Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Political Elite - Clark, WA

Yury Polsky, West Chester University of Pennsylvania
BOOK REVIEWS


This volume is a timely, successful, and frequently compelling exploration of major trends and issues in the rich historiography of Stalinism. Its five scholarly essays and brief concluding afterword, by leading scholars from Britain, America, and Russia, were all completed in the period from late 1989 through early 1991, during the latter stages of the Gorbachev regime's failed attempt to reform socialism and re-invigorate the Soviet Union's political integrity.

The first essay, by the volume's editor and highly-regarded economic historian, the late Alec Nove, is entitled "Stalin and Stalinism—Some Introductory Thoughts." Nove provides a lucid overview of the central debates and research interests in current scholarship on the Stalin period. As he rightly points out, the fundamental yet difficult question customarily pursued by all who work in this field—What was Stalinism?—retains its urgency, and its frustrating elusiveness, even as the Stalinist system is now slowly unraveling. The search for the answer lies, in Nove's words, in a "detailed examination of the origins, causes, preconditions, rationale, essence, and nature of the Stalinist system and the role of Stalin himself." Nove strives in particular to outline the following areas of controversy: the impact of Russia's pre-revolutionary past on the emergence of Stalinism; the question of continuity between Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism; the possibility of alternatives to Stalin and his eventual re-definition of the revolution's destiny; the significance of opportunism, "revolutionary immorality," and exigent circumstance in the Bolsheviks' decisions and actions; the actual scale of human losses as a result of collectivization, famine, and the purges; and the contributions of "society studies" revisionism to our interpretation of the period.

In the second chapter, "Economic Aspects of Stalinism," R. W. Davies, a specialist in Soviet industrialization, offers a nuanced and cogent analysis of the Soviet economic system from the late 1920s up to 1953. His main argument is that the Stalinist economy in its final form was not simply an "administrative-command structure," as it has often been characterized. Davies complicates and refines this interpretive framework through a consideration of the varied economic, social, and political pressures on the system. These influences, he notes, led to often underestimated departures from the command model. For example, with respect to the basic decision-making process developed under Stalin, he finds a surprising degree of autonomy and resistance to the center at various levels of the political and economic bureaucracy. He also stresses the efficacy of numerous "market" or "quasi-market" mechanisms permitted in the system.

Sheila Fitzpatrick's "Constructing Stalinism: Reflections on Changing Western and Soviet Perceptions of the Stalin Era" forms the volume's third chapter, and is a superb discussion of the principal schools of thought on Stalinism that have arisen since the 1930s. Fitzpatrick, a preeminent figure in scholars' reformulation
of Soviet social and cultural history, delineates five distinct phases of interpretation. First, prevalent from the 1930s through the mid-1950s were traditional, encomiastic Soviet treatments of the era, or "Stalinist" Stalinism, as Fitzpatrick dryly puts it. The keynote of this scholarship was the "building of socialism," and the primacy of the economic infrastructure remained uncontested. The next phase, spanning the Cold War era as a whole, was dominated by Western scholars' "totalitarian" paradigm, in which the primacy of politics and political structures was assumed and elaborated.

The third major stage was Soviet revisionism after 1956. In a brief period that lasted until the early 1960s, Soviet scholars were more realistic in their depiction of Stalinism, and accommodated a measure of self-reproach in their judgments, but a general, fairly rigid Party line still held sway ultimately. In the 1970s and 1980s, the West's totalitarian model began to weaken, and a fourth phase, Western revisionism, took shape in a push for greater "historicization" of Soviet studies and heightened interest in social history. Such "revisionism," of course, continues to flourish today. The fifth and final major stage identified by Fitzpatrick is current Soviet revisionism (she completed the essay in late 1989), dating from the advent of Gorbachev and the era of "new thinking." Although similar to earlier, Khrushchev-era efforts in its critical outlook on Stalinism, the present wave of scholarship has already gone much farther and increasingly represents a fundamental questioning of the entire revolutionary and Soviet experience in Russia. On the question of what lies ahead in the study of Stalinism, Fitzpatrick properly foregoes specific predictions, and emphasizes instead the future benefits for research owing to the rising volume and variety of sources, and the greater ethnic diversity of those who will publish on Stalinism in the years to come.

In a fourth essay, perhaps the most provocative and challenging in the volume, J. Arch Getty, a leading authority on the purges and Stalinism in the 1930s, paradoxically urges the depoliticization of research and writing on the Stalin era as a means of better understanding its politics. The essay, entitled "The Politics of Stalinism," calls for the renunciation of ideologically-driven studies of the period. Getty's view is that beyond the numerous difficulties presented by the primary sources themselves, scholars' traditional hostility to the role of Stalinism in Russian history has had a distorting impact on the field. Rather than focus his attention on the overwhelming influence of both Stalin the individual and the phenomenon of Stalinism, Getty emphasizes instead their reception and acceptance by Soviet society. His ultimate goal is a "non-partisan sociology of Stalinism," in which the interplay of state and society is the consistent focus of interpretation.

Amidst the fascinating analysis of specific aspects of the period (the use of repression and terror indicated the weakness of the state, not its strength; the absence of a genuine "civil society" inevitably crippled the revolution's pluralistic impulses), Getty argues that Stalinism's principal causes were the "backwardness and customary violence" that had historically defined Russia's "plebeian culture." Characteristic of this essentially "peasant" culture, he maintains, were social conflict and class antagonisms, various kinds of illiberalism, continual experience of
war, and the tenacious localization of political and bureaucratic power. He thus concludes that because the salient features of Stalinism had been structurally pre-figured, ideology, i.e., socialism, was of minor importance in the maturation of the Stalinist system. Despite the tremendous value of Getty's approach in stressing long-term factors, a potential problem remains: in his efforts to combat ideological particularism and interpretive reductionism by drawing attention to deeper structures of causation, is he perhaps offering instead a kind of "sociological" reductionism, and in some respects an equally particularist reading of Russia's pre-Stalinist past?

Sergo Mikoyan's "Stalinism As I Saw It," the volume's fifth chapter, functions mainly as a critical commentary on many of the controversial issues raised in the previous four essays. His perspective on the topic is a distinctive one. Mikoyan is not a Soviet historian by training; his scholarly specialization is Latin American studies. His father, Anastas Mikoian, became an important Communist Party member after the revolution and worked closely with Stalin for many years. His interpretations are thus informed both by personal, subjective experience and his "scholarly outsider's" command of the field's primary sources and literature.

Because of the unusual background Mikoyan brings to an assessment of Stalinism, his essay, a wide-ranging, discursive, and not always crisply argued effort, pursues numerous tasks: source discussion, cultural and sociological critique, personal reminiscence, and objective analysis of disputed data. Of the many conclusions and ideas he proposes, among the most notable are his view that historical circumstances (the civil war, for instance) militated against multi-party governance as much as other factors did, his contention that the lives of Lenin and Stalin convincingly demonstrate the decisive role of personality in history, and his conviction that feasible, legitimate alternatives to Stalin and Stalinism indeed existed in the 1920s. Mikoyan's essay, although impressive in its scope, insightful and learned in its analysis, and passionate in its discussion of how current scholars should intellectually confront the astonishing horrors of the period, ultimately suffers in comparison with the volume's preceding chapters, all of whose authors are longtime specialists in Soviet history. From time to time, "Stalin As I Saw It" strikes one as a somewhat impressionistic reply to the other contributors' conclusions and arguments.

Alec Nove's brief afterword seeks both to give a basic coherence of vision to the contributors' varied efforts and, appropriately, to reject the notion that any meaningful interpretive closure concerning Stalinism is imminent. He succinctly recapitulates the most important issues treated in the volume, and for his own part endeavors to take a balanced position, neither fundamentally traditional nor explicitly revisionist, with respect to the major debates.

This volume is sensibly designed, and each essay is attractively and clearly presented. The subject and name index is also quite useful, given the extraordinary range of information and opinion covered by the contributors. Occasionally the detail and specificity of the analysis, coupled with regular reference to the works and arguments of other specialists, will likely make it difficult going for the general reader who does not already possess a basic familiarity with historians' de-
bates on the Stalin years. Nevertheless, although The Stalin Phenomenon is perhaps more accessible to the specialist in Soviet history, it can also be strongly recommended both for undergraduates with some training in modern Russian history, and to all those curious about the deeper historical causes and contemporary significance of the Soviet Union's recent collapse.

Girish N. Bhat


To introduce students to the Stalin era can be a frustrating task. To convey the terror and excitement of the period, one can assign a memoir of a prison camp victim or of an observer such as John Scott or Maurice Hindus. Such accounts, however, fail to explain the excesses of the Stalin era and whether, in Alec Nove's words, Stalin was "necessary." The twin goals of evoking the drama and addressing the interpretive debates have been admirably served by Chris Ward, Lecturer in the Department of Slavonic Studies at the University of Cambridge, in his new book Stalin's Russia.

Ward divides his book into roughly chronological sections on Stalin's Rise, Collectivization, Industrialization, Purges and Politics, War and Late Stalinism, and Culture and Society. In each, he summarizes basic events, then sets out various interpretive strands, and finally gives his own reasoned evaluation. An example is his chapter on collectivization. In his fourteen-page narrative of agricultural developments, a few vivid quotes from memoirs by Viktor Kravchenko and Maurice Hindus hint at the brutality of the period. The facts seem unobjectionable, except that Ward erroneously dates the decree of August 7, 1932, on the protection of socialist property (50).

Next, in ten pages Ward explicates various interpretations, using categories such as "Stalin centre stage," "Economic Dilemmas," "Economic Dilemmas Revisionized (sic)," "Popular Support," "Human Costs," and "Economic Results." Finally he weighs the evidence and produces a reasonable synthesis: that the Bolshevik government had inherited from the Tsars an economically backward country and an "obsession with economic development and national defence that had some basis in fact" (63); that the Bolshevik leaders' "fixation with the 'kulak danger' was ... a very powerful [fantasy]," especially in the crises of the late 1920s; and that "Stalin stumbled into a bloody civil war with the peasants, but he stumbled along a path which the party, increasingly reflecting his own ideological proclivities, was already inclined to take" (67). Turning to look "from below" at the actual encounters between ill-prepared enthusiasts and peasants, Ward acknowledges that "collectivization proceeded in a jerky, haphazard manner, much influenced by the accidents of place and personality" (68). As for debates on the impact of collectivization, Ward predicts that a "gradual accretion of studies of particular regions or social groups," made possible by the opening of archives,
should enable the resolution of these questions. However, he points out that in the arguments over whether socialized agriculture actually helped fund industrialization, historians and economists frequently talk past rather than to each other, and the latter too often underrate the significance of non-measurable variables—the scale of the foreign threat, the importance of ideology and the part played by meditations on Russia's past (70).

Finally, Ward puts Soviet events into perspective by recalling that industrialization everywhere caused hardship. "Stalin's agrarian revolution is noteworthy only for the scale and speed of its implementation, and the compression of the misery involved into an extraordinarily short time-span" (71). This suffering should also be seen in the context of our "very violent century," in which "the practice of exterminating whole populations in the pursuit of this or that social or political goal (albeit in wartime) was unexceptional" (71).

Ward takes the same approach in succeeding chapters. He points out how interpretations are colored by the availability of sources and the quirks of particular disciplines, and he puts events into their larger contexts, especially that of Bolshevik leaders' perceptions and predilections. He forcefully argues for this kind of understanding in his graceful conclusion: The purpose of academic history . . . [is] to see all around a problem; to understand and make comprehensible old policies, old faction and past lives. . . . And once we have made that imaginative leap we are no longer free to talk easily of the crimes and follies of this or that epoch, or to engage in the glib luxury of allotting praise or blame . . . the world becomes stranger, more complicated and less amenable to manipulation when we recognize the singularities of the past, see things otherwise, begin to think for ourselves, and falter before judging (229).

These meditations on the historian's craft are just one of the features that would make Ward's book useful in courses on Soviet history. In addition, the text includes footnotes identifying individuals and defining terms; Russian words and Soviet acronyms are identified in a glossary placed handily at the front of the book, along with two readable maps; and each section ends with an annotated bibliography.

However, Ward's concentrated prose and constant use of Russian terms would make this heavy reading for students. They also may have difficulty sorting out concepts. For example, in the section on the Purges, Ward discusses interpretations that use the totalitarian model, without defining that model until the final chapter (206). As a result, at first Ward seems to be identifying as "totalitarian" all interpretations that put Stalin at center stage and implying that they all depict a continuity between Lenin and Stalin (124-25, 129-30). Works such as Robert Tucker's books on Stalin do not fit such a description.

In giving students a vivid introduction to the historiography of Stalinism, Ward's book resembles Robert Daniels' The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of a Totalitarian Era (Lexington, MA, 1990), which excerpts various interpretations of the First Five-Year-Plan. While Daniels' book may be more conducive to class discussion, Ward's summaries and evaluations of the historians' arguments may leave the students with a more coherent sense of the overall picture. Ward's dispassion-
ate portrayal of conflicting interpretations does allow readers to form their own conclusions if they wish; but in his evaluations he also shows the reader how a historian should think through the evidence and logic of competing interpretations. In addition to being a serious contender for undergraduate course adoption, Stalin's Russia would be an excellent text for graduate courses, as well as a valuable historiographical guide for any scholar.

Nellie H. Ohr
Vassar College


There are still very few studies which try to analyze how Soviet society and economy under Stalin were functioning in reality. This of course is due to the poor quality and scarcity of sources on everyday life. Sheila Fitzpatrick now presents a social history of the peasants under Stalin until 1941. Based on her concept of "history from below," she tries to shed new light on the whole relationship of the Soviet state and peasantry. Using a picture dating back to the times of Peter the Great which shows the Mice burying the Cat, she challenges the hitherto accepted view that the kolkhoz was only an institution of state compulsion over the peasants. She claims to show the range of strategies Russian peasants used to cope with the state-inflicted trauma of collectivization, and the way they tried to modify the kolkhoz so that it served their purposes as well as the state's. This is a fascinating idea, since we already know that the land communes after 1861, in spite of their character as an instrument of state control, gave the peasants the possibility to realize their interests.

Fitzpatrick describes practically all aspects of life in the Soviet countryside, excluding only workers on state farms. To give an idea of the range of this book, I would like to enumerate some of the topics touched on. The introductory chapter is on the village in the 1920s. It follows the story of the struggle for collectivization, causing the famine of 1932-33. The migration of peasants into towns before and after the introduction of the passport regime is treated, too, as well as the question of kolkhoz landholding and the advantages and disadvantages of membership in the kolkhoz. Another chapter is devoted to the internal organization of the kolkhoz—the work regime, payments, taxes and the private plots. There is a look at the people outside the kolkhoz: independent former peasants, "otkhodniks" working outside the kolkhozy, and craftsmen. Of special importance for the argument is the description of the local authorities, including the kolkhoz chairmen and the purges. Material on the religion of the kolkhoz peasants, their everyday life, the structure of families and the possibilities of education is presented. Crime and violence, village feuds and the crucial question of denunciations are the topics of another chapter. The question of the living standards and political activities of the peasants is raised, as well as the celebrity of the small group of successful
stakhanovites and the procedure of election in the villages. The last chapter, already published separately, sheds light on rumors among the peasantry and on local show trials against kolkhoz chairmen in 1937-38. This wide range of topics is vividly illustrated by quotations from sources and the description of single local events. Helpful information for the reader is provided in a glossary of Russian terms, a chronology, an annotated bibliography, and a description of the sources. Many topics are thoroughly discussed, including peasant thinking on a second serfdom (although a stringent comparison of old strategies of resistance to serfdom with the resistance to the kolkhoz is not presented). In addition, the author offers a vivid portrait of the "Potemkin village," stressing the striking difference between the official picture of prosperity in the kolkhoz village and the downtrodden and miserable truth which nobody was allowed to mention in public. These are stimulating interpretations for the understanding of the Soviet village under Stalin. However, it is not always obvious whether the facts of the early 1930s also apply to a later period or whether they are representative at all. In some places the presentation avoids a clear judgment, and the reader remains somewhat in doubt about the argument. For example: Was the famine of 1932-33 caused by peasant sabotage, or was it the result of state terror? Both arguments are to be found. Were elections part of real "kolkhoz democracy" or an element of the Potemkin facade of the Soviet countryside?

Although Fitzpatrick uses new material from the archives, this book is based mainly on a thorough consideration of contemporary publications such as central and local newspapers, official documents and protocols of kolkhoz congresses in 1935. Archival data are mostly taken from the already known Smolensk archive. In particular, the peasant letters to Krest'ianskaia gazeta, available only for the years 1938 and 1939, were not used before. Taking the character of these sources into account, the interpretation raises questions. Fitzpatrick's concept of peasant resistance corresponds only too well to the peasant sabotage claimed by the state to justify the terror policy. Independent sources on that are extremely rare. Peasant letters, as Fitzpatrick recognizes, are an independent source only to some extent, as the peasants had to make use of state conceptions in order to get into print. Using statistical data, the findings often form a contrast to the official statements about peasant sabotage or peasant resistance as debated by Fitzpatrick. The so-called sabotage of field work looks different if we consider the severe loss of horses due to the lack of forage in the beginning of the 1930s. The alleged unwillingness of the kolkhozniks to work is not very convincing if we take into account the even greater labor surplus in the Soviet countryside after collectivization due to the annihilation of livestock and peasant crafts. Apart from short seasonal peaks, there was a permanent lack of labor for the kolkhozniks. To illustrate the difficulty of interpretation of official documents in only one point: Fitzpatrick takes the law forbidding the local authorities from expelling kolkhozniks from the kolkhoz in 1938 as "state care of the peasants." I found evidence for just the opposite interpretation. It was an attempt by the state to stop peasants from leaving the kolkhoz after the good harvest of 1937 by blaming the local authorities for mistakes.
Being familiar with most of the author's material and taking the wide range of possible interpretations of the sources with our present-day knowledge into account, I would like to argue many points. Since there is no room for this in a short review, I will select only a few examples. The main thing I feel uncomfortable with is the affirmation of the "kolkhoz democracy" movement in the mid-1930s. Did this really mean that influence of the peasants was increasing to include even the selection of kolkhoz chairmen? To me, this seems to be a misunderstanding of the role of elections under Stalin. The fact that local authorities were blamed for violating the will of the kolkhozniks does not yet mean that the regime wanted to give freedom of election to the peasants. In fact, the concept of "free election" by no means was new. Throughout this period voting remained an important part of everyday terror, breaking the will of the peasants. Starting with collectivization, it was the policy of the Stalin regime to legitimize its rural policy by forcing the peasants to vote "voluntarily" for the measures dictated by the state. The important change of policy regarding the private plots took place not only in 1935, as Fitzpatrick argues. State support for the private plots dates back to 1933 and was a reaction to the famine. The discussion on the new kolkhoz charter in 1935 did hardly more than turn the already existing norms into law. Fitzpatrick's belief in only passive resistance by the peasants causes her to underestimate the violence of protest, especially against the expropriation of cows, which was a fight for survival. She even blames Stalin for an "exaggeration of the danger" (63). I also doubt the argument that peasant resistance was directed primarily against the antireligious campaign rather than against collectivization itself. An important fact that contradicts the hypothesis that the kolkhoz in the end also served the purposes of the peasants is not analyzed in detail by Fitzpatrick, namely, the rapid deterioration of the conditions for survival within the kolkhozy in connection with the attack on the private plots in 1939.

In sum, we have to thank Fitzpatrick for a stimulating book that gives us a good impression of life in the kolkhozy. This is especially true for the attempt to challenge the traditional view of state-controlled kolkhozy. Fitzpatrick certainly is right in affirming that the kolkhozniks somewhat aligned themselves with the kolkhoz system by getting used to it and that, to a limited extent, they were successful in undermining state demands. However, there is still much work to be done in writing the social history of the peasants before coming to final and fully convincing conclusions. Fitzpatrick's book is an excellent starting point for further research.

Stephan Merl

Universität Bielefeld

Sheila Fitzpatrick ends her book with a pointed and provocative question about the relationship between the Communist Party and the old intelligentsia: "In cultural terms," she asks, "who was assimilating whom?" (p. 256). In this beautifully interlocking collection of essays, she explores this relationship in its many facets. The collection contains two previously unpublished pieces, a wide ranging introduction to the themes of the book and an essay on Andrei Zhdanov's little known foray into the cultural field in 1936 with his attack on the composer Dmitrii Shostakovich. Most of the essays date from the 1970s and were previously published separately. The book, however, offers far more than a retrospective of Fitzpatrick's work. The articles all focus on the intelligentsia—artistic, technical, academic, Party and non-Party—and its changing relationship to the Party and the state, disclosing a set of patterns and connections that might not be apparent in a dispersed body of work.

Although Fitzpatrick concludes with a question, her own answer is never in doubt. The central thesis of the book is that the intelligentsia influenced the values of the Soviet regime as much if not more than it was itself influenced. Fitzpatrick consistently aims to explode the idea that the intelligentsia was merely a supine creature of Stalinist ideology. Highly attentive to the interaction between structural change, culture, and ideology, she examines how the values and traditions of the intelligentsia affected the Party's views, how newly promoted workers and peasants acquired "culture," and how the Party's line was ultimately shaped by older values and newer class formations.

Throughout the civil war and NEP, self-consciously "proletarian" groups such as RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) and other militant cultural organizations aggressively sought to define and control the content and orientation of literature, art, and music. Fitzpatrick describes a three-way struggle between "proletarian" groups, the left-wing avant garde, and more mainstream, classical, apolitical humanists. In the 1920s, both the avant garde and the militant proletarians became increasingly marginalized, although the latter experienced a brief revival during the Cultural Revolution (1928-31). Yet by the end of the Cultural Revolution, Pokrovskii's Marxist school of history, the various "withering-away" theorists of the state, the law, the family, and the school, the proletarian groups of music, art, and literature, and the avant garde had been largely discredited. By 1937, the regime's endorsement of high culture reached its apogee. Fitzpatrick argues that the Bolshevik Party and the intelligentsia had a great deal in common. Both shared a respect for high culture, both believed that the masses needed enlightenment, and most importantly, both were elite, privileged groups "and neither wanted to admit it." (5)

Much of this information is known, partly as a result of Fitzpatrick's own enormous contribution to Soviet history, partly by the efforts of other scholars such as Lynn Mally, Katerina Clark, Frederick Starr and others. What is new and signif-
significant about The Cultural Front is that it allows us to view the changes in Party policy alongside the process by which a new Soviet intelligentsia was formed. In connecting these two often separately understood phenomena, Fitzpatrick makes a fascinating argument about culture and the making of a new elite.

Between 1928 and 1937, the Party created a new, Soviet-trained intelligentsia. A generation of young people (known as the vydvizhentsy) was recruited, educated, and promoted from the working class into the managerial elite within an astonishingly short period of time. Experiencing a dizzying upward mobility, they were eager to absorb the high culture of the older intelligentsia. They urged their own children to move beyond a narrow technical education and to study the humanities and pure sciences. Yet once a new Soviet elite had been formed, Fitzpatrick maintains that Stalin's attitude toward the working class changed. "Their anti-intellectual and anti-elite feelings were no longer politically useful," on the job, within political institutions, or in the realm of culture (178). She concludes that, "from the first half of the 1930s, the intelligentsia—Communist and non-Party, technical and cultural—became an unambiguously privileged group" (245). The leadership "was inwardly convinced" that "real culture" was to be found among nonproletarians and noncommunists" (245).

Fitzpatrick also considers the relationship between the vydvizhentsy and the great purges (1936-38). She argues that the chief beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution and of the purges were the vydvizhentsy who filled the places vacated by the managers and administrators destroyed in the purges. "As a result of the Great Purges," she notes, "this group received dramatic promotions into industrial, government and Party leadership" (150). Yet if we understand the cohort of vydvizhentsy to be those who received higher education during the Cultural Revolution (1928-31) and if more than 140,000 workers were promoted to responsible administrative and managerial positions between 1928 and 1933 (161), then surely the vydvizhentsy made up a substantial portion of the managerial strata purged in 1937-38. Who benefitted from the purges and who suffered? Fitzpatrick concludes that the great majority of vydvizhentsy survived the purges and prospered as a result of them (176). Yet questions remain about differences in the experience of early and later graduates. For if promotions were rapid during the Cultural Revolution and the first vydvizhentsy the chief beneficiaries, how did they manage to escape the decimation of the managerial elite?

Fitzpatrick pushes her argument even further, however, claiming that Stalin may have engineered the purges as a way of "solving the problem of their (vydvizhentsy) promotion" (181). The idea that a blood purge was necessary to permit upward mobility in a society undergoing vast industrial expansion and desperately short of trained personnel makes little sense. Moreover, if the victims and the beneficiaries of the purges were, in fact, members of overlapping cohorts, the notion of the purges as a planned mechanism for upward mobility loses much of its explanatory power. The process may have been more complicated than this explanation suggests.

Yet these criticisms do not in any way detract from the value of this volume. This is the rare collection, distinguished by both breadth and internal coherence.
The individual essays are of high quality, and the sum is greater than the parts. From high Party politics to the shop floor, from culture to structure, Shostakovich to RAPP, Fitzpatrick explores the relationship between the intelligentsia and Soviet power in all its many dimensions. She has done both teachers and scholars a great service by collecting and publishing these essays in a single volume.

Wendy Goldman
Carnegie Mellon University


These two books on N. I. Bukharin represent stages in the reevaluation of his status as the most important Soviet leader to pose a viable alternative to Stalinism. Despite their limitations, these books raise questions that require some alteration of this accepted view.

In The Tragedy of Bukharin, the more valuable of these two books, Donny Gluckstein presents a full-scale Trotskyist critique of Bukharin’s intellectual development and politics from his Imperialism and World Economy written during World War I to his final conflict with Stalin in 1928-29. Gluckstein takes positions that directly challenge conventional Western views. He approves of Bukharin’s Left Communist phase because he believes that Bukharin in this period was at his most revolutionary and most supportive of the working class. It was in this period, he argues, that Bukharin wrote consistent, innovative, and valuable works from an orthodox Marxist standpoint. Gluckstein evaluates Left Communist ideology as progressive because it reflected confidence and optimism on the part of both intellectuals and workers. He is consequently tolerant of the radicalism of War Communism, though he admits that the Bolsheviks’ goals in that period were unrealistic.

In line with these views, Gluckstein argues that the introduction of NEP and Bukharin’s turn to the Right reflected a loss of confidence in the working class and represented the degeneration of the revolution. NEP, in his view, hindered the creation of a “truly free society,” because it revived “the old tyranny of wealth” and laid the basis for the new tyranny of bureaucracy that developed under Stalinism (92-93). He argues that Bukharin was mistaken in his optimistic view of NEP as the logical continuation of the revolution and a stage on the road to socialism. And despite his Right-wing economic policies, Gluckstein points out, Bukharin contributed the most, after Stalin, to the formation of Stalinism with his harsh treatment of the opposition.

Gluckstein challenges the prevailing post-Soviet consensus on Bukharin and the NEP on many points. He presents a balanced defense of the Left Opposition’s alternative to Bukharin’s economic policies. He rejects the views of Chaianov,
Danilov, and Lewin that a *kulak* class as such did not exist, and criticizes Bukharin for "capitulating" to the *kulaks*. He attacks Bukharin sharply as the Soviet leader most responsible for the Komintern's failures in Britain and China. In his last and longest chapter, Gluckstein attempts to deconstruct the accepted view that Bukharin posed an alternative to Stalinism. He argues that Bukharin's economic policy alternative to Stalinist industrialization—balanced growth—would have been highly unstable and would have left the Soviet Union a backward Third World country "at the mercy of international capital and the bony hand of hunger" (233). He even questions whether it should be considered a genuine alternative policy, because Bukharin never attempted to challenge the bureaucracy and organize serious support for it. He concludes by questioning Aesopian interpretations of Bukharin's last writings and arguing that from 1930 on Bukharin never challenged Stalin and in the wake of Hitler essentially accepted Stalinism as an unavoidable evil.

Gluckstein writes clearly and concisely, and his defense of the Left and attack on the Right is nuanced and balanced. His sources include recent literature on Soviet social and economic history as well as new collections of Bukharin's writings and letters drawn from the archives. The book is stimulating because for him the issues of the 1920s have not lost their relevance and immediacy, enabling him to recapture the intensity that drove that era's debates. Gluckstein still holds to some discredited Leftist views, however, such as that the former Tsarist officers, officials, and specialists in Soviet Russia prevented the formation of a socialist state in the civil war period (38). Such views also weaken his criticism of Bukharin's proposals by distracting him from his usually good awareness of history. The instability that Bukharin's approach might have caused would have been minor compared to the crises that accompanied Stalinism. The image of a Bukharinist Soviet Union as an impoverished Third World country (by no means the only possible outcome) looks almost rosy compared to the polluted, decrepit, despairing successor states trying to reform themselves out of near-Third World status today. And his defense of Trotsky as posing the only real alternative to Stalinism by the 1930s could be criticized on the same grounds that he criticizes Bukharin.

Still, Gluckstein's emphasis on Bukharin's early Leftism is a useful corrective to the prevailing emphasis on his later period, and his presentation of Bukharin's career from the Left standpoint shows Bukharin to have been more ruthless and more blind to the consequences of his politics than is generally acknowledged in the literature.

Similar arguments are also raised in *Bukharin in Retrospect*, the result of an international symposium on N. I. Bukharin held in West Germany in 1988. The nineteen articles in this collection, by European, Russian, Chinese, and American scholars, are grouped into the categories of the revolutionary politician, the economist, and the political theorist, but most deal with the Bukharin alternative to Stalinism.

The articles that highlight the limits of Bukharin's liberalism, his ambivalence about the market and the private sector, and the effects of political power and ideological conflict on his awareness of alternatives are the most noteworthy.
historian Aleksandr Kan examines Bukharin's influence during the civil war on the labor movement in Scandinavia, where his writings served as the basis for the education of the radical Left. To Scandinavians in the Komintern, Bukharin appeared Russia-centered, inflexible, and authoritarian. Kan cites Scandinavian activists' interviews with Bukharin, in which he favors liquidation of the kulaks and "a revolutionary offensive war waged by the victorious proletariat against existing capitalist states," and justifies "the deaths of millions for the sake of a communist future" (41). No study I have seen cites these sources or the degree of Leftist extremism that Bukharin shows in them.

Kenneth Tarbuck's examination of Bukharin's views on "market socialism" shows that Bukharin, even during NEP and the debate with Preobrazhenskii, predicted that the market would "prepare its own demise" (102-03) because it was incompatible with socialism in the long term. Jiří Kosta contrasts Bukharin's radical ideas in the civil war, described as "precursors of Stalinism," with his NEP-era emphasis on equilibrium and balanced growth. He argues that Bukharin was neither a supporter of market socialism nor an opponent of central planning. V. P. Danilov, criticizing the Stalinist dogma that Bukharin opposed the socialist transformation of agriculture and supported the kulaks, argues that Bukharin supported the "cooperative collectivization" approach advocated by Chaianov.

Pierre Broué argues that the views of Bukharin and Trotsky converged by the end of the 1920s, and regrets that they did not find a way to ally against Stalin. Moshe Lewin finds valuable insights on bureaucratization in Bukharin's later writings, but argues that Bukharin's "intoxication with power" in his struggle with the Left, and his undue optimism for NEP, distracted him from the danger posed by the bureaucracy until too late. Silvio Pons sees Bukharin as favoring the development of pluralism and civil society, but recognizes his acceptance of Stalinist political approaches in the struggle with the Left and his disregard for the Party's authoritarianism until it was too late. Ernest Mandel argues that Bukharin failed to pose a serious alternative to Stalinist bureaucratic domination because he misperceived the conflict with the Left as primarily over economic policy rather than the power of the bureaucracy. Despite their ideological differences, these articles, like Gluckstein's monograph, generally emphasize the radicalism of Bukharin's Leftist phase and reevaluate his economic alternative to Stalinism in light of his harshness against the Left.

The remaining articles generally echo the Prologue by Bukharin's widow Anna Larina-Bukharina in reasserting the importance of Bukharin's theories as valid political, economic, and social alternatives to Stalinism. Two economists defend Bukharin's theories as an alternative to the Left and to Stalinism. Karl Kühne examines the evolution of Bukharin's concept of balanced economic growth and argues that Soviet economic development confirmed Bukharin's views. Aleksandar Vacic asserts that Bukharin advocated a mixed economy in the long term in opposition to Preobrazhenskii's argument that the socialist sector would eventually have to absorb the private sector. In his effort to attack socialism, Vacic cites CMEA statistics (81) that attribute 100 percent of Soviet agricultural output to the socialist sector from 1960 to 1985, completely ignoring private plot production.
These articles depict Bukharin as more supportive of the market and capitalism than he actually was, especially judging from the Tarbuck and Kosta articles.

Two articles discuss Bukharin's influence in China. Yin Xuyi and Zheng Yifan, historians at the Institute for the History of the International Labor Movement in Beijing, outline the history of Bukharin's writings in China. They were popular in the 1920s, anathema from 1938 until the late 1970s, then revived after the Cultural Revolution and adopted by most academics. Zheng Yifan himself played a central role in translating and popularizing Bukharin's works. Su Shaozhi, former director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong-Thought in Beijing, exemplifies the last phase in an essay on Bukharin's criticism of centralized state authority that quotes Deng Xiaoping criticizing the Chinese government in very similar terms.

The remaining articles deal with narrow topics: Bukharin's "socialist humanism" (by his daughter Svetlana Gurvich-Bukharina); his theory of a transitional society (Herman Schmid); his alleged anarchism (Sidney Heitman); and NEP agrarian policies (Alessandro Stanziani). The mechanic Valerii Pisigin, founder of a Nikolai Bukharin Club in Naberezhnye Chelny, defends Bukharin as a true Leninist against Stalin's distortions, characteristic of Soviet views in 1988.

While some articles in Bukharin in Retrospect present interesting information, most are too short to develop the issues they raise adequately. They vary in quality, and needed more conscientious editing, as some show inadequate awareness of the literature. Reinhart Kössler's article on the dispute over China after the April 1927 Shanghai massacre asserts that Bukharin agreed with the Left, and with Stalin, that Chinese revolutionaries should focus on the towns and treat peasants as secondary actors, overlooking Cohen's evidence (Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, 257) that Bukharin recognized the primary importance of peasants and peasant nationalism in colonial regions. This symposium would have been more valuable had it been prepared a few years later and based on new archival materials.

The idea of the Bukharinist alternative to Stalinism emerges from these two books somewhat compromised. Both show that his early Leftism was more extreme and his NEP-era commitment to balanced growth and a mixed economy more ambivalent than usually acknowledged. They also reinforce arguments by Stephen Cohen and others that Bukharin's harsh treatment of the Left and his tardiness in recognizing Stalin's control over the bureaucracy compromised and ultimately doomed his moderate economic policies during the NEP. The views expressed in these books, however, tend to be polemical and often ideological. They indicate the need for archival investigation of Bukharin's career and contributions.

Mark B. Tauger
West Virginia University
Sergo Beriia begins by asserting the son's duty to present a balanced, judicious account of his father's life. However, he does nothing of the kind. According to his son, Lavrentii Beriia was a humane and cultured man who rose quickly to the leadership of the Georgian party through his hard work and intelligence. In that position, he attempted as best he could to limit the terror in Georgia and to defend the Georgian intelligentsia. In 1938 he was chosen to reform the NKVD, and he worked to end unjust repressions, free the innocent, stop torture, and improve living conditions in the GULag. By doing so, he "became for millions of GULag prisoners a symbol of liberation." From 1942 to 1953 he had nothing to do with the repressive apparat. Instead he occupied himself with military defense, foreign espionage, and the spectacularly successful atomic bomb project. He opposed all of the Stalinist political crimes: the terror of 1937-38, the invasion of Finland, the Katyn massacre, the national deportations, the postwar anti-Semitic trials, the Leningrad Affair, and so on. He alone would speak his mind in Stalin's presence. His chief fault was naïve loyalty, which led to his perfidious betrayal and execution after Stalin's death in 1953.

Now some of this may to some extent be true. I am willing to entertain, based on other sources, the argument that Beriia did at least partially protect the Georgian intelligentsia in 1937. However, Sergo Beriia insists on his father's saintliness to such a degree as to cast suspicion on all claims. In some cases, published documentation proves his account to be completely false. On several occasions Beriia insists that his father vocally opposed the deportation of the North Caucasus peoples in 1943-44. However, documents published in 1992 reveal that Beriia not only zealously executed the Politburo's deportation decree but also successfully petitioned Stalin to widen the decree and deport other North Caucasus nationalities.

This gets at the book's fundamental flaw. Beriia never makes clear how he came to know any given fact. He clearly has had no privileged archival access (indeed he complains of closed archives), so his only possible source for any of his major political assertions would be his father. (Sergo Beriia was born in 1924 and so was twenty-nine years old when his father was executed.) Only on a few occasions, however, does he make clear that he is relaying information confidentially revealed to him by his father. One assumes, then, that the rest of the time he is relying on hearsay. This makes the book worthless as a historical source. One can say with certainty only that Lavrentii Beriia sired a fiercely loyal son.

This is a shame since Beriia has emerged from the recent archival revelations as one of the most interesting and ambiguous figures of the Stalin era. In the few months between Stalin's death and his own arrest, he promoted ambitious reforms in foreign relations, nationalities policy, penal reform, and economics. Oddly, Sergo Beriia almost entirely neglects this part of his father's career, although it is the key to any even mildly positive evaluation. Beriia's book does manifest one potentially interesting
leitmotif: an intense hatred of the party apparat and its leadership, above all, Zhdanov, Khrushchev, and Malenkov. At all times, he is at pains to blame repression on the Party apparat and to present the military, economic, and security organs as representatives of a largely non-ideological professionalism. If Beriia inherited this outlook from his father, and that is not altogether implausible, this would be an important psychological insight. However, doubt is raised by the fact that the book presents Malenkov and Beriia as political enemies, when Beriia’s recently published petitions from prison (as well as other sources) clearly show that Malenkov was his closest friend and ally among the Stalinist elite.

The reader, then, is left with little of value. Sergo Beriia was involved in military intelligence during World War II, and his occasional autobiographical accounts of that activity, in particular his work work at the Tehran and Yalta summits, might be of interest to specialists. Otherwise the book is a disappointment for those hoping for some new insights into the still quite obscure political career of Lavrentii Beriia.

Terry Martin

University of Chicago


This admirable study sheds new light on the political history of the Soviet Union between the 1920s and 1950s. Combining research in numerous published and unpublished sources, including several formerly closed Soviet archives, Professor Knight gives us the most intimate view of a major Soviet leader other than Lenin, Stalin, Bukharin, Trotsky or Khrushchev. Chapters on Beria’s early career contribute to our understanding of how Soviet politics worked in the non-Russian republics and at the middle levels of the hierarchy. The book contains valuable information on dozens of lesser known, but nonetheless important, figures. Perhaps the most exciting part of the book is that covering the post-war years, which offers excellent treatments of the "Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee Affair," the "Doctor’s Plot," the struggle between Zhdanov and Malenkov, the Soviet nuclear program, and the judicial farce preceding Beria’s execution. The author broadens the common image of Beria as secret police boss to present a fuller picture of a powerful administrator who shaped the evolution of Soviet government, economy and society. Knight argues that despite his notorious cruelty, sexual perversions and political ruthlessness, Beria was intelligent enough to understand the weaknesses of the Stalinist system, and that only liberalizing reforms could guarantee the long-term survivability of the USSR (though she pushes this point a bit too far). The edition contains numerous interesting photographs.

Knight adheres to limited aims: tracing the life and career of an important political/administrative figure. Beria the man remains elusive, although it is hard to see how any biographer could render personable any of the key leaders of the Stalinist system: all were fanatically devoted careerists who worked long days, took
little leisure, and salvaged only bare rudiments of family life. Few left personal
texts. Stalin’s First Lieutenant is not a social history, and many groups whose
destiny Beria affected remain in the background: the personnel of the police appa-
ratus, the population of the GULag, the deported nationalities. Similarly, Beria’s
role in the economy seems underemphasized. Specialists may pick a fight or two
over the fine points. In the larger picture Molotov was actually more of a “first
Lieutenant” than Beria. And even if Beria was more prominent for a decade, stal-
warts like Anastas Mikoian, Lazar Kaganovich, Andrei Andreevich Andreev, and
several others remained extremely important: certainly their staying power was
greater than Beria’s, and if he overshadowed them, his position was no less shakey
than theirs. Here and there a bit more historical background would have been desir-
able for the classroom audience the book deserves, especially on the revolution,
civil war, and NEP. A few errors mar the text (on page 127 the number of Balkars
deported in 1944 is approximately ten times their total population in 1944). Ty-
pos are rare (Dekanazov instead of Dekanozov on page 127, spornik instead of
sbornik on page 281). Though Professor Knight interviewed Beria’s widow and
son, she did not have a chance to see Sergei’s lengthy apologia for his father, pub-
lished only in 1994; the (sensationalistic) reminiscences of atomic spymaster
Pavel Sudoplatov (and the American responses thereto); or David Holloway’s
Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956. Never-
theless, Amy Knight has given us a biography that will become a standard in the
field and a challenge to others who will undertake biographical studies of major
Soviet leaders.

Michael Gelb
Franklin and Marshall College

Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives. Edited by J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Man-
nning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 294 pp. $59.95 cloth;
$17.95 paper.

This is a book with a mission, to lay to rest in a meaningful and comprehen-
sive way the relevance of the “totalitarian” paradigm in Soviet history by offering
recent archival research on the various political, economic, social and demo-
graphic dimensions of Stalin’s purge policies. In these terms, the editors have
achieved mixed success.

They have assembled a series of essays which do offer “more complete and bal-
anced” perspectives on politics, life and labor in the USSR between the 1920s and
1940s. The editorial arguments on the need for more verifiable kinds of evidence
to understand Soviet history are admirable and appropriate. Although some of the
essays may seem hurried and provisional, filled with leading questions and qualifi-
cations, they are all equally interesting and readable, providing a healthy dose of
new information and challenges to an ongoing debate.

The first essays in this collection (Getty on sources, Viola on peasant life and
culture, Ritterspoon on conspiratorial thinking, Manning on economic crises,
and Thurston on the Stakhanovites) confront what we might call the semiotic background of the purges: the political and cultural myths, as well as the real events and ideological models, through which Soviets, and historians after them, either justified or made sense of the purges. Other essayists (Starkov on Commissar Ezhov, Hoffman on Moscow's factories, Manning on rural purges, Reese on the Red Army, Kuromiya on coal miners) provide the essential building blocks for future interpretations of the purges by their precise biographies, micro-histories and "local" case studies. Starkov and Hoffman have applied archival research with special care and success. Yet other essayists (Getty, Chase, Fitzpatrick, Nove and Wheatcroft) offer innovative, detailed and well-defended studies of the scope of the purges among elites and the population in general. Their work offers scholars significant, well-documented parts to the larger, incomplete puzzle of the "terror."

Unfortunately, the editors set a rather sharp polemical tone in the first pages by arguing for the radical novelty of these approaches, methods and sources. Scholars who disagree have, by no coincidence, created a small body of literature in response to the style and the argument of the book, as recent articles in the Times Literary Supplement, New York Review of Books, and Politics and Society attest. Students of Russian history can only be grateful for this exchange. But the tones of professional polemic and interpretive certitude from voices on both sides seem altogether inappropriate and premature. The archives of the former Soviet Union are by no means so completely open for historians to make decisively informed and balanced judgments on the purges as a whole.

The editors offer reasonable apologies as to why these essays may not make a satisfactory and complete collection for all interested readers. But, having raised a set of crucial issues and questions for Soviet history, they still leave their book and that history with some blank spots. Several of the contributors relied perhaps too heavily on secondary sources and easily accessible primary sources for their research. The book as a whole does not subject its new kinds of evidence to the most essential kind of scrutiny by providing more institutional and professional studies of the police and government apparatuses which ordered and organized the purges in the first place. In order to remain true to their subtitle, the editors might also have chosen several younger, less established scholars, and more Russian scholars, to join in the work of this edition and share their findings from the archives, especially with regard to the impact of the purges on the arts and sciences and the nationality republics and regions.

In sum, perhaps we need the work of a new generation of scholars, unencumbered by the false assumptions and language of traditional and revisionist "Sovi- etology," before our perspectives can become truly "new."

Michael Smith
University of Dayton
Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics—Conversations with Felix Chuev.

This work is being advertised as one of the most important historical sources to emerge from the glasnost' era and, along with Khrushchev's remembrances, one of the two indispensable memoir sources for the Stalin era. One must qualify this claim by noting that these are not strictly speaking Molotov's memoirs, but rather excerpts from 140 conversations between Molotov and the Soviet writer Felix Chuev, which took place regularly from 1969 to 1986. Thus the first conversation took place when Molotov was already seventy-nine years old and they continued until his death at age ninety-six. These conversations were not taped. Rather, we are given excerpts (about 15 percent) from Chuev's massive diary of those conversations, arranged and presented topically, rather than chronologically, by Chuev himself. Nevertheless, despite these considerable qualifications, one must agree that the work represents a unique and remarkably valuable historical source.

The work is not valuable, however, in its "lifting the curtain of the obsessive secrecy of the Soviet state," as the publisher promises. On matters of state secrecy, Molotov is systematically uncandid. He maintains that there were no secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Nazis did murder the Polish officers at Katyn, the 1936-38 show trials were based on a solid core of fact, there was no substantial famine in 1933, and so on. Unfortunately, Chuev insistently focuses on just such major events, where Molotov is most evasive, and ignores the many interesting details of everyday political life which Molotov mentions in passing. Chuev's other principal interest, Molotov's opinions on the major Soviet personalities of his era, produces more interesting material. Still, it is Molotov's unrepentant, unreconstructed defense of the Stalinist legacy that makes the book interesting. What emerges from Molotov's fervid defense is a fascinating portrayal of the mentality and political culture of the Stalinist elite.

The leitmotif of Molotov's remembrances is his fear of the rightist deviation, which he believed had triumphed under the leadership of Khrushchev. Indeed, much of Molotov's conversation revolves around his attempts to comprehend Khrushchev's victory and his own defeat. He admits that Khrushchev's new course, which Molotov summarizes with the slogan "Life under Stalin was hard; from now on it is going to be better," was popular, and that the majority in society and the Party was against Stalin. This belief in the popularity and ubiquity of the rightist deviation pervades Molotov's account of the terror. In his telling, the Party was plagued with bouts of resistance from rightists until 1937, and only the terror ended this problem. Molotov repeatedly states that the terror was a necessary and basically correct policy, but that excesses occurred. However, when Chuev presses him on these excesses, Molotov responds that in fact the terror did not go far enough. It missed Mikoian and Khrushchev. Other Stalinists—Kalinin, Voroshilov, Beria—are also labelled hidden rightists. Molotov's obsession with the rightist danger leads to a surprising personal evaluation. I had expected the politically sophisticated Molotov to have nothing but contempt for the politically
naive Bukharin. In fact, Molotov praises Bukharin's theoretical abilities quite fulsomely and portrays his defection as a major loss for the Stalinist group.

The feeling of political isolation implicit in Molotov's belief in the ubiquity of rightist sentiments finds expression in Molotov's comments about the Stalinist leadership's political style. In Molotov's telling, political power under Stalin was not at all bureaucratically routinized. Molotov revels in anecdotes about drinking bouts at Stalin's dacha and private film screenings in the Kremlin, tales familiar to us from existing memoir sources. However, Molotov consistently endows these tales with political significance. He tells of the emergence of a close group around Stalin in Lenin's last years. This group met informally to decide all important political decisions, which were then formally sanctioned by the Politburo. In the 1920s, Trotsky and other oppositionists were excluded. However, even in the high Stalinist period, Molotov excludes from this inner circle such long-time Politburo members as Andreev, Kalinin, Rudzutak, and Kosior. In keeping with this focus on tight personal relations, Molotov places great emphasis on each individual's circle of acquaintances. Enukidze is suspect for his relations with ballet dancers, Voroshilov for his ties to painters, Kalinin because he did not drink with them. In seeking reasons for his own fall into disgrace in 1952, Molotov blames his wife's careless choice of company. Even Lenin, whom Molotov orthodoxly places a rank above Stalin, is censured for his questionable choice of friends.

These represent some central themes that run through Molotov's sprawling recollections. Each reader will also undoubtedly find useful nuggets relating to their own areas of interest. I, for instance, was struck by Molotov's strong expressions of Russian nationalism and his pervasive ethnic stereotyping. In closing, one should note the editor, Albert Resis, has taken considerable liberties with Chuev's text. He has reorganized it to create a more linear chronological narrative, and has removed much of Chuev's side of the conversations. This produces a more readable book, but sacrifices the sense of conversation present in the Russian original. Finally, one should note that the indefatigable Chuev also succeeded in speaking to Kaganovich toward the end of his long life, and has published those conversations in 1992 in an as yet untranslated work, Tak govoril Kaganovich (Thus Spoke Kaganovich).

Terry Martin
University of Chicago


In 1985, when Western historiography broke its long silence regarding Soviet society during World War II, Susan Linz, editor of The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, noted that "over fifteen thousand Russian volumes have been written about the Great Patriotic War," but in the West "little research has been
done to understand the ways in which World War II affected Soviet economic, political, or social systems." Regretfully, after nine years the situation has not significantly changed, although we have seen two important publications recently (The Soviet Home Front, 1941-1945, by John Barber and Mark Harrison, and World War II and the Soviet People: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, edited by John Garrard and Carol Garrard). Considering the historiographic vacuum, we should welcome the publication of Moskoff's monograph, focusing as it does on a crucial issue of the period, namely, the food supply problem.

The first merit of Moskoff's work consists in the very fact that he chose the subjects of food procurement and distribution in wartime, which are usually hidden behind the other component of total war administration, that is, industrial mobilization. As far as the study of World War I is concerned, such an underestimation of the significance of public food policy in Russia or in other warring countries is quite understandable. This happened because total war regimes during World War I have been discussed from the viewpoint of the formation of "state monopolistic capitalism." Analysts of Soviet wartime policy during World War II may not be able to find similar ways to legitimize the imbalance of interest.

However, they also tend to concentrate attention on industrial mobilization. It is true that we have Alec Nove's brief article in The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, focusing on agricultural policy during the war, but I must say that it is an insufficient and incomplete work even as a starting point for the discussion. One of the reasons for ignorance of Soviet food policy during World War II seems to be the lack of available materials for researching the issue. Nove's work is based only on published Soviet literature.

Moskoff overcame this problem, relying upon two independent sources: diplomatic archives in the United States and interviews with emigrants from the Soviet Union. It seems that the evacuation of the foreign diplomatic corps to Kuibyshev (Samara) during World War II gave foreigners a chance to be in touch with the realities of life in the Soviet provinces. Based on his interviews with emigrants, Moskoff presents vivid pictures of the evacuation of refugees, the real diet of soldiers, a barter economy, the blockade of Leningrad, starvation in general, and cannibalism, all of which could not be fully reflected in official documents. It must be added that Moskoff filters this data through a humanistic lens.

The key concept of Moskoff's book may be summarized, in my words, as a factual decentralization of the Soviet state during World War II, enforced by the necessity to "rely upon local food resources." In Moskoff's opinion, comprehensive planning of a national economy is impossible even in peacetime. Central planning works best when it "channels resources to areas that have been given priority status" (2). During the war, therefore, central planning functioned mainly in order to relegate scarce food resources to the needs of the army. As for the civilian population, "a decision was made early in the war to decentralize production and distribution and to require the population explicitly to rely on local resources for most of its food" (3). According to Moskoff, the Communist Party was forced to promote private economic activity, using vestiges of NEP, which had been liqui-
dated barely a decade earlier. In short, the author criticizes the stereotype "total war regime = central planning."

Moskoff proves his idea by analyzing many phenomena during the war such as the expansion of individual gardening and of subsidiary farms affiliated with state industrial enterprises, the rejuvenation of the collective farm market and so on. For example, the sown area of subsidiary farms increased from 1.4 million hectares on the eve of the war to 5 million hectares in 1945 (101). As a proportion of all food sales, the collective farm market went from 20 percent in 1940 to 51 percent in 1945 (153). The author also notes hidden signs of localism such as toleration of the black market by authorities, flexible implementation of food rationing systems and so forth.

An important issue in this book is a change in the method of food procurement for the Soviet army. Logistical organizations of the Soviet army abandoned centralism early in the war and "turned to local food sources." A collective work on which Moskoff relies (Tyl sovetskih vooruzhennykh sil v Velikoi otechestven- noi voine [1977]) says that the first turning point in the abandonment of centralism was the counterattack near Moscow at the end of 1941, when the Soviet army began, for the first time, food procurement from local resources in the liberated areas. At the end of January 1942 Stalin ordered that food procurement must be based mainly on local resources in the areas attached to the front. According to Moskoff, this transformation of procurement policy was accomplished during the battle for Stalingrad (124-25).

In my opinion, this problem must be given attention because Russian food procurement policy during World War II developed in a reverse way. At the beginning of the War "operational regions," which territorially amounted to one-third of European Russia, were judicially cut off from other territories and put under the jurisdiction of the General Staff. After 1915, when resources of these "operational regions" were almost exhausted, the General Staff and the government began to seek a method of centralized coordination of mobilization policies in both "operational" and civilian territories. In other words, food procurement for the Russian army during World War I moved from localism to centralism.

In this way, Moskoff argues that Soviet food policy during World War II—for not only the civilian population but also for the army—was decentralized early in the war. In his opinion, trends to centralism appeared again in 1943. Though Moskoff's idea is well-founded, I cannot avoid questioning it. It seems that Moskoff tries rather to pick out one aspect, namely decentralization, than to present a balanced, comprehensive picture of Soviet total war mobilization. This attitude is typically demonstrated by the fact that the author almost excluded from his analysis the supply of the most basic food, namely bread, which enjoyed, in the author's words, "state responsibility" and "central guarantee." Instead, the author concentrates his attention on the supply of potatoes, vegetables and other items which can be easily produced in non-agricultural regions. This is not the case for grain.

Besides, the author repeats an opinion of the above-mentioned Soviet collective work that "in the second half of 1943, local food sources supplied most of the
food of the south and central fronts" (126). Even so, the lack of analysis of the whole Soviet logistical system in Moskoff's book cannot be legitimized.

We may ask a counter-factual question: if the Soviet Union survived, mainly thanks to the reliance on local resources, why could a far less urbanized tsarist Russia not do the same? In short, a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the combination of centralism and localism in the Soviet total war regime remains to be done. Of course, this does not negate the significance of this book.

Lastly, it must be added that the concept of a "factual decentralization of Soviet state during World War II" already has a long history in our study. As far as I know, it began at 1983 with Sanford Lieberman's study on evacuation policy during the war. He pointed out the combination of Stalin's one-man exercise of total power and decentralized decision-making in the localities. After Moskoff, the concept of "factual decentralization" was given a more generalized formula in John Barber and Mark Harrison's book, concerning not only the food supply for the civilian population but also wartime economic policy in general.

Kimitaka Matsuzato
Hokkaido University


Anyone who picks up this book expecting a sequel to Professor Tumarkin's 1983 book, Lenin Lives!: The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia, will be disappointed. They are very different books. While Lenin Lives! was written in a very accessible style, it was at the same time a thoroughly scholarly book. It contained a wealth of information, culled from an extensive and careful reading of contemporary sources. For the non-specialist it explained who Lenin was and what the 1917 revolution had been all about, and for the specialist and non-specialist alike it went on to explain why there had been a cult of Lenin, who was behind it, how it had manifested itself in many different ways, how the Stalin cult had displaced it, and how it had reappeared in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years.

The Living and the Dead tells a good deal less about how the world war was remembered and how that memory was manipulated. In its own way it is a thoughtful and interesting book, but it is neither as informative nor as scholarly as Lenin Lives! Professor Tumarkin devotes about a third of the book to the sort of anecdotal writing provided by journalists who have covered the Soviet Union and Russia. She describes, for example, her participation in a search for the remains of the war's victims with a group of Dozor volunteers on the outskirts of Rzhev in 1992, relates her acquaintances' reactions to speeches and other events at Victory Day celebrations, and takes us to her meeting with Lev Kerbel, a sculptor known for his officially acceptable tributes to war heroes. Each vignette provides another angle from which to see how Russians continue to react to the memory of the war, but most will seem familiar to anyone who has read Hedrick Smith, David Remnick, or the daily papers for the last eight years or so. Professor Tumarkin also
shares with us, quite movingly, how her researches into memory and memorials have been connected with the early deaths of her father, brother and sister.

In the meatier part of this book one chapter describes the actual horrors of the world war and the propaganda campaigns of those years. It is followed by two chapters, totaling a little more than sixty pages, which deal with the pre-*glasnost'* memory and cult, and by another two chapters of about the same length which deal with revelations about the war in the Gorbachev and El'tsin years. Specialists who have read some history of the war, maybe including Matthew Gallagher's *The Soviet History of World War II* and John Barber and Mark Harrison's recent *The Soviet Home Front, 1941-1945*, will find little new in the first three of those chapters, and no one who has lived through the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev eras, reading the papers, will be startled by anything in the latter two. General readers or younger readers might find a good deal more to interest them. They will also appreciate that the book is clearly written.

The central problem of this book seems to be that while Professor Tumarkin had no difficulty separating the truth from the cult where Lenin was concerned, she is a good deal less certain about where the war leaves off and its cult begins. Just beneath the lies and exaggerations of the cult there is always the enormity of the real war that should not go away. Professor Tumarkin is so sensitive to the suffering caused by the war—as seen in the historical facts and, maybe just as important, in her friends' and her own experiences—that she cannot lay bare its cult as she did Lenin's.

One illustration of this problem can be seen in her use of humor. In *Lenin Lives!* Professor Tumarkin related a number of anecdotes about Lenin, particularly those inspired by the silly excesses of the Lenin jubilee in 1970. She clearly appreciated the humor and understood how ridicule had helped deflate the artificial pomposity of the cult. In this book she tells only one anecdote about the war and then—apparently because she shared her friends' indignant response to it—to make the point that even today many Russians are unable to laugh about the war or its heroes, even those raised up by the cult. The joke conflates Aleksandr Matrosov, an eighteen-year-old soldier who supposedly saved his buddies by throwing his body over the gun port of a Nazi pillbox, with Pavlik Morozov, a fourteen-year-old who was murdered by his neighbors after he turned in his father as a kulak during the collectivization campaign in 1932. In the joke Pavlik Matrosov saves his comrades by throwing his body over the body of his father.

No doubt, it is a good deal easier to laugh at Lenin than at the war. Whatever death and suffering may be laid at his door, it happened on a smaller scale and much longer ago than the very real horrors of the world war. Cheka executions and civil war deaths are no longer part of the living memory of Russian families as are the twenty-two million or more deaths in the world war. Even if Matrosov's deed were an invention, there were too many other men who died in similar, or even very dissimilar, circumstances for many Russians to laugh at his death. But it is important to understand that some others do laugh, for it is the very tastelessness of the joke that helps let the air out of the cult of the Great Patriotic War in Russia.

*Bruce F. Adams  
University of Louisville*

Authored by an international team composed of a Russian, an American, and a Chinese scholar, this book is a major contribution to the study of the making of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the early 1950s and the origins of the Korean War. Basing their study on new Chinese and Russian source materials, the three authors argue that the relationship between Beijing and Moscow had been complex. Although Stalin and Mao both were Communists, their policymaking was determined by their perceptions of China and the Soviet Union's national security interests, which differed significantly in terms of goals and means in 1949 and 1950. While Stalin's main concern was how best to serve the Soviet Union's strategic interests in a global confrontation with the United States, Mao's top issue lay in how to unify his country by liberating Nationalist-controlled Taiwan. During his visit to the Soviet Union from December 1949 to February 1950, Mao had to face a highly suspicious Stalin, who was reluctant to provide China with freedom of action in East Asia. On the Korean issue, Stalin originally was unwilling to support North Korean leader Kim Il-sung's plans to unify his country by force, fearing that it might result in a direct Soviet-American confrontation. However, when he sensed that the Americans might not intervene in Korea and that Kim's actions might divert American attention from the European theatre and drive a wedge between Mao's China and the West, Stalin approved Kim's plans. In the meantime, the Chinese provided the North Koreans with valuable support in manpower. Consequently, a "reckless war-making effort of the worst kind" came into being.

After the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the book points out, Stalin's top priority shifted to avoiding a confrontation with the United States. In Beijing, Mao and his comrades reluctantly turned their main attention from Taiwan to Korea. After the Inchon landing in mid-September 1950, Stalin encouraged Beijing to send troops to Korea to save Kim's revolutionary regime, promising that the Soviet Union would provide the Chinese with air cover in Korea. However, when the Beijing leadership, for the purpose of safeguarding China's border safety, made the decision to enter the Korean War, Stalin reneged on the air-support promise and made it clear that the Soviet air force would not enter war operations together with Chinese troops. Still Mao decided to enter the war. In the long run, a Chinese-Soviet split became inevitable.

The sources cited by the book include Chinese materials made available in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Mao's telegrams, memoirs by key Chinese figures, and selected Party documents), Russian documentary sources (mainly the documents from I. V. Kovalev's personal archives, which thinned out dramatically after the spring of 1950), and interviews with key Russian and Korean participants. The book's database, however, is uneven in the sense that it does not include the Korean War documents that have been released by the Russian government since 1992-93 (such as the ones historian Kathryn Weathersby has translated into En-
lish); nor does it include information from Chinese archives or direct interviews with key Chinese participants. As a matter of fact, careful China specialists will find that, in some places, the book’s citing of Chinese sources mixes documentary evidence with fiction-style novels or even unreliable hearsay (an example is the book’s discussion of an early August 1950 Chinese Politburo meeting on page 165, which is based solely on a highly unreliable account, Russel Spurr’s Enter the Dragon). In a few places, the book provides readers with inconsistent information. For example, when did Kim Il-sung secretly visit Beijing before the outbreak of the war in Korea? On page 145, the date given is "from May 13 to 16, 1950," which is correct according to new Chinese and Russian sources. But on page 153, the visit is said to have occurred "in April," which is incorrect.

It is controversial for the book to argue that "Kim Il-sung was merely a pawn in Stalin's great chess game." Kim certainly deserves something more than that. New Chinese and Russian materials clearly demonstrate that unifying the country through revolutionary and military means was Kim Il-sung's own initiative, which followed his understanding of the revolutionary situation existing on the peninsula. While it is true that without Moscow and Beijing's support it would have been impossible for Kim to carry out his plans of unifying the Korean peninsula, especially in the context of the escalating Cold War in East Asia, it is equally true that neither Moscow nor Beijing had "ordered" the North Korean attack on June 25, 1950. Indeed, the events leading to the Korean War reflected the rising tide of radical revolutions in East Asia after the end of World War II. To understand the origins of the Korean War, one certainly needs to consider how great-power politics had defined the changes in East Asia in general and Korea in particular, but one never should ignore the impact of the profound regional and national changes within East Asia itself.

Jian Chen

Southern Illinois University


As Russia opens up its historical archives to the scholarly community, we are likely to see more accounts to add to a small but important collection of books on the post-Stalin Soviet dissent movement, including the Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin's The Political, Social and Religious Thought of Russian Samizdat; Boris Shragin's Samosoznanie: sbornik statei, Boris Kargarlitsky's The Thinking Reed, and Ludmilla Alexeyeva's Soviet Dissent published in Russia in 1992 as Istoriia inakomysliia v SSSR by Vest'). None, however, is likely to be as personal and compelling as the story told by Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg in The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era. In a very simple, direct style, Alexeyeva and Goldberg take us behind the apartment doors where a small group of the dissident intelligentsia shape strategies to promote free
expression, to the offices of the KGB where the regime hacks attempt to thwart those strategies through intimidation, outside the courthouse during the Daniel and Siniavskii trial in 1966, to the small demonstration held in Red Square to express solidarity with the Prague Spring reformers after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In chronicling Alexeyeva's life in the USSR as a young Komsomol activist, then Communist Party member committed to socialist renewal, then dissident after her expulsion from the Party in 1968, The Thaw Generation weaves a fascinating tale of the intellectual and organizational history of the opposition to the Soviet regime after 1956 as pieced together from individual stories, telling dialogues, accounts of meetings, encounters with the regime, and links with Western journalists and politicians. This rich account provides a veritable who's who of the known and not so well known opposition figures and a working etymology of the terms familiar to the student of free expression in the USSR: glasnost' (first used as an opposition strategy by Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin in the early 1960s), samizdat (coined initially as samsebiaizdat by poet Nikolai Glazkov in the mid-1950s), and podpisanty ("we, the undersigned" of the intelligentsia-led petition campaign against human rights abuses by the Soviet regime in 1968). The dissident intelligentsia (though in their own eyes they were not "dissidents" but true citizens) clearly saw themselves as the heirs to the Decembrists, who fought for universal rights in the face of tsarist oppression, and to Aleksandr Herzen, whose tracts on political reform had to be published abroad in another age of censorship. Their opposition to the regime emerged after a collective realization that the noble goals of the 1917 revolutionaries had been corrupted by careerists who used the power of the Communist Party to buttress their own positions, not move Russia toward socialist democracy. Encouraged by Khrushchev's "secret speech" to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress which initiated the thaw, the small, anti-regime, opposition intelligentsia, many of whom were Party members themselves, began to establish informal networks to carry out goals of eliminating censorship, democratizing the Soviet regime, and fighting for universal human rights. In piecing together the formation and eventual destruction of these networks, The Thaw Generation tells the tale of an isolated opposition, threatened by a Communist party-state neither willing nor capable of reforming itself and ignored by a society not yet ready to see the truth.

The nucleus of the opposition movement was the kompaniia—the small gathering of friends and acquaintances who got together to socialize, talk openly, and discuss both official and censured literature. Individuals were associated with particular kompaniis; constant interaction resulted in overlapping membership in these "social institutions" which sprang up, as Alexeyeva tells us, because her generation "had a psychological, spiritual, perhaps even a physiological need to discover our country, our history, and ourselves" (83). Using the kompaniia as the foundation, the opposition slowly developed a loose network of affiliations to promote the transformation of the corrupt Soviet regime into a socialist democracy based on laws promoting free expression and human rights. The movement's activities reached a peak in the years 1965 to 1968, beginning with the arrest and trial of Iurii Daniel and Andrei Siniavskii for publishing anti-regime material.
abroad, and ending with the heady months of a Czechoslovak reform movement actively supported by the Soviet intelligentsia since "the Moscow thaw was inseparable from the Prague Spring" (220). The strategies of the opposition during this period were remarkably similar to those of independent activists in Eastern Europe. Through the various vignettes presented by Alexeyeva and Goldberg we see an intelligentsia which exhorts citizens to act as if they had rights and which tries to hold the regime accountable to its own self-proclaimed laws and obligations. A dissident "Red Cross" fund was begun to aid political prisoners, much like the intelligentsia-organized KOR in Poland aided the families of imprisoned workers in the 1970s. The Soviet opposition, like Vaclav Havel, recognized the need "to live in truth" as the moral foundation for any organizational activity against the regime. The difference in the Soviet Union was that the opposition never spread beyond a small core group of the intelligentsia. With no links to broader social groups or reformers in the regime, the opposition was extremely alienated from an apathetic society and completely demoralized after Soviet tanks rolled into Prague in August 1968. The tanks made it clear that the Soviet regime was not interested in establishing a dialogue with any of its subjects, in the bloc or at home. The wind was taken out of the sails of the opposition after 1968 as even sympathetic members of the intelligentsia pulled back into the cocoon of job security and personal safety once the crushing of the Prague Spring made it clear that reform from below was impossible. While the Helsinki Accords on Human Rights and continuing success of the underground Chronicle of Current Events revitalized the movement in a new guise (from socialist renewal to universal human rights), the eventual success of Brezhnev's party and Andropov's KGB in destroying the personal and organizational bonds of the opposition networks meant that "by 1983, the movement was destroyed" (297). Alexeyeva emigrated to the U.S. in 1977, along with many of her opposition compatriots who had no recourse for action in the years of Brezhnev's crackdown. It was only "from the other shore" that the children of the thaw could see their efforts vindicated by the rise of the reformist Gorbachev to power in the USSR. While Gorbachev—the career bureaucrat—was no particular inspiration, his recognition of the need for systemic reform, using the opposition's own methods, did allow the little flame kept alight by the opposition intelligentsia in the 1960s to turn into the burning fire of the independent movement in the late 1980s. Alexeyeva sees the opposition intelligentsia of the 1960s, if not the mother, then the midwife of the opposition movement that finally captured Soviet society in the late 1980s. Her approach raises an interesting question about the continuity of opposition throughout Russian and Soviet history. There was and could be no political or organizational continuity between the struggles for freedom and political liberalization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Certainly there was no direct link between the small, intelligentsia dominated kompanii and the thousands of "informal groups" which undermined the authority of the Soviet regime in the late 1980s. Yet Alexeyeva and Goldberg create a compelling case for understanding the history of Russian opposition as a continuous struggle to promote universal values and to keep alive the "conscience of the nation."

Marcia A. Weigle Bowdoin College

In this book, William A. Clark examines the problem of official corruption. As the author states in his preface, "unlike a number of works appearing over the years on the topic of Soviet political corruption ... that had sought primarily to affix moral blame to this or that individual or to this or that mode of social organization," he decided "to regulate any such ethical calculation to the realm of the reader's own judgment." The study draws upon academic works in "organizational behavior, economics, administrative ethics, and political development, including such authors as Paul Appleby, Antony Downs and Stuart Huntington, as well as "books on Russian and Soviet history, culture and politics," the works of David Granick, Michael Urban and Ilya Zemstov among them. The author discounts the "notion that the USSR and its politics are sui generis, and hence incomparable." In other words, Clark tries to examine corruption there using "a theoretical and comparative perspective."

The author identifies differences between Soviet and Western definitions of crime and corruption. For instance, he points out that "the vast majority of economic crimes that existed under Soviet law were legitimate practices in American society." "The Soviet crime of 'speculation,' a serious transgression punishable in extreme cases by death, involved in many cases little more than the everyday activity of retailers in the United States: the procurement and re-selling of goods and/or services with a view toward the acquisition of profit," is a case in point. Clark also emphasizes the fact that Russia, be it Soviet or tsarist, was overwhelmed by bureaucrats. One should concur with Clark's supposition that "the role of the official has been historically much more salient as a telling characteristic of Russian and Soviet society than has been the case in the western world."

The author accepts the six operational principles developed by Charles A. Schwartz which explain "business as usual" in the former USSR. First, "party interests have supremacy over legal ones." In my view, this is the most important operational principle, because it shows a double standard approach at its worst. For Soviet authorities the interests of the Communist Party were more important than anything else. They could interpret these interests as they pleased. Therefore, law could be easily used as a sheer instrument in the authorities' exercise of power. Second, plan is most important in economic development. Third, "state money likes to be counted." Fourth, "white" forms of corruption should be tolerated. This form of corruption happens when managers commit report padding in order to receive bonuses. Fifth, marginal or "gray" forms of corruption were to be evaluated on a case by case basis. This form of corruption includes graft, influence peddling, and activities of procurement agents. Sixth, "black" forms of corruption will not be tolerated. This includes "large and boldly conspicuous material gains, high living, and a blatant disrespect for Soviet law."
While analyzing corruption in different periods of Soviet rule, Clark discovered that corruption existed even during Stalin's régime both within Soviet officialdom and in the greater society despite the threat of stiff punishment. However, as the author correctly concluded, the level of corruption never reached the proportions common in the post-Soviet years. The level of corruption started to increase dramatically since the early 1960s, when Khrushchev's tenure was approaching its end. The corruption assumed astronomical figures by the early 1980s, when Brezhnev was still in power. Improper transactions or illegal activities were called "nalevo" (literally, in Russian "on the left"). In the text Clark mistakenly writes "na levo" as if these are two words. In general, the author transcribes and translated Russian terms accurately with two noticeable exceptions, "nalevo" being the one and strakhovka (the safety factor) being the other. In the text, instead of strakhovka one can find this term misspelled "strakhova." "Nalevo" became so common that few people considered it illegal any longer. Clark cites a figure of 400 billion rubles generated by illegal activities. According to this study, large-scale corruption "certainly infected all segments of society, including the political elite." Clark points out that "in this heavily administered economy marked by sizeable monetary overhang and severe chronic scarcity, the corruption of its officials was almost inevitable."

I would tend to agree with Clark that certain foreign successes of Soviet foreign policy in 1970s created a misperception that the Soviet Union was gaining strength, whereas in fact "the lack of real structural reform of the state's formal institutions . . . led to the dramatic reversal of Soviet fortunes in the 1980s." However, in my view, the author makes a false assumption that Brezhnev recognized "the critical weaknesses of Soviet institutions and their need for a throughgoing restructuring." The author incorrectly credits Brezhnev for understanding this problem and faults him only for lacking "the nerve to attempt radical reform of the inadequate public institutions of the Soviet state." Clark mentions the 1957 sovarkhozy reforms to make economy less centralized and the Liberman and Kosygin "reforms" of the 1960s to substantiate his assertion. However, the 1957 reforms were initiated by Khrushchev, and it is unlikely that Brezhnev had anything to do with this project. As far as the other mentioned project is concerned, it is common knowledge that Brezhnev rejected the Liberman and Kosygin innovations and that was the main reason why the plan was stillborn. In fact, Brezhnev is personally responsible to a very major degree for the corruption and the degradation of the Soviet economy. It is not without reason that in the post-Brezhnev era his rule was termed the stagnation period. Clark himself produced ample and convincing evidence to this effect: "Under the Brezhnev régime leadership virtually every official from the lowest enterprise manager to the all-union Politburo, was potentially vulnerable to charges of abuse of office, bribery, black marketeering, and other related illegalities." Nicolai Shchelokov, the Minister of Internal Affairs since 1966, "the chief policeman of the Soviet Union" and Brezhnev's close friend and associate, represents an impressive example. He was rumored to acquire more than a dozen Mercedes and Volvo sedans for his family and relatives. Shchelokov also used to virtually steal the confiscated items at the Moscow Custom Of-
fice's storeroom and was involved in many other illegal and criminal activities. According to Clark, "Shchelokov's attitude was typical of the selfish arrogance of the Brezhnev era's political elite." Clark describes other outrageous examples of criminal activities under Brezhnev, including the behavior of the members of Brezhnev's immediate family.

The author also mentions Gorbachev's attempts to combat corruption in the former Soviet Union. However, his description is sketchy and inconclusive. In Clark's opinion, Gorbachev was replacing Brezhnev associates with Gorbachev associates. But this was not a self-fulfilling endeavor. Gorbachev did not hesitate to fire the officials he named earlier in case they did not live up to his expectations in terms of their work performance. Clark sums up: "In a word, Gorbachev attempted to wield the cadre weapon so long in disuse in Soviet politics. . . ."

Clark makes a questionable conclusion "that the actions of Leonid Brezhnev are much more responsible for the present crisis and change in the USSR than those of Mikhail Gorbachev." There is no question that under Brezhnev the Soviet system experienced difficult times. However, the degree of corruption and decay became even worse under Gorbachev's rule. No matter how good Gorbachev's intentions were, he objectively exacerbated the crisis of Soviet society. It is not without reason that his policy perestroika was termed katastroika.

On the whole, this book is an interesting and provocative insight into the problems of corruption and nepotism in the former Soviet Union. It is useful for students of Soviet politics and could provide limited assistance to students of post-Soviet politics.

Yury Polsky

West Chester University

The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs.

Considering the rapid pace of change during the last four years, it is not surprising that the first thing to consider about a new book on Russian politics is not so much when it was published but when it was researched and written. And if the book were not researched and written very recently, it would not be used. One way to avoid this problem is to describe a limited section of the recent past as history, with little or no attempt to touch the present. As can be seen by the title, this is what these editors have done: depict the birth of Russian democracy without assuming that democracy would either fail or succeed. This policy allowed the birth to be treated as a specific historical event with no attempt to fudge the separation in time from the present. The interviews with political leaders are clearly dated in 1991 and there is no effort to make them sound more up to the minute, for example, by deleting internal references to Gorbachev and his ongoing reforms.

Troubled Birth does not pretend to be about contemporary Russian politics. It does not even pretend to be predictive. As a result the book is a marvelous source-
book for a time period in Soviet/Russian development that caught most of us off guard. The editors describe the details of what most of us barely saw at the time: new democratic possibilities emerging under the very nose of the authoritarian government.

What one has in this book is a sound foundation for a course in post-Soviet Russian politics. An introductory chapter describes the origins of the new parties in the twilight of Gorbachev's futile attempts to end sixty years of command economy ideology. First there were discussion clubs like Club Perestroika and Obshchina that were formed the moment they became legal in 1987. One reason they were legal is that they did not, at first, challenge the system. Quickly, however, returning dissidents did just that, and the Democratic Union began discussing moves beyond improving socialism. The Democratic Union declared itself a political party in May of 1988, well before the March 1990 amendment of the Soviet Constitution that permitted party formations. Its mere existence had a shock value, as did the nationalist, rightist Pamiat' organization visible in 1987 or Nina Andreeva's galvanizing letter in Sovetskaia Rossia in March 1988. Political positions were being publically created in a country whose history since 1921 had not been kind to dissident opinion.

Then the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988 raised the masses' level of political competence and began the process of political reforms that led to multicandidate elections in 1989 and to the challenge to the status quo raised by the live television coverage of the Congress of People's Deputies in May-June 1989. Everyone that could watched, and those that could not watch listened. My Moscow busdriver almost wrecked our bus cheering the anti-KGB speech he heard on a small radio in the front of the bus. In my hotel, for the first time I took my own key from the central table on my floor, and later I put it back again. The table was unguarded because the "floor lady" was settled some distance away where a TV was operating, watching the Congress with the maids.

While Gorbachev attempted a reform from the top down, reforms from the bottom up were already occurring. Hindsight suggests that Gorbachev's loss of control was visible at the very beginning of the first session of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989 when unplanned criticism of military violence in Tbilisi caused a public review.

As the Interregional Group of People's Deputies formed on the national level, local elections in 1990 contributed even more to the proliferation of parties, groups and even professional campaign organizations such as the Moscow Association of Voters. The contest at this point was not Communist vs non-Communist because even the most radical of the reformers were still members of the Communist Party: the first impetus for an opposition party came from the liberals within the CPSU when they formed the Democratic Platform.

Why was the birth of Russian democracy troubled? Well, life got in the way of the birth. For example, most of the parties came into being after the March 1990 elections and they had to wait a very long time before elections again occurred. Second, parties whose main reason for existence was anti-Communism splintered when that cause for cohesion was gone and they found it difficult to develop attrac-
tive political positions. Third, too many parties competed amidst too little compromise. So the birth of democracy has been troubled, and the development a bit slower than optimum, giving right wing resurgence time to develop anti-democratic alternatives.

The editors provide the details of twelve different political party births accompanied with an in-depth interview of each group's leader and a major party document if one exists. The parties (or groups) are as follows: The Democratic Union, Pamiat', The Democratic Party of Russia, The Social Democratic Party of Russia, The Republican Party of Russia, The Russian Christian-Democratic Movement of Russia (RXDD), The Democratic Russia Movement, Strike Committees and the Independent Union of Miners, The Neo-Communists, Soyuz, The Liberal-Democratic Party of the USSR, and the Movement for Democratic Reform.

This is a worthwhile book that will not go out of date.

James R. Ozinga
Oakland University


Stephen White's book After Gorbachev attempts to comprehend the vast changes that took place in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. As in the previous editions of this book, White discusses the three principal parts of Gorbachev's reform program (democratization, glasnost', and economic restructuring) and their effect upon the multinational Soviet Union. Additionally, White examines the need for "new political thinking" in Soviet foreign policy to help domestic reforms. The book provides an abundance of information on the Gorbachev period and is extremely well documented.

In chapter 1, White contends that Gorbachev's early policies can be understood as a continuance of the policies of Andropov and Chernenko. In a discussion of the need for leadership renewal White examines the rise of both Gorbachev and his leadership team. White argues that economic reform was Gorbachev's main goal. However, to reform the Soviet economy it became necessary for the Soviet Union to embark upon the processes of democratization and decentralization. Chapter 2 discusses these processes as well as the structural and electoral reforms initiated to empower the Soviet citizenry.

Chapter 3 covers the policy of glasnost' and its effect upon Soviet society. White argues that glasnost' was particularly successful in revealing the social ills of the Soviet Union and the drain of defense expenditures on the domestic economy. Glasnost' also led to the publication of previously banned foreign and domestic literature. However, as White demonstrates, glasnost' did not completely expunge the activity of censorship.

In chapter 4, White presents a very detailed examination of Gorbachev's attempts to reform the Soviet economy. Recognizing that the planned economy had outlived its usefulness for a modern developed state, Gorbachev embarked upon a
plan to bring the socialist market to the Soviet Union. While detailing the laws and reforms proposed by Gorbachev, White also describes some of the problems that economic reform encountered, such as shortages of goods, as well as bureaucratic and social resistance to the reforms. White concludes this chapter with a discussion of the economic transition plans proffered by Nikolai Ryzhkov and Stanislav Shatalin.

White does not limit himself to a study of the policies of glasnost and perestroika. In chapter 5 he provides an overview of the major nationalities that comprised the Soviet Union. In particular, White gives a detailed examination of the Baltic states' struggle for independence as well as "hot-spots" like Nagorno-Karabakh, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. Decentralization gave strength to minority groups fighting for cultural, political, and economic autonomy. White describes events leading up to the proposal of reconfiguring the Soviet Union as a voluntary federation and the proposed "9 + 1" Union Treaty. He also discusses the effects of the August Coup of 1991 on minority issues and the birth of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

White concludes his discussion of Gorbachev's policies in chapter 6. After tracing Soviet foreign policy and its expansion throughout the Communist and non-Communist world, White turns his attention to Gorbachev's policy of "new political thinking." He describes Gorbachev's view of all states living in a "common home," along with the need for the Soviet Union to de-escalate tension abroad to carry out reforms at home. The chapter contains a well rounded discussion of Soviet relations with Communist nations and the developing world. While many conservative politicians and analysts in the West believed Soviet foreign policy to be a planned, long-term strategy, White convincingly argues that Soviet policy simply reacted to international events. He concludes this chapter by discussing the decline of Soviet influence in the international arena.

White ends his examination of the Gorbachev administration by asking the question: What was his long-term strategy? White points to an evolution in Gorbachev's thinking from continuing the late Brezhnevite and Andropov policies of eliminating shortcomings to trying to restructure the whole society. He argues that Gorbachev sought a "humane, democratic socialism" with a mixed economy and political pluralism. In the end, he attained the former, but not the latter. White rounds out the chapter by describing how the Party leadership and general public viewed glasnost' and perestroika.

In his final chapter, White discusses the rise of El'tsin and the struggle between El'tsin and the Russian Congress of Peoples' Deputies through the spring of 1993. In this chapter, White examines the litany of problems, including economic reform and party factionalism, that face[d] Russia. Unfortunately, White does not attempt to link this chapter with the rest of the book. The reader is left wondering: How do all of these problems relate to glasnost', perestroika, and the "new political thinking"?

As stated above, White does an excellent job of describing Gorbachev's policies and presenting an abundance of information for the reader's perusal. Unfortunately, this is also the book's major weakness. The understanding of the Gor-
The Gorbachev period becomes lost in the presentation of data and survey information. He tends to cite many surveys in lieu of offering an explanatory analysis of the Gorbachev period. The larger questions of the Gorbachev period are thus left unanswered. For example: Would these reforms have occurred if Gorbachev had not become the leader of the Soviet Union? Was the time ripe for reform regardless of the leader? White appears to implicitly answer this question in chapter one when he talks of continuity among leaders. In addition, White's book is "Gorbo-centric." He takes on faith that Gorbachev was the main catalyst for the reforms rather than considering Gorbachev as a contextual figure. The topical nature of each chapter instead of a chronological examination of the entire Gorbachev period only adds to this perception. Chapters 1 and 2 are especially devoid of context. However, despite these problems, White's book is both informative and interesting to read. *After Gorbachev* would be a useful textbook for both advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate courses.

Jeffrey Lawrence Roberg  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

---


This book is an interpretative monograph on a very important subject: the challenges facing post-Soviet Russia in redefining both its internal ethnic relations, and its foreign policy with other countries, including the other Soviet successor states. The book's premise is that these challenges both stem from a common problem: the Russian state has inherited from its tsarist and Soviet pasts a tendency to try to resolve problems "once and for all," rather than developing a strategy for managing conflict. As a result, Russia historically preferred to become a participant in ethnic and regional disputes rather than to arbitrate them.

Although Kremenyuk travels skilfully across subnational and international levels of analysis, his discussion of internal nationality politics in the Russian Federation is particularly striking. He portrays conflict between the state and its borderland territories as a constant theme in Russian history, from the tsarist period to the demise of the USSR. Historically, the Russian state was able to expand into borderland territories and to contain ethnic unrest, seeking to "resolve" nationality problems through the imposition of central state power. In Kremenyuk's view, nationality unrest would inevitably accompany the breakup of the Soviet Union, since the government had repressed ethnic conflicts rather than adopting a more constructive approach. The historical precedent for this was the upsurge of national independence movements in the Russian civil war of 1918-21, following the collapse of the tsarist imperial system. As this example reveals, Kremenyuk tends to point to recurring patterns in Russian history as evidence of the existence of a "political culture."

Kremenyuk's thesis is an interesting and important one, which reminds us that contemporary ethnic conflicts are rooted in their historical context. Many of to-
day’s "upstart" nations (such as the Chechens and Tatars) have a long tradition of resistance to Russian authority. Moreover, Kremenyuk argues that the Soviet Union’s manipulation of the borders of ethnic territories, and its forcible displacement of populations, ultimately provoked an assertive quest for redress from the affected ethnic groups once it became possible to voice political demands under glasnost'. The author offers interesting examples of disputes that are still relatively little-known to many Western experts on Russia, such as the contentious North Caucasus region. Finally, Kremenyuk attempts to place ethnic assertiveness in the context of socioeconomic decline as a whole, considering the recent failure of economic reform in Russia to produce tangible improvements in the popular standard of living. In order to understand the aspirations of localities for autonomy, one should consider the harsh demands the central government has traditionally imposed. Moreover, the conflict between "communists" and "democrats" has been complex here: as Kremenyuk discusses, communists in sub-national territories throughout the former Soviet Union have advanced the goal of regional autonomy in order to maintain their hold on power, while the El'tsin government was confounded by its inability to prevent the wave of national self-determination. Indeed, one of the real strengths of Kremenyuk's book is his discussion of the El'tsin democrats' attempts to apply Western methods of conflict resolution to interethnic disputes within Russia.

As an expert in international conflict resolution, Kremenyuk's interest extends to both the theory and practice of political problem-solving. As he himself admits, he is not a Russian historian by training, and his book is intended to provide a Western audience with an indigenous observer's insight on the problems of his country. He is more interested here in exploring a range of arguments than in presenting detailed empirical research. These points reinforce the fact that Kremenyuk does not claim to write a specialized monograph on Russian history, but rather to provide a "Russian view" of the situation.

This book will be of interest to several audiences: historians who wish to bridge the gap in their understanding of foreign policy on the one hand and ethnic politics on the other; political scientists who seek a longitudinal view of contemporary problems; and laypeople who are baffled by the complexity of the new geopolitical map of the former Soviet Union. Readers should consider the book to be an interpretation, rather than the definitive Russian view of the subject. The book could potentially generate debate among experts, some of whom are likely to consider the notion of a continuous Russian political culture to be a controversial one. It is useful to recall, first, that historically Russian leaders have varied considerably in their approaches toward the contentious issue of ethnic demands; and, second, that members of the peripheral nations themselves often have a very different perspective on their situation than Russians.

Andrea Chandler Carleton University

The break-up of the Soviet Union has resulted not only in the emergence of new nation-states, but a wide range of scholarly and journalistic accounts of the non-Russian regions. Most of these studies tend to be on particular regions or countries, or edited volumes with separate articles on the various states. Ronald Suny's The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union stands out as an exception to this rule, as it is an attempt to synthesize the various ethnic groups into one methodologically-defined volume. Based on a series of lectures that the author delivered at Stanford University in February 1991, the book revolves around the problem of studying nationalism in the former Soviet Union. Indeed, The Revenge of the Past reads more like a general discussion of the theoretical contradictions inherent in the system than a detailed history of the development of nationalist movements in the Soviet Union.

This approach is outlined in chapter 1, which is a convincing discussion of "class and nationality" in the Soviet context. Suny argues that the two forces often existed side by side during the formative years of the Soviet Union, with their inherent differences left unresolved. To a large degree, this resulted in a divided academic community, in which scholars of "nationalism and ethnicity" and scholars of "class" spoke at cross-purposes. In order to move past definitional debates, and begin to compare the two, Suny writes, "(t)he formation of class and nationality should be understood to be a contingent and historically determined occurrence rather than the working out of a natural or historical logic or a sociological derivative.... Classes and ethnicities in one form or another exist in various historical periods, but their political claims are the specific products of historically derived discourses of our own times" (18-19). In short, the relative merits and strengths of each is, in many ways, contingent upon the other, and the environment within which they exist.

The remaining three chapters are cross-temporal studies that explore this relationship, looking at the revolution and civil war, the Soviet experience of "state-building," and the Gorbachev era, respectively. Chapter 2 is particularly insightful in its summation of the uneven development of class and ethnicity in the non-Russian regions. In order to link these levels of sophistication with "national success," Suny posits that there are specific typologies of national identity that existed prior to, and during, the revolutionary period. The five sub-groups listed range from those that possessed a low level of national consciousness, such as the Lithuanians and Azerbaijanis, to the "most developed" Finns and Armenians. Suny notes that, "(t)his typology illustrates the variety of socially and ethnically generated responses to the new opportunities offered by the revolution" (30). Although the typologies might seem a bit artificial, they support a conclusion that merits consideration: "Almost everywhere, the nationalist movements were either strengthened or fatally weakened by the nature of their class base" (79).
Chapters 3 and 4 lead the discussion through the Soviet period and into the Gorbachev years. Briefly, Suny contends that such policies as the korenizatsiya campaign in the late 1920s and early 1930s, as well as the subsequent evolution of "localism" during the Brezhnev years, created the conditions of nation-building in the Soviet state. Suny writes that "By its own usurpation of the language of class, the Soviet state had delegitimized it as a rhetoric of dissent and, ironically, authorized ethnicity as an alternative mode of oppositional expression" (126). In attempting to incorporate non-Russian leaderships, the system itself directly abetted the stabilization of national identities. Consequently, there emerged a crisis of "empire management" during the Gorbachev reform years. As the system became decentralized, the leadership found itself without the force to keep the "odd empire" together. The end result was a series of ethnic conflicts, systemic dissolution, and revolution. Such has been the "revenge of the past."

The strength of the author's argument, however, is tempered by two specific omissions. First, the cases used, especially in chapter 2, are somewhat unbalanced. For example, almost no mention is made of the national movements in the Central Asian states, which are not even included in the typologies discussed in chapter 2. Although selectivity is critical when attempting to compare cross-nationally, these states, and others, would have offered interesting contrasts to the classifications explained in the text.

Second, while chapters 2 and 3 stay close to the theme outlined in chapter 1, the final chapter is somewhat disappointing. Partially because the crises are presented in a non-sequential order, the chapter begins to lose focus on the central theme of class and nationality. Unless one is already familiar with the specific events in question, the narrative could be difficult to follow. In defense of the author, one should note that this was, and still is, a confusing time, and it is extremely difficult to categorize any discussion of over a dozen movements in one chapter with any sense of depth. The strength of the theoretical claims outlined early in the book would have only been furthered had the final chapter returned to them.

In spite of these criticisms, The Revenge of the Past is an excellent discussion of a topic greatly in need of attention. After all, as the study of nationalism moves from the Soviet to the post-Soviet world, the perennial question of area-specific versus cross-national analysis remains. To it, we can now add a cross-temporal element. Perhaps the ultimate strength of Suny's work is that he gives an example of how each of these elements can be intertwined, constructing frameworks within which to compare nations. One hopes that the spirit and merit of the work, especially its focus on broad-based comparisons, are furthered in future works.

Roger D. Kangas

The University of Mississippi

The nicely-written and well-researched new book edited by Igor Kon and James Riordan, Sex and Russian Society, is an important addition to the growing literature on post-Communist Russian society. It is a truly collaborative effort by a team of four Russian and three Western scholars, the kind of endeavor that scholars used to dream of before the fall of the Soviet Union.

After the succinct introduction by James Riordan, who edited the volume and translated all of the Russian chapters into English, Professor Kon provides a valuable historical summary of sex in Russia. He points out that the seventy years of Soviet rule, which was restrictive and prudish about sex matters, cannot be blamed for the massive ignorance about sex among Russians. The Communist Party only followed what had been deeply imbedded in pre-revolutionary history: the very inhibiting, limiting rule of both the Russian Orthodox Church and the state. Even the fling that the Communists had with emancipated love and free abortion in the 1920s was brief, ending, of course, with Stalin's heavy hand by the 1930s. During this awful decade, all sexological research was halted and banned, not to be picked up again until the 1960s and 1970s. Even so, however, Professor Kon states that the word "sexology" did not appear in the popular press until 1984, in what he called "a daring step by the editors."

What are the consequences of such ignorance of this important aspect of life? Glasnost' broke the bonds of many formerly taboo subjects, with sex being the most noticeable. Now Russia is seeing trends that are not unlike the trends in other Western countries: sex as a growth industry in print and film; increasing pre-marital and extra-marital sex, the rapid growth in violence associated with sex; an urgent need for sex education and a better way to prevent pregnancy than with abortion, divorce, and the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases, even AIDS.

In their own ways, all of the authors of this collection deal with some of these problems and issues. Larissa Remennick focuses on the Russian habit of terminating pregnancies by abortion instead of preventing pregnancies by other means of birth control. She found that abortion, the main method of birth control since the 1950s, has been the chief factor in the USSR's postwar fertility decline. The Russian medical establishment was isolated from such Western developments as the sexual revolution and the Pill, while poor material conditions prevented them from introducing a wide-scale effective contraceptive. They routinely overemphasized the adverse effects of oral contraceptives and downplayed the deleterious effects of abortion on women's health. She estimates that there are 9-10 million induced abortions in Russia every year.

Lynne Attwood analyzes trends of sex in an assortment of recent films. She discusses sex and youth culture, the alienated youth whose lives seem pointless, as we in the West saw in the Russian movie Little Vera. She discusses how sex is often portrayed as an antidote to boring lives, how the myth of the traditional family is exploded, how women are symbolically represented (as in a rape scene where
the main character appears to be raping the Soviet system), and how women in films admire men who take control of them and treat them roughly.

Igor Kon's chapter "Sexual Minorities" presents the sad status of homosexuals in the former USSR. Always something to be kept quiet, homosexuality is still a crime today. Long years of ignorance and fierce propaganda among Russians prevent homosexual men and women from living openly and honestly. As late as the 1970s, homosexuality was treated as a pernicious "sexual perversion," a disease that had to be treated. Needless to say, the AIDS epidemic has done nothing to erase this perception from people's minds.

We return to the subject of women in Russian society with Elizabeth Waters' chapter on Soviet beauty contests. She postulates that beauty contests are popular because of a deep desire for Western style, the appearance of the market, the freedom to break old taboos, and the ability to explore female sensuality. Her conclusion is that beauty contests, at least in 1991, encapsulated people's hopes for democracy and prosperity. I found this somewhat dubious, but I wish them luck.

With Sergei Golod's chapter, "Sex and Young People," we are returned to the more standard empirical approach. He presents several surveys of young people and tries to get at what, if anything, keeps them from having sex, and why they do have sex. Finally, Lev Shehegov, in the chapter "Medical Sexology," laments the insufficient number of professional sexopathologists in Russia. In this article, he joins with Igor Kon and with James Riordan in their plea that this book go beyond the bounds of Russian studies and become a way to pique attention of international organizations to help Russia develop.

Of course, with Russia being in the throes of post-Communist development, even helping turns out to be difficult. While the legacy of Soviet rule did little to promote topics like sex education, sex counseling, and safe birth control, Russia's present leaders have shown themselves no better at dealing with these. And now the problems are even more difficult, for the legacy of neglect has been mixed with new freedoms and lack of control. Hence we see the continuation of marital distress and thus divorce, the low status of women in society in general, and perhaps most frightening, the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases, including AIDS, all falling onto the shoulders of a government already trying to deal with massive unemployment, poverty and crime. I hope that this excellent little book will play a role in illuminating the problems and perhaps even helping to solve them.

Deborah A. Kaple
Princeton, New Jersey


Those of us (I have pictures to prove it!) who attended the original Woodstock in 1969 do not need to be reminded of the deeply anti-establishment political role assumed by rock music and musicians in the American cultural-social revolution of
that turbulent era. Almost exactly twenty years later, in the late 1980s, rock and rock festivals (minus the skinny dipping) played a very similar role in the revolutions that swept Communist regimes from power across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As Vaclav Havel and many others have observed, rock was really the theme music of the anti-Communist movement. "The archetypal rock star became, symbolically, the muse of revolution," writes Prof. Sabrina Petra Ramet in her introduction to this collection of eleven articles. "The decaying communist regimes (in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania especially) seemed to fear the electric guitar more than bombs or rifles."

Just as in the United States in the 1960s and 70s, rock music in Eastern Europe in the 1980s became perhaps the most effective medium for encouraging large segments of the population, particularly young people, to question authority and think in a different way. In most—but not all—of these societies, a strong link existed between rock music and ideological dissidence. That the rock scene was intensely politicized became very clear after the fall of Communism, when Eastern European rockers suddenly found themselves stranded, rebels without a cause. With their explicit or implied message of resistance suddenly rendered irrelevant, rock groups in the region now face a fundamental identity crisis as they see their throngs of fans turn away to television, video, travel and the many other forms of entertainment available in a free economy. Many of the groups prominent in the late Communist period have now disbanded, unable to adapt.

According to Prof. Ramet, this informative new collection is the "first scholarly attempt to treat systematically" the evolution of rock music in the western USSR and Eastern Europe. As such, it is a very welcome companion to more anecdotal volumes such as Artemy Troitsky's Back in the USSR and Timothy Ryback's Rock Around the Bloc. Along with Prof. Ramet's introductory article, the anthology contains individual chapters on the rock scene in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the former USSR, Belarus and Ukraine. As is almost always the case with edited volumes, the essays vary considerably in quality and profundity, but the overall level of the contributions is high.

Like Communism, rock developed differently in each country of Eastern Europe, and even in each of the former Soviet republics. In his somewhat confused and rambling "Rock Music in the GDR: An Epitaph," rock musician and journalist Olaf Leitner describes the bizarre dual system of government-sponsored and unofficial rock groups that existed in East Germany, where the regime had to be particularly aware of Western influence from West Berlin. Alex Kan and Nick Hayes, in their "Big Beat in Poland," succinctly analyze what was "probably the most developed pop and rock scene in the lands of the Warsaw pact." Czechoslovakia, as Prof. Ramet writes in "Rock Music in Czechoslovakia," was much less hospitable to rock musicians, a number of whom were arrested and put on trial in 1976 on the charge that "their texts contain extreme vulgarity with an anti-socialist and anti-social impact, most of them extolling nihilism, decadence and clericalism."

One of the best essays in the collection is "How Can I Be A Human Being?: Culture, Youth and Musical Opposition in Hungary," by anthropologist Laszlo
Kurti. Hungary, like all the countries discussed here, sponsored an official "pop" scene of light music which was despised by the creators of Hungarian "new music. Operating largely in isolation from Western trends like punk, the leading Hungarian bands developed a very distinctive style, "a politically dynamic music with new ideas and a challenging program." Sadly, this style has virtually disappeared since 1989, under the homogenizing onslaught of MTV and other Western imports.

Prof. Ramet's chapter "Shake, Rattle and Self-Management: Making the Scene in Yugoslavia" is also excellent, reflecting the author's long experience there. In Yugoslavia, lyrics were particularly important and poetically dense. Largely due to Tito's relatively liberal cultural policies, rock music developed much more freely than in other Eastern bloc nations. For this reason, it was much less involved with the dissident movement; when songs addressed political concerns, they tended to be more universal ones, such as the need to protect the environment or ethnic hatred. Prof. Ramet follows her essay with a brief interview with Goran Bregovic of the Sarajevo group Bileto dugme (White Button). Conducted in 1989, the conversation is sadly prophetic of the future fate of Yugoslavia. Bregovic remarks: "The central fact of our life is that there are Serbs and Croats and they don't understand each other. They will finish with war. It will be 1941 all over again."

In "The Bulgarian Rock Scene Under Communism (1962-1990)," Stephen Askley describes how Bulgaria's geographical remoteness and economic backwardness prevented it from participating fully in the Eastern rock renaissance. Here, many leading rock musicians incorporated elements of the country's rick folk tradition into their songs.

But the most fascinating, and certainly the best written, of the essays on the East European scene is Nick Hayes' portrait of the American singer Dean Reed ("The Dean Reed Story"), who died in East Berlin under suspicious circumstances in 1986. Ruggedly handsome and multi-talented, Reed abandoned a very promising singing and acting career in the United States for superstardom in the Eastern bloc. There, he became the best-known American performer ("the Johnny Cash of the Iron Curtain"), intimate with the Communist leaders to whom he became so useful and living the high life in East Berlin and Moscow. Drawing on various published sources and his own interviews with Reed, Hayes provides a mini-biography of this enigmatic character who combined his genuine political radicalism with a strong streak of opportunism to forge one of the most unlikely and enduring careers in the history of pop music.

Perhaps reflecting the fact that Prof. Ramet is a specialist on Eastern Europe and not the USSR, the section on rock music in the Soviet Union is less satisfactory than the much longer one on Eastern Europe. Prof. Ramet, Sergei Samascikov and Robert Bird have to cover a lot of ground in "The Soviet Rock Scene," which threatens to degenerate into little more than a set of lists, concluding with a very useful appendix giving profiles of the major Russian-language rock groups of the 1980s. Their treatment of the innovation and influential Baltic rock scene is limited to a mere two pages, which make the decision to devote an entire chapter to the much less important Belarussian rock scene (Maris Paula Survilla's "Rock Mu-
sic in Belarus") all the more questionable. Both Survilla, an ethnomusicologist, and literary scholar Roman Bahry (in "Rock Culture and Rock Music in Ukraine") stress the importance of language for rock music in the non-Russian republics, where national identity and language are so closely intertwined.

Overall, this is a well-edited and accessibly written volume that could be used in courses on the recent history and culture of the USSR and Eastern Europe. Since its treatment of the Soviet rock scene is far from exhaustive, one hopes that another scholar will produce a similar collection devoted solely to that topic in the near future.

Harlow Robinson
State University of New York at Albany


It is with some eagerness that one picks up this volume, the first monograph to be published on the momentous economic transformation under way in Russia. A glance at the endnotes reveals that the book is based on extensive reading of the Russian press and a survey of 171 privatization decision makers, 966 directors and entrepreneurs, and 4,645 workers. However, the book does not live up to its initial promise. Not only is it far from being the definitive account of Russian privatization, one would also think twice before allocating it for student use.

The first point to note is that, despite the title, the main focus of the book is not the privatization program, but the general politics of the reform process. Only chapter 7 (121-54) is devoted to privatization per se. The remainder consists of a chronological account of Russian economic policy from 1990 to 1993 (after an introductory chapter 2, "From NEP to Eltsin"). Chapter 8, misleadingly titled "Perspectives from the Workforce," consists of brief extracts from interviews with a few dozen managers of private firms. There is surprisingly little use of the four-city, 6,000-person survey. The raw results of the survey are tabulated in an appendix, and some of the implications are briefly discussed in chapter 7. In any case, the survey would be of limited value: it is a snapshot of attitudes in July-August 1992, before the implementation of the large-scale privatization program (although this point is not made clear by its authors).

Second, the book fails to explain the context in which the program of liberalization and privatization was adopted. The narrative seems to have been hastily assembled from newspaper clippings, and has a confusing chronology which weaves back and forth between 1992 and 1993. At no point is there even a cursory summary of the organizational structure of the Soviet of post-Soviet economy, without which the non-specialist reader will not be able to make sense of the discussion of privatization. There is no discussion of the collapse of the central planning system in 1990-91, nor the economic impact of the disintegration of the USSR and the CMEA. These factors, and not the policies of the Gaidar govern-
ment, are mainly responsible for the economic catastrophe which has befallen Russian over the past two years.

Third, the book analyzes the reform process by reducing it to a clash between two sets of personalities: El'tsin and his Western advisors versus his conservative opponents. The portrayal of El'tsin's advisors, Jeffery Sachs and Anders Aslund, verges on the libelous. They are painted as theoretically-blinkered economists who were motivated by a shadowy "political agenda" that included a disregard for "human hardship" (176). The authors do not venture an explanation of why El'tsin teamed up with this pair of monetarist fanatics. While El'tsin's advisors are pilloried, perestroika-era "reformers" such as Grigorii Iavlinskii, Leonid Abalkin and even former Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov are repeatedly cited as if they were authoritative sources, the voice of reason. There is no suggestion that it might have been the failed policies of this group from 1985 to 1991 that caused the Russian economic collapse, and not Gaidar's halting efforts.

Rather than deploy economically coherent arguments, the authors prefer to snipe from the sidelines. Gaidar is castigated both for following a tight monetary policy in the first half of 1992 and for running a slack monetary policy in the second half of the year (chapter 6). The authors recycle without comment Iavlinskii's argument that the USSR could have been saved in November 1991, had El'tsin not chosen to crush it to advance his own personal power (32). The book pillories the privatization program as a "reform from above" akin to Stalin's collectivization, while in reality the program was markedly decentralized, with each firm drawing up its own privatization project (176). The authors' own survey found that managers and skilled workers supported the privatization program, something that was hardly true of collectivization (in Table B.7.4 clerks and unskilled workers were "don't knows").

The authors imply that there was an alternative policy to monetary stabilization, but do not spell it out. They advocate subsidizing industry and having a looser monetary policy, but do not discuss how they would avoid the sort of hyperinflationary collapse which befell Ukraine when such policies were followed. There is a strong case to be made against shock therapy, but this book does not provide it.

Peter Rutland Wesleyan University


Policy-makers in Moscow today look enviously at the success of China's economic reforms, while the Chinese leaders observe the fundamental political changes in Russia with considerable wariness. How do we account for the differences in the reform processes in the two countries? Do the apparently divergent reform paths taken by the two countries belie similarities in their transitions from
communism? In From Reform to Revolution, Minxin Pei provides some interesting answers to these questions by applying comparative politics theories about transitions and state-society relations.

Pei takes a critical approach to the literature on transitions and asks to what extent these theories apply to transitions from communism. In Pei's view, regime transition from communism is qualitatively different from transition from authoritarianism because it involves a dual process of democratization and marketization. This is not to say that all transitions from communism are alike. Pei distinguishes three possible transition routes with different sequences of political and economic reform: 1) the evolutionary authoritarian route (economic reform comes first, e.g., China, Vietnam); 2) the revolutionary double-breakthrough (political change precedes economic reform, e.g., the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia); 3) the single breakthrough short-cut (a hypothetical situation in which political and economic reform occur simultaneously).

The most interesting aspect of Pei's book is his discussion of state-society relations during transitions from communism. The author calls attention to the "de Tocqueville paradox," referring to the French theorist's point that the most perilous moment for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways. According to Pei, limited reforms tend to become revolutions when the balance of power between state and society tips in favor of society. Although most analyses of reform in the Soviet Union and China focus on the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping, Pei portrays the fundamental transformations in these countries as society-driven change, taking place in weak states.

The book is organized around case studies which illustrate the influence of changing patterns of state-society relations on two aspects of the transition from communism in Russia and China: privatization and liberalization of the media. The chapter dealing with privatization in China is the strongest and provides a convincing case for society-driven economic change in China. The author highlights a particularly striking feature of the development of the Chinese private sector: unlike Poland and Russia, in China there was no deliberate state-organized privatization program. He argues that the Chinese government's most important contribution may have been "its permissiveness toward the grassroots decollectivization of agriculture in 1979-1982, the partial legalization of small urban private businesses, the opening to the West, and limited price reforms" (94). In Pei's view, the massive disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution had weakened the power of the Chinese state to such an extent that the Chinese leaders found themselves unable to control the emergence of the private sector.

To some degree, Pei's treatment of perestroika was a victim of timing; the more fundamental economic changes in Russia had not yet taken place when the book was completed. Nonetheless, Pei's main points about the lack of societal support for the Russian government's privatization policy hold true even today. Contrasting the Russian economic reform experience with China's, he attributes the differences observed to structural factors, such as Russia's greater centralization, urbanization, and higher level of development, as well as to China's advantage in at-
tracting foreign financial support at an early stage. In other words, Russia stood to lose more and gain less than China did from radical change.

One problem with an approach that focuses on the process of transition from communism is its assumption of linear change. This has never been the case in China, where cycles of reform and retrenchment have been characteristic. In Russia, on the other hand, economic and political reform gradually became more and more radical, but El'tsin's unpopular military intervention in Chechnia calls into question his government's very commitment to democratic development. Such turns of fate do not fit well into the elegant model of regime change presented by the author.

Overall, however, Pei has made a clear and interesting case for considering the importance of society's role in transitions from communism and the inability of the state to direct change. To the contrary, he emphasizes the weakness of the party-state and raises many interesting questions about the socio-political consequences of the Chinese economic reforms, as well as about the prospects for further fragmentation in Russia and China.

Elizabeth Wishnick
Washington, D.C.


Post-mortems continue to be the order of the day for students of the Soviet period of Russian history. In this volume Professor Alfred Evans (Political Science, California State University at Fresno) has provided a welcome post-mortem for one aspect of Soviet reality that many believe died long ago—Marxist-Leninist ideology. Professor Evans' thesis, supported by abundant references to primary sources, can be stated succinctly by paraphrasing Mark Twain: earlier reports of the ideology's demise were greatly exaggerated. It continued to show signs of vitality and to respond to developments in the real world right up to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Evans' clearly written and informative study, suitable for undergraduate students as well as advanced specialists, is organized chronologically. He summarizes and critically comments on the contributions to the ideology of its successive chief oracles, in sections (chapters and groups of chapters) that roughly increase in length as they approach the present: Marx (8 pages), Lenin (12 pages), Stalin (28 pages), Khrushchev (48 pages), Brezhnev (46 pages), Gorbachev (60 pages). Throughout, he gives special attention to what historically were two of the principal tasks facing every Communist Party general secretary: to describe the stage of development in which he found Soviet society and to show how that stage provided a stepping-stone to the bright future.

In this effort, as Evans demonstrates, much ideological ingenuity was displayed in defining new historical stages to interpose between the Bolshevik revolution and the eventual goal of communism. Marx's original two-stage theory (the
"first stage" and the "higher stage" of communism) grew with Lenin to three stages (the transition to socialism, socialism itself, and communism), and with Brezhnev to four (by splitting socialism into two discrete phases—"socialism in the main" and "developed socialism"). In analyzing such changes Evans treats them not as cynical and empty manipulations of concepts but as attempts on the part of the Soviet leaders to make sense of the actual state of affairs in their country while preserving not only their own power but the Marxist heritage of which they considered themselves the defenders. He provides a particularly accessible and helpful account of the content and rationale of the theory of developed socialism, which was in the ideological forefront in the Soviet Union for much of the twenty years before Gorbachev.

Perhaps the book's most timely contribution, however, is its lengthy and illuminating discussion of Mikhail Gorbachev's approach to questions of Marxist-Leninist ideology. By following the evolution of Gorbachev's thinking from his accession to power in 1985 to the coup attempt of August 1991, Evans constructs a coherent picture out of what sometimes seemed to be conflicting signals coming from the architect of perestroika. Evans argues convincingly that Gorbachev was a consistent and truly radical reformer—more radical than any previous Soviet leader—who essentially fell victim to the law of unintended consequences: he failed to understand that the ideological innovations—elements of liberalization and democratization, along with partial acceptance of private ownership and market relations—with which he wished to strengthen (not destroy) the socialist order in the USSR would in fact undermine not only the ideology but the entire Soviet state system. (It is ironic that Gorbachev's attempts to improve Marxist ideology actually produced the long-sought result of the withering away of the Soviet state—though of course not in a manner Marx would recognize. Marx believed the state would wither away when it was no longer needed to coerce people into good behavior; instead, it withered away when the will to use such coercion was no longer present.)

Substantial as Evans' treatment of Gorbachev is, one wishes that it could have been longer, because there are other, perhaps even more significant departures from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy that Evans does not examine. Gorbachev's first truly dramatic departure—a development that caught the attention of the most suspicious skeptics among Soviet anti-Communists—was his assertion that there are universal human values and interests that take precedence over class values and interests. More than mere tinkering with forms of property relations, this thesis shakes Marxist orthodoxy to its foundations; but aside from a passing reference to "common human values" (200), Evans is silent on the subject. Similarly, although Evans points out that Gorbachev encouraged a fundamental rethinking of the Soviet Union's relations with the West, he does not acknowledge the fact that Gorbachev's ceremonial address on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in 1987 amounted to an elaborate outright rejection of one of the pillars of Marxist-Leninist international orthodoxy, Lenin's theory of imperialism; the fundamental ideological importance of such a change can scarcely be overestimated.
In other words, a case can be made that Evans focuses too narrowly on changes effected by Gorbachev within Marxism-Leninism (i.e., changes that could be considered compatible with higher-level principles of the ideology), important as these were, at the expense of changes that burst beyond it (i.e., changes that are incompatible with the ideology at any level). Thus, in the sphere of ideology Gorbachev, wittingly or unwittingly, may have been still more radical than Evans allows. Clearly this subject is not closed, but Evans' insightful analyses will be an essential element in any further discussion of it.

James P. Scanlan
The Ohio State University


The title of this collection on Soviet film satire takes its source from a passage in Sergei Eisenstein's writings. The director compared Soviet comedy to a weapon, suggesting that it could be used against political foes. "I adhere to the tradition of laughing while the lash swishes," he claimed. "Mine is a laughter of destruction" (1). The irony of the findings in these essays is that modern Soviet cinema turned the lash against the Soviet system itself. As the Soviet Union moved toward self-destruction in the 1980s and early 1990s, Soviet filmmakers charted the stages of decline in a series of bitter social satires.

The book results from a conference on Soviet film satire held in New Orleans in October 1990. Both Soviet and American scholars participated. The essay topics cover the full course of Soviet film history: from NEP-era satires, through Stalinist musical comedies, to the dark social satires of the late 1980s. The final chapter of Soviet history had not been written when the conference presented their papers in 1990. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's perestroika already betrayed signs of failure and the future of the Soviet system appeared to be in doubt. The sense of a system in decline seems to inform all the papers, as indeed, it doubtless shaped the discussions of the original conference.

The motif which cuts across several of the essays in the collection is the subversive dimension of the USSR's satiric tradition. Vlada Petric, for example, finds this in Lev Kuleshov's The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks ("A Subtextual Reading of Kuleshov's Satire... "). Although the film's humor generally mocks American misperceptions of the USSR, Petric finds that the film also targets Bolshevik rhetorical excess. Kevin Moss's thoughtful discussion of the Soviet made-for TV film The Very Same Munchausen ("A Russian Munchausen"), discovers that satire resides in the act of translation. He traces how the foreign source of the Munchausen legend was adapted for Soviet television in the late 1970s and how that adaptation opened the opportunity for "Aesopian" readings. And Vida Johnson's essay ("Laughter beyond the Mirror") finds comic satire in the most unlikely of places, the seemingly humorless films of Andrei Tarkovskii.
Other enlightening essays suggest the variety of forms satire can assume. Greta Slobin's reading of Eldar Riazanov's *Forgotten Melody for a Flute* ("A Forgotten Flute and Remembered Popular 'Tradition'") notes how this glasnost'-era film plays on cultural memory in its critique of Brezhnev's bureaucratic legacy. Svetlana Boym's discussion of Sergei Solov'ev's *Black Rose, Red Rose* sustains the most nuanced argument in the collection ("Perestroika of Kitsch"). She notes how the film includes both conscious and unconscious uses of kitsch in its version of Soviet popular culture.

Any decision to publish the proceedings of a conference involves some risk. Papers that may have played well in person do not always transfer well to the printed page. The collection contains several decidedly chatty essays (Valentin Tolstykh, Michael Brashinsky, Olga Reizen, Andrei Codrescu). They may have provided interesting discussion when originally delivered to the conference participants, but they remain flat and uninformative when read.

A more nagging concern about the collection is the loose conception of satire in some of the essays. Satire is sometimes simply confused with comedy. Although those two modes are related in practice, they are not interchangeable. The two essays on Stalinist musical comedies (Maya Turovskaya on *Volga, Volga* and Moira Ratchford on *Circus*) provide some understanding of the ideology of Stalinism, but they do not deal with satiric devices.

One also might have appreciated a stronger editorial hand in the organization and layout of the volume. Some printer and diction errors slipped through the editorial process. In addition, the volume lacks consistent citation procedures, and authors are not identified in individual chapters, but only in the table of contents. Several essays cry out for illustrations. The volume contains only a smattering of stills, however, and they are purely decorative. They do not illustrate issues raised in the articles.

On the other hand, one appreciates the useful filmography at the volume's end. And editor Andrew Horton's introductory essay is first-rate ("Carnival Versus Lashing Laughter in Soviet Cinema"). He presents an incisive account of common characteristics of Soviet film satire while contextualizing the collection's various articles. Such an introductory essay promises somewhat more focus than the rest of the book delivers.

Vance Kepley, Jr.  
University of Wisconsin-Madison


This volume is a collection of eyewitness accounts of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991. On Monday, August 19, 1991, a self-styled State Committee for the State of Emergency (with the initials GKChP in Russian) announced that it was taking power, relieving Mikhail Gorbachev of his duties as
President of the USSR, and proclaiming martial law in Moscow and Leningrad. By Wednesday, August 21, the attempted putsch had collapsed.

This book brings together accounts by many people who witnessed events in the Soviet Union at the time of the unsuccessful coup. Those whose stories are collected in this volume included both Soviet and American citizens. Most of their reports focus on what happened in Moscow, while a few describe events in Leningrad and other cities. The largest concentration of attention, naturally, is directed toward the people in and around the Russian parliament building in Moscow, who were ready to defend that "Russian White House" from the tanks and troops nearby, which had been sent to the center of Moscow by the GKChP. The vast majority of accounts, though not all, were provided by people who were active in the resistance to the attempted putsch, or were at least sympathetic to those offering resistance. The words of those witnesses to the historic events of August 1991 effectively convey the tense atmosphere of the moment, the strong emotions experienced by those facing the tanks, and the sense of exhilaration felt by the resistance forces when they learned of the ignominious failure of the machinations of the GKChP.

This book will be useful for the undergraduate college student or nonspecialist reader who seeks an understanding of the attempted coup. It will also be the obligatory starting point of any scholar who engages in an extensive analysis of the forces behind the failed putsch and the reasons for its collapse. A number of questions are answered, at least tentatively, by the writings collected in this volume, but a number of other questions have not been answered, and deserve further exploration. It is clear that the coup plotters acted with amazing ineptness and without any coherent, long-term strategy. It is also clear that they overestimated the subservience of the population of the USSR, because they underestimated the changes in political attitudes which had taken place under Gorbachev. It is also apparent that the plotters did not have firm control of the military and security forces, and that the divisions in the loyalty of those forces spelled the doom of the attempted putsch. It seems likely that cities other than Moscow and Leningrad were relatively quiet during the August days, as people generally continued their usual routines, though organized protests against the coup did occur in some provincial centers. It also seems likely that many officials on all levels were poised to carry out the orders of the GKChP with no hesitation, and indeed with some anticipation of relief and pleasure.

Active resistance to the authority of the State Emergency Committee was concentrated mainly in Moscow and Leningrad. The composition and motivation of those defending the Russian White House have not been established decisively, though hints on those subjects are offered in the writings in this volume. A disproportionate number of those on the barricades seems to have consisted of young adults, though many older people surely played a crucial role in encouraging the resistance effort and discouraging soldiers from obeying orders to suppress resistance. The social composition of the resistance forces seems to have been varied, though it is probable that a large proportion of the members of those forces came from the Soviet middle class, or those with a high level of education. It may have
been true that many of the defenders of the White House were activated by broad, inchoate feelings of resentment against the representatives of the old order, and by the outrage over the threat of the use of Soviet military force against Soviet civilians. Thus those citizens may have been moved more by a mixture of populism and patriotism than by a commitment to democratic institutions and procedures. At the same time, it is clear that the movement for democracy, growing out of the "informal" groups and the Democratic Russia movement, played a key role in mobilizing and organizing active resistance to the putsch. It is also apparent that the communications media, especially television, were of vital importance in arousing opposition to the coup, and that the failure to cut off their opponents' access to such media was yet another indication of the incompetence of the leaders of the GKChP. The balance of public attitudes in relation to the attempted coup is only touched on in passing in this collection, but it may have been the case that public opinion on the putsch was fairly evenly divided, with as many people supporting the GKChP as opposing it, and many citizens wavering in their views. By raising such questions and by recreating the atmosphere of the dramatic days of August 1991, this collection merits the attention of students of recent Soviet and Russian history.

Alfred B. Evans, Jr. California State University, Fresno


This is a book with a thesis, and one this reviewer finds persuasive: that post-communist Russia will take a "long time to evolve towards genuine democracy, if ever" (403). More obviously, it is a working journalist's account of the changing Russia he has been reporting. Jonathan Steele was the London Guardian's man in Moscow from 1987 onwards, succeeding Martin Walker; his book, despite its academic imprint, is closer to the accounts of a changing Russia that have been provided by other journalists like David Remnick and Steve Crawshaw than to social science. Despite the lack of footnotes, this is a book that specialists will consult with considerable profit: as perhaps the most searching account now available of Russia's ambiguous transition, and one with an important message for Western policy-makers.

Russia, Steele begins by arguing, was always a "special society." But it was beginning to change with increasing rapidity from the late 1980s, and above all through the rise of glasnost', which in turn made possible this kind of Western reporting. After a survey of developments up to the El'tsin presidency, a second part considers the end of Communist rule and a third part looks at the collapse of the Soviet empire. The fourth and final part is concerned with Russia's new institutions. Steele is full of respect for the democrats, and for more pragmatic reformers. But his conclusion is that to democratize a country with Russia's authoritarian history will require "generations rather than years"; and that the construction of new
institutions is less important than "the fabric of consensus, the notion of solidarity, the feeling that the individual's opinion matters" (xii-xiii). These, Steele concludes, are not matters that should concern Russians alone. Western governments shared the optimism that came with the failure of the attempted coup, and then the end of Communist rule. Even the storming of the White House in October 1993 seemed acceptable if this was the only way of moving towards more genuinely democratic parliamentary elections. But the outcome was to show how weak was Russia's understanding of democracy, and El'tsin's in particular. The West, at the same time, had put too much emphasis upon economic reform, and upon privatization in particular. The fall in living standards that resulted helped to bring about the success of the Liberal Democrats in the December 1993 elections; and it encouraged corruption and the theft of state property rather than investment, innovation or management reform. It would have been better, Steele suggests, to develop a framework of political consensus once communist rule had collapsed, and to encourage a more gradual process of economic change.

A paperback edition of this book has already appeared (London: Faber, 1995); it claims to be "fully revised and updated" but appears to be an unaltered reprint, with all of the errors of the hardback version. It is Ignalina, for instance, not "Ignolina" (7). In April 1993 49.5 percent (not "a narrow majority") voted for early presidential elections (37). The 19th Party Conference closed in July, not June 1988 (83). Lenin's slogan was that a newspaper (not a "journalist") should be an "agitator, propagandist, and organizer" (100). Article 6 of the constitution was reworded, not "removed" (124, 126, 347). It is Yegor, not Yuri Stroev (135). El'tsin's ban on the Communist Party was in November 1991, not 1992 (142). The Russian declaration of sovereignty was in June, not July 1990 (205). The Russian Congress of People's Deputies had 1068, not 1040 members (278). And Kommunist (293) is not a weekly. Journalist or scholar, we all need to get our facts right.

Stephen White
University of Glasgow


This book describes in detail Soviet religious policy formulation and implementation during the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, and post-Soviet eras. The author portrays the way those policies affected not only the Russian Orthodox Church, but the Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Islamic faiths as well. Through such an overview, he traces patterns of continuity and change, and presents what he sees as the long-term trends that gradually led to the shift in the state's attitude toward religion.

Anderson makes a heroic attempt to systematize the motivations and actions of the various individuals and bureaucratic institutions involved in the religious pol-
icy process. However, as quickly becomes apparent in his study, the reality of religious policymaking and implementation was often intricate and did not lend itself to a clearly definable formulation. The success of Anderson's work lies precisely in that it discloses the variety of personalities and ideals that lay behind the supposedly monolithic body of the "Soviet state." He personalizes those individuals sitting behind the desks of the leading organs of the Central Committee, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults, and the KGB. His discussion in chapter 6 of the role played by Konstantin Kharchev as the head of the Council of Religious Affairs from 1984 to 1989 is particularly illuminating in this regard. Anderson's work likewise does not stop at "the center"; he extends his view to include those more local authorities, including the press and educational leaders, on whom policy implementation rested.

Anderson identifies a spectrum of ideological groupings among policymakers and administrators that variously tended toward "fundamentalist," "pragmatic," and "skeptical" approaches to religion. He stresses that people tended or inclined toward these positions without coalescing into clearly definable parties. Moreover, this ideological spectrum developed only gradually as the decades progressed. Only in the Gorbachev era, according to Anderson, did its various colorings become "more spectacular," with the distinct majority now doubting the aims of the religious policy to date.

Anderson pinpoints a series of questions around which the debate over the religion issue centered: the proper role of religion in society; the nature of religion itself; the relationship between religion and culture; and the links of religion with morality. In addition to these philosophical issues, he also notes the appearance of more practical challenges that influenced those connected to religious policy. These included the rise of religious dissent and the confidence these dissenting groups gleaned from international human rights monitoring groups; the more positive public attitude toward religion; the linkage between nationalism and religion, given that the "nationality question" had clearly not been solved; and such external influences as detente and closer contact between East and West.

While the parameters of his study tend to push Anderson to focus on the internal workings of the Soviet bureaucratic system, he is careful not to leave out of his picture the effect the religious policy was having on the religious communities themselves. His narrative allows the reader to follow the circular interaction between state "officials" and various religious communities and to gain a sense of the long-term effects that this interrelationship had on both sides. Not only were bureaucrats finding themselves divided by the results of their policies on the faith communities; religious communities as well found themselves internally split over the issue of relations with the state. Religious activists from within the Islamic, Protestant, and Russian Orthodox communities claimed that the leaders of religious organizations had compromised too much in their attempts supposedly to preserve the well-being of their communities.

Anderson poignantly shows how, in the end, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end to any semblance of a single, united religious policy. His
last chapter, "Religion, State, and Politics into the 1990's," is perhaps his best in that it uncovers the long-term effect Soviet religious policy had on the inner life of various religious communities. He leaves the readers with a picture of internally fragmented religious communities which are faced not only with the task of re-evaluating their past, but also with the challenge of defining and envisioning their place in society in the future.

Anderson's achievement rests not so much in providing new information, but in bringing together the various aspects of Soviet religious policy under a single cover. For this reason, his book is a welcome addition to any library. One of the few shortcomings is the minimal attention devoted to the effect the state religious policy had on such smaller, though historically significant, religious communities as the Jews and the Old Believers. Also, while Anderson mentions the "True Orthodox Church" in Russia and its two hundred branches, he does not define who these people were, and in what ways they differed from the official Russian Orthodox Church—something that is not well known even by the informed Western reader. But given that his study is completed in a little more than two hundred pages, Anderson is to be commended for covering as much ground as he does.

Vera Shevzov

Smith College