We model the satisficing behaviour proposed by Sarin and Yi (2014) in extensive form games. Players at different information sets are modeled to independently adjust their satisficing levels and satisfice with options with respect to the levels. We introduce a refinement of subgame perfection, named as subgame dominance, which requires players choose 'Best' actions at all information sets. Satisficing players play subgame dominant paths most of the time in perfect information games and a class of imperfect information games like simultaneous games with outside options. And, we identify conditions under which satisficing players 'always cooperate' in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games and 'fairly coordinate' in repeated Battle of the Sexes games. Lastly, we show that the players develop complete communication strategies in signaling games with same interests.
- Extensive Form Games,
- Subgame Dominance
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/yi/3/