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Unpublished Paper
Existence of Equilibria in Private-Value Auctions
Stanford Business School Research Papers (2010)
  • Srihari Govindan
  • Robert B Wilson

A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and is not affected by the rule for resolving tied bids.

  • auction,
  • bidding,
  • private values,
  • equilibrium strategies,
  • existence
Publication Date
July, 2010
Citation Information
Srihari Govindan and Robert B Wilson. "Existence of Equilibria in Private-Value Auctions" Stanford Business School Research Papers (2010)
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