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Unpublished Paper
Existence of Equilibria in All-Pay Auctions
Stanford Business School Research Papers (2010)
  • Srihari Govindan
  • Robert B Wilson
Abstract

For an all-pay sealed-bid auction of an item for which each bidder's realized value can depend on every bidder's privately observed signal, existence of equilibria in behavioral strategies is established using only the assumption that bidders' value functions and the density function of signals are positive and continuous on a product of intervals. Such equilibria have atomless distributions of bids and thus are not affected by how tied bids are resolved.

Keywords
  • auction,
  • all-pay,
  • bidding,
  • signals,
  • interdependent values,
  • common value,
  • equilibrium strategies,
  • existence
Disciplines
Publication Date
July, 2010
Citation Information
Srihari Govindan and Robert B Wilson. "Existence of Equilibria in All-Pay Auctions" Stanford Business School Research Papers (2010)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/wilson_robert/20/