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Unpublished Paper
Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetric Bidders
Stanford Business School Research Papers (2010)
  • Srihari Govindan
  • Robert B Wilson
Abstract

For two symmetric bidders, weak monotonicity conditions are shown to imply existence of an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies for a sealed-bid first-price auction of an item for which each bidder's value depends on every bidder's observed signal. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and thus is unaffected by how tied bids are resolved.

Keywords
  • auction,
  • bidding,
  • signals,
  • interdependent values,
  • common value,
  • equilibrium strategies,
  • existence
Disciplines
Publication Date
July, 2010
Citation Information
Srihari Govindan and Robert B Wilson. "Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetric Bidders" Stanford Business School Research Papers (2010)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/wilson_robert/18/