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Unpublished Paper
Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games
Stanford Business School Research Paper #2021 (2009)
  • Srihari Govindan
  • Robert B Wilson
Abstract

We impose three conditions on refinements of the Nash equilibria of finite games with perfect recall that select closed connected subsets, called solutions. A. Each equilibrium in a solution uses undominated strategies; B. Each solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium; C. The solutions of a game map to the solutions of an embedded game, where a game is embedded if each player's feasible strategies and payoffs are preserved by a multilinear map. We prove for games with two players and generic payoffs that these conditions characterize each solution as an essential component of equilibria in undominated strategies, and thus a stable set as defined by Mertens (1989).

Keywords
  • game,
  • equilibrium,
  • refinement,
  • axiom,
  • admissibility,
  • backward induction,
  • small worlds,
  • stability
Disciplines
Publication Date
May, 2009
Citation Information
Srihari Govindan and Robert B Wilson. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games" Stanford Business School Research Paper #2021 (2009)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/wilson_robert/16/