Chapter 09: Societal order, personhood, and human rights (the anthropology of constitutional justice)

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Chapter 9: Societal order, personhood, and human rights (the anthropology of constitutional justice)

Next to family and kinship, society is the closest framework and mark of orientation to a “higher mammal” such as the human being (cf. Chapter 7; and I., below). Chapter 9 deals with societal and social ordering of human life and thus represent the “public side” of personhood. This gives rise to a simultaneous discussion of the concept of personhood in anthropology. Johann Wolfgang Goethe once remarked in his drama “Dr. Faustus”: “It’s in their gods that humans paint themselves” (In seinen Göttern malt sich der Mensch). Similarly, Goethe could have said: “In his companionships man paints himself”. Also he could have said: “It is in terms of family relationships that a person assumes the qualities and roles of its personhood”. Family, society and supranaturality define what a person is: because the three cultural tasks with which a human being is confronted is incest regulation, regulation of societal power, and regulation of human relationships with supranatural phenomena (see Preface, the last two paragraphs).

In detail, Chapter 9 on human organizations contains a redesigned explanation of the segmented society (encompassing big man societies and chieftaincies), its history since Durkheim, its restatement by Evans-Pritchard, and its relation to other fragmented societies including Islamic societies. The focus on superaddition as gist of any organization (that deserves its Greek name) owes much to the Thai studies of the sociologist of law Ludwig Hamburger. Also, Chapter 9 attempts a correlation of cultural and economic development with systems of government and religion. This leads to an explanation of existing forms of government by what is called here the phenomenon of societal inertia. Again, the axial age will serve as a background.

The picture of any society also reflects how the persons who make up that society see themselves as a group. A dialectical relationship exists between the understanding of oneself and of one’s society. It would mean putting the cart before the horse to start from a preconceived idea of a person (for example the individual which is typical for a western style society), and then try to study what kind of society is being formed by that kind of person (note that many anthropologists, political science experts, and sociologists, let alone psychologists, take this approach). Likewise, it would be wrong to simply postulate a society that works under certain observable, describable and obviously inherent rules, and then derive in a monocausal manner from that type of society and those rules a fitting idea of personhood (Emile Durkheim’s and his followers’ approach).

Rather, societies constitute cultural qualities of their members, and persons define their societies contingent upon the way they define themselves as persons. In anthropology, in conformity to available and accepted generalizations, concepts of person and society may best be developed together (a principle that could be called personhood-society interdependence).

This is not a gnostic statement on subject-object identification, but a consequence of what society and persons are as mutually reflective ideas: A Muslim is part of a Muslim type of society, the citizen of an ancient Greek city state is citizen in the sense of the polis, a Hinayana Buddhist monk is a member of his Wat (monastery) society, the President of Afghanistan is defined by his and his government’s understanding of what Afghanistan is today, an Amerindian is what his tribe or nation

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1 Tributes to him are contained in W. Fikentscher (1977b, 20 – 27), and idem, Festschrift Andreas Heldrich (2005, 1119 – 1143).

2 On Durkheim: Jerry Moore (2004) 46 – 58; also see 177 for the ongoing importance of the conflict between given “materialist” societal structures and personal “idealistic” flexible input.
expects him and has educated him to be. These and other examples are used in the following text. 3

Chapter 9 could be entitled “anthropology of organization” if the word organization would be used in a wide sense as human societal order in general. However, we will see that not every societal order is an organization in the strict sense of the term. Therefore, the word organization is not contained in the headline of Chapter 9, but the expression societal order instead. Keeping in mind this terminological remark it may be said: In spite of many known details and well researched materials, in theoretical respect ethnography, ethnology, and cultural anthropology of organization (Organisationsanthropologie) are noticeably underresearched. The Max-Planck- Institute for Multireligious and Multiethnic Societies, established in Göttingen (2008), under its director Steven Vertovec, may help fill this lacune.

I. A System of Groupings in Behavioral Science

Humans may belong to different groupings of humankind. Groupings of humankind are special kinds of groupings of all living beings. Below is a survey of groupings of living beings. 4 Whether human beings join one or more of these groupings depends on human nature and usage. To some, they belong always, to others only rarely or never. The interesting point is that by nature humans are biologically able to belong to almost any grouping of living beings, but that culture may exclude them from this or that biologically possible grouping. The issue is of considerable relevance for forms and requirements of human cooperation, for example, in the contexts of foreign aid, or federal organization.

Robert M. Axelrod provides a foundation for understanding the principles of human cooperation. 5 His models are derived from Western society, more precisely, from the post-axial time Greek-Judaean-Christian mode of thought. 6 For pre-axial time and non-Greek-Judaean-Christian post-axial time modes of thought, Axelrod’s conclusions are less than convincing. 7 Moreover, Axelrod did not check his conclusions against the wealth of grouping possibilities as discussed in behavioral science.

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4 Zoology knows many systems of this kind, e. g., H. Kummer, Primate Societies: Group Techniques of Ecological Adaptations, Chicago 1974: Aldine/Atherton; Hubert Markl, Die Evolution des Soziallebens der Tiere, In: Grzimeks Tierleben, Enzyklopaedie des Tierreiches, Ergänzungsbau Verhaltensforschung, Zürich 1974: Kindler, 461 – 487, with a list of other topical works on p. 644. The text above uses a simplified combined version of types found in zoologic literature, and also orients itself at the elaborate system used in the Encyclopedia Britannica. On reasons why humans form groups and why they leave them, for example by a split”, see note 697, below.


Sociability is characterized by a feeling of belonging that is more than merely nature-given (1. – 4.) nor merely based on space (5.). This negative definition may be the most precise, although it is, as all merely negative definitions, unsatisfactory. The positive trait of a group that may be called “social”, or better: “societal” (see Chapter 3 II, above), is an innate consciousness of belonging to an entity of animals of the same sort. There are four separable subgroups which in certain subgroups in turn can be subdivided:

a. Swarms

A swarm of fish, mosquitos, flies, locusts etc. is characterized by a lack of hierarchy or leadership although the swarm is locally more closely contained than colony and population. The swarm is a means of defense. As long as a swarm of fish sticks together, a shark will not attack them by swimming into the swarm. As long as the pidgeons fly “in formation”, a falcon will not attack them. Only after a raptor succeeds in singling out an individual prey, it may very well be caught. There may be a leader of the swarm, not in the sense that the “leader” commands the direction in which to go, but in the sense that one of the more respected animals indicates which course to take so that the rest will immediately follow. There seems to be an intricate mechanism of stimulus and response that together determines the direction for a swarm to go. If any fish (not only one of the respected animals) of a swarm is deprived of its sense of orientation by an experimenter’s brain surgery on that fish, this mutilated animal does not know where to go, but the whole warm will still follow. The brainless “leader” proves that in a swarm there is no “leader”.

b. Flock formations

This is different in flock formations of which migratory birds are a well known example. The issue of true leadership in many cases is solved by a strong, experienced bird which sets itself at the head

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8 Cf., H. Klingel, Gruppenbildung bei Huftieren, Grzimeks Tierleben (note 600, above, Ergänzungsband Verhaltensforchung, 506 – 528, at 522.

of the formation. A hierarchy is created. Comparable are ant hills, termites’ nests, social spiders, etc. A flock formation is a swarm within an inherent structure. There is separation of labor. However, there remains a relatively large number of animals within the flock. Flock participants are not brought into an individualized order. Rather, instead of an individualized order there is a class structure, consisting perhaps of a queen, female “working” bees, and male “drones”. This structure is typical for bees, ants, and termites. A “brainless leader”, for example a queen that has been subjected to surgery, would not “lead” the flock formation or its movement.

c. Herds (= packs, troops)

In English, “herd” and “pack” applies to ordinary mammals. “A “troop” is used for primates. In German, cows and sheep form a Herde, chickens a “court” or “yard” (Hühnerhof), apes and monkeys a Schar, or Horde. The middle type is an extended family which need not be internally related by descent. The animals know each other and establish, sometimes in tournaments, a hierarchical, societal order. The proverbial “peck order” was discovered in a chicken yard: Chicken may only peck kernels etc in a fixed order, that extends from the lead animal down to the lowest rank. Every farmer knows his “lead cow” who holds its position in the stable and on the pasture. A newly bought cow may need weeks to find its place in the hierarchy beneath that lead cow and will fall back in its milk production during that period. Ethology distinguishes the alpha, beta, gamma etc. animal down to the least important piece of the herd, the omega animal. This inner hierarchy is typical for the herd’s sociability. Still, a herd (pack, troop) lacks the element which is so important for the next type of social grouping, the joint effort (as can be found in a hunting pack of wolves). When a herd of cows shares in grazing on a meadow, every cow grazes for itself. The grazing is no joint effort. The alpha cow does not tell the others who are lower in rank: “O.K, now let’s graze on that piece of land and finish off the grass.” The alpha animal need not be single. It has been reported that wolves – they hunt in joint efforts - know not only alpha-males but also alpha-couples, a male and a female.

d. Hunting pack

An even narrower societal grouping is achieved when the group joins efforts, that is, forms what in German is called an Arbeitsgemeinschaft (team, working group, joint venture). Now the group aims at a common goal, often the kill of huntable prey. The group achieves more, a plus, than the addition of the single separate efforts such as cows grazing on a pasture, and often it is only this addition that makes the pursuit of the common goal possible. The hunting pack of wolves or some other canines is the prime example. However – and this may add new aspects to what can be found in ethological literature – there are significant distinctions within what is called “a hunting pack”:

aa. Hunting packs without separation of labor and without inhibition of hunting impulse

In this most simple form, a hunting pack approaches the prey from various sides, each hunter running on his own, each hunter essentially doing the same, in the absence of a strategy that would involve the inhibition of the hunting drive to ensure the success of the hunt. Examples are hyenas, Scandinavian foxes in summer time, jakals, coyotes, and similar canines, however not African wild dogs (lycaon pictus), Indic red dogs, Scandinavian foxes in winter time, wolves and dogs.
Characteristical for this “everyone-on-his-own hunt” of hunting packs without separation of labor and without inhibition of hunting impulse is the collectivity of the effort, the absence of labor specialization, and the absence if drive-inhibiting strategies. In terms of “cooperation”, this behavior could be called “parallel cooperation”.

bb. Hunting packs with separation of labor, but without inhibition of hunting impulse

The effort is performed jointly, as above. However, there is a specialization among the hunters. Not everyone does the same thing. Still, there is no strategy which requires a temporary suppression of the innate hunting drive. The African wild dog, the Indic red dog and Scandinavian foxes in winter time hunt in this manner. The prey of the African wild dog, for example, are animals which are much stronger than a single wild dog. African wild dogs are relatively small canines who specialize in hunting comparatively large animals such as gnus, zebras, wildebeest, hartebeest and the like. Zimen thinks that small prey such as rats, mice, moles, squirrels etc. are inaccessible for wilddogs because here other raptors such as fox and larger cats monopolize this resource. Large animals such as zebra or hartebeest can only be brought down by the small dogs if they attack from all sides, one biting in the nose, others in the legs, again others in the belly, and so on. Each dog goes for a different part of the victim’s body, representing separation of labor. But the manner of attack is simple, like above.: the hunters come from all directions. In terms of “cooperation”, this kind of behavior could be called “concurring cooperation”.

cc. Hunting packs with separation of labor and with inhibition of hunting impulse

When wolves and dogs, bred by humans from wolves, go in a hunt an additional attribute can be noticed. They hunt not only under the principle of separated labor, but also a strategy that requires a temporary suppression of the hunting drive. Wolves encircle their prey, for example a herd of reindeer. The wolf pack divides itself into three subgroups. Groups A and B prepare an ambush on both sides of the herd, in an angle of 90° to the orientation of the main group. Both groups lie down, making as little noise as possible, and hide. Then the main force, Group C, attacks, noisily storming against the herd from the third side. When the reindeer try to flee, Groups A and B join the attack from their respective sides (the battle plan resembles the one by Hannibal at Cannae). For the reindeer, only the fourth side seems to remain open for flight. But Groups A and B try to cut off the reindeers’ retreat. Not every reindeer will succeed in finding the “escape door”. Wolves seem to have mastered the inhibition of the hunting “instinct” which is indispensable for this hide-and-hunt strategy.

Whether the strategy is “in the genes” or learned from experienced members of the pack, must be left open here. When a modern herder sends his two dogs to assemble a flock of sheep, on the herder’s whistle the dogs will separate and encircle the flock in order to contain it and then guide it to the place the herder is indicating after the encirclement. Thus, the strategy of encirclement is innate. Throwing some dirt, with a little shovel fixed to a long stick, into the desired direction is the traditional way to indicate to the dogs the direction of the upcoming move. Obeying the order is learned. In terms of cooperation research and game theory, this kind of cooperation could be called “strategic – or strategically planned – cooperation”.


23 Kortlandt (see preceding note).
Hunting groups falling under bb. and cc. can further be subdivided by yet another aspect applicable to both categories. Separation of labor may be introduced in such a way that the actors always do the same kind of the labor. In old Dutch reports from colonial “India” (today Indonesia) it is often told that Malay personnel of Netherlands land owners observed a separation of labor strictly confined to the original job conferred upon them. The *babu* (nurse, *Amme*) would take care of the children, but never share in house cleaning, or cooking. The gardener would refuse any other work than gardening, the chauffeur other work than driving the car, etc. This is a system of separated labor with firmly *fixed roles*. Charley Chaplin describes in his movie “Modern Times” the fate of the assembly line worker who forever has to turn one and the same screw. The opposite is separation of labor with *changing roles*. Charles Heston in the title role in the movie “Ben Hur” demands and is granted the privilege of being used as a galley slave on both sides of the galley, taking turns, in order not to have his body crippled by one-sided rowing, the common fate of galley slaves. Before automation, at the assembly line shop stewards pressed employers for plans for changing positions of the employees. Doing different work for others can be a political goal of authoritarian socialism: During the cultural revolution in Maoist China, academic doctors had to serve as “barefoot doctors” in the country side.

Whether hunting African wild dogs not only do separated labor but also change their roles when attacking the prey, is not yet known. They probably work with changing roles and not “specialize” on the nose, belly, etc. Likewise, it would be interesting to know whether hunting wolves have their fixed places in the two ambushing groups resp. in the attack group, or whether they are able to take different roles in different groups.

In terms of “cooperation” in game theory, in addition to (1) “parallel cooperation” defined above under d. aa., four more kinds of cooperation now become apparent: (2) concurring cooperation without changing roles, (3) concurring cooperation with changing roles, (4) strategic cooperation without changing roles, and (5) strategic cooperation with changing roles. Game theory could distinguish these five kinds of cooperation since they deliver different results, as it is shown by the examples above. Particularly the degrees of efficiency are significantly different.

7. Application to human groups

All groupings discussed so far may occur in humans. However, choice and frequency of any of these groupings as applied to humans, differ widely due to cultural specificities. Ludwig Hamburger based his theory of the fragmented society on observations in Thailand in 1952. “Cooperation” in Thailand at that time essentially meant the grouping which has been described above as “hunting group” without separation of labor and without inhibition of hunting impulse” (6. d. aa). Work was done by parallel efforts without strategic serial planning. Thus, he did not observe “real” cooperation. Hamburger found “operation”, but the “co” missing. Whether these observations were correct at that time must be left open. A comparison to China may indicate that there were changes since then. With regard to China, Lin Yutang criticised a lack of cooperative spirit in the 30ies and 40ies of the last century. My personal observations in Nanjing 1992 documented a high degree of voluntary and improvised cooperation inside and outside of family ties.

24 Ludwig Hamburger’s observations; see W. Fikentscher (1977b), 20 – 24.

A hypothesis may be that cultures have different ideas of cooperativeness and togetherness.\footnote{W. Fikentscher, Zur Anthropologie der Körperschaft - Polis, Genossenschaft, Tewa-Pueblo - (ein Feldforschungsbericht), Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist.Klasse, Sitzungsberichte Heft 2/1995, Munich 1995 (Komm. C.H. Beck).} Axelrod himself has doubts whether his “Evolution of Cooperation” works in non-European cultures.\footnote{See notes 601, 603, above.} Axelrod’s differentiating line of argument will be followed in the rest of Chapter 9. The relationship of evolutionary building blocks for human behavior to cross-cultural reality is governed by the four-function theory of biological anthropology for societal order. Details of this theory are discussed above.\footnote{See Ch. 7 IV , above, with references.}

To sum up: The survey of extant groupings in the animal world, in particular the variations of societal hunting pack behavior, demonstrates what is possible also among humans. This demonstration is like a lecture about the building blocks out of which human societal behavior are made. On top of them, cultural specificities may further unfold human possibilities. Inversely, cultural specificities may limit the possibilities offered by the wealth of societal forms to human behavior. Culture not only gives rise to human variability of behavior, culture sometimes limits what is open to adaptive and successful human behavior. For example, whenever certain modes of thought warn their followers against cooperation, family attachment, mutual reliance, and trust across time, for whatever reasons such as self-improvement or overcoming human suffering, culture has a restrictive or limiting influence on forms of human cooperation and government.\footnote{Cf., W. Fikentscher (1975a) 182 – 188.} Whenever religious or political commands prescribe consensus for at least a large part of the population, restricts diversity of opinions and corresponding separation of labor in that part of society.\footnote{Cf., W. Fikentscher (1995/2004) 408 – 438.}

II. Segmentation

1. The concepts of segmentation, societal inertia, and superaddition

Evan E. Evans-Pritchard (1902 – 1973) called the Nuer, a Nilotic tribe, a segmented society. Since then, segmentation has become a form of societal order often associated with traditional people, which use to be called segmented societies. However, the precise meaning of segmentation is not clear as the term has undergone successive stages of understanding. The theory and history of the concept of segmentation are summarily sketched below.\footnote{E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People, Oxford 1940. On segmentation, esp. in Durkheim’s sense, see W. Richard Scott, Organizational Structure, 1 Annual Review of Sociology 1 – 20 (1975).}
freely willing individuals that form modern societies (“organic solidarity”) by way of steadily increasing division of labor (which in turn grew out of demographic factors). In order to distinguish the “primitive societies” in contrast from modern ones, he called the former “segmented” and the latter “state organized”. Later in life, Durkheim concentrated on the social facts (“faits sociaux”) underlying all societies, causing them to appear in collective representations (“représentations collective”) that make up social life. With this theory, Durkheim became the founder of the school of thought that recognizes supra-individual rules inherent to society as such.  

Here is not the place to discuss the question up to what degree the earlier concepts of segmented collectivism found their way into Durkheim’s later ideas of society-inherent rules and laws. This ought to be assumed to some extent.

Among the Nuer, Evans-Pritchard observed a societal feeling of not belonging to a greater unit, such as a state, or a region, but to horizontally ordered family and kin clusters of varying sizes, typified by brotherhood. While not necessarily intent on drafting a system of these clusters, he called the Nuer entities which he observed (households, nuclear families, extended families, lineages, clans, and tribes) “segments”, and saw the relation between brothers as their prime model.

The difference between Durkheim’s and Evans-Pritchard’s understanding of segmentation is this: For Durkheim, a segmented society lacks the organized coherence of a modern state. For Evans-Pritchard, segmentation obtains a positive meaning inasmuch as politically independent groups of equal standing communicate with each other, friendly or belligerently, being essentially sovereign units, instead of being subjected to a vertical centralized organization. Furthermore – as a consequence of this communication between these entities on principally equal terms – Evans-Pritchard observes that each entity and its participants consider an entity “out there”, on the other side, as an undivided unit.

Elsewhere, I have used segmentation neither as a general term for non-state societies (as Durkheim did), nor merely as same-level agglomerations of households, nuclear families, lineages, clans, or tribes (as Evans-Pritchard did for the Nuer). Rather, segmentation was used to designate a principle of ordering societies that is defined by the absence of corporate organization and by the interpretation of human togetherness as brotherhoods or family-metaphors comparable to brotherhoods. In this sense, segmentation becomes a principle able to explain all non-Western social and societal life. My use of the term segmentation takes from Durkheim the general character as a non-western society-explaining principle, and from Evans-Pritchard the brotherhood-like horizontality of independent societal clusters whose inside structures are of no interest to the outsider. In this book I use segmentation in the same meaning.

The advantage of this understanding of “segmentation” over Durkheim’s use is that lineages, clans, etc. can now be described as segmented (or not), whereas for Durkheim all lineages, clans, etc. are

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segmented. The advantage over Evans-Pritchard’s use of the term is that there can be talk of a type or principle of human sociability that contrasts to human organizations in a true sense of the word, whereas for Evans-Pritchard segmentation is a matter applying to the Nuer mainly.

Thus, segmentation may be understood as the principle of human sociability that is defined by the absence of a corporate order of society and the presence of a family or family-metaphoric—essentially horizontal—order of equal components. The absence of the corporate order places the components on one and the same “horizontal” level so that the components, viewed from the outside, appear as undivided units of “others”. Visualized, a segmented society does not look like a map on which parts and subparts are shown as from above (“bird’s eye” view), but like a chain of pearls, lined up on a string, whereby every pearl feels related only to the neighboring pearls and is not concerned with the entire necklace.

Graphically, this may be represented as follows:

Follows graph

Segmentation is not the same as fragmentation. All segmented societies are fragmented, but not all fragmented societies are segmented. Segmentation as a principle of human sociability is a special form of fragmentation, a special type of fragmented societal order. Principally, segmentation is limited to pre-axial age societies. Fragmented societies can be found in pre-axial age societies as well in post-axial age societies including Hinayana-Buddhist (also called: “loosely structured”), Arab, and Modern-Totalitarian.

Although segmentation is the typical form of pre-axial age societies, segmentation may often last into post-axial age environments. This is a phenomenon that may be called societal inertia: People sometimes tend to maintain traditional societal patterns of leadership such as bigmanship, chieftaincy, kingship, or empire. Thus, for reasons of societal inertia, post-axial age societies may operate with pre-axial age cultural traits, so that segmentation is not foreign, for example, to

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34 W. Fikentscher (1975a), 104 – 120; idem (1995/2004), 214 – 219; the opposite of fragmented is defragmented by mutual trust, the opposite of segmented is, in Durkheim (1964), centralized by state government; in Evans-Pritchard (1940, see note 627 above) living in a coherently structured society, and in this book (as well as in earlier publications of this author): cooperatively organized in the true sense of Greek polis antiquity or other corporate forms.


37 see Embree (note 631, above).


40 On the phenomenon of societal inertia see IV.below. Societal inertia may be an issue of acculturation across time (communication Irmgard Fikentscher 2006).
leadership patterns such as kingships without or by “God’s grace”, or may be practiced in modern Islam, Eastern Europe, and Asia. 41.

The dividing line between a segmented society and its opposite, a cooperative society, is the principle of the “oversum” or superaddition. It means that – quite generally - the whole is seen as something different and in a normative sense more than the sum of the parts. Segmented societies are not superadditive, whereas cooperatives are. Big man societies and chieftaincies are segmented societies. Nay-voters and abstainers are not bound by a decision of the others, the yea-voters. By contrast, in the cooperative system, the element of superaddition binds the nay-voters to obey the majority decision., because the whole is more than the sum of the parts. One consequence of superaddition is that majorities and minorities (and thus majority rule) become conceivable in the first place. Another consequence is an understanding of time-as-a-straight line because majorities may become minorities and vice versa.

2. Big man societies

Big man societies are one type of the segmented societies. The second may be called family and family-like (“family-metaphoric”) societies (chiefs, kings, queens, etc.). Neither big man societies nor family-metaphoric societies vote with results of majorities and minorities. The difference between bigmanship and family-metaphoric societies consists in the lack of importance of family and family-like ties and hierarchies in big man societies. Big men are a type of societal leadership frequent in foragers’ or *Wildbeuter* (hunters’, gatherers’ and fishers’) societies. Thus, in the evolution of human society, big man societies may mark the earliest step.

Contemporary big man societies are the San in Namibia and Botswana, 42 the Inuit, 43 Melanesian peoples such as the Kapauku and Eipo, 44 Philippine aborigines, 45 Australian aborigines, 46 and “pygmies” from the African rain forest. 47 Colonization, television, political pressures, and

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41 For Islam, see VII.(below); for Eastern Europe, VI. 2., (below).
43 Knud Rasmussen, Eskimo Folk-Tales, transl. and ed. by W. Worster, London 1921: Gyldendal
44 On the Kapauku, see Leopold Pospíšil’s books and articles, on the Eipo see I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt and W. Schiefenhoevel. Among the Eipo of New Guinea, the babyal is the big man in general, and the mal deyenang the leader in warfare. Thus, specialists as big men as specialists for certain tasks are not infrequent so that several big men may exist at the same time and place (communication Schiefenhövel 2006).
45 E.g., J.D. Early & T.N. Headland, Population Dynamics of a Philippine Rain Forest People: The San Ildefonso Agta, Gainesville, FL 1998: Univ. Press of Florida. Philippine aborigines are also known as Negritos, or Aeta, see Schebesta, note 646, below.
47 Kevin Duffy, Pygmies of the Rain Forest, San Francisco, CA 1975: Pyramid
increasing identity awareness have of course changed the situations that existed before these societies had contact with the “West”. Sometimes one need not go far to experience life under big man societal conditions. Sitting at a beer table of an inn in a Bavarian country side village and listening to what the most well to do farmer has to tell the others what to fight for next week in county parliament, and from other farmers who react to his proposals, is witnessing contemporary big man society.

Demographically, groups led by big men may be small and “close-knit”, but relying on mere numbers may be misleading. The Kapauku, described by Pospíšil, and the San, described by Schebesta and others, are numerous nations (with many big men).

Big men can be specialized, and then their leadership may be limited to that special ability. There may be an outstanding tracker – he becomes the big man for the hunting expedition. There may be an elderly tribal leader knowledgeable enough to cure diseases, handle supernatural issues and apply the traditional legal rules and customs – he will be the big man for healing corporeal and deciding upon social mishaps. There may be a young warrior who at the same time has distant family in neighboring villages – he will be the big man in warfare and peacemaking. It is an honor and a burden to be a big man.

Big men are not elected, nor appointed. There is an understanding in the tribe that X should be big man. The position of the big man is not inheritable. If he gets old and unwise, there will grow an understanding, also in the big man himself, that some other outstanding figure should take over.

The big man has no staff (although he may have helpers). He listens to others, but there is no council of elders. Big man societies are usually what may be called consensus societies, in the sense that decisions to be taken for the continuation of societal life require the consent of all participating members (adult males in Kapauku). In other words, every participant has the right of vetoing the decision, but the vetoer does not have the legal possibility to prevent those who voted positively from acting under the decision. Saying “nay” means to exclude oneself from having to obey the decision. In a consensus society, people do not cooperate in the precise meaning of the word,
because every participant consents on her or his own. Cooperation requires to cooperate towards something, and this something is *more than, and different from, the additive* entirety of the participants.

In this sense – consensus is necessary, if all should be bound – big man societies are “collective”. There are no precise concepts of “individuality” or “collectivity”. In addition, even if precise concepts could “etically” be determined, their concrete cultural application may mean different things in different cultures, because every culture seems to possess a special “mix” of individual and collective traits. As test whether a society is individualistic the standard should be that individualism is present when a person takes on a role in a unit that is conceived as more than the sum of its parts. The opposite, collectivism, has to be assumed when this is not the case, so when a person feels to be participant in a family, lineage, clan, or tribe without being assigned a distinct role in relation to other participants of this group.

To illustrate, the issue may be raised whether the Kapauku are “individualistic” or a “collective” of tribesmen and tribeswomen. In economic respect, Kapauku are described by L. Pospíšil as “individualists” because of their keen sense for property and market (see soon, below). However, they do not seem to assign to each other membership roles, comparable to the citizens of the Ancient Greek polis, or the farmers of a Frankish cooperative. A (cooperative) team for building a village road could not be formed. In this respect they form a “collective” society. Likewise, their law knows collective liability of a family or a clan for the deeds of a single person. From the reported cultural traits it may be inferred, that Kapauku society has individualistic and collectivist elements, the latter being preponderant. In a similar manner, the two sides could be examined for every big man society. On the whole, with respect to existence and weight of collective civil and criminal responsibility, big man societies may be characterized as collectice societies, and thus societies of blame (Schamgesellschaften), not of (personal) guilt (Schuldgesellschaften).

Aesthetically, fine arts of big man societies are aspective, not perspective, their music seems to be melodic-vocal, not tonal-instrumental.

Economically, big man societies belong to the subsistence fund societies and typically use hunting, gathering or fishing as means of subsistence. Social and ceremonial funds are thinkable and have been observed. Replacement funds exist at Kapauku who store harvest and animals (pigs). In addition to their hunting and gathering activities, Kapauku are horticulturalists and as such know the property of storable goods. According to the theory on cultural correlates as developed below (see IV), Kapauku society as an increasingly reproducing society should have changed from big man type of societal leadership to chieftain type of society because stored property invites envy and, as a

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55 Cf., Günter Bierbrauer’s two articles of 1994, cited in note 362, above.


58 Kottak (2002), 249.

59 See Kottak’s (2002) remarks on social activities of big men, referring to Pospíšil’s reports.
rule, the defense against possible theft and robbery asks for a police under an institutionalized command. In Kapauku society, trust relations seem to exist but are short-range.\(^\text{60}\)

However, Kapauku society, in contrast to a theoretically to be expected change from bigmanship to chieftaincy, as so many other societies develops a reluctance to change from one type of leadership to another. This has been called societal inertia (see above, more under IV., below). Thus, Kapauku society has to combine loosely structured swarm- or herdlike grouping under semi-authoritative big man leadership providing property protection.\(^\text{61}\) Of necessity, the result is a jealous “individualism” that is to guard one’s own, resulting in so-called Kapauku capitalism.\(^\text{62}\) While Harris calls Kapauku capitalism an erratic exception hard to explain,\(^\text{63}\) for this phenomenon societal inertia is a rather plausible explanation. *Kapauku capitalism is a police replacement*. Households, villages, sublineages, lineages, subclans, clans, and tribes (=“federations” of clans) are the entities ascribed by Pospíšil to Kapauku society. Thus, it cannot be said that a big man society lacks structure or inner order.\(^\text{64}\)

Religious types found in big man societies include totemism, dreaming, cult of the dead, ancestor worship, idolatry, animism in the narrow sense and possibly magic.\(^\text{65}\)

Big man society is, as such and as distinct from chieftaincy, not well researched. Its precise description is all the more difficult as older or less informed ethnographic texts, such as colonial officials’s reports, media news, and foreign aid materials, often do not distinguish between big men and chiefs and often simply call big men “chiefs” or “village heads”. This can lead to misunderstandings and ethnic disruptions.\(^\text{66}\)

When modern humans migrated from Africa to Australia and Melanesia around 60,000 years ago,\(^\text{67}\) their leaders were big men (not chiefs). The second great migration, 20,000 years later, again from Africa, but this time along a more northerly route, to many areas including Polynesia, was led by

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\(^{60}\) Leopold Pospíšil, Kapauku Papuan Economy. New Haven 1963: Yale University Publications in Anthropology No. 67.

\(^{61}\) For common purposes such as slash and burn, or a pig feast, the societal structure may change into one of the hunting pack types, see I. 6. d., supra.


\(^{64}\) See, e. g., Pospíšil (2004), 149 f. Whether big man societies know sodalities could not be certified.

\(^{65}\) W. Fikentscher (1995/2004) 195. In the Old Testament, the book “Judges” describes the pre-Davidian Israeletes’ leading men, in Hebrew called shōfet, usually translated as “judges”. They were selected for a certain period when the people felt a need for having leadership, for example when war was threatening. When the danger had passed, the shōfet returned to private life, and there was no transfer of the leadership. Since in history these “judges” preceded kingdom, it is probable that they were rather big men than chiefs. See for details Rémy Brague, The Law of God: The Philosophical History of an Idea, Chicago & London 2007: University of Chicago Press (transl. Lydia G. Cochran), 31. Brague calls the shōfet chiefs. But any transfer of office, inheritance, staff, and hierarchy seem lacking.

\(^{66}\) For the Namibia San, see examples in Bolaane, note 647, above.

chiefs, not by big men. As pointed out it is important to distinguish big man society and chieftaincy as ideal types. Both kinds of societal order not only characterize different phases of migration of *homo sapiens* from Africa since about 60,000 years, both also respond to different building blocks of the mental program of humans, and both continue to influence human societal behavior and ordering: Bigmanship is the historically older general form of leadership, observable in Melanesia and remote areas of Africa. Chiefship is younger, and can be observed for example in Polynesia (see Bohannan 1992, 161 ff.). It became much more influential through its further historical development to kingships, queenships, empire, dukedom, down to modern forms of dictatorship (on the transient relationship between chiefdoms and state see Kottak 2004, 258 ff.).

Because of its foundation in the group and its relatively weak position of the big man, bigmanship appeals to the sense for human equality. Chiefship resembles the verticality of mammalian societal structure, from the alpha-animal down to the lowest ranking members of the hord. Whenever societal egalitarianism and claims of leadership collide, both building blocks of innate and universal human behavior become visible: egalitarian alliances, and leadership. This directly leads to the study of chieftaincy.  

3. Chieftaincies (chiefdoms), kingdoms, and queenships

As societal structures, chieftaincies among humans are as little “purely natural” as are bigmanships. Instead, they are cultural constructs, based on natural building blocks. Anthropologically, there are no significant differences between chiefdom and kingdom. Chiefdoms are the second model of segmentary society, historically often – but not always - following bigmanship. The Old Testament tells a story of such a succession in the books Joshua, Judges, 1st and 2nd Samuel, and 1st and 2nd Kings. The non-segmentary, cooperative form of human societal order will be discussed later. Only the cooperative form uses the idea of super-addition, the Übersumme, which can be expressed by saying that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. The three models, bigmanship, chiefship, and cooperative, are the three types that have been culturally invented by humankind to guide and govern its societies. All three are rooted in two innate human building blocks, egalitarianism and leadership. The third one, the cooperative, combines the two natural possibilities in a peculiar human way, superaddition (see III., below).

The following lines discuss common cultural traits of chiefdoms/kingdoms. The traits listed under a. to f. concern (a.) property implications, (b). kinds of chiefdoms, (c.) the family metaphoric background, (d.) and (e.) examples from Africa, and (f.) a reconsideration of the “succession” theorem. Similarly to the presentation of bigmanship, traits g. to k. treat /g.) economic factors, (h.) collectivity and shame vs. guilt culture, (i.) types of socialization in chiefdoms, (j.) aspectivity vs. perspectivity, and (k.) religious types. In preparation of the following subchapter on cooperative and superaddition, the traits l. through n. deal with (l.) a correlation of civilizational stages, axial age, and leadership, (m.) the ensuing change from elders to organs, and (n.) a specialty: the “harvesting nations”.

a. Reproduction, property, leadership, splits, diseases, witchcraft.  

In many cultures cultivate creation stories and related myths are set in a time when people began to grow crops (such as corn, rice, beans, etc.) and breed animals. Hiawatha, the hero of the Iroquois, is

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68 The texts follows Bohannan (1992), Kottak (2002), Meyer Fortes & Evans-Pritchard (see d., below), Middleton & Tait (see d., below), and my own observations in three different areas: Pueblo nations of New Mexico and Arizona (USA), and surrounding tribes; Taiwanese indigenous peoples (Paiwan, Rukai, Atayal); and Namibian tribal organization.
said to have taught the people to plant corn.\textsuperscript{69} Countless other half-gods and wise men with similar merits exist. Myths serve as education under conditions of illiteracy. Basically, it is of no great difference whether plants are reproduced in horticulturalist societies, or animals in nomadic or sedentary early farming societies: the idea to reproduce nature is the same. Humans enter into a give-and-take relationship with nature, instead of merely taking (by hunting, gathering, or fishing). The time of this monumental change of livelihood and corresponding psychology can roughly be estimated at about 8,000 years ago.\textsuperscript{70} In the aftermath, many life-influencing factors were affected: Among them are the following:

- Reproduction means storage. In times of need, cattle or livestock can be slaughtered and eaten, and supplies used. Hunger becomes much less of a threat. Populations increase. Storage means possession, and possession invites theft, and with it the necessity of a defense against it. The defense can be handled by the single herder or farmer, or by a police force overseen by a leader, or leaders: the chief(s). A more centralized leadership arises from these exigencies. Storability of produce even influences the form such government takes: The better storable a crop, such as corn or rice, the more centralized a government may be installed. Conversely as in the case of a more perishable crop such as pine apple, the more powerful the clans would remain, resulting in a less centralized form of government.\textsuperscript{71}

- Reproduction makes for a new relationship to land, because both forms of cattle herding - nomadic or sedentary - require an area, and planting requires a garden or field which in turn may ask for slash-and-burn or clearances. Again, this land’s defense - single or collective - as well as policing and taxing become issues.

- Planning alters the human mind’s attitude towards the environment. A hunt and a fishing expedition ask for “one-shot” plannings; even if seasonally occasioned. But reproduction requires “multi-shot” planning on a regular basis across time to address future needs.\textsuperscript{72}

- Intensive contact to an area or a homestead strengthens the role of women in the family. The fertility of soil and motherhood become comparable. A reverence for women as the heads of societal groups is accompanied by collateral sacrality. Hunter and gatherer societies are often patrilineal, whereas reproductionists’ societies tend to be matrilineal, with all the direct consequences for family, real estate, inheritance law and economy, as well as the indirect ones for a strengthened family, lineage, and clan structure. In many sedentary Germanic tribes, the kuní (a term used for both lineage and clan) was influential, and from there the a new type of leader, the chief, called kuning (king, König, koning) emerged with significantly more power that a big man.

- It seems that the precise differentiation of lineage and clan becomes an issue as reproduction increases: As lineages grow, alliances for work or defense that are larger than lineages may become necessary. Blood-related descent is no longer enough to form effective groups. Quasi-relationships are constructed and to justify these a the descent “from the sun”, “from the eagle” or other stipulated

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\textsuperscript{70} See Childe 1925, 1942, 1950

\textsuperscript{71} The observation is Marvin Harris’ who remarks that Hawaii never got “real kings”, comparable to Egypt’s pharaos because pineapple cannot be stored.

\textsuperscript{72} The issue of planning is discussed, in the form of a story, in Genesis (1\textsuperscript{st} book of Mose) Chapter 41.
apical ancestors replaces the descent from a demonstrated apical lineage ancestor. Artificial relationship by clan descent, phratry, moiety or even tribe becomes of interest. This explains why in hunters’ and gatherers’ societies lineages as undistinguished from clans (=“kunis”) are known, but clans proper are rare. In reproductionist societies, by contrast, the distinction between lineages and clans is common and wise-spread.

Thus, the size of human societal groups is the result of a plus-minus calculation: the more danger from outside and the more demographic pressure from inside, the larger a group may be. Less danger from outside and less demographic pressure from inside mean smaller groups. The phenomenon of the “split” is related to this calculation. For not yet fully understood reasons, groups of early humanity tended to split up, and there are indications that often the faction of the “traditionalists” took the initiative to quit. “Splits” are related to risk. The unit of a group of humans makes risk more manageable politically. This is a generative factor of forming units, a cause of uniting. On the other hand, if staying together is deemed to be riskier than splitting by a majority, a split occurs.

In animist societies, many of the risks bear a character which ethically could called religious. A place which has become religiously unclean, will be abandoned. Unclean in this context means too risk-laden. In early times, the Japanese imperial court used to move after every death of an emperor. Very grave uncleanliness may lead to a multiple split: People simply flee into many directions. San Lazaro (near Santa Fe, NM) seems to have been left by what may be called a double split: both sides left. Uniting and splitting may have played an important role in the rise and fall of early civilizations.

These differentiations within reproducing cultures brings about a multifaceted life of societal groupings and thus ask for speakers and representaives of those groups. The several specialized big men, or the one big man surrounded by similarly informal (and like the big man himself never heritable) helpers are replaced by the chief (or king) and those speakers. Often, the chief’s position is inheritable or tied to a certain lineage or clan, and the speakers for the sub-units are tied to their respective lineage or clan, or are relatives of the chief. High-sea-going boats need a crew, and the boss of the crew holds the position of a chief, not of a big man. Polynesians are known as great sailors, Melanesians are not.

- A phenomenon observable in bigmanship cultures and in chiefdoms as well (but less frequent in cooperatively organized cultures because of their greater inner flexibility) is the “youth bulge”. In bigmanship cultures, regular food is too scarce to permit a sharp increase of the population. Reproductionist societies may very well show a population growth affecting a group consisting of

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73 See Chapter 3 V.
74 This is not pseudosocialization; pseudosocialisation may occur in the absence of actual communication and allow for “membership” of an imagined community. Fictitious relationships require communication.
75 An example for the rule is the “Oraibi split” in Hopi in 1908, see text near note 1030, below; an example for the exception: is the “Duncan split” of the Tsimshian Indians (a Northwest Coast tribe) in Metlakatla, the Anglican converts left to avoid contact with the traditionalists. “Risk and split” is an understood research subject.
76 The early Japanese imperial court moved after each death of an emperor.
77 I thank Dr. John Ware, Santa Fe, for a discussion of this case; see also Douglas Preston, Cannibals of the Canyon, The New Yorker, of November 30, 1998, 76 – 89.
78 Cf. note 644, supra.
second, third, fourth, fifth sons. In a patrilineal culture, the first son typically inherits the farm etc., the later born sons have to find their own way. Under matrilinearity, a daughter will inherit the farm and marry one of the boys, and all the other young men may belong to that “bulge” group. Some authorities attribute the tendency of such additional male population to engage, under the leadership of youthful “war chiefs”, in sudden raids, daring sea voyages, extended expeditions or warfare to the lack of opportunities to make an acceptable living at home. This is also a facet of chieftaincy society. Examples are the attacks by Vikings, Normans, Apache, Comanche, crusaders, and many other similar aggressive undertakings. Some think that the early conquests of Islamic warriors were due to youth bulge as well.

- While a hunter and a fisherman as a rule makes the kill at a distance and touches the prey only to carry it home and distribute its parts, the herder and the early farmer lives together with the animals, often under one roof. This has drastic effects on human hygiene compared to the forager’s life-style. Many diseases strike humans through contact with cattle (tuberculosis), chicken (bird flu), or sheep, goats, and cattle (all smallpox), or with wild animals attracted by the domesticated ones or by stored crops (mice, rats, fleas). For the forager, the typical critical handicaps are hunger and injury, for the reproductionist, disease and contagion. The causal link between domestication and illness is not always apparent to the affected people. This may explain a much expanded belief in witchcraft among reproductionists, compared to foragers. While a hunter or a fisherman may be known for superstition, foragers generally do not believe in witchcraft. Among horticulturalists and farmers, witchcraft is common and inevitable part of daily life.

b. Chiefs, kings, queens

The salient feature of chiefship is hierarchical power as such, a power that is no longer tied to

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80 See also Gunnar Heinsohn, Machen junge Männer Krieg?, DIE ZEIT, No. 10 of Febr. 26, 2004, 49.

81 Litigation before US courts between Native Americans and descendents of pioneers about land, involving for instance so-called “clouded titles” dating back to homesteading and settlement times, often concerns “peace treaties” between a tribe and an US-American agency in which the tribal representative ceded Indian land to the whites. These tribal “representatives” may have been self appointed “war chiefs” who led a group of young warriors hunting and raiding, then were defeated and asked to sign the “treaty”, but had no mandate to turn over tribal land to the victors. Upon return, these war chiefs used to get in trouble with the tribal council.


83 Reference must be made to the specialized literature of medical history.

84 Frank Linderman, Montana Adventure: The Recollections of Frank B. Linderman (H.G. Merriam, ed.), Lincoln & London 1968: Univ. of Nebraska Press, reports that during his time as assayer for mining companies in the Northwest Territory that an Indian once asked him: “Tell us, what does it mean to be ill? We know that one may starve from hunger, or is killed by a bear, but what is illness?” Linderman let the Indian look through a microscope and showed him some bacteria, answering that this “dirt” is illness.

certain tasks, qualities, and abilities as in the context of bigmanships. In chiefdoms, there is a frame for governmental power that gives rise to a presumption of jurisdiction. This presumption can be refuted (except in a tyranny), but the burden of proof is on the challenger. To indicate this concentration of power, Bohannan speaks of a “role” the chief assumes. Again, this idea of a leading role is indicative of a certain framework of power. Often, chiefship is inherited. The Polynesian chief is protected by *mana*, a spiritual power that works against commoners who come too close to the chief and thus violate a *tabu* (taboo) zone (Bohannan 1992, 161). In chiefdoms, social inequality is the rule.

Because of their basic lack of horizontal legitimation, chiefhoods tend to have a spill-over effect: the chief - perhaps self-appointed - wants to govern additional subjects. Particularly in connection with the phenomenon of a youth bulge as a surplus of young men (often the second, third, and fourth sons who did not inherit father’s farm, shop or position) chiefhoods may take on an aggressive character. The interior verticality then turns into an exterior one.

Instead of specialized leadership in different contexts which is common in big man societies, chiefs are in command of a staff to take care of different tasks. For the basic structure of a chieftainship it makes no difference, in principle, whether the chief is more or less powerful, more or less elevated from the people, more or less assisted or controlled by a council of elders as the horizontal element of human society. It does not matter very much whether his title is chief, paramount chief, king, emperor, or pharaoh, or whether the chief’s position can be held by a female, a queen or empress. Among the elders, the consensus principle is followed. The parallel opinions have to be bargained; a common will is absent. Colonial powers often did not distinguish between the big man as *primus inter pares* (the first among the equal) and the chief as holder of an office which is equipped with a framed authority, even if they intended to change the structure of leadership of the subjugated nation as little as possible. Generally, big men were regarded and treated as chiefs. Sometimes the colonial power went farther and instructed these “chiefs” to act as its politically authorized agents.

c. Families, lineages, clans, tribes. Family metaphors

Demographic pressures, including the need for more numerous defense troops, lead to alliances of lineages, and to artificial family structures such as clans (see Ch. 3, and the remarks under a.). Clans unite to tribes. Chiefs as speakers of these units play a role in forging these advanced alliances. In

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86 Bohannan (1992), 160 f.
88 An often overlooked factor in peace studies; a century-old but still modern example is what has now come to be called “Breshnjew Doctrine”; see note 277, above, and note 779, below.
89 See 3., before a., above; for example: hierarchy and conciliarism (the power of the bishops to meet and decide in council) are the two elements of leadership within the Roman Catholic Church. Christian Orthodox churches even more stress hierarchy which was a factor in the East-West split (Schism) of Christianity that separated the Orthodox and Latin Church in 1054 A.D.; from modern times, see, e. g., Rudolf Schunck, Profil einer hierchischen Rechtsfigur in der Kirche: Aspekte der Personalpräfektur Opus Dei, A. Egler & W. Rees (eds.), Festschrift Georg May, Berlin 2006: Duncker & Humblot, 597 – 610.
90 See note 744, below.
91 In 2004, as reported above in notes 660 and 663, it appeared that in Namibia the same mistake is still being made; see also notes 638 and 646 above.
92 On the negative effects of the British rule that gave such political power to the chiefs of the Tiv (Nigeria), see Bohannan (1992) 159.
this phase of the formation of human associations the next higher unit was conceptualized by using a family metaphor: the chief, especially a paramount chief, receives the title of a “father”. For many Native Americans, especially Plains Indians, the US president was the “Great White Father”. A queen is sometimes called the “mother” of the “motherland”. Members of alliances in warfare become “brothers” who might drink to “brotherhood”, nuns become “sisters”. A king might address his subjects as “my children”. The Orthodox church officials received the title of “pope”, the head of the Roman Catholic Church that of “papa” or “Holy Father”. Monks address each other as brethren or brothers, and Islam has its Muslim Brotherhood. In German, the Vaterland (fatherland) has its Landeskinder (land’s children). The examples are numerous.

Family metaphors are used to legitimize alliances that otherwise may be difficult to rationalize. Precisely at this point, superaddition as a reason for forming an alliance may become an issue (see III. below). To oppose both families and family metaphors and their political impact, superadditive alliances may be conceptualized. Historical examples include the ancient Greek polis (the city state, around 550 B.C.), the Frankish cooperative (around 250 A.D.), the League of Iroquois (allegedly around 1350 A.D.), and the Tewa moiety system (which may be 1,000 years old or more).93

d. African studies by Fortes & Evans-Pritchard and Middleton & Tait. Polynesian studies. Other chiefdom structures

In 1940, Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard edited a book on “African Political Systems”.94 The book was followed by a similar volume, titled “Tribes Without Rulers: Studies in African Segmentary Systems”, edited by John Middleton and David Tait.95 The reports cover the period 1920 to 1953. More recent comprehensive and comparative studies do not seem to be available. Decolonization, political independence of African states, and UN membership changed the picture. Thus, despite of their lack of modernity, these reports contain valuable material on traditions that may be of interest today, especially when new African constitutions refer to traditional rules.

The authors divide the African political systems which they studied into three main groups: the Bushmen or lineage systems as the oldest traditional forms (Amba = Bwamba), the segmented tribes Tiv, Bantu-Tavirondo, Tallensi, Konkomba, Lugbara, Nuer, Western Dinka, and Mandari), and what the editors call the “centralized tribes” (Ngwato, Banyankole, Kede, and Zulu). The Bushmen or lineage systems correspond to big man societies. The San of contemporary Namibia and Botswana and rainforest “pygmeees” could have been added. Their main groups are lineages, and there are no chiefs. In the segmented tribes, the lineages become combined to ever growing entities, such as clans, tribes, and people or nation. A segment is variable in composition and is always defined in relation to who is the actual or possible enemy (A.-W. Asserate).96 These segments have leaders who may be called chief. Hostilities between lineages, clans, and tribes require mediators,


96 See the discussion of segmentation II. 1., and note 627, above. There is only a word for enemy in the 2,000 non-Arabic African languages, and no word for opponent, Prince Asfa-Wossen Asserate of Ethiopia, cited in Chapter 10 I. 4 (at the end), below. *The Arabic-Muslimic language, however, seems to have two expressions, adú = Angreifer, and muchalif = he who argues differently, so that enemy and opponent could in theory be distinguished. The contrast nicely illustrates the difference between pre- and post-axial-age thinking*.
such as the “leopard skin chief” of the Nuer (who is not a chief but a go-between and intermediary). The centralized political systems are characterized, according to the four editors, as having a power center and often a territory. If there is one person who holds central power, a male person is the paramount chief or king, a female person the queen. In the centralized systems, hostilities between the lineages, clans or tribes will be policed, rather than mediated.

Of course, there are transitional forms of political systems, not so much between bigmanships and chiefships, but between what the four editors call segmented and centralized chiefships. Also in the centralized national or tribal political forms, there is this feeling, expressed by Asserate, that “the other” is the enemy who defines the size and composition of the group to which somebody belongs. The only difference is that in the less combined forms hostilities are mediated, and in the more combined forms settled by the king’s or queen’s police or army because there is a centralized power. Here, by generalizing the absence of hierarchized units, the term segmentation is used to refer to both bigmanship and chiefdoms.

The original meaning of segmentation in Durkheim is “non-state”, and in Evans-Pritchard “non-hierarchy of units of belonging”. This permits to group together what the four editors call “segmented” and “centralized” “political systems” to a wider concept of segmentation (also with a view to the many forms of transition). This facilitates to separate from one another on the one hand the wider concept of segmentation - to be found as big man societies or as (more loosely or more centralized) chiefdoms - , and on the other hand the corporate forms of political structure, typified by polis and cooperative (Genossenschaft), in short, by what is called the “state”. To some degree, this harks back to Durkheim’s distinction between the state and segmentation. But going beyond Durkheim, big man societies and chiefdoms are separated and distinguished, and the essence of “the state”, the idea of the cooperative entity of members, is stressed. The great difference between segmentation and corporation consists in the corporation’s special combination of horizontal and vertical elements which provide for superaddition, membership, member’s roles as individuals, and rights and duties both between the members and the members and (consequently accountable) authorities. The gist of the corporate entity, that the whole is more than the sum of the parts, because horizontal and vertical elements combine to form a unit separate from the sum of the (horizontal) parts, is not to be found in segmented societies.

To complete the sketch of chieftaincy, it would be necessary to compare with the African systems of political order other chiefdom systems such as the Polynesian. This cannot be done here in detail. Suffice is to say that Polynesians highly developed various forms of chiefdoms, including the one of the Hawaiian kings, and that Polynesian chiefships are clearly different from Melanesian bigmanships. Native American chieftaincies would have to be discussed and compared with chiefdoms in other parts of the world, such as those of the Slavic and Germanic tribes, described by Tacitus and others. Reference must be made to the authorities of these subjects of study.

e. The village head

In reports from Bantu Africa, the “village head” or village leader (Dorfältester) plays a central
role. He is responsible for keeping up decency, and law and order, in the village, mediates and sometimes decides family issues, and is the instance to be addressed for ruling many other things. Now, after having discussed a number of typical societal administrative forms, the position of the village head can – as middle types - be determined:  

(1) In bigmanships, in most cases the village head is identical with the big man. He will be taken from an influential lineage and thus may – in derivation from the demonstrated apical ancestor as the head of the lineage – be named a demonstrated actual leader.

In chiefdoms, there is to be made a distinction: (2) In the more loosely structured chiefships, the village head will be a clan leader, or head of a subclan, having essentially the same functions as a lineage head, but involving more households, maybe based on some lineages, and the stipulated nature of the apical ancestor of the clan will attribute to the chief a somewhat higher, spiritually authorized status. (3) In the more centralized chiefships up the veritable kingdoms, the village leader traces his competence and jurisdiction to the central chief, or king, or to one of his relatives or officials, so that there is a noticeable human line of authorization down from the power center of the tribe.

(4) During the postcolonial period, under Western influence, maybe transmitted by the United Nations, there may be village heads who are appointed, or elected with governmental consent, by the modern government. The corporate structure of the cooperative based on superaddition will become visible, foreign to the traditional tribal form of government, but acceptable by virtue of "modernity". Conflicts with traditional patterns including village heads of the types (1) through (3) are frequent, detrimental, and often inevitable. Africa-grown superaddition has not yet been discovered.

(5) and (6) There are two more types of village heads in regions where Muslim mission is successful, like down the coast of the Indic Ocean from Erythrea to Mosambique. Muslim mission in Africa is almost always of Sufi type, which is closer to Bantu conceptions of harmony than the more strict or radical versions of Sunnitism and Shiitism. Acceptance of Islam usually lets family structures such as the lineage or clan system break up or being damaged (as does Christian mission). In turn, this generates a call for leadership and thus opens a gate to more centralization. Therefore, village heads in those areas become conceivably Islam-appointed one way or the other, from benign local imams up to religiously supported warlords.

*In sum*, there are six rather different types of village heads. For foreign aid actions as well as for UN peace keeping and similar interventions, the knowledge of the local (regional) type of village head is indispensable for success, but practically never investigated.

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101 See, however the warnings against centralization in Bohannan, 161 ff.

102 W. Fikentscher, The Whole is more..., see note 695, above.

103 Models from Native Americans (Iroquois, Tewa Pueblos) would be available, but since they are “heathen”, Christian and Muslim missionary efforts are in the way.
Leadership issues in other chiefdoms (Polynesia, Amerindians, Near East, Slavic and Germanic tribes, etc.) seem to be similar. The modern ones among them are not as well researched as African chiefdoms, although there is a wealth of ethnographic material. Time and space do not permit to go into details. Most of what has been said about Africa will analogously apply.

f. Elman R. Service’ and C. Ph. Kottak’s idea of chieftainship as transition from tribe to state.

Following a proposal by Elman R. Service,104 Carl Philipp Kottak divides early human social organization in bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states.105 The definition of big man corresponds to the one used in this book.106 For Kottak, a tribe is characterized by horticultural or pastoralism and a lack of socio-economic stratification, central rule, and no enforcement of political decisions, a chiefdom by a kin-based social-political organization with a permanent political structure in which the participants are stratified by having different access to available resources. Chiefdoms are, in this perspective, a transitional phenomenon between tribe and state.

However, some Native American tribes have strong socio-economic stratifications,107 many tribes have a centralized rule,108 and tribes enforce political decisions.109 On the other hand, chiefdoms are not always kin-based,110 often engage in horticulture or pastoralism or both, and they are no organizations in the original meaning of the word since they do not know membership or accountable organs.111 Moreover, tribe is an assembly of people, and chiefdom is a form of societal order. Both are concepts on different levels. Therefore, the assumption fails, too, that chiefdom is a transition from tribe (a group of people) to state (another form of societal order).

Thus, the division in segmented societies (bigman societies and chieftaincies), and cooperative societies defined by superaddition, both under the impact of frequent societal inertia, seems to be the better solution. Against Service and Kottak, chieftaincy is seen as an important, independent, and non-transitional form of social order, which appears in many more or less loosely

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108 see the four editors in d., above.

109 Cooter & Fikentscher 2008

110 In general, pueblos are either moiety- or clan-based (both do not mean kin). See for details, R. Fox, F. Eggan; L. White, Ortiz (1969), Fikentscher (2004) 276 – 285.

111 see III, below.
structured or centralized shapes. The chiefs are the chiefs of tribes

g. Barter. Short-range trust.

The economic forms of chiefdom are richer than those of bigmanship. Reproduction of domesticated animals and of garden or field crops creates property in need of protection. From such property follows lending, credit, additional economic stratification, but not necessarily the introduction money. Barter remains the main type of exchange (see Chapter 10, below).

The policing of property protection, effectuated by the tribal chief, initiates trust. The combination of barter and such trust results in what may be called short-range trust. Long-range trust, over distances of space and time, is facilitated in cooperative societies (see III. below).

The phenomenon of societal inertia can also be observed in chiefdoms. In big man societies, the phenomenon has been described above and used to explain Kapauku capitalism: Although it would have been more appropriate to pass to chiefdom because of storability of property, the Kapauku stayed with their their traditional bis man system and developed a high degree of property awareness instead. In a formerly chief/king/emperor system such as China, societal inertia can also be found on the side of the governed: Although kingdom and empire should have generated a more or less strictly vertical “tributary mode of production (TMP)”, the Han Chinese stayed for more than thousand years – in juxtaposition to TMP – with their “petty capitalism mode of production (PCMP)” (Hill Gates 1996), with consequences for today’s apparent inability of Chinese Communist Party and state to successfully interfere with the “trading crowd” of the Shanghai stock market (Ellen Hertz 1998). After the urban revolution, the appropriate governmental form would have been the polis, and for the governed the individual longe-range trust market. But societal inertia worked on both sides. The effect is an expansion of the tripartite

h. Collectivity. Shame. *Sovereignty*

This is an especially sensitive issue in modern cultural anthropology. An often made distinction holds that there are individualist and collectivist societies. Broadly speaking, Western society is regarded as individualist, non-Western societies are considered to be collectivist. Brought under these wide and imprecise categories, chiefdom societies would have to be dubbed collectivist, along with bigmanships.

Historically and systematically, an important text on the contrast between collectivity and individualism is Chapter 18, in the book ascribed to the prophet Ezekiel, from the Torah, the Old Testament. This text, dating back to about 610 B.C., contemplates whether the animist assumption is correct to punish children or other family members for the misdeeds of their fathers or other relatives, and fathers and other relatives for the misdeeds of their offspring or family, or whether it is more just to punish a human being, and nobody else, for its own misdeeds. The issue is personal guilt versus Sippenhaft, a word for which there is no literal English translation. The result of Ezekiel 18 is, that in contrast to animist earlier Jewish law, the future rule should be individual


113 My dictionary circumscribes Sippenhaft: “Liability of a family for the crimes or actions of one of its members.” This is too narrow because feud can hit victims outside of victim’s family, such as members of the same religion or nation.
responsibility. By consequence, collective liability, *Sippenhaft*, and thus feud, is to be rejected.

About 130 years later, around 480 B.C., Thukydides, in his *Historiae*, makes Pericles talk about individuality in the classic Athenian culture of the polis. Thukydides’ text reads intriguingly because the concept of the individual was not yet *born in the language of his time*. Yet, what individuality and personal responsibility mean in the eyes of the author, is clearly presented in *graphic* words. The difference between individual and collective is born in Ezechiel 18 and Thukydides.

Khaled Abou El Fadl, Professor of Islamic Theology at UCLA, and one of the competent speakers of and for Islam as a religion, discusses the issue under the Muslim belief system. El Fadl says that originally Islam, since the teaching of the Prophet, a.s., adhered to the principle of individual guilt, but that in the course of the 19th century Islam turned to collectivity and the assumption of collective guilt, including feud and revenge against the opponent’s family, friends, co-believers, and people. El Fadl muses why this turn occurred and offers several reasons. The most convincing to him is an at that time rising desire of the Muslims to be different from Jews and Christians.

One of the most striking texts on Muslim collectivity is Malcolm X’s report of his *hadj*. Malcolm X convincingly describes the overwhelming feeling of being taken up in the multitude of pilgrims and carried away, without a feeling of individuality, in the great mass of *hadj* participants.

In moral science, and in criminal law, the difference between personal guilt and collective responsibility is of remarkable impact. Not only that feud and revenge against members of the actor’s family, friends, religious co-believers, and co-patriots is forbidden, guilt is what is reproached against the perpetrator. In collective systems of morals and law, no accusation of guilt is raised against the wrongdoer, but he is put to shame. He will be criticized by the villagers, or cursed by the offended parties, and subjected to others forms of shaming and public reprimand. Synonymously, along with individualist and collectivist societies, there is often talk of guilt societies and shame societies.

However, it should be noted that *both* individuality and collectivity are no rubber stamps that can be pressed upon any culture in the same manner. Probably, every culture has its own shade of individuality and type of collectivity which both should be studied before making sweeping

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115 the pilgrimage to Mekka which a pious Muslim should perform at least once in his life time.

116 Pospisil (2004), 514 f.

117 As member of a collective and shame society (since the middle of the 19th century), a Muslim may be tempted to take revenge against Western society as well as other societies in the world and all their members because victory, good life and success, promised by the Prophet, a.s., to his followers already during their life time, have in the Muslim’s judgment not occurred and are likely to even get more and more distant. Not only Western, but also East and South Asian, animist African, South American and Pacific modes of thought today prove, politically and economically, to be more successful than Islam. Some Muslim might think that this is a wrong done to the righteous believers, the Muslims, by all the other inhabitants of the world, that this wrong has Islam put to shame, and ought to be revenged. This theory has been established for the Islam-Western relationship by Ralph Patai: R. Patai, The Arab Mind, New York 1973: Scribner (see also notes 948 and 950). Given the apparent successes of Chinese, Japanese, Russian and – at least in philosophical respect - even African peoples, Patai’s theory could be extended to modes of thought other than Western. However, against Patai, this collective feud theory should not be applied to all Muslims. There are inner-Muslim changes in direction back to individuality, for example in Morocco under King Muhammad VI.
*In addition*, much depends on precise examination of what is meant in the particular case. For example, in Christian religion, the order to missionize (Matthew 28, 19) is usually quoted to the effect that all humans should be taught the Christian belief, made disciples, and be baptized. A frequently heard complaint by animist believers, especially cultural revivalists, against Christian and Muslim missionaries is that, by missionizing single persons, the traditional structures of family, lineage, clan, moiety, and tribe are declared to be “heathen” and consequently ruined so that stable life and reliable societal patterns come to an end. For many peoples, this indeed meant loss of familial and societal ties. However, in the Greek and Latin text of Matthew 28, 19 (if the verse is authentic, which is debated). is does not say that individuals should be taught, baptized, and made disciples. The text clearly speaks of nations (ethne) alone, not of nations and individuals. This is different in the Zwinglian translation and translations following it, where the object of mission is duplicated by saying that the way should be taken to peoples in order to teach and baptize individuals. Obviously, these translators cannot conceive of a collectivity to be taught and baptized and therefore split the object. However, following the originals texts, missionizing single human beings is neither warranted nor mandated by the Bible, much less doing this by force. Rather, according to the text, the addressees of mission should be nations, or other similar collective entities at best. Of course, this does not impede the practice to address single persons: Mission may be individual. In Islam, mission means adding participants to the ummah (the assembly of believers) which, according to El Fadl, as mentioned before, consists of a collectivity, not of individuals. This does not prevent Muslim mission of individuals. But the result, if positive, can only be *a* strengthening of the collective.

*There are interesting connections between collectivity and sovereignty. In Islam, there is only one sovereign: God. Hence, the people as a sovereign (the auctoritas populi in the writings of William of Orange, resumed by Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius) is a blasphemy. However, since God’s grace is all-embracing so that evil is always human guilt and never tragic failure, the Islamic concept of sovereignty leads to the aporical statement that guiltless failure remains inexplicable. From the non-sovereignty in interhuman relations it then follows that interhuman hatred is created because that failure can readily be attributed on other people. Combined with Islamic collectivity this line of thought leads to the allround-killings of Muslims and non-Muslims for which radical Islamism is sometimes blamed.*


Chiefdoms are known for having cross-culturally typefied internal structures that go beyond mere family, lineage, clan, tribal, or national ties. The designations vary, and the activities of these non-familial societal groups as well. A systematic cultural-anthropological overview seems to be lacking. Only some keywords may be listed here: E.g., Thomas O. Höllmann, Poro und Sande: Geheimgesellschaften im westlichen Afrika, 1 Münchner Beiträge zur Völkerkunde 115 - 130 (1988); Conrad Phillip Kottak, Windows on Humanity, New York 2007: McGraw.Hill; Bandelier (1890).
Sodalities are unions of likeminded persons within a tribe for many thinkable purposes, such as fishing sodalities, traders’ associations, chanting and drumming teams, sports clubs, newly-weds, from outside accepted members and their descent, etc.\(^1\) Liminality may give rise to such uniting.\(^2\) Moieties are no sodalities. They belong to the theory and practice of tribal structure as such.\(^3\)

Non-secret societies are frequent in Native American tribes, such as warriors, hunting, medicine, clown, scalp (often female), musical (female flute players), etc. societies.\(^4\) They serve the need to have feelings of belonging.\(^5\)

Secret societies may practice witchcraft, vehmgericht, kangaroo court and other more or less sinister activities.\(^6\)

Laura Nader mentions an important consequence of the belonging of the same persons to more than one of these groups: There results a “criss-crossing” of memberships which strengthens the inner ties of (let us say) a tribe because one person may be member of sodalities and societies A, B, C, and D, another person in B, D, and E, and so on.\(^7\) For life in societal harmony within the tribe, and using pretended harmony as a means of cultural defense towards the outside, this criss-crossing is of considerable assistance.\(^8\)

Anthropological and sociological science has given these non-familial unions the technical *but unfavorable* name of “pseudosocialization”.\(^9\) Clubs, political parties, factions, etc. are also counted under this concept. The concept of pseudosocialization is somehow biased and will not be used in this book. It places too much weight on family ties as purportedly most important and “true” foundation of societal structure, disregarding the societally helpful (and only seldomly negative) contributions of non-familial memberships to animist societies.

Only a survey can be given of these and other non-familial forms of interhuman contact in segmented societies. A systematic study seems still to be missing:

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\(^{123}\) The clown societies are a well known example; see Bandelier (1890); Tony Hillerman, Sacred Clowns, New York 1993: HarperCollins.

\(^{124}\) see Chapter 9 V., below.


\(^{127}\) Among Native Americans, sodalities are often called societies. “Sodality” may have a religious tint since Catholic lay groups often use the term sodality.


\(^{129}\) This is not just a matter of “being social” but also of protection, W. Fikentscher (1995/2004), 277 f.


\(^{131}\) On pseudosocialization see also note 670, above.
1. clans as fictive blood relationships
2. name-identical clans in different tribes that feel obliged, by the likeness of their names (e.g., “bear clan”) to assist each others’ members
3. “warrior” clans which today work as police organizations and by the likeness of the name “warrior” (see before) facilitate cross-tribal cooperation ( “police clans” are a not yet discovered means of development aid in failing states such as Afghanistan and Yemen)
4. adoption
5. blood brotherhood or sisterhood
6. name giving (“baptizing”), see Pospíšil’s name-giving experience among the Kapauku when Pospíšil suddenly had to support 60 “children”
7. sodalities - in Tewa nations also used for entertainment and education (clown societies), sports teams and music bands -
8. professional organizations such as potters, silver smiths, and the Navajo World War II “sign talkers” meetings of veterans
9. schools and colleges and their alumni organizations
10. religious rituals including liminal or other initiations, marijuana (Rastafari) or peyote consume (Native American Church)*.


Chiefdoms and kingdoms (queenships) are to be found in human societies which frequently have an advanced artistic feeling and count artists among their members. The way of presentation, in figurative art, is aspective, not perspective. Music is either melodic-vocal, or soundic-instrumental. Thus, music lacks bass-line and counterpoint. Dances show the Reigen pattern (powwow), not the counter-dance or square-dance structure.

k. Religious types

Chiefdoms essentially show the same religious types as bigmaships. This is another argument for grouping bigmanship and chiefship together as segmentation (in a wider sense than the one used by the “four editors”). It would amount to an interesting anthropological study to investigate

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132 This is a gradual contrast to big man societies, see note 653.
134 See the remarks on Rudolf v. Ficker, note 654 above.
136 R. v. Ficker, note 730, above.
137 Gertrude Kurath, with the aid of Antonio Garcia, Music and Dance of the Tewa Pueblos, Santa Fe 1970: Museum of New Mexico Press. A comparative anthropology of dance has – to my knowledge - not yet been written.
139 See II. 2., above.
140 See d., above, or note 664.
differences. As to possible differences, it might be expected that religious types which require no “discovery of the other” such as ancestor worship and idolatry without magic are more characteristic for bigmanship, and that religious types that built upon culture comparison, such as intertribal witchcraft, polydaimonism, and polytheism are rather to be found in chiefdoms.

I. A correlation of civilizational stages, axial age, and types of leadership

For this reason, one finds chiefs on all evolutionary levels of human society, among foragers, reproductionists, and urban citizens. However, and for the same reason, on the three levels of human development, foraging, reproduction, and urban division of labor, leaders assume different roles and have different competitors. (1) Among foragers, one of the important tasks of a leader is to mediate consensus and decide when consensus is too inefficient; hence, the big man is the appropriate type of leader. (2) Among reproductionists, chiefs carry a responsibility for protecting property, their own, their followers’, and the whole nation’s. Being responsible for, and therefore responsive to, the customary law regulating the adequate distribution of property and land use rights, the chiefs share the dignity of the land, and are thus entitled to corresponding respect, often including music and dance. Among pastoralists and farmers, magic is considerably more practiced than in society of hunters and gatherers. This increase of magic may help to replace the big man by a chief as type of leader, since a chief enjoys richer prestige. The chief’s competitor may be an usurper who challenges the chief’s qualities as a leader. He could be also an appointed or elected lord in the sense of the Franko-Normannc cooperative of vassals (the Franks had no nobility) who is representing another type of leadership. (3) In urban societies, everything even more depends on the outcome of the axial age: Outside of superadditive units, the chief’s or king’s task is to run a full-fledged government. His main challenger may again be an usurper. Inside superadditive units, there is more stability: Chiefs and kings are replaced by appointed or elected lords who derive their power from the trust and allegiance of the members. In turn, the lords feel responsible for their follower’s welfare and protection. Urban division of labor develops into a superadditive entity.

m. A consequence: From elders to organs

Besides big men, and chiefs respectively kings, groups of elders exist, assisting and sometimes controlling the big men, chiefs, and kings. However, one does not find elders of this quality in those farming and urban societies that opted for axial-age secularity and world-attachment, such as the ancient Greek, the Germanic Franks, the Tewa-speaking Pueblos of Northern New Mexico, and the League of Iroquois. Both Greek city state culture and Frankish farmer’s culture were cooperative, egalitarian, and lacking nobility; the Tewa-speaking Pueblos possess at least egalitarian moieties (half-tribes), the half-tribes representing the Winter (foraging) people and the summer (farming) people; and the Iroquois understand their leaders as accountable functionaries of the League in which only the Mohawk have a veto against majority decisions. In cooperative, that is, superadditively thinking societies, as a matter of logic elders become organs, city fathers, responsible archontes in the meaning of Paul’s letter to the Romans, Chapter 13, and accountable tribal office holders. Historically, the cooperative structure tried to free an organized society from the influence of strong lineages, clans, phratries and other forms of sub-tribes, priesthoods, sodalities, unaccountable nobility, and tyrants, and to strengthen egalitarian peace and economy by trust and credit between the members of an entity.

n. A Transition: Harvesting peoples (Erntevölker)?

The theory of Erntevölker (literal translation: harvesting peoples) posits that there is a transient stage in between bigmanships with their typical economic form of foraging (hunting, gathering,
fishing), and chiefdoms with their typical economic form of reproduction of animals (herding, nomadic life), or crop (slash-and-burn, horticulture, sedentary early farming). The North American nation of the Chippewa (=Ojibways) consists of many bands. Some of the bands use wild rice for their livelihood. Traditionally, harvesting of the wild rice is done not only by reaping the bundles of wild rice from shallow water and putting them in the canoe, but also by occasional but regular beating some bundles of rice over the railing of the canoe. Hereby, rice kernels fall out of the bundles, sink to the bottom of the water and will contribute to the harvest of next year. Australian aborigines are said to care for certain fruit trees by cutting their fruit in a way destined to make the tree carry the same amount of fruit or more during the next harvesting period.

These practices are no “real reproduction” as it is practiced when herds are held to produce offspring, or seed is sown or planted. Instead, re-growth is fostered. not more. The harvesting peoples theory, interesting as it looks, has not been accepted by dominant opinion as foundation for a full-fledged type of economy besides foraging and reproduction. The majority of the authorities seem to hold that these and other next-harvest-fostering practices may be regarded not more than a negligible dead-end road in the gradual development of human economy.

III. Superaddition

As we have seen under II 2. above, at the end of the description of bigmanship and the opening of the discussion of chiefdoms as the two types of segmentation in Evans-Pritchard’s sense, the exact opposite of segmented society is cooperative society, exemplified by the agricultural, defensive, dike building, mining, manufacturers’, “Kings Peace” (Landfrieden) or other citizens’ cooperatives (Genossenschaften). They could also be named “associations”, but this term is imprecise since it was defined by superaddition, that is, by the understanding among the participants that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Discussions in Southern Africa, Taiwan, US, and Eastern Europe about these types of human governance produced two typical misunderstandings: (1) For many participants in these discussion the notion that the whole could be more than the sum of the parts was simply illogical and inconceivable; usually, these participants were educated in a mode of thought that strived for “consent”, “unity”, or “harmony”; (2) In places where before 1990 communism was of political influence, mentioning the “cooperative” as a model for superaddition raised suspicion. Discussion partners surmised that I was surreptitiously propagating communism, because the only association to the term “cooperative” they could think of was a kolkhoz or sowchoz system of forced collectivity. When they realized that a cooperative (Genossenschaft, polis) is the tool to individualize a person by making it a member of a contractual unit with interior rights and duties and responsible agents conceived as, and called, organs of a body of self-government, they could not believe that such a “mix” of communism and capitalism might exist. In such discussions, I therefore dropped the expression “cooperative” and replaced it by “corporation”, and was...
covers non-superadditive units as well. Farmers who “associate” may do this for *many* reasons, arrange marriages, meet in the beer hall, or drive together to the weekly market. What is meant here is the association for the pursuit of a common goal, such as building a dike, city hall, or church, or joint purchases, or joint sales of their products, or forming a defense unit, or using the same machinery, mountain road or bull, etc. Therefore, “coopereative” as a term for such joint agricultural undertakings is preferable. The difference between the segmented and the superadditive society can be sketched as follows:

suspected to be a “capitalist”. The best way to avoid these misunderstandings, I found, is to study the constitutions of historical *polis* and Frankish cooperative. - The following lines are a combined and revised version of W. Fikentscher (2004), 65 ff. and idem (2006). The Whole is more…. in (2004).
The axial age has direct impact on the concepts of individuality, social contract and government contract, majority rule, and economic organization. Social contract, government contract, and majority rule are possible (not necessary) consequences of the axial age secularization (whereby counting of the votes, as in Athens, is only one way of determining a majority; Tacitus describes some Germanic peoples as "weighing" votes - according to the noise they are able to produce by knocking their swords against their shield). Outvoting a minority without breaking up the social entity amounts to a social contract - the pactum generale (or sociale) both of the Greek city state (the Athens model) and of the Frankish feudal pledge-of-faith system. Accordingly, the big men who try to reach consensus among those who see themselves exposed to the forces of spirited nature turn into a city government of archontes or into a lord who is mandated by a second contract, the pactum regium, or government contract, that is built upon the pactum sociale. The meaning of the second contract is to authorize a leader (lord) or leaders (archontes) to head a group, to let them levy services and contributions, and in turn give account to the members of the group, the citizens (vassals, polites) after a predetermined period of time. In the Germanic tradition, a vassal, obligated and entitled in relation to all other vassals and to the lord within the described system, was called a Franke, a free, able, and active man. Franks were to defined not so much as a tribe by descent than as an entity, the membership of which was obtained by accession. If not born from a Franke, it was possible to “join the club” by taking an oath to be willing to become a vassal in relation to a lord. Of necessity, the vassals as obligated and entitled individuals, had legally equal rank. Their society became a society of equal Franks. As everyone - as far as political action is concerned - was a secularized individual and thus entitled to his or her own personal conviction, the principle of "one man one vote" and therefore majority rule are logical consequences. Taken together, social contract and government contract, make up the classical Greek city state (about 550 – 330 B.C.E.) and the Frankish Feudalism, which in its Normannic derivation is called “pledge-of-faith system” (third century A.D – today’s modern state). Since the leader was assumed to have a mandate and was held accountable, for some time the Franks had no nobility comparable to the chieftaincy system (characterized by dukes, Herzöge): the wergeld (compensation for manslaughter) was the same for every Frank, rich or poor, whether or not he came from a known family. Consequently, there was no Frankish nobility which could be employed for structuring and administering the Frankish empire. Royal officials had to be found to do the job. Since they were expected to be able to write, these officials were called Grafen (from Greek: graphein = to write).

The Frankish tongue (the Italian-Provençal jargon used in the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean)

became a trade language and received the name *lingua franca* (comparable to Suaheli, Papiamento, Pasamalais, Pidgin English, Chinook Jargon, Tlingit, Ancient Greek and modern English).

2. Role of time

Time is an important factor of the pledge-of-faith system because of the stipulation to hold the lord accountable periodically (hence the word “diet”, meaning a gathering on a certain day). For this political purpose, time by logical necessity becomes “time as a straight line”. Time-related contract (between contractual partners entitled to rights) and time-related corporation (composed of voice-and-exit entitled members) become conceivable. Both grow from the same contractual thinking across time as a straight line. The Frankish-Normannic pledge-of-faith system, composed of both egalitarian and authority-providing elements, with its time-as-a-straight-line related subjective rights and duties between the members of the group, and between the members on the one hand and the periodically accountable leader(s) on the other, becomes the central organizational pattern of the “West” and the foundation for “Europe’s special way” (S.N. Eisenstadt: the “European complex”), in politics as well in economics. Note that the words politics, economics, and organization are Greek.

3. Heathen, not Christian. A history of superaddition

It is noteworthy, and of considerable tactical advantage in contemporary discussions with Asian, African, and Islamic politicians, lawyers, and economists that both *polis* and the Frankish-Normannic pledge-of-faith are not secularized Christian achievements, but rather products of “heathen” thinking (albeit on the basis of Parmenidean judgments). More precisely, the concurrent crises of animism (in the narrow sense of “spirited nature”) and its later forms of polydaimonism and polytheism marked the end of animism in the broad sense, introducing the axial age in both Ancient Greece and the Frankish-Normannic regions.

For the subject of this chapter, the anthropology of constitutional justice and the establishment of societal order in the widest possible sense between humans, obtains an influential tool by the Frankish-Normannic pledge-of-faith system. Social contract and government contract create an entity to which its participants belong. The Franks understood this entity as agricultural and political *Genossenschaft* (=cooperative). Through uniting for an entity, associated risk became more manageable, in weather, floods, politics, business, disputes, and defense. Today, the concept of membership appears so self-evident that Westerners do no longer think about its sources – the Greek *polis* and the Frankish cooperative – and its cultural specificity. But the ability to think in terms of membership is in no way natural. Being a member of something requires the assumed existence of that very “something”, an entity that is not identical to the sum of its members, the compulsory association. In other words, Greek *polis* and Frankish cooperative created a new identity, the identity of a unit which exists in addition to the participants. When hundred *polites* as citizens of a Greek city state form a *polis*, or when hundred Franks form a Frankish cooperative, there are hundred and one individual entities in each case. The hundred and first entity is a corporation, a *personne morale*, a *juristische Person*, composed of hundred members. The Greek city states (the *poleis*) had membership lists. Although the Franks were illiterate, they became members by taking an oral oath. By that oath, they received a new legal status, namely, to be a Frank (hence their name which does not designate a tribe such as the Goths, Burgundians, Teutons, or Alemans, etc., but a legal quality: being a member. Thus, *poleis* and Frankish cooperatives were wholes that differ from, or are “more” than, the sum of the parts, a
phenomenon that may be called the *oversum principle* (as a translation from German: *Übersumme*; an English term seems to exist only in mathematics: *superaddition*; *a disadvantage of using this term may be that addition could be understood as an activity or process while only the result of this process is concerned; then a way out may be - linguistically inconvenient – *supersum*). Why the principle of superaddition took hold of the minds of people at different times in certain parts of the world and in others not, remains an open question.

The increase of trade after the invention of the wheel and the construction of seagoing vessels must have promoted the interchange not only of merchandise but also of animist, polydaimonist and polytheist belief systems that included tribal or national good-bad evaluation scales. Comparison led to an abstract good-bad dichotomy of a more secular nature (compared to tribal and national moral standards). This in turn fostered a thinking in comparative terms and over-arching concepts which related to reality like a superadditive unit to its local implementations. The assumption of superadditive units then gave rise to the independence of thinking, thinking seen as a nexus between subject and object (Parmenides) and to the approachability of abstract ideas through dialog (Socrates/Plato). Thus, (Greek) polis and (Frankish) cooperative have their roots in generalizations of good and evil without an inclination of recurrence to tribal/national morals, but linked to sceptical attachment to this world. Hence the majority vote, and the (“horizontal”) trusting of one another.

The adage that the whole is more than the sum of its parts has been attributed to Aristotle. An extensive literary search did not produce a confirmation. However, Aristotle, the great collector of the philosophies of his time may have made this statement, but probably as the rendering of another’s opinion rather than as his own. His general “entelechial” conviction (that things have their reasons of being and meaning in themselves – a *fundamentally* animistic and certainly not Parmenideian*-Socratic* attitude) is essentially anti-reductionist and opposed to doubt, and thus foreign to the idea of superaddition. The reductionist concept of superaddition is pre-Socratic, Parmenidean and ontologically idealist, and Aristoteles’ was rather critical of his teacher Plato’s “realistic idealism”: *Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas* (Plato may be a friend, but I prefer Truth above Plato), is one of Aristotle’s confirmed sayings. Where Plato asked for truth, Aristotle claimed he knew it, an attitude towards philosophical inquiry which Plato found pert, even cheeky (see the ironic remarks in Plato’s dialog Parmenides, 137 b, c). *While the rejection of ethnocentrism promotes multiplicity, superaddition works the opposite, reductive way. Both claims offer structure to anthropology more than any other leading idea: They heal the uneasy insight that (as Herbert Franke once remarked in a discussion) there was a European indology but no Indic europoeology. Superadditive cultures compare within the multiplicity of individual parts set free by the rejection of ethnocentrism. Whosoever compares superadditivities, for example engaging in team sports, is able to categorize others and oneself. Inconceivable as it sounds, observing the enthusiasm for soccer in many Islamic countries, one is tempted to say that Islam has already “lost the game”, not against total religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, or against any religious type out of the multitude of animisms in the wider sense, but against -soccer: Soccer introduces a horizontal element into human life – superaddition -, impinging upon the verticalism of strict monotheism. It is un-Islamic to get organize (Ayyub Axel Köhler, communication 1991). Soccer organizes. Egypt’s coach reacted: Only obedient Muslims are permitted to play in the national team (SZ Nr. 12 of January 16/17, 2010, p.1).*

4. Philosophical (ontological and epistemological) and political meanings of superaddition. A definition

In philosophical terms, entities such as the Greek city state and the Frankish cooperative follow the principle of superaddition: The whole is -ontologically - more than the sum of the parts. The parts are individualized “members”. In this sense only superadditive units have genuine membership, that
is, an individuality separable from the individuality of the whole. In other words, members take the quality of a role, of a task to be performed, within the entity. There is the entity outside of the sum of the members, and this entity can be empowered by a will. Once there is a distinction between “all the members” and the entity to which they belong, from the point of view of comparative culture decision-making by vote becomes conceivable, and consensus is unnecessary to form the will of a group. Under the consensus rule which is typical for pre-axial age cultures, and frequent in post-axial cultures outside of the “West”, all concerned have to agree in order to be bound. There is no individual role of a person (as member, as obligated participant) within the group, apart from being that person. In the case of consensus, all opinions are laid on the table, so to speak, one next to the other. On this virtual table, these different opinions remain to lie, that is, to exist, in all their diversity. No common will is formed, no shared will guides the group’s behavior. There is no hierarchization of several divers opinion under a common will. An opinion brought forward most convincingly, or by the most respected person, will be followed. Since consensus requires a cumbersome process or cannot be achieved, dictatorship may replace the consensus will of all. The Islamic ummah, the community of the believers, follows the consensus principle so that a like-minded undertaking, for example djihad, requires at least a substantial number of Muslims.

a. The idea that the whole is more than the addition of the parts does away with the need of consensus (and its subterfuges) because the members – being bound by their pledge of faith to

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148 When in November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Empire began to crumble, for several months East Germany, officially still the GDR, was without effective leadership (“Modrow period”). The Four-plus-two treaty, restoring German unity, was in preparation. The general crisis in Germany, however, was severe and asked for decisive steps to be taken, for example to keep up law and order in the streets and at the workplace, keep the education system running, the economy intact, etc., not to speak of having forums for the hectic political debates about the end of socialism that were going on. The political instrument chosen, by civil self-help, for doing all these jobs was the Runder Tisch, the round table. It worked under the consensus principle on the initiative of one or more respected citizens, “big-men” so to speak, and thus did not apply democratic decision making by the “majority-beats-minority-for-a-limited-time rule”. The pacifying effectiveness of these ad-hoc round tables in business and administration was remarkable. Anthropologically speaking, during those months, there was no superadditive Germany. Local government by consensus was therefore logical. – A counter example: On a field trip in March 1994, Hsiao-lo Wu, Shio-w-ming Wu and I studied the legal and economic situation of two aboriginal tribes in Southern Taiwan, the Paiwan and the Rukai; see W. Fikentscher, Vom Recht der Paiwan und Rukai: Ein Forschungsbericht über die Altvölker Taiwans (Of the law of the Paiwan and Rukai: A research report on the aboriginal people of Taiwan), Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft von Freunden und Förderers der Universität München 1994, 18 – 20. Traditionally, the Paiwan practice an animist-polydaimonist belief system. Earlier researchers also categorize them as polytheist. It appeared that the Paiwan have been largely missionized by Christian denominations, mainly Presbyterian, and that they see little difficulty in combining their traditional and Christian religious patterns (a typical case of enculturation). After their Sunday church services, the community members habitually stay on, remaining seated on the church benches, and discuss town problems, the minister often acting as facilitator. We were invited to attend the meeting. After a lengthy discussion about a planned demonstration, it was decided not to demonstrate, but no formal vote was taken. We were told that, as a recent development and new usage, such secular meetings were added to church service. Regular town meetings take place on weekdays outside the church, the mayor acting as moderator. There also, issues of general interest are being discussed and decided upon. We learned, for example, that decisions were made outlawing Karaoke events in the town (because of the noise), and prohibiting the possession of dogs except for professional breeding (for reasons of cleanliness). At the town meetings, decisions are made by majority vote. However, neither the polydaimonist background, nor the surrounding dominant Han-Chinese culture provides for voting under the majority rule, both lacking the concept of superadditive units. Obviously, the idea that the town is more than the sum of its citizens, who can therefore proceed by majority voting, is a secular form of the Christian church community practice. From its beginning in the first century C.E. (cf., Acts 1. 12 – 26; 6. 1 – 7; 1 Thessalonians 5. 21) Christians used the synagogue and the polis as organizational models of superaddition, membership, voting, and time-as-a-straight-line.

149 Peter Scholz, Scharia in Tradition und Moderne, Eine Einführung in das islamische Recht (Sharia in tradition and modernity: an introduction to Islamic law), JURA 2001, 525 – 534, at 529. See also note 299, infra.
serve – serve the entity by contributing their individualized will. The validity of the decision of the majority is based on the original pledges of faith. The minority has to follow the will of the majority for the same reason: the original pledge of faith. Since the entity exists across time, majorities and minorities may change, but these changes do not affect the existence and efficiency of the entity. The roles of the members remain the same, regardless of the momentary situation of majority and minority. The introduction of the factor time into the forming of the joint will makes this possible.

Superadditive units such as the Greek city states and the Frankish cooperatives are politically anti-family and anti-clan creations.\(^{150}\) The history of the *polis* is the best known proof, that of the Tewa-Pueblos in New Mexico another.\(^{151}\) Superadditive units tends to avoid family metaphors, such as “father”, “mother”, “brotherhood”, etc.\(^ {152}\) The consequence is that a superadditive unit may be confronted with the objection that “there is no family tradition”, or “any spiritual legitimation is lacking”. Indeed, the polis is a product of the secular Tragic Mind of Ancient Greece as an instrument to control influential families (in serious cases by ostracism). As noted above, the Franks needed counts (*Grafen*) for want of noble families.

b. The word membership may be taken literally. The idea is that the participating persons play a role for running the entity, the whole, based on the pledge of faith to play this role as long as one wants to be a member. Thus, the whole, the corporation, the cooperative, the moral person, is seen as a body, of which the participants are its members. The Greek *polis* followed this metaphor. In his *Historiae*, Thucidides (about 460 – after 400 B.C.E.), has Pericles explain to his Athenian co-citizens the city of Athens as a body of common ownership (*ta koiná*), to be seen separate from the individual citizens who enjoy and support the city. The service for the city makes them into organs that belong to this body. The word “organization” describes this entity-membership relationship with the aid of the organ metaphor. Therefore, in culture comparison, strictly speaking the term organization can only be applied to cultures that recognize the principle of superaddition - historically the Greek and Frankish cultures -. These cultures are known as “Western”. Outside the West, there are many forms of human ordering, but no organizations *stricto sensu*, and if we find there institutions called organizations, they may have been accepted by way of borrowing from another culture. Sometimes they may be simple misnomers.

In addition to granting membership entitlements, another major advantage of the pledge-of-faith system and its underlying principle of superaddition over the consensus principle is efficiency. The Franks were surrounded by animist tribes using the consensus principle. Among them were the more numerous Celts who - if we may believe Caesar – had a cultural development regarding arts and crafts. But cultural standards do not necessarily mean higher efficiency in warfare. At that time, warring was considered a necessity of life, comparable to the Indians in the Americas. Let us take a numerical hypothetical example: Hundred Franks debate whether they should go on the warpath. Fifty one are in favor of, forty nine against the raid. Under the principle of superaddition, the fifty one outvote the forty nine, and the “Gang” (the Germanic word for the warpath) would be waged, with one hundred warriors participating. In a consensus society, the vote fifty one against forty nine


\(^{151}\) See the Tewa-Pueblo study, preceding footnote.

\(^{152}\) The Muslim community is called “*ummah*”. *Um* stands for “mother”.

will enlist fifty one warriors. Forty nine would stay home. Who wins the encounter? With their efficiency derived from superaddition, the Franks became the most powerful and influential Germanic tribe after the demise of the Roman Empire for about the next one thousand years (from 258 C.E., the year of the first mention of the Franks who in 496 C.E. accepted Athanasian Christianity, to 1273, the election of Rudolf von Habsburg as German king). “Franconia” - Frankischer Kreis -, was the political unit which in the framework of the Frankish constitution of the Empire represented the many times renewed “King’s peace”. It *directly* survived as a legal institution until 1806 C.E.). The German term for “King’s peace” is Landfrieden (land’s peace). Many small, and even before the Frankish king Charlemagne was installed, three larger German tribes, the Alemans, the Thuringians, and the Bavarians, and as the only Slavic tribe the Slovenes, joined the Franks by pledge-of-faith). For religious reasons, the German king broke his own land’s peace when after 1566 C.E. the Hapsburgs refused to help the Netherlands against Spanish intended genocide (see note 302, above and accompanying text). William of Orange’s “Defensio” *cited* this reason for ending Dutch membership of the Empire. Hugo Grotius established a new trust-based system of sovereign nations in its place (W. Fikentscher 1979a). Consequently, having lost its value-based superadditive structure, Germany disintegrated. Neither the Peace of Westphalia, nor the Vienna Congress, Bismarck’s European five-power equilibrium, or Hitler’s reckless militarism succeeded in putting a superadditive unit together again. It took the defeat in 1945, to go the “long way to the West” (H.A. Winkler 2002) that in a sense is a return, of course not to the empire, but to “Franconia”.

Giving way to the organizationally superior Franks, the Celts withdrew to Brittany, Wales, Ireland, Spanish Galicia, and other European outskirts. Frankish law became the backbone of Europe’s constitutions, and via the Norman who – in anthropological language - borrowed from the Franks after the conquest of Northern France, also for Britain and the US (see 7., below) German kings from other tribes (such as the Saxons or Suebians – the latter called Staufer -) upon election by the Electors had to submit expressly to the Frankish constitutional pledge-of-faith.153 The Frankish cooperative became the basis for the Western systems of government.

It would be wrong to think that it is acceptable for the whole world. The Frankish cooperative is culturally specific. The forming of stable governments and economies in many African societies, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in many other places is so difficult because democracy, historically grown from the Frankish cooperative, is culturally speaking alien to these places. This does not mean that other cultures are unable to understand democracy. The understanding of the principle of superaddition (that the whole is more than the sum of the parts) is open to borrowing by any other culture. But unless it is borrowed, democracy can hardly be fully implemented.

The Greek city state did not exist long, and estimates vary according to the selected. In essence, the polis died because it did not grant human, inalienable, rights. Thus, the minority could not be legally protected to become majority. Majority rule is an unstable order, if not protected by inalienable rights of individuals and the minority as such. But some of the Greek ideals survived, mediated and modified through the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire was in a sense a super-polis of the then known world, thriving on the Greek polis’ spiritual force. Rom added to Greek egality and superaddition a strong element of trust, fides. But both Athens and Rome, lacking politically and legally recognized inalienable human qualities, suffered Socrates’ death at the hand of sophists and

153 Regardless from which tribe he was taken, the (German) king always lived according to Frankish constitutional law which distinguished between the king’s private property and the commonwealth, Karl Ploetz, Auszug aus der Geschichte, 27th ed. Würzburg : A.G. Ploetz Verlag 1968, 538; Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, 17th ed., Wiesbaden: F.A. Brockhaus 1968, article „Franken, Landschaft“. Also the popes, by another step of borrowing, used to hand out feudal rights according to the Frankish - certainly not Christian, but heathen - pledge-of-faith system.
their value arbitrariness leading to bargained realities.

For a while (258 – 496 C.E.) the Franks had similar problems. The protection of minorities (in every sense: as minority as such, or a regional subunit, or the smallest minority conceivable, an individual) remained an issue. The Frankish king Chlovis (†511 C.E.) sensed the instability of the Frankish cooperative style of government with its lack of inalienable rights and, in 496 C.E., decided to accept Christianity as a stabilizing factor for his animist tribe and himself. This made the Franks acceptable to the Gallic nobility and the Romanic population in what is today France. Christianity introduced welcome value standards into the simple rule of following the majority’s will. In this form – majority rule, but with respect for the other side across time - , the Vikings (Normans) adopted the Frankish pledge-of-faith system in what is today Northern France, taking it to England in 1066 A.D.from where it spread to the United States, other countries, and international organizations. This sketch does not do justice to a historical subject covering 2,500 years.. In the present context, the study of societal orders in anthropological perspective, it may however suffice.

Nor is this the place to speculate on why superaddition could develop in ancient Greece considerably more than two thousand years ago and, a bit later- possibly transmitted by the original state philosophy at the bottom of the Roman Republic - among the animist Franks in the Middle European countryside. By focusing on establishing a union beyond its participants (now to be called members), this principle essentially rejects illegitimate and uncontrolled leadership and, anthropologically speaking, chiefdom and absolute kingly rule. It rather tends to be egalitarian and bottom-up-oriented. However, the road back to tribal consensus society - older than chieftaincy - was barred by axial age good-bad ethics and corresponding epistemological doubt. Maybe, in short, the principle of superaddition may very well be the result of a combination of pre-axial age consensus memories and axial-age epistemological moral doubt. *Politically striving for both, egalitarianism and a stable unit behind epistemological contest, reveals the ambivalence of the amorphous: on the one hand, it favors unfettered egalitarianism, on the other the rise of uncontrolled “tyrants”. The superadditive unit tries to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis: it offers egalitarian parts and at the same token controlled leadership, a polis of equal citizens, and their archontes instead of exousia.*

Is the family a superaddition (eine Übersumme)? The family looks so close and elementary to the person that one may be tempted to say yes. But the answer must be no. Anthropologically, the family serves two purposes, orientation and procreation (Chapter 8 I.). Among birds, mammals, and humans, neither purpose becomes the basis for societal stratified ordering, such as peck order, alpha-to.omega stratification, sodalities (in Indian country: “societies”), moieties, etc.) and often these societal stratifying orderings are not only exoneratively parallel but also critical and even hostile to family and family metaphor. Superaddition is one societal stratifying ordering among many. Therefore it is not family-born.

c. Superaddition can be defined as a societal stratifying ordering that *requires* an entity composed of members having basically equal rights and duties among themselves, and between them and the entity, the entity being represented by organs.

d. Also the epistemological side of the principle of superaddition is of anthropological importance. Cultural superaddition follows from the epistemological distance between person and object, introduced to ancient Greek philosophy by Parmenides (540 – 470 B.C.E.). In the present context, the distanced objects are those of good and bad, right and wrong, and there has be the general intention to understand this world as a place for engagement and action (unlike Buddhism). In Greek worldview, the decider and actor will probably fail (the Greek Tragic Mind154). Still; the

decider and actor is called to be –sceptically - aware of the objects outside. The Greek *koiné* is a corporation of good-bad sceptics. By superaddition, those skeptics become *members* of a unit which is more than the sum of the parts. The citizens’ register of the Greek city states makes this membership *visible*. On the superadditive unit depend the regional and personal extent of agreed ethics, law, trust and reliance, as well as the concept of membership. On the concept of membership depend the pledge of faith, a feeling of belonging, and protection by the law. The member of the unit takes on the role of an individual as against the commonwealth. This in turn creates the distinction between the private sphere (Greek: *oíkos*) and public sphere (Greek: *tà koiná*), enculturated by the Romans as *res privata* and *res publica* (republic). For pre-axial age, that is, most traditional, societies, it follows a falling-in-one of private and public sphere in the form of closely-knit family, lineage, or clan. In non-superadditive post-axial cultures a certain neglect of the public space in comparison to a highly refined private space (Islam) may be observed.

Cultural superaddition also implies a specific frame for interhuman exchange and discourse. It enables the exchange of opinions between two conversation partners with result orientation. In a superadditive society, discourse takes on goal orientation, and thus dialog in the true sense of the word: emerges. It follows an exchange between two or more individuals *about something*, and comparison receives a *tertium comparationis*. Systems can be built. Cooperation does no longer mean meeting half-way, but reinforced working for an end. Therefore, superaddition, dialog, cooperation, trust and credit, the corporation as a moral person, as well as public and private wealth are closely interlinked, and to be distinguished from pre-axial age and non-superadditive post-axial age modes of thought that lack these attributes. *Cooperation alone does not do it. Cooperation alone permits freeriding, cheating, majoritarianism without protection of minorities, and other behavior detrimental to trust. Cooperation alone is abstract from time. Superadditive cooperation avoids these flaws.*

Superaddition – the discovery of the „oversum“ – should not be regarded as a „fulgurization“, to use Konrad Lorenz’ expression for an inexplicable memetic break or jump in the epistemological development of human thought. The assumption of a superadditive unit becomes at least plausible, if not a necessity, if two things are combined: (1) the critical epistemological distance between the person and the axial-age conception of a secular, general, worldwide good-bad distinction (born, as we have seen, from increasing cultural contact); and (2) the will to act (unlike the Buddhist reaction to that distinction). Rather, the assumption of cultural superaddition is the calculated result of a deliberation: that acting in front of a general and not tribe- or clan-related standard of good and bad leads to guilt in any case, regardless of the actor’s good will, and thus to individual tragic, since against this general standard collective assumptions of guilt become untenable. The Judaic discussion of the issue in Ezekiel, chapter 18) has already been referred to. The context of superaddition and personal guilt raises the issues of individuality and personal risk-bearing.

5. Superaddition and individuality. Risk

Once individual guilt is conceivable, it becomes obvious that dealing with that guilt addresses like-minded guilt-conscious individuals hedging different conceptions of guilt: Clan shame and clan responsibility develop into individual guilt. Thus, to weather the tragic situation, a unit beyond the guilt-laden individuals becomes imaginable, even desirable, a unit that is able to justify the individuals’ actions while simultaneously bearing the agreed general ethical standard. A person assuming the role of membership within that unit becomes hereby an individual, and a voter under the rule of majority. Again simultaneously, an element presses itself like a wedge into the relationship between the individual and the object of that ethical standard, opening the gap and filling it in one move: thinking. In this way, Parmenides places individual thinking between the individual and the observed object, and Plato/Socrates adds that an appropriate manner to represent
that thinking is dialog. In sum, cultural superaddition follows from the epistemological distance to the ethics of the axial age (Parmenides and Plato/Socrates) plus the will to act in this world; in contrast, non-superadditive institutions, e.g., pre-axial age and post-axial age non-superadditive associations, work “at arm’s length”.

If we follow the Parmenidean theory of thinking as a connection - including distance as well as goal-orientation - between the self and the object as prerequisite for a truth-related, moral/legal, or esthetic propositions, and if we further accept the insight that this object may have “superadditive” quality, for example a city or a man-of-war, one is ready to do the third step. It consists in acknowledging that, in this kind of thinking, grasping the superadditive object, requires the Parmenidean distance between self and object. Only when this distance between self and object is maintained, conceiving of the superadditive object is possible, and a judgment about the object (i.e., whether it is true, or just, or pleasing) may be rendered. The object may be an encompassing idea, such as a value to be approached by critical thinking by oneself (Parmenides), or by thoughtful dialog (Plato/Socrates). That object may be personal or public property, and critical dialog (in the Platonic sense) about that property may amount to the setting of an economic value. Facing the object “out there”, that is, in the Parmenidean distance, by thinking about it makes the critical observer a person, an individual, and facing this object in a dialog creates a public sphere. For example, in economics it follows that the distinction between internalities and externalities does not work in a society which has difficulties in conceiving a mutually related constitution of a private and a public sphere, such as Islam and many other non-Western societies. To the extent this functional distinction between internalities and externalities forms the basis of game and decision theory or institutional economics, these theories do not easily apply to non-Western societies. Moreover, in the public sphere the right to freely and fairly compete is constantly to be weighed against institutions and owning property, so that there is little help to be gained from those theories for said reasons.

Thinking about superadditive objects requires making dependent the realization of superaddition, and:with it systematic thinking in generalizations and specializations, on a culturally very specific kind of thinking, namely, the Parmenidean distance-keeping between the individual observer and the judgment to be made. It submits the practical working with superadditive objects, for example the establishment of a fail-safe economy in de Soto’s sense, a government for Iraq; Afghanistan, OR Kosovo; or a Palestinian state, to the willingness to engage in a Platonic dialog. This sounds far-fetched, even shocking, because it makes dependent certain political solutions on certain philosophies. But it is a consequence of culture comparison, of the comparative study of cultural modes of thinking. The said interdependence is not a “clash of civilizations” (Samuel Huntington), but rather a restriction of civilizational thought-patterns for certain ends. In a pluralist world, such interdependences are of course hard to sell. Parmenides’ and Plato’s idealism considers ideas to be real, accessible, possibly superadditive, and subject to at least preliminary judgments of truth, good,

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and beauty. This Parmenidean and Platonic idealism is a cultural specificity of “the West”. There are other modes of thought. The most important are Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Marxist-Confucianism, and traditional pre-axial-age modes of thought. These modes are different. Their thinking is not Greek. For instance, Buddhism rejects approachability of this-worldly operationable values, and Islam as a world without Parmenides and Plato (see Ch. 5 V. 6. d., above) regards non-submissive, independent human judgment an agnostic sacrilege.

6. Examples

To illustrate the above, some consequences of superaddition, randomly chosen may be useful:

(a) Organization is a superadditive concept. A body which exists as an entity at the same time consists of parts, members, organs that, taken together, do more than amount to the whole. The whole is more than the sum of its parts. The state is an example, as is the corporation. Both organizations are derived from the Frankish cooperative and the Greek polis. Implications are the ideas of membership, trust, individual rights, human rights, and the distinction of the private and the public sphere. In contrast, the shari’a does not know the concept of the corporation, nor of the state. It is not anorganization. An Islamic saying goes: It is un-Islamic to get organized. The umma has no members, an Islamic government has no citizens comparable to the Greek polities, the Roman cives, and the Frankish “franks”, and the Norman “knights and citizens”. Pre-Islamic segmented society (E.E. Evans-Pritchard) prevails. The use of (Western) organizational forms in modern Islamic society occurs by certain suppositions, by some called hijals. Whether and how into Islam a mutually constitutive relationship between private and public spheres can be introduced (“borrowed” in terms of acculturation theory*) remains an open issue (for practical proposals see Rohe 2001; on Islamic foundations as a hijal to circumvent the strict koranic probate law and for other purposes, but not for creating a moral person, Kogelmann, Meier & Pahlitzsch at 988).

(b) What in Western society is called dialog, in Islamic settings may take the form of “bargaining for reality”, the title of a book by Lawrence Rosen (1984). Bargaining for realities gives freedom rights and property rights a certain degree of volatility. Rights as such become a function of (mostly short-term) stipulations. This “bargaining” ends with at least one winner and one looser. The prospective winner resembles what, in discourse theory, Jürgen Habermas would call the competent one. Reality-creating bargain and truth-creating discourse are both attempts to bring about values through processes. The bargain is, as is force-free discourse, open-ended, until a substantive result is reached. However, processing value from procedure is subject to a debate that focuses on the admissibility of forsaking (Parmenidean) judgment and (Platonic) doubt.

(c) Every human being is a person belonging to a nuclear and an extended family, frequently also to a lineage and a clan. Higher conglomerations of persons consequently are formed by family metaphors, such as brotherhoods, sororities, fatherlands, motherlands, popes, emperors with a father’s role, big brothers, etc. Becoming an individualized member of an organization is not a derivative, but the opposite to families and family-like structures (contra: Max Weber in his study on the Roman gens). Both the Greek polis and the Frankish cooperative developed in opposition to nobility.

(d) There is a problem dealing with the identification of segmented societies (Southern Sudan, Somalia, Arabs, Kurds, etc.). Once the tribe is left or for some reason no longer available as the place to go to, people must retain their identities while living face to face to, or even among, strangers. People outside no longer live through relationships. They do not solve this problem by individuating as members of an oversum. The solution may be the “discovery of the other”, in anthropological synepeia analysis on level II, and in linguistics the dual, the precursor of the plural
(“you and me” is not yet “we”).

(e) The de Soto issue is “why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else”. Its solution may have something to do with the Parmedean distance: Only the “idealist brain” can conceive of superadditive object. Property and credit worthiness are culture-specific, as is getting organized, engaging in a dialog, being clan-and-tribe independent, and thinking in plural and pluralist terms. It is true that a credit economy depends on visible and secured property. But property is not worth more than its contents which in turn is defined by the rules of property exchange, that is, a specific form of the market. De Soto’s visible and secured property depends on the long-range credit and trust market form. This form of the market only exists at the “price” of superaddition. Therefore, property remains invisible and unsecured in all modes of thought which do not think in terms of superaddition, such as religion-based clan hierarchies, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Marxist-Confucianism (all these are de Soto’s fieldwork areas).

(f) My concern is not, how on the basis of Parmenidean-Platonic thinking superadditive structures such as democracy, or a free and fair property and market system, may be established in Islamic, or Buddhist, environments. An intended acculturation would require much more detailed research. In Islam, the theory of the “greater djihad” as developed by the Prophet Muhammad, a.s., as a principle of self-restraint, may point the road to reflective, discursive, explicit, declaratory thinking and thus to Cartesian doubt, Parmenidean judgment, and Platonic dialog. In Buddhism, the seventh and the eighth step of the “right path” to salvation concern “right thinking” and “right reflection”. Perhaps this can be interpreted in the Parmenidean sense of getting a distance to what a person is thinking about. Modes of thought are not “ideal types” (Max Weber), but middle types of human thinking. They are open to modifications. Not infrequently, such modifications are the reason for culture change. The issue whether such interpretations are permitted illustrates a closeness to superaddition in neighboring modes of thought.

(g) In part, the acceptance of a superadditive reality of ideas, and their this-wordly detectable guidance for human behavior, seems to be a matter of degree. There are statistics and other research on the degree of trust between cultures, telling us that in Lutheran countries the extent to which people trust and rely on each other is the highest worldwide (Zak & Knack 2001). In Lutheran teaching, human failure is not predetermined (as in Islam and Calvinism), not to be blamed on earlier failure (as in Hinduism), not to be overcome by walking a “right way” (as in Buddhism and other gnostic belief systems) or orthodox prescript (as in Christian and other orthodoxy). In Lutheran teaching, human failure is no deviation of the party-line defined li = good mores (Marxist Confucianism), and it is no offense against tribal law. Instead, other-worldly grace is promised, quite independently from “good works” (classic Catholicism) and other efforts to “do the right thing”. Exactly that high degree of trust and reliance is mirrored in a this-worldly context and explains high levels of inter-human trust.

(h) For a society, the absence or presence of superaddition is of decisive importance. Among other factors, the efficiency of superadditive units is considerably higher than that of consensus units (see Frankish history, above). Also, the possession of rights largely depends on superaddition. This can be illustrated by a juxtaposition of cooperative and segmented units in modern Africa:

It is a truism that there are various forms of human cooperation. One is the cooperative, also called

158 See Chapter 1, section 2, supra.

159 The following text is in part an abbreviated and revised version of W. Fikentscher, The Whole is More Than the Sum of the Parts, Therefore I have Individual Rights: African Philosophy and the Anthropology of Developing Economies and Laws (2004).
corporation, corporate unit, juristic or moral person, Ancient Greek city-state - depending upon historic or contemporaneous factual conditions. Here, it is called by its most general name, cooperative. Examples from modern times are agricultural, arts and crafts, and industrial cooperatives. Cooperatives are entities which legally exist independently from their members.

i) An example of the essence of superaddition is the parable of the “Good Samaritan” in the New Testament (Luke 10. 25 – 37). This parable is usually told as a model of being kind to others, loving your neighbor, watching out for people in trouble, being generous, etc. However, seen with an eye on comparative culture, there may be a second morale of the story: In the narrative, the helper is a Samaritan. At the time, the province of Samaria was hellenized, which means, it had become godless, or at least god-critical, under the influence of Ancient Greek city culture. Because of the Greek influence, Samaria was despised by the pious Jews, and when Jews traveled through Samaria, they did it as fast as they could and avoided contact with the non-believing and therefore “inferior” Samaritans. In this historical context, the parable of the Good Samaritan assumes a specific meaning, in addition to the ethical teaching traditionally expressed by it. By identifying the helper as Samaritan, Jesus of Nazareth says, that if these Samaritans learn from their parents and in school to assist one another as members of their communities and thus for political reasons, it shouldn’t be too difficult for Jews to assist one another in times of need, to show interest in your neighbor’s fate, and do good to others. It is the political anthropology of the cooperative, of the polis, which makes the parable additionally noteworthy. The cooperative culture of Hellenism gives the story a superadditive political emphasis that goes beyond its love-your-neighbor morale.

j) The spirit of the polis survived to this day, whereas the ancient polis died, after 250 years of existence, around 400 B.C.E., from the liberal paradox that says: If you’re free to vote for absolutely everything, you are able to vote for a dictatorial regime, and in case of doubt, the winner takes all. There is no limit to liberty that may guard liberty so that liberty may become sustainable. If you as member of a city state are able to regulate everything by majority vote, this very vote may end the membership of others, or other members’ life. Socrates received the death penalty because he had made use of the liberty to think, and to have his own opinion. The polis died because it did not provide enough inalienable rights in order to serve and maintain Socrates’ liberty to think. 800 years later, he super-polis of antiquity, the Roman empire, died for the similar reasons.

k) Apparently, there is no other way to create individual rights (“A→B”), outside of the superadditive principle of the cooperative. A modern dictator may on a whim create, even prescribe, the existence and use of individual rights, but it will be a borrowing from the theory of the cooperative. And it would certainly not be in his interest. In the 18th century, Frederick the Great of Prussia did not like the answer of the owner of the Sanssouci Mill. The miller was addressed in person by the King who claimed that the mill, adjacent to the King’s palace, made too much noise and would therefore soon be closed by royal order. Confronted with the imminent taking, the miller answered, right into the King’s face: “Alright, Majesty, but for a decision of the Chamber Court.” The king – realizing that the king was under the law of the state as an entity comprising king and subjects, and not above the law, gave in, and the mill survived.

l) During the 2008 primaries, according to press reports, a US diplomat warned the Europeans: regardless of the outcome of any primary, US foreign policy was going to remain the same for decades to come, striving for two goals at a time, an idealist and a materialist one, namely to

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160 It may be this additional undertone of a favorable comparison to Hellenism which is responsible for the otherwise astonishing fact that this “great parable” is to be found in one gospel, Luke’s, alone. Luke’s text was intended, by the Apostle Paul, as written source for Christianity in the hellenized world. For Matthew, Mark, and John and their – different – Jewish audiences, the parable could have been too offensive.
disseminate democracy around the world, and to be strong enough militarily to enable the US to have its way even if all others, foes, neutrals, and friends, would not agree. Anthropologically, it is remarkable that both counts are flawed by one and the same circumstance: the disregard of unqualified Frankish superaddition. US democracy follows the Normannic type, lacking a leadership’s constitutional duty to answer; by the same token, this hinders internalization of the sense of being a member of the club (of Free Nations).

7. Additional historical and comparative dimensions

In a comparative survey of cultures, the cooperative system as a cradle for individual rights and duties can be observed in some cultures:

- The Ancient Greek city state was established in order to overcome tyranny and the influence of powerful clans. It introduced the idea of equality of the citizens, membership rights and duties such as majority vote, one man one vote (“isegoria”), legal control, and ostracism against potential tyrants. The polis mentality also created a feeling of belonging to an encompassing unit, and hereby a sense of trust and reliance among members. The reach of this trust and sense of reliance extended throughout the community of the Greek city states, the Commonwealth. Within the koiné, traders were willing to give one another credit, for example. The Olympic Games were a symbol of the koiné.

- Early and incomplete attempts, without lasting consequences, at superadditive units are reported from China 200 years B.C.E (Coulborn, 1956). The topic “China’s organizational history and presence” is a clearly underresearched anthropological field. The older descriptions, maybe stereotypes, of Confucian verticality and non-sociality (Lin Yutang, Max Weber) do not seem to fit anymore. Ellen Hertz wrote a study on the role of the Han-Chinese “crowd” which may be a new element for a comparative study of governmental powers in Eastern – traditionally “collective” and non-superadditive – cultures, where Montesquieu’s separation of political functions apparently does not work or is regarded insufficient. Respect for a will or a (more or less sub-conscious) sentiment of the “crowd” may work as a fourth power next to parliament, government, and judiciary.

- Rudimentary cooperative systems within three North American Indian tribal groups: Iroquois, Otoe, and Tewa-speaking Pueblos can still today be found. These examples are little known. So are the alleged Chinese examples.

- The accepted history of theology holds that during the Babylonian exil the Jews “invented” the synagogue because the Temple was lost. The synagogue community was understood as a superadditive unit, the Christian church following suit. In a parallel conception, the relationship between the Jews and their God may be seen as founded on a superadditive entity. This entity was called testament, treaty. This treaty effectuated time-as-a-straight line and in turn God’s participation in that (human time) in the form of a messiah. A comparison to Islam shows the logic of this context: Islam lacks superadditive conception, and thus has neither time-as-a-straight line nor a


messiah. As indicated in Chapter 5 V. 5. c.(and in W. Fikentscher 1997, 178 ff., 181 – 183),
Christian concepts of societal ordering are connected with Christian epistemology. From rejection of
despotism (Luke 22. 25,26) and acceptance of authority of elders and city fathers (archontes,
Romans 13) follows a theory of superadditive organization (1st Corinthians 12.12 – 30) and within it
of plurality of societal tasks, contributions, and judgments in meeting these demands (1st
Corinthians 12.4 ff; Colossians 4.17). In turn, from these positions follow the human ability to form
self-responsible judgments (Matthew 16.3, example refers to causality), the necessity of difference
of opinion (1st Corinthians 11.19, factions), the plurality of opinions including the encouragement to
form self-responsible judgments (1st Thessalonians 5.11), the admonishment to respect even
unexpected opinions and to test them (1st Thessalonians 5.19 - 21 first part), and all this because of
the human inability to see things clear enough to fully know reality (1st Corinthians 13.12, with the
metaphor of the dim copper mirror, reminiscent of Parmenides’ teachings of human judging and of
Plato’s cave). Again, a comparison to Islam shows the logic of the context: Because of the “God-
willings” proviso, Islam lacks Parmenidean judgment and Plato’s “dim mirror” (so that no
dialog. about truth, moral good, and esthetic quality is epistemologically required). According to
Lawrence Rosen (1984), bargaining for reality takes their place.

- As said above, the historically most lasting impact occurred with the establishment of
superadditive political units among some Germanic tribes inhabiting the area of the lower Rhine
that today encompasses to the southern Netherlands, northern Belgium, and the German state of
North-Rhine Westfalia. These tribes joined to form a cooperative entity. The new unit had a general
assembly of the vassals and elected leaders, the lords. The kings did not rule as an absolute
monarchs, rather they were mandated to lead in peace and war, keep up law and order and the
trading routes safe, tax the members with contributions to achieve these tasks (mostly in kind such
as services in war, transportation, road building and policing, and participation in common affairs)
and to give account at the next meeting of the assembly of the vassals of how the contributions were
spent (“budget day,” Haushaltsdebatte). The vassals, at least in earlier times, cherished political
equality even in view of inequality of wealth and family influence.

The Franks were mentioned for the first time in 258 C.E. Around 150 years later, at the end of the
fourth century, the Franks had extended their territory up the Rhine and Main rivers in what is today
western and southern Germany, and into what is today southern Belgium and northern France. They
expanded not only by belligerent conquest of territories not yet covered by Landfrieden, but, as it
seems, mainly by accession of other tribes. These latter joined the cooperative system of the Franks
by taking an oath of loyalty, promising to follow the Frankish rule of becoming vassals to a lord and
thus share in the cooperative system. In turn, the lord assigned a territory to the new members. This
organization is called the Frankish pledge-of-faith system, or Frankish feudalism. In Germany, it
lasted until 1806 C.E., the year in which Napoleon defeated the German Empire, and thus brought
to an end what was called Franconia (Fränkischer Kreis), as part of the Imperial Constitution. Later,
was reestablished in different forms and under different names, working to this very day. This is a
long history for a political idea. The reason for this longevity is the following:

Again as already discussed, in 496 C.E., the Franks decided to become Christians, in order to
stabilize the constitutional system, by grounding it on generally accepted values. This prevented the
Frankish rule from falling victim to the liberal paradox that had ended Athens and Rome. In the eight
and ninth century, the Franks ruled an empire from Denmark to Sicily, and from Brittany to Croatia,
almost the entire Europe. In the ninth and tenth century, the Vikings, or Normans, coming from
Denmark and Norway, conquered northern France. Thereafter, the Normans replaced their
traditional chieftaincy by the Frankish pledge-of-faith system, and in 1066, under William the
Conqueror, took it to England (Kerber 1997, at 21 f.). From there the Frankish-Normannic
constitutional rule spread to all parts of the British Empire, including the US, and from there to
international organizations such as the United Nations. Whoever thinks of the Charter of the United
Nations, and of most of the constitutions on this planet, as superadditive pledge-of-faith rules of a Frankish cooperative of farmers?

- The entities mentioned above are in theory corporations with a Frankish constitution, equipped with a parliament, with organs - authorized and held accountable - , and with a legal system built upon individual rights between the members, as well as between the members and the political entity. According to the Frankish model, these rights include membership rights that prevent the majority from abusing the system. The most important of these rights today are called human rights. Human rights mark the difference to the Greek model of the **polis**, as an additional factor that stabilizes the entity across time because minorities may become majorities. But like the **polis** and the Roman Republic, the Frankish cooperative is more than the sum of the parts. It is a superadditive unit and as such across time.*

  * Alison Dundes Renteln (International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism, Newbury Park 1990: Sage) derives human rights from anthropological universals, in particular from reciprocal cooperation. This is correct once that cooperation is grounded in a superadditive unit, in other words, not just in a bilateral relationship. We will see that there are reciprocal cooperations outside of superaddition, for example a trade agreement. They do not produce human rights.*

- Interestingly, there is no country in world history that went through Frankish feudalism and later became Communist (communication Ludwig Hamburger). In Germany, there is a cultural divide running from Northwest to Southeast. It is the divide between the Frankish and the Saxon cultures. The Saxons, a strong tribe in Germany’s North at the time of the early Frankish kings, never submitted to Frankish rule for good. They rejected the idea of the pledge-of-faith system, employing and continuing chieftaincy instead. The German kings were elected organs of a superadditive unit, the German Empire according to the Frankish constitution. Compared with other European rulers, kings or dukes, of Slavic, Normannic, Romanic, or Nordic provenance, German kings were rarely assassinated (see Peter Landau on Philipp of Suebia, forthcoming). It makes little sense to kill an organ. *One cannot kill an office.* A person can be removed from office, *even by murder, but* it will be replaced by another carrier of that role. *Inversely, a tyrant is no office.* It follows that no provision of criminal law protected the life of a German king as a Frankish-constitutional organ. By contrast, dukes as nobles of chieftain character needed such criminal law protection (for instance the Duke of Bavaria in the Philipp story, *lege Bavarica*). Superaddition makes all the difference.

- A superaddition-related difference is still observable today in local German newspapers, or German small talk. In the formerly Frankish areas to the West and the South, people might say: “There is a problem. Let’s sit together and discuss it. Then, tomorrow, we’ll decide what to do.” There may be an exchange of opinions in the local newspapers. Assuming that the decision the people wanted to come up with ends with a vote 51:49. On the day after the vote hundred people will support the resolution.

In the formerly Saxon areas to the German North and the East, one might hear people say or read in the local paper: “There is a problem. Somebody must come up with a solution. There has to be a regulation that takes care of that.” Maybe, there will be a vote to establish a basis for that regulation, and the vote is 51:49. How many will support the resolution after it has been voted upon? 51. And all hundred participants will wait for the next directive from Berlin.

What is more efficient, superadditive membership of individuals, or the collectivity of single deciders under the exhortation to find consensus? Which system is time-bound, and which is not? Polis (or Genossenschaft), individuality, and time-as-a-straight line are three aspects of one and the same phenomenon.
Why is there this difference, along a cultural divide between Franks and Saxons running through Germany? The answer is: In the Frankish tradition, a majority vote binds all members – for the time being, and until minority becomes the majority -. The Saxonian tradition does not know or rejects the cooperative, the oversum, or superaddition. Hence, the call of the people for guidance by a chief. Put bluntly, Franks think bottom-up, Saxons top-down.

- It follows from the main requirement of the cooperative, superaddition, that it is possible to draft a federalist, horizontally and vertically structured, multi-member system: A the bottom, members (formerly vassals) elect and control the organ (the former lord). This is a partly horizontal and partly vertical structure: the ties between the members, plus the ties between the members and their government. It is what is called the cooperative unit. One can image more than one cooperative unit, may be five, or ten, and let them be the members of a second cooperative unit, situated one level higher, with an organ of its own. This is the basic idea of federalism. One could continue and establish a third layer. Frankish feudalism made frequent use of this plurality of levels utilizing the pledge-of-faith system (=Lehenswesen). Today, corporations - which are superadditive economic units - use the possibility of multi-layer structures in every holding or similar business combination. The European Union is a mul-level superadditive structure..

- However, parliamentarism (grown from the vassal-lord-pledge-of-faith system) combined with federalism grown from building levels of corporate units on top of one another as sketched above raises an issue: Are the members of the lower cooperatives only members of these original cooperatives, or do they become - through federalization - members of the higher cooperatives, or do they become members of both the lower level and the higher level cooperatives? This issue every federation has to solve. For example, the citizens of the USA are citizens of both their home state and of the US as a federation. Consequently, they pay income tax to both, following a rather cumbersome procedure. The European Union was conceived as a federation (for limited purposes) of member states, not of their citizens, who were and still are citizens of their countries. Nobody in Europe seems to want an additional income tax system imposed by the EU. When the Constitution of the EU was drafted (since 2000) and accepted (October 2004), obviously nobody expressly addresses the issue. The text of the EU Constitution leaves the question unanswered: In elections of representatives to a body called European Parliament the direct vote of the citizens of the EU member states seems to indicate that there is direct citizenship, additional to the national memberships, but the lack of a European nationality as well as the absence of, and opposition to, a constitutional EU tax jurisdiction speak against it. In principle, the combination of parliamentarism and federalism is possible and in conformity with the idea of the cooperative (having consequences for taxation and other membership duties and rights), but there should be lawyers and politicians who see and address the problem.163

8. Recent applications of superaddition, and instances where it is lacking

On May 1, 2004, five Slavic nations joined the EU: Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Historically, only one Slavic nation introduced the Frankish pledge-of-faith system and thus superaddition: Slovenia, in the 8th century. All five acceding members went through long periods of their history with a social order regulated by chiefs and kings, similar to the German tribe of the Saxons. The other Slavic nations with what anthropologists call a chieftain tradition are Russia, Belorus, Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Serbia, Croatia, Czechia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria.

On May I, 2004, to celebrate the new membership of Slovakia in the EU, the Slovakian Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda gave a speech that - according to press reports on May 2 - contained the following statement: “We are now EU members. But it may never occur that Europe stands above us, or against us.” Dzurinda continued by giving a reason why in the future Europe should never stand above Slovakia: “Because now we are Europeans.” The speech indicates a neglect of superaddition. Of course, there are inherent conflicts of interest between Europe as a whole and Slovakia as its member state. Out of necessity, Europe must stand “above” Slovakia as one of its members among 25 members. Having never known or internalized the concepts of the cooperative, the Prime Minister could not think in terms of membership and its duties and rights. And his remark “Because now we are Europeans” sounded as if he were prepared to give up his Slovakian citizenship.

The Slovakian story is strikingly reminiscent of President Karsai’s response, about one year before the Slovakian example, when he was asked by a journalist who then reported the interview how he could ever manage to solve the contradiction that on the one hand he has been appointed President of Afghanistan, while on the other he belongs to the tribe of the Pashtuni (the most numerous Afghan tribe). Mr. Karsai answered: “There is no problem: I am not a Pashtuni. I am an Afghan.” Mr. Karsai did not say: “I am both Pashtuni and Afghan”. Neither Slovakia nor Afghanistan ever joined the Frankish association of tribes, the superaddition, in which the whole is more than the sum of parts.

On May 19, 2004, in recognition of the access of the new members to the European Union on May 1, 2004, in this case of Poland, the renowned Polish sociologist and philosopher Piotr Sztompka, in his Ortelius Lecture before the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study on May 19, 2004, made an interesting personal remark about his feelings being now a Pole and at the same time a European. 164 Sztompka said that these multiple identities give him the feeling of personal richness and a more complete sense of self-realisation. “Unity and distinction may be two sides of the same human fate, its perennial and irrevocable duality”. 165 However, from an anthropological point of view the assumption of a dual identity – if at all possible, see President Karsay’s mutually exclusive either-or-statement – misses the point. Even for leading Polish thinkers it must be hard to conceptualize a political entity that is more than the sum of its parts, in other words, comprising membership, membership rights and membership duties. The stubborn insistence of Polish leaders on a Polish *liberum veto* against EU decisions, most recently in the Lisbon Treaty which in essence is a European constitution, are proof of this difficulty to see oneself as “member of the – superadditive club”. When one follows the reports on the EU - Turkish access negotiations, it seems that the Turkish side is never pleading as a prospective member of the EU, but merely as Brussels’ negotiation partner. Will the Frankish structure of the EU be strong enough to integrate all the “Saxons”?

The first West German chancellor (prime minister) after World War II was Konrad Adenauer, a Rhinelander (from the western most part of Germany) who made no secret of his strongly francophile political conviction. After he was elected chancellor, a journalist asked him: “Dr. Adenauer, how can you conceive yourself of being the German chancellor – you as a Rhinelander of whom some people say that he likes France more than Germany?” This was the “Karsai question” Adenauer answered: “I think I am a good Rhinelander who loves his home country. Therefore I am a good German, and because I am a good German, I am a good European.” This therefore – Adenauer’s emphasis - explains superaddition, that is, the feeling of being a member of a greater unit that serves a legal, moral, and economic framework and entity of itself. When I told this story

165 Sztompka, op. cit., at 17.
in Namibia, a conversation partner said. “Therefore? No Ovambo would say that!” In superadditive conception, there is no duality and neither a new nor a double identity.

Some years ago, in a small West German small town, two brothers died, one briefly after the other. The two had owned a glass manufacturing business (Glashütte Süssmut). There was no will and no known descendent. All employees, about 25, met in the local inn and, after a debate, decided by majority vote to continue their work in the factory. If any problem would arise, they would handle it in the manner of running the local soccer team. They then elected a chairman, a vice chairman, and a treasurer, because the local soccer association had such officials. With this simple organizational model they kept the business running successfully. The soccer team model worked, for many years, and the “company” earned enough to support 25 families. One day, probably in connection with a credit which was applied for with a local bank, it became apparent that the enterprise did not exist at all, legally speaking. But someone found a way to bring the situation into a fitting legal frame. This happened in a formerly Frankish area (Hesse). It could hardly have happened east of Berlin. The glass manufacture case is an example of “economic democracy”, of the working of superaddition in the economy and labor world, and a piece of the rule of law in a small German town.

9. Majority rule and human rights

Lacking superaddition, a movie audience or the tourists in a hotel or on the beach are not organizations. From the idea of an organization two results can be derived: majority vote and – under the additional assumption of inalienable positions which are protected against a majority vote – human rights. Thus both one-man-one-vote and human rights are derivatives of the cooperative system: In history, what came first? In other words: What is older, democracy, or Rechtsstaat (= the “rule-of-law state”)? The answer is: Human rights came first. In 1572 the incipient Dutch republic granted inalienable, majority-proof rights, such as free exercise of religion and other opinions, and freedom of assembly, to the citizens of the Netherlands. Other nations, such as France, Great Britain, or U.S., took it from the Dutch. But at that time, during the second half of the 16th century, single citizens did not possess individual rights to vote. Often the lords, the staten (Netherlands), Stände (German), les états (French) were entitled to form the common will of a political entity. However, they did this both for themselves and their families, and as trustees of the citizens for them; because as in Ancient Greece, trust was possible within a superadditive unit. In this manner, often based on a model of presbyterianism, representative democracy arose, mainly during the 18th century, after the idea of human rights had taken foothold. In the 19th century, in many countries, a written constitution became to be the legal vehicle

In time, a complete legal system for the protection of the rights of the citizens against the corporate unit was established. The British habeas corpus legislation of 1679 marks a beginning, followed by the Bill of Rights in 1689. In 1810, the U.S. Justice John Marshall introduced the judicial review of the rule-setting activities of the cooperative entity, but only with regard to rules that cover a generality of situations. On the other hand, the introduction of a legal protection of the single citizen against every administrative action, that is, in particular cases, took longer, and is at present only introduced in a limited number of countries. Germany introduced judicial review of administrative acts – after a long period of precursors, experimentation and lawlessness under Hitler’s regime – only in 1949, in Article 19 (4) of its constitution. The present situation – not the development - in France is similar. Great Britain and US still grant legal protection against singular administrative acts only if a specific statute provides for this, such as in Internal Revenue Service or Food and Drug Agency statutes in the USA.

*10. Superaddition and passive co-existence
Superaddition should not be confused with co-existence. Superaddition is a societal ordering requiring an entity composed of members having equal rights and duties among themselves, and between them and the entity (see I. 4. c., above). By consequence, the whole, consisting of the members and the entity, is one more than the sum of the members. Co-existence is a term used in the subchapter on acculturation (see Chapter 5 VI, above). There, co-existence means the existence of more than one culture side-by-side without an influence of one culture upon another. An example is the city of Mostar in former Yugoslavia where the Muslim and the Orthodox culture co-existed on opposite sides of the famous bridge with little contact between each other. Ideally, every culture lives its own peaceful life, and the participating cultures respect one another. If there are two cultures, the number of participants is two, if the number is three, three cultures live side-by-side, etc. From acculturation theory, co-existence can be transposed to societal ordering. Two and three are sums, not supersums. No superaddition takes places. There is mutual respect, but no common purpose, such as a common defense, a mutual trade, having a joint high school, or the building of a road or bridge as a task to be shared. An interesting case is Haiti religions. It has been said that 90% of the Haitian are Catholic, 10% Protestant, and 100% Voodoo (French: Vaudoux; German Wodu). Voodoo is a conglomerate of religious types used in the home places of modern Haitians’ ancestors who were enslaved in the 17th and 18th centuries on the African western coast (Dahomey, Gold Coast, Nigeria etc.) and took their religions along. Cults of the dead and ancestor worship seem to be prevalent (Maya Deren, Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods of Haiti, London & New York 1953). Voodoo religious rites include equal respect to be given to all Voodoo “denominations” represented by the attendants of the rites. There is no missionary zeal between Voodoo variations. This mutual respect is passive. In meetings and conferences of the Rio Grande Pueblos the same can be observed: All religious traditions are respected, and the tribal representatives take turns in openly saying the morning prayer in the way they are use to at home (unpublished fieldnotes). This is practiced passive co-existence, but not “ecumenical” superaddition (remember that superaddition is not a Christian achievement). If religious superaddition is secularized, the result may be a Swiss confederation. If religious co-existence is secularized, mere mutual passive respect does not prevent political anarchy in the wane of a Haitian earthquake or revolution.*

11. Learnability of superaddition?

Can superaddition be learned? How would one teach it? The polytheistic Athenians around or soon after 600 B.C, the animist Franks around 250 A.D., and the animist Tewa Pueblos and Iroquois invented it in pre-Columbian time, all independently from each other. Most of the West European peoples and the Slovenes learnt it. What for those nations was possible centuries ago should also be manageable today for Turks, Chinese, and Ovambos. Turkey, China, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Poland and many other countries suffer from not being able to imagine superaddition: that the club has members with individual rights and duties and an accountable leadership. Turkey does not desintegrate when Catholics have a permanent permission to hold religious services at Tarsos, Poland does not need a second identity to belong to the EU, and China would profit from trust relationships between Han provinces and autonomous regions.

IV. Correlates

One of the hardest issues of contemporary cultural anthropology concerns the question whether and to which degree societal leadership, politics, economy, religion, mental activities and other cultural attributes can be correlated. S.N. Eisenstadt, Katherine Newman, H.de Soto, S.P. Huntington, Edward Said, V.S. Naipaul, and many others tried comparisons of cultural traits (see background books listed in Chaper 1). So far such anthropological correlates have met with insurmountable difficulties. Moreover, the question as such has not been posed in a clear and direct manner. Is it possible to say: “Give me the economic situation of a society, and I will tell you its governmental form and its family system”? Or: “Tell me the government system of a society, and I will tell you
from this not only its economy but also its manners of expressing objects in language and the fine arts”? Or: “Let me know the dominant religion observed in a given country or nation, especially its components of total religions or religious types, and I can predict its governmental structure, some principles of law, and the degree of trust elements as parts of the economy”? An attempt may be ventured from the vantage point of the modes of thought. Hence, the question posed and probed here is: Is it possible to deductively correlate modes of thought to the three following complexes: Societal ordering, economy, and belief system? In the following text, such correlates are proposed, For them, S.N. Eisenstadt has introduced the expression “concatenated list” of cultural traits.

A list can indeed be drafted, by passing in review, at the price of repetition, the results from the earlier discussion of events of the development of cultures in human society, so that correlates may be indicated.

The theoretical framework of this issue is cultural determinism, that is, the question of concluding from one cultural trait or complex the truth or untruth of another. The authorities are divided both as to the possibilities and degrees of such deterministic conclusions as well as to the permissibility of the question in the first place. In a discussion with S. N. Eisenstadt, the following sketch of correlates of cultural attributes has been developed elsewhere:

Eisenstadt refers to two opposite theories on the relationship of culture and power: For Max Weber, regulatory codes for the exercise of power arise from the nature of man and human interaction, carrying a direct implication for the order of society. Michel Foucault assumes that culture interweaves with power and thus power establishes the determining factor for all arenas of social life. Eisenstadt views the Weberian approach more fruitful for a comparative analysis of social dynamics. He builds on it his own “comparative civilizational analysis” of the relation of culture and power. A normative judgment on human power behavior offers more criteria for evaluating and comparing cultures than a conflation of fact and norm. Eisenstadt also tests his overall theory in the cultures of Islam, Hinduism, and and the Greek/Judaic/Christian/tribal-Germanic “European Complex”

If one accepts a distinction between culture and nature (along with Weber and Eisenstadt), one of the primordial tasks of culture is the control of natural power Empirically, there seems to exist no culture in history or presence that does not provide for rules concerning societal power, incest, and contact with the supernatural. One of the most contested issues of cultural anthropology concerns the question whether certain types of societal groupings, such as chieftaincies, are assignable to certain groups of cultures, such as animist cultures. Depending on the inclination of the anthropological writer, these attempts at categorization are designed either in an evolutionary dimension (diachronic), or proceed comparatively without relation to time (synchronic). None of these outlines has gained such reputation as to become prevailing opinion. Treatises and college text

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167 Boas, in Foreword to Ruth Benedict (1934), Katherine S.Newman, Law and Economic Organization: A Comparative Study of Preindustrial Societies, Cambridge & New York 1983: Cambridge Univ. Press; Benjamin Whorf, Language and Logic. New York 1941: Wiley; Eisenstadt, see next note; in earlier publications, I took the position of a modified cultural determinism that finds its roots and at the same time is limited by empirically-sustained cultural comparison on a pluralist basis: W. Fikentscher (1977b), 30, 32; idem (1995/2004), XXIV, 184 – 186; idem (2004), 90 ff., 303. Cultural correlations involving economics raise additional issues which are discussed in Chapter 10 II. 7., below
books refrain from offering more than a rough sketch that includes broad concepts such as bands, tribes, chiefdoms, kingdoms, and modern states (Kottak 2004, Ch. 9; Bohannan 1992; Wesel 1979). There seems to be no convincing genealogy or a concatenated list of observed possibilities of forms of societal control brought into context with societies, religion, economics, and law. Kottak is correct in pointing out that there are “many correlations between economy and social and political organization”. But more indications, other than general remarks of this kind, are hard to find. Also Eisenstadt, while offering a general theory and some examples, is reluctant to point to regularities, correlates and what he calls “concatened lists”.

To determine, for example, which type of power control is used in a given culture, modes of thought are helpful. The starting point is, as so often, the axial age (see Chapter 5 II. 3, and V.). To repeat its essence: It is the time when belief systems that relate human beings in a tribe- or nation-specific manner to nature (“animism in a wide sense”) become suspect. Axial age means that spirits and gods become confronted with (and possibly get subjected to) a worldwide good-bad ethics (and its societal and legal consequences, among others, for the conception of leadership in control of power, its economic system, its basic religious conceptions, etc.).

In pre-axial-age societies, as we have seen, the typical standard for good and bad is what is viewed to be good and bad from the tribal vantage point. To recall what has been said earlier: Foragers (hunters, gatherers, fishers; Richard Thurnwald: Wildbeuter) collect from nature, and, typically, they do not reproduce. For 99.5% of their history, human beings lived in this state. When a group becomes too numerous so that hunting, gathering and fishing became unproductive, the group is ripe for a split. Herders, horticulturalists, and farmers reproduce and thus are able to save and to store storable produce. In herder, horticulturalist, and early farmers’ settings, the importance of property increases considerably. The cultural step of being able to reproduce and thus be more independent of hunger is called the Neolithic revolution (Childe 1925, 1942, 1950, 1975) Usable land and access to it by trails become assets. With more durable property, there is wealth (and poverty) and influence (and lack of it). Wealth can be accumulated in family, lineage, or clan by saving, storing, marriage, or inheritance. For demographic and territorial reasons, especially lineage and clan leadership may develop into chieftaincy and inheritable kingdom. The next “revolution” in V.G. Childe’s sense, the “urban”, is characterized by separation of labor: Not everyone does everything anymore for her or his life support. There are now farmers, blacksmiths, tanners, potters, traders, etc. This induces separation of cities from the surrounding countryside. Such centers develop into marketplaces which require a market police. The military, and its finance by taxes, add more power to the leading clan or clans, and their leaders may be called paramount chiefs or kings.

All these changes in livelihood and lifestyle must leave their imprint upon government, economy, family systems, and religious attitudes. Pre-axial age societies rely on two tests for the identification of recommendable behavior: on consensus, and on big man or chieftain leadership. Foraging societies prefer big men over chieftains, for reasons just mentioned. Inversely, big men are to be found in reproducing societies, due to an effect of societal inertia. The “urban revolution” with its incipient separation of labor logically calls for a type of leadership that profits from the “superaddition principle”. It implies that the whole is more than the sum of the parts; because ideally now the professions have to cooperate. In post-axial-age societies, the culture of power and of its control is even more diversified. Childe’s two revolutions point the way of interpretation: There are even three consecutive “revolutions”, the neolithic, the urban, and the axial age. As remarked, the core of the axial age cultural revolution is the replacement of behavioral guidance by spirits and gods through an ethical standard of good and bad. Humans begin to mentally reflect and doubt guiding rules for their behavior independently from the supranatural. Pre-axial age “religious types” are defining the belief systems of single tribes or nations. Post-axial age “total religions” address the whole known world.
This poses two questions to human understanding of societal control of power: How does the disrespect of spirits and deities, the loss of animist awe, influence that understanding and promote it to a new quality? What are the building blocks, if any, of pre-axial age society and leadership that may be retained, by that societal inertia, in a new more secular kind of understanding society and leadership although the axial age has brought about basic changes? The answers to these two questions ought to furnish reasons for the characteristic traits of post-axial age societies, their leadership and power control issues as well as their economic and personal traits of living. For axial-age world-views which propagate detachment from the world, a new interpretation of human society is essentially a non-issue: The world is doomed and has to be overcome. Therefore post-axial age modes of thought recommending world denial will be reluctant to replace pre-axial age societal and leadership patterns by new models and ideals. They will regard leadership as part of the burden to be dropped anyway, and downplay its human importance. Classical Hinduism and Buddhism in many of their directions and factions give examples for this attitude: Their thinking about society and leadership does not tend to produce new guidelines, but due to societal inertia rather retains the pre-axial-age models, and maybe add to them a disinterested interpretation. Eisenstadt’s description of Indian (Hindu) civilization demonstrates this fragmented control of power by a diffuse culture. It should be added that this culture contains elements of pre-axial-age polytheism and post-axial-age world denial. Confucianism, a basically sceptical view of human society and leadership as inevitable burdens, adds wise, practical, and mildly distanced advice how to abstinent deal with power. Thus, even after the axial age, predominantly world-denying or world-sceptical modes of thought often retain chieftain, king, or one-“party” leadership. Examples are China, India, Myanmar, Thailand, and to some extent Japan, whereas Nepal is about to drop traditional monarchy.

In confirmation of the theory of correlates, this is different for world-attached axial-age world views. Here the consensus tradition is being confronted with a principled doubt whether the result of consensus is good or bad under an ethical standard that no longer flows from tribal, or national, expediency. Leadership by a big man, chieftain, or king finds itself exposed to the same critique. But what is the “concatenated” standard to be? The obvious bridge from axial-age ethics to decision-making is voting: Generally convincing tribal and national backing is no longer available. Instead, true and false, good and bad, right and wrong, become standards of general, comparable meaning. Different people may have different opinions about these judgments. A logical way to world-attached decision-making is majority rule. This was the rule in Greek city states, in some organs of the Roman Republic, and is reported by Tacitus (animist) Germanic tribes. In ancient Greece, voting was introduced under the influence of the egalitarian philosophy of the Tragic Mind. As for leading families, lineages and clans, a radical axial-age solution would have been to deprive them of power. Leaders were held accountable by members of the city state. The Greek polis made frequent use of this device to keep actual and possible tyrants at bay. In this manner, older forms of societal ordering were sometimes respected, but at any rate fundamentally remodelled under the impact of secular axial age ethics. Wherever the axial-age revolution took place without the introduction of a value-founded pledge-of-faith system, totalitarian leadership patterns were installed based on “correct consciousness”.

The Franks, Middle European egalitarian farming and river-trading people, were used to voting, and sworn together by a pledge-of-faith system among the vassals and between non-noble lords and vassals. A direct borrowing from Ancient Greece seems unlikely. This is why Eisenstadt is basically right in characterizing the “European Complex” by its decentralized but effective control of political power. Outside of this region, in the Near East, Africa, and South Asia, Christian mission did not change much of pre-axial-age leadership and power control, and their essentials – described above under A. – still prevail today. Apparently to be this-worldly effective, Christian mission cannot jump the Tragic Mind or a comparable organizational structure equipped with superaddition. This is logical because of the central role of the synagogue for the establishment of the Christian
community. The Apostle Paul apparently calculated very well when he depicted, in his letter to the Romans, Christianity as an antithesis to, or derivative of, the Tragic Mind (as a belief system that accepts failure regardless of best intentions), Letter to the Romans Ch. 7..

The remaining part of the question how government, economy, and belief system may be correlated refers to the areas of the world, where the axial-age revolution took place, but a value-based pledge-of-faith system was not introduced. This is the combination of axial-age revolution plus absence of polis, republic, or Genossenschaft. It is not difficult to give a theoretical answer (and again empiry confirms theory): The relevant post-axial-age belief system has to furnish a “religious” solution, because there is no secular one in the offer. The ideas of society and leadership have to be derived from the belief system itself. In short, religion serves as a guide to leadership. Theocracy - a combination of monotheism and human dictatorship - is one radical model of this sort. Christian orthodoxy is able to give more examples. Secular totalitarianisms such as Marxism derive their societal and cultural control models from their underlying value system: the Marxian use value cannot be discussed, and thus only be high-handedly (“scientifically”) filled with contents. This requires an anti-pluralist society led by political dictatorship. The same holds true for nationalistic, racist (“blood and soil”), iustum pretium, God-willing-conditioned, radical-Calvinist-predestination fixed, orthodox, discursive-competence-defined, “rational” and other debate-removed or interpretation-monopolized value systems. The practical performance of dictatorship orients itself at a timeless determinism that “victory is ours”, “God with us” and “world revolution is certain to come,” illogically but psychologically fused with exhortations to act.

The result is that – while cultures are manifold and pluralist - correlates exist and “concatenations” can be posited. Their main causal factors are Childe’s “revolutions”, the axial age, societal inertia, and the principle of superaddition. Only when these (or other, equivalent ) factors are ignored or denied, can any form of cultural determinism be discarded. There is consequence in culture, some synepeia (Chapter 6).

V. Liminality. Rites de passages. Sodalities. Stratification

Limen means border, separation. Liminality is the phenomenon of having interior groupings or categorizations within a society defined by certain stages, age periods, or events. Liminal stages in Western life are, e.g, baptism, confirmation, bar-mizwa, wedding, retirement, Last Rites (Krankensegnung).

Numerous cultures may have more and stricter defined liminal groups. The Andamans are said to have: twentythree liminal stages. Within each liminal category, special rules, permissive or certain obligatory behavior are usually attributed. In Hopi culture, for example, up to the age of 35, a male member of the tribe may be permitted to lead a flexible, not so steady life. But after 35, a male person is expected to behave in a settled, reliable manner, speak clearly and reasonably, and be a useful member of the tribe. In Suebia, a southwestern part of Germany, a proverb says that a Suebian gets wise at 40 (and not before).

Stepping from one liminal stage into the next is often accompanied by rites of passage (rites de passage). Initiation rites are a frequent type of liminal occurrences. In some cultures, rites of

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passage continue after death, for example, when funerals are divided into several stages. Among the Ojibway, a deceased person is assumed to stay around for four days to regulate things that remained undone when still alive, such as an apology. The still soul of the deceased lives in a little wooden hut and receives food and drink from those left behind for four days. In parts of Germany, after a person’s death, a three-days period is observed during which the deceased is believed to be “still there”. Also, the southern German custom of Aussegnung (Last Blessing for a deceased person), often celebrated in a last-blessing hall on the cemetery and to be done while the corpse is “still warm”) indicates the belief in a post-mortem liminal stage.

Rites grant power to those who are licensed to perform them, and who how to perform them. A shaman is respected because he is a master of rites to be performed. The power of the Egyptian and Brahman priests rests in their esoteric knowledge. In Europe, for the Christian churches it is of essential importance to retain possession of rites connected with liminal stages: Baptism after birth, confirmation around puberty, wedding celebration, Last Rites or corresponding ritual. Often these rites are the only stable connection between the church and their members.

Liminal events and rites of passage are often celebrated collectively, for instance all members of an age group. The young warriors of a tribe may be collectively initiated, and later remember their entering into the sodality of defenders of their tribe with pride. At this point, liminality meets sodality. Students recall their commencement day. In many countries, navy officers observe a special respect for and feeling of belonging to the “crew of the year”. Thus, liminality may create sodalities, also called “societies”, such as the clown societies in the Pueblos of the Northamerican Southwest. Fraternities and sororities have their rites of initiation, and advancements (Fuchs, Bursch, etc.).

Liminal stages need not, but may generate higher and lower classes within the population: The initiated ones have more duties and, by fulfilling them, more rights than average tribal members, guests or outsiders living in the tribe. In a Bavarian countryside inn, choice of seats is always free but you better do not sit down at the regular’s table (“Stammtisch”), lest the innkeeper ask you to take your seat “over there”. The regular’s table is for the voluntary fire squad, the pharmacist, the rifle association members, or the local priest.

Another link of liminality is to stratification. In sociology and anthropology, stratification has often been treated as a uniform societal quality of a group of people. Put simply, stratification means that there are rich people and poor people, leading circles and commoners, etc. However, depending on the neolithic and the urban revolution, there are different kinds of societal stratification:

As a consequence of reproduction there is possession and property, and hence the differentiation of rich and poor families, reinforced by hereditary succession. These families will be the ones who claim chiefship. The keyword for this could be wealth stratification.


170 I thank Hans Borchardt for a thoughtful exchange on this issue.

171 See notes 720 ff., above


173 Among the White Mountain Apache in Arizona, the number of sundances (initiation rites for girls becoming young women) is increasing steadily. Instead of being forgotten, the liminal event contributes to
Separation of work goes hand in hand with an increase of functions within a society. This induces *functional stratification*. Both kinds of stratification may mutually reinforce each other, and castes may result. To equalize wealth stratification, the remedy is redistribution; to equalize stratification of functions, the remedy is open access to offices and a reexamination of functions.

VI. Anthropological lessons for Europe

1. A cooperative called Europe

In 1952, the European Community of Coal and Steel was founded for six European care states: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg (“Montan-Union”). It was followed in 1958 by the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Community. Together, these treaties have been called “Rome Treaties”. The organizational structure of these three unions of joint political and economic purposes provided for each a parliament, consisting of six nation states as members (called Council of Ministers because it was the meeting place of the six nations’ governments), a Commission as administration, and a Court. Montesquieu’s pattern of separate powers was observed...

The later development of these three communities into a European Union (EU) caused imbalances for this incipiently satisfactory organizational system. The Ministerial Council in daily practice composed of government employees acted more like a second governmental administration next to and in competition with the Commission, so that its parliamentary function was no longer well understood, in public and by the Members themselves. Instead, in a centrifugal manner, the Ministerial Council became more and more the arena for airing the diverse national interests of the 27 members (in 2006). The original Treaties of Rome had provided for a weak “European Parliament” as a body of consultation. The loss of the original function of the Ministerial Council as parliament caused the European Parliament to ask for more power (which it got), in order to better promote the European cause in a centripetal way. Moreover, the loss of political weight of the Ministerial Council made necessary another Council, the European Council, composed of the heads of state of the EU members, taking turns on a six-months basis as political leadership of the EU members.\(^{174}\)

This changed situation led both to the call for a European constitution as well as to the rejection of its draft by two founding members, France and the Netherlands who had held national referendums on the draft (in 2005).

Because of its roots in the Frankish cooperative system, the EU and all of its members are democracies. This holds true even for those areas of Europa where Frankish feudalism and its pledge-of-faith system of horizontal and vertical rights and duties (as mentioned earlier) have never been the law of the land, such as in all Slavic nations (with the exceptions of Slovenia and the Hanse cities) and in the area of the former Saxon tribe which under its dukes never accepted the cooperative model. The way in which the Saxon and Slavic chieftaincy traditions will adapt to the Frankish cooperative model of mutual assistance among the EU Members, accountable organs, and cultural revival. This is a sign for the increase of wealthy families, both in number, and prosperity (communication Ben Chavis 1992).

\(^{174}\) Media keep confounding the Ministerial Council, the European Council, and the Council of Europe (in Strasbourg), a treaty organization of about 50 European states for special, mainly legal, purposes, such as human rights protection; the Council of Europe has also a court.
super-addivity (in a tripolar fashion, see 3., below). will be interesting to observe. The result could be a failure because of the sheer size of non-Frankish background. The accession of the non-Frankish nations to the EU has its historical parallel in Chief Rollo’s taking the feudal oath in 911 A.D. (see below). But Rollo did not represent more than a couple of thousand Danish and Norwegian successfully raiding Vikings. At this point, parallelism ends.

Since the EU itself is beyond any doubt envisaged as a continental democracy, the task of making a European constitution consists in forming one cooperative from several cooperatives. This is what cultural anthropology asks from European constitution-makers today. Logic compels to go either one of the following two roads. Applied anthropology permits speculation because any application requires planning:

(1) Either the citizens of all of the member states become citizens of the EU as the cooperative “on upper level” as well. Then every citizen receives two annual income tax returns per year, one from the home state, the other from Brussels, and every citizen pays taxes twice. This is the consequence of the duty to cooperate in the Frankish model. Then also a European constitution will have to undergo a referendum in all member states, and the majority of all Europeans will have to vote with yes. A model is the USA.

(2) Or the nationals of all member states remain their respective citizens only. Every European pays income tax only once to his home state. The member states finance the “upper” cooperative, called EU. No referendum is needed, nor in conformity with superadditive membership. The accession to the EU is voted upon in the national parliaments. A model is the existing EU since the “Rome Treaties” were signed in 1958.

The commission which prepared the European draft constitution since 2002, headed by Mr. Giscard d’Estaing, was not aware of the above choice and its logic of applied anthropology, nor were the French and Dutch governments when they submitted the draft to referendums. Yet, a decision between the two possibilities should have been made before attempting a EU constitution because the organizational structure of the EU depends on that decision:

In case of double citizenship – option 1 – direct elections to a European parliament are needed. Its task would be – in contrast to the present parliament’s policy – to safeguard the interests of the national Member States and their citizen, thus engaging in the centrifugal task. Since 258 A.D. and times, the budget of the Frankish cooperative – the contributions of free farmers - is decided upon by the members. The same parliament appoints the government as the centripetal force and executor of the budget, and holds the government accountable. For the European citizen, European politics would be something foreign from his home state, almost politics from another star. A tradition such as the one attached to the US model is not available.

In case of single citizenship – option 2 – the carriers of the EU are its member states, not their citizens. The European Parliament, in conformity with the current state of affairs, is be composed by members of the national parliaments. These parliamentarians would have to travel between the seat of their national parliaments and the European Parliament in Strassburg, to and fro, theoretically every day when either one of the two convenes. As the times of the Frankish assembly, the “thing”, are over, when there was a meeting once a year or several times per year, the European parliamentarian’s

or according to the Dutch prime minister Mr. Balkenende’s proposal a constitution-replacing treaty among the participating nations with self-executing rights and duties of all European nationals.

See III.  &. and text following note 759, above. For centuries, Franks was a synonym for middle-Europeans, and the lingua franca was the language of common usage.
workload would be close to unbearable. It would be more sensible to elect a pair of two parliamentarians of each party in every voting district, one for the national capital, one for Europe. This enables national politics along with European politics, adjustable, debatable, and accessible because close to the citizens home. The task of the European Parliament is centrifugal control of the European Government that is composed of delegates from the national governments, whose task in turn is centripetal promotion of European goals. The European Government replaces the Ministerial Council, the Commission and the European Council. It is accountable to the European Parliament.

The European Court of Justice may institutionally remain as is. However, it has to become a fair arbiter between centrifugal and centripetal interests, instead of deciding unilaterally – as it does now – “when in doubt, in favor of Europe”. This is a cultural anthropological lesson for present-day Europe and its greatest need: a constitution and a readjustment of the centrifugality and centripetality of its organs.

2. Slavic chiefdom and the Brezhnev doctrine

As mentioned above, historically no Slavic tribe except the Slovenes ever accepted the Frankish pledge-of-faith principle of cooperate organization. Most Slavic tribes seem to have preferred chiefship, both in ecclesiastical and in secular contexts. Feudal horizontality as well as vertical vassality as expressions of mutual relationship of service and protection between lord and vassal with corresponding rights and duties, and the concept of a cooperative entity as superadditive organization with consequential accountability of the lord were either unknown or intentionally suppressed (as in Nowgorod and Pskow by Czar Ivan Grosny).

In ethnocentric manner, leadership by a chief was turned to the outside of the country to subjugate peoples and to claim the right of peaceful or warlike intervention in other countries whenever this seemed favorable to Russia or the Russian chief, the Czar. This is the foundation of Russian foreign policy at least since Peter the Great. Bismarck, Prussian ambassador to Russia, criticized this intervention-oriented foreign policy (“Ich habe dem Eisbären in die Augen geschaut” (I looked into the icebear’s eyes)). Bismarck’s European peace policy (Re-Insurance Treaty, Rückversicherungsvertrag) may have been drafted under the influence of his observation as ambassador. Lenin used the traditional concept of Russia’s right of intervention in foreign countries for his addition of “imperialism theory” to Marxism: class struggle does not only take place with historical necessity between dominant and expropriated classes, but also between the rich imperial European powers and poor countries in other regions of the world. Lenin claimed the right to intervene in such poor countries in order to fight, in support of local insurgents, against Western colonialism. The competence to define the kind of socialism the insurgents are to fight for rests with the leaders of Russian socialism. Stalin incorporated this theory of the right of intervention in other countries for self-defined purposes in Art. 28 to 31 of the “Stalin Constitution” of 1936.


178 E.g., Hans-Joachim Torke, Einführung in die Geschichte Russlands, Munich 1997: C.H. Beck, 37, 39, 47, 249 f., 252 f.; repeatedly, Torke stresses that Russian governments never acknowledged mutual trust relationships between the Lords and the vassals. “Vassaldom as it existed in the Western European feudal system was unknown”, at 37, 47. On Russian policies of expansion see, e.g., Juri Semjonow, Die Eroberung Sibiriens, Berlin 1937: Deutscher Verlag.

179 Details in W. Fikentscher (1976), 578.
Stalin’s death, the doctrine received the name “Breshnjew Doctrine” because Leonid Brezhnev repeatedly validated it as base of the foreign policy of the “Socialist Camp” under Soviet Russian chiefship.\textsuperscript{180}

In 1992, on a study tour to Moscow arranged by the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research to empirically observe the legal and economic changes after the dissolution of the Soviet empire,\textsuperscript{181} I asked the Russian professor of international law and diplomacy, Gennady M. Danilenko: “What happened to the Breshnjew doctrine after 1990?” In addition to his professorship, G. M. Danilenko served country as a diplomat. His answer was: “Of course, the Breshnjew doctrine is still in force. Russia assumes the right to intervene in foreign countries whenever this is in Russia’s interest”. I expressed my shock, sensing that he did not understand why I was shocked.

3. Bipolar and Tripolar Democracy

a. Bipolar democracy is characterized by a lack of separation of government and state, tripolar democracy is defined by their separation. The distinction goes back to the cultural borrowing of superaddition from the Franks by the Normans. The distinction is still of practical importance. In brief, history went like this:

b..It was mentioned that Scandinavian peoples, called Normans (northmen), or Vikings (villagers), mostly Danes, accompanied by Norwegians, attacked Frankish territories beginning in 834 A.D. sailing upstream on Frankish rivers (Rhine, Maas, Seine). The Normans had chiefs (dukes). A horizontal-vertical governmental system such as the land’s peace and pledge-of-faith system was foreign to them. In this, they might be compared to Northamerican Indian tribes and the Bedouin tribes of Prophet Mohammed’s time, a.s. The Norman thrust was such that large parts of Frankish land soon fell into Normans’ hands. In church, the Lord’s Prayer was amended during that time by the words: \textit{et delibera nos de furore Normannorum} (and save us from the Normans’ furor).

The Normans were obviously impressed by the efficiency of the superadditive unit that permitted horizontal peaceful cooperation and held leaders vertically accountable. In 911 A.D., the (militarily superior) Norman Duke Rollo swore the \textit{Frankish} oath of pledge-of-faith to the King of the Franks Charles the Numskull, apparently in order to constitutionally integrate the Normans into the Frankish governmental system. Hereby a chieftain became an accountable organ, and the chieftain’s followers turned members. Equipped with the Frankish pledge-of-faith system, the Norman William the Conquerer crossed the Channel in 1066 A. D., introducing the Franks’ way of having a constitution in England. The Battle of Hastings proved the superiority of the Frankish cooperative over Anglian chieftaincy.\textsuperscript{182}

However, the borrowing was not complete.\textsuperscript{183} True, the cooperative system as brought from France


\textsuperscript{182} On borrowing as a form of culture contact, see Chapter 5 VI. 3. a., above.

\textsuperscript{183} A more elaborate treatment of this subject in W. Fikentscher, Staat vs. Government – eine
to England, and later from there to the US and other parts of the world, starts from the superadditive manner of having a unit which is more than the combination of social contract and contract of government. But superaddition can be understood in two different ways: (1) either as a unit that is in essence separated from societal forces forming, in modern terminology, a moral person, also called corporation, equipped with organs who feel that they are responsible to that corporation; (2) or as a unit that is represented by the respective majority of its constituting parts (the members), although conceptionally distinct from those parts.

c. The first - tripolar - idea of superaddition took shape as the concept for the modern state in the European Continental sense. It commands a “raison d’état”. It can pose tasks that outlast periods of administration. Its organs will not be changed when majorities within the will-forming process of the corporation change. If after an election the opposition takes over, public employees remain in the positions they have been appointed to up to and including the rank of Ministerialdirektor, that is, one rank below the vice secretary of a ministry. Although these officials know that after the election the political goals will change, they serve these goals because they feel loyal to the entity, not to a party line. The government itself, the cabinet, is not a commission of the Party in power, but an organ of the state as an abstract unit. There are human rights and claims (in the Hohfeldian sense) that are to be directed directly against the corporation, that superadditive entity, so-called “subjective public rights”. Defendant of these rights and claims is the entity called “state”, not as in the British system one of its officials or functionaries. Everyone who comes in contact with this “state” such as a Chinese passenger arriving from Hongkong or JFK, or a stateless combattant, or a Guantanamo inmate, has rights and claims against this entity “state”. There is no need for a special legal provision enabling such a plaintiff to sue that “state”, because the “King - the state through its organs - can do wrong”. And if there is a “public wrong” (Amtshaftung), “the state” will compensate the injured plaintiff (§ 839 Civil Code, Art. 34 Constitution), and have recourse against the public employee only in grave cases, so that the public employee may feel free to take action in the interest of the concerned person (for example in cases of discretion). “Civil courage” (in Bismarck’s sense), responsibly exercised, of public employees is favored.

d. The second – bipolar – idea of superaddition developed in the Normanic-Angloamerican sphere. There is no particular “raison d´état”. The goals set for the superadditive entity loose their obligatory character together with the next election. Its organs change with majorities. The

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184 Contra: Horst Ehmke, Wirtschaft und Verfassung. Die Verfassungsrechtsprechung des Supreme Court zur Wirtschaftsregulierung. Karlsruhe 1961: C.F. Müller; Ehmke’s proposals were not successful.

185 Cf., Art. 19 (4) of the German constitution. The lack of a provision like Art. 19 (4) German Constitution (everyone – also a foreign national – may claim her or his rights against public authorities including the right to sue) in the UK and USA is due to the difference between the Frankish and the Norman cooperative. The Norman type of democracy gives no inherent rights to the commoner against the lord (because “the King can do no wrong”). From constitutional history it follows, e.g., that US authorities may bar non-US citizens from entering the US, confront them with the choice between being detained or sent home on the next plane, without revealing reasons, accepting an appeal, or granting a right to call the traveller’s next consular office, Nina Bernstein, …… Scholar Barred From U.S., but No One Will Tell Her Why, NYT of 9/17/2007, 17, involving the case of a British professor teaching at a California college, whose visa was revoked because of administrative discretion, no explanation given.
government is a committee of the party in power, and the loyalty of the organs is owed to that party. Subjective public rights, if recognized at all, are to be directed against organs, not against the entity, in the British system one of its officials or functionaries. There is no third partner to be identified as “state”. There are the people and their government, in a bipolar relation. Somebody who comes in contact with the government or one of its organs has no rights or claims unless legal provisions grant them, because in principle and absent appropriate legislation, the “King can do no wrong”.

Since there is no public liability as a general principle, an Angloamerican public employee (especially in the US) - absent an abstract “state” as a third partner and protector as liability cover - will be afraid of violating the limits of democratic authorization and rather deny the concerned person’s request (especially in cases of discretion). This makes – in particular US – administration often so cumbersome and running dry.

A linguistic implication of the difference between the (bilateral) government- and the (trilateral) state-oriented democracy is the lacking translatability of the German word *verwalten*. In the Frankish tradition, the state *regiert* and the government *verwaltet*. In the Normannic tradition, the verb for both activities is the same: administer. In the US, there is talk of the “Bush administration” and of the INS or IRS “administration”. In Germany, Frau Merkel as the head of *government regiert*, but nobody would speak of *Einwanderungs- oder Steuerregierung*. The activities concerning immigration and taxes belong to the *Verwaltung* of the *state*. Behind the difference in expression, there is a noticeable difference in feeling responsible: an administrator is politically bound, a *Verwalter* is politically free. The Frankish system takes the separation of powers more seriously.

e. Both options are variations of superaddition. Superaddition is the common denominator. But the differences between the options need be seen (f. and g.). By the principle of superaddition over-arching units become conceivable. Toward the inside of the superadditive unit this means cooperative organization in the true sense: the whole is more than the sum of the parts, and the parts acquire membership role as in an assembly. Instead of seeking consensus, the members vote. There is a majority and one or several minorities. Next time, the minority may take over the lead by winning more votes and become the majority. The concept of time as a straight line is essential. Leaders become organs of that unit, to be held accountable by the governed ones, or by their superiors who again are organs (Romans 13, 1: archontes, literally: city fathers; instead of Luke 22. 25, 26: exousia = overlords, warlords). The symbol is, as has been noted above, budget day. Membership creates subjective rights, that is, rights between the individuals, and between the individuals and the unit represented by the organs. Superaddition creates a law made up of those subjective rights. This implies tolerance of different opinions, a basis to rely on, and long-range trust between the individual members under that law. The state becomes such an entity, and this entity is more than mere government. In a democracy, if the representatives come from the different parts of the country in order to represent the latterand not more, you have a government, but not a state in the tradition of the Frankish cooperative. If these representatives try to represent the whole as being more than the sum of the parts, there emerges a superadditive state, a state in the true sense of its meaning. This implies not only judicial review of norms promulgated by that state, a consequence Chief Justice John Marshall has drawn in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803), but also judicial review of all state activities related to law including administrative acts (*Verwaltungsakte*), a consequence the German constitution of 1949 reflects in its Art. 19 (4), thus rejecting the enumeration principle based on the rules of “the king can do no wrong”, act of state and sovereign immunity. There is a slight difference between rule of law and *Rechtsstaat*.

f. In a *Rechtsstaat* the protection of minority positions is more important than listening to the majority.186 Sovereign immunity, state action, and act of state doctrine as legal means of

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immunizing government against private or public claims are not in use or limited to international public law.\textsuperscript{187} Being at war with another state means warfare of one state against the other, and for their citizens a \textit{res inter alienos gesta}. The war does not take place between the peoples of the states involved. In war, the peoples of the warring states suffer, indiscriminately.\textsuperscript{188} Private property of citizens of warfaring states is left untouched. States at war are reluctant to expropriate it. Foreign languages to be taught at school will continue to be taught because a language has nothing to do with states engaged in atwar. Collateral damages ought to be compensated.

g. In peace and war, this (c. – f.), is the Frankish model of state and democracy. It can also be named the Continental model.\textsuperscript{189} Another expression could be ”state principle”. The state principle works tripolar: The people elect a government, and the government is in charge of the state.

Things are different when the superadditive entity belongs, so to speak, to the temporary possessions of the majority of the parts of which the entity is composed. This is the Normannic, or Angloamerican, model of state and democracy. It could be called the “governmental principle”. It works bipolar: The people elect a government, and here the number of engaged entities stops. The Normannic derivation from the Frankish cooperative system says “\textit{e pluribus unum}”. Franks would have said: “\textit{e pluribus magis quam unum quod est fides mutua}”. In the Normannic tradition, ”the state” is not a third entity in addition to members and organs. Rather, the word “state” means a concrete something, for example the state of Ohio, or Michigan. Now the winner takes all because there is no “raison d’état”,\textsuperscript{190} but a public policy pursued by the party in charge. It goes without saying that loyalty is owed to “the country” or “the Crown”, or “England” (Lord Nelson: “England expects everyone to do his duty”), and these and similar concepts represent the superadditive unit. But an element of Norman chieftaincy remains in this form of superaddition. Public officials and employees serve the governing party, not the state as an entity by itself. Therefore, in principle and largely in fact too, all officials change with the governments.*The public employee serves a supervisor, not the state as an abstract entity. When a public employee in USA is asked to give an information, the applicant in front of the window is likely to hear that notorious “Don’t ask me, I’m just working here”.Listening to the majority is more important than protecting the minorities against the majority. It is harder to put into effect programs that outlast the election period, to the dismay of attachés and foreign experts who may look into a different face and talk a different idiom when discussing an international issue from last year’s agenda. USA’s enemies from timeless cultures rejoice and just wait for the upcoming election. The government itself is a kind of commission or body of the successful party or parties. In short, the Normannic democracy works top-down from a government, the Frankish democracy bottom-up to an abstract entity called state.*


\textsuperscript{188} Johann Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen, Simplicius Simplicissimus, 1668.

\textsuperscript{189} Of course, sad exceptions occurred and occur. Hitler wanted to teach that the whole nation is at war with another. Nazi propaganda pushed the idea of \textit{Volkskrieg} (people’s war). The Nazis did not completely succeed. Education in English and French took place as usual, also during World War II 1939 - 1945, SS officers married Russian girls in pompous Russian weddings, and German GI’s cheered when they were announced to be sent to the Western front: they saw a chance to get “to the Californian hospitals” (\textit{Auf in die kalifornischen Lazarette!}) (personal experiences resp.communications 1944/5).

\textsuperscript{190} See note 767, above.
The peculiarities of the British parliamentary system including the exchange of the prime minister when he or she loses support in the own party follow from the “Normannic” tradition. So do the absence of exchange of opinion between the lonely president and his secretaries in the US government and the lack of a cabinet.* Remedies for “public wrong” have to be enumerated by statute. *There is no “general clause” of state liability typified by Art 19 al. 4 German constitution.* Still in principle the king can do no wrong. In the same manner in which a citizen is responsible to the own government in peace time, she or he is held responsible by that “government” in its international relations including warfare against other governments.191 The march from Atlanta to the coast at the end of the Civil War 1862 – 65 was warfare against the own population. An Angloamerican traditional principle is to expropriate “enemy property”.192

h. The principle of “separation of state and church” takes different forms when a state is recognized next to the government, or not: The less “state” besides “government”, the stricter the separation of state and church has to be, because an instance of law and certainty begins to disappear that can act in a neutral manner in view of political positions of the government. The more there is of a “state” next to a “government”, the easier border-crossing compromises are possible. The strict separation of state and church in USA is a consequence of the “government principle” in which the government (“the king”) has a stronger, less accountable position. It is perhaps indicative that in the Frankish tradition one of the underlying ideas of forming a superadditive entity, the duty to keep peace among the members, is called “the land’s peace”, whereas in the Normannic tradition it is called “the King’s peace”, a term referring rather to the lord than to the community of the vassals.

This can be expanded to an even broader statement: The more “state” there is besides “government”, in other words, the stronger a tripolarity works against a bipolarity, the more there is “Rechtsstaat” and the less a governmental fiat. The distinction between a tripolar Continental democracy and bipolar Angloamerican democracy is of immediate influence on the role of the “Rechtsstaat”. Usually, Rechtsstaat is translated by “rule of law”. But rule of law does not require a Rechtsstaat because it requires no Staat, no state (in the Continental sense). Rule of law means only that the government is bound by law. It does not purport that besides a government there is a third entity, the state, monitoring whether or not the government abides with the law. The tripolar system, that in which the people elects a government to run the state as a superadditive entity, is able to grant much more protection against fiat and arbitrary action by that government to that people.

i. These days, in political debate whether democracy can, or should, be “exported”, i.e., made accessible to nations that venture to try self-government instead of dictatorship, the distinction between Continental (originally Frankish) and Angloamerican (originally Normannic) democracy is of great importance. What these nations, aspiring to democracy, need is Rechtsstaat, not “mere” rule of law (as well-intended as the latter may be), because having rights and claims against any public action is the essence of trust and reliance. The opposite position (the “mere” - rule of law

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191 In 1944, having been drafted as a flak-helper at the age of 15, I was treated in a military hospital against several health defects. In the area, a British bomber had been shot down. An injured crew member was carried to the same hospital and taken care of. He got a room for himself (which was exceptional, we all lay in eight to ten bed rooms). The Briton, a young fellow, steadfastly refused to talk to anyone, and to cooperate in the healing process. The hospital doctors who were military officers of some rank, asked me to cheer him up with my highschool English. I attempted repeatedly, mentioning his family, his home town, the Bavarian countryside, food and drink, the weather – all in vain. All friendly advances were refused. He regarded me as a non-person. Finally, I gave up, at that time not understanding what was going on. Had somebody told him to keep silent when talking to Germans? Did he suspect that I was a spy trying to interrogate him? Was I an enemy for him, or he for me, or were we both each others’ enemy? I hope he got home safely.

192 For wartime consent decrees based on that principle, see S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Federal Anti-Trust Laws: Trade Regulation, St. Paul, Miinn. 1948: West Publ., 988 – 1012.
says “the King is under the law, but he can do no wrong”. For democracy-aspiring countries, this is difficult to understand. The principle that a modern government is liable to carry public responsibility, even hidden in heterogeneous statutes, is weakened if the legislator introduces the Angloamerican consequences of “state action”, “act of state”, “sovereign immunity,” and broadly interpreted “political question”, too.. The gist of Frankish-Continental democracy is the opposite: general, not selective, accountability of government/state/sovereign/crown. It is the export of the state-conscious, government-accountable Continental democracy, not of the government-dependent Angloamerican variety that would help the recipients better. The desire of the US-Americans to democratize other nations, for example in the Near East or in South America, confounds the two concepts of democracy. Moreover, it confounds democracy and Rechtsstaat. Needed is a Rechtsstaat (and not just the rule of law), meaning legally accountable, court-subjected government absent, on the basis of a general constitutionally secured principle, instead of statutory enumeration, and free from hierarchy-focused exceptions. Once Rechtsstaat is safely secured and internalized, the democracy-aspiring countries need democracy of the Frankish type.

j. The outside effects of polis/Genossenschaft as a superadditive means of structuring society are underresearched. Outside effects of superaddition include issues such as representation vis-vis third partners, treaty power, piercing the corporate veil, and financing structure (Finanzausgleich) The inside – horizontally pledging to keep peace and vertically to hold leaders responsible – is so interesting that authorities are kept busy studying it. But Genossenschaften must have important outside effects, too. Most of all, outside nations are interested in the King’s Peace pledge inside. This invites outsiders to join by taking the oath (Chief Rollo’s example; see above). Exactly this is the reason why the Franks between 500 and 800 A.D. succeeded in uniting Europe from the British Channel to Croatia (“Franka Gora” near Zagreb) and from Denmark to Sicily. As remarked above, the Franks did not ‘conquer’ this huge area alone.. The others came to join. This required an active foreign policy. At this point, the distinction between the original Frankish Genossenschaft and its Normannic derivative that shaped Britain and USA is gaining weight. The Normannic version is more centralist and leadership-shaped, perhaps because of societal inertia. Some consequences of this have been discussed before. Here is another difference: Angloamerican democracy is less outside policy oriented. In his book “On War”, the Prussian general and philosopher Carl von Clausewitz (1780 – 1834) taught that war has always to be accompanied by negotiations between the parties because war is only a function of politics.. This excludes a warfare for unconditional surrender as asked from the opponent. Normannic/Angloamerican warfare has followed the principle of asking for unconditional a. surrender and almost never engages in negotiations parallel to belligerent actions.

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195 See notes 301 and 361, above

196 Many differences have their reasons in the contrast between bipolarism of people and government (Normannic-Angloamerican version) and tripolarism of people, government, and state (Frankish-European Continental version).

197 Unconditional surrender of Germany was stipulated in 1943 by Roosevelt and Churchil in Casablanca, George Szekeres, Das Recht der Militärregierung, Erlanger Vorlesungshefte, Erlangen 1948: Dipax-Verlag, 32.
For instance, negotiating with the Taliban while fighting them seems inconceivable to Angloamericans. Cultural anthropology would deem this refusal to be ethnocentric, and instead call for a comparative study of the relationship between war and bargaining in the various modes of thought. When in 2007 Germany was asked to contribute Tornado reconnaissance planes to an anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan it would have been the opportunity of the German government to reciprocate the demand by insisting on an examination of chances for bargaining talks with the Taliban parallel to the ongoing warfare, talks that had indeed been offered from the Taliban side through mediators in Kabul. Such reciprocation would have made it more difficult for terrorists to abuse the Tornado mission as a pretext for anti-German attacks. If peace keeping and peace restoring activities are planned by international treaty organizations it is, because of the internationality of the effort, important not to follow the culturally specific war theories of only one or two of the treaty members.

VII. Anthropological Lessons for Islam

“Export of democracy” is a subject bordering on Near Eastern and other global issues, notably connected with Islam. How do leadership issues of Islam fit into anthropological concepts of bigmanship, chiefship, and cooperative?

Islam, a post-axial-age mode of thought and a religion at the same time, does not focus on developing society and leadership models but rather restricts itself to timeless dogmatic tenets. It assigns to the ummah (the Islamic congregation) the pre-axial age consensus model, identifying the ummah’s opinion as infallible instruction: Hereby, the (axial-age-related epistemological) difficulties of the consensus principle (Surah 3.106, 3.110 in M. Henning’s transl. 1960 = 3.110, 3.114 in R.Paret’s transl., 5th ed. Stuttgart 1989) are not reflected. Rather, the pre-axial-age chieftain principle essentially remains untouched so that, unlike the axial-age changes brought about by polis and Genossenschaft, a value-related accountability of political leaders as organs cannot be assumed. In concordance with Islam’s egalitarianism, leaders are addressed as ordinary believers and participants of the ummah. S.N. Eisenstadt’s description of Islamic essential non-control of societal power - outside of ummah status - comes to a correct judgment.198 The outcome is an ethically largely open (Rohe 2001), timeless (in the sense of time as a straight line) society, obligated to engage in activity (jihad), under ummah-qualified “big man”, “chieftain”, “king” or comparable leadership.

Concerning Muslim leadership and political power conceptions Islam as a religion does not contain prescripts for good political behavior or government of men over men.199 All that Islam expects from a good political leader is to grant the Muslim believers enough opportunity and freedom to follow their religious calling in dogmatic and ethical respects.200 Martin Luther wrote an important book on the “Freedom of a Christian Human” (in 1521 A.D.), but stopped short of telling how

198 See note 239, above.


Christian liberty means in political respect. Instead, Luther relied on the existing system of local magnates, particularly the Electors of the Empire, to open for Christian believers to open the political space needed for the exercise of Christian liberty. Similarly, Mohammed, a.s., did not provide, as part of his revelation, a political recipe or structure but relied on the religious reliability of existing tribal or governmental leadership. This was not due to his disinterest in political affairs, but his belief in the all-encompassing authority of monotheism.

From a Western “orientalist” point of view, Muslim governmental practice appears ethnocentric because it uses the concept of political leadership. But polis is a concept specific to the Tragic-Western philosophical tradition and cannot be used to interpret other thought-modal leadership structures. Polis is the cooperative of the city, as much as cooperative is the polis of the countryside. Both concepts imply a structure, as described above in this chapter, of a horizontal layer of pledges-of-faith between members of a superadditive unit combined with a vertical delegation of organs held responsible and accountable. Most of all, polis and cooperative require the concept of time-as-a-straight line, that is, passing time, historical awareness and evolution from the past into the future. This is not Christian. It is heathen, Greek, and Frankish. Christianity lateradded inalienable values, sometimes even rights, to the Frankish cooperative, but not to the Greek polis that ended about 300 B.C. Only in a wider sense can one speak of polis-related subjects in Islam. But this is confusing, and it is not easy to find a word that does justice to both Islam and public leadership. The term “organization” is just as unsuitable because it is also Greek and implies a political whole which is more than the sum of its parts, such as an association of citizens, a city state, or the classic Greek koiné (commonwealth of Greek city states) that has organs like a human body does.. The use of words such as polity, politics, organ or organism for non-Greek-Judaic-Christian assemblies is misleading because they assume an inner structure and an outside-identity which both do not exist. Therefore, in the present discussion, the designations of such assemblies and their leadership will be “group” and “leadership”.

A modern version of the question for the appropriate form of Muslim leadership is whether Islam can or should accept democracy, and how democracy could work in an Islamic country. Khaled Abou El Fadl and others have discussed. El Fadl himself does not think that Islam requires

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201 On the long path from „Freedom of a Christian Human“ via Calvinism, Swiss, Dutch, and German critique of Calvinism, irenism, monarchomachism and Dutch constitutionalism to what may be called a “politically required Christian government”, see W. Fikentscher (1977a), 478 – 638; idem (1997), 178 – 197.

202 See note 796 and material cited there.

203 Still, the Islam world is in need of a book on the “Freedom of a Muslim Human”, but fitting it the 21st century and in contrast to Martin Luther with a final chapter on the political consequences of that freedom. This final chapter ought not just cover the issue of an Islamic democracy, it also would have to draw conclusions from Muslim strict monotheism for any kind of legitimate leadership in Muslim society. As mentioned, the Koran does not seem to contain sufficient binding conclusions.


206 The literature is vast and cannot be reported here. For a recent discussion, see: Khaled Abu El Fadl
democracy, but that Islam can accept democracy as far as “freedom, forgiveness and tolerance and the pursuit of overlapping consensual commitments are virtues that are important to a democracy but……not exclusively Western”. Thus, El Fadl’s answer is a “yes, but”, and placed under certain “conditions”. He holds a middle position between Muslim defenders of and opponents to democracy.

One of the most impressive critical voices in El Fadl’s book is Jeremy Waldron’s: Waldron misses in Islam what he thinks is essential for democracy: “a system of open decision making empowering and facilitating the confrontation between opposed ideas and interests in the context of representation, debate, and voting”. El Fadl disagrees with Waldron. He sees no sense in opposing views and voting on them, but favors freedom of expression, forgiveness, tolerance, and consensus.

Anthropologically - to limit the issue to these two views pars pro toto -, the contradiction between El Fadl and Waldron as to the leadership of human groups can be defined in the following manner: The views disagree about the coming into being of an opinion. El Fadl’s interpretation of Islam has an opinion grow from conciliatory contributions such as freedom of speech, tolerance, forgiving erroneous opinions, and in the search for consensus. An opinion becomes a sound basis for acting when these factors combine. Opinions emptying into this combination are wrong in that they differ by content from the final product.

Here follows an important point: Once the final outcome is reached, the wrong opinions that contributed to the outcome, are still there – though being wrong. Thus, there is still a multiplicity of contradicting opinions. The diverse opinions remain “on the table”. No common will on a level higher than the opinions is formed. There is no procedural technique to eliminate the wrong opinions, at least for a while, because in Islam (and some other belief system who may be similar in this respect) there is no “while”, no ongoing time. Consensus does not work to create an overriding entity because the consenting opinions remain in existence, parallel to each other, in an aspective, not perspective serial order. Consensus is a result laid open on a wide horizontal plain. In order to overcome the flaws of consensus of which volatility is the biggest it is necessary to combine horizontal and vertical elements of will forming. One has to think in terms of a triangle, not in those of a line between two points on a plain. Dialog is such a triangle. To get to it, one has to care for a system of opinions in the first place, not just for a series of opinions. This is the wisdom of Pre-Socratic reductionism. But early Islam adopted Aristotle’s entelechia, the doctrine of the inherent goal and meaning, and not Parmenides’ doctrine of human judgment and Plato’s realism of partly knowable ideas.

For the aspective mind this triangle is inconceivable, The unit is always missed. In international law between Arab nations, “regional solutions” are hardly conceivable. “Road maps” are possible


207 El Fadl op.cit. 111 f.
208 op. cit. p. 111, 128.
209 See the eleven contributors to the El Fadl volume.
210 El Fadl, at 55 – 58 (58).
211 op. cit., at 112.
because they only indicate a malleable direction and only as long as the “road” permits timelessly repeatable changes of the momentous forces involved.

Consensus is the least useful means to reach a result, strange as it sounds, because the other opinions – all “wrong” except one – still exist in opposition of the outcome. This is the reason for proverbial Arab disunity, of short-livedness of consensus results, and of frequent renegotiation of commercial transactions. It is also the reason for what Lawrence Rosen calls “bargaining for reality” as the main epistemological tool for establishing opinions among Muslims. If an imaginary moderator were participating in the consensus-finding process, he could say: “OK, you are right, and you are right, and you are right. But we must come to a result today and this can only be one opinion. Let’s have a vote, and then we have a temporary solution, until next time, when we come together again and have another discussion, and another vote, and then another temporary solution.

However, there is no Muslim moderator of this kind, because in Islam there is no such time, time-as-a-straight line, ongoing time. Why not? Because ongoing time binds time together to an entity, so that there is a unit that can embrace all opinions brought forward, without tolerance, forgivenss and searching for consensus. No voting is possible. With voting there is a majority and one or more minorities. The majority is “right” for a while, and the minorities “wrong” for a while, until the next vote. The majority opinion is a relative truth, a relative reality, until a “better insight” wins (which need not be better), when one of the minorities becomes a majority. But this thinking in ongoing time and contributions by majority and minorities requires that there are entities that are more than the sum of their parts. It requires the convictions of classic Greek city dwellers, or of Frankish farmers, who at that early time in history had never heard of Judaism or Christianity. Superaddition stabilizes opinion making, while avoiding disunity between the contributors of different opinions.

Islam must have serious difficulties with this, because such a procedure goes beyond the consensus of the ummah, re-opens the door of epistemology, establishes opinion-forming units within the ummah and thus some form of a federal structure, and entrusts the single Muslim with rendering judgments devoid of the caveat of Insch-Allah (God willing). This looks like denying Islam the ability to introduce democracy into the Sharia, or any other form of government using representation, debate, and voting (to use Waldron’ words).

It has been said before in the context of the anthropology of leadership that secular totalitarianisms such as Marxism derive their society and cultural control models from their underlying value system: the Marxist use value cannot be discussed, and thus only high-handedly (“scientifically”) be filled with contents. This requires an anti-pluralist society led by political dictatorship. The same holds true for nationalist, racist (“blood and soil”), iustum pretium, discursive-competence-defined, “rational” and other debate-removed values. Also Islam, though not a secular mode of thought is exposed to political dictatorship for lack of available, doubt-subjected, debatable and result-accessible values. Islam, of course, is rich in what is to be called values. But Islamic values are hard to transfer into reality because they cannot be made subject to a Parmenideian judgment or to a Platonic dialog. In Marxism, there is a (Parmenidean) judgment that “use values” (Gebrauchswerte) are just values. This is so because of the concept-immanent inoperationability of use values This inoperationability forces the strongest of the strongmen (the big man within “the top cadres of the metropolises”) to define the contents of the use values.

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212 See notes 231 f., above

Hence, there is no Marxism without dictatorship.

By contrast, in Islam, there is for reasons of a strictly defined (i.e. non-messiah-qualified and thus not inter-humanly effective) monotheism no Parmenidean judgment. There are only competing allegations of truth, good and bad, and esthetics. These allegations have to be weighed against each other and in case of non-agreement bargained about. The strong speakers have to decide among themselves whose allegation is to be followed. The one with the most bargaining power will win the contest of competing allegations.\(^{215}\) As long as his bargaining power will not change, he is the leader. Criticism is anti-Muslim. What for Marxism is the emptiness of the use value that asks for a definition monopoly of the top cadres (and their top politicians) in the metropoles, for Islam is the pre-Parmenidean inconclusiveness of opinion forming that asks for political activism. Both is mode-of-thought-inherent and “system-immanent”. The main difference between Marxism and Islam is that Marxism operates with fabricated truths using Parmenidean judgments, and Islam with successfully bargained truths outside of, and not pretending to use, the Parmenidean judgments. However, there is always at hand what the anthropologist calls culture change.\(^{216}\) It occurs steadily, across time. So which characteristics of Islam would have to undergo culture change in order to make Islamic democracy a reality? There are at least four points:

1. Linear time with a human awareness of history, present and future, seems to be indispensable. Instead of letting time begin with Mohammed, a.s., and end with the closing of the epistemological “gate” around 300 A.H. or 950 A.D. Islamic time ought to be accessible for perspective observation and historical categorization.\(^{217}\) Otherwise parliaments in Islamic countries that meet and work on a timely regular basis it cannot be explained. Since these parliaments exist, they are evidence of culture change taking place. Time may be understood as depending upon the time-creating and time-pervading God, and such time creates trust, and from such trust follows the lack of necessity to bargain truth, morals, and esthetics.

2. Judaic monotheism, historically the model for Islam, grew to an undisputed religious dogma during the time of the Babylonian exile (597 – 538 B.C.). The axial-age dichotomy of good and bad

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\(^{216}\) See Chapter 5 VI, above. The above is a castle-in-the-sky discourse, but at the same time a “negative” checking of statements made before.

on a transnational, comparative scale (replacing the old tribe- and nation-oriented ethical standards) made inevitable a monotheistic God who represents the side of the good. This in turn immediately raised the question of the source of evil in this world (the question of theodicee). Once the good God was identified as an individual, the question arose whether a human being is an individual as opposed to participant of a collective. This search for human individuality is a subject discussed in more than one culture. In the Jewish exile, the synagogue was founded as a membership organization of individuals, replacing the Temple lost in Jerusalem. The issue of theodicee in combination with God’s assumed individuality created the image of the suffering Servant of God. Thucydides developed the theory of the polites as the individual members of the Greek city state. in Ezechiel 18 individual guilt is treated as the appropriate way to punish humans, the Greek tragedians dwelled on the subject in extenso, and Deutero-Isaiah or (if he existed) Trito-Isayah confronts the Jewish nation with the individual believer (Isaiah 63.7 – 64 12).

In sum, one of the most exciting facets and maybe the very essence of the axial time is this: The increased contact between cultures leads to a comparison of the ethics commanded by national spirits, polydaimonisms and polytheisms. The end result is a worldwide standard of good and bad. In the world of spirits and gods, the same comparison leads to monotheism. Then, the monotheistic god is identified with the good, and this is the end of the pre-axial-time gods who are both good and evil. Moreover, the good God, because of his ethical quality, besides his other qualities, takes the features of an individual. This individualistic monotheistic god is necessarily reflected by human individualism, and this is the end of a merely collective responsibility and culpability. For human individualism, Ezechiel 18, Thucydides’ oracles ascribed to Pericles, and the Greek tragedies are relevant texts. The individualization of guilt and responsibility has a double effect: It exonerates the tribe, clan, town (Slavic: mir), lineage, and family. But it places culpability on that (“newly invented”) individual. This creates the issue of theodicee of the good God: Who is causing worldly evil? This calls for an individualized good God who takes care of the evil. While the non-monotheistic Greek leave it at the Tragic fate of humankind, monotheistic Jews believe in the suffering Servant, identical with God and of human nature at the same time: He is the messiah. Whether this Servant-messiah is a part of the Jewish exilant population or a single person can be left open. Thus, Deutero-Isaiah’s repeated announcement of a personalized Servant of God related to himself. Five centuries later, Jesus of Nazareth resumed this relatedness. Therefore, this Jesus must be seen in the context of the search for individuality, by mirroring the individual monotheistic God in the human sphere. The Servant of God is part of the finding of individuality under the aspect of monotheism, comparable to Thucydides’ search for Athenian individuality in a non-monotheistic, polytheistic environment.

Islam shares strict monotheism with Judaism. It cannot escape the reason why a monotheism of the good God was necessary for a Zoroastrian good-bad dichotomical world in which animism (“the

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218 See Chapter 11 IV., below, and text near note 287, above


220 Individualization is no less involved if, as some authorities think, the Servant of God is a circumscription of a group of the exiled Jews who hoped for a return to Jerusalem and were willing to suffer disadvantages for this from Babylonian and Jewish camps. It is not unusual that the image humans make of their god or gods is reflected in a prototype of a human being. This prototype serves as a kind of mediator or messenger of god or gods to humans. Prometheus, Herakles, Hiawatha, coyote, Big Brother and other “tricksters” seem to be a necessary part of the inventory of human need for supranaturality, see ………… The messiah may be the intermediary in a monotheistic religion, as the halfgods of Greek and Roman polytheism came to be intermediaries of their time. Mohammed, a.s., wanted to be seen as a mere human, not as a son of God. But popular belief raised him to an elevated position. The Servant of God in Deutero-Isaiah may have both attributes: the position of the intermediary, and that of the active but suffering individual in front of a monotheistic God that is good. See also Chapter 5 note 326 above.
Gods of Babylon”) had become doubtful. In contrast to Jesus, Mohammed, a.s., never wanted to be identified as “God’s son” and at the same time as a “Son of Man”. Rather, he insisted to be no more than a human prophet – the last in a series of God-sent prophets. The reverence shown to the Prophet proves that the acceptance of an individualistic monotheistic God induces believers to look for such an outstanding messenger, and - more important: - to look for human individuality.\textsuperscript{221} Thus, the denial of a messiah in Islam has logical consequences: the denial of personal culpability and the collectivity of guilt and responsibilities. Allah’s infinite almightiness prevents individual humans to act in direction of self-set – albeit doubtful – goals: hence the difficulties of cooperation and cooperation-directed dialog, leaving a felt certain lack of opportunities for cooperation and communication. But \textit{jihad} fills the place.

In his book on the possibilities of an Islamic democracy, mentioned before, Khaled Abou El Fadl deplores that Islam, as El Fadl thinks in the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, “turned” from an individualist to a collectivist religion.\textsuperscript{222} El Fadl declares that in the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century there was no explicit reason for Islam to become a collectivist religion. He assumes that the change from individualism to collectivism in Islam had something to do with France’ victory over Egypt and a general feeling of being in need of a differentiation from the West (something which could be called a religious dimorphism). The derivation of the belief in a messiah from axial-age demands – as posited in Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah 40 – 55) - demonstrates, that Islamic collectivism is basically rooted in the Prophet’s, a.s., denial of a messiah, rather than in an anti-Western caprice of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. El Fadl overlooks that the concept of the messiah is not an offense against monotheism, but a consequence of the axial-age reduction of animism and polytheism to monotheism and a corollary individualized understanding of god-human relationship.

To this one could add a point of simple psychology: it may be a relief for anyone not to be identifiable by individuality.\textsuperscript{223} However, who would not want to eat the cake and have it, too: collective, not individual, culpability, but monotheistic grace? Seen against the historical background of the axial age, this calculation cannot go but wrong, because apart from the fact that the participant of a shame culture is hardly able to render a Parmenidean judgment - one does not have to stand for something -, nobody can be a participant of a shame culture and be responsible to a monotheistic God at the same time.

The culture change toward collectivism, as assumed by El Fadl, would of course have to be made undone if Islamic democracy is to be accepted, because – as Thucydides brilliantly explicates - democrats are \textit{individuals} and members equiped with rights and duties who are tied together by a pledge-of-faith in the \textit{polis} (or Frankish) style to form superadditive units. Within those units, members put forward and defend their judgments (see below 5.). Also, members have a right to quit (”exit”) the superadditive unit.

Islamic collectivism means a turn against Judaic (Ezechiel, Chapter 18) and, following Judaism, Christian conviction of individual culpability. Lacking \textit{individual} culpability before God and fellow

\textsuperscript{221} Goethe: in his gods depicts man himself (\textit{In seinen Göttern malt sich der Mensch}); cf. the opening lines of the present chapter.

\textsuperscript{222} at 28 f., 126 f.

\textsuperscript{223} Cf., Bierbrauer’s result gained from converts to Islam, see note 362, above. See also the report on his \textit{hadj} (pilgrimage) to Mekka in Malcolm X’s autobiography, Malcolm X & Alex Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, New York 1965, re-issue 1993: Bantam Doubleday, where Malcolm X describes the relief that flows from a feeling of being carried along by a indefinite number of pilgrims, and just be a grain in a huge pious crowd. This has nothing to do with irresponsibility, it is a form of being open to God.
humans, personal responsibility for one’s own behavior and acts is different. This makes it difficult to hold Muslims personally responsible, for example in British courts dealing with Islamic youth gangs, or Spanish courts dealing with Islamic terrorists. Islamic suicide bombings have their philosophical roots here: the actor cannot be held accountable.

Shame cultures are difficult to deal with by guilt cultures for two reasons which reinforce each other in their force: Individuals cannot be held responsible, and the groups of persons which can be blamed are the carriers of feud and will seek revenge from an opposing group – yet to be defined ethnocentrically. This is the explanation for Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. God’s chosen people to whom all the glory of the world is promised, the Muslims, suffer and culturally seem to lag behind the other modes of thought. Revenge must be taken against those others.

A (re-)turn to Muslim individual responsibility and culpability - from shame culture to guilt culture - would make a huge difference. Besides getting in line with other individualist and personal culpability-positing modes of thought, a recognition of individuality and of individual judgment would open, as a corollary, the distinction of private and public sphere (Thucydides: oikos and polis), the possession of inalienable rights, and a path to fight corruption.

(3) This implies another culture change to be performed, the one from tolerance of the contents of different opinions (in the consensus seeking assembly) to tolerance and respect of the frame and the procedure within that frame for “representation, debate, and voting” (in Waldron’s terms). “Keep thinking the way you think, but respect that you have been outvoted, for the time being, until next time when we might need your point of view. What needs respect, in the long run, is not our or your opinions opposing each other, but the framework, the entity, that enables us to govern ourselves” (loc. cit., note 339, above)).

(4) It was remarked before that Muslim philosophers, in Islam’s forming years, did not have much chance to read Pre-socratic or Platonic writings since they were largely not yet rediscovered. Only Plato’s dialogs on the Laws, the Sophists, Timaeus, and Republic, and some Neoplatonic texts are said to have been available. “Plato seems to have been more an icon and an inspiration than an authentic source for Islamic philophers”. The discovery of the individual and its judgments is a Pre-socratic achievement, but it can also be found in Deutero-Isaiah. A good Muslim will not render a Parmenidean judgment on “this is true”, or “good”, or esthetically acceptable”. The “Insch-Allah” is in between. Nor does a good Muslim know the meaning of a Platonic dialog in which A and B participate to learn more about C, because a Platonic dialog consists of Parmenidean judgments (see Chapter 1 II. 4 a., above). Culture change may mend this, once historical research is reopened. It should be no sacrilege against God’s supreme power and compassion to make propositions. A proposition made with the intent to subjugate all other propositions may be a sacrilege, but not making them and subjecting them to a vote for given period of time. Cartesian doubt is a gift, not a

225 following the terrorist attacks on Madrid suburb trains of 2006.
226 W. Fikentscher, Oikos und Polis und die Moral der Bienen, eine Skizze zu Gemein- und Eigennutz, Festschrift Arthur Kaufmann, Heidelberg 1993: C.F. Müller, 71-80
227 see, e.g., Tad Beckman, Plato, Notes, http://www4.hmc.edu:8001/humanities/beckman/PhilNotes/plato.htm (visited March 2008).
The theory of the “greater jihad” as developed by the Prophet Mohammed, a.s., on the occasion of the military and diplomatic conquest of Mekka in 630 C.E. as a virtue of fighting against oneself and thus of self-restraint, may point the way to reflective, discursive, and explicit thinking and thus to an Islamic kind of Cartesian doubt.\(^{229}\) Perhaps this can also be interpreted in the Parmenidean sense of developing a self-critical distance to what a person thinks, comparable to the aforementioned interpretation of Islamic “greater jihad”.

Perhaps this can also be interpreted in the Parmenidean sense of developing a self-critical distance to what a person thinks, comparable to the aforementioned interpretation of Islamic “greater jihad”.

After all, can Islamic society be human-rights democratic (a question Eisenstadt does not expressly ask but may imply)\(^{230}\)? The answer may be yes, at the price of some culture change in the direction of the Greek Tragic Mind, or of the acceptance of inalienable values to be derived from Islam including the inalienable freedom to leave Islam. Both alternatives would also require the acceptance of time as a straight line with its religious and behavioral implications.

As to foreign relations of and to Muslim countries, the aforementioned anthropological suggestions for Islam apply respectively. The radical division of the world in dar-al-Islam (world area of submission) and dar-al-harb (world area of chaos, turmoil) does not admit a basic relation of trust (\emph{fides}) between the sovereign nations of the world, whether organized in form of the UNO, or not.\(^{231}\) Parallely, a friction exists between ongoing time conceptions in most non-Muslim countries and non-ongoing time conceptions in Islamic -countries. Consequently, from the Muslim point of view, ethnocentrically, no propositions can be extended to other nations, and time frames such as deadlines are meaningless. Therefore, from the non-Muslim point of view, again ethnocentrically, irritations may result whenever statements prove to be “unreliable” and time tables or deadlines are not observed. These irritations can be avoided after an advance clearance of the mode of thought in which contacts between dar-al-Islam and dar-al-harb countries are to be carried out.. Absent such advance clearances, culture change seems to be the only way.\(^{232}\)

VIII. An anthropological lesson for the introduction of democracy to a formerly undemocratic country

On a global scale, the present time shows a number of attempts to introduce democracy in countries that for diverse reasons (history, tradition, colonization, conquest, etc.) formerly were not democratically governed. Whether this is possible can be predicted: Democratization is possible only in countries in which a sufficient number of people accept the principle of superaddition. Without being able to perceive that the political whole of the country is normatively more than the sum of its parts – the citizens –, winning a majority makes no democratic sense because it leaves the minority and its supporters out of sight as members of the whole. Consequences of such an oversight are protests of outvoted citizens, riots, suppression by members of the “majority”,

\(^{229}\) Correspondingly, in Buddhism, the seventh and the eighth step of the “right path” to salvation concern “right thinking” and “right reflection” may open this way to legitimate doubt.

\(^{230}\) See Chapter 5 IV . 5., above

\(^{231}\) For the \emph{fides}-conception underlying the conception of international law since Hugo Grotius, see W. Fikentscher, De fide et perfidia, Der Treuegedanke in den “Staatsparallelen” des Hugo Grotius aus heutiger Sicht, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, Heft 1, München 1978: Commission C.H. Beck.

\(^{232}\) A sub-issue of this is the different attitude toward reciprocity in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Factors of reciprocity, such as mutual deterrence, \emph{do ut des}, or tit-for-tat, often do not work in contacts to Muslim countries because of their leaders’ sometime extreme reliance on monotheistic destination. This adds to the described volatility in foreign relations to Muslim countries. The issue of reciprocity may serve as a starting point for the next chapter.
boycotts by those who are being declared the minority without being a minority because the whole is missing, and other disturbances. Recounts cannot help much either. First, the entity must be defined, and this cannot be done without substantial internalization of that entity. Contemporary examples are Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The establishment of rechtsstaatliche conditions might be an interim help (the rule of law in the Euro-Continental, not in the Angloamerican sense, and this means including general accountability of government as a constitutional principle). Living under a common constitutional law may prepare the internalization of a superadditive unit. For this, democratic elections are not necessary. In such a situation it is better not to start with an election, but with law.

IX. Bibliography


