Expanding "Choice" in School Choice(2008)
AbstractTruthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.
- Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm,
- choice-augmented deferred acceptance,
- tie breaking,
- ex ante Pareto efficiency.
Citation InformationYeon-Koo Che. "Expanding "Choice" in School Choice" (2008)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/yeonkoo/26/