Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging Migration and Membership

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Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging

The aim of this article is to reflect broadly on the themes of migration and membership in the modern nation-state. But what exactly is a nation-state? The term is often used to designate polities that recognize one another’s (nominal) independence. Yet given the range of variation among such polities on such fundamental dimensions as state structure, strength, capacity, size, wealth, and cultural heterogeneity, this usage risks being analytically vacuous. The risk remains even if we exclude micro-states and limit attention to, say, the fifty largest polities.

To be sure, the wide spectrum of polity types found c. 1500—ranging from micro-principalities, city-states, and loose tribal confederations through emerging bureaucratic territorial polities to vast empires—narrowed substantially in succeeding centuries, thanks to the military success of centralizing bureaucratic territorial states. Convergence is evident in the tasks undertaken by states (which have everywhere assumed at least nominal responsibility for such matters as education, health, social welfare, dispute resolution, the regulation of economic life, and so on); in certain aspects of their formal structure (characterized by what Weber called legal authority with a bureaucratic administrative staff); and in their fundamental modes of legitimation (which generally involve an appeal to the sovereignty of “the people” or “the nation”). Yet contemporary states remain strikingly unlike in their nation-stateness, that is, in the extent to which, and manner in which, “nation” and “state” are joined. The set includes relatively (but decreasingly) mono-ethnic states such as Korea, Japan, and Norway; avowedly binational or multinational states such as Bel-
gium and Spain; and complex multi-ethnic polities such as India, Russia, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Nigeria.¹

When the term **nation-state** is not used ostensively to designate a heterogeneous set of actually existing states, it generally signifies an analytical or normative ideal type. As an **analytical** ideal type, the nation-state is a model of political, social, and cultural organization; as a **normative** ideal type, it is a model for political, social, and cultural organization. In the former sense, **nation-state** is a category of **analysis**, used to make sense of the social world. In the latter, it is a category of **practice**, a constitutive part of the social world, a core term in the modern political lexicon, deployed in struggles to make and remake the social world.²

In both guises—as part of the analytical idiom of social science and as part of the practical idiom of modern politics—“the” nation-state is often understood and represented in a highly idealized manner—idealized, that is, first and foremost, in a logical sense not necessarily in a normative sense. Even sharp critics of the nation-state invoke an idealized conceptual model that is said to capture the basic “logic” or nature of “the” nation-state. Practical political invocations of the nation-state as a model for political organization—that is, nationalist invocations of the nation-state—also rely on an idealized conceptual model, though, for nationalists, the model also serves as a normative ideal.

The idealized conceptual model of the nation-state, which began to take shape during the French Revolution and was elaborated in both political practice and theoretical reflection during the nineteenth and the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, posits the congruence of nation and state; the hyphen that joins “nation” and “state” suggests—and in practical political contexts may

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demand—a tight coupling. More specifically, the idealized conceptual model posits a set of mappings or congruencies linking state territory, national territory, national culture, and citizenry. First, the frontiers of the state as an actually existing territorial organization should match the frontiers of the nation as an “imagined community”—to use Anderson’s overworked but still indispen-sable phrase. Second, polity and culture should be congruent: A distinctive national culture should be diffused throughout the territory of the state, but it should stop at the frontiers of the state. There should be cultural homogeneity within states, but sharp cultural boundaries between them. Third, state territory and citizenry should be congruent: Ideally, all permanent residents of the state should be citizens, and all citizens should be residents. Finally, cultural nationality and legal citizenship should be coextensive: All ethnocultural nationals should be citizens, and all citizens should be nationals. The nation-state, in short, is conceptualized in both social-scientific analysis and political practice as an internally homogeneous, externally bounded political, legal, social, cultural, and (sometimes) economic space.3

This model has important corollaries for mobility and membership. The nation-state is understood as an internally fluid but externally bounded space, as a space of free social and geographical mobility, in both vertical and horizontal dimensions. But geographical mobility is understood as sharply bounded. There is free mobility within but not between nation-states, just as—in the idealized conceptual model—there is free circulation of goods, ideas, messages, and cultural patterns within but not between nation-states. Mobility within nation-states is facilitated and seen as normal, even desirable (in that it contributes to the smooth functioning of labor and housing markets, and to cultural homogeniza-tion), but mobility between nation-states is hindered and seen as anomalous. Insofar as actual regimes of mobility approximate this pattern, mobility is reciprocally linked to homogeneity within and heterogeneity between states: The internal mobility of persons is both cause and consequence of internal cultural homogeneity, and

the external barriers to mobility are likewise both cause and consequence of cultural differences between nation-states.4

THE POLITICS OF BELONGING To show how this idealized conceptual model of the nation-state can illuminate the politics of membership or belonging, I begin by drawing four distinctions. First, the concern herein is with the politics of belonging only at the level of the nation-state, not at other levels or at other sites. In the broadest sense, the politics of membership plays itself out in a great variety of sites. The question “who belongs” can be contested—and hence, in the broadest sense, politicized—at sites as diverse as cities, neighborhoods, workplaces, clubs, associations, churches, unions, parties, tribes, and even families. Yet although the nation-state is one among many loci of contestation over membership, it remains—contrary to certain postnationalist arguments—a particularly consequential one. Indeed, in longer-term historical perspective, we can appreciate the increasing importance of the nation-state as a locus of belonging, as development of increasingly direct, intrusive, and centralized forms of rule entailed what might be called, after Noiriel’s take on Foucault, the “étatization of membership.”5

Second, the politics of citizenship in the nation-state can be distinguished analytically from the politics of belonging to the nation-state, though the two are often closely linked in practice. For some marginal or minority populations, there is no doubt or contestation about their formal state membership; they unambiguously belong to one, and only one, state, the one in which they reside. But in such cases, there often is doubt or contestation about their substantive membership or citizenship status—that is, about their access to, and enjoyment of, the substantive rights of citizenship, or about their substantive acceptance as full members of a puta-

4 On the nation-state as an internally fluid but externally bounded space, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, 1983).
tively national “society.” In these cases, the politics of belonging is not generated by migration, at least not in any proximate sense, but by various forms of social closure, discrimination, or marginalization.

The Anglo-American political sociology of citizenship of the early postwar era, associated with Marshall and Bendix, was concerned with this kind of politics of citizenship in the nation-state—that is, with the substantive civic incorporation of the working class, whose formal membership in the nation-state was not in doubt. A similar point could be made about work on the civic incorporation of African Americans or of indigenous populations in many countries.6

Even in cases where the politics of belonging arises in response to migration, one can distinguish the politics of substantive membership or citizenship in the state and the politics of formal belonging to the state. For example, much work on the civil, political, and social rights of migrant workers in Europe has centered on substantive citizenship, not formal belonging; such work has focused on rights that are not contingent on a particular membership status in the state.7

Third, the politics of belonging has both formal and informal aspects. Certain kinds of membership—legal nationality or state-membership, for example—are administered by specialized personnel using formal, codified rules. Nation membership in a more informal sense, however, is not administered by specialized personnel but by ordinary people in the course of everyday life, using tacit understandings of who belongs and who does not, of us and them. These everyday membership practices of identification and categorization, and of inclusion and exclusion, may well be at variance with codified forms of official, formal membership. This tension is captured in the expression “français de papier” (paper Frenchman) or in the saying that was current in France during the late 1980s, “ta carte d’identité, c’est ta gueule” (your identity card is your face).

This distinction between the formal and the informal applies not only to the politics of belonging in and to the nation-state but also to the politics of belonging at other levels of aggregation and at other sites. Formal membership in a club, church, family, or association does not entail informal acceptance; formal membership may be informally contested or subverted. But the concern herein is with the distinction between formal and informal aspects of the politics of belonging in and to the nation-state.

Fourth, and most important for the discussion that follows, the internal dimensions or sites of the politics of belonging can be distinguished from the external dimensions. The internal politics of belonging apply to populations that are durably situated within the territorial ambit of a state but are not—or not fully—members of that state. The external politics of belonging pertain to the membership status of populations that are durably situated outside the territorial ambit and jurisdiction of a state but claim—or are claimed—to belong, in some sense, to that state or to “its” nation. They may or may not be citizens or otherwise formal members of the state in question; in either case, their membership status, actual or claimed, is the focus of contestation.

The internal and external politics of belonging can be connected in three ways: (1) They can be reciprocally connected between states. That is, a population subject to an internal politics of membership in one state may be subject to an external politics of membership in another state. This reciprocal link can arise through migration. Mexican migrants and their descendants, for example, participate as immigrants in an internal politics of belonging in the United States, and they have begun in recent decades to participate as emigrants in the external politics of belonging in Mexico. But the reciprocal connection between internal and external membership politics can also arise without migration. To take a case from postcommunist Eastern Europe, the ethnic Hungarian minority is the focus of an internal politics of belonging in Romania, Slovakia, and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine and Serbia; at the same time, it is the focus of an external politics of belonging in Hungary itself.8

(2) The internal and external politics of belonging may be-

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come intertwined within a particular state at a particular political junc-
ture. Such was the case in Germany during the 1990s, when de-
bates about the privileged immigration and citizenship status of ethnic German migrants from Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union (the so-called Aussiedler) collided with debates about the ways in which German citizenship law excluded guest workers and their children from citizenship. The weak knowledge of Ger-
man displayed by the Aussiedler—especially the increasing number of them arriving from the former Soviet Union—invited compar-
ison with the fluent German spoken by the German-born children of guest workers. This situation raised the question: Why were the children of Turkish guest workers still overwhelmingly foreigners, despite being born and raised in Germany and speaking fluent German, while Aussiedler enjoyed all the rights of citizenship, and special privileges to boot, despite speaking little or no German?

Finally, (3) the internal and external politics of belonging may be linked sequentially, as when a “homeland state” facilitates or induces the immigration of external members. Large-scale re-
settlement can generate a new internal politics of membership, formal and informal, insofar as the re-settlers are not fully inte-
grated or accepted, or insofar as they are accorded certain privi-
leges or benefits that become contested. Germany’s policies to-
ward the ethnic Germans of Eastern Europe again furnish an example. The external politics of membership established immi-
gration and citizenship privileges for these transborder ethnic “kin” during the 1950s, but the flow of re-settlers was limited by exit restrictions throughout the Cold War era. The lifting of these restrictions in the late 1980s generated a huge influx of re-settlers. The various special rights and benefits that they enjoyed, as well as their conspicuous lack of integration, generated a new internal politics of membership, both formal and informal.\(^9\)

**Sources of the Politics of Belonging** As noted earlier, a series of congruencies—of territory and citizenry, state and na-
tion, polity and culture, and legal citizenship and ethnocultural nationality—are central to the idealized conceptual model of the nation-state. But in practice, those congruencies are seldom, if

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9 Brubaker and Jaeun Kim, “Transborder Nationalism and the Politics of Belonging in Germany and Korea,” unpub. ms. (University of California, Los Angeles, 2009).
ever, fully realized. It is the lack of congruence that generates both internal and external forms of the politics of belonging.

In a hypothetical world of “perfect” (in a logical or conceptual sense, not in a normative sense) nation-states, characterized by these congruencies, there would be no politics of membership. It would be clear who belongs where; there would be no “matter out of place,” in Douglas’ words, no internal or external politics of belonging to the nation-state.  

Nor would there be a politics of membership in the nation-state. This hypothetical world of “perfect” nation-states would, by definition, have no marginal, unincorporated minority populations. The nation-state would be, in fact, just what the nationalist imagination represents it to be—an undifferentiated, fluid totality, without fundamental class, regional, ethnic, or caste divisions; a space of internal equality and mobility; and an internally homogeneous and externally bounded sociocultural and sociopolitical realm. But actual nation-states do not conform to this idealized nationalist model (or, for that matter, to the ideal-typical conceptual model deployed by analysts and critics of “the” nation-state). Specifying the ways in which they do not conform is one method of identifying the sources of the internal and external politics of belonging.

Migration is the most obvious source. It is easy to see how migration—insofar as it leads to substantial and more or less permanent settlement in another state—disturbs the congruencies central to the idealized model of the nation-state. But three other sources of the internal and external politics of belonging deserve analysis before we discuss migration in more detail.

The internal politics of belonging affecting ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine, mentioned above, revolve around Hungarian-language schooling, the public use of the Hungarian language in areas of concentrated Hungarian settlement, and the vexed question of territorial and nonterritorial forms of autonomy. This internal membership politics is reciprocally linked to an external politics of belonging in Hungary. The Hungarian state claims the right to monitor the condition, to promote the welfare, and to protect the rights of “its” transborder co-

ethnics. A few years ago it caused a stir by adopting the so-called “Status Law,” which established a formal membership status for which transborder co-ethnics could apply, and to which certain benefits were attached.

This configuration of the internal and external politics of belonging exemplifies a more general pattern involving a triadic nexus between territorially concentrated national minorities; the nation-states in which they live, and of which they are citizens; and the external national “homelands” to which they “belong” by ethnocultural affinity, though not by legal citizenship. This pattern, characteristic of interwar Central and Eastern Europe after the breakup of the multinational Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov empires, was generated again by the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Contemporary cases notably include the relations between the large Russian or Russophone minorities, the nationalizing Soviet successor states in which they live—especially Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Latvia—and the Russian Federation. But the pattern is not restricted to Eastern Europe. A similar relational nexus, for example, exists between Chinese minorities, especially in South East Asia; the states in which they live, and of which they are citizens; and China as an external national homeland.\(^ {11} \)

In interwar Europe, the internal and external membership politics were generated not by the movement of people over borders, but by the movement of borders over people. The same condition holds for the Russian case (though not for the Chinese case, which derives from migration): To be sure, ethnic Russians had been migrating outward from core areas of Russian settlement for centuries, but only within the Russian empire or the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed, borders moved over people, not (immediately) vice versa, thus creating the post-Soviet internal and external membership politics in Russia and the other successor states.

A second set of configurations do not involve this sort of reciprocal connection between the internal politics of belonging in one state and the external politics of belonging in another. In these configurations, the contested membership status is that of marginal

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or minority populations who do not have external “homeland” states. Such populations include certain ethnoreligious, ethnoracial, ethnonational, and indigenous minorities, with the caveat that indigeneity itself is not an uncontested ethnodemographic or ethnohistorical fact, but a contested political claim.

In these cases, the politics of belonging are generated not by the movement of people across borders, or by the movement of borders across people, but by the absence of movement or mobility—in social space, not geographical space. Gellner called this condition “obstacles to entropy,” by which he meant the traits, structures, and processes that were resistant to what he saw as the prevailing feature of industrial society (and its concomitant, the modern nation-state)—namely, the tendency for the relatively fixed structures, divisions, and subgroupings of agrarian society to erode in the “fluid totality” of the nation-state, with its “need for [a] random-seeming, entropic mobility and distribution of individuals” throughout social space.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite this prevailing tendency or “need” of “modern” or “industrial” or “national” societies (more or less equivalent designations, in his view), Gellner acknowledged the existence of certain important “entropy-resistant” classifications or traits. People so classified, he noted, were not “evenly dispersed throughout the entire society” but remained “concentrated in one part or another of the total society,” particularly—as in the cases of interest herein—in the lower regions of social space. Gellner was thinking primarily of ethnoracially and some ethnoreligiously distinct populations (African Americans or Muslim immigrants in Europe, for example), since such markers—and the uneven distributions in economic and social space with which they are associated—often persist across generations. Needless to say, this state of affairs constitutes a major anomaly from the perspective of the ideal conceptual model of the nation-state as a fluid and egalitarian social space.\textsuperscript{13}

The internal membership politics in these cases do not correspond to a reciprocal external membership politics, since these

\textsuperscript{12} Gellner, \textit{Nations and Nationalism}, 63–64.

marginalized minority populations do not have an external “homeland” nation-state with which they identify. Membership politics in these configurations, however, are not always devoid of an external reference; sometimes an important international dimension is evident. Indigenous peoples, for example, have pressed claims in various international forums in recent decades, as have Roma.\(^\text{14}\)

The persisting legacies of empire are a third source of internal membership politics. Such instances are often conveniently forgotten, or seen as marginal and unimportant, but Kymlicka and others have rightly emphasized their significance. The United States may style itself a nation of immigrants, but as Thernstrom wrote, “There are sizable numbers of people whose ancestors did not come to the US either voluntarily or involuntarily. Instead, the United States came to them in the course of its relentless expansion across the continent and into the Caribbean and Pacific.” To the extent that such populations are not fully incorporated and integrated into the contemporary nation-state, they can become the focus of an internal politics of membership. Examples in the American context include Puerto Ricans and Native Hawaiians, not to mention other Native Americans who mobilize as indigenous peoples, as noted above.\(^\text{15}\)

Common to all three sources of membership politics discussed so far is that they cannot be understood as disturbing the congruencies that are central to the idealized conceptual model of the nation-state. More precisely, they can be understood from an atemporal, logical perspective as deviating from the conceptual model, but they cannot be understood in historical perspective as departing from or disturbing a previous condition of congruence. These are not new incongruencies; they have characterized nation-states from their inception.

**MIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING** A similar point can be made about migration as a source of the internal and external politics of membership. To be sure, large-scale transborder migra-

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tions leading to more or less permanent settlement do seem to introduce a new “disturbance,” or new incongruencies, into the system of nation-states. But that disturbance—like those considered above—has been part of the system of nation-states from the beginning. Only in an atemporal, logical sense, not in an historical sense, can migration be said to disturb the congruencies that constitute the ideal conceptual model of the nation-state.

With this caveat in mind, it can still be heuristically useful to consider the ways in which migration departs from this model. First, and most obviously, migration engenders a discrepancy between long-term residence and citizenship, which, in turn, can generate an internal—and, reciprocally, an external—politics of membership. Internally, this involves contestation over the terms of access to full formal citizenship, whether through naturalization on application or through automatic attribution, as well as contestation over the definition and content of other membership statuses short of full citizenship.

In an inclusive vein, this internal politics of belonging is focused on efforts to bring the formal membership status of migrants (or their descendants) into alignment with their substantive position as long-term residents whose lives—notwithstanding certain transborder engagements—are firmly anchored in the country of settlement. The longer the period of settlement without citizenship, and the more integrated such resident non-members are in the economic, social, and cultural life of the country of settlement, the more anomalous is their status, and the stronger is their case for full membership. The case is especially strong for second- and third-generation immigrants. In countries without provisions for automatic civic incorporation through *jus soli* (which confers citizenship based on birth in a particular territory), immigrants and their descendants can remain indefinitely without citizenship in the country of settlement, even though they may be residing in the only country that they have ever known. This sort of predicament was crucial to the debates that led to the introduction of certain elements of *jus soli* in Germany in 1999.16

Migration does not just engender a discrepancy between resi-

dence and citizenship. Insofar as migrants are understood to be outside the imagined national community of their state of settlement, migration also engenders a discrepancy or incongruence between nation and state, or, put in slightly different terms, between culture and polity. This second incongruence can generate a more restrictive, or at least a more assimilationist, politics of belonging, premised on the claim that migrants must become members of the nation before they can become full members of the state. In many European countries, the center of gravity in struggles over the terms of membership has recently shifted back in this assimilationist direction, as the luster of previously fashionable differentialist policies and practices has faded. This trend was powerfully reinforced after 9/11 and after the attacks in London and Madrid.17

By virtue of the discrepancy between long-term residence and citizenship, migration can engender not only an internal politics of belonging in the state of settlement but also an external politics of belonging in the state of origin. On the one hand, the discrepancy between residence and citizenship may be seen as a problem in the homeland state, which may prevent emigrants from retaining citizenship or from transmitting it to their children. But the main trend in recent decades is in the opposite direction. The discrepancy between residence and citizenship now looks more like an opportunity than a problem. From this standpoint, the politics of belonging is about maintaining ties with emigrants; making it easier for them to retain their citizenship, even when they acquire citizenship elsewhere; and facilitating home-country involvement in such matters as voting, property ownership, and remittances.18

TRANSBORDER KIN AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING The emerging literature about the external politics of belonging focuses primarily on recent migrations between established nation-states. This trend is in keeping with the literature’s general emphasis on recent transformations of polity, economy, culture, technology,


18 On the increasing de facto and de jure tolerance of dual citizenship in Europe, see Faist (ed.), *Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood to Societal Integration* (Burlington, 2007); on other forms of home-country involvement, FitzGerald, *Nation of Emigrants*. 
and social relations, transformations that are usually subsumed under the heading of globalization or transnationalism. According to this view, these transformations have engendered a world of newly pervasive and largely uncontrollable cross-border flows of people, goods, images, data, ideas, political projects, and social movements, in which loyalties, identities, solidarities, and membership structures increasingly cut across the borders of nation-states.\textsuperscript{19}

The literature gives scant attention to the external politics of belonging generated by earlier migration flows. As a result, its understanding of the external politics of belonging is too presentist. It neglects sources of the external politics of belonging that antedate the current phase of capitalist globalization, recent advances in communication and transportation infrastructures, and the putative epochal shift toward a transnational, diasporic, postnational, or postmodern world.

Consider two cases that highlight a key issue neglected in the recent literature about migration and the external politics of belonging. The German population in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the Korean population in Japan and China share four characteristics from the perspective of their putative “homeland” states: First, they have long resided outside the territory of the state—or indeed, in the case of many Germans, have never resided in that state. Second, they do not (for the most part) possess citizenship in that state. In fact, they \textit{could} not (for the most part) possess German or Korean citizenship, since neither Germany nor Korea existed as a modern nation-state with its own citizenship when their ancestors emigrated. Yet, third, these transborder populations have been represented as belonging to the German or Korean nation, and, fourth, they have been understood, though not uncontroversially, as having a legitimate claim on the “homeland” state.\textsuperscript{20}

Why have West Germany, post-unification Germany, South


\textsuperscript{20} This section draws on Brubaker and Kim, “Transborder Nationhood.” For other examples, see Joppke, \textit{Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State} (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).
Korea, and, in certain contexts, North Korea treated these transborder populations as “their own” and extended rights and privileges to them? More generally, how and why are certain populations, but not others, construed as “belonging” in some respect to states other than those in which they are settled? This question is seldom raised in the literature treating the external politics of belonging, which tends to take the existence of such transborder populations for granted. The literature has not been centrally concerned with the social and political processes through which states identify and constitute some—but not other—transborder populations as “their own.” It has focused on configurations in which the identification of transborder kin has been relatively straightforward because of the recent movement of people over borders, or of borders over people, which generates relatively clear-cut relations between home states and their transborder emigrant populations, or between territorially restructured, often “downsized,” states and their newly transborder ethnonational kin. In both configurations, the transborder populations have been relatively bounded and identifiable because they are not simply emigrants or ethnonational kin but also either citizens or former citizens of the “homeland” state in question, or descendants of such persons.

In the German and Korean cases, the identification of transborder kin has been much more complicated. For most of their centuries-long existence, the German-speaking settlements of Central and Eastern Europe had no particular connection to Germany, which, after all, did not even exist as a unified state until 1871. Even after 1871, the ties between scattered German-speaking communities and Germany were tenuous and—until World War I—politically insignificant. The complex chain of events that led the postwar West German state to embrace these populations and to extend certain rights and privileges to them included the German defeat in World War I; the rise of völkisch nationalism; the Nazi eastward expansion, and Nazi resettlement initiatives for transborder Germans; the Soviet deportations of Germans to Central Asia; the postwar expulsions of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other countries; and the restrictive exit policies (and assimilationist cultural policies) of East European communist regimes. In the post–Cold War era, the privileges extended to these transborder coethnics became increasingly difficult to justify and were gradually withdrawn.
nder Germans of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were thus only contingently and temporarily defined as belonging to Germany.

Identification of transborder kin in the Korean case was problematical and contested for different reasons. Large-scale emigration from the Korean peninsula to northeastern China, Japan, and the maritime provinces of Russia began only in the late nineteenth century and intensified under Japanese colonial rule. These emigrants and their descendants were clearly considered Koreans in vernacular understanding, which the colonial regime reinforced by establishing a separate family registry for Koreans, regardless of where they resided in the Empire. But the collapse of the Empire and the division of Korea confounded the question of belonging. Colonial-era migrants had never possessed Korean nationality, since the precolonial dynasty had not adopted modern nationality legislation. Their connection to the two postcolonial states was therefore legally ambiguous.

During the Cold War era, North Korea sought (with some success) to induce the repatriation of Korean Japanese, while South Korea courted the political alignment of Korean Japanese, urging them to register as South Korean nationals. Both states neglected transborder Koreans in the Soviet Union and China. The easing of geopolitical tensions in the aftermath of the Cold War prompted renewed South Korean interest in Korean Chinese, who (after sustained contestation) were recognized as transborder “kin.” The Korean case thus highlights the contested and conjuncturally specific processes through which the state has embraced some—but not other—transborder coethnics. Like the German case, it reveals the social and political processes through which states constitute, recognize, or claim certain external populations as “their own.”

Migration is as old as human history, and so too are questions of membership and belonging. The development of the modern nation-state fundamentally recast both migration and membership, subjecting both to the classificatory and regulatory grid of the nation-state. Some argue that a movement beyond the nation-state is currently recasting migration and membership again in a postnational mode, but there is little evidence for such an epochal shift.
Far from escaping the control of the state, migration is subjected to ever-more sophisticated technologies of regulation and control. This does not mean that states have become hermetically sealed; they never were in the past either. But there is no indication that states have lost their capacity to regulate the flow of persons across their borders, nor that membership has been recast in a way that bypasses or transcends the nation-state. The nation-state remains the decisive locus of membership even in a globalizing world; struggles over belonging in and to the nation-state remain the most consequential forms of membership politics.

By disturbing the congruencies—between residence and citizenship, between nation-membership and state-membership, and between culture and polity—central to the idealized model of the nation-state, migration has long generated, and continues to generate, both an internal and an external politics of belonging. The former concerns those who are long-term residents but not full members of a state, the latter those who are long-term residents (and perhaps citizens) of other states, yet who can be represented as belonging, in some sense, to a “homeland” or “kin” state or to “its” eponymous nation.

Recent scholarly attention has focused primarily on the external politics of belonging. New forms of external membership have indeed been instituted in recent years, but they are hardly unprecedented: Numerous examples of external membership politics are available from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, the recent forms of the external politics of belonging are neither postnational nor transnational; they are forms of transborder nationalism. They do not presage the transcendence of the nation-state; they indicate, rather, the resilience and continued relevance of the nation-state model.

Nationalism is a remarkably flexible and adaptable political idiom, as recent trends in external membership politics demonstrate. Today, the language of nationalism is used to identify and constitute certain transborder populations as members of a nation and to justify maintaining or re-establishing ties with them; in other contexts, the language of nationalism is used in effect to “excommunicate” certain transborder populations.

The current situation does not evince a shift from a national to a postnational mode of membership politics, and even less a shift from a state-centered to a non-state mode of organizing mi-
gration and membership. On the contrary, state ties to transborder populations and claims of transborder populations on “homeland” states are expanding and strengthening, and both are legitimated by the language of nationalism.

The ways in which the conceptual model of the nation-state is construed, however, are changing. The various idealized congruencies highlighted in this article—between the boundaries of the state and those of the nation, between polity and culture, between residence and citizenship, and between cultural nationality and legal citizenship—are not all of a piece. They can be prioritized, and interpreted, differently. The recent wave of external membership policies reflects a movement toward ways of interpreting these congruencies that are decidedly less territorial. Congruence between state and nation can mean, for example, the need for the territorial frontiers of a state to match the (imagined) territorial boundaries of the nation. But it can also entail another kind of matching between state and nation, one that extends the reach of the polity to embrace transborder members of a nation who do not reside within the territory of the state. This interpretation, rather than the territorial interpretation, has informed the recent versions of external membership politics.

In this regard, the literatures of trans-nationalism and post-nationalism are correct to stress the diminished significance of territoriality. The point should not be overstated; the nation-state remains fundamentally a territorial organization. But it is also a membership association, and the frontiers of membership increasingly extend beyond the territorial borders of the state. These new forms of external membership, however, are neither trans-state nor transnational; as forms of transborder nationalism, they represent an extension and adaptation of the nation-state model, not its transcendence.²¹

²¹ On the duality of the state as a territorial organization and membership association, see Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 22–23.