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Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment
Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
  • James Andreoni, University of California, San Diego
  • Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
  • Jinwoo Kim, Yonsei University
Abstract
This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions of the auction theory, by providing an effective means to control for risk aversion and other behavioral motives that were difficult to control for in previous experiments. Our experimental evidence provides strong support for the theory, and sheds light on the roles of risk aversion and the spite motive in first- and second-price auctions, respectively.
Disciplines
Publication Date
2007
Publisher Statement
Discussion Paper 0506-27
Citation Information
James Andreoni, Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim. "Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment" Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 59 (2007)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/yeonkoo/10/