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Unpublished Paper
Expanding "Choice" in School Choice
  • Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.
  • Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm,
  • choice-augmented deferred acceptance,
  • tie breaking,
  • ex ante Pareto efficiency.
Publication Date
Citation Information
Yeon-Koo Che. "Expanding "Choice" in School Choice" (2008)
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