targeted victims. If the inefficiency of bureaucracies was the sole measure of a regime's ability to terrorize a population, one wonders that radicals created such effective hells in Cambodia, Rwanda, and other unsophisticated lands.

Another rhetorical point emerges from comparison with such tyrannies, namely that all tyrants, no matter their enthusiasm for terror, seek to inculcate love for their personas and belief in their systems: pharaohs and Caesars alike sought the worship of their subjects. Did not Nazi propaganda make Hitler the idol of the German everyman?; is not Milosevic the Serbs' defender?; wouldn't many Iranians say the mullahs would prefer not to have to punish the enemies of Islam? One student of modern genocides has observed that all tyrants who would inspire their subjects to mass murder must convince them that their violence is at bottom a pro-active defense against the victims.

What binds Stalin's Russia with other terroristic dictatorships is a common cleverly masked will, a manipulative malice that made the people its own oppressor. If the USSR under Stalin was a more or less "normal" society, then would we not also have to so characterize China under Mao, Uganda under Idi Amin, and Cambodia under Pol Pot? In his chapter "The History of Our Sewage System" Solzhenitsyn describes rivers and tidal waves of repression bearing hundreds of thousands to the GULag, but the reprieves which followed periodic relaxations as symbolic trickles; to Thurston "the acknowledgement [in 1938] that grotesque mistakes" had been made, that "injustice had . . . spread widely," could hardly have been "the action of a government that wanted to continue frightening its own citizens" (114; Alexander Weisberg, co-author of the "totalitarian" classic Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession, would hardly have approved citing his authority on p. 118 to bolster the image of a waxing Stalinist liberalization in 1938 and 1939). Other acts of leniency cited by Thurston, such as the release of "kulaks" sent to the camps during collectivization (12), actually meant little, since the vast majority of dekulakized peasants had been sent not to camps but to internal exile (with family, forever). Thurston treats a number of political episodes (e.g., the party purges, the punishment of "Kirov's assassins," the early show trials) long considered milestones to '37 as rather innocuous. They entailed statistically insignificant numbers of arrests, the reasoning goes, and in any case were unrelated to any master plan to terrorize society (24). What such casuistry overlooks is that they all undermined the organizational, political, and legal grounds on which people might resist the concentration of power in Stalin's hands, and that they did make it steadily easier to arbitrarily arrest, torture, imprison, and execute.

Even during the Great Terror (Thurston does acknowledge the word "great"), the population at large was not particularly frightened, Thurston, argues, stressing that the primary targets were only "those who had committed crimes or somehow offended the authorities in the past," for example "kulaks, nationalists, criminals, Whites, and church figures" (60). In the same vein Thurston maintains: that executions in the camps were not intended to instill terror among the population because they were not publicized (61); that even though Stalin initiated the mass arrests, he was only reacting to requests from lower levels (61); that quotas for the number of arrests expected
in the provinces "suggest panic at the top levels . . . more than a careful plan to frighten the nation" (61); that Stalin and Ezhov's turning on "the usual suspects" resembled the way "old-time police chiefs did [the same] in America" (62); and that the employment of torture to extract confessions suggests that there was no plan to terrorize the population, otherwise the regime would have simply convicted people without feeling the need to prove the charges or to justify convictions before the public (63). Elsewhere the author argues that "recent studies of architects and astronomers in the Terror show clearly that problems, personal tensions, and denunciations had built to a high level inside these groups by the mid-1930s" (88), i.e., that pressure from below moved the regime to mass repression; but at an institution where the present author taught, members of one department so detested one another that fistfights broke out, and yet neither FBI nor CIA arrived to liquidate a portion of the faculty.

For the record, Thurston acknowledges that "Stalin, or rather Stalin with a great deal of help, killed millions or facilitated their untimely deaths"; that "he was one of history's leading murderers"; that his "crimes were truly grotesque" (137). But his thesis that "extensive fear did not exist in the USSR at any time in the late 1930s" (159) weakens the entire book. The chapter "Life in the Factories" reconstructs a valid picture of the Stakhanovite movement as one that permitted workers to vent their frustrations boldly with economic management; unfortunately for the argument, that workers took advantage of this no more proves their confidence in "the system" than their understanding that its fundamentals — Stalin, his lieutenants of the moment, Leninism, and the October Revolution — remained sacrosanct. A more nuanced conception might have characterized Stalin's "system" as a form of repressive but demagogic authoritarianism relying on both terror and allegiance: the paralysis of elites and the mobilization of the mob.

The author's case for popular loyalty during World War II, "The Acid Test," is in some ways key. In part this chapter is a sophisticated rehash of what communists, fellow travelers, and new-leftists have long argued: despite its "mistakes," Stalin's regime was "progressive," and its popular character enabled it to overcome the mighty invader. Many German officers on the Eastern Front commented on the tough resistance of the "Russian" soldier, and not only after Stalingrad, either. Indeed there is little question that Russians and millions of other Soviet citizens rallied during the country's hour of need. But this chapter seems singular for its faulty, even political, reasoning. Not only is it a matter of Stalin's having opened the way for the Axis swarm to reach the Volga and the very Caucasus by his purge of the Red Army's officer corps; not only of his criminal folly in staying ordinary preparations even as it became apparent Germany was preparing to invade; not only of his bungling interference in military decisions during the first year of the war. Not only is it Thurston's gliding over the criminal economic policies that crippled the country's ability to feed itself or produced such a lopsided industry that soldiers perished or fell captive for lack of such basics as flashlights or wire clippers. Rather it is Thurston's dismissive treatment of the widespread willingness of Soviet citizens to greet the Germans as liberators in 1941 and to regard them, well into 1943 or 1944, as no worse than the communists that undermines the argument. Be this more true for the Baltics or Western Ukraine, one should not forget that it was true in other places too, or that in fact the USSR is the only country on whose occupied territory the Germans found such widespread
support. This does not deny the joy with which millions of Russians greeted the returning Red Army. Nevertheless widespread acceptance and collaboration are now finding disturbing new confirmation in recently available archival documents, and especially the growing literature on the Holocaust as carried out on occupied Soviet territory. One reason the Soviet government long silenced discussion of the Holocaust was precisely that the crimes revealed in literally tens of thousands of trials of perpetrators and collaborators (not to mention bystanders) would have raised the question of mass — mass — treason, and thereby called into question the claims of the Soviet government to embody the will of the people. For the author of Life and Terror this is apparently not a question; for the author of this review, history is not so unambiguous.

Both Thurston's and Parrish's books represent Western scholarship in a transitional phase, embodying some of the best of what it had become capable of before the archives opened, as well as some of the limitations official secrecy imposed on our knowledge of Soviet life and politics. In some ways their accomplishments are dated: Kremlinology of the tendency which Parrish may be seen to culminate must give way before archivists and historians working with access to formerly secret records; the work of social historians of the tendency Thurston represents must also be reconsidered in the light not only of revelations of the major state and party archives but also those of the secret police. But must we then consider Parrish and Thurston's books as a whole "dated"?

The answer must be "no." In the rush to the archives not only are scholars today producing exciting new studies but also a mass of dry, non-analytical literature. At some point a more balanced historiography — both Russian and Western — will need to weave the voices of history's makers and victims with official documents to create a more three-dimensional representation of society, government, and their interaction; this historiography should draw upon the flexibility, imagination, and creativity a dearth of information once forced Western historians to develop. If in many details The Lesser Terror and Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia may be dated, both offer compelling tapestries of Soviet life and politics. Their authors deserve praise for this, and it is to be hoped that future work will continue to reflect their creativity as well as to evolve with the opportunities archival access now makes possible.

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*The views expressed herein are those of the author and not of the United States Holocaust Museum.


This translation of Stalins ungeliebtes Kind (1994) is a useful contribution to occupation studies. It concisely extends Loth's work, with Rolf Badstübner, Wilhelm Pieck—Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1953 (1994). This earlier book excerpted the difficult notes by Pieck, senior member of the German Communist Party (KPD), made from conversations with Stalin.
Loth finds no plan by Stalin to Sovietize eastern Germany. He says Stalin's German policy was a result of four factors: the West's "walling-off" policy regarding western Germany; Stalin's unique view of reality; Stalin's duplicity; and Walter Ulbricht's duplicity. But Loth mostly blames Walter Ulbricht (the KPD leader who rose to power in 1948), and then the West, for dividing Germany.

The book has two drawbacks. First is Loth's credulousness placed in Communist sources, manifested in two ways: He takes at face value Stalin's words to an international underling; and he imputes Western understandings to Communist vocabulary such as "democratization," "antifascism," "unified," "peace-loving," "progress," "mobilization" or "development." The second drawback is that Loth's evidence often contradicts his conclusion, which blames others more than Stalin for the division.

Loth publicizes what Stalin said to Pieck. This is Loth's great contribution. But what did Stalin do? And what did he say or think elsewhere? The author asserts Stalin's words likely accorded with Stalin's thoughts — a strange assumption, especially about Stalin. In addition, what if Stalin's words and thoughts were in accord, but hopelessly romantic and unrealistic?

Loth is partly able to build his argument because he rarely focuses on the West in the book's body, or discusses the historical literature. The English-language edition afterward adds little.

Loth assumes a rational, non-threatening Soviet security interest in east/central Europe, pointing out the Soviets needed German reparations. However, newer studies of the Soviet occupation on the ground in Germany show the Soviets extracted from Germany in the late 1940s the ten billion dollars they demanded at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, plus some. And what if Soviet or Stalinist security was a zero-sum game? If prudence, moral concern, selfish concern and Marxist prophecy all predicted American intervention in Europe, then why is it condemned?

Loth states the Soviets "had to" pursue unity of the KPD and Socialist (SPD) parties in the eastern zone (SBZ) in late 1945 — not that the KPD was so weakened in August that forced unification became the only option to keep Communist control. He believes the Soviets intended a democratic path in early 1946 for all Germany. Did their "democracy" mean much beyond fraudulent Stalinist elections? He states the Soviets desired democratic bourgeois transformation in Germany before moving to Socialism. If so, why would the overall intent be benign?

In discussing the formation of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in 1946, Loth remains over-credulous. He lists idealistic reasons why people joined. He takes at face value SED public relations. He accepts as democratic the SBZ election results of September-October 1946, in which coercion, fraud, and inappropriately limited choices were commonplace.

The author refers to the outlawing of SBZ confessional schools as establishing "the separation of church and state" (51), not as limiting freedom of religion. He does not criticize other aspects of SBZ anti-religious campaigns in the 1940s, but only touches on such in discussing events of 1952.

Loth believes the SED was ostracized in early Cominform politics because the Soviets assumed Germany would be unified under non-Communists. He notes Stalin did not attend the German Democratic Republic's (GDR's) founding ceremony in 1949. However, Loth ignores the alternative explanation, and public opinion problem, of early postwar hatred of Germans by many Europeans.
Loth says increasing German division allowed heightened unfolding of totalitarianism in the east. This is a chicken-and-egg situation. He notes the SED mentality "developed into a closed battle formation" (95). However, Eric Weitz's work shows the KPD had this mentality long before.

The author thinks Stalin could not imagine a permanent occupation of Germany. However, recent research still finds no intention among Soviet occupation authorities to ever leave. When Loth refers to "internal documents" and "a very exact feeling for what was possible" (172) he privileges his reading of Pieck's notes above traditional readings of Wolfgang Leonhard, Viacheslav Molotov, and others.

Throughout, Loth moderates his main argument to the point of contradiction. He says Stalin reacted to Western plans on occupying Germany, but Loth also admits the unilateral transfer of territory to Poland weakened the German economy. Soviet inexperience in democracy and capitalism harmed Allied cooperation at least as much as the Western walling-off policy did; and Communism and Stalinism "predestined" the failure of attempts at democracy in eastern Germany. Loth says Soviet-style "antifascism" was antidemocratic to Westerners: "[a]s early as the summer of 1945, tendencies became perceptible which ended in the exclusive control of the Soviet zone by orthodox Communist functionaries" (25). Loth admits Soviet-sponsored land reform and the impulse to economic nationalization in the SBZ were divisive. He notes the Soviets blocked demilitarization commission visits to their zone. The Soviets "unknowingly contributed decisively" (42) to the formation of Bizonia (in the Anglo-American zones in 1946-1947). These developments predated the "silent coup" (122) and "increasing loss of reality" (129) which Loth ascribes to the SED's desperate hold on power in the SBZ in 1948-1950.

Thus, Loth notes that Soviet force, ideas and practices in their own zone, including playing dirty tricks on the SPD, rejecting the Marshall Plan, and instituting the Berlin Blockade, all were strategic Soviet errors which unconsciously furthered division. Soviet behavior prodded their erstwhile allies' fears. The Soviets refused to choose between economic and political cooperation in all Germany, and the politico-cultural remaking of their own zone.

Instead, the Soviets and KPD/SED thought propaganda that highlighted the class struggle would sway the masses. They did not see that their strategies since early 1945 had backfired. Purging bourgeois elements and succumbing to a "siege mentality" (74) in the SED and extra-parliamentary means of power in 1947 are examples. Continued repressions and mass agitation in 1948 and 1952-53 are others. Loth argues that "the forced struggle for unity had in reality hastened the process of division," because "the German population, including a large majority of the 'working class,' saw little value in the protection of the Soviet Union" (94). "Sheer ignorance and ideologically based misjudgments lay behind all the wrong strategic decisions of Soviet policy on Germany" (175).

Loth believes a de facto GDR existed by September 1948. On beginning the Berlin Blockade, SED leaders asked the Soviets if they should set up a German government. Stalin replied negatively because he wanted an all-German triumph first.

Loth regrets the West not taking seriously Stalin's 1952 offer to unify Germany. However, he notes the Soviets opposed U.N. democratic conditions for all-German
elections. The Soviets wished to establish governmental unity on the basis of equality between east and west (despite the east's lower population), before allowing elections.

It would appear Stalin finally countenanced a Cold War lasting ten to fifteen years, and thought the Socialist side would win economically. But Stalin's defeat in Germany was his own fault, since his instruments of KPD/SED were "extremely unsuited" to democracy or national unity, and he himself had facilitated the rise of ruthless lieutenants such as Ulbricht. "He also carried the mistrust against all actual democrats so far that in the end only those willing to submit themselves unconditionally remained as allies" (146).

In 1952, the number of monthly refugees from east to west Germany quadrupled; the eastern populace was exhausted; and Ulbricht even (unsuccessfully) requested material help from the Soviets. This disaster prompted KGB chief Lavrentii Beria the next year, after Stalin's death, to advocate selling out the GDR and SED in exchange for the prospect of Western aid to the USSR. Ulbricht may have been saved from a sacking simply because Beria was sacked first — although Loth does not mention Molotov's view that Beria's approach to German policy was treasonous, and that Stalin always intended the socialization of eastern Germany.

However, Loth notes Stalin and Beria were ignorant of realities on the ground in eastern Germany. It seems both of them pursued unrealistic policies in Germany, as though their Western opponents were cardboard cutouts. In all, I appreciate Loth's qualifiers, but they often conflict with the overall thrust of his book.

Believing Stalin's word today, without coercion, is a strange choice. Loth's title is both clever and misleading. Stalin's telling Pieck he wanted a unified Germany is revealing. However, whether this proves him moderate, lying, megalomaniacal (wanting to control all Germany after a Western postwar economic depression and troop removal), and/or out of touch with reality is debatable. Fathers exist who did not want the children they were instrumental in creating — but their patrimony and responsibility remain. Stalin simply created Stalinism wherever he could.

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When I was in graduate school, a faculty advisor told me there were only three justifications for publishing scholarly writing. One was to present or critique a general theory or methodology. The second was to present and assess a new source of data. The third was to reinterpret existing data using existing methodologies. He emphasized that when publishing for the first of these reasons one made the strongest and most lasting contribution to the profession. Unfortunately, he added, the overwhelming majority of scholarly publications fell into the third category.

In Russian Civil-Military Relations, Dale Herspring makes a strong contribution to this first and highest form of scholarly publication by reviewing the existing body of theory on the topic and highlighting its strengths and many shortcomings. By training and experience he is well qualified to undertake this work — he is a former Foreign
Service Officer with postings in both Poland and the Soviet Union, and has authored extensive works that draw on Western theories of Soviet and Russian civil-military relations, most notably *The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989*. In the work under review, he targets these very theories for examination and discussion.

Herspring sets out his motives for undertaking this study in a short preface. He notes that the military in Russia has been in a downward spiral since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that at the time of writing (mid-1996) organizational cohesion and combat readiness were at an all-time low. But in the next decade or so a new military may emerge that resembles its predecessor both as a combat force and a political interest group. How that process unfolds, and under whose guidance, will be an important trend to follow. Indeed, Herspring argues "that the way in which civil-military relations develop over the next five years is the most important issue in Russian politics today."

That being the case, it is imperative to test the models we use to understand this process. Herspring cites three individuals as outstanding in establishing varying approaches to analyzing Soviet civil-military relations: Roman Kolkowicz, William Odom, and Timothy Colton. (It is a measure of Herspring's own long experience in this area that in 1978 he co-edited *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, a work to which Kolkowicz, Odom, and Colton all contributed.)

Herspring tests these three models by applying them to the historical record of Soviet/Russian civil-military interaction in three key periods across four major issue areas. The time periods he examines are: 1917 to 1930, when the "civil" portion of this equation shifted from tsarist autocracy to Marxism-Leninism; 1985 to 1990, when the last Soviet leader attempted a major change in civil-military relations in order to save the Marxist-Leninist system; and 1990 to 1994, when post-Soviet leaders have attempted to build a new framework for civil-military relations while retaining an army in most respects unchanged from its Soviet predecessor ("they lack a model," Herspring notes tartly). His issue areas are: military doctrine, which he views as most important because it sets the agenda for deciding the other areas; force structure, national armies, and personnel issues.

While Herspring employs history masterfully in his analysis, it should be emphasized that his book is not "a history," and that a reader interested in a chronological account of Soviet military history should look elsewhere. For example, Herspring correctly does not drag in Frunze's suspicious operating-table death during his examination of the main currents of the debate over military doctrine in the 1920s, but Frunze's unexplained disappearance might be disorienting to one not already familiar with the details of how Stalin came to assume supreme power. Instead, as is appropriate in a theoretical work of political science, Herspring will interrupt a chronological narrative to point out the successes and shortcomings of his three models in explaining particular policy developments. Herspring's most important observation is the mutability of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and Russia. He points out that during the periods and in the issues he examines, each of the three models at points provides a good descriptive assessment of the processes at work. But none of them work well at all points, and their critical flaw is that all are essentially static. (Herspring allows that Colton's concept of civil-military conflict occurring when military core interests are threatened in principle allows for dynamic analysis over time, but
Colton’s inability to provide a satisfactory definition or scale for “core interests” in practice makes it as static as Kolkowicz’s and Odom’s models.)

Despite this pessimistic conclusion, Herspring emphasizes the importance of models and promises that he and his colleagues will continue attempting to build them. He warns against exaggerating the importance of models and theories and of becoming dogmatically attached to a given paradigm. He also reminds us that models and theories are culturally sensitive, and that any set of findings, particularly in the ever-changing reality of contemporary Russia, must remain tentative.

*Russian Civil-Military Relations* does a superb job of clearing the ground for further theoretical work on this topic. While Herspring does not make the point directly, his assessment makes it clear how deeply scholars of the Russian military are indebted to theorists of the 1960s and 1970s who worked primarily on the U.S. and other Western militaries to build their models. Much theoretical work on general civil-military issues has been conducted since then; and the Soviet Union of those years has splintered and altered almost beyond recognition. I look forward to the day, which I hope is not too far off, when Herspring redeems his promise and produces a dynamic, change-sensitive model for conceptualizing the extremely important relationship between Russia’s military and its political leadership.


Georgiy Mirsky was a leading Soviet expert on developing countries and the Arab world. Currently he specializes on ethnicity problems in the former republics of the Soviet Union. In this book Mirsky begins with an analysis of the foundations of the Soviet system and the reasons for its destruction. He provides an interesting interpretation of Gorbachev’s policies and the last months of the Soviet Union. "Glasnost dealt a mortal blow to the Soviet regime. De-Stalinization that Gorbachev initiated after much hesitation . . . turned into de-Leninization and the rejection of the whole concept of Marxism-Leninism" (7). Mirsky’s account indicates that Gorbachev’s programs were poorly prepared and implemented, causing misery and economic devastation for the Soviet people. It appears that the author is in agreement with Milovan Djilas’s warning that “Socialism is not reformable, it just disintegrates.” According to Mirsky, “The role of ethnonationalism in the breakup of the Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a major one” (9). He points out that serious ethnic conflicts occurred in the periphery, not in central regions, and proceeds to examine them in subsequent chapters.

The discussion of ethnic conflicts is preceded by an examination of Western theories concerning the notion of nationalism, the establishment of nations and their ethnic characteristics as well as the concept of the nation-state. The theoretical discussion ends with a framework of various types of ethnic conflicts.

As a longtime observer of ethnic problems in the former Soviet Union, Mirsky provides interesting insight. For instance, he mentions his conversations with an Armenian colleague at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) who was indignant with how Azerbaijani authorities treated Armenians in
Nagorny Karabakh long before perestroika started. Mirsky analyzes the Nagorny Karabakh conflict and the chances to resolve this dispute. He also gives his assessment of the situation in the Transcaucasian states. In his view, "Of all the former Soviet republics, with the exception of Tajikistas, the three Transcaucasian states are in the worst shape" (66). However, Mirsky points to an important distinction: in contrast to its neighbors, Armenia is dealing with its problems "with courage and dignity, displaying stamina, determination, and discipline. The morale of the Armenian nation is incomparably higher than that of its neighbors, and its internal stability is remarkable" (66).

In his analysis of Moscow's role in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, Mirsky calls the policy of the Russian military "cynical." He argues that Moscow supplies Abkhazia with military equipment to establish a Russian foothold in this area and to prevent anti-Russian sentiment in the Northern Caucasus. Obviously, Russia pursues its national interest in this area in a way that the United States or Britain might have done in a similar situation. At the same time, Russia, in my view, plays a stabilizing role in this conflict by exercising a moderating influence on both sides. This factor needs to be emphasized.

In the chapter devoted to Kazakhstan, the reader is given a glimpse into the unique situation of this country, where the titular nationality — the Kazakhs — constitute a minority. The Russian Cossacks, residing in Western Kazakhstan, are not happy with the fact that the lands they inhabit are recognized as part of Kazakhstan by Russia. At this time, some influential figures among them seek autonomy within the state of Kazakhstan. At the same time, according to this study, the country also experiences problems associated with "old-standing differences between traditional regional agglomerations called joozes." Mirsky cites the opinion of people he spoke with in Kazakhstan that major disturbances are more likely "to occur between various parts of the Kazakh ethnos than between Kazakhs and Russians" (114).

While tackling the ethnic issues in Ukraine, the author dismisses the possibility that relations between Russians and Ukrainians may deteriorate to the degree of those between Serbs and Croats. For centuries, Russians and Ukrainians have been living side by side, sharing a common historical heritage, achievements and problems, "with a lot of mixed marriages and with everybody speaking Russian" (124). However, there is a difference between attitudes toward Russians in Eastern and Western Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalism is far stronger in Western Ukraine. Mirsky refers to the role of the UPA (Ukrainian Liberation Army) to emphasize this difference. At the main cemetery in Lviv, the principal city of Western Ukraine, he took note of the dates of death of Red Army enlisted men. They were killed after March 1944, that is, after this area was liberated from Nazi occupation. The UPA fiercely resisted Soviet power for years after this area was retaken by the Red Army by means of guerrilla warfare. At present, Stepan Bandera, the leader of the UPA, is considered a hero in Western Ukraine. His "statues have been erected in Western Ukraine, and his sympathizers have been elected city mayors" (125). Obviously, non-Ukrainians in Western Ukraine — primarily Russian-speaking people — feel more pressure than in the rest of the country.

One of the most useful chapters in this book is the discussion of Russian nationalism. Mirsky mentions the ideological vacuum that developed after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the discarding of Marxism-Leninism as a decisive factor for the
emergence of nationalism as "a dominant, if not the only political ideology and mass-inspiring idea in the successor states" (157). It is apparent from Mirsky's writing that some nationalism in Russia today can be a positive phenomenon. Nationalism can encourage people to feel better about themselves, to be patriotic and honest. Mirsky points out that a dramatic rise of "Russian ethnic consciousness, suppressed after the Bolshevik revolution, is only natural and inevitable." However, extreme nationalism bodes disaster. "The triumph of ethnonationalism ... will seriously hamper the formation of a civic nation and, as a consequence, of that civil society without which Russia can hardly hope to overcome its present malaise" (172).

While Mirsky examines most of the former republics of the USSR, he omits the Baltic nations, Belarus, and Moldova. This makes his analysis incomplete. Also, surprisingly, the book lacks a conclusion, where the author could have summarized his research. Overall, however, the merits of this volume outweigh its flaws. It offers interesting insights into the ethnic problems of the former Soviet republics as well as incisive and provocative observations about the general state of affairs there in the early post-Soviet period.

Yury Polsky


Donald Murray's *A Democracy of Despots* is an achievement: in a single, concise and readable account, he takes the reader from Soviet collapse to the emergence of the Russian republic without sacrificing the small, human details of one of the greatest political dramas of the century.

To be sure, Murray (a Canadian journalist assigned to Moscow from 1988 to 1994) does not offer a complete picture of the transitional period, and those seeking the story of change in Russia's regions and among lower-echelon politicians will have to seek it elsewhere. Murray's focus is Moscow and the machinations within the Kremlin and the Russian White House. But if the overall sweep of the book is at the highest levels of the Soviet and Russian governments, its true value is in the attention it gives to the small details of immense events.

For example, the world watched Mikhail Gorbachev resign his post on international television. But Murray adds an unforgettable detail from the shadows: as the last Soviet state leader stepped down, a tiny group of Supreme Soviet deputies met in the deserted legislative chamber in the winter darkness. A recently appointed deputy speaker "addressed rows of empty seats as he protested that officials had broken the law by dismantling the Soviet Union without prior legislative approval." Turning to the few deputies assembled, the speaker said, "Until we meet again, wherever that might be," upon which this small group of anonymous legislators "raised their hands in approval of a resolution declaring the Soviet Union dead." (Outside, Murray notes, workmen "hadn't bothered to wait," and had already carted off the bronze plaque identifying the building as the USSR Supreme Soviet.)

Murray's images of the personalities of the time are no less colorful. Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov walks the halls of the Kremlin in 1991 as "the image . . . of
the accountant in a mafia casino." Gennadii Ianaev and Aleksandr Rutskoi are revealed, in the end, to be made of little more than bluster — and, in Ianaev's case, not even that. Ianaev begins his "presidency" with a bout of drunken whining (he wanted someone else to assume the responsibility of deposing Gorbachev), and Rutskoi, who began as a suave figure in imported clothing, ends up an embattled "acting president" in a grimy warm-up suit shouting obscenities over a cellular phone.

But the most interesting portrait in *A Democracy of Despots* is that of Gorbachev himself, and readers interested in the last days of the Soviet president's career would be better advised to read Murray's account than to slog through Gorbachev's own wordy and sadly disingenuous memoirs. Murray eschews the hagiographic approach to Gorbachev taken by many other observers, rejecting the idea that he was some sort of visionary and instead depicting him quite plainly as a vain, misled, and confused man who even at the very end did not understand the implications of his own actions.

At every turn, Murray shows how Gorbachev convinced himself that things were working out, that he would retain his power, that his decisions were correct. Gorbachev aide Anatolii Chernaev describes his boss's mood after having forced the Soviet Congress to accept as Vice President the traitorous Ianaev: "He was convinced that nothing and no one could resist him. He left the Congress believing he had total control of the situation." As others in Moscow plan the end of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev mulls over how his presidential jet ought to be painted. (It should have "Soviet Union" written on it, he thought, just as Air Force One has "United States.") Even at the very end, as Murray notes, Gorbachev used his resignation speech to argue that he had been right all along, but that "the legislature [and] the people hadn't lived up to the task set by the Soviet leader."

Murray is less adept in explaining Boris Yeltsin. What people see in Yeltsin, and why they support him, are made clear enough. But what motivates Yeltsin is left largely unexplored; even in the climactic standoff between the parliament and the president in 1993, Yeltsin is still something of a cipher in the midst of frantic activity. Despite his disapproval of Yeltsin's actions, Murray's account of the White House extremists (some of whom shouted that they were willing "to die for Soviet power" as they fought Yeltsin's troops) is a welcome balance to others who saw the attack as a play for power by Yeltsin. But the details of the White House resistance are not matched with similar details about what took place in the Kremlin.

In any case, Murray does not use Khasbulatov's sins to excuse Yeltsin's, and perhaps the weakest aspect of *A Democracy of Despots* is the gloomy ending, from which a reader could hardly imagine that things in Russia would turn out the way they have since 1995. (For one thing, there is too much attention given to the clownish Vladimir Zhirinovskii, whose star faded so quickly after 1995.) To be fair, Murray was writing at a time when it seemed that the political struggles in Moscow had burned themselves out in a smoldering heap of apathy and resentment. But the title of the book itself is ironic, for the events Murray describes, and the course of events since 1995, suggest that in fact there are few true despots left in Moscow, and that Russian democracy, while perhaps not particularly pretty, is more stable than we have assumed.

Murray's book continues a string of excellent works by Moscow correspondents, and would make a useful companion to David Satter's *Age of Delirium* or David Remnick's masterpiece *Lenin's Tomb*. For the advanced undergraduate, it will be an
indispensable and readable contemporary history. For the specialist, it is a trove of insights from first-hand interviews, and for the interested non-specialist, it is a compelling narrative that reduces the chaos of the Soviet transition to a human and comprehensible scale.

Thomas M. Nichols

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This is an excellent book. No single-volume monograph offering an overview of Russia's expansion to Asia and the North Pacific has heretofore existed. Now March has written a much needed — and reliable — book, depicting Russia's expansion to Central Asia, Siberia, and the North Pacific, as well as its relations with China, Japan, Mongolia, and the United States while engaged in the process. The book begins with Kievan Rus' and Mongol rule in the thirteenth century, but March's main focus is on Russia's constant move towards the east since the Muscovite period, especially from the seventeenth century on, to which fifteen out of twenty-five chapters are devoted. The last seven chapters deal with the period after the Russian Revolution, including the post-Soviet era.

Eastern Destiny is a useful book for undergraduates and general readers, who are provided with a cogent synthesis of this important, but neglected, page from the history of Russia, East Asia, and the United States. Possessing a wealth of information, it also is a useful reference work for specialists. The reader is treated to an abundance of maps (ten in all), which are well coordinated with the text so that almost all geographical names used by the author are found on maps.

A major weakness of the book is the lack of footnotes and a bibliographical guide. Different readers bring varied interests to the book and may use it as a stepping-stone to further reading. March provides a list of selected books for such reading; since, however, chapters lack footnotes with which to identify sources, this bibliography is of little use. Moreover, specialists would like to know which sources March relied on to reach his balanced synthesis, since such sources must encompass Russian, Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian, Korean and Japanese materials, not to mention those written in various Turkic languages. Obviously, the use of all of those sources is likely to exceed the competence of a single scholar; nevertheless, it is fair to ask an author to identify major sources. In addition, the citing of non-English sources would have made this book more valuable.

Although the book covers a wide geographical and chronological range, it is remarkably free of factual and editorial errors. As a specialist on recent Russo-Japanese relations, I would quibble with the statement that the Russians "proposed that they should take over the island of Hokkaido as their share of the occupation of Japan" (226) at the end of the Pacific War. Stalin proposed the occupation of only half of Hokkaido. I am puzzled by the author's contention that "during the Khrushchev regime were exchanges made seeking to resume negotiations with the aim of terminating the state of war still existing between Japan and the USSR — once in 1961 and again in 1964" (242). As the state of war was terminated by the Joint Declaration of
1956, I am not certain what the author refers to in 1961 and 1964. In 1960 Khrushchev unilaterally abrogated the provision of the 1956 Joint Declaration that promised the return of the two small islands. The next serious negotiations to resolve the territorial dispute did not take place until the Brezhnev-Tanaka summit in 1973. Perhaps it reflects the prejudice of the reviewer, but the last two chapters devoted to the postwar period do not seem to have received the care that they deserve and that characterizes previous chapters.

Nevertheless, these are minor irritants in an otherwise fine book. Indeed this work adds luster to the Center for Russia in Asia at the University of Hawaii as the pioneer on Russia's relations with East Asia. Led by John Stephan, the author's mentor, the University of Hawaii has provided a valuable corrective to the essentially Eurocentric study of Russia. March's book follows this illustrious tradition, contributing to our understanding of Russia's interaction with the Asian and Pacific countries, a much neglected but important subject.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

University of California at Santa Barbara


Magocsi divides his work into ten chronological sections beginning with pre-Kievan times and ending with Ukraine's declaration of independence in 1991 -- the sixth time in the twentieth century that all or part of Ukraine proclaimed its independence, but the first assertion, he reminds us, that did not result from civil war or invasion, and the first that brought all Ukrainians into the decision-making process. Attention is given to socioeconomic and cultural developments throughout, and Magocsi highlights key documents and controversies in shaded inserts. One such insert outlines the debate over whether a common East Slavic language existed in Kievan Rus'. Another, set amidst a lengthy treatment of Cossack Ukraine, cites a 1660 travel account observing that women aggressively pursued their future husbands in this otherwise male-dominated culture. Another examines the name Ukraine, which was first used by the Poles to apply to a specific territory in the sixteenth century. Falling into disuse with the demise of Polish rule, the name "Ukraine" was resuscitated in the early nineteenth century when national activists began to speak of Ukraine as a kind of non-specific territory in which Ukrainians lived. Only in 1917 was Ukraine again used to refer to a specific territory.

In a particularly good chapter on the national renaissance in the nineteenth century, Magocsi stresses the importance of *Istoriia Rusov*, which contrasted "freedom-loving and democratic" Cossacks with the authoritarian, serfholding Muscovite culture. If this romanticized work inspired the Ukrainian patriots of the 1840s and 1850s, the publication of Shevchenko's *Kobzar* in 1840 "began a process of perceptual change whereby Shevchenko's contemporaries came to believe that the Little Russian dialect could perhaps become a full-fledged language." Rejecting the idea of multiple loyalties, "Shevchenko thought solely in terms of mutually exclusive Russian and Ukrainian identities" (362).
Considerable space is given to the complex set of events that comprise the revolution of 1917-20. Although Ukraine did not win independence, Magocsi believes that the energy and sacrifice that burst forth after 1917 on behalf of the national cause "... instilled in Ukrainians a firm sense of national purpose — achieved, moreover, not after several generations of peacetime cultural work, but in less than half a decade. From such a perspective, the Ukrainian revolution was a remarkable success" (520). Cultural advance continued in the twenties. By 1929, 97 percent of elementary students were enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools, while the number of secondary schools using Ukrainian jumped from 1 percent in 1922 to 66 percent by 1929, with another 16 percent using both Ukrainian and Russian. In 1930-31, 80 percent of all books and 90 percent of all newspapers were published in Ukrainian.

The Stalinist backlash of the 1930s is treated rather briefly. One shaded insert offers a compelling recollection of the personal horrors of the Great Famine. Magocsi concludes that at least 15 percent of Ukraine’s population died as a result of the famine, but notes that conclusive answers as to its cause continue to elude scholars. He says little about Ukraine’s great cities. There is no discussion of the destruction of several of Kiev’s churches in the 1930s, for example.

Magocsi’s discussion of the cultural thaw of the 1960s, the intense debates over sliianie (one wonders what would have happened in 1991 had republican boundaries been eliminated, as some Communist theoreticians recommended in the 1970s), and the crackdown on dissent under Brezhnev offers an interesting case study of changing Soviet views on nationality. More a form of political accommodation, Soviet Ukraini

anism did not compel the assimilationism of tsarist times, and most Ukrainians “seemed resigned to or even satisfied with functioning within a system that reflected the principle of a hierarchy of multiple loyalties” (663). Despite urbanization and linguistic russification, nearly all Ukrainians continued to know their language. Moreover, Ukrainian identity continued to reflect association with Ukrainian territory, rather than with language usage, a reality that helped lay the basis for Rukh’s tolerance of minority rights and for the absence of significant ethnic conflict today.

Viewing Ukraine as a multinational state, Magocsi devotes considerable attention to the plight of Jews, Crimean Tatars, and other minorities. Historiographical controversies appear in discussions of key figures such as Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and Ivan Mazepa. If the author updates his work in the future, I recommend that he add an essay on the nature of the sources used in the study of key events by scholars such as Sergei Solov’ev and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, whose views shaped the major historiographical schools. For now, we know something of their perspectives, but nothing about the depth of their scholarship or the sources they used.

Comprehensive, fairminded, and balanced, Magocsi’s volume is clearly written and eminently readable. It would make an excellent text for a course on the history of Ukraine, and those who teach Imperial Russian or Soviet history will also find many of its chapters suitable for use as supplementary reading assignments.

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