Anthropology Notes: 492 pages
Karl Widerquist
Four-hundred and Ninety-two pages of anthropology notes

Accumulated by Karl Widerquist (Karl@Widerquist.com)

Abstract

Here are 492 pages of notes, mostly in anthropology, some in history and other disciplines. I accumulated them in the process of researching two books (Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy and the Prehistory of Private Property), both of which used sources from anthropology and other disciplines to criticize empirical claims philosophers and political theorists often accept without sufficient skepticism. These notes are not a broad-based coverage of the discipline as a whole; they involve only information relevant to the claims addressed in those books. I’m posting them publicly (in both DOCX and PDF formats) in case anyone doing related work will benefit from them in any way. I hope some people find these notes to be a useful aid for their own research.

NOTE: The coauthor of those two books, Grant S. McCall keeps his own notes separately. Any problems with these notes are my fault alone.

Asad, Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter

Qatar Stacks GN17.A57 1973

Talal Asad, “Introduction,” pp. 9-19
14: “It is not a matter of dispute that social anthropology emerged as a distinctive discipline at the beginning of the colonial era, that it [15] became a flourishing academic profession towards its close, or that throughout this period its efforts were devoted to a description and analysis—carried out by Europeans, for a European audience—of non-European societies dominated by European power. And yet there is a strange reluctance on the part of most professional anthropologists to consider seriously the power structure within which their discipline has taken shape.”
17: “We must begin from the fact that the basic reality which made pre-war social anthropology a feasible and effective enterprise was the power relationship between dominating (European) and dominated (non-European) cultures. We then need to ask ourselves how this relationship has affected the practical pre-conditions of social anthropology; the uses to which its knowledge was put; the theoretical threatment of particular topics; the mode of perceived and objectifying alien societies; and the anthropologist claim of political neutrality.”
18: “I believe it is a mistake to view social anthropology in the colonial era as primarily an aid to colonial administration, or as the simple refletion of colonial ideology. I say
this not because I subscribe to the anthropological establishment’s comfortable view of itself, but because bourgeois consciousness, of which social anthropology is merely one fragment, has lay was contained within itself profound contradictions and ambiguities—and therefore the potentialities for transcending itself.”

19: “The papers that follow analyse and document ways in which anthropological thinking and practice have been affected by British colonialism, but they approach this topic from different points of view and at different levels.”

**Aiello: Paleofantasy**

http://www.wennergren.org/about/leslie-c-aiello

Aiello, Leslie C.: E-mail: laiello@wennergren.org

Emailed her about “Paleofantasy.” She said she might have coined the term, but never wrote on it.

**Aykroyd: Nasty, Brutish, but Not Necessarily Short**

“Nasty, Brutish, but Not Necessarily Short: A Reconsideration of the Statistical Methods Used to Calculate Age at Death from Adult Human Skeletal and Dental Age Indicators”


COPIED TO ARTICLES FOLDER & CONVERTED TO AUDIO.

**Altman: Hunter-Gatherers Today**

Altman, Jon C., Hunter-gatherers today: an Aboriginal economy in north Australia. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, c1987

Kim Hill says see it.

Balfour Libr. BAL Main Libr (UA) KSL K Available library guide for BAL

Rhodes House RHO Stack C90.R00352

Suggested by Kim Hill


1: participant observation between 1979 and 1981 of a group of people in a remote village in northern Australia. They had been in contact with the Australian welfare state for 25 years, but who had maintained a lot of HG practices.
31: data on the diet of the Gunwinggu people in a band at the Momega out station was collected for 296 days between Oct 79 and Nov 80.
72: “There have been only three studies of work effort in hunter-gatherer societies: McCarthy and McArthur’s (1960) study of Aborigines at Fish Creek and Hemple Bay in 1948; a study by Lee (1968) of the !Kung bushmen; and Van Arsdale’s (1978) study of Asmat hunter-gatherers in Papua New Guinea. Sahlins (1972, 1043) used data from the first two studies … the data he used have been called to question (Johnson 1975; Jones 1980). In McCarthy and McArthur’s work for example, while the study is detailed, the sample surveyed is unrepresentative of demographically normal groups and the seasonal cycle. Furthermore it was conducted under somewhat artificial circumstances as subjects were required not to consume market foods to which they had access. Nowhere in his essay does Sahlins note that both studies were conducted in post-contact situations. Van Arsdale’s study of Asmat activity patterns is brief but appears rigorous—the brevity of the study period (three weeks) resulting in a seasonal bias. All three studies despite their differing locations and methodologies, conclude that hunter-gatherers work three to five hours per day. In Van Arsdale’s study this time includes working for missionaries for cash.”
80: He finds an average of 3.6 hours per day in productive activities, and 5.4 hours in nonproductive activities.
81: 2.6 hours in subsistence; 0.8 in market exchange; 0.3 miscellaneous. (The market exchange for this group is mostly production of arts and crafts for sale on the market.)
89: He argues that they are better off today than before contact “because work effort requirements in subsistence activities have decreased.” Their subsistence efforts have benefited from market technologies (I think he means things like guns.).
94: “by accepting McCarthy and McArthur’s data, Sahlins grossly over-estimated the amount of leisure time available to Arnhem Land Aborigines.”

Ames. The Archaeology of Rank


487: “This chapter reviews methods archeologists use to investigate the presence and forms of permanent inequality in ancient societies.”
490: “The key element in all of this terminology is the concept of differential access. In egalitarian societies, there is equal access to positions of prestige and to basic resources; in rank societies there is differential access to positions of prestige but equal access to both positions of prestige and basic resources, with people in high strata also having structural organizational power. Differential access to resources can be reflected in nutrition, health, and life expectancy.”
Despite their utility, terms like bands, tribe, and chiefdoms obscure variability …, and many workers prefer to distinguish among small societies (essentially bands), middle-level (or transegalitarian …) societies, and states only. …

No coherent single body of social theory explains the origins of evolution of permanent social inequality … Until quite recently, however, they all assumed that humans are, by default, egalitarian in their social organization, so that all recently evolved systems of permanent social inequality are departures”.

Table 28.2: Types of societies defined by anthropologists and archaeologists, based on sociopolitical organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bands</td>
<td>Egalitarian, demographically small (25-50 people), fluid membership based on kinship, friendship, hunter-gatherers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribes</td>
<td>Egalitarian, demographically larger (500+), membership fixed, based on kinship, hunter-gatherers, and farmers; concept of tribe controversial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiefdoms</td>
<td>Ranked, ascribed leadership positions, demographically larger (2,000+), decision making centralized with a two-tier decision-making hierarchy, leadership lacks coercive power; chiefs usually have social power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>Stratified, with minimally a three-tier decision-making hierarchy; leadership has both tactical and strategic power; states usually have a territorial base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transegalitarian societies</td>
<td>Term for societies that are neither egalitarian nor ranked. There may be unequal access to prestige, but numbers of high-prestige positions fluid, positions are achieved based on generosity, ability to attract followers, social power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-range societies</td>
<td>Broad term for societies falling between bands and states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex societies</td>
<td>Can have three meanings (1): ‘civilization”; (2) societies with many parts, implying social hierarchies and/or occupational specializations (the usage here); or more narrowly (3) societies with permanent ranking. At a basic level, all human societies are complex, some more than others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Start now: copying notes from hardcopy

491: “Hayden (2001) postulates that egalitarianism has existed for perhaps the past 2 million years.”

508: “the absence of data for ranking is not evidence for the absence of ranking.”

Important citations:


Angel: Paleoeecology, Paleodemography and Health


Harris says Angel finds evidence that Paleolithic HGs were very healthy. I’ve cited Harris on this, but the original checks out:

Here’s what Harris NOT ANGEL says: p. 14: What is actually known about the physical health of Paleolithic populations? Skeletal remains provide important clues. Using such indices as average height and the number of teeth missing at time of death, J. Lawrence Angel has developed a profile of changing health standards during the last 30,000 years. Angel found that at the beginning of this period adult males averaged 177 centimeters (5’11”) and adult females about 165 centimeters (5’6”). Twenty thousand years later the males grew no taller than the females formerly grew—165 centimeters—whereas the females averaged no more than 153 centimeters (5’0”). Only very recent times have populations once again attained statutes characteristic of the old stone age peoples. American males, for example, averaged 175 centimeters (5’9”) in 1960. Tooth loss shows a similar trend. In 30,000 B.C. adults died with an average of 2.2 teeth missing; in 6500 B.C., with 3.5 missing; during Roman times, with 6.6 missing. Although genetic factors may also enter into these changes, stature and the conditions of teeth and gums are known to be strongly influenced by protein intake, which in turn is predictive of general well-being. Angel concludes that there was a ‘real depression of health’ following the ‘high point’ of the upper Paleolithic period. 179: “Table 1 suggests a real depression of health as well as a decrease in population density following the relatively high point of the Upper Paleolithic. The decrease in stature and in longevity are especially striking.”

AusAID, Making land work, vols. 1 & 2

DOWNLOADED TO BOOKS FOLDER
Chapter 2 of Vol. 1 appears to be all I need

Xi: “Customary ownership is the dominant form of land tenure in the Pacific region. In most countries it accounts for more than 80 per cent of the total land area. The characteristics of customary tenure systems are significantly different from those of public or freehold forms of tenure. Land rights are managed by customary groups according to their own unique processes, which are linked to underlying social and spiritual belief systems. For countless generations, customary tenure has successfully met the basic needs of people in the Pacific region by effectively adapting to changing social and environmental conditions. Land has come to represent an important safety net in terms of the subsistence lifestyle of many people in the region.”

Chapter 2 describes the basic features of the tenure systems for customary, freehold and public land in the Pacific region, focusing on customary systems, while acknowledging the great diversity among these systems.

3: “In the Pacific region there are basically three systems of land tenure—customary, public and freehold. Most land in the region is under customary authority and in most countries it represents more than 80 per cent of the total land area … In any country there may be dozens of different types of customary tenure but in some of the Melanesian countries the number is higher. Despite their complexity and diversity customary tenure systems do share some common characteristics (Box 2.1), which differ significantly from those of public or freehold systems.”

4: Table 2.1 is interesting.

5: Box 2.1

> **characterIstIcs of customary tenure systems**
>
> Although customary land tenure systems vary greatly across the Pacific region and it is risky to generalise, they do share some common features. For present purposes, some of the main characteristics of customary tenure systems follow.
>
> » Access to land primarily stems from birth into a kinship group. » Groups based on kinship or other forms of relationship are the main landholding (or ‘owning’) units.
>
> » The main land-using units are individuals or small household units.
>
> » Men, particularly chiefs, elders or senior men within the customary group, have the main say in decisions over the group’s land matters.
>
> » As well as being a source of power, land is a focus for many social, cultural and spiritual activities.
There are usually ways to accommodate the land needs of anyone accepted into the group. Outsiders—for example, refugees from tribal fights—are sometimes adopted by a group and gain the privileges of group membership.

Land can be transferred only within existing social and political relationships.

Rights to access land are constantly adjusted to take account of changes in group membership—some groups increasing and some dying out—and the need to redistribute land.

5: “Although customary land is often described as being ‘owned’ by a group, this does not necessarily mean that all members of the group have equal access to the land. Each individual within a customary group has distinct and often different interests and right to use, control and transfer land and land-based resources … Some rights are vested exclusively with a particular individual (for example, rights to harvest a particular tree); some are vested in families or households (for example, right to grow a crop); and some may be shared equally between all or a large number of the group’s members (for example, the right to decide, or to veto a decision, to swap land with another customary group). Customary groups often allocate land right to members on the basis of function rather than demarcated area. This can result in several members have different functional rights to the same land.”

6: “Social hierarchies that define social status within a customary group also determine the distribution of exercise of land rights. Relationships within a landowning group may be determined by age, social rank and gender.”

**Bahn & Flenley—Easter Island, Earth Island**

This book shows that a lot of the stuff I believed about Easter Island isn’t as certain as I’d thought. They did cut down a lot of trees to roll the statues, but that may not have been the sole reason for deforestation—rats the islanders imported were also involved. There was some kind of violent crises, probably brought on by scarcity of resources, but it wasn’t necessarily a revolution of the oppressed against the aristocracy. It might have been inter-clan warfare instead. The cult of the statues did not end all at once either. People were still using some statues after many of them had been knocked down. To me this indicates inter-clan violence rather that some kind of revolution against the status quo. There was a big population crash about the time of European contact, and it must have had something to do with scarcity of resources, but exactly what happened, why, and how, nobody knows. There was a second bigger population crash in the 1860s when slave raiders from Peru carried off most of the population, and then some of the survivors came back with smallpox. That was shortly after the missionaries got there, although the book didn’t implicate them in the slave trade. Many island rituals and at least some of its class system survived to that time, although they had changed quite a bit including the addition of the birdman race, which might have started sometime in the 1700s. The last birdman race happened in 1878.
Baily—Aboriginal Property Rights


Looks at property rights in various kinds of aboriginal societies. 183: Literature by economists on aboriginal property rights is poor. “This article undertakes such an endeavor, using the observations of anthropologists of the diverse set of rights, customs, and practices of over fifty aboriginal peoples. The cases considered here include peoples who used their group territories for hunting and fishing; for gathering wild roots, fruit, vegetables, and invertebrates; and (sometimes) for primitive horticulture. Among the studies’ groups, one observes almost all conceivable structures of rights.” 185: The author states that it is a well established fact that Malthusian pressures create scarcity in land. “Almost everywhere, each group lived on territory on which it had exclusive rights to hunt, fish, gather, or garden.” 186: “Either the people held and used the territory in common, or households and single persons held separate parcels, or most often, some combination of the two existed.” 191: quote:

In most observed cases of horticulture prior to European contact, the aboriginals did not maintain or improve soil fertility. In some cases, they used irrigation, but if so, the irrigation works and allocation of water were community operations. Water rights varied from case to case, as they do in developed countries. These more advanced agricultural techniques could be thought of as analogous to group hunting. (In any case, it does not affect the following argument about heritability.) Because they lacked such techniques, these groups moved periodically or used lengthy periods of fallowing land to enrich the soil for further cultivation. In any case, with no way for the individual household to improve the land’s fertility, a right to inherit or keep the land for long periods would have no economic consequences. By contrast in those cases where an aboriginal people discovered fertilization, the right to inherit would provide a positive incentive to maintain the soil’s fertility, so that heritability would serve the best interests of the tribe.”
Balter, Michael: Paleofantasy

This is a “meeting brief” from the AAAS annual meeting, Feb. 14-18, 2008, Boston, MA. He credits Leslie Aiello with using the word, but doesn’t say she coined it there.

BANDY, Fissioning, Scalar Stress, and Social Evolution in

Early Village Societies

ABSTRACT Theories of social evolution have predicted that early permanent population concentrations will frequently be unstable, with fissioning the predominant mechanism for resolving intravillage conflict. It has further been suggested that village fissioning will cease with the emergence of higher-level integrative institutions. These processes have remained archaeologically undocumented. In this article I attempt to identify the village fissioning process in the Formative Period of Bolivia's Titicaca Basin. I conclude that village fissioning took place in the Early Formative, and that it ceased with the emergence of a regional religious tradition in the Middle Formative. These results confirm the utility and applicability of the evolutionary model.
808: “Each side perceived land, and human activity involving land, through the lens of its own property system. The result, in the early years, was that each side systematically misperceived what the other was doing. In the long run, as the balance of power gradually swung to the side of the British over the course of the nineteenth century, they were largely able to impose their property system on the Maori. The centrality of property within the thought of both peoples, however, meant that the transformation of Maori into English property rights involved much more than land. Religious belief, engagement with the market economy, political organization—all were bound up in the systems by which both peoples organized property rights in land. To anglicize the Maori property system was to revolutionize Maori life.”

809: “The earliest European to reach New Zealand were astonished to discover that the Maori were farmers. … The Maori did not just farm as in England; they also appeared to divide their farms much like the English.”

810: “As both peoples would soon learn, the physical similarity of English and Maori agricultural methods masked some fundamental differences between English and Maori conceptions of property. The English tended to allocate property rights in land on a geographic basis. Land was divided into pieces, each piece was assigned to an owner, and the owner was ordinarily understood to command all the resources within that geographic space.

811: “The reality of English landholding was often more complex than this ideal. …

   The Maori … tended to allocate property rights among individuals and families on a functional rather than a geographical basis. That is, a person would not own a zone of space; he would instead own the right to use a particular resource in a particular way. One might possess the right to trap birds in a certain tree, or the right to fish in a certain spot in the water, or the right to cultivate a certain plot of ground.”

812: “This disaggregation of property ownership into multiple use rights is quite close to the conception of property that prevails among American lawyers today, who tend to think not of the ownership of property in an
absolute sense but of rights to do particular things with property, rights that
can be separated from one another and allocated to different people (T. C.
Grey 1980).”
813: “The Maori were politically divided into iwi, or tribes, sets of interlocking kin
groups with common genealogy and leadership. The iwi were composed
of hapu, or subtribes, which were in turn made up of whanau, or
extended families (Cleave 1983, 53-54). … While individuals did not exert control over
geographic spaces, iwi did, and hapu sometimes did as well, within the
larger territory controlled by the iwi (R. Firth 1972, 374, 378). Individual
use rights were located within this physical space. The tribal unit's relationship
with its land accordingly corresponded more closely to the European
conception of sovereignty than that of property ownership.”
814: “The chiefs of tribal units, like European government officials, did not
command more property than the ordinary people within their jurisdiction,
but they had a greater than ordinary power to allocate property to others
(Lian 1992, 392-93). These opportunities arose frequently. Property rights
had to be maintained by use; if abandoned for long enough, sometimes only
a few years, a right would revert back to the tribe, and could then be allocated
to someone else (Binney, Bassett, and Olssen 1990, 144). Land and
natural resources were so plentiful in comparison to the number of people
that it made sense for tribes to move from one block of land to another
periodically, rather than continuing to exploit the same block persistently.
These shifts would again have afforded the opportunity to allocate some
property rights, although this opportunity would have been limited by the
practice of returning periodically to each block of land and resuming the old
pattern of use. Such cycling was necessary because of the requirement that
rights be used in order to be maintained. … Finally,
land could be acquired by one tribe by conquest from another, in the intermittent
warfare that occurred among tribes. In this circumstance, property
rights would need to be allocated from scratch.
The authority of a chief thus normally included the creation of property
rights when the situation arose but not the destruction of existing property
rights. Chiefs enjoyed property rights of their own, but these were
defined no differently from those enjoyed by anyone else, in that they were
by and large inherited from ancestors, and it was up to the chief himself to
exploit them or have them revert to the tribe. In this regard the chiefs were
quite different from the monarchs of Europe, who held vast amounts of
land, none of which they worked themselves. The contrast was not lost on
the Maori. "We are not like the King of England," wrote one chief in the
1830s. "We are going to work to get food" (Ross 1837).

The precontact Maori economy provided very little occasion for the
accumulation of personal wealth. There was no money, and few other durable
goods, capable of being saved (Kawharu 1975a). The resources naturally
present on the land far exceeded the ability of the relatively small population
to consume them. Land was accordingly not understood as something
that one might wish to sell; The Maori had little with which to purchase it,
and had there been more to exchange for it, the price at which land might have sold would have been extremely low. Any sale, moreover, would have had to occur within the tribal group that exercised control over the land.”

815: “the Maori had no transactions comparable to the sale of land in England.”

818: “coming from a culture in which property rights were organized by geographic space, and observing many Maori exercising use rights within the same zone of land, many colonizers erroneously concluded that the land was held by all in common, and that property rights were therefore unknown. …

This view persisted in part because of its appeal to writers eager to contrast the equality associated with this supposed Maori communism and the sharp wealth disparities to be found in nineteenth-century England. … But the view also persisted, ironically enough, because of the opposite sentiment. A world without property rights could also be understood as one in which "might was right," to all intents and purposes .... No right to land existed but in the pleasure of the most influential chief in the neighbourhood" (New Zealand Gazette, 4 October 1843, 2).”

818: “the English, because they were primarily interested in learning how they might purchase Maori land, were focusing their inquiry at precisely the point on which Maori thought had not been developed.”

826: “The Maori interpreted the transaction within the categories of their own property system. As the pace of settlement increased in the 1840s, and the English began living in communities of their own rather than among the Maori, the English began more and more to interpret transactions within their own categories. They often believed themselves to have acquired the right to use every resource within a geographic space. This divergence in understanding caused each side to look upon the other's conduct as at variance with the agreement. When the English used land for a purpose other than that for which the Maori intended it to be sold, the Maori saw overreaching. One purchaser in Whangarei, for instance, tried in 1844 to remove manganese from land he believed he owned outright, and was told that while he may have purchased the right to use the land, he had not purchased the right to remove the stones from the land. A similar incident happened a few years later in Rotorua (Orange 1987, 115). When the Maori, on the other hand, perceiving the English to be taking more than they had bargained for, demanded extra payment, the English saw an unreasonable seller asking to be paid twice for the same land.”

827: “Current academic and judicial opinion is divided as to when the Maori realized what the English meant by a sale. Some writers date this understanding to the 1840s (Ward 1986; Parsonson 1992). Others suggest that misunderstandings still existed in the 1840s, and even as late as the early 1860s, time enough for the government to have purchased half the country's land (Wyatt 1991, 220-46; Waitangi Tribunal 1997). The date most
likely varied from place to place”.
844: “In 1800, the Maori owned over 60 million acres of land; by 1911, they owned only 7 million, much of which was not well suited for farming. A few million acres had been confiscated by the colonial government after the mid-century wars, but the rest had been sold (Belich 1996, 259).

With the disappearance of the Maori system of property rights, so too went much of the traditional political structure of the tribes. When chiefs could no longer control the allocation of land, they lost much of their authority.”
845; “As tribal authority broke down, so did the tribe's ability to enforce traditional property rights in land. The ironic result was that Maori-owned land became much closer to what the less-informed proponents of "individual" titles thought it originally was—a commons, within which no individual or family possessed any enforceable rights.”

Banner, Conquest by Contract

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ABSTRACT: “Much of the British empire was acquired by purchase rather than conquest, but indigenous peoples usually acquired little wealth despite extensive land sales. Explanations of where the money went tend to blame either the imprudence of indigenous sellers or the duplicity of British buyers. This article suggests that a focus solely on the conduct of the individuals operating within the land market rests on a poor theoretical understanding of the relationship between law and markets, an understanding that blinds historians to the allocative effects of markets' constitutive rules. Using New Zealand as an example, the article shows how the British modified the structure of the land market over the 19th century, sometimes intentionally and sometimes inadvertently, to transfer wealth from the Maori to themselves.”

Bar-Yosef: Threshold of agriculture

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Listened to it: agriculture develops for many different reasons
Barfield—Dictionary of Anthropology


Relevant entries


Evolutionary Stages: “Perhaps the oldest typology of evolutionary stages is that of savagery—barbarism—civilization. This was made famous by Lewis Henry Morgan (1877).” But it dates from the 18th Century. Spencer used another classification. Marx and Engels “classified societies according to their modes of production … primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, and capitalism.” Service (1962) is one of the most popular. He identifies four stages of sociopolitical organization: “bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states.” Fried: egalitarian, rank, and stratified.

Barnard—Hunter-Gatherers in History, Archaeology and Anthropology

Barnard—Hunter-Gatherers in History, Archaeology and Anthropology: introductory Essay, pp. 1-14—Barnard

2: Speaking of Sahlins, “He articulated the theoretical position that really lay beneath the hard data being uncovered in the 1960s: if hunter-gatherers maximize, they maximize their free time, not their wealth. This realization … was to transform hunter-gatherer studies into perhaps the most theoretically challenging branch of anthropology of that time.”

DON’T REALLY NEED THIS UNLESS I GO DEEPER INTO AFFLUENCE THEORY

Batuman: “The Sanctuary,” New Yorker article w/o citations


The article is about the author’s experience at Gobekli Tepe, the cite in Turkey with the oldest known megaliths, from about 9000 BCE.

81-82: “A surprising fact about the Neolithic [82] revolution is that, according to most evidence, agriculture brought about a steep decline in the standard of living.
Studies of Kalahari Bushmen and other nomadic groups shows that hunter-gatherers, even in the most inhospitable landscapes, typically spend less than twenty hours a week obtaining food. By contrast, farmers toil from sunup to sundown. Because agriculture relies on the mass cultivation of a handful of starchy crops a community’s whole livelihood can be whipped out overnight by bad weather or pests. Paleontological evidence shows that early farmers had more anemia and vitamin deficiencies, died younger, had worse teeth, were more prone to spinal deformity, and caught more infectious diseases, as a result of living close to other humans and to livestock. A study of skeletons in Greece and Turkey found that the average height of humans dropped six inches between the end of the ice age and 3000 B.C.; modern Greeks and Turks still haven’t regained the height of their hunter-gatherer ancestors.

But: Frustratingly she doesn’t give any source info for the “Paleontological evidence” or the “study of skeletons in Greece and Turkey.” Those would be extremely useful.

She also mentions:

Ryan, Christopher and Cacilda Jetha, Sex at Dawn. They “cite anthropological data about numerous hunter-gatherer societies that aren’t monogamous, don’t have nuclear families, and don’t valorize paternal certainty. They argue that this was the norm before the Neolithic revolution, that promiscuity had once fostered cooperation and reduced violence among our tribal ancestors”

Pinker, Steven, The Better Angels of Our Nature. Directly conflicts with Ryan and Jetha. Argues that “society is at a current all-time high in peacefulness, and that the hunter-gatherers were massacring and barbecuing each other for hundreds of millennia before the cultivation of wheat.”

Childe, Gordon V. Coined the term Neolithic revolution. Died in 1957

Schmidt, Klaus, archeologist making it his life’s work to study Gobekli Tepe

Bellwood, Peter: The Polynesians

A good book about the Polynesians, but I can only use some of it for this paper.

31: “In the larger island groups, such as Tonga, Hawai’i and the Societies, chiefs commanded powers of life and death over their subjects, and were surrounded with elaborate rituals and deferences. Brother-sister marriage is even recorded for Hawai’i, to preserve the royal pedigree. The Polynesians in fact developed aristocracy to a far higher pitch than any other Pacific peoples in prehistoric times, and the Hawaiians had virtually evolved a simple form of state organization—a level which they eventually reached very rapidly after acquiring European arms.”

33: “social stratification became very marked in large volcanic islands which had both substantial and dense populations. New Zealand, with a large but scattered population, and many of the atolls, with very dense but small populations, remained relatively egalitarian, although the principles of aristocratic ranking
were observed everywhere in Polynesia, and truly egalitarian societies were virtually absent.”

**Bentley: Community differentiation**

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U S A. 2012 May 29. [Epub ahead of print]
“Community differentiation and kinship among Europe's first farmers.”
Source

**Abstract**

Community differentiation is a fundamental topic of the social sciences, and its prehistoric origins in Europe are typically assumed to lie among the complex, densely populated societies that developed millennia after their Neolithic predecessors. Here we present the earliest, statistically significant evidence for such differentiation among the first farmers of Neolithic Europe. By using strontium isotopic data from more than 300 early Neolithic human skeletons, we find significantly less variance in geographic signatures among males than we find among females, and less variance among burials with ground stone adzes than burials without such adzes. From this, in context with other available evidence, we infer differential land use in early Neolithic central Europe within a patrilocal kinship system.

**Bettinger—Hunter-Gatherers**

This book discuses several issues in HG theory including optimal foraging theory 99-100: Uses optimal foraging theory (OFT) to measure affluence: OFT uses a standard measure of caloric efficiency for comparative studies. Cites a study by Hawkes and O’Connell, challenging Sahlins & Lee’s claims about Kung affluence. The affluence theorists don’t pay attention to the time HGs take to prepare goods for use. It actually takes the !Kung a long time to prepare mongongos, and they’re not particularly calorically efficient. Similar results for Indians in California. “Using marginal foraging efficiency as a measure, it would appear that native Californians were roughly equivalent in “affluence” to the !Kung and Alyawara, all three being demonstrably less affluent in this respect than the Ache.”
Binchy: Celtic and Anglo-Saxon kingship


Rothbard cites this to support his claim the primitive legal systems discover rather than create law.

4: “tuath, which can mean either the people or the territory ruled by the tribal king.”
14: “The Irish law-tracks still show us a rural society consisting of a congeries of petty kingdoms, each governed by a *ri*. And while I am far from claiming that the king, as he is pictured in these tracts, is in all respects the same as the traditional Indo-European *reg*-s, I submit that he and his *tuath* may well retain many of the features of the parent society.”
15: “The king may have originally incorporated in his person all the offices necessary to a primitive society, being at once priest, war-leader, judge, and lawgiver. But by the time of the earliest recorded tests there is clear evidence that … ‘the separation of functions’ had already taken place, … the king is no longer judge and lawgiver. Both of these functions may have been originally vested in him in Ireland as elsewhere, for we find several references to judgments given and laws promulgated by mythical kings.”
16: “The king has no lawmaking powers as far as the traditional ‘sacred’ law is concerned. The task of ‘finding’, interpreting, and applying this devolved first on the Druids … later on the *filid*, lit. ‘seers’ … later still on a more specialized caste … of professional jurists, the ‘brehons’.
16: “In theory the law was a complete whole, needing neither addition nor alteration. Hence there was no place for the king as legislator. He had, however, the power of issuing special ordinances in times of crisis”.
18-19: describes a very private legal system in which the king has almost no role, but the king did have power to collect tribute and demand service, including military service from his subjects.

Binford: Bones

FOUND @ GEORGETOWN:

Limited because for the most part his focusing on methodology and not looking at the myths I’m interested in. But some if it is of interest, and the general analysis: that we know less than archeologists imply is very important.
250: Archeologists are very interested in when our hominid ancestors developed characteristics that differentiate us from other apes. These characteristics include: speech, tool- & structure-making, food sharing & collective responsibility, propensity to consume animal protein, division of labor (e.g. by sex & age), use of a home base or campsite, the nuclear family, and observance of rules. Isaac and Isaac (1975: 32) suggest that they developed in two stages. “Cultural” behaviors (e.g. speech) supposedly arose “during the Middle Pleistocene, between 1 million and 100,000 years ago.

Much earlier, during the Miocene-Pliocene from 8.10 to 3.0 million years ago, basic and important changes are imagined: … ‘bipedalism, the carrying of food and implements, varied tool making and using, hunting, food collecting, food sharing, division of labor, organization of movements around a home base’ [Isaac and Isaac 1975:33].

“This model is a speculation as to what the past was like. It is conjectural history and involves no theoretical arguments that I can recognize.”

251: “Basically no methods beyond wishful thinking have been applied to the Early Pleistocene sites for evaluating the degree to which the foregoing assumptions are warranted or the degree to which the models are realistic.” The problem is that they see concentrations of bones as evidence that hominids brought their kill back to a home base. But the observations are just as well (or better) explained by humans scavenging at sites where other animals killed the prey.

289: “This book has been about methodology. It has been primarily concerned with documenting empirical conditions that are thought to be redundant in their patterning and general in their relevance. The underlying message goes beyond a strict concern for methodology, however: A science that lacks robust methodology cannot operate as a science. In the absence of reliable methods it cannot evaluate the ideas that are set forth about the subject matter in the field, and that is, of course, its function.

293: Here’s an example of more of what he focuses on: “It is relatively easy to demonstrate that the role of the nonhominid predator-scavengers as contributors to deposits in which occur traces of hominid behavior has been generally overlooked and in many cases unrealistically denied.”

294: “The picture one gains from the analysis of the Olduvai materials is a far cry from many of the romantic pictures that have been advanced (see, for instance, Andrey 1976; R. Leakey and R. Lewin 1977; 1978). The analysis seems to justify several statements about our early hominid ancestors: 1. They were scavenging the consumed kills and scavenging death sites of animals after most of the other predator-scavengers had abandoned the carcass and scattered some of its parts.”

294: “There is no evidence supporting the idea that the hominids were removing food from the location of procurement to a base camp for consumption. In fact, the covariant patterning among anatomical parts shows that the parts selected by hominids for use were taken from already consumed and abandoned carcasses … No evidence for base camps exists. Similarly, the argument that food was shared is totally unsupported. … There is no evidence supporting the argument that the hominids at Olduvai Gorge were hunting.”

295: “We are told that the first tools were weapons for defense and killing prey, knives for cutting up large animals, or tools used for shaping more important tools of wood. All these arguments were invented to fit the author’s beliefs. Argrey believes in the ‘killer-apes’; Isaac in a kind of middle-class genteel protohuman who shared his food, took care
of his family, and was on his way to being emotionally and intellectually ‘human’; for Leakey and Lewin [who he earlier on this page calls ‘popularizers of other people’s ideas’], hominid life was an impoverished projection into the past of Richard Lee’s ideas about the !Kung Bushmen.”

295-296: He says that the romantic ideas that hominids took off in the period of 3 to 1 million years ago because they learned better ways to hunt, need to be replaced by what the evidence supports. They succeeded because of improved scavenging techniques. They found ways to eat what hunters had left behind. For example, they could break bones with rocks to get to the marrow.

296: “I am convinced that hunting as an important contribution to a human adaptation is a part of our history that must be understood in terms of the radiation of ‘men’ out of Africa. I can see no selective context for hunting to have arisen as an organized component of a hominid adaptation within the African ‘homeland.’ In fact, I would be very surprised to find that hunting played an important role in most African adaptations until after the appearance of the bow and arrow. Although these ‘hunches’ are interesting, this is not the place for a return to sheer speculation.”

297: Last sentences of the book: “We have had far too much of what I tend to think of as the National Geographic approach to research. That is the view that progress is made through discoveries (preferably photogenic ones) that are treated as self-evident in their meaning. In fact the reverse is the case. Basic research makes possible the reliable assignment of meaning to observations. Without such research, discoveries simply serve as the stimulus for modern myth making. We have had quite enough of that. It is time we got down to the difficult and perhaps not so photogenic task of carrying out the basic research that will make possible the move from the age of myths to the era of understanding.”

References (probably don’t need to see):

Binford, Decoding the Archeological Record

BOD U. Camera S.HIST.1.23.15 (RES)
Berkeley: University of California Press.
I read from 2002 edition, but the only changes seems to be the addition of an afterward.
202: “while it appears that agriculture followed sedentism in the Near East, Mesopotamia, even in Peru, the data available from Mesoamerica and North America are clear in indicating that the adoption of domesticated plants preceded the appearance of sedentary ways of life in those areas.”
203: “we need to give much more serious thought to Darwinian arguments, where the driving forces of change lie in the interaction between the environment and
the adaptive system being considered. … Selection for change occurs when the system is unable to continue previously successful tactics in the face of changed conditions in its environment.”

226-7: “In hunter-gatherer societies, generalized reciprocity is the guiding ethic of behavior: that is, people share freely with their relative without expecting an exact or immediate return from them. Yet, if a man is to maintain a herd of goats and build up his property as he becomes increasingly sedentary, he must refuse his relatives when they come to him to ask [207] for a goal for supper.”

231: “archeologists still do not know what causes complex societies, what brings them into being. The argument for redistribution has no obvious factual basis: at least, I know of no redistributive agents who are not operating in what are already societies based on political power and I doubt that power comes from being nice. [criticizing Sahlins here]”

He’s most interested in a general theory of why complex systems develop, not just how they did.

**Binford: Constructing Frames of Reference**


I read through this; found only a few parts that were useful to me, but I lost my hardcopy notes.

**Binford: Post-Pleistocene adaptations**


This wasn’t all that useful for me. I think the main contribution of this book was that it coined the phrase in its title. But I did take a few notes:

326: “These data suggest that while hunting-gathering populations may vary in density between different habitats in direct proportion to the relative size of the standing food crop, nevertheless within any given habitat the population is homeostatically regulated below the level of depletion of the local food supply. 326-7: If population size were regulated almost exclusively by food supply] *Man would be continually seeking means for [327] increasing food supply. … There is a large body of ethnographic data which suggests that this is not the case.*
Carneiro (1957) in his study of the Kuikuru, who are horticulturalists, demonstrated that these people were capable of producing several times the amount of food they did.”

Bird-David—The Giving Environment

SEE THIS AGAIN FOR “THE GIVING ENVIRONMENT.”
COPYED TO ARTICLES FOLDER
Nurit Bird-David.
Cite for some measure of well-to-do-ness among hunter-gatherers.
190: “Nayaka [of southern India] look on forests as they do on a mother or father. Form them, it is not something ‘out there’ that responds mechanically or passively but like a parent; it provides food unconditionally to its children. … Similarly the Mbuti Pygmies refer to the forest as giving ‘food, shelter and clothing just like their parents’.”
191: “Nayaka give to each other, request from each other, expect to get what they ask for, and feel obliged to give what they are asked for. They do not give resources to each other in a calculated, foresighted fashion, with a view to receiving something in return, nor do they make claims for debts.”
191: “X wants something … and he asks Y to give him one. If Y were to refuse, he would be criticized for being stingy, so he gives …. Some time later, Y notice X has some biddies. Wanting he does not remind X that he gave him a biddi a few days ago, nor does he ask X for a biddi in return. He merely asks X to give him a biddi because X has biddies and he does not. What has happened in the past is irrelevant. Still, X has to comply with the request for fear of social disapproval. Both can avoid giving away biddies by creating circumstances in which they are not asked”.
192: “Among the Nayaka game distribution is a ceremonial act of giving which emphasizes the importance of sharing and implies nothing about any personal obligation of recipients towards the providers of the meat. Nayaka distribute game equally to all other Nayaka in the hamlet. … Mere presence in the hamlet entitles a person to share, and this includes the old and the infirm, who can never reciprocate. The hunter receives a share just like everyone else’s, though he also usually gets the skin”.
192: “Nayaka believe that the forest as parent gives wild resources to all Nayaka, that is, that all Nayaka are born with rights of direct person access to land and unearned resources. For Nayaka, not even preparatory work entitles the labourer to an exclusive right over a resource in situ.” They fish by blocking a section of river, which takes several hours, but anyone can then gather the fish in the pool whether or not they participated in the prep work.
192: To the Hayaka “land is not an object that can be owned but something that people can be closely associated with and related to.”
192-193: “Among the Mullu and Bette Kurumba … [south Indian tribal peoples who are more agricultural than the Nayak], land is associated with households, many of them composite. The mupan, the head of the composite household, allocates land the heads of the constituent families, who later inherit it, establishing their direct association with it.”
193: “Men occasionally borrow and use the darts of others when they hunt. The game then belongs to the person whose dart it is, not to the hunter who has used it. In either case the meat is normally shared equally amongst all members of the group who are present …. To have right over the meat means to have the right to give it”.
194: “gatherer-hunters, although they may not be strictly distinguished from other peoples (especially their neighbours) in terms of their bases of subsistence, do have a distinct economic system. It relates to the particular view of the environment that is entailed by their primary metaphor ‘forest is parent.’”
195: “The gatherer-hunters’ economic system, constructed in terms of giving in relation to the metaphor ‘forest is parent,’ implies that people have a strong ethic of sharing and at the same time practice demand sharing; they make demands on people to share more but not to produce more.”

Bird-David—Beyond the ‘Original Affluent Society’

Good criticism and defense of Sahlins.
25: Anthropologists seemed to agree he had a point, but didn’t know what it was. “Above all, most specialists, and many other scholars as well, recognized, if only intuitively, that Sahlins ‘had a point.’ We sensed that he had touched on something essential to the hunting-and-gathering way of life, although—and this is the problem—we did not know quite what it was. … Had specialists attempted to engage with Sahlins’s essay in the years immediately following its publication, they would have encountered three problems in particular.”
One. He draws very sweeping, specific, and quantitative conclusions from data too scant to meaningfully support those conclusions. “First, despite the paucity of reliable data, Sahlins drew quantitative and pseudo-quantitative conclusions concerning hunter-gatherer’s work … and leisure.”
25-26: Two. Introduces imprecise concepts.
26: Three. The Australian survey that Sahlins relied on was not of people who normally lived as hunter-gatherers but who were asked to participate in an experiment. The Lee data was from a selective sample of !Kung who were only part-time hunter-gatherers. “Finally, and most important, although Sahlins acknowledged the difficulties involved in studying contemporary peoples as descendants or representatives of prehistoric hunter-gatherers, in discussing evolutionary processes of the macro- time scale, he projected ethnographic observations of the micrco time scale, which left much to be desired.”
ecologically oriented specialists … have reported that Sahlins’s argument does not apply universally, because some peoples—for example, the Ache, the Alyawar, the Agta, and even the !Kung …—work on average at least six hours per day.”

“Drawing on culturally oriented data, new and old, concerning three groups—the Nayaka of South India, the Mbuti of Central Africa, and the Batek of Malaysia—I will argue that Sahlins’s argument, duly updated and reconceptualized, does indeed hold.”

“these hunter-gatherers both praise the goodness and generosity of the natural agencies and (regardless of what they actually have) frequently complain of hunger and other insatiable needs.”

“Do hunter-gatherers have ‘confidence in the yield of the morrow’?” They have seen hard times and they know that they’ll see them again, but “they are confident that under normal conditions it [the environment] will give them food.”

“there is a certain truth in Sahlins’s suggestions that hunter-gatherers have ‘limited needs,’ although it is empirically … inaccurate to say that they restrict their material desires …. They culturally construct their needs as the want of a share. Therefore, they require of their environment what they see when they see it and do not request it to produce more.”

“With one critical proviso, there is also value in Sahlins’s suggestion that hunter-gatherers’ economic dispositions are predicated on abundance. The proviso is that ‘abundance’ as an assumption of their economic model—homologous with and opposite to the assumption of scarcity in Western economic models.”

Overall, she finds that they are affluent in that they assume that nature is abundant that it will share its fruits with them in normal circumstances, even though they know they will face occasional hard times.

Bird-David—Sociality and Immediacy

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SEE THIS FOR SPLITING AND REUNITING
Ingold says, “the person in a hunter-gatherer band, she writes, is like a drop of oil floating on the surface of a pool of water. When these drops come together, they coalesce into a larger drop. But drops can also split up into small ones that may then coalesce with others. Likewise persons, ‘throughout their lives perpetually coalesce with and depart from, each other’ (1994:597).” (checks out)

Abstract:
This article offers a fresh account of the social organization of hunter-gatherers, challenging the ecological framework which has dominated hunter-gatherer studies to date. It re-visits the conversation on ‘band societies’, which was started by Julian Steward in 1936 and nearly died out thirty years later, after the seminal symposium Man the Hunter. It introduces indigenous voice into it, linking them not with ecological but with contemporary theoretical concerns about the diversity of sociality and about society as a concept. The article proposes that band relationships are about ways of relating to others
that rest on ‘we relationships’ and on a ‘sharing perspective’. They are expressions of sociality, the general significance of which has hitherto been largely overlooked.”

591: “Small such groups with weak (if any) boundaries characterize many other band peoples (see Lee & DeVore 1988: 8). …
595-6: Describes a ritual where the Nayaka pour oil on water and show how the drops join and break up.
597: “This oil-in-water sociology, finally, implies egalitarianism. For once, individuals have common access both to potential resources and to available ones—the latter, often only effected by requests for sharing that cannot be refused (see Woodburn 1982). Furthermore—and speaking in Nayaka ‘oil-in-water’ terms—only drops made of the same stuff can amalgamate, and so equality is of the essence. It is an inevitable condition for making relationship. Moreover, since ‘society’ itself is constitutive of these relationships, equality is an a priori position of any person within society.
597: “Born as wholes, persons coalesce with others, but retain their wholeness, they can subsequently depart and again coalesce with others. Throughout their lives, they perpetually coalesce with, and depart from, each other.”

Blurton-Jones, Nicholas. 2002. “Selection for delayed maturity: Does it take 20 years to learn to hunt and gather?” Human nature, 13(2), 199-238.

199-200: “Abstract:
Humans have a much longer juvenile period (weaning to first reproduction, 14 or more years) than their closest relatives (chimpanzees, 8 years). Three explanations are prominent in the literature. (a) Humans need the extra time to learn their complex subsistence techniques. (b) Among mammals, since length of the juvenile period bears a constant relationship to adult lifespan, the human juvenile period is just as expected. We therefore only need to explain the elongated adult lifespan, which can be explained by the opportunity for older individuals to increase their fitness by providing for grandchildren. (c) The recent model by Kaplan and colleagues suggests that longevity and investment in "embodied capital" will coevolve, and that the need to learn subsistence technology contributed to selection for our extended lifespan.

We report experiments designed to test the first explanation: human subsistence technology takes many years to learn, and spending more time learning it gives reproductive benefits that outweigh lost time. Taking away some of this time should lead to deficits in efficiency. We paid Hadza foragers to participate in tests of important subsistence skills. We compared efficiency of males and females at digging tubers. They differ greatly in time spent practicing digging but show no difference in efficiency. Children who lost "bush experience" by spending years in boarding school performed no worse at digging tubers or target archery than those who had spent their entire lives in the bush. Climbing baobab trees, [200] an important and dangerous skill, showed no change with age among those who attempted it. We could show no effects of practice time.
These findings do not support what we label "the practice theory," but we discuss ways in which the theory could be defended; for example, some as-yet-untested skill may be greatly impaired by loss of a few years of the juvenile period. Our data also show that it is not safe to assume that increases in skill with age are entirely due to learning or practice; they may instead be due to increases in size and strength.”

COPIED TO ARTICLES FOLDER, but probably don’t need to read beyond this abstract.

**Blurton Jones et al, H-G Life Spans**

Antiquity of Postreproductive Life: Are There Modern Impacts on Hunter-Gatherer Postreproductive Life Spans?


**ABSTRACT**

Female postreproductive life is a striking feature of human life history and there have been several recent attempts to account for its evolution. But archaeologists estimate that in the past, few individuals lived many postreproductive years. Is postreproductive life a phenotypic outcome of modern conditions, needing no evolutionary account? This article assesses effects of the modern world on hunter-gatherer adult mortality, with special reference to the Hadza. Evidence suggests that such effects are not sufficient to deny the existence of substantial life expectancy at the end of the childbearing career. Data from contemporary hunter-gatherers (Ache, !Kung, Hadza) match longevity extrapolated from regressions of lifespan on body and brain weight. Twenty or so vigorous years between the end of reproduction and the onset of significant senescence does require an explanation.

196: “Our records show four Hadza killed, three by Datoga (two men, one woman) a man killed by other Hadza in 10 years. These deaths come from a sample of 1,000 people followed in our “where are they now” inter-vies and known to have been alive at some time between 1985 and 1995. This is four deaths in 10,000 person-years(40/100,000). Lee (1979) givesa rate for the !Kung of 29.3 per 100,000 person-years. (Kim Hill, personal communication, suggests this figure is an underestimate because it includes the yearsafter police began to intervene and because the people who lived in Namibia were included, while it is not clear that all
homicides that occurred in Namibia would have been recorded. All these killings were of !Kung by !Kung. Thus, compared to !Kung, Hadza lose more people to homicide but themselves kill fewer.”

**Boehm: Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior**

NOTRE DAME: GN 281.4 .B64 1999
Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior.
Published by Harvard University Press, 2001.

1: “The ‘democratic’ origins I describe are not recent and historical, but evolutionary and ancient. They date from well back in the Paleolithic era, and were intimately involved with the development of human nature itself.”

3: In egalitarian societies “individuals who otherwise would be subordinated are clever enough to form a large and united political coalition, and they do so for the express purpose of keeping the strong from dominating the weak. Because the united subordinates are constantly putting down the more assertive alpha types in their midst, egalitarianism is in effect a bizarre type of political hierarchy: the weak combine forces to actively dominate the strong. My thesis is that they must continue such domination if they are to remain autonomous and equal, and prehistorically we shall see that they appear to have done so very predictably as long as hunting bands remained mobile.”

3: “the egalitarian political lifestyle of Upper Paleolithic hunter-gatherers could have profoundly affected our evolving social nature”.

3-4: “before twelve thousand years ago, humans basically were egalitarian … They lived in what might be called societies of equals, with minimal political centralization and no social classes. Everyone participated in group decisions, and outside the family there were no dominators.”

4: “For more than five millennia now, the human trend has been toward hierarchy rather than equality. But the past several centuries have witnessed sporadic but highly successful attempts to reverse this trend”.

5: “Although human political life essentially starts with the nuclear family, it comes into play chiefly at the level of bands, tribes chiefdoms, and nations. In virtually all of these political units, the preponderant power … seems to be in the hands of males.”

9-10: “egalitarianism does not result from the mere absence of hierarchy, as is commonly assumed. Rather, egalitarianism involves a very special type of hierarchy, a curious type that is based on anti/hierarchical feelings.”
“it takes considerable effort to maintain that condition. Our political nature favors the formation of orthodox hierarchies—hierarchies like those of chimpanzees or gorillas, or humans living in chiefdoms or states. … It is politically ambitious individuals, those with special learned or innate propensities to dominate, who are likely to become upstarts in egalitarian bands or tribes.

When subordinates take charge to firmly suppress competition that leads to domination, it takes some effort to keep the political tables turned. …

Thus, egalitarianism does not just happen. Even when the habit of equality and autonomy is well established, an egalitarian order meets with periodic challenges from upstarts.”

If tendencies to hierarchy are to remain decisively reversed, both hunter-gatherers and people living in modern democracies must consciously create, and carefully enforce, egalitarian plans or blueprints. … egalitarianism cannot last long without insightful guidance and manipulation.”

Chimpanzee “males seem intent on domination yet submit readily when it is necessary to do so.”

For both sexes, a dominant position leads to better access to food resources, and for the typically promiscuous males, high rank confers better mating opportunities. … But there are few contexts in which he [the alpha male] actually controls the group, acting as its ‘governor.’ Every chimpanzee decides autonomously where to forage, and whether or not to join in a hunt or go on patrol.

In human terms, then, Goblin is far more a bully than a despotic ruler or even a reasonably strong governor who possesses some decisive authority.”

While rank and file are regularly bullied and dominated, they are little governed—except when they get into fights. And if the costs of being bullied become higher than the rewards of sociability, individuals can seek refuge in peripheral areas … and thereby remain undominated. … a sexually active female can transfer to an adjacent community. A male really cannot do so, for he is apt to be killed on sight”.

Consider now the very different political life of human being who live in strong chiefdoms or modern nations.” They can be more despotic or more egalitarian.

Politically equalized bands and tribes had been found on every continent, so this anomaly could not be explained as some kind of local historical development. They were found in a bewildering array of ecological niches, so environmental influences did not seem to be a major determinant; egalitarians foraged, farmed, and herded animals. They also used many different residence and descent rules and a variety of kin terms.”

Humans are innately disposed to form social dominance hierarchies similar to those of the African great apes, but that prehistoric hunter-gatherers, acting as moral communities, were largely able to neutralize such tendencies—just as extant hunter-gatherers do. The ethnographic basis for that hypothesis was that present-day foragers apply techniques of social control in suppressing both dominant leadership and undue competitiveness.”
65: “[Kauft (1991)] compared the quite hierarchical nature of extant great apes with hunter-gatherers … suggesting that with respect to political hierarchy human evolution had followed a U-shaped trajectory. The curve began with strong degrees of despotism … then dipped to represent a protracted period of hunter-gatherer egalitarianism. Not too long after the domestication of plants and animals, the curve climbed steeply to encompass no only hierarchical chiefdoms, but eventually modern civilizations and nations. In effect, Kauft was posing an evolutionary riddle: how could a species apparently lose its innate tendencies to hierarchy for possibly millions of years, then suddenly regain them so forcefully?”

71: “the average nomadic hunter-gatherer band has only half a dozen or so adult hunters or people who are otherwise likely to be chosen as leaders”.

72-73: “For a moral nonconformist, living with other people in a band often is quite literally the only way to stay alive. Most foragers have alternative bands they can join, but the number is very limited. If the individual runs out of bands, in some environments he and his family are likely to perish without the cooperation and sharing that are advantageous in making a living. In the Arctic, where solitary existence meant all but certain death, fugitive deviants sometimes managed to establish colonies of outcasts—murders or men who had stolen other men’s wives and had to flee …. Inuit speakers in these deviant colonies survived by working together just as people in normal bands did.”

74: “A cardinal act of political deviance is to attempt to set oneself above another person in a way that is belittling, or, worse, to try to give direct orders to one’s peers. The available sanctions run from criticism to ridicule to execution. When it is a leader who oversteps, special sanctions are available. These include pointed disobedience, desertion of the by moving to a different band, or formally deposing the person from the group leadership role (assuming that it exists).

To document such patterns of political control, I now survey the specifics of sanctioning on four continents: Australia, North America, Africa, and Asia.”

84: “With respect to deviance, bands tend to be highly conformist societies—in spite of the heavy emphasis on personal autonomy. … it became apparent that political processes everywhere were similar, and that the sanctioning methods I identified were likely to be widely distributed.

To summarize, the specific anti-authoritarian sanctions I encountered followed a continuum from moderate (criticism, ridicule, or disobedience) to strong (ostracism or expulsion, deposition or desertion) to ultimate (execution).”

86-87: “Hunter-gatherers in their bands may seem bereft of government as we know it, particularly if one looks to political structure—to the existence of offices or roles involving unambiguous lines of personal authority. Outside the family, there is very little delegated, legitimate, effective authority …. Yet on a collective basis these people do manipulate and control their social and political life to a substantial degree, by acting as a moral community. One way they govern themselves is by imposing an egalitarian blueprint on their social and political life; the main political actors are able to do this cooperatively, behaving as one large and somewhat amorphous political authority that makes its decisions by consensus.”
The result is nothing like anarchy—a term evocative of romantic (or pejorative) sentiment. Anarchy suggests an absence of power and control, but the band as a cohesive group of adults is in a position to speak with collective authority—and to behave dominantly in governing the behavior of individual deviants. … this power usually remains latent. But it is always there, assuming that the band remains in agreement about its moral issues—and avoids serious political factions by fissioning. Bands are normally in a position to act as well-unified moral communities.”

87: “authority tends to be present, legitimate, and relatively unrestrained within the household. Dominant control is directed at children, and often at wives, so acts of interpersonal domination are witnessed constantly.”

88-89: “One of the great mysteries of social evolution is the transition from egalitarian society to hierarchical society. … a hunting and gathering way of life in itself does not guarantee a decisively egalitarian political orientation; nomadism and absence of food storage … also seem to be needed. Nomadism in itself does not guarantee egalitarianism either, for after domestication of animals some pastoral nomads were egalitarian but others became hierarchical …. Nor does becoming sedentary and storing food [necessarily] spell the end of an egalitarian ethos and political way of life.”

90: “The political arrangements of foraging communities can be either egalitarian or nonegalitarian, but the mobile groups we call bands are always egalitarian, ideologically speaking. They are also egalitarian in fact, except when they are experiencing a domination episode. “Tribes” are seen … as being egalitarian by definition; they are taken to represent a stage of political evolution that is intermediate between egalitarian bands and hierarchical chieftdoms.

90-91: “Tribesmen, for my purposes, are nonliterate people who have domesticated plants or animals; have an egalitarian ethos; live in small, locally autonomous social groups; and refuse to permit strong authority to develop in the context of everyday group leadership.”

91: “Curiously, the radical subsistence changes that came in with the Neolithic era did not alter group political life very much. In spite of a major ecological transition, reverse dominance hierarchies continued in force through similar mechanisms of social control. However, with the advent of chieftdoms the political ethos became hierarchical ….

It is safe to say that with the advent of the Neolithic era, most foragers became tribesmen. However, by no means did tribal societies always turn into chieftdoms. Indeed, the bulk of ethnographic descriptions on record today are of tribal societies whose egalitarianism extends back to the acquisition of domestication, and farther back to the Paleolithic era.”

93: “Yanomamo villages typically comprise perhaps a hundred persons. Although they can approach two hundred, they are prone to fission. … The village headman walks a difficult political line …. He cannot control the serious village-splitting conflicts—homicidal conflicts between men of different clans—because he operates in an egalitarian society that does not allow him the requisite authority.
Male authority certainly is not absent in this society. The Yanomamo beat their wives severely. Any man has this prerogative, for the egalitarian rules do not pertain to intrafamilial use of authority.

94: “The Yanomamo do not fight over land used for horticulture, and Chagnon (1983) has rejected suggestions that they may fight over hunting territory. Apparently what they are fighting about is women, whom they make scarce by practicing preferential female infanticide, and about revenge. … The endemic violence has many ramifications, but essentially the Yanomamo remain just as egalitarian as nomadic hunter-gatherers.”

98: “Several ‘tribal republics’ in North America … did set up permanent governments that remained egalitarian in spite of having centralized functions … the ultimate stable segmentary system was the Iroquois Confederation”.

105: “Even though individuals may be attracted personally to a dominant role, they make a common pact which says that each main political actor will give up his modest chances of becoming alpha in order to be certain that no one will ever be alpha over him. To repeat Schneider’s words, ‘All men seek to rule, but if they cannot rule, they prefer to be equal.’ This adage parsimoniously explains the political attitude that keeps an egalitarian ethos in place, be it forager or tribal.”

112-122: Tribesmen seldom have to use sanctions to maintain equality because people know the cultural limits, but have several sanctions available, including: public opinion; criticism; ridicule and ostracism; disobedience, deposition, and desertion; and assassination.

122-123: “Given the fact that such societies universally use collective sanctioning in order to remain egalitarian, and all seem to develop upstarts from time to time, I believe the characterization ‘reverse dominance hierarchy’ is applicable. In effect, it is the rank and file who are on top, and the would-be alphas who remain under their thumbs.”

144: Examples of chiefdoms in which the egalitarian ethos is absent. But they still have to worry about rebellion if they fail to abide by tradition.

145: “In delegating legitimized power to their rulers, people in primitive kingdoms go far beyond what takes place in chiefdoms …. The egalitarian ethos is long gone, having been replaced by a hierarchical worldview by which people accept major differences that not only separate commoners from the royal line, but may include an intermediate noble class as well as savages at the bottom.”

146: “both ancient civilization and modern nations are highly despotic because the leaders can govern strongly, with abundant coercive power.”

146-147: “Humans appear to be capable of extremely adaptive modification. At one extreme are egalitarian foragers; at the other, despotic kingdoms and modern dictatorships. If we look below the surface, however, the fact that egalitarians are obliged to strongly suppress both competition and social hierarchy means that they range of modifications is not so broad. While I have placed foragers and tribesmen somewhere between bonobos and chimpanzees, primitive kingdoms are tyrannical modern states are far more despotic than any ape.”

147: “Human nature surely is despotic …, particularly if we focus on the males; but the forms that our hierarchies take are quite varied—precisely because sometimes the subordinates take firm charge of the group, sometimes they share
their power with fairly authoritative leaders, and sometimes they are subjugated or enslaved. Our despotic nature is flexible”.

196: “The process [of forming a reverse dominance hierarchy] could have begun with *Homo Erectus*, and conceivably even earlier, depending on when the linguistic and cultural thresholds were present for moral life to develop. But the highest state of behavioral and cultural readiness was reached by Anatomically Modern Humans.”

199: “An altruistic gene can be defined simply and unambiguously: It is supported by between-group selection, and it is undercut by within-group selection …. However, as Kauft … points out, for well over twenty years evolutionary biologists, sociobiologically inclined anthropologists, and evolutionary psychologists have agreed—almost, but not quite unanimously—that natural selection can support nepotistic helpfulness but *not* altruistic helpfulness.”

199: “The factual problem is that extant hunter-gatherer nomads not only cooperate, in very generalized ways, as groups, but to a significant degree they may take care of nonrelatives in their bands …. They also preach steadfastly and strongly in favor of altruism … while such preaching is of obvious importance, its ultimate, natural-selection basis remains little explored.

199-200: “Traditional approaches in social biology have been seriously out of touch with common sense when traits such as human cooperativeness and one-way helping behavior are explained wholly in terms of selfish desire for self-aggrandizement, innate nepotism, exact reciprocation, or third-party coercion.”

205: “The vast majority of these scholars have rejected group selection as a viable level of natural selection, and this decision automatically excludes the evolution of altruistic genes in any mammalian species, including our own. However, for more than two decades David Sloan Wilson has been a ‘voice in the wilderness’. … His heretical and increasingly persuasive campaigning on behalf of multilevel selection prominently features selection between groups. …

For two decades I too have been pointing to mechanical possibilities for group selection mainly in humans”.

252: “We humans will never be able to live in relaxed egalitarian societies, in the way that *squirrel monkeys* do much of the time. These monkeys’ innate dispositions appear to be substantially different from our own apelike dispositions, which are ethologically despotic. It is our capacity for morality, a most important cultural universal, that enables us to create egalitarianism out of what would otherwise be despotism.”

253: “After the mutual ancestor gave birth to the human lineage, at some point humans (conceivably even hominids) were poised on the threshold of inventing not only morality, but egalitarianism. Innately they were still despotic, for they were given to dominance, subordination, and the formation of power pyramids with just a few dominators at the top. But with help from morality, an insubordinate rank and file learned to combine their power in a politically focused, durable way and managed to turn such pyramids upside down. This political invention proved attractive to other groups whose subordinates resented being dominated, and it spread. People lived in dominance hierarchies that were decisively reversed for at least several thousand generations.
Gradually, many millennia of egalitarianism modified our basic social dispositions. All those generations under the egalitarian syndrome were likely to have affected our basic political dispositions as well.

254: “I suspect that the most radical effects of the egalitarian syndrome on human behavior dispositions came in the social field, because of robust selection of genes for altruism.”

255: “This book has chronicled some major surprises in human political and social evolution. The moral community was a profound development indeed, and it empowered large subordinate coalitions as they outlawed domination by stronger individuals in their bands. This was the egalitarian surprise. After the Neolithic, another unexpected occurrence was the large-scale tribal egalitarian society, a segmentary type of reverse hierarchy that permitted individual autonomy and freedom to combine (ephemerally) with some centralized governance and large-scale military operations. Eventually that society led to the development of a few tribal republics, which consolidated themselves politically on a durable basis yet remained egalitarian—a special (and rare) innovation in the tribal field. Given our apelike despotic nature, the advent of chiefdoms was no political surprise. Indeed, I have likened chimpanzee alpha males to the leaders of human chiefdoms because both have some limited means of controlling the destiny of their group. By contrast, the degree of centralized political control in primitive kingdoms and early civilizations was phenomenal by primate standards.”

256-257: “Marx and Engels were sincere altruists and political reformers, but as visionary democrats they were unrealistic. Unfortunately for the modern world, they subscribed to a strongly ‘Rousseauian’ position on human nature: remove the cancer of exploitative capitalism, and human social systems would all be automatically become egalitarian, noncompetitive, and noncoercive. Had these political visionaries understood human nature as it has been described in this book—and understood, therefore, the depth of the need for political vigilance and formal checks and balances—the world might have been spared a long and costly Cold War that fortunately was won by realistic democrats.

Marx and Engels were not alone. In their anthropological naïveté, visionary communists everywhere failed to see that human hierarchical tendencies are simply too strong to allow dominant competition to evaporate and the state to wither away on its own. The image was compelling, and it captured the hearts of resentful underdogs everywhere. But the social engineering was inept: the blueprint was not laid with an accurate view of human political nature.

Hunter-gatherers maintain similar blueprints, but they are utter realists about human nature. Intuitively they comprehend the need for eternal political vigilance, and the need for force in the hands of the rank and file as means of controlling the self-aggrandizing tendencies of their own leading citizens. Similarly, the Iroquois understood the need for formal checks and balances in their very large version of tribal government. For them, the equally realistic American revolutionaries borrowed wisely, having recently been dominated by a foreign king. A belated communist response was to declare a Dictatorship of the
Proletariat, but this ideological Band-Aid solved none of the problems of poorly controlled despotism.”

Boehm, Moral Origins

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14-15: “I shall show that the human conscience is no mere evolutionary side effect, as Darwin had to imply it was. Rather, it evolved for specific reasons having to do with the Pleistocene environments humans had to cope with prehistorically and, more specifically, with their growing [15] ability to use group punishment to better their own social and subsistence lives and create more socially equalized societies.”
15-16: “That group members’ punitive actions can not only influence group life but also shape gene pools in similar directions is one main thesis of this book. Therefore, we must as if some limited purposeful [16] element is actually creeping into a biological evolutionary process that, in their, is supposed to be operating ‘blindly.’”
319: “I have tied moral origins to the major political transition of earlier humans from being a species that lived hierarchically to becoming one that became devoutly egalitarian. The theory I’ve proposed can be state simply: what put this very decisive brand of egalitarianism so firmly in place was the ability of politically unified groups to ‘outlaw’ and punish resented alpha-male behavior. The impact was profound, for this put an evolutionary premium on self-control and also began to suppress free riders in ways that were all be uniquely human.”
319: “I’ve suggested that archaic Homo sapiens might conceivably have already been fully egalitarian before a quarter of a million years ago, when intensive hunting began. … What I feel most confident in hypothesizing is that from a quarter of a million years forward archaic humans in bands, with their obvious needs for efficient meat distribution, had a great deal to gain by being engaged in the same intensive, effective, general suppression of alpha-male behavior practiced today.”

Bonta, Cooperation and Competition in Peaceful Societies


GRANT’S RECOMMENDATION, “please find attached … a paper with an appendix of 25 so-called non-violence small-scale societies. Some are more dubious than other but it makes a certain kinda point.”

Bruce D. Bonta, “Cooperation and Competition in Peaceful Societies.”

ABSTRACT: p. 299: Most of the world's nonviolent societies base their peaceful worldviews on cooperation and an opposition to competition. Although they have nurturant, affiliative societies, many raise their children to be hesitant and fearful about the intentions of others so that they will internalize nonviolent values and never take their peacefulness, or that of others, for granted. The children in these societies lack competitive games; although they are loved as babies, by the time they are 2 or 3 years old, they are made to feel no more important than others. These societies devalue achievement because it leads to competition and aggressiveness, which leads to violence they feel. Their rituals reinforce their cooperative, harmonious beliefs and behaviors. They have internalized their peaceful, cooperative values so that their psychological structures accord with their beliefs in nonviolence.

299-300: “there is a fairly substan-[300] tial body of scholarly literature on nonviolent or peaceful societies—groups of people who live without much or any violence in their lives. Perhaps some or most of these societies are also noncompetitive? A review of this literature shows that, in fact, many of them are highly noncompetitive. … More than 40 societies have been identified as peaceful, where people live with virtually no, or in some cases absolutely no, recorded instances of violence.

More than 40 societies have been identified as peaceful, where people live with virtually no, or in some cases absolutely no, recorded instances of violence.”

300: “… The research reported in this literature, if examined carefully, does turn up a rich and interesting vein of information on competitive, cooperative, and individualistic behaviors, which should be useful to researchers concerned with these issues—particularly those who are interested in the connections between competition and aggression or, the converse, between cooperation and nonaggression. … As I describe in more detail later, basic to the worldviews of these 40 or more societies is their absolute opposition to manifestations of violence. The literature makes it clear that 23 of them link competition quite firmly to aggression, and as a result they are opposed to both; but 2 of the societies do not seem to have any problem with competition.

… I do not cover or take a sample from small-scale societies in general; neither do I attempt to produce a statistical analysis from the literature about the peaceful societies. … To summarize, these 25 societies were selected because (a) they appear to be somewhat, highly, or totally peaceful; and (b) information is available about their competition, cooperation, and individualism. This article is a search for alternative ideas about the ways that societies build a psychology of peacefulness and an opposition to aggression and violence. …

… several scholarly, comparative analyses list the peaceful societies and discuss many aspects of their nonviolence (Fabbro, 1978; Howell & Willis, 1989; Montagu, 1978; Ross, 1993; Sponsel & Gregor, 1994)
“Whereas some researchers might argue that modesty and peacefulness are not necessarily incompatible with achievement and leadership, most of the peoples in the nonviolent societies would not agree (although few would debate the point because that would be considered too aggressive). Out of the nonviolent societies that are explicitly opposed to competition, many are also opposed to the recognition of individual achievement, success, and leadership. Instead, they highly value humility and modesty and do not tolerate achievement-oriented people. The opposition of these societies to achievement appears to be based on the concern that successful individuals will threaten the overall stability and peace of the group.

…the !Kung … are very strongly opposed to competition (Draper, 1976). They also are very strongly opposed to any signs that one person might think he or she is superior to another. They constantly find ways to make sure that people relate modestly with others and that there is absolutely no appearance of people making anything of their individual achievements. Even an elaborate gift if it is perceived as self-display is challenged (Lee, 1969).”

“Many of the nonviolent societies, although not all, avoid having leaders—another aspect of their tendency to refrain from focusing on individuals and their achievements. The !Kung traditionally had no leaders with authority … prestige that a person may have from knowledge of a field, which enables him or her to exert some leadership, does not carry over into other fields (Silberbauer, 1982).

Among some of the societies, the lack of leadership is based on their belief in an absolute condition of equality, in which no one individual can tell another what to do (K. L. Endicott, 1984; Howell, 1988). In several societies in addition to the !Kung and the G/wi, individuals with a lot of ability or wisdom are given considerable respect, although without any authority …

Some of the peaceful societies, of course, do have leaders, such as the Buid (Gibson, 1986) and Piaroa (Overing Kaplan, 1975). Most of the societies with leaders, however, do not give them power, prestige, or privileges that would distinguish them from others, despite the fact that they may be expected to perform rituals, help resolve disputes, foster fidelity to group traditions, and recommend strategies for economic survival and prosperity. …

Modesty and humility are behavioral strategies used by a number of the societies to prevent competition and conflict. The list would include, among others, the Tahitians (Levy, 1973), Paliyan (Gardner, 1985), Amish (Kraybill, 1989; Savells, 1988), traditional Mennonites (Driedger & Kraybill, 1994; Juhnke, 1989), and Inuit (Briggs, 1994). The nonviolent societies, in summary, are reticent, cautious, and modest about personal achievements, and they avoid leadership, or at least the arrogance of leadership, as a major strategy to maintain their peacefulness.

… some of the bands in the central Canadian Arctic … have a strongly felt ideology of their nonviolence, cooperativeness, equality, and generosity. Their ideology is based on extremely strong controls, particularly their psychology of contradictions, which prevent the expressions of anger and aggression. To the Inuit, opposite values are important,
constructive aspects of their society: As a hunting people, killing is essential, but nonviolence is an equally essential value to maintain the society (Briggs, 1971, 1982).”

306: “the literature on the nonviolent peoples, despite variations from society to society, shows that the societies have structures that reinforce their beliefs that competition fosters aggression: They have developed strong psychological controls, which nurture cooperative, helpful, peaceful behaviors and limit competitive and aggressive ones.”

308: “The assertion that competition is ubiquitous is clearly contradicted by the evidence of the nonviolent societies. Montagu (1976) pointed out that cooperation is also a ubiquitous social behavior, in fact, it is more prevalent than competition. The literature on the peaceful societies supports and amplifies Montagu's conclusions: Peaceful societies are highly cooperative in nature, and competition is relatively rare. Of the 45 unique societies listed by Bonta (1993), only 2 appear to explicitly thrive on competition, as already mentioned—the Fipa and Jains—and a few others exhibit very modest instances of competition on occasion.”

312: “To conclude, although most of the nonviolent societies are strongly opposed to competition, abstain from competition, or foster cooperation as important elements of their peacefulness, some of them contradict these patterns. These societies, exceptions to the general pattern, are able, perhaps paradoxically, to mix competitive and cooperative behaviors and still maintain their peacefulness.

…

Conclusion
Several conclusions are possible from this review of the literature on the scores of nonviolent societies around the world. The most striking conclusion is that, for many of these societies, the central, defining elements in their beliefs are strong opposition to competition and support for cooperation. Whereas the literature varies, some of the societies are described as strongly opposed to competition, others as never experiencing it, and others as highly cooperative. Whichever the case, only two societies, which can be described as nonviolent, are also quite competitive, and the literature reveals instances of competition in a few others. Cooperation is overwhelmingly the dominant orientation of the peaceful societies.”

313: “A number of social scientists have observed a complete absence of competitive games in such societies, and some have gone on to describe the elements of cooperation they saw in children's activities. …

The nonviolent societies clearly link competition with aggression and violence. Those who are hunting peoples see the need for the killing of animals, but they react with horror at the thought of violence to other humans. Anger and aggressiveness are negatively valued, whereas in general, nurturance and cooperation with the group are positively valued. These societies also strongly de-emphasize individual achievement, which for some of them shows the close identification with competitiveness and hence aggressiveness. Even the societies that emphasize personal autonomy do not allow individuals to stand out to the extent of overshadowing others. Most of the societies foster modesty, humility, and an opposition to general leadership as part of their egalitarian, cooperative ethos. But does competitiveness necessarily lead to violence? The examples of the Fipa and Jains show that it does not. However, many of the peaceful societies view competitiveness as a dangerous behavior that should be avoided and strongly opposed. In addition, because most of them have such a negative attitude toward
competition, there is an implication—not necessarily an absolute cause-and-effect relationship—that competitive behavior does help produce violence in human societies.

Appendix, non-violent societies [317-320]

317:
Batek
“A Negrito Orang Asli (aboriginal) people living in the highlands of the Malay Peninsula traditionally subsisted mostly by hunting, gathering, and trading the products of the forest; they have been affected by extensive lumbering in more recent years, the same as the other traditional societies in Malaysia.”

318:
Buid
“The Buid are an aboriginal people of the highlands of Mindoro Island in the Philippines who live by swidden agriculture and trading with the lowland Filipino peoples.”

Chewong
An Orang Asli society who live in the mountains of the Malay Peninsula, some of the Chewong are settled agriculturalists, while others live in the forests by hunting, fishing, foraging, and trading. As the government of Malaysia has clear cut the forest, the lives of all of the traditional societies in the mountains have been severely affected. The Chewong have been described by Signe Howell in a number of works as people who have absolutely no mythology of violence; whose language includes no words for quarreling, fighting, aggression, or warfare; and who are completely unable to adapt to any conflict. During her 17 months of living with the Chewong, Howell (1984) "never witnessed a quarrel, nor an outburst of anger, except among small children" (p. 37).

G/wi
“The G/wi are a so-called "San" or "Bushman" society of the Central Kalahari Desert of southern Africa; the traditional economy of the G/wi was based on hunting and gathering, although today most are laborers on farms.”

Inuit
“Aboriginal peoples who live in the Arctic from western Siberia across northern Alaska and Canada to Greenland, the Inuit traditionally subsisted on fishing, trapping, and hunting, although now they are part of the cash economy.”

Kadar
“A traditional, tribal people who subsist on hunting, gathering, and trading near the southern end of the Western Ghats mountain range in India”

318-9:
!Kung
“The !Kung are a San or Bushmen society in Botswana and Namibia, southern Africa, who traditionally subsisted on hunting and gathering but today live off their wage labor on farms plus their own livestock and gardening. … [319] Lee (1979) discredited their nonviolence by analyzing the rate of murders that have occurred among them in comparison with the murder rate in modern U.S. cities. However, there is contradictory evidence (Thomas, 1994) that, during the period when the !Kung still lived primarily as a nomadic people, they were peaceful overall, despite the tensions that flared up fairly
frequently in their camps: The murders that occurred were the result of exceptional circumstances such as a case of mental illness. Clearly from the literature, overall they had a fairly, if not highly, peaceful society.”

319: Montagnais-Naskapi

“These American Indian people, also called the Innu, traditionally subsisted on hunting, trapping, and trading in the forests of the Labrador Peninsula in Canada, although today they are primarily dependent on the cash economy. They fought some wars historically, although they usually preferred quiet, peaceful relations with each other and the European fur traders who established trading posts in their territory in the early 17th century. There are reports of domestic violence caused by alcohol (Leacock, 1981). An important feature of their traditional society was that they would never fail to share scarce food resources with other families who might be in danger of starvation (Leacock, 1969).

Nayaka
“The Nayaka are a tribal society that lives on hunting, gathering, trading, and some wage labor at the southern end of the Western Ghats in India.”

Paliyan
“the Paliyan live in the forest fringes of remote Hindu villages in southern India (near the Nayaka and Kadar), subsisting on nomadic gathering and contract labor,”

Piaroa
“These Native American people of Venezuela formerly lived in forest villages along the highland tributaries of the Orinoco but moved downriver in the 1970s to live in permanent settlements.”

Semai
“These Orang Asli people subsisted on swidden agriculture and gathering, fishing, and hunting in the mountains of the Malay Peninsula until recently, when their traditional economy was significantly modified by the lumbering of their area forests.”

REFERENCES:


Bowles et al: Special issue
NOT ALL THAT VALUABLE: Mostly about when, whether, and why inequality existed. Not about property rights or state-private issues and not much relating to it.

Bowles et al: The Emergence and Persistence of Inequality in Premodern Societies

Samuel Bowles, Eric Alden Smith, and Monique Borgerhoff Mulder. The Emergence and Persistence of Inequality in Premodern Societies

Introduction to the Special Section

ABSTRACT: In this special section we propose an interpretation of the emergence and persistence of wealth inequality in premodern populations along with ethnographic and quantitative evidence exploring this hypothesis. The long-term trajectory of inequality in premodern societies, we suggest, is based on the differing importance of three classes of wealth—material, embodied, and relational—together with differences in the transmission of these types of wealth across generations. Subsequent essays in this forum use data on individual and household wealth from 21 populations to evaluate this and related propositions concerning the interaction of wealth class, transmission rates, production systems (foraging, horticultural, pastoral, and agricultural), and inequality. Here we motivate our interpretation by applying our ideas to the Holocene transition from more egalitarian to more stratified societies, introduce key concepts that are developed in the subsequent essays, and comment on some of the limitations of our study.

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Four articles on four modes of production

Wealth Transmission and Inequality among Hunter-Gatherers
Eric Alden Smith, Kim Hill, Frank W. Marlowe, David Nolin, Polly Wiessner, Michael Gurven, Samuel Bowles, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Tom Hertz, and Adrian Bell

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Eric Alden Smith, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Samuel Bowles, Michael Gurven, Tom Hertz, and Mary K. Shenk
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SEE ALSO ELECTRONIC HIGHLIGHTS
ABSTRACT:
Premodern human societies differ greatly in socioeconomic inequality. Despite much useful theorizing on the causes of these differences, individual-level quantitative data on wealth inequality is lacking. The papers in this special section provide the first comparable estimates of intergenerational wealth transmission and inequality in premodern societies, with data on more than 40 measures of embodied, material, and relational wealth from 21 premodern societies representing four production systems (hunter-gatherers, horticulturalists, pastoralists, and agriculturalists). Key findings include (1) the importance of material, embodied, and relational wealth differs significantly across production systems, with material wealth more important in pastoral and agricultural systems; (2) the degree of wealth transmission from parent to offspring is markedly higher for material wealth than embodied and relational wealth; (3) aggregate wealth is transmitted to a higher degree among pastoralists and agriculturalists; (4) the degree of inequality is greater for material wealth; and (5) the degree of intergenerational transmission of wealth is correlated with wealth inequality. Surprisingly, horticulturalists exhibit no greater wealth inequality or intergenerational wealth transmission than do huntergatherers, while pastoralists are very similar to agriculturalists. We discuss how these trends may have
favored the emergence of institutionalized inequality, as intensified forms of production made material wealth transmission increasingly important.

92: “Our finding that the overall intergenerational transmission of wealth is no greater in horticultural than in hunter-gatherer populations is provocative. It suggests that, contrary to the many models of the emergence of institutionalized inequality, the domestication of plants and animals per se may not have been sufficient. Instead, persistent inequality may have depended on subsequent developments associated with intensified forms of cultivation and animal husbandry represented by agriculture and pastoral livelihoods. … Horticulturnalists rely on domesticates, but this production system is characterized by abundance of land relative to labor and, hence, low payoffs to defending property rights at the household level (Harrell 1997). Only when land becomes scarce enough can it repay the social and economic costs of excluding some members of one’s group in order to retain long-term control of arable land. This scarcity in turn drives technological and ecological investment such as plowing, irrigation, and terracing, which increase the incentive for control and transmission to descendants.”

92: “If plant and animal domestication is not sufficient to stimulate institutionalized inequality, it is also not always necessary. Ethnographers and archaeologists have long noted the existence in various times and places of hierarchical hunter-gatherer societies with marked inequalities in wealth and status … The best-described examples of such hierarchical foragers are the various societies of the North Pacific Rim, from Aleut to Coast Salish. Most focused their subsistence production on rich marine resources, particularly salmon runs; and again, the density and spatiotemporal predictability (hence, economic defensibility) of key resources, enhanced in this case by fish traps and extensive storage, would reward the defense and intergenerational transmission of property rights, favoring the emergence of persistent inequality.

The egalitarian ethos of most hunter-gatherer societies in the ethnographic record (Boehm 2000) and the limited wealth inequalities in our hunter-gatherer estimates are consistent with the view that, at least prior to some 20,000 years ago, economic inequalities between families were quite limited. Although scattered evidence of economic inequality predates the Holocene (Formicola 2007; Pettitt and Bader 2000; Soffer 1989; Vanhaeren and d’Errico 2005), the Holocene saw the emergence of permanent inequality in many populations, eventually culminating in the rise of class societies and the hierarchical ancient states (Ames 2007; Carneiro 1970; Price 1995; Wright 1978).”
92: “In sum, our findings resonate with the argument that controlling access to economically defensible resources such as intensively worked land or other scarce resource-producing sites (e.g., salmon streams, livestock herds, trade routes) is a potent contributor to the emergence and persistence of high levels of inequality (Boone 1992).”

Discussion

Comments and Reply: Intergenerational Wealth Transmission and Inequality in Premodern Societies

Comments on the Emergence and Persistence of Inequality in Premodern Societies
Kenneth M. Ames

Does It Matter What Form Inheritance Takes? Comments on Bowles, Smith, and Borgerhoff Mulder
James L. Boone

Studying Wealth Transmission and Inequality in Premodern Societies: Some Caveats
Dan Bradburd

Measuring Inequality through the Strength of Inheritance
Gregory Clark

Evolution Is Not Egalitarian
Mark V. Flinn

History and the Problem of Synchronic Models
N. Thomas Håkansson

A Good Start
Robert L. Kelly

Inheritance and Inequality of Wealth: A Comment
Frederic L. Pryor

Comparative Anthropology and Human Inequality
Stephen Shennan

The Emergence and Persistence of Inequality in Premodern Societies: A Historical Perspective
Richard Waller

Intergenerational Wealth Transmission and Inequality in Premodern Societies: Reply
Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *A Cooperative Species*

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1: “we advance two propositions:

First, people cooperate not only for self-interested reasons but also because they are genuinely concerned about the well-being of others, try to uphold social norms, and value behaving ethically for its own sake. People punish those who exploit the cooperative behavior of others for the same reasons. Contributing to the success of a joint project for the benefit of one’s group, even at a personal cost, evokes feelings of satisfaction, pride, even elation. Failing to do so is often a source of shame or guilt.

Second, we have come to have these ‘moral sentiments’ because our ancestors lived in environments, both natural and socially constructed, in which groups of individuals who were predisposed to cooperate and uphold ethical norms tended to survive and expand relative to other groups”.

1-2: Evidence that people in South Africa 75-95,000 years ago hunted cooperatively and shared the meat.

3: “the task we set for ourselves is not that typically addressed by biologists and economists, namely to explain why people cooperate despite being selfish. Rather, we seek to explain why we are not purely selfish—why social preferences that sustain altruistic cooperation are so common.”

4: “we will advance three reasons why these altruistic social preferences supporting cooperation outcompeted unmitigated and amoral self-interest.

   First, human groups have devised ways to protect their altruistic members from exploitation by the self-interested. …

   Second, humans adopted prolonged and elaborate systems of socialization that led individuals to internalize the norms that induce cooperation, so that contributing to common projects and punishing defectors became objectives in their own right rather than constraints on behavior. …

   Third, between-group competition for resources and survival was and remains a decisive for in human evolutionary dynamics.”

5: Edgeworth … *Mathematical Physics*: ‘The first principle of economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest’ (1881, p. 104).”

93: “[Among] prehistoric men … life was a continual free fight, and beyond the limited and temporary relations of the family, the Hobbesian war of each against all was the normal state of existence.’ T. H. Huxley *the Struggle for existence: A Programme* (1888), p. 163
‘The philosophers … have all felt it necessary to go back to the state of nature, but none of them has succeeded in getting there.’ J.-J. Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality Among Men* (1755), p. 1

94: “We will see [in this chapter] that neither the likely size of groups, nor the degree of genetic relatedness within groups, nor the typical demography of foraging bands is favorable to the view that Late Pleistocene human cooperation can be adequately explained by kin-based altruism or reciprocal altruism. What is known or can reasonably be inferred about the Late Pleistocene and early Holocene suggests that ancestral humans did not live in small closed groups in which family and self-interest with a long time horizon alone were the cement of society. Rather our ancestors were cosmopolitan, civic-minded, and warlike. They almost certainly benefited from far-flung coinsurance, traducing, mating and other social networks, as well as from coalitions and, if successful, warfare with other groups.”

95: “The minimal feasible foraging band, Christopher Boehm (2007) reasoned, would include 5 hunters. The number of adult decision makers then would be triple or more this number, counting women and the elderly. The average and (census) size among 175 ‘warm climate, non-equestrian’ hunter-gatherer groups identified by Frank Marlowe (2005) as the groups in the ethnographic record most likely to be similar to ancestral humans is 37. Even if we exclude the old and the young, this would be about 12 adult decision makers. … even for groups a half this size reciprocal altruism will evolve only for implausibly low rates of behavioral or perceptual error and extraordinarily high benefit-cost ratios of the altruistic behavior.”

Citing:


95-99: argues that most communities were demographically unstable during the Pleistocene, experiencing frequent population crashes or the need to relocate altogether. 110: “It has been conventional since Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan* to attribute the maintenance of social order to states. But for at least 95% of the time the biologically modern humans have existed, our ancestors somehow fashioned a system of governance that without the assistance of governments avoided the chaos of the Hobbesian state of nature sufficiently to become by far the most enduring of social orders ever. The genetic, archaeological, ethnographic, and demographic data make it quite clear that they did not accomplish this by limiting human interactions to a few close genetic relatives. … a particular form of altruism, often hostile toward outsiders and punishing toward insiders who violate norms, coevolved with a set of institutions … that at once protected a group’s altruistic members and made group-level cooperation the sine qua non of survival.”

112: “Conventions such as sharing food or information with other group members, consensus decision making, and political practices that prevent dominate males from monopolizing reproduction are examples of *reproductive leveling*, a form of niche construction that, as we will see, contributes to the evolution of altruism. … Because altruists receive lower payoffs than other group members, they benefit from reproductive
leveling because this attenuates the within-group selective pressures working against them.”

Chapter 8, pp. 133-147 argues that the cooperation was largely (though not entirely) in-group. Suspicion of outsiders is also a likely outcome of the models.

Carneiro—A Theory of the Origin of the State


733: “(When I speak of a state I mean an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities with- in its territory and having a centralized government with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree and enforce laws.)”
733: “the old Social Contract theory, which was associated especially with the name of Rousseau. We now know that no such compact was ever subscribed to by human groups, and the Social Contract theory is today nothing more than a historical curiosity.”
734: “voluntaristic theories of the rise of the state founder on the same rock: the demonstrated inability of autonomous political units to relinquish their sovereignty in the absence of overriding external constraints. We see this inability manifested again and again by political units ranging from tiny villages to great empires.”
734: “A-close examination of history indicates that only a coercive theory can account for the rise of the state. Force, and not enlightened self-interest, is the mechanism by which political evolution has led, step by step, from autonomous villages to the state.”
735: “For Amazonia as a whole, then, population density was low and subsistence pres- sure on the land was slight. …. The consequences of the type of war- fare that did occur in Amazonia were as follows. A defeated group was not, as a rule, driven from its land. Nor did the victor make any real effort to subject the vanquished, or to exact tribute from him. This would have been difficult to accomplish in any case, since there was no effective way to prevent the losers from fleeing to a distant part of the forest. Indeed, defeated villages often chose to do just this, not so much to avoid subjugation as to avoid further attack. With settlement so sparse in Amazonia, a new area of forest could be found and occupied with relative ease, and without trespassing on the territory of another village.”
735: “It was apparently by this process of fight and flight that horticultural tribes gradually spread out until they came to cover, thinly but extensively, almost the entire Amazon basin.”
735: “villages of the Peruvian coastal valleys tended to grow in size. Since autonomous villages are likely to fission as they grow, as long as land is available
for the settlement of splinter communities, these villages undoubtedly split from
time to time (19). Thus, villages tended to increase in number faster than they
grew in size. This increase in the number of villages occupying a valley probably
continued, without giving rise to significant changes in subsistence practices, until
all the readily arable land in the valley was being farmed. … With increasing
pressure of human population on the land, however, the major incentive for war
changed from a desire for revenge to a need to acquire land. … Once this stage
was reached, a Peruvian village that lost a war faced consequences very different
from those faced by a defeated village in Amazonia. … The mountains, the desert,
and the sea—to say nothing of neighboring villages—blocked escape in every
direction. A village defeated in war thus faced only grim prospects. If it was
allowed to remain on its own land, instead of being exterminated or expelled, this
concession came only at a price. And the price was political subordination to the
victor. … subordination sometimes involved a further loss of autonomy on the
part of the defeated village—namely, incorporation into the political unit dominated
by the victor.”
735: “Political evolution was attaining the level of the chiefdom. As land
shortages continued and became even more acute, so did warfare. Now, however,
the competing units were no longer small villages but, often, large chiefdoms.”
736: “an entire valley was eventually unified under the banner of its strongest
chiefdom. The political unit thus formed was undoubtedly sufficiently centralized
and complex to warrant being called a state.”
736: “Finally, those made landless by war but not enslaved tended to gravitate to
settlements which, because of their specialized administrative, commercial, or
religious functions, were growing into towns and cities. Here they were able to
make a living as workers and artisans”.
736: “The really fundamental step; the one that had triggered the entire train of
events that led to empires, was the change from village autonomy to supravillage
integration. This step was a change in kind; everything that followed was, in a
way, only a change in degree. In addition to being pivotal, the step to
supracommunity aggregation was difficult, for it took 2 million years to achieve.
But, once it was achieved, once village autonomy was transcended, only two or
three millennia were required for the rise of great empires and the flourishing of
complex civilizations.”
737: “we can safely add resource concentration to environmental circumscription
as a factor leading to warfare over land, and thus to political integration beyond
the village level.”
737: “while still at the autonomous village level of political organization, those
Yanomamo subject to social circumscription have clearly moved a step or two in
the direction of higher political development.”
738: Conclusion “In summary, then, the circumscription theory in its elaborated
form goes far toward accounting for the origin of the state. It explains why states
arose where they did, and why they failed to arise elsewhere. It shows the state to
be a predictable response to certain specific cultural, demographic, and ecological
conditions. Thus, it helps to elucidate what was undoubtedly the most important
single step ever taken in the political evolution of mankind.”
In my files I find reported instances of village splitting among the following Amazonian tribes: Kuikuru, Amarakaeri, Cubeo, Urubu, Tupari, Yanomamo, Tucano, Tenetehara, Canela, and Northern Cayapo. Under the conditions of easy resettlement found in Amazonia, splitting often takes place at a village population level of less than 100, and village size seldom exceeds 200.

The evolution of empire in Peru was thus by no means rectilinear or irreversible. Advance alternated with decline. Integration was sometimes followed by disintegration, with states fragmenting back to chiefdoms, and perhaps even to autonomous villages. But the forces underlying political development were strong and, in the end, prevailed. Thus, despite fluctuations and reversions, the course of evolution in Peru was unmistakable: it began with many small, simple, scattered, and autonomous communities and ended with a single, vast, complex, and centralized empire.

Carrithers, Anthropology as a Moral Science of Possibilities

Anthropology as a Moral Science of Possibilities.
Michael Carrithers.
Current Anthropology Volume 46, Number 3, June 2005.
ABSTRACT: “In a world of continued and expanding empire, does sociocultural anthropology in itself offer grounds for moral and social criticism? One line in anthropological thought leads to cultural relativism and an awareness that a cloud of alternative possibilities surrounds any moral code. However, a second line, based in reflection on fieldwork and on the professional ethics arising with it, does suggest some basic moral aesthetic standards, including trust, mutual forbearance, and acceptance of others’ worth. Moreover, a third line, that investigating the sources of social change and cultural metamorphosis, suggests that moral agency-cum-patiency—doing-and-being-done-to in the web of social relations—is a basic category of human thought and existence and that moral rhetorical persuasion of agents-cum-patients is likewise a constituent of all cultural arrangements. These reflections give sociocultural anthropologists support, based in the moral logic of the discipline itself and in its understanding of the complexity of possibilities surrounding any moral judgment, for sceptical and therapeutic criticism of rhetoric exercised in pursuit of empire. This argument is illustrated through an analysis of American political rhetoric supporting the invasion of Iraq.”

433: “Musil defines the sense of possibility as “the ability to think what could just as well be the case, and not to take that which is as more important than that which is not.””

434: “To what extent is anthropological knowledge like Musil’s knowledge, not a knowledge of structures alone but also of spacious possibilities and of unintended consequences that crowd closely around certainty and lift it
away from solidity?”

“Latterly that fundamental sense of possibility has been amplified by the growing conviction that any particular sociocultural arrangement is mutable, labile, far less determining or determined, far more historically contingent than we had thought: even the rules, anywhere, could have been different and are becoming different.”

435: “As a first pass over this problem let me invoke an experience which, I think, defines anthropological knowledge at the very beginning of one’s discovery of it (I speak now from years of inadvertent fieldwork among anthropology students and teachers), namely, the revelation of cultural relativity, of a lavish, apparently endless and unpredictable diversity of values and practices among different societies. This initial shock of others’ diversity is followed closely by a second shock, a new knowledge of oneself: one discovers one’s own world reflected in the alternatives, the possibilities, of others’ worlds, and many of one’s attitudes and values are revealed to be contingent and arbitrary. It becomes apparent that one’s own arrangements are “never the only way possible,” as Marshall Sahlins (1976) put it.”

Cashdan “Egalitarianism among Hunters and Gatherers.”


Very short article in a larger “reports and comments section. I listened to it.

116: “The literature of anthropology is rich in theories and discussions on the causes of stratification, while egalitarianism has largely been considered to be simply the baseline upon which stratification develops. Material from !Kung ethnographers, however, indicates that the egalitarianism found among most Bushman groups is a phenomenon resulting from stringent constraints, not simply a natural condition that represents the absence of stratification. … The //Gana Bushmen of the northeastern Kalahari, on the other hand, have ways of buffering environmental variability that are not available to most other Bushman groups, and it appears that these buffers allow a relaxing of the constraints that make strict egalitarianism a necessity. Among the //Gana one sees a greater tolerance for individual accumulation, and greater (although uninstitutionalized) economic and political inequality). …

One obvious reason for the economic egalitarianism prevalent among hunter-gatherers in general and Bushman groups in particular is that the mobility associated with hunting and gathering hinders the accumulation of property: material goods cannot
readily be carried from camp to camp, and without a home base, any substantial accumulation of property is prevented. If that were the sole cause of Bushman egalitarianism, however, an "equality" based on lack of material goods would arise automatically from the conditions of hunting and gathering, and no social sanctions to reinforce sharing and egalitarianism would be needed. Bushman groups, however, are in fact typified by strong and continual socialization against hoarding (i.e., toward economic equality) and against displays of arrogance and authority (i.e., toward social and political equality). …

Draper (1978) and Wiessner (1977) argue that the emphasis on sharing and recirculation is a kind of "insurance" against local scarcity and environmental variability among a people who have no other means of buffering the variability.”

117: “Mechanisms for leveling wealth (which include the pervasive socialization against the individual accumulation of property) are therefore a kind of social insurance that protects the !Kung from the extreme variability of their Kalahari environment.

…

The relationship between egalitarianism and lack of economic buffers among the !Kung appears to be typical of most Bushman groups, but the //Gana are an interesting exception- an exception that in fact "proves the rule."”

119-120: “The inequality that exists among the //Gana has an entrepreneurial, "big man" flavor; there are no formal positions of leadership, and the "headmen" have no economic redistributive role, nor any formal political power. Inequality among the //Gana can therefore be explained best not as the development of any formal organization of "ranking" or "stratification," but, rather, as the inevitable result of the lifting [120] of the constraints that produce strict egalitarianism among other Kalahari hunter- gatherers. These constraints arise from a lack of means to buffer environmental variability, and are a form of social insurance for hunter-gatherers living in unpredictable environments. This view, then, holds that there is nothing "natural" (statistically or socially) about the extreme leveling typical of most Bushman groups and suggests that the type of inequality found among the //Gana can be seen as the inevitable result of economic buffers that make such leveling mechanisms unnecessary.”

Caspari and Lee, “Older age becomes common late in human evolution,”


COPIED TO ARTICLES FOLDER: listened to not that valuable. Here’s the most worthwhile stuff:

P. 10,897: “The larger OY ratio in Homo relative to australopithecines weakly supports the predictions of the grandmother hypothesis as applied to Homo erectus(6). The OY ratio doubles in the Early/Middle Pleistocene Homo sample, but is still very low. In
contrast, the increased longevity in the Upper Paleolithic is dramatically larger, with OY ratios five times greater than that seen in Middle Paleolithic hominids. Because the OY ratio increases so significantly at this time, we suggest that theories involving the evolutionary value of senescence may be most applicable to the Middle/Upper Paleolithic transition.

P. 10,899: “these results suggest a major increase in adult survivorship in the Upper Paleolithic. We suggest that this increase in longevity addresses the meaning of modernity itself. Modernity is a complex concept, incorporating both biological and cultural variables, that has proven difficult, if not impossible, to define (44). However, if there is a single fundamental factor related to biology that underlies the behavioral innovations of modernity, this increase in adult survivorship may be it. We therefore think significant longevity came late in human evolution and was a fundamental demographic component tied to the population expansions and related behavioral innovations associated with modern humans.”

NOTE: Konigsberg and Herrmann are very critical of this article.

Clark: A farewell to alms

READING: 330.903-CLA On the shelf on the 4th Floor

Chapter 1:
1: “the average person in the world of 1800 was no better off than the average person of 100,000 BC. Indeed in 1800 the bulk of the world’s population was poorer than their remote ancestors.” Lucky Europeans “managed a material lifestyle equivalent to that of the Stone Age. But the vast swath of humanity in East and South Asia … eked out a living under conditions probably significantly poorer than those of cavemen.”

“...The quality of life also failed to improve on any other observable dimension. Life expectancy was no higher in 1800 than for hunter-gatherers: thirty to thirty-five years. Stature, a measure both of the quality of diet and of children’s exposure to disease, was higher in the Stone Age than in 1800. And while foragers could satisfy their material wants with small amounts of work, the modest comforts of the English in 1800 were purchased only through a life of unrelenting drudgery.”

1-2: “The average forager had a diet, and work life, much more varied than the typical English worker of 1800.”

2: “Average welfare, if anything, declined from the Stone Age to 1800. The poor of 1800, those who lived by their unskilled labor alone, would have been better off if transferred to a hunter-gatherer band.”

3: “Modern medicine has reduced the material minimum required for subsistence to a level far below that of the Stone Age. Just as the Industrial Revolution reduced income inequalities within societies, it has increased them between...
societies, in a process recently labeled the *Great Divergence*. The gap in incomes between countries is of the order of 50:1. *There walk the earth now both the richest people who ever lived and the poorest.*

Chapter 3: Living Standards

40: “The logic of the Malthusian economy is clear. There should be no systemic gain in living standards on average across societies between earliest man and the world of 1800 on the eve of the Industrial Revolution. … on balance the happy circumstances that made for Tahiti in 1769, or the unhappy ones that made for Tierra del Feugo in 1832, were no more likely in AD 1800 than in 100,000 BC. … Were material living standards truly no better on average in 1800 than in 10,000 BC or even 100,000 BC?”

55: “The most obvious effect of better material living standards is to make people taller. … Average heights of young males in rich contemporary societies of predominantly European origins are in the range of 177-183 centimeters (70-72 inches).”

56: “There is little sign in modern populations of any genetically determined differences in potential stature, except for some rare groups such as the pygmies of central Africa.”

57: Fig.

59: Fig.

60: “The Tahitians of the 1760s, still in the stone age, seem to have been as tall, or taller, than their English visitors with all their marvelous European technology. … Thus the thousands of years of advance representing the difference between forager technology and that of agrarian societies around 1800 did not lead to any signs of a systematic improvement in material living conditions.”

63: Fig.

64: Fig.

70: “The Success of the Malthusian Model

There is ample evidence in the historical and skeletal record to support the key contention of the Malthusian model. Living conditions before 1800 were independent of the level of technology of a society. But living standards did vary substantially across societies before 1800. Medieval Western Europe, for example, in the period between the onset of the Black Death in 1347 and renewed population growth in 1550, was extraordinarily rich, rich even by the standards of the poorest economies of the world today. Polynesia before European contact also seems to have been prosperous. In contrast China, India, and Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries appear to have been very poor.”

Chapter 5: Life Expectancy

93-95: Figs.

Tables show life expectancy was low for hunter-gatherers, but lower for people in pre-industrial Europe and near east.

109: Infanticide seems to be one reason why Tahiti kept its population down and living standards up.
6-8: “In an effort to sort out the meaning of the !Kung San data, I undertook a review of published data on the health and nutrition of other contemporary hunter-gatherers. I studied more than forty additional hunting and gathering societies from all of the world’s continents for which at least some comparable data were available. For the purposes of this review, I argued that groups like the !Kung San, even if they were not pristine remnants of ancient life, might nevertheless act as twentieth-century experiments in hunting and gathering lifestyle through which we could evaluate certain aspects of the health and nutrition of hunter-gatherer groups. For example, whether or not contemporary hunter-gatherers were “pristine,” we could use them to evaluate the potential for obtaining a balanced diet by foraging in various environments; the amount of labor involved in obtaining and processing various foods; and the impact of group size and nomadism on the transmission of infectious disease.

The comparative data suggested that modern hunter-gatherers are indeed commonly well nourished in qualitative terms (vitamins, minerals, protein) although calories may be in short supply at least on a seasonal basis. Anemia was very infrequent in such groups. Diseases like kwashiorkor or marasmus (protein and protein-calorie deficiency), pellagra (niacin deficiency) or beri beri (thiamine deficiency), which plague modern poor populations worldwide, essentially do not occur among hunter-gatherers (until they are forced to adopt modern diets.) In short, although they are occasionally hungry, modern hunter-gatherers are conspicuously well nourished by modern Third-World standards. Moreover, the !Kung San, living in a desert, far from being the most affluent, seem to be relatively impoverished in comparison to other hunter-gatherers. Groups such as the East African Hadza, living in game-rich areas, seem to be far more affluent and also better models for prehistoric hunter-gatherers who chose similarly rich environments in which to live.25”

The data also suggested that small group size and the mobility which characterizes hunters seems commonly to act to protect them against parasites of various types. This relative freedom from parasites contributes to the good nutritional health of hunter-gatherers since parasitic infestation typically robs the body of nutrients in a variety of ways. In particular, intestinal parasites spread by human feces are rare among hunter-gatherers who tend to move on before feces accumulate and who therefore suffer relatively little diarrhea. Perhaps most important, hunter-gatherers seem to suffer relatively little of the diarrhea of infancy and early childhood that contributes so heavily to the death of children in the modern Third World.27
average, such groups seem to lose about 20 percent of their children as infants and about 40 percent of children overall before they reach adulthood. These figures are comparable to what was true for most of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and significantly better than European and American cities at the beginning of the twentieth century. Adult life expectancy is not as great in most hunter-gatherer groups as Howell suggests for the !Kung. But overall life expectancy at birth averages twenty-five years or so in these groups, a figure which is still moderate by historic standards.28“

9: “The second major new line of evidence which emerged during the 1970s and 1980s was the development of paleopathological techniques for the direct assessment of prehistoric health from the study of archaeological skeletons, mummies, and feces. … Paleopathology can assess the presence and frequency of some specific, chronic diseases such as syphilis and tuberculosis in the skeleton. … Paleopathology can also assess some specific nutrient deficiencies such as iron deficiency anemia. But it can also be used to assess a number of chronic but nonspecific indicators of nutrition, health, growth, and the disruption of growth, which permit the comparison of general health between populations.

9-11: “I had hoped that the data would display clear declines in health prior to the adoption of agriculture in support of my population-pressure model of agricultural origins. In this respect the data were disappointing. Fragmentary archaeological samples most often did not permit us to recognize more than one population that had existed prior to the adoption of agriculture in any region. The few comparisons that could be made were limited by small sample size and imperfect preservation. However, throughout the Old World where preagricultural samples are available (India, the Middle East, Mediterranean Europe, Northern Europe) the data suggest that people did get smaller before the adoption of agriculture. In at least one region (the Mediterranean) the trend in stature is combined with other signs of declining nutrition. Since decline in stature itself is often used as an index of declining nutrition in other historical contexts, this may be an indicator of declining nutrition among prehistoric groups. I consider this the best explanation of the trend. However, various authorities suggest that declining stature is, instead, an indication either of changing climate or of changing human activities.34 In any case, few data from this period suggest that preagricultural human beings are making “progress” in health or nutrition.

The comparison of prehistoric farmers with their hunting and gathering forebears provided much more interesting results. In most regions of the world, early farmers, living in larger and more sedentary communities than their ancestors, also displayed higher rates of infection in the skeleton (or preserved tissues or feces.) In particular, periostitis, the non-specific infection of bone surfaces usually attributed to staphylococcus or streptococcus infection, is almost invariably more common after the adoption of sedentary farming. A comparison of mummies from Peru suggested that intestinal infection also increased after the adoption of farming.36 The same conclusion was suggested by comparison of human feces from different periods of prehistory in the American southwest.37 Treponemal infection (yaws) also seems to be more common after the adoption of farming (its venereal form, syphilis, seems to be a much more recent affliction, rarely if ever being diagnosed with certainty in human groups of any region before the age of Columbus). Tuberculosis is almost entirely confined to relatively
recent populations living in large urban agglomerations, which do not occur in the absence of agriculture.38

Farmers also almost invariably displayed more frequent anemia than earlier hunter-gatherers in the same region. There is some controversy about the source of the anemia. One possibility is that it reflects iron deficiency resulting from farmers’ dependency on cereal crops such as maize (corn), which are poor in iron and actually tend to inhibit iron absorption.39 A more likely possibility is that it reflects the secondary loss of iron to parasites such as hookworm, malaria, or tuberculosis, all of which become more frequent when large sedentary aggregates of people are formed.40

Other signs of malnutrition such as retarded growth among children or premature osteoporosis (loss of bone) among adults also seem to be more common after the adoption of agriculture. Farmers also displayed higher rates of imperfections in the enamel of teeth (enamel hypoplasia and Wilson’s bands) thought to be a permanent record of severe episodes of poor health in childhood.41 This suggests, contrary to popular expectation, that prehistoric hunter-gatherers may have been better buffered against stressful episodes than their descendants.

The data, unfortunately, cannot be used to assess changing life expectancy.”

11: “Overall, these data seem to me to be a fairly substantial body of evidence in support of the hypothesis that the adoption of agriculture resulted in a decline in human health.”

12: “Similarly, anemia becomes more visible in skeletal populations after the adoption of farming. But we also know that anemia is infrequent in contemporary hunter-gatherers and that rates of parasitism (the most probable explanation of anemia for most populations) increase with farming. Again it seems reasonable to conclude that the increase in anemia is a matter of historic fact. Similarly, dental defects indicating disrupted growth in children become more common in skeletal populations after farming. But observations on living groups suggest that weanling diarrhea—which is thought to be a major cause of such dental defects—also increases with sedentism suggesting that the prehistoric trend is real and not the product of a sampling error. Similarly, tuberculosis, which occurs only in relatively recent, dense, sedentary populations in the archaeological sequence is also primarily a disease of cities in the modern world, suggesting that we are not being misled about its prehistoric distribution.

In short, data from a variety of sources seem to be converging on a new way of viewing the origins of agriculture and other episodes in human history. Taken together, evidence from paleopathology, from ethnographic studies of contemporary hunter-gatherers, epidemiology or knowledge of disease mechanics, and optimal foraging research all suggest that human health declined with the adoption of agriculture—and these data also suggest more generally that much human “progress” has been a matter of diminishing returns for all but privileged groups and classes.”

13: “The idea of “progress” is itself nothing more than an hypothesis that was created by scientists and scholars like ourselves who were working from similar data (although generally from less data and never from more data than are now available). If it is to be believed, the hypothesis of progress must be supported by empirical evidence from contemporary populations or skeletons, like any other competing hypothesis. At present it is not supported and I believe it has less actual empirical evidence in support than the alternative hypothesis offered here. I think it is time to change our thinking and our assumptions about what happened in history.”
Cohen, M, Health & the Rise of Civilization

SEE ALSO: hardcopy highlights for lots of specifics about which changes were related to which diseases.

1-2: “Our perception of human progress relies heavily on stereotypes we have created about the ‘primitive’ and the ‘civilized.’ We build our ideas of history out of images that we have projected on our past. In face, Western civilization teaches two conflicting images of the primitive and the civilized, and each has become something of a cliché. On the one had, we teach admiration for smaller societies or simpler cultures, as exemplified by romantic portrayals of the American India. On the other had, we teach disdain for the primitive and appreciation for science and civilization. These two themes intertwine in our poetry and our fiction. They complicate our sense of history and our political decisions, but neither is subjected to careful examination.

In the absence of such scrutiny, it is all the more dangerous that the two images have such unequal power. We associate the idea of progress with science and base our decisions on the assumption that human progress is real and well documented. We relegate our appreciation of the primitive to ‘romance,’ implying that it is nothing more than the stuff of poetry and legend. In the popular mind, at least, to be primitive is to be poor, ill, and [2] malnourished; and group poverty is a demonstration of primitive lack of technological sophistication—lack of ‘development.’ … We may well discover that there is more romance to the ‘scientific’ assumption of progress than we usually recognize and more empirical validity to the ‘romantic’ perspective of the primitive than we usually concede.”

3: ‘the major transformations of human societies have been portrayed as solutions to age-old problems which liberated human populations from the restraints of nature—an image traceable to Thomas Hobbes some three hundred years ago. Thus, for example, in the last century, Lewis Henry Morgan described the three major stages of human cultural evolution as a progression from ‘savagery’ to ‘barbarism’ and then to ‘civilization’—terms hardly less prejudicial when he wrote than they are now. Far more recently, Leslie White portrayed human history in terms of progressive increase in efficiency, and Julian Steward characterized the technological changes of prehistory as ‘freeing’ human beings from the ‘exigencies’ of simpler lifestyles and ‘permitting’ new organizational styles to unfold. In perhaps the most explicit statement of this progressive sense of cultural change, V. Gordon Childe described the major technological and social revolutions of prehistory essentially as great improvements in the adaptive capacity of the species.

… implicit in most of these theories, at least as they came to be understood by the public, was the idea that progress favored individuals and improved their lives. We assumed that the human workload became lighter, our nutrition better, our diseases fewer as civilization emerged. This image still persists most strikingly in descriptions of the history of human life expectancy, which commonly suggest a steady, if irregular, upward trend.”
human activities can create disease or increase the risk of illness just as surely as medical science reduces the risk. Most threats to human health are not universal, nor are they dictated solely by natural forces: most are correlated with patterns of human activity. … human activity is neither as successful in minimizing health risks as we would like. Despite the state ideal of the World Health Organization, minimizing health risks is rarely our only or primary goal. Our activities—and their effects on health and disease—involve compromises.”

“bands are typically small, informal networks of friends and kin who know one another personally, who deal with each other as individuals and as friends and relatives, and who remain together largely as a function of mutual dependence and positive feelings toward one another.”

“If human beings are to live permanently in groups of more than fifty to one hundred people, they apparently have to change their own rules. People who live in large groups must find ways of dealing with [24] neighbors to be known individually.”

“In short, tribes and chiefdoms trade some of the flexibility of band societies for more formal rules; they trade some of their sense of individual reciprocity for an emphasis on group membership. They lose some of the sensitivity to individual needs that characterize simpler bands. The reorganization also entails some increase in principles of segregation and exclusion, limiting the right and ability of individuals to pursue their own welfare”.

“Studies of the habits of various parasites, analysis of historical patterns of disease, and mathematical simulations of disease processes all suggest that early primitive human groups per probably exposed to a different—and much more limited—set of diseases than modern civilized populations. Almost all studies that attempt to reconstruct the history of infectious diseases indicate that the burden of infection has tended to increase rather than decrease as human beings civilized lifestyles.”

“Sedentism has some advantages in warding off infectious disease. Nomadic bands are likely to encounter a wider range of zoonotic diseases than do more settled populations.”

“sedentism has one other major advantage: it makes it easier to care for the sick and helps reduce the risk that a sick individual will die.

But sedentism has several disadvantages that may well outweigh any advantages it confers. The first of these is that sedentary populations typically increase their investment in trade. …

In addition, sedentism encourages the spread of many diseases.”

“More substantial shelters provide better protection against the elements [40] … but they probably encourage disease transmission.”

“The evolution of civilization has probably broadened the range of infections to which human beings are exposed and has probably increased both the percentage of individuals infected and the size of the common dose of infection by tending to increase the reproductive success of the various parasites.”

“The implication of these figures is that the transition from hunting to broad spectrum foraging is a process of diminishing returns probably motivated by growing population, expansion into game-poor environments, and the disappearance of large game animals, rather than by improving technology.”
56-7: “Farming apparently restored some efficiency that hunter-gatherers had lost, but it represents no net improvement over once-rich hunting economies. It seems likely that hunter-gatherers blessed with a reasonable supply of large animals to hunt would not have bothered, but that broad [57] foragers increasingly forced to rely on small animals and seeds might well have been motivated to adopt farming—which is, in fact, what the archaeological record suggests.”

58: “Dietary quality may well have been adversely affected by the major changes in our subsistence strategies.”

59: “growing population and the disappearance of preferred resources would ultimately have forced human groups to focus on “third choice” foods—those that are relatively plentiful but neither flavorful nor nutritious. …

   The third choice foods that ultimately became our staples (cereals and tubers chosen for their prolific growth, their shelf life, and their ability to respond to human manipulation) are not particularly rich sources of nutrients …. Most are poor sources of protein, vitamins, and minerals compared to the variety of wild vegetable foods eaten by modern hunter-gatherers.”

61: “the transition from small mobile hunting and gathering groups to larger sedentary populations relying on storage and agriculture is likely to have been accompanied by a reduction in the proportion of animal products in the diet, a reduction in the proportion of foods eaten fresh, a reduction in dietary variety, and, consequently, a decline in the overall quality of diet.”

62: “trade networks may not solve the problem entirely. Traded food is likely to be comparatively scarce and expensive.”

63: “Elite social classes commonly manipulate trade systems for their own purposes. … their privilege tends to exacerbate the deprivation of the poor.

   In fact, trade systems often result in the movement of necessary resources from rather than to populations in need. It is a fairly commonplace observation than modern Third World farmers may be deficient in nutrients that they themselves produce because of the insidious effects of such exchange systems.”

75: “Observations have now been made on a number of contemporary human groups whose lifestyles approximate those of the smallest prehistoric human societies. … None of these groups—nor even all of them together—provides a complete or unbiased picture of early human lifestyles. We should, perhaps, consider them twentieth-century experiments in small-group foraging, rather than remnants of the past. But they, along with the evidence of archaeology discussed in chapter 7, are the best evidence we have—and the only evidence we have ever had—about hunter-gatherers in the past. They provide hints about the epidemiological consequences of mobile small-group living and the nutritional consequences of eating wild foods.”

77: “There is evidence that San-like peoples practicing a similar way of life have inhabited some portions of the desert for at least eleven thousand years.” Cites Bleek 1928m The Naron.

81: “controversy surrounds interpretation of the relatively small caloric intake that is common to the [San] groups studied. …

   … Hausman and Wilmsen have suggested that seasonal variations in food supply were sufficiently severe to promote weight loss among the San, as have Harpending and Wandsnider. …
...Howell has noted that the growing of !Kung children is seasonally slowed by reduced food intake … Howell has also observed that there is little evidence of mortality resulting from food shortages among the !Kung.”
82: “Lee has pointed out that there are few negative health effects of the !Kung diet, which though poor in calories is rich in all other nutrients; the various observers agree that, at the cattle posts where San children grow more rapidly to taller statutes, they are also more likely to display clinical signs of qualitative malnutrition than are those at the hunting and gathering camps, apparently because they sacrifice dietary quality while obtaining more calories.”
83: “In sum, observations by several different teams of scientists and in several different San populations living as hunger-gatherers all seem to confirm that qualitative nutritional health is good—and that such hunger as is reported, although it may result in significant seasonal undernutrition and weight loss and substandard skinfold measurement, is not associated with other clinical symptoms of malnutrition.”
92: “The dietary quality of the San … appears to be only average or below average among hunting and gathering populations, even though it is excellent by contemporary Third World standards.”
93: “The diet of the San … almost certainly contains less meat than that of our historic and prehistoric forebears. …

A wide range of reports about contemporary hunter-gatherers in various parts of the world suggests that they, like the San, eat eclectic diets of fresh vegetable foods that, along with their meant intake, tend to assure a good balance of vitamins and minerals. These observations about dietary balance are largely confirmed by reports and observations on hunter-gatherer nutritional health.”
94: “It is fairly clear from almost all reports … that the quality of hunter-gatherer diets is eroded rather than supplemented by trade networks and outposts of civilization. Most descriptions of trade indicate that hunter-gatherers trade protein and variety for calories; most descriptions of attempts to force hunter-gatherers to settle suggest that dietary quality falls off markedly.

Dietary analysis of isolated groups of subsistence farmers, such as those of the Amazon, who live at low population densities and maintain some mobility and ability to forage for wild resources, document that they often enjoy well-balanced diets. But many suffer from high rates of parasitism and secondary loss of nutrients.”
96: “contemporary hunting and gathering populations may not be affluent by in terms of caloric intake, but they are clearly average or better by world standards.”
96-7: “The likelihood of hunger and starvation appears to vary widely among hunting and gathering groups, depending primarily on the environment they inhabit. The Hadza of the African savannas—one hunter-gatherer group that is not in a marginal environment—have never been observed to go hungry in a serious way, except when they agree to go to the government reservation and the food truck does not come. Otherwise, their concept of hunger refers to days in which they must eat more vegetables and less meat than they would like. A recent survey of their resources seems to suggest that the simultaneous failure of all resources is very unlikely. Most reports of hunter-gatherer subsistence I have seen from other parts of the world also indicate that food supplies are usually abundant and reliable.
Many descriptions of hunting and gathering groups, however, do report that seasonal hunger and food anxiety occur, as does accessional starvation. But hunter-gatherers may not be exceptional in this respect. There is little evidence that hunter-gatherers suffer disproportionate risk of hunger or starvation in comparison to more settled groups inhabiting similar environments.”

98: “there is little to suggest that the hunting and gathering way of life (as opposed to the extreme environments in which many such groups find themselves) is more likely that other modes of subsistence to lead to hunger or starvation.”

99-100: “Comparative study suggests that the relative absence of modern degenerative disease (heart disease, cancers, hypertension, diabetes, bowel disorders reported among the San is universal (or nearly so) among hunter-gatherers and subsistence farmers alike. Reports from a number of groups suggests that high serum cholesterol is extremely rare in such groups. Blood pressure is commonly low in such groups and does not increase with age; and widespread reports suggest that such intestinal disorders; as appendicitis, diverticulosis, and bowel cancer are rare until groups are introduced to civilized diets. Diabetes mellitus is rarely observed—but becomes quite common among such populations introduced to civilized diets. Coronary heart disease and most cancers have been observed to be comparatively rare.”

100: Infant mortality: “the majority of values [of estimates] cluster between 150 and 240 deaths per 1,000 infants”.

101: “historical European and American values particularly in urban areas have commonly matched or exceeded the hunger-gatherer figures, often by substantial amounts. In the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, five major cities … had official infant mortality rates of 300 per 1,000 or more, and many more exceeded 200 per 1,000. In European history average national values for infant mortality fell below 200 per 1,000 only late in the nineteenth century. In the Third World, official rates still often over between 100 and 100 per 1,000. …

… most estimates of adult life expectancy among hunger-gatherers (the average number of years that an individual can expect to live from age fifteen), averaging about 28 years [i.e. 43 years total], are below those reported for the San and are very low by our standards.”

102: “Published estimates of life expectancy at birth for hunter-gatherers range from as low as 20 years to as high as 50 years. The Hadza, who may be the best model we have of prehistoric groups, have been estimated like the San to have a life expectancy at birth of about 30 years. …

Life expectancy at birth of 20 … would equal or exceed that for some European cities of the eighteenth century and for the poorer portions of other cities of Europe as late as the nineteenth century.

It would also equal life expectancy for all of India as late as 1920 … Life expectancy at birth of 25 years (a more reasonable long-term estimate of hunter-gatherer survivorship) would approached that for much of Europe as late as the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and for many urban European communities well into the nineteenth.”

103: “The assumption that primitive people are more fertile than civilized ones is a popular one, but it is completely unsupported by scientific observation”.


“it is possible to document changes in the skeleton from early (Paleolithic) to later (Mesolithic hunter-gatherer economies)—changes that roughly parallel the disappearance of large game animals and the consequent adoption of broad spectrum foraging … … all areas of the Old World where measurements have been reported)—report that adult stature for both sexes declined at the time of the broad spectrum revolution during the Mesolithic period of prehistory. The average reduction in stature reported is about five centimeters (or two inches).”

“Although the data are mixed, the preponderance of existing evidence suggests that nutrition and health were declining, not improving, among hunter-gatherer groups during the broad spectrum revolution prior to the adoption of agriculture … These data seem to support the contention that the decline in big game hunting and the intensification of foraging activities characterizing re-[116]cent hunter-gatherer populations represents diminishing returns, not technological progress. Increasing rates of infection also suggest that increased community size and sedentism had negative effects on health.”

“comparisons do not yet yield any clear trend in the frequency of trauma and violence. …

In general, the skeletal evidence provides little support for the Hobbesian notion that hunter-gatherer life is particularly violent or for the assumption that hunting is particularly dangerous. But there is also no support for the proposition recently debated in anthropology that hunter-gatherers are particularly nonviolent people.”

“it is not clear whether the adoption [117] of agriculture eased workloads … or increased workloads”.

“Skeletal evidence of physical stresses … does not show clear trends through time. In several other respects, however, comparisons of prehistoric hunter-gatherer and farming populations reveal clear trends. …

Signs of infection observable on bone usually seem to increase as human settlements increase in size and permanence. Nonspecific skeletal lesions … increase through time in most cases.”

“A second common trend is that farmers often appear to have been less well nourished than the hunter-gatherers that preceded them, rarely the reverse.”

“In several areas, the stature, size, and robustness of adult individuals declines with the adoption of farming. …There are some counterexamples. …

… hunter-gatherers and early farmers rarely displayed signs of scurvy or rickets, which become more common in the civilized world, especially during medieval times. (Rickets was still a problem for the early twentieth-century Americans.) …

Although the overall quality of nutrition seems most often to have declined with the adoption of agriculture, one class of skeletal pathology may suggest that food supplies become more reliable and episodes of hunger become less common.”

“But enamel hypoplasias and microscopic enamel defects … are almost invariably reported to have become more frequent and/or more severe as farming replaced hunting and gathering in different parts of the world. …

… seasonal hunger may have been more frequent for prehistoric hunter-gatherers, starvation and epidemics more frequent for the latter farmers.”

“It is hard to draw reliable conclusions about relative mortality and life expectancy because skeletal evidence suggest that prehistoric hunter-gatherers often fared relatively
well in comparison to later populations, particularly with reference to the survival of children. At the very least, the data fail to confirm or naïve expectation that the earliest, least civilized groups had the highest mortality.”

122: “Fragmentary as they are, the data are bolstered somewhat by replication in various parts of the world.”

“If the adoption of agriculture seems commonly to have had negative effects on health and nutrition—and perhaps even survivorship—the later intensification of agriculture and the rise of civilization appear to have had only mixed results. Some populations clearly rebounded to levels of health, nutrition, and survival equaling and exceeding those of prehistoric hunters, but others just as clearly did not.”

124: “Some medieval populations from Scandinavia appear to have experienced extremely high rates of infant and child mortality. … individuals in the large Westerhus cemetery (ca. AD 1200 to 1550) had an average life span of 17 to 18 years. … 50 to 80 percent of individuals in some populations died as children.”

126: “extremely high levels of stress among the less privileged citizens of complex societies can even be traced archaeologically into the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Several descriptions of skeletal samples of black American populations—both slave and free and as late as the 1920s in the United States—suggest rates of malnutrition, infection, and death the equal or exceed those of most prehistoric groups.

In sum, the archaeological record of civilizations, ancient and recent, [127] provide a very mixed record of changing health. Skeletal indicators of infection and malnutrition increased in some sites or regions and declined in others.”

127: “Many measures and estimates of adult life expectancy, … suggest that after a nadir at the adoption of agriculture, average adult age at death and adult life expectancy gradually improved. At the same time I can find no actual evidence of regular improvement in child survivorship anywhere in the world until the late nineteenth century (and for much of the world the mid-twentieth century). If anything, the reverse is the case. For most of history, civilized societies may have lost a higher proportion of their children than their primitive forebears.”

132: “There is no evidence either from ethnographic accounts or archaeological excavations to suggest that rates of accidental trauma or interpersonal violence declined substantially with the adoption of more civilized forms of political organization. In fact, some evidence from archaeological sites and from historical sources suggest the opposite.

Evidence from both ethnographic descriptions of contemporary hunters and the archaeological record suggests that the major trend in the quality and quantity of human diets has been downward. Contemporary hunter-gatherers, although lean and occasionally hungry, enjoy levels of caloric intake that compare favorably with national averages for many major countries of the Third World and that are generally above those of the poor in the modern world. Even the poorest recorded hunter-gatherer group enjoys a caloric intake superior to that of impoverished contemporary urban populations.

Prehistoric hunter-gatherers appear to have enjoyed richer environments and to have been better nourished than most subsequent populations (primitive and civilized alike). Whenever we can glimpse the remains of anatomically modern human beings who lived in early prehistoric environments still rich in large game, they are often relatively large people displaying comparatively few signs of qualitative malnutrition. The subsequent
trend in human size and stature is irregular but is more often downward than upward in most parts of the world until the nineteenth or twentieth century.

The diets of hunter-gatherers appear to be comparatively well balanced, even when they are lean. Ethnographic accounts of contemporary groups suggest that protein intakes are commonly quite high, comparable to those of affluent modern groups and substantially above world averages. Protein deficiency is almost unknown in these groups, and vitamin and mineral deficiencies are rare and usually mild in comparison to rates reported from many Third World populations. Archaeological evidence suggests that specific deficiencies, including that of iron (anemia), vitamin D (rickets), and, more controversially, vitamin C (scurvy)—as well such general signs of protein-calorie malnutrition as childhood growth retardation—have generally become more common in history rather than declining."

133: “the popular impression that nutrition has improved through history reflects twentieth-century affluence and seems to have as much to do with class privilege as with an overall increase in productivity. Neither the lower classes of prehistoric and classical empires nor the contemporary Third World have shared in the improvement in caloric intake; consumption of animal protein seems to have declined for all but privileged groups.

136: “Epidemiological theory further predicts the failure of most epidemic diseases ever to spread in small isolated populations or in groups of moderate size connected only by transportation on foot.”

139: “Contrary to assumptions once widely held, the slow growth of prehistoric populations need not imply exceedingly high rates of mortality. Evidence of low fertility and/or the use of birth control by small-scale groups suggests (if we use modern life tables) that average rates of population grown very near zero could have been maintained by groups suffering only historically moderate mortality (life expectancy of 25 to 30 years at birth with 50 to 60 percent of infants reach adulthood—figures that appear to match those observed in ethnographic and archaeological samples) that would have balanced fertility, which was probably below the averages of more sedentary modern populations.”

139-40: “There is no evidence from archaeological samples to suggest that adult life expectancy increased with the adoption of sedentism or farming; there is some evidence (complicated by the effects of a probable acceleration of population growth on cemetery samples) to suggest that adult life expectancy may actually have declined as farming was adopted. In later states of the intensification of agriculture and the development of civilization, adult life expectancy most often increased—and often increased substantially—but the trend was spottier than we sometimes realized. Archaeological populations from the Iron Age or even Medieval period in Europe and the Mid-[139]dle East from the Mississippian period in North America often suggest average adult ages at death in the middle or upper thirties, not substantially different from (and sometimes lower than) those of the earliest visible populations in the same regions. Moreover, the historic improvement in adult life expectancy may have resulted at least in part from increasing infant and child mortality and the consequent ‘select’ nature of those entering adulthood as epidemic diseases shifted their focus from adults to children.
Until the nineteenth or even twentieth centuries, the improvement in overall life expectancy appears to have been fairly small in any case. Life expectancy at birth was still in the high twenties or low thirties in much of Europe in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the pattern of life expectancy was highly irregular or, ... socially partitioned.”

140: “Many urban centers even in Europe may not have exceeded or even matched primitive life expectancies until the mid-century or even the twentieth century; the world’s poor clearly did not share in the recent improvements in life expectancy until the past 150 years or less and still share only to a substantially reduced degree.”

141: “In popular terms, I think that we must substantially revise our traditional sense that civilization represents progress in human well-being—or at least that it did so for most people for most of history prior to the twentieth century. The comparative data simply do not support that image. At best, we see what might be called a partitioning of stress by class and location, in which the well-to-do are progressively freed from nutritional stress (although even they did not escape the ravages of epidemics until recently) but under which the poor and urban populations, particularly the urban poor, are subjected to levels of biological stress that are rarely matched in the most primitive of human societies. The undeniable success of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been of briefer duration, and are perhaps more fragile, than we usually assume. In fact, some of our sense of progress comes from comparing ourselves not to primitives but to urban European populations of the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries. We measure the progress that has occurred since the and extrapolate the trend back into history. But a good case can be made that urban European populations of that period may have been among the nutritionally most impoverished, the most disease-ridden, and the shortest-lived populations in human history. A Hobbesian view of primitive life makes sense form the perspective of the affluent twentieth century. But Hobbes was probably wrong, by almost any measure, when he characterized primitive life as ‘poor, nasty, brutish, and short” while speaking from the perspective of urban centers of seventeenth-century Europe. At best, he was speaking only for his own social class.”

142: “There is a practical implication to all of this—at least, if we are to maintain the ideal that civilization is about individual well-being and not just about numbers, competition, and power. We tend to assume that progress is inevitable, and we tend to promote membership in civilization as if the mere fact of being civilized were itself a worthy goal. The data presented here suggest, in fact, that the organization and style of civilization are at least as much the cause of biological stress as they are the cure. The one clear blessing of civilization from the point of view of the individual is the potential for investment. It is only by generating investment in solutions to human problems that civilizations offset the problems generated by increasing human numbers and the problems that their own organizations create; only be permitting the benefits of these investments to be shared can we truly be said to share the blessings of civilization.”
Cohen R. & Service Origins of the state

CHECKED OUT FROM GUQ

Ronald Cohen, “Introduction”


7: “Service’s chapter … reports that there are no known cases of social stratification prior to statehood. He argues instead that those conditions leading to centralized government bring with them the development of a ruling group or class. In this sense social stratification is a result, not a cause, of state formation.”

Colchester—Rethinking Stone Age Economics


Finds evidence of a higher workload among pre-contact South Americans, casting some doubt on the Sahlins’s ‘aboriginal affluence’ concept. Contends that 200 years ago the Yanoama were essentially a foraging society and became largely agricultural after contact. Steel tools brought by westerners were in wide use by foraging people in South America by the mid 1500s. This reduced their workload.

310-1: Given the fact that the data on which these suggestions [of aboriginal affluence] are based relate to steel-using, not to the Stone Age Indians, the argument is poor. The subsistence effort required in the pre-Steel Era was probably much greater than that required in the present era of steel tools.”

311: “Remote groups like the Yanoama, long considered to be the largest unacculturated group of Indians in Amazonia, have, it seems, been experiencing continuous change over several centuries. They cannot, therefore, be treated as if they were stable adaptations to their environment.”
Corry, Tribal Peoples


A nonacademic book by an activist who heads of the indigenous rights group, Survival International.

18: Definition of indigenous peoples: “Indigenous peoples are the descendants of those who were there before others who now constitute the mainstream and dominant society. They are defined partly be descent, partly by the particular features that indicate their distinctiveness from those who arrived later, and partly by their own view of themselves.”

20: The Amish error: “The mistake of assuming that certain peoples live in the past simply because they use different technologies is also applied to many indigenous peoples, particularly those who have a ‘tribal’ lifestyle.”

22: “Tribal peoples are those which have followed ways of life for many generations that are largely self-sufficient, and are clearly different from the mainstream and dominant society.”

44: “Perhaps they [the Andaman] live in a fairly similar way to the first colonists. The Andaman tribespeople thrive on fish, turtles, dugongs or sea cows, from the sea, and board, small mammals and birds, and vegetables and fruits which are plentiful in their forests. As their environment has probably not changed much in millennia, it might well follow that neither has their way for life.

This poses an apparent dilemma for those, like me, who argue that tribal peoples today should not be equated with our ancestors: they are not backward but have simply developed in a different way. The Andaman way of life, based on fishing, hunting and gathering probably would be at least partly recognizable by our ancestors of, say, fifty thousand years ago, whereas that of city dwellers today would seem very alien. All this is, however, just a further manifestation of the ‘Amish error’. These tribal peoples use their intelligence and skills, honed and passed down over generations, to gather everything they need in order to live well. It is impossible to know how much the way they live now is similar to the way their ancestors lived. All we can say is that this is the way they choose to live today—and that they, like other tribal peoples by my definition, are largely self-sufficient. How they achieve this comprises the largest part of how they define themselves.”

146: “There are at least two or three dozen Amazonian peoples who have no peaceful contact with outsiders.”

200: “I am not alone in observing that the more isolated the tribe is from outsiders, the more its members seem to laugh, and this is often the feature that most forcefully strikes visitors.”

201: “the most important preoccupations for many indigenous people today are the problems they face from mainstream society.”

202: “Several years ago when an Innu man went to social services or hospital and was asked his occupation, he said, ‘Hunter’. Now he says, ‘Unemployed’.” —Jean Pierre Ashini, Innu, Canada
There is little doubt that if offered the choice to have all the benefits enjoyed by the well-off in the West, particularly if it included continuing to live on their own land in their own communities, many indigenous people might well opt in. The problem is, that is not what is on offer. There is an enormous trade-off for practically everything that passes for ‘development’, and it can leave people in a worse state than before, frequently much worse.

These presumed qualities make tribal peoples inferior to others, which is thought to legitimize the violation of their rights, particularly if it is for the benefit of supposedly more civilized, intelligent and grown-up beings. The latter may take indigenous lands because tribes are thought not to have the capacity to use it properly; they do not exploit it the way that intelligent adults would.

A hunter-gathering society has, on its doorstep, the equivalent of its supermarket, hospital, place of worship, and entertainment centre, and none are shut at weekends. There are no admission fees, no bills, no tax, no mortgage, and no pensions. A house and food cost nothing, so there is little need to plan far in advance. These are also, of course, the keys to why their land is so much more important for tribal peoples that it is for almost anyone else.

Perhaps curiously, those (like me) who assert the realities about tribal ways of life, and refute the racist view that they are savage, stupid and childish, are often accused of romantically portraying the ‘noble savage’.

The theft of indigenous territory and resources is underpinned by a deeply ingrained prejudice: that such peoples are several rungs ‘below’ Westerners, or ‘behind’ them in time. It is even the case that many of those who are actually sympathetic to tribal peoples still view them as backward, fragile societies, left behind by the advanced civilizations which developed from the West’s ‘discovery’ of agriculture. They are thought to be doomed to disappear under an inevitable march of ‘progress’ because they do not have the capacity to catch up with modernity quickly enough. However commonly accepted these views might be, not a single component in them is true.

Irrespective of whether or not the self-satisfaction of industrial civilization is deserved, or whether or not its wealth is earned fairly, it clearly does not even work for all of its participants. Crippling poverty can be found just as easily in the industrialized, as in the ‘developing’, world.

Darwin, “Voyage of the Beagle”

January 1909
Publisher: P.F. Collier
Pages 547

Darwin, “Voyage of the Beagle.”

A description of the Fuegians (natives of Tierra Del Fuego):
234: “It was as easy to please as it was difficult to satisfy these savages. Young and old, men and children, never ceased repeating the word yammer schooner, which means ‘give
me.’ After pointing to almost every object, one after the other, even to the buttons on our coats, and saying their favorite word in as many intonations as possible, they would then use it in a neuter sense, and vacantly repeat ‘yammer-schooner.’ After yammerschoohering for any article very eagerly, they would by a simple artifice point to their young women or little children, as much as to say, ‘If you will not give it me, surely you will to such as these.’”

**de Waal, Frans — Our Inner Ape**

He says that the Apes that are our closest relatives, **chimps and bonobos, have strong dominance hierarchies, as do gorillas.** He also shows many examples of modern human dominance and hierarchies. But also mentions the egalitarianism of hunter-gatherers and says that it might have lasted for millions of years.

**de Waal: Primates and Philosophers**

Frans de Waal
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006,
3: “Social contract theory, and Western civilization with it, seems saturated with the assumption that we are asocial, even nasty creatures rather than the zoon politikon that Aristotle saw in us. Hobbes explicitly rejected the Aristotelian view by proposing that our ancestors start out autonomous and combative, establishing community life only when the cost of strife became unbearable. According to Hobbes, social life never came naturally to us. He saw it as a step we took reluctantly and ‘by covenant only, which is artificial (Hobbes 1991: 120). More recently, Rawls (1972) proposed a milder version of the same view, adding that humanity’s move toward sociality hinged on conditions of fairness, that is, the prospect of mutually advantageous cooperation among equals.”

4-5: “These ideas about the origin of the well-ordered society remain popular even though the underlying assumption of a rational decision by inherently asocial creatures is untenable in light of what we know about the evolution of our species. … We come from a long lineage of hierarchical animals for which life in groups is not an option but a survival strategy. Any zoologist would classify our species as **obligatorily gregarious.** Having companions offers immense advantages in locating food and avoiding predators (…). Inasmuch as group-oriented individuals leave more offspring than those less socially inclined (…), sociality has become ever more deeply ingrained in primate
If any decision to establish societies was made, therefore, credit should go to Mother Nature rather than to ourselves. This is not to dismiss the heuristic value of Rawls’s ‘original position’ as a way of getting us to reflect on what kind of society we would like to live in. … But … it still distracts from the more pertinent argument that we ought to be pursuing, which is how we actually came to be what we are today.”

52: Speaking of Hobbesian or veneer theory, “The theory is at odds with the evidence for emotional processing as driving force behind moral judgment. If human morality could truly be reduced to calculations and reasoning, we would come close to being psychopaths, who indeed do not mean to be kind when they act kindly.”

**Demsetz: Toward a Theo o’prop rights**

NOT REALLY RIGHT LIBERTARIAN BUT CITED BY A LOT OF RIGHT-LIBERTARIANS
SEE ELECTRONIC HIGHLIGHTS; USEFUL FOR ANTHROPOLOGY; DOES NOT GIVE THE LIBERTARIAN STORY AT ALL.
Cited by 3564 on Google Scholar


P. 350: “The thesis can be restated in a slightly different fashion: property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. … A proper interpretation of this assertion requires that account be taken of a community's preferences for private ownership. Some communities will have less well-developed private ownership systems and more highly developed state ownership systems. But, given a community's tastes in this regard, the emergence of new private or state-owned property rights will be in response to changes in technology and relative prices.”

“What appears to be accepted as a classic treatment and a high point of this debate is Eleanor Leacock's memoir on The Montagnes "Hunting Territory" and the Fur Trade.' Leacock's research followed that of Frank G. Speck who had discovered that the Indians of the Labrador Peninsula had a long-established tradition of property in land. This finding was at odds with what was known about the Indians of the American Southwest.”


FOUND: SEE ANTHRO NOTES
Dennett & Connell, “Acculturation and Health in the…”

COPIED TO ARTICLES FOLDER
Acculturation and Health in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea: Dissent on Diversity, Diets, and Development
Glenn Dennett, John Connell, B. J.
Pessimistic view of hunter-gatherer life. I’ve only read the abstract and skimmed some of the commentary. I could look more.

ABSTRACT (273): A widespread tradition in human ecology claims that unacculturated peoples were healthy and usually adequately nourished and lived in harmony with the environment and that acculturation reduced their health and nutrition status by disrupting ecological principles through which homeostasis was achieved. Selective use of global examples provides some support for these assertions, but more detailed examination of data from the Central Highlands of New Guinea, an area apparently isolated offering support, demonstrates that both must be critically questioned. In the Central Highlands at the time of first contact, maternal intakes of nutrients, cultural restrictions on diets, and social and ecological constraints contributed to significant levels of early childhood malnutrition. Acculturation contributed to improved health and nutrition as a result of greater dietary diversity, though variation in the extent of the transfer of labour and land away from food crops ensures that there are exceptions. The duration and content of acculturation are crucial to changes in health and nutrition, and the Central Highlands situation is not likely to be an anomaly. Lack of models synchronically distinguishing such variables as income availability, food prices, and food availability has obscured the complexity of changes in the health and nutritional status of acculturating societies and led to erroneous conclusions.

Diamond—The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race

Race

By Jared Diamond
University of California at Los Angeles Medical School
Discover Magazine, May 1987
Pages 64-66
Short article; Zuz sent it to me. Copied to articles folder. It’s a good nonacademic article that says some of the things I’m trying to say, but it doesn’t cite any sources.
Diamond, the world until yesterday

LISTENED TO IT ON AUDIO; should take notes; only somewhat valuable, mostly for Grant’s chapter

Dowling: Individual ownership and the sharing of game in hunting societies

CITED BY MAYOR


ABSTRACT:
“In most hunting societies there occur together two patterns of behavior that seem incompatible: on the one hand, there are precise formulae for ascribing ownership of an animal to one person when many contribute to acquiring it; and on the other hand, there are patterns for community wide distribution of such animals. Why should such explicit property rules exist if the animals will be distributed anyway? The seeming paradox becomes resolved when these patterns are viewed in the context of the dynamics of reciprocal distributive systems and patterns of esteem-acquisition through superiority in contributing to the community subsistence. The pattern of ownership involved appears to have the function of suppressing conflict among those who contribute to acquiring an animal, since all would like to own it and thus be able to share it. Support for this conclusion derives from social situations in which the pattern of property ascription is absent and conflict is present”

SEE ELECTRONIC HIGHLIGHTS, BUT REALLY THE ABSTRACT SAYS ALL I NEED.

Drennan & Peterson. Patterned variation in prehistoric chiefdoms

CITED BY MAYOR

Drennan & Peterson. Patterned variation in prehistoric chiefdoms

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Abstract: Comparative study of early complex societies (chiefdoms) conjures visions of a cultural evolutionary emphasis on similarities and societal typology. Variation within the group has not been as systematically examined but offers an even more productive avenue of approach to fundamental principles of organization and change. Three widely separated trajectories of early chiefdom development are compared here: the Valley of Oaxaca (Mexico), the Alto Magdalena (Colombia), and Northeast China. Archaeological data from all three regions are analyzed with the same tools to reveal variation in human activities, relationships, and interactions as these change in the emergence of chiefly communities. Patterning in this variation suggests the operation of underlying general principles, which are offered as hypotheses that merit further investigation and evaluation in comparative study of a much larger number of cases.

3960: “Supralocal communities organized around institutionalized social inequalities emerged repeatedly and independently around the world between about 1,000 and 7,000 years ago. The earliest such societies, often broadly labeled chiefdoms, frequently, but not always, came into existence after the establishment of sedentary agricultural living.”

3966: “Recognition that supralocal communities based on institutionalized social hierarchy have emerged repeatedly in human history was among the central contributions of early cultural evolutionary thinking. Comparing just three trajectories of chiefdom development, however, reveals considerable variability in the forms that early hierarchical societies can take and in the ways in which they emerge. The fact that there is not just one kind of chiefdom or one pattern of development in no way undermines the cultural evolutionary observation, and delineating different kinds of chiefdoms (usually by dichotomies) has been common in the more recent cultural evolutionary literature.

As we have seen, there is not just a single critical axis of variability among chiefdoms but several that seem to matter. In this brief effort, we have noted variation in the demographic and spatial scale of chiefly districts and in the extent to which local communities structured interaction, economic production was specialized, hierarchy was connected to the supernatural, inequalities implied different standards of living, districts formed in conflict and conquest, population growth fostered the formation of supralocal communities, prestige goods were imported from other regions, leadership was strongly focused on particular individuals, ritual was communal as opposed to exclusionary, and social hierarchy was unitary, among other things. One way in which a focus on such variation can help reveal general
principles is through the empirical investigation of relationships between such measurements. For these three regions, for example, economic specialization and interdependence seem the main forces that produced nucleated villages, and ceremonialism was more important to supralocal organization. Such supralocal organization was only achieved by unitary hierarchies, and only the unitary hierarchy of the San Jose’ Mogote chiefdom, binding local economics to supralocal ceremonialism, eventually became the backbone of state-level organization.”

3967: “The comparative study of the variation between trajectories thus expands and complements the traditional cultural evolutionary quest for universals seen in similarities between cases. Extracting fundamental principles from patterned variation presents a greater challenge than traditional comparisons in several ways. While it can begin by generating hypotheses from only a few cases, it finally must include a great many cases so that general patterns can be discerned. It must cope with many societal variables, resisting the temptation to dichotomize or oversimplify.”

Dubreuil, Human Evolution and the Origins of Hierarchies

Notes by Kindle “locations” rather than page numbers

I am not interested in explaining specific transitions but in explaining how social cognition makes possible and constrains the range of institutional outcomes found in human societies. Why are human beings sometimes capable of resisting exploitative social arrangements and at other times not? Why are societies in which millions of individuals interact never devoid of vertically integrated social hierarchies, whereas no societies comprising a few hundred individuals present anything like them? -- 200

anthropologist Christopher Boehm (1999) emphasized the peculiarity of humans’ evolutionary -- 246 trajectory. At some point in their evolution, humans got rid of ape-like dominance hierarchies. Foragers could maintain a relative equality for a while before hierarchies progressively reappeared in the form of large-scale societies during the Neolithic era. Boehm (1993, 1999) has probably illustrated better than anyone the various mechanisms (e.g., ridicule, ostracism, violence) that foragers, as well as numerous pastoralists and horticulturalists, have used to prevent aggressive individuals from establishing their dominion over others. -- 247
hierarchies in humans rest on radically different grounds from those of other hierarchies among primates. -- 255

The last two chapters of the book are dedicated to hierarchies in Homo sapiens. -- 314

Chapter 4 addresses the question of equality and hierarchy in nonstate societies. I examine the claims of neoevolutionism in social anthropology concerning the link between group size and political organization. -- 316

The scarcity of time and humans’ limited social memory endanger efficient sanctioning of deviant behaviors in large groups and create incentives for fission as population grows. I argue that the only way for groups to grow beyond the size of foraging bands (a few dozen individuals) is to maintain what I call a “social division of sanction” and to attach to some individuals the duty to sanction normative transgressions within a certain domain. -- 320

Chapter 5 pushes further the argument proposed in Chapter 4 to account for what probably remains the most significant political change in human history: the development of the state. -- 328

I argue that the most significant turning point between nonstate and state societies occurs when an individual is authorized to delegate to others the power to sanction normative transgressions. This is the beginning of political centralization and of the hierarchical integration that characterize many state institutions -- 331

the dependence of subordinates creates a feeling of gratitude in them that tends to inhibit their willingness to sanction their superiors, which, in turn, creates a context of impunity favorable to rulers. -- 336

In the following chapters, I argue that egalitarian social arrangements in Homo sapiens and extinct human species should not be explained as the direct outcome of a passion for equality, but rather in the broader context of the evolution of the motivational and cognitive mechanisms underlying norm following and sanctioning. In the proper circumstances, these very mechanisms are also likely to permit the evolution of hierarchical and inegalitarian arrangements. -- 347

My objective in this chapter is to provide readers, -- 358
with an updated picture of how norm following and sanctioning function in our species. This picture is essential to understanding both how hominins got rid of dominance hierarchies during their evolution and why hierarchies could reappear in Homo sapiens. -- 359

The main conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that, although humans arguably have a passion for equality, this passion alone is not sufficient to explain the presence or absence of hierarchies and inequalities. Egalitarian social arrangements must build on
what Boehm (1999: 66) called an “egalitarian ethos,” which is culturally constructed and transmitted and does not straightforwardly result from our passion for equality. -- 1193

In this chapter and the following, I argue that social norms and sanctions as we know them in modern Homo sapiens result from a few significant cognitive changes in the human lineage and that these changes led to the elimination of dominance hierarchies as they exist in nonhuman primates. -- 1207

In the last two sections, I delve into the archaeological data to identify major behavioral changes since our last common ancestor with chimpanzees and other apes -- 1215

I argue that the bulk of the evidence speaks in favor of the two-step evolutionary scenario -- 1219

I argue that the reversal of dominance hierarchies was completed before the emergence of anatomically and behaviorally modern humans. The next chapter is dedicated to Homo sapiens; there I argue that the cognitive revolution associated with this species allowed hierarchies to reappear progressively in a novel guise. -- 1222

Exploring the social life of extinct hominins has never been easy. Groups cannot be observed directly, and inferring social structures from archaeological and paleoantropological data is a hazardous undertaking. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that the emergence of the cognitive and motivational mechanisms underlying normativity and sanction would have had a pervasive effect on the social life of hominins. -- 1543

reversing dominance hierarchies is basically a public goods game. -- 1547

a large majority of individuals are always in the losing position when dominance hierarchies exist. At the same time, however, every single subordinate individual has an interest in being kind to the alpha male to avoid harassment. From an evolutionary standpoint, it makes sense to assume that dominance hierarchies persisted in the human lineage as long as individuals lacked the motivational and cognitive resources needed to engage in the collective sanctioning of dominant individuals. -- 1549

If we find evidence in the archeological record that hominins began to produce new public goods, we might infer indirectly that they had successfully reversed dominance hierarchies. -- 1554

It is thus reasonable to hold that by 1.8 million years ago Homo erectus sensu lato was living in environments significantly different from the one in which it evolved. -- 1588

The evolution of exclusive bipedalism in early Homo erectus probably implies that hominins stopped using nesting as a form of protection and began to sleep on the ground -- 1611
It is tempting to suggest that this important change also implied a greater reliance on group protection, which can also be understood as a form of cooperation. -- 1613

Chimpanzees enjoy hunting and devour their prey greedily. In no primate species other than humans, however, does the consumption of meat play a significant nutritional role. Of course, meat does not always play a role in the human diet. The ethnographic record on that point is as diverse as one can imagine (Leonard 2002). At one extreme, 96% of the traditional Inuit's daily energy intake comes from animals. At the other, Quechua agriculturalists from Highland Peru get only 5% of their daily calories from animal foods. -- 1616

The discovery of a wooden spear dated at 125,000 BP between the ribs of a straight-tusked elephant in Lehringen in Germany provides evidence that Neanderthals were big-game hunters. The finding of three well-preserved wooden spears in Schöningen dated at 400,000 BP confirms that so was Homo heidelbergensis, their alleged ancestor -- 1624

The balance of the evidence suggests that Plio-Pleistocene hominins were active scavengers – chasing other carnivores away before they could consume the carcasses completely -- 1639

it seems thus reasonable to maintain that a significant change in diet occurred in early Homo erectus. -- 1685

The controlled use of fire in hearths probably appeared during the Mid-Pleistocene and was more or less concomitant with the emergence of Homo heidelbergensis -- 1696

it is only for Homo heidelbergensis that we have convincing evidence of extensive reliance on large-game hunting. -- 1698

the shift to a higher quality diet is more efficient for a group in which there is an ethos supporting cooperative feeding, because of the uncertain nature of high-quality food acquisition. -- 1707

there is another way to meet the energy challenge: hominins can share the costs associated with raising and feeding children -- 1750

For the first 20 years of their life, humans consume more than they produce. In contrast, chimpanzees become self-sufficient around 5 years of age and remain so for the rest of their lives, investing slightly in their offspring until their death. The contrast with modern human foragers is striking. For them, production peaks at around 45 years of age and then slowly decreases until net production once again turns negative around 60. On the whole, modern human life history implies huge transfers between generations. Most of the transfers go to younger generations, but significant amounts are also allocated to the elderly. -- 1750
both body mass and adult brain size in Homo heidelbergensis and Neanderthals fall within the ranges of modern Homo sapiens. If we join these data to what we know of dental development in these species, we can infer that a more or less modern life history had evolved in Africa and Europe during the Mid-Pleistocene -- the originality of the human offspring development strategy is striking. Humans usually give birth to one child, but in contrast to precocial species, human newborns are usually quite immature and vulnerable. -- 1786

the rare fossils available suggest that the size of the birth canal in Homo heidelbergensis and Neanderthal was similar to what is found in modern humans -- 1824 and that brain growth rate in juveniles was also similar -- 1827

The emergence of a modern life history, secondary altriciality, and the modern birth mechanism all provides evidence of greater social cooperation between females and the rest of the group. According to the grandmother hypothesis, cooperative breeding appeared initially among related females (Hawkes et al. 1998). However, cooperation in modern humans is not limited to females. -- 1829

conspecific care. -- 1911

Support given to temporarily incapacitated individuals takes the form of a public goods game, because everyone has an incentive in being cared for in case of illness or injury, but not in caring for others -- 1912

In the case of a permanent disability, it should no longer be a question of a public goods game, because the caregiver cannot reasonably expect a return on his investment. For instance, the Shanidar specimens found in Iraq and studied by Erik Trinkaus (1983) provide compelling evidence of conspecific care. The Shanidar 1 individual is probably the one in the worst state. He survived multiple traumas, including a violent blow to the left side of his face that left him blind in one eye, several fractures to his right arm, and a deformity of his lower right leg and foot sufficient to make his walking painful. If the Shanidar specimens count as evidence of lasting caregiving behavior, we can reasonably infer that this behavioral trait was homologous in both Neanderthals and modern humans and, thus, shared with their common ancestor some 500,000 years ago. -- 1917

What emerges from Table 2.1 is a punctuate evolution with two major behavioral transitions: 1. Early Homo erectus sensu lato presents strong evidence of increased cooperation for two of the points that we examined: he was ecologically more flexible than his predecessors, probably because of his modern body, and he shifted to a higher quality diet. 2. Homo heidelbergensis presents strong evidence of increased cooperation for all but one of the points discussed. There is no unambiguous evidence of long-term support for incapacitated individuals among these hominins, but this can easily be due to the scarcity of the fossil record. Even the much better known Neanderthal record has provided only a few indisputable specimens. -- 1932
The dietary shift in early Homo erectus implies the capacity to control free riders in low-cost everyday games of cooperative hunting/scavenging and food sharing. Hominins can shift to higher quality (though less reliable) food sources if they can pool the risks associated with this new diet and make sure that nobody abuses the public good. In such games the stakes are relatively low, and most players have the capacity to punish at every turn. -- 1960

first central fact is that the relative and absolute increase in brain size in Homo heidelbergensis – the most important in the human lineage – coincides with the emergence of long-term cooperative ventures. -- 1998

I have argued in this chapter that, with regard to cooperation and social norms, the archaeological record suggests that at least two major behavioral transitions occurred since our last common ancestor with chimpanzees. The first took place in early Homo erectus and can be related to a change in social motivations that made cooperative feeding more advantageous. It provoked a shift to a more versatile, higher quality diet, as well as the colonization of a new ecological niche. The second, which occurred in Homo heidelbergensis or slightly earlier, can be explained by enhanced cognitive control that facilitated investment in long-term public goods games such as cooperative breeding. -- 2031

If my argument is correct and these changes really occurred, they must have had a major impact on traditional dominance hierarchies. Had the early Homo erectus been interested in sharing attention with its conspecifics, it would have been more prone to engage in cooperative resistance against aggressive and violent individuals. A few hundred thousand years later, enhanced cognitive control could have given groups of Homo heidelbergensis the capacity to turn down the aspirations of their most aggressive members. We will never know exactly how our ancestors lived or the specific tactics they used to resist dominance. Nevertheless, the best guess as of now would be that a few hundred thousand years ago hominins were living in nearly egalitarian foraging bands, successfully resisting despotic individuals. Although dominance hierarchies were eradicated, modern status hierarchies had not yet been created. Homo erectus, Homo heidelbergensis, and Homo neanderthalensis had no more alpha males, but not yet a chief, a priest, or a president. As we will see in the following chapters, it is only modern Homo sapiens who paved the way for the reemergence of hierarchies in the human lineage, but under a totally different form. -- 2035

Modern Homo sapiens is the first and only primate ever to have created large-scale hierarchical societies. It is also probably the first and only hominin to have built large tribal networks and to have made use of symbolic artifacts to indicate individuals’ places within these networks. In the next two chapters, I will contend that it is through the construction of such institutions that inequality and hierarchies came back in the human lineage. However, they came back, I will argue, in a form that has little in common with primate-like dominance hierarchies. -- 2053
Anthropologists Bruce Knauft (1991) and Christopher Boehm (1999) have suggested that political hierarchies have followed a U-shaped trajectory during human evolution, disappearing during the Paleolithic and reappearing during the Neolithic. -- 2058

In this chapter, I argue that hierarchies reappeared in the human lineage because Homo sapiens is cognitively different from its ancestors. It is my contention that specifically human hierarchies could not have appeared in Homo erectus or Homo heidelbergensis. For cognitive reasons, prior human species were condemned to equality. -- 2069

In this chapter, I argue that Sapiens culture depends on the capacity to represent opposing and potentially conflicting perspectives on objects. In the following chapters, I will explain why this capacity is also instrumental in the creation of the institutions without which humans would be incapable of maintaining trust in large-scale societies. -- 2074

A proper explanation of the evolution of human culture and behavior must build on insights from various disciplines and propose links between usually unconnected sets of data. Ultimately a comprehensive theory must answer the following questions (see Fig. 3.1): (1) To what extent do changes in material culture indicate changes in behavior? (2) Must changes in behavior be explained by changes in cognitive functions? (3) Can changes in cognitive abilities be related to the evolution of specific morphological and neural features in human populations? (4) Can morphological and neural changes be related to specific genetic mutations? (5) Which mechanism best explains these genetic changes: genetic drift or natural selection? -- 2093

there is no more doubt that modern human morphology evolved in Africa from more archaic forms during the last 500,000 years. About 100,000 years ago, most morphological features associated with modern Homo sapiens were in place. By this time, human specimens from Africa can be referred to as anatomically modern humans (AMH). -- 2150

Genetic studies have shown that AMH and Neanderthals diverged from a common ancestor some time between 700,000 BP and 300,000 BP -- 2161

This common ancestor is occasionally referred to as Homo heidelbergensis, a general name under which European and African fossils dated between 700,000 BP and 300,000 BP can be regrouped -- 2164

there was an expansion of the modern human genotype and phenotype outside of Africa some time between 60,000 and 40,000 years ago. Evidence for this expansion comes from material culture, as we see later, but above all from genes and morphology. -- 2174

Studies of mitochondrial DNA have concluded that the common ancestor of all living humans through the maternal line of descent -- 2182

lived some 150,000 or 200,000 years ago in Africa, -- 2183
Biologists usually define a species as a group of organisms that can interbreed and produce fertile offspring. Under such a definition, Homo sapiens, Homo neanderthalensis, and Homo erectus may have represented one and the same polymorphic species. However, for our purposes Homo sapiens need not necessarily be a distinct -- 2227

species under the classical (and long debated) biological understanding. There are other ways to inquire into the distinctiveness of Homo sapiens. In the next sections, I explore two of them: brain morphology and behavior. -- 2230

I said that there was still no agreement about the identification of Homo heidelbergensis as a relevant taxon in human evolution. Nevertheless, if there is one compelling morphological argument in favor of such a taxon, it is the general increase in brain size apparent in the human lineage after 700,000 BP. -- 2235

Paleoanthropologists usually compare fossil specimens on the basis of their encephalization quotient (EQ), which expresses a ratio of brain mass to body size. -- 2241

Rightmire (2004) proposed an average EQ of 3.61 for Homo erectus sensu lato and of 5.26 for Homo heidelbergensis. This latter level is similar to that found in Homo sapiens and Neanderthals. -- 2243

In the following sections, I review the main archaeological evidence in favor of behavioral transitions in the human lineage. My focus is on the period of morphological modernization of Homo sapiens (500,000–50,000 BP). I begin with Africa (3.4.1 to 3.4.3) and then turn to the issue of Neanderthals’ modernity -- 2371

In the Levant, sites such as Qafzeh and Skhul – where remains of quasi-modern humans have been found – have shown for the period between 160,000 and 90,000 BP a stone industry similar to that produced in Europe by Neanderthals -- 2436

There is no consensus as to whether modern behaviors appeared gradually or more suddenly in the MSA [mid-stone age?], but it is now widely recognized that most modern behavioral traits were present in Africa much earlier than 50,000–40,000 years ago -- 2505

Genetic analyses show that human evolution has accelerated since modern human expansion and dispersal out of Africa 60,000–40,000 BP (Hawks et al. 2007). There is no doubt that the spectacular growth of human populations in urban environments since the Industrial Revolution has accelerated and will further accelerate the pace of natural selection. -- 3005

institution-making in humans builds on our capacity to consider and coordinate alternative perspectives on concepts. This capacity requires more than the faculty of language as it is ordinarily understood. 1. It implies that we have the right affects and that we are interested in sharing attention with our conspecifics. I proposed in the previous
chapter some reasons to believe that this ability was in place early in the human lineage.  
2. It implies executive functions such as inhibition and working memory, located in large part in the prefrontal cortex. Given the relative stasis of the frontal lobe during the last 500,000 years and the presence of long-term cooperative ventures in Homo heidelbergensis, these abilities were probably in place before the morphological and the behavioral modernization of Homo sapiens.  
3. Finally, it entails sufficient attentional flexibility to look simultaneously at a person as a man or as a president, or at an object as a tool and as a ritual object. Such tasks rely heavily on the temporoparietal areas, and as these areas underwent significant reorganization in line with the globularization of the cranium, I propose that the cognitive modernization of Homo sapiens began there. -- 3034

I think that evidence in favor of uniquely human social organization appears quite early in the archaeological record. As noted, the presence of raw materials from distant sources (>100 km) in MSA sites as old as 130,000 BP suggests that modern humans were already engaged in long-distance exchange networks at that time -- 3046

My goal, in this chapter and the following, is to plead in favor of naturalism in explaining the existence of hierarchies in modern humans. I aim to show that, although natural history would try in vain to supplant cultural history, it can supplement it advantageously and shed some light on lasting epistemological problems in the study of human hierarchy. I focus my discussion on the functional link often emphasized (and questioned) in both anthropology and archaeology between larger polities and political organization. Do larger polities entail hierarchical social structures? If so, what causal mechanism explains this link, and how can this mechanism account for the huge variations found across human societies? -- 3075

My objective is to show that the correlation between group size and political organization can be accounted for by explaining how the cognitive mechanisms described earlier relate to precise relational mechanisms. -- 3087

I begin this chapter with a discussion of the universalistic and particularistic tendencies in the study of human societies (4.1) and of the central place of neoevolutionary typologies in the debate on the evolution of hierarchies (4.2). I argue that the functional link between group size and political organization is at the center of neoevolutionary approaches, but has never been explained convincingly (4.3). To account for this link, I first consider group size within the larger context of primate societies. I provide some reasons to think that group size in primates is constrained by their limited capacity or willingness to maintain bonds of trust in large groups (4.4). Humans, despite their unusual ability to cooperate, face a similar problem. Small egalitarian societies tend to split apart because of individuals’ limited dispositions to punish increasingly unknown individuals (4.5). For human societies to grow beyond the size of the bands, some institutions must be present. In nonstate societies, these institutions involve two relational mechanisms that are intimately linked to the evolution of hierarchies: the creation of corporate groups and the social division of sanction (4.6). This chapter concludes with a discussion of two issues that might contribute to explaining when and how hierarchies reappeared in the human
lineages. I first contend that the creation of appropriate relational mechanisms depends on complex theory of mind and perspective-taking abilities, which, as argued in the previous chapter, are probably specific to modern Homo sapiens (4.7). I then explain that, if hierarchies play a functional role in human societies, their presence is consistent with various levels of inequalities in wealth and power (4.8) and often contributes to the creation of persistent situations of injustice (4.9). -- 3089

it is often possible to group theorists according to their tendency either to seek or to oppose generalizations. This is sometimes referred to as the opposition between “lumpers” and “splitters.” -- 3104

In social anthropology, the question of social hierarchies, maybe more than any other, has been at the center of the opposition between lumpers and splitters. Indeed, it was at the core of the first real attempts in academic anthropology to produce generalizing frameworks to account for (mainly socio-political) human diversity. -- 3123

Table 4.1. Neo-Evolutionary Sequences -- 3155

These sequences, which are claimed to cover all human societies, are unquestionably the most influential and most disputed legacy of neoevolutionism. They are of specific interest for us because they are primarily (though not exclusively) oriented toward politics. -- 3161

Although primarily concerned with political leadership, Service's sequence is also economic because evolutionary stages are correlated with production types: bands are usually found among hunter-gatherers, tribes among sedentary horticulturalists and pastoralists, and both states and chiefdoms are found among agriculturalists. -- 3176

Service's evolutionary framework is by far the most prominent in the literature, but has serious limitations. -- 3179

bands and tribes seem to exist along a continuum, rather than as two clear-cut categories. For instance, nomadic Algonquian Indians foraged in small fluid bands comprising a few dozen individuals during the winter, but regrouped into larger tribal groups that could grow to include a few hundred members in the summer. Tribal leaders’ roles were much more prominent during summer gatherings than during winter foraging. -- 3183

The concept of “band” associates egalitarian social structures with the hunting and gathering production type, although this association [between H-G & egalitarianism] does not hold for many sedentary, food-storing hunter-gatherer societies, such as Northwestern Coast Indians, California Indians, and southeastern Siberia peoples, among whom substantial inequalities can be found (Testart 1982, 1988). -- 3196

The most interesting point of Fried's typology remains his criticism of the distinction between bands and tribes. The point seems to have been accepted by Service, who
subsequently agreed on a new typology with only three stages: (1) egalitarian societies, (2) hierarchical societies, and (3) archaic civilizations.

To overcome the problems associated with the concept of “tribe,” Robert L. Carneiro (1981, 1987) proposed replacing it with the concept of “autonomous village.” The concept applies not only to Amazonian horticulturalists but also to many agriculturalists and sedentary pastoralists around the world.

Table 4.2. Equality versus Residential Patterns

According to Carneiro (1981: 45), a chiefdom should be defined as “an autonomous political unit comprising a number of villages or communities under the permanent control of a paramount chief.” The distinction between tribes and chiefdoms, which is ambiguous in Service's sequence, is now clear: chiefdoms appear when some villages lose their autonomy to the benefit of others. Carneiro's sequence has had a great influence in archaeology, in which core–periphery distinctions between settlements are often easier to reconstruct than rank inequalities.

Carneiro and Fried simply built their sequences along two different dimensions: hierarchy/equality and residential patterns.

Both Carneiro and Fried discussed both dimensions, even though each placed his primary emphasis on one or the other. This table can give us an idea of the arrangements that they both considered possible. On the one hand, both Carneiro and Fried argued that chiefdoms and states are organized hierarchically and share a high level of inequality. On the other hand, they also agreed with Service that bands are necessarily egalitarian.

over the last two or three decades, neoevolutionism has lost much of its support among anthropologists and archaeologists.

At the methodological level, neoevolutionists, with the notable exception of Carneiro, have been charged with neglecting the thorough examination of cross-cultural variations (Trigger 1998: 31). Moreover, they have been accused of handpicking their cases instead of following an objective sampling procedure (Ross 1988). Following Sahlins (1958, 1963), they have also been criticized for placing too much emphasis on the Pacific region, modeling the opposition between “tribes” and “chiefdoms” (just like the opposition between ranked and stratified societies) too closely on a stereotypical opposition between Melanesian and Polynesian societies (Sand 2002). Neoevolutionists have been accused of neglecting other regions, such as Africa, which contradict many features of their model.

At the epistemological level, neoevolutionists have been said to have proposed no evolutionary theory at all (Yoffee 2004: 8). Like nineteenth-century evolutionists, they instead used comparative methods to build (or to confirm exogenously motivated) taxonomies of social types (Stocking 1987: 316–318). Consequently, neoevolutionism does not explain the directionality of evolution and why some social types should come
before others. In fact, it does not explain why we should understand social types as “stages” in an evolutionary sequence at all, nor does it account for evolutionary “reversals” such as the collapse of chiefdoms or states or the decision to abandon horticulture in favor of foraging. -- 3265

Another related problem concerns the linearity of typologies; that is, the fact that each social type is defined as a stage on the scale of complexity or social integration. As neoevolutionists do not thoroughly examine the concepts of integration and complexity, it is difficult to understand not only why evolution should tend toward greater complexity but even why we should classify societies according to this criterion -- 3275

Neoevolutionists and their followers in anthropology and archaeology do not tend to consider specific cultural content as independent variables that can constrain evolutionary processes in any interesting way. Because of this stance, neoevolutionism has been portrayed as a deterministic approach to human society. -- 3284

Neglecting the role of specific cultural content in the evolution of social hierarchies has a cost. In many African kingdoms, kings are thought to control the rain or to have a privileged access to supernatural forces and beings (Asombang 1999). -- 3288

there is no question that specific cultural content will affect social and political evolution by making some associations more attractive than others. -- 3295

Another traditional criticism of neoevolutionism and systems theory relates to their inability to connect with micro-level explanations of human behavior and to account for social change and conflict. -- 3296

My own view is close to Philip Pettit's (1993) ecumenical stance on scientific explanations in the social sciences. The inability of functionalism to explain the origins of social arrangements is not a problem per se, but it limits the scope of potential functional explanations to the stability of certain types of social arrangements. People can pursue many goals in building institutions (political, religious, ideological, etc.). In many cases, the benefits produced by institutions will simply be the unintentional byproduct of the pursuit of unrelated goals (Elster 1981). Yet that does not mean that these benefits will play no role in the success of the institution. Indeed, there can be a mechanism that feeds these benefits back into the social system to support this type of institution (Elster 2007: 14). Specifying a plausible mechanism does not imply describing precisely the intentions of individual agents in each case – and thus functionalism is not an alternative to more detailed historical accounts – but at a minimum, it establishes a link among some psychological traits, a typical social dynamic, and the reproduction of a certain type of social arrangement. I contend that neoevolutionism can meet this challenge in the case of socio-political organization. -- 3322
Neoevolutionists have usually presented increasing group size as the prime mover behind socio-political evolution (Carneiro 2002; Ross 1988). Large-scale societies apparently imply more hierarchical social organization -- 3332

Bruce Trigger wrote (1998: 32), “no society will ever be found that has both a big-game hunting subsistence base and a divine monarchy…. The need for functional integration limits what is possible within viable systems.” Is this a sound use of functional explanation? To be sure, it is based on a strong correlation: foraging bands have small populations and are egalitarian, whereas large chiefdoms and states contain large populations and have hierarchical social structures. -- 3342

Nevertheless, neoevolutionists specify no feedback mechanism to explain how hierarchies contribute to social order in large groups. The point is presented as intuitive – and in a certain sense it is – but the inability to specify a mechanism has cast doubt on the foundation of neoevolutionism, as well as on its explanatory power. -- 3346

My contention is that we could gain a clearer understanding as to why the correlation fails for intermediate stages by explaining the mechanism that underlies the correlation between population size and socio-political organization in the first place. This is what I do in the following sections. Once this is done, the reason why it is so difficult to construct a convincing typology of nonstate societies of increasing “complexity” should become clearer. This should also help us understand – in the following chapter – both why political -- 3351 centralization is an unavoidable outcome in very large polities and in what indirect sense group size plays a causal role in explaining the origins of the state. -- 3355

Affiliative behaviors can thus compensate for increased social conflict, but there are reasons to think that they cannot do so indefinitely. If Dunbar's model is correct, there is a point at which primate groups should split apart – or at least become less stable – because of time and cognitive constraints on group size. -- 3406

Because there is no reason to assume that primates’ motivation and ability to process social relationships are constant across species, it is particularly difficult to figure out the exact effect of cognitive constraints on group size. -- 3447

three good reasons to assume that cognition has an impact on group size. -- 3452

The first reason is that, when group size becomes too large – Lehmann and colleagues (2007: 1624) suggested around 40 individuals – grooming time tends to become asymptotic. -- 3453

The second reason is that increasing group size seems to be a good predictor of fission, at least in some species. -- 3456
The third reason is that very large primate groups are less structured and less stable than smaller ones. -- 3464

it is reasonable to maintain that group size in primates is, at least in some way, constrained by the ability and the motivation of primates to build and maintain social relationships. Interestingly, such constraint can be taken to support a functionalist account of group size in primates. Groups will tend to reach a “functional” size; that is, a size that allows individuals to avoid social conflicts and instability, as well as predation and exacerbated feeding competition. To be sure, primates are not under cognitive stress all or even most of the time, but cognition does constrain group size in some interesting ways. Can the same be said of humans? -- 3468

My contention, for the rest of this chapter and the following, is that cognition does constrain group size in humans, although modern humans, because of the cognitive changes discussed in the previous chapter, have the capacity to overcome these limits through institution-building. -- 3488

One trait of small foraging bands is their relative egalitarianism. Egalitarianism, to be sure, is a contested concept, and I discuss later some of the problems associated with it. For now, it suffices to say that small foraging bands have no leader – or, more precisely, no leader with coercive power – and are intolerant of bullying and patronizing individuals, as well as of opportunists who contribute insufficiently to public goods. Equality is thus not an accidental social outcome, but the result of practices favoring social leveling (Clastre 1977; Flanagan 1989). Such practices include social norms concerning marriage, food sharing, gift exchange, and warfare, as well as conscious strategies of socio-political leveling. -- 3587

Anthropologist Christopher Boehm (1993, 1999) has conducted an impressive survey of the strategies adopted in stateless societies to intentionally level socio-political relationships. He reviewed the ethnographic record and identified 48 cultures from all around the world for which there were reported episodes of intentional leveling. The survey included not only nomadic hunter-gatherers and pastoralists but also sedentary horticulturalists and pastoralists. -- 3588

The first group of sanctions can be described as “moderate” because they involve no physical violence. Criticism and ridicule are the strategies used most frequently to remind people of their duties. In societies where leadership is institutionalized, desertion of the headmen can have the same effect. -- 3595

Stronger sanctions include ostracism or expulsion and – in the case of institutionalized leadership – deposition or desertion of the leader. -- 3598

Finally, there are ultimate sanctions – assassination or execution – which are far from exceptional in stateless societies. -- 3600
If small communities are so efficient in maintaining social order and equality, why would larger hierarchical societies emerge in general? I examine this question in two ways. First, I need to give more details about how larger societies can maintain social order at all (4.6.1, 4.6.2, and 4.7). Then I explain why people living in hierarchical societies often, but not always, end up compromising on equality -- 3606

When people struggle to monitor who is who, punishing defectors becomes more risky and less effective. -- 3611

My contention is that local groups that grow beyond the level of a few dozen individuals have to find a cheaper strategy to monitor individual behavior. -- 3617

If the chief represents the group, there is no more need for members of other groups to monitor the behavior of each member of the group; it is sufficient to focus one’s attention on the most prominent ones. -- 3623

The creation of corporate groups is a relational mechanism that relieves the social system of the need to process loads of information that would exceed individuals’ cognitive capacities. -- 3627

How do we explain the complexification of societies where there is no institutionalization of sanction? -- 3634

For an individual to function as a reliable indicator of other individuals’ trustworthiness, however, certain conditions must obtain. Most important, the corporate group must be well ordered, avoid open conflict, and behave as one body. -- 3642

The creation of corporate groups is usually accompanied by a change in the way people understand the enforcement of social norms. As their reputation and trustworthiness are bound to that of their follow clansmen or tribesmen, they have an interest in keeping the relationships within the corporate groups and with other groups orderly. -- 3662

the “social division of sanction.” By that, I mean that in such societies not everybody is equally responsible for sanctioning normative violations. -- 3670

primary rules are rules of conduct. -- 3674

Secondary rules can identify the validity (or domain of validity) of other rules, specify how normative violations should be adjudicated, or describe how new rules might be created or old ones abrogated. -- 3678

creating secondary rules is another way of coping with cognitive constraints on group size. -- 3682
The social division of sanction and the multiplication of corporate groups allow stateless societies to control the rising costs of sanction and to build groups of thousands of individuals. -- 3734

Multiplication of corporate groups might also be detrimental to security and social order, because private conflicts between individuals can degenerate into more violent conflict between corporate groups. -- 3737

Why are higher theory of mind and perspective taking essential for creating corporate groups and secondary rules? -- 3764

Baboons – like other nonhuman primates, but unlike humans – do not have the complex mind-reading ability associated with understanding false beliefs and level-2 perspective taking -- 3771

The presence of such collective intentions in nonhuman primates is debated and debatable, but what is implausible is to claim that they believe that the group to which they belong has a mind of its own – in other words, to claim that baboons believe that the troop to which they belong can have, as a troop, a belief that they do not have as individuals. -- 3808

In sum, higher theory of mind and perspective taking support the creation of social identities and of autobiographies, two defining traits of subjects. In everyday life, we apply these constructions with the same ease to individuals and to corporate groups. This explains how some of the mechanisms traditionally associated with corporate groups became possible in modern Homo sapiens. For instance, the idea that a corporate group must preserve its honor makes sense because we are able to distinguish the reputation of the group from that of its members. The same thing could be said of the possibility of speaking on behalf of the group, which is essential to the construction of aggregated tribal networks. Representing the group is probably the most widespread function of chiefs and headmen in stateless societies. Yet fulfilling that function is only possible if people believe that the group has a point of view of its own. Constructing an autobiography for the group – that is, a history or a tradition – provides leaders with guidelines about the point of view they must represent. -- 3819

It is therefore reasonable to associate the emergence of secondary rules, just like that of corporate groups, with the evolution of higher theory of mind and perspective taking. If my reading of the archaeological record is accurate, the emergence of secondary rules must be associated with the evolution of modern Homo sapiens. -- 3843

Despite modern humans’ disposition to follow norms and to sanction their violation, large-scale cooperation poses cognitive problems for them, as it probably did for their ancestors. However, modern humans are able to overcome the cognitive constraints on group size by building corporate groups and developing secondary rules. Many traits traditionally associated with the rise of hierarchies and inequalities correspond to this
kind of institution-building. For example, chiefs or headmen are often spokesmen for corporate groups. We consider them to have a higher status because they have the privilege of representing the group and speaking on its behalf. In contrast, secondary rules often entitle some individuals (but not others) to create, sanction, change, or abrogate social rules. This is also a form of inequality and, arguably, of hierarchy. If the creation of corporate groups and secondary rules is required to maintain social cohesion, we can soundly affirm that, because of the way human cognition functions, larger populations will come with increased social inequality and hierarchy.

the persistent inability of evolutionary typologies to arrive at a satisfying correlation between group size and socio-political forms for intermediate societies; that is, societies fitting somewhere between small egalitarian bands and large hierarchical chiefdoms and states. Carneiro's framework does not give a prominent role to the question of hierarchy and inequality. It groups societies in which social inequalities and hierarchies play very different roles under the label of “autonomous villages.”

archaeologist Robert Paynter (1989: 381) criticized the equation he saw in neoevolutionism between complexity and inequality, which he understood as differential access to strategic resources: Recent studies do show that egalitarianism can be maintained despite underlying social differences. One reason that inequalities don't arise is that members of the group lack the means to monopolize strategic resources. In egalitarian societies, there are too many leveling devices, too many places to escape to, too many authorities, and too many weapons too widely spread throughout the population to foster accumulation of power by the few.

Robin Osborne's He argued that the development of hierarchies does not imply differential access to resources and wealth: “The politics of equality play themselves out in hierarchical and non-hierarchical societies alike as the politics of personal relationships” (Osborne 2007: 146).

many African segmentary societies have permanent positions of leadership though very few wealth inequalities.

One typical way to account for the persistence of inequality in human societies is to refer to the symbolic or narrative constructions that sustain these inequalities. For instance, Maurice Godelier (1986), in his ethnography of the Baruyas, an acephalous tribe in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, reconstructed the complex myths and narratives underlying strong gender inequalities in the tribe.

Baruya boys,
practice over many years a secret ritual of fellatio, in the belief that drinking the semen of other men allows young males to maintain their strength and beauty prior to marriage. After marriage, the belief continues in a way, with the idea that women need the sperm of their husband in order to produce milk. In Baruya belief systems, sperm counts as the ultimate source of life and strength. In contrast, their mythology presents women as a source of pollution and disorder. According to Godelier, these beliefs justify the enforcement of the strict segregation of women in numerous areas of life and especially during menstruation. -- 4000

women consider it immoral to refuse the sperm of their husbands (and thus to deprive their children of high-quality milk) or to pollute their husband during menstruation. -- 4009

In the case of the Baruyas, we just cannot help wondering why women adhere to narratives that are so obviously disadvantageous to them. It is as if they were more attached to the narratives than to their own well-being. -- 4012

The problem of interpreting the behavior of subordinate individuals pertains to all societies in which there are considerable inequalities. I call this the “problem of voluntary servitude,” following the French moralist Étienne de La Boétie (1975). Why do people accept servitude when they are not overtly forced to do so? -- 4020

We can give one general argument to account for this frequency. -- 4030 although people are unsatisfied with inequalities, the individual costs associated with their eradication often exceed the benefits. One reason why eradicating inequalities can be costly is that they are often functional. -- 4031

When some individuals become more salient, they can be transformed into indicators of other individuals’ trustworthiness and function as nodes in larger social networks. Thus, the economic, political, or ideological benefits associated with these larger networks get tied to the unequal status of these more salient individuals. -- 4032

Headmen, chiefs, or leaders are the nexus of nonstate societies. They have increased access to information, social networks, and prestige, as well as a greater capacity for organizing collective action. Less salient individuals can thus face collective action problems when they attempt to oppose the opportunistic behavior of more salient ones. -- 4044

When network strategies are predominant, headmen and leaders use personal connections and relationships of dependence to accumulate wealth and influence. When corporate strategies prevail, inequalities are more limited and power remains faceless. This difference in access to resources is often related to a difference in access to power. In groups in which corporate strategies prevail, the source of power is generally located in the approval of councils or assemblies that function as powerful checks on headmen's authority (Détienne 2003). When network strategies prevail, the source of power lies in one's ability to multiply the number of one's clients, slaves, wives, and other dependents.
Personal networks do not function as a check on leaders in the same way that assemblies do. -- 4056

If people have a preference for equality, then, all other things being equal, corporate strategies should be preferable to network strategies. Yet all other things are rarely equal. Human societies are full of conflicts and distrust, and creating perfect institutions is easier said than done. Existing institutions and expectations constrain possible evolution in important ways. This is what social scientists often call “path dependence”: new institutional arrangements are constrained by older ones. -- 4067

The opposition between lumpers and splitters was not necessarily counterproductive in science. Lumpers provide splitters with useful distinctions and concepts, whereas splitters force lumpers to amend unsatisfying frameworks. -- 4080

The objective of this chapter was nevertheless to save one core assumption underlying neoevolutionary approaches. -- 4087

there is some functional link between large societies and the emergence of hierarchies. -- 4089

the methodological ecumenism that I adopted excludes neither multiple pathways to the evolution of hierarchies nor evolutionary reversals. It acknowledges the existence of important variations in the level of wealth inequalities, exploitation, and personalization of power across societies of similar size. -- 4096

my goal is to explain how the recurrence and stability of certain institutional outcomes can be explained by the cognitive and motivational mechanisms underlying human cooperation. It is the recurrence and stability of certain types of outcomes that I seek to explain, not the emergence of specific outcomes, -- 4110

Factors such as the intensification of agricultural production, insecurity, or the presence of antagonistic social classes do play a central role in explaining specific trajectories. However, I contend that a theory of the emergence of the state in general must ultimately explain how the nature of human cooperation constrains the range of stable social arrangements. -- 4117

to understand how delegation works, one has to hold in mind two perspectives on sanctions. One has to know whether sanctions are (1) appropriate responses to violation of primary rules and (2) appropriate applications of delegated entitlements. Conflict between these two perspectives typically produces legitimacy problems, -- 4137

The mechanism of the delegation of sanction is central to our understanding of the state. In nonstate societies, this mechanism is normally nonexistent, -- 4147

I suggest that the emergence of the state follows from the expansion of this mechanism and the ensuing competition among organizations claiming a right to delegate sanction.
As commonly understood, the concept of the state refers to the situation in which one organization successfully claims the monopoly on the legitimate delegation of sanction. As my objective in this chapter is to explain why the state must partly be understood as a product of human nature, I have to explain why the motivational and cognitive mechanisms underlying human cooperation make the delegation of sanction optimal in a number of settings. I have to explain why they give rulers the capacity to organize collective action among – and provide public goods to – an indefinitely growing number of individuals.

On the one hand, the benefits of the delegation of sanction in terms of collective action can support a functionalist account of the transition to statehood (5.4). On the other hand, the difficulty of sanctioning rulers can explain why this transition is often partial and subject to reversal (5.5). The overall account thus provides support both to those who regard the state as a problem solver and to those who regard it as an exploitative device.

Early in the 16th century, Machiavelli was already speculating about the origins of political societies: For since the inhabitants were sparse in the beginning of the world, they lived dispersed for a time like beasts; then, as generations multiplied, they gathered together, and to be able to defend themselves better, they began to look to whoever among them was more robust and of greater heart, and they made him a head, as it were, and obeyed him.

[It] is not clear if modern social contract theorists following Hobbes seriously intended to explain the origins of the state or if they merely aimed at justifying its authority. Their accounts often give the impression of being naive because of this ambiguity.

To paraphrase philosopher Otto Neurath, reforming a society's political institutions is like revamping a boat voyaging on the open seas.

if the state evolved from societies in which political hierarchies and economic inequalities were already pervasive, there is no reason to think that it was equally willed by everyone. Functionalist accounts cannot ignore the fact that institutions are sometimes more “functional” to some individuals or groups than to others.

The Class Struggle Hypothesis

Rousseau and Engels are certainly correct when they emphasized the importance of economic inequalities in the evolution of societies, but their account faces serious limitations. The first problem is that they do not really explain why people would accept so easily the rise of an exploitative state.

A second problem is that private property – and especially of land – was not a common feature of early state societies.
The possibility cannot be excluded that political hierarchies came first and made it possible for economic inequalities to grow. -- 4230

A final point is that Rousseau's and Engels’ accounts face the same limitation as any functionalist theory: they explain the benefits created by the state (specifically, the benefits for the ruling class), but not the process by which the state appeared. -- 4231

The Agricultural Hypothesis -- 4234

V. Gordon Childe -- 4236

the state can evolve only when it is possible to produce an agricultural surplus and relieve the ruling class from the burden of food production. -- 4237

However, if agriculture is a necessary condition of the transition to statehood, it is certainly not a sufficient one. -- 4239

5.1.3 The Hydraulic Hypothesis -- 4250

Karl Wittfogel -- 4251

the state originated from the need to organize irrigation in arid or semi-arid regions -- 4252

Wittfogel's hypothesis has lost most of its appeal following the accumulation of archaeological knowledge of early civilizations. In Egypt, the Pharaoh did not probably play a central role in organizing agricultural production, whereas in Mesopotamia and China, extensive irrigation postdated the origin of the state. -- 4257

5.1.4 The Warfare Hypothesis -- 4263

Franz Oppenheimer -- 4265

From his viewpoint, the state originates in the subordination of the vanquished by the victors, who subsequently arrange their dominion to ensure the long-term economic exploitation of subordinate classes. -- 4266

the conquerors are often organized in states before they make the conquests, -- 4270

warfare is ubiquitous in nonstate societies and does not typically lead to the permanent dominion of the vanquished by the victors -- 4271

5.1.5 The Circumscription Hypothesis -- 4275

the circumscription hypothesis falls short of accounting for several cases of the transition to statehood around the world. As Carneiro himself acknowledged, the Maya Lowlands
in Mexico and the Yellow River Valley in China are not areas of circumscribed agricultural land. Yet he contended that these exceptions can be dealt with by supplementing the idea of environmental circumscription with that of social circumscription. -- 4294

Although the territory of Yanomamö is noncircumscribed, villages at the center of the territory are closer to one another and wage war more frequently. Villages at the center also tend to be larger and the influence of headmen greater than at the periphery. -- 4299

the theory of circumscription still raises questions, in that not all early states have a high population density. This is the case of many African kingdoms, for instance among the Yoruba people -- 4303

the mechanism of circumscription does not specifically explain the origins of the state. It is present in nonstate societies, such as the Yanomamö, but also among states themselves. -- 4308

the circumscription mechanism does not explain what is specific to the transition to statehood. -- 4312

The King's Men Hypothesis -- 4313

Testart sees a strong correlation between the emergence of the state and the expansion of personal networks outside of kinship. -- 4322

Table 5.1. Factors Promoting the Transition to Statehood -- 4385

-- 4385

In sum, theories of the origins of the state point toward what I call the “dual nature of the state.” Put briefly, it is the classic idea that the state functions both as an instrument of exploitation and as a provider of public goods. Consequently, -- 4389

The crucial question regarding the origin of the state is why there is a point at which these relational mechanisms of representation and division of sanction are supplemented by the delegation of sanction. I propose the following answer: the delegation of sanction is a frequent and stable institutional arrangement because it -- 4421 multiplies the number of dependents whom salient individuals can count on. Having more dependents, salient individuals have more opportunities not only to generate benefits for less salient ones but also to abuse or exacerbate collective action problems among them. -- 4423

social hierarchies can be functional because they make it possible to maintain trust in large networks. Now it should be clear why hierarchies are not always functional and why they often come with substantial inequality and domination, both in state and nonstate societies. Leaders and rulers often gain access to positions of power because
they have numerous dependents, who are ready to give their benefactors a free ride. -- 4458

the possibility of delegating sanction transforms the situation significantly. Once integrated vertically, networks of dependence can grow exponentially. This is what La Boétie explained -- 4468

so powerfully. Each level of the hierarchy maintains the face-to-face interactions necessary for subordinates to experience gratitude toward their superiors. The state, so to speak, is an institution that emerges from this vertical integration of networks of dependence that ensures the impunity of the agents at the higher level of the hierarchy: the rulers. I say “the state” although, in fact, any vertically integrated organization functions in the same way: General Motors, or Greenpeace, or the Roman Catholic Church. In all these organizations, punishment of rulers is made costly by the fact that subordinates owe their status to their immediate superiors. -- 4469

Neoevolutionists have traditionally argued that the state was the only functional way to secure cooperation among indefinitely large numbers of people. -- 4516

the state is -- 4528
still a robust outcome. In groups with more than a few tens of thousands of individuals, the delegation of sanction and the vertical integration of networks become universal features of human societies. There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon: the first, the functionalist explanation, is that vertical integration is more efficient in providing certain public goods in very large groups. The second, which is more consistent with the conflict theory of the state, is that this integration is so powerful that, once in place, it creates new collective action problems that make it hard for subordinates to oppose exploitation. I think that both explanations are correct -- 4528

The higher levels of the hierarchy can reorient more easily the behavior of lower levels because of the delegation of sanction and of the relationships of dependence and gratitude that exist between the different levels. In very large populations, vertical integration thus has a critical advantage over corporate strategies in securing social interactions. -- 4556

One of the most common sources of dissatisfaction with neoevolutionism in social anthropology is its conception of evolution -- 4574
as unilinear (Carneiro 2002). Critics correctly emphasize that there is not a single way to move from bands to states or from egalitarian to state societies. -- 4575

emerging states do not easily expand and replace the institutions of nonstate societies. Those who neglect this reality might lose sight of the fact that many early states – and also failed states – have more in common with nonstate societies than with modern states. A first mistake would be to think that it is in the nature of the state to exert a direct control over the interactions among its subjects. A -- 4603
central feature of most premodern states is their weak control over communal justice and its enforcement. Rulers exert strict control over the military, fortifications, palaces,
markets, and trade routes, but leave a large space for their subjects to enact their own justice. -- 4606

some premodern states are not interested in interfering in the daily lives of their subjects, preferring to focus on a purely exploitative strategy. -- 4613

Another mistake would be to see the delegation of sanction as an almighty mechanism that local rulers or communities can hardly resist. -- 4624

by its very nature the state is incompatible with the kind of equality enjoyed by generations of foragers, pastoralists, and simple horticulturalists. As an institution, the state -- 4669
itself implies dependence among individuals at different levels of the hierarchy. -- 4670

Inequality of wealth and access to resources is not necessary to the state, but inequality in sanction certainly is. -- 4671

democracy implies the institutionalization of mechanisms counterbalancing this inequality in sanctioning authority. -- 4672

the rise of the state introduced a novel problem in human politics. I called it the La Boétie effect: the delegation of sanction entails the vertical integration of networks of dependence and thus makes rulers costly to punish. -- 4678

the main political problem of state societies is to find a way to sanction rulers. -- 4680

despotism is a regime in which punishing the state is costly, whereas democracy is one in which it is cheap. -- 4681

even if slaves were fully conscious that slavery is not a legitimate institutional arrangement, the fact that they are habituated to this form of domination might deprive them of any powerful motivation to rebel. The urge to rebel is not -- 4701
triggered by a judgment about the unfairness of the situation, but by an unexpectedly unfair action from the despot. -- 4703

There is no need for the prince to be fair, but only to refrain from the kind of unfairness that would trigger in his subjects this visceral emotion that Machiavelli called “hatred,” but which I prefer to call “righteous anger.” As long as this emotion is not triggered, the prince can secure his power only by curbing the ambition of a few; -- 4729

a true republic is one in which the relationships of dependence that necessarily come with the rise of the state are not exploited by rulers with impunity. -- 4737

public opinion, secret ballots, and competitive elections make it possible to punish political elites at low costs. However, the modern democratic solution is only one
instance of a general kind of mechanism that can also be found in premodern egalitarian polities. -- 4743

As long as rulers can be deposed on the basis of popular judgment, a republic can flourish. -- 4765

This judgment can be expanded to nonstate societies in connection with the distinction between corporate and network strategies. Leaders of corporate groups are usually owed respect, whereas leaders of networks benefit from gratitude. Thus, in both state and nonstate societies, the preservation of equality among people depends on the existence of institutions favoring the accumulation of public credit. -- 4771

In many ways, the transition from the premodern to the modern state is as significant as the transition to statehood itself. In premodern states, the insulation of trust networks from public politics allowed for the preservation of many institutions typical of nonstate societies. -- 4864

the transition to modern states was accompanied by the waning of many ritualized practices of collective sanctioning. -- 4867

neoevolutionists and social contract theorists have largely overlooked the reason why the state is functional. It is one thing to point to the kind of benefits that it provides and another to explain why it can provide those benefits in the first place. Once again, the explanation is to be found in the nature of relationships of dependence and gratitude that link subordinates to superiors within the state apparatus. This relationship gives rulers the freedom both to provide public goods and to pursue exploitative strategies on an unprecedented scale. It thus transforms the state simultaneously into the most efficient and the most dangerous tool under human control. -- 4937


Notes by page number (only a very things)

9: “egalitarian social arrangements of Homo sapiens and extinct human species should not be explained as the direct outcome of a passion for equality, but rather in the broader context of the evolution of the motivational and cognitive mechanisms underlying norm following and sanctioning. In the proper circumstances, these very mechanisms are also likely to permit the evolution of hierarchical and inegalitarian arrangements.”

90-91: “the best guess as of now would be that a few hundred thousand years ago hominins were living in nearly egalitarian foraging bands, successfully resisting despotic individuals. Although dominance hierarchies were eradicated, modern status hierarchies had [91] not yet been created. Homo erectus, homo heidelbergensis, and Homo neanderthalensis had no alpha males, but not yet a chief, a priest, or a president. … it is only modern Homo sapiens who paved the way for the reemergence of hierarchies in the human lineage, but under a totally different form.”

138: “My goal … is to plead in favor of naturalism in explaining the existence of hierarchies in [relatively large-scale societies of] modern humans.”

139: “the correlation between group size and political organization can be accounted for by explaining how the cognitive mechanisms described earlier relate to precise relational mechanisms.”

162: “small foraging bands have no leader—or, more precisely, no leader with coercive power—and are intolerant of bullying and patronizing individuals, as well as of opportunists who contribute insufficiently to public goods. Equality is thus not an accidental social outcome, but the result of practices favoring social leveling”.

163: “When people struggle to monitor who is who, punishing defectors becomes more risky and less effective. … local groups that grow beyond the level of a few dozen individuals have to find a cheaper strategy to monitor individual behavior.”

164: “If the chief represents the group, there is no more need for members of other groups to monitor the behavior of each member of the group; it is sufficient to focus one’s attention on the most prominent ones. … the creation of corporate groups is a relational mechanism that relieves the social system of the need to process loads of information that would exceed individuals’ cognitive abilities.”
182: “Maurice Godelier (1986), in his ethnography of the Baruyas, an acephalous tribe in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, reconstructed the complex myths and narratives underlying strong gender inequalities in the tribe. … Baruya boys … practice over many years a secret ritual of fellatio, in the belief that drinking the semen of other men allows young males to maintain their strength and beauty prior to marriage. After marriage, the belief continues in a way, with the idea that women need the sperm of their husbands in order to produce milk. In Baruya belief systems, sperm counts as the ultimate source of life and strength. In contrast, their mythology presents women as a source of pollution and disorder. … these beliefs justify the enforcement of the strict segregation of women in numerous areas of life and especially during menstruation.”

182: “women consider it immoral to refuse the sperm of their husbands (and thus to deprive their children of high-quality milk) or to pollute their husbands during menstruation. … the belief system of the Baruyans constitutes a redoubtable support of male domination. … we just cannot help wondering why women adhere to narratives that are so obviously disadvantageous to them.”

191: “On the one hand, the benefits of the delegation of sanction in terms of collective action can support a functionalist account of the transition to statehood (5.4). On the other hand, the difficulty of sanctioning rulers can explain why this transition is often partial and subject to reversal (5.5). The overall account thus provides support both to those who regard the state as a problem solver and to those who regard it as an exploitative device.”

191: “Early in the 16th Century, Machiavelli was already speculating about the origins of political societies”. [Cites Discourses on Livy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 11] … Machiavelli … anticipated social contract theory I that he related the existence of the state to its function: security. … it is not clear if modern social contract theorists following Hobbes seriously intended to explain the origins of the state or if they merely aimed at justifying its authority.

Their accounts often give the impression of being naïve because of this ambiguity.”

192: “if the state evolved from societies in which political hierarchies and economic inequalities were already pervasive, there is no reason to think that it was equally willed by everyone. Functionalist accounts cannot ignore the fact that institutions are sometimes more ‘functional’ to some individuals than to others.”

Beginning p. 193 (5.1.1), section 5.1 reviews six hypotheses about the origin of the state, including “the Class Struggle Hypothesis,” “the Agricultural Hypothesis,” “The Warfare Hypothesis,” “the Circumscription Hypothesis,” and “the King’s Men Hypothesis.”

203: “the delegation of sanction is a frequent and stable institutional arrangement because it multiplies the number of dependents whom salient individuals can count on.”

205: “social hierarchies can be functional because they make it possible to maintain trust in large networks. Now it should be clear why hierarchies are not always functional and why they often come with substantial inequality and domination, both in state and nonstate societies. Leaders and rulers often gain access to positions of power because they have numerous dependents, who are ready to give their benefactors a free ride.”

215-6: “by its very nature the state is incompatible with the kind of equality enjoyed by generations of foragers, pastoralists, [216], and simple horticulturalists. As an institution, the state itself implies dependence among individuals at different levels of the hierarchy. Inequality of wealth and access to resources is not necessary to the state, but inequality in
sanction is. … democracy implies the institutionalization of mechanisms
counterbalancing this inequality in sanctioning authority.”

216: “the rise of the state introduced a novel problem in human politics. I call it the La
Boétie effect: the delegation of sanction entails the vertical integration of networks of
dependence and thus makes rulers costly to punish. … the main political problem of state
societies is to find a way to sanction rulers. … despotism is a regime in which punishing
the state is costly, whereas democracy is one in which it is cheap.”

219: “public opinion, secret ballots, and competitive elections make it possible to punish
political elites at low costs. However the modern democratic solution is only one instance
of a general kind of mechanism that can also be found in premodern egalitarian polities.”

229-230: “relationships of dependence and gratitude that link subordinates to superiors
within the state apparatus. This relationship gives rulers the freedom both to provide
public goods and to pursue exploitative strategies on an unprecedented scale. It thus
transforms the state simultaneously into the most efficient and the most [230] dangerous
tool under human control.”

Dyble et al, “Sex equality can explain the unique social
structure of hunter-gatherer bands”

Sex equality can explain the unique social structure of hunter-gatherer bands
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Science 15 May 2015:
Vol. 348 no. 6236 pp. 796-798
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Dyble et al, “Sex equality can explain the unique social structure of hunter-gatherer
bands.”

ABSTRACT:
The social organization of mobile hunter-gatherers has several derived features, including
low within-camp relatedness and fluid meta-groups. Although these features have been
proposed to have provided the selective context for the evolution of human
hypercooperation and cumulative culture, how such a distinctive social system may have
emerged remains unclear. We present an agent-based model suggesting that, even if all
individuals in a community seek to live with as many kin as possible, within-camp
relatedness is reduced if men and women have equal influence in selecting camp
members. Our model closely approximates observed patterns of co-residence among
Agta and Mbendjele BaYaka hunter-gatherers. Our results suggest that pair-bonding and
increased sex egalitarianism in human evolutionary history may have had a transformative effect on human social organization.

Editor's Summary: Friends and family?
Evolutionary theory stresses the importance of living with kin, not least because they share some of our genes. Nevertheless, a large-scale assessment of contemporary hunter-gatherer societies has established a consistent pattern of unrelated individuals living together. Dyble et al. used a modeling approach to suggest that a possible answer to this conundrum is that cohabitation choices are being governed equally by men and women.

Notes:

796: “Contemporary mobile hunter-gatherers co-operate extensively with unrelated individuals across multiple social and economic domains. Many communities of mobile hunter-gatherers (hereafter hunter-gatherers) share food extensively within camp and hunt, gather, and fish cooperatively (1). Alloparenting is also commonplace (2, 3). The importance of cooperative activities is reflected in many hunter-gatherer societies by a pervasive ethic of egalitarianism (4, 5). Like a number of nonhuman primate species, humans live in multimale, multifemale groups (6). However, we maintain enduring pair bonds, resulting in what have been described as “multifamily” groups (7). In addition, and in contrast to the bounded and territorial groups of chimpanzees (8, 9), bonobos (10), and gorillas (11), contemporary hunter-gatherers have fluid social networks where family units are relatively autonomous, with couples and their children moving often between bands (12), living with kin of either the husband or the wife. This residence pattern has been described as either “bilocal” or “multilocal” (13).

As well as being highly mobile, contemporary hunter-gatherer camps include a significant proportion of unrelated individuals (14) and are less closely related than groups of non-foraging small-scale societies (15).”

797: “Both pair-bonding and sex equality in residential decision-making act together to constrain the overall relatedness of groups, leading to the co-residence of individuals unrelated through either genetic or affinal ties.”

798: “Gender inequality reappeared in humans with the transition to agriculture and pastoralism (17) [“17. M. Martin, B. Voorhies, Female of the Species (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1975).”]. Once heritable resources, such as land and livestock, became important determinants of reproductive success, sex-biased inheritance and lineal systems started to arise, leading to wealth and sex inequalities (18). …

Understanding hunter-gatherer sex egalitarianism and the shift from hierarchical male philopatry typical of chimpanzees and bonobos to a multilocal residence pattern is key to theories of human social evolution. A possible clue for the evolution of sex equality in the hominin lineage was the increase in the cost of human reproduction associated with larger brain sizes in early Homo (19). Higher offspring costs would require investment from both mothers and fathers (20), as seen among extant hunter-gatherers (3, 21). The need for biparental investment predicts increased sex equality (22), which is reflected in the high frequency of monogamy and the reproductive schedules of male hunter-gatherers, who typically stop reproducing early and exhibit long
life spans after their last reproduction. … Increased reproductive costs, cooperative breeding, and sex equality in residential decision-making can explain why hunter-gatherer parents live in groups containing multiple mated pairs, why hunter-gatherers recruit help both from related and un-related individuals, and why hunter-gatherer camps exhibit low levels of relatedness."

**Dyson-Hudson & Smith. Human territoriality**

**ABSTRACT:**
The question of human territoriality has frequently been debated, but most previous discussions have not sufficiently emphasized ecological variables as major factors determining territoriality. We argue that current theories in sociobiology, especially the model focusing on economic defendability of resources, need to be considered in analyzing human territoriality. According to this model, territoriality is expected to occur when critical resources are sufficiently abundant and predictable in space and time, so that costs of exclusive use and defense of an area are outweighed by the benefits gained from resource control. This model is developed, and then applied to several locally adapted human populations (Northern Ojibwa, Basin-Plateau Indians, and Karimojong). Variations in territorial responses for these groups seem to accord with the predictions of the economic defendability model.

LISTENED TO: NEED TO TAKE NOTES

24: “the model presented here assumes that: "The territorial strategy evolved is the one that maximizes the increment of fitness due to extraction of energy from the defended area, as compared with the loss of fitness due to the effort and perils of defense" (Wilson 1975:269).”

36: “CONCLUSIONS”
“In our view, territoriality is a subset of resource-defense strategies, and resource defense is in turn an aspect of subsistence strategies. Clearly under some circumstances humans are territorial, in that they occupy certain areas more or less exclusively by means of repulsion through overt defense or through social interactions. But it is equally clear that although (as with all behaviors) the capacity to demark and defend territory must have some genetic basis, human territoriality is not a genetically fixed trait, in the sense of being a “fixed-action pattern,” but rather a possible strategy individuals may be expected to choose when it is to their adaptive advantage to do so. Analyses arguing that territoriality is an evolutionary imperative, or conversely a political aberration of basic human nature, do not seem to us to have explanatory validity. We have argued that territoriality in humans is at least in part an adaptive response to environmental factors and, as such, is to be expected when critical resources are distributed so that exclusive use and defense of a resource area produces a net benefit in resource capture.”

37: “Our analysis suggests that human territoriality can, as with other animal species, be fruitfully analyzed in terms of a general model of spatial organization that focuses on resource distributions and economic defendability. However, since humans use such a wide variety of resources, even a single population can exhibit a great range of responses with respect to different resources, and describing the behavior of a particular group as "territorial" or "nonterritorial" can therefore be overly simplistic. It is not enough to know if a particular group exhibits territorial behavior. Instead, it is necessary to discuss particular resources and determine if these resources are defended, how they are defended, the circumstances under which access to these resources is restricted, and which people or groups of people are allowed or denied access to resources.”

37-8: “Until such tests are performed, [38] however, we argue that the economic defendability model accounts for the available evidence in greater depth and extent than the alternative explanations of variation in human spatial organization.”

Earle (article): Archaeology, Property, and Prehistory

39: From 1877 to 1945 most anthropological studies included chapters on material culture, land tenure, and inheritance.

40: “Property determines exclusive rights to things. The core of property is the right to exclude (North 1981). … property exists in all societies,” but it is different in different societies.

44: “elite ownership (and the corresponding ability to extract tribute from commoners) was basic to the emergence of social complexity. Earle … argues that the evolution of social stratification in chiefdoms rests on the articulation of property rights by which chiefs control stable production and the distribution of wealth. Elite control through ownership involved irrigation and dryland systems in Hawaii … and Spain …; textiles and land in Mesoamerica …; metal wealth in Bronze Age Britain … and Scandinavia …; and agrarian estates in Iron Age Scandinavia”.

46: “Local groups are organized as corporate kin groups …. Based on ethnographic analogy, these kin groups are corporate, meaning they own or at least defend land as a
group …. Use rights in a plot were held for as long as it was farmed by the individuals who improved it. Household tenure is private for all intents and purposes”.

47: “The Inca empire of the prehistoric Andes was based largely on a corporate strategy with stable finance …. The empire claimed ownership of all lands, but subsistence lands returned to the local community in return for corvée labor obligations. Open community lands were held as commons and allocated annually; improved lands were held and inherited by individual families.”

48: “An interplay between public and private property underlay the complex social world of the Maya. The kin group, cah, lived close together and owned land together.”

48: “The best evidence for the emergence of private property with the development of states is available for the Middle East, where complex categories of land ownership become discernible through an early written record …. Lands were held “publically” by institutions of government and temples and “privately” by extended families. … As land became increasingly owned by a wealthy class, taxes in currency replace corvée as the means for finance.”

Earle: Bronze Age Economics


1: “The political economy is the material flows of goods and labor through a society, channeled to create wealth and to finance institutions of rule. … My book is about the emergence of chiefdoms and states without mercantile or industrial economies. I see these societies as the historical bridge between the traditional societies studied by Sahlins and the modern societies in which we now live.”

5: Sahlins (1972) introduced the concept of the Domestic Mode of Production …, specifying Polanyi’s original idea of householding. The DMP was envisioned as ideal household self-sufficiency in which household members produced most of what the household needed. Such a subsistence economy would not be growth oriented”.

9: “Traditional economies contain two interrelated sectors: the subsistence economy and the political economy. … In traditional economies, each household can produce much of what it wants, and this household self-sufficiency is the Domestic Mode of Production. … The political economy, in contrast, involves the ways that surpluses are mobilized and allocated to support political activities, lifestyles, and operations of social institutions and their leaders. … By practical control, political economies are built on subsistence economies, and together they organize all production, distribution, and consumption. … To understand an economy, the first question to be resolved is the nature of land tenure (ownership). Who owns the land and what are the mechanisms of ownership (Chapter 13; Earle 2000)? Lands can be open to use by anyone, limited to a specific group, owned by a group but allocated by its leaders, or owned by a discrete institution or individual within the group. As land use becomes intensified, land ownership is more easily asserted and becomes vested progressively in fewer hands.”

15: “The local group of political integration (a.k.a. tribes) comprises perhaps several hundred members organized as villages or hamlet clusters. … Local groups are
characteristically corporate; they own and defend agricultural land or other productive resources.” They have the power to demand obligatory contributions to events.

15-16: “Chiefdoms embed several local groups to create a regional polity with populations in the low thousands to tens of thousands.” States are larger still.

50: “From the Neolithic up to the expansion of the Roman Empire, much of Europe was organized at a chiefdom level …. This allows anthropologists to view the dynamics of chiefdoms over several thousand years with different economies, patterns of regional interaction, and ideologies.”

51: “Following the collapse of the Roman Empire and the associated demographic collapse, the European world reverted to a chiefdom level of organization …. Through the Dark Ages, the evolutionary changes that took place offer a dramatic case of the development of states out of chiefdoms.”

53: “The main defining characteristics of chiefdoms are scale of integration, centrality of decisionmaking, and stratification.”

61: “Control over staple production, as the first option, would be based on ownership of and restricted access to productive resources, most importantly land. Such control is manifest as a system of staple finance …. Food is mobilized from commoner producers as a rent for land made available to them. The Hawaiian ‘redistributational’ economy illustrates well how this was accomplished …. Land was owned by the paramount chief by right of conquest. The land was then allocated to the high chiefs as their income estates. Commoners received use-rights to small subsistence plots in return for their work on lands producing for the chiefs’ incomes.”

61-62: “Economic control through resource ownership may also help explain other examples of chiefly development not based on irrigation. Coe (1974) argues that the Olmec chiefdoms depended on ownership of the highly productive natural levee soils, the fertility of which was maintained by annual river flooding. The circum-Caribbean … and Amazonian … chiefdoms were based on the intensive farming of alluvial bottoms, as were the Mississippian chiefdoms.

69: “The chiefdom is not a unitary stage of social evolution that characterizes one type of society developing independently across the world. Rather at different places and times, human agents have fashioned distinct societies with similar scale of political integration. Our goal should be to understand the parallel and divergent processes of social evolution. … I concentrate on how economic factors of subsistence, social feasting, power, and finance linked together in systems of support and domination to create alternative ‘pathways to complexity.’”

Part I: Hawaiian Chiefdoms

71: “The island chosen for my primary study was Kauai, the most westerly and oldest of the main Hawaiian group”.

104-107: Irrigation was used on all of the Hawaiian Islands, but it was most extensive on the more western islands, especially Kauai, Oahu, and western Maui.
Chapter 13: Property Rights and the Evolution of Chiefdoms

325: “Here I concentrate on the fundamental relationships between the development of chiefs and specific property rights in prehistory. The evolution of chiefdoms hinges to a large measure on the ability to control or direct the flow of energy and other basic resources through a society as a means to finance new institutions”.

325-6: “Labor mobilization depends usually on an explicit reciprocity, a return for service. What the emerging elite has to offer in return to its supporters may be somewhat variable, but the recurrent pattern would appear to be access to land and its productive resources.”

326: “Fried (1967) … focused on the shift from communal to private property rights as underlying the differential access to strategic resources, the key economic ingredient for stratification and the evolution of the state. Sahlinis (1972) reiterated Fried’s position by equating the shift from kinship to property as a basis of control with the beginnings of bourgeois states.

326-7: sketches out co-evolution of property rights and social complexity.
326-7: “First, at the family level of organization, land rights are ambiguous and flexible.” Although flexible, property rights exist, and “territoriality exists among such groups [hunter-gatherers], maintained by social boundaries.”

327: “At the local group level, property rights are radically transformed with the creation of lineages or clans. These corporate groups are associated with specific, demarcated land sections that are defended along their perimeter. Ownership is publically established during ceremonies …. Individual families receive land through their clan/lineage …. Families clear and improve sections for garden and house sites, but their rights depend on continuing us. Abandoned lands revert to the clan. … individual titles emerge in these societies at high population densities when land is continually used and internal conflict ruptures the corporate groups.”

327: “In simple chiefdoms, chiefs are local leaders, highly respected members of the clan. Clan lands are spoken of as owned by the chief, who can manipulate his position for significant political advantage.”

327-8: “The preceding evolutionary pattern for land tenure is of course simplified and should not be taken as an invariant unilinear scheme. In fact, the basis of control can be highly variable; however, the evolution of property rights by which chiefs control primary production can be seen as basic to the evolution of many complex stratified societies … the significance of economic control through varying systems of land tenure is a constant theme.”

345: “By constructing these ceremonial places, the chiefs of Wessex … would have asserted ownership over the surrounding pastoral lands. As a general principle, resources become owned when they have been improved by an individual. The capital investment in the monument thus would have created ownership resting squarely in the hands of the chief who supervised their building and supported their associated ceremonies.”

NOTE: Chapter 13 was largely a disappointment.
Earle: Chiefdoms (for Earle see also separate Earle document)


*Earle The Evolution of Chiefdoms*


5: “what do bosses do to gain extended power? A listing of ten potential political strategies included the following:

1. giving (inflicting debt), feasting, and prestations;
2. improving infrastructure of subsistence production;
3. encouraging circumscription;
4. outright force applied internally;
5. forging external ties;
6. expanding the size of the dependent population;
7. seizing control of existing principles of legitimacy (the past, supernatural, and natural);
8. creating or appropriating new principles of legitimacy;
9. seizing control of internal wealth production and distribution;
10. seizing control of external wealth procurement.”

8: Perhaps the most heated discussion in the seminar focused on the question of the priorities of power. Drennan, Feinmaan, and Steponaitis argued strongly that in the Mesoamerican and Mississippian chiefdoms, no convincing argument could be made for strict economic control, as would be seen in ownership of land or central storage.” They see a religious basis for power.

“On the other side, both Gilman and Earle kept returning to the position that power differential, although ceremonially sanctioned must lie in the control over labor through control over subsistence. At least in some circumstances, as in Polynesian cases and those from southeastern Spain, evidence for this economic control through ownership of land, productive technology, and storage is evident.”

9: “Several participants felt that the strict economic controls discussed by Earle and Gilman were inappropriate for understanding the origins of chiefdoms but became important only in more complex chiefdoms. … all participants [recognized] that the three components of power (i.e. control over the economy, war, and ideology) to some degree present alternative strategies. Ferguson emphasized how polities contain factions and institutions competing for power …. These different factions within a single chiefdom or between competing chiefdoms may opt for different strategies to attempt to dominate each other. The Marquesan case (Kirch) illustrates how chiefs warriors and inspirational priests with their different power bases competed with each other without an ability for any sector to dominate.”

10: nine environmental conditions most responsible for differences in political development:

1. “natural productivity and potential for intensification;
2. regional population density;
3. existence of external markets;
4. natural circumscription;
5. concentration of productive resources;
6. proximity to needed nonfood resources
7. proximity to avenues of trade and communication;
8. social circumscription;
9. structural preconditions of hierarchy.”

14-5: “The combination of economic control, military might, and ceremonial legitimacy is a repeated [15] theme of the cases developed in this book.”

Kristiansen Chiefdoms systems of social evolution

16: “Several recent works stress the inadequacy of our present evolutionary typology and emphasize that an individual type, such as chiefdom, spans too broad a range of variation (citations). Although some might propose abandoning evolutionary theory (citations), it remains the most persuasive explanatory framework in archeology and we are probably well advised to continue to use a refined evolutionary perspective.”
17: “the chiefdom concept has been applied to a range that many would see running the gamut from tribal to state societies.”
17: “What I will argue … is that a fundamental organizational divide exists between tribal societies, of which the chiefdom is a variant, and state societies.”

Earle Property Rights

71-2: “Families do not freely give up labor without either an expectation of direct return or the threat of force. … Labor mobilization depends usually on an explicit reciprocity, a return for service. What the emerging elite has to offer its supporters may be somewhat variable, but the recurrent pattern would appear to be access to land and its productive resources.”
72: “At the family (band) level of organization, land rights are ambiguous and flexible.”
73: “At the local group (tribal) level, property rights are radically transformed with the creation of lineage or clan groups associated with specific demarcated land sections that are defended along their perimeter. … Collier (1975) points out that individual titles emerge in these societies at high population densities when land is continually used and internal conflict ruptures the corporate groups. In highland New Guinea, for example, individual land ownership is associated with high population densities and intensive agriculture (Pdolesky 1987).
73-4: “At the level of the regional policy (chiefdoms) … land tenure, … could be quite important. In simple chiefdoms, chiefs are local leaders, highly respected members of the clan. Clan lands are spoken of as owned by the chief, who can manipulate his position for significant political advantage. The Trobriand Islanders illustrate how this works. The
local sublineage (dala) owns agricultural land, but the group’s leader, by controlling the annual allocation of subsistence plots, effectively controls access to it (Malinowski 1935). A household can obtain land only from the leader, and he can allocate use rights to non-dala members who support him politically. The leader also exercises control through his ownership of the magic that accompanies all major steps in farming.”

[Malinowski 35 is Coral Gardens and Their Magic—no page number given.]

74: “In more complex chiefdoms, the chiefs characteristically become the primary landowners”. Hawaiian “paramount chiefs were the owners of all lands …. They then allocated community territories … to high-ranking chiefs who were their close relatives and supporters in wars of succession and conquest. In turn the community chiefs offered land plots, especially on irrigation systems, to individuals in exchange for their labor on chiefly lands and projects.”

74: “The preceding evolutionary pattern for land tenure is of course simplified and should not be taken as an invariant unilinear scheme. In fact, the basis for control can be highly variable … however, the evolution of property rights by which chiefs control primary production can be seen as basic to the evolution of many complex stratified societies.”

98: At the seminar, “A split existed between those participants who emphasized economic controls versus those who emphasized ideological controls …. The Hawaiian and Wessex cases help resolve this split by clarifying how the two forms of control are interdependent.”

Kirch: Chiefship and competitive involution


120: the origins of Polynesian chiefship are external to the region, both in time and space. … Ancestral Polynesian Society was already hierarchically structured …. Thus the origins of Polynesian chiefship must be sought in the preceding Lapita cultural complex, marking the Austronesian-speaking colonization (between ca. 1600-500BC) not only of Polynesia but of Melanesia and eastern Micronesia … the region provides a marvelous field for the study of variation and diversification in patterns of chiefship”.

143-4: “The Marquesan case, much like that of Easter Island … is one in which the evolution of chiefship did not proceed towards increased and encompassing hierarchy. Unlike Hawaii, Tong, or Tahiti … [144] a dynamic context of … forced rivalry between inherently contradictory hereditary and achieved status positions. The result was an involuted cycle of prestige rivalry and competition that led as often to the destruction of the very means of production which were the objects of competition.”

Gilman: Mediterranean


165: In the Aegean Bronze age, “the palace regulated access to land.”

4: “Whether chiefly power derives from social relationships, the economy, military might, or ideology determines in large measure the scope and stability of a chief’s political position.”

4-6: Social relationships seem to be the sources of power in places where the powerful aren’t all that powerful

6-7: Economic power:
7: “In chiefdoms, control over production and exchange of subsistence and wealth creates the basis for political power. In Hawai‘i, community chiefs allocated to commoners their subsistence plots in the chief’s irrigated farmlands in return for corvée work on chiefly lands and special projects. By owning the irrigation systems, and thus controlling access to the preferred means of subsistence, chiefs directed a commoner’s labor. Where you lived was determined by whose land manager ‘put you to work.’ In contrast, in Bronze Age Denmark and elsewhere in northern Europe, control over the specialist manufacture and the distribution of prestige goods underwrote the emergence of regional elites.”

7-8: Military power:
8: “Military power is in fact a highly problematic source of social power. … While leaders depend on their warriors to extend political power, they must always be on the lookout for treachery.”

8-10: Ideology:
10: “Like kinship and military might, ideology by itself is a weak source of power. … To mold beliefs and guide social action, ideologies must be manifested in a material form that can be manipulated centrally and experienced in common by a targeted group. It is this materialization that embeds ideology in the economic process of production and gives it a central role in the competition for political power.”

10: Citing Carneiro 1977, “the number of independent polities in the world has declined dramatically over human history as world population has increased. At the beginning of the Neolithic, the size of the largest political group was probably in the hundreds, and we can estimate that more than 100,000 such polities existed; now the largest polity contains more than a billion people, and the United Nations has only about 160 sovereign states.”

14: “It is my contention that the fundamental dynamics of chiefdoms are essentially the same as those of states, and that the origin of states is to be understood in the emergence and development of chiefdoms.”

15: “Three cases are used to develop the arguments in this book—Denmark during the Neolithic and Early Bronze Ages (2300-1300 B.C.), Hawai‘i from early in its settlement to its incorporation into the world economy (A.D. 800-1824), and the high Andes of Peru from the early Huacrapukio chiefdoms through Inka imperial conquest (A.D. 500-1534). … The goal is to investigate roughly one thousand years of the prehistory from each case in order to evaluate the long-term evolutionary dynamics of chiefdoms.”

38-39: “I participated in an ethnohistorical project organized by Marshall Sahlins to analyze the Great Mahale, the creation of fee-simple (private property) land ownership
throughout the islands; valleys (former ahupua’a) were deeded to the chiefs and small subsistence plots to the commoners.”

43: “During initial coloniz 

ation, the settlers would have carried with them early archaic, or Proto-Polynesian, principles of rank and leadership. Although the operational strength of these principles would have been a weak source of power alone, they would have provided important legitimation for authority constructed subsequently from the other sources of power. … Common throughout Polynesian languages is the term for chief ….

The chiefs probably maintained their distinction as leaders in different ways, but minimally as owners and organizers of the seagoing, colonizing canoes.”

44: “early Hawaiian populations were probably organized at this time [by A.D. 800] by principles of simple chiefdoms, in which chiefs led local landholding descent groups.”

Chiefs expanded their territory by conquest against each other from no later than 1200 until after 1800. “The emergence of stratification has been documented archaeologically by a growing differentiation in the amount of labor invested in burial monuments and in elite house platforms.”

44-45: “By the time of contact, Hawaiian society was rigidly divided into classes. … Certain individuals were “big men,” and other commoners clustered their households near to the big men’s houses, but ranking was informal. The Hawaiian chiefs were, in contrast, a people apart. The chiefs held mana, power that flowed through the individuals and demonstrated their feared divine essence.”

45: “To summarize, the sequence for the Hawaiian Islands documents a long-term trend during which the environment was transformed into a cultural world owned by a class of ruling chiefs. … intensive irrigation technology and the stratified chiefdoms appear to have developed quite rapidly, rather than growing quite slowly to meet expanded needs for subsistence.”

Chapter 3: Sources of Economic Power

67-8: “Control over the economy is a direct and material power over the lives of people. Individuals and households must obtain the food and goods necessary for their survival. They must eat daily to survive, and they must obtain clothing, housing, and draft goods routinely. Humans exist in a world of energy flows that sustain all life, including their own. In simplest terms, to understand economic control, we must understand the subsistence economy—how societies are adapted to their environment; how people make a living … . Then it may be asked if the nature of the subsistence economy is such that it may be controlled and that, through its control and manipulation, the activities of a group can be brought under a leader’s authority.”

68: “Service [citation] described chiefdoms as redistributional societies. … communities shifted from generalized, self-sufficient economies toward specialized, regionally integrated economies. … The chief’s authority derived from his essential position coordinating a regionally integrated economic (and political) system.”

68-9: Alternatively, Wittfogel [citation] saw the essential role of chiefs in the management of irrigation as the cause for the development of central leadership and eventual state bureaucracies. Chiefs and later kings were thought to derive their authority from the managerial responsibilities, which created irrigation systems … on which the productivity and survival of the local communities depended.”
69: The managerial theories were challenged starting in the 70s, “Basically it was argued that in chiefdoms the complexity of trade and irrigation was not closely correlated with the degree of central leadership and institutional control.”

69-70: Discusses coercive, political theories. “Control over factors of production, distribution, or consumption provides the mechanism for amassing power.” These are historical materialist theories, ala Ricardo and Marx. “the basic point is to understand how control over the productive process translates into control over the political economy and resulting class differentiation. … the model developed by Marx and Engels may in fact have general applicability to the emergence of social complexity. The basic principle from which their analysis derives can, I argue, extend to the emergence of leadership in ‘tribal society,’ that is among Big-man societies and chiefdoms.”

71: “Effective stable finance must be based on a property system through which staples are mobilized from commoners as ‘rent’ in return for access to subsistence resources.”

71-2: “The critical factor appears to be how the development of technologically intensive farming provided the opportunity for control by ruling institutions through a land tenure system. Locke [only citation of him in the book] conceived natural resources, such as land, as give by God to all persons alike; then individuals invested their personal labor to transform the resources, to improve land and make it private property. But why does a culturally specific concept like ‘improvement’ translate into a more broadly applicable principle for human societies? Technological improvements of the resource do two things: First, they radically differentiate land in terms of quality. Specific locations that are improved become more productive and desirable than other locations in the region. Second, improvements evidently delimit and mark the resource in ways that can be easily represented and recognized within the cultural landscape. Improvements such as walls, terraces, and ditches materialize the division of the landscape and form the basis of a cultural system of land ownership.”

72: “How agricultural improvements translated into the development of systems of land tenure and political domination has been studied best with irrigation systems. By financing the construction of the irrigation canals …, ruling institutions became the owners of the most productive lands.”

73: “The construction of the irrigation systems provided great opportunities for settlement and farming, but the canals were lifelines for the farmers, binding them securely to their masters. The farmers were caged, unable to survive except by what was offered by ruling institutions that owned the irrigated lands.”

74: “control over the ideology of social ranking rested on control over the system of wealth finance.”

74-5: What cases show are the diverse means of economic control and the different outcomes that are possible among chiefdoms. The Hawaiian case illustrates how economic power emerged with the creation of irrigation systems owned by the chiefs. I then look at the limitations of economic power in the Andean case, where agriculture was less intensive and environmentally marginal. In the Danish case, irrigation and intensive agriculture did not exist; the political economy rested on involvement with the prestige-goods exchange that stretched across Europe. In all cases, economic power was in some sense basic to the political strategies to amass power, but the success of these strategies in allowing chiefs to institutionalize and extend their domination proved highly variable.”
The Hawaiian Case

75: “My doctoral dissertation research began by discrediting the managerial theories of Wittfogel and Service, as related to Hawai‘i … Ruling chiefs used the staples grown on the irrigation systems to finance their political aspirations. Economic control was based upon ownership of the irrigation systems; land plots were allocated to commoner farmers in return for their corvée labor growing foods that were the currency of the chiefdoms.”

79: “But farmers will not produce a surplus unless compelled to do so. The logic of the subsistence economy is simply to produce for the immediate needs of the family and then to rest (Sahlins 1972). The ability to produce surplus only translates into the mobilization of resources if political controls are in place.”

79: “The system of land tenure was not codified into law; it was highly flexible, manipulated by chiefs to generate the surplus used in political maneuverings. Ultimate ‘ownership’ rested with the paramount chief, based on his political office. Although this office was, in principle, inherited …, in fact it was most commonly seized during wars of succession and conquest. The paramount then delegated to his closest supporters the rights in a community. The title of community chief was a political compensation for support and could be rescinded at will by the paramount. The community chief then appointed a konohiki, often to compensate a lower-ranking chief who had been a warrior supporting the paramount. The konohiki allocated the land to commoners, and the staples mobilized as rent from the commoners were the currency of the chiefdom.”

79: “During the Great Mahele, when the Hawaiian land-tenure system was transformed to one of private ownership like that in Europe, the details of traditional practice were recorded in legal proceedings.”

81: Records showed land tenure could be rescinded for nonpayment of labor. “The lesson was clear. A person’s farmland, on which he and his family depended for subsistence was his only as long as he worked for the konohiki.”

82: “The development of the irrigation technology was pivotal for an ideology of chiefly rule. The chiefs, as organizers of the social labor responsible for the irrigation systems, were the owners.”

85: Discussing the eastern Hawaiian island w/o irrigation, “the physical nature of the built landscape created the basis for a land-tenure system not unlike that found on the irrigation facilities. Whether built directly under chiefly supervision or later taken over by chiefly overlords, the technology of intensification created a sharp separation between improved and unimproved lands.”

The Andes

94: “To the degree that a family’s participation in the farming cycle was necessary for it to qualify for a land allocation, the management of both the labor and the allocation gave some leverage, however weak, to the local leader.”

95: “The power to control the subsistence economy derived from both an explicit military threat and the system of land tenure. All lands belonged to the state by virtue of conquest, and these lands were held by and financed the operation of, the state administration and religious institutions. The lands, expropriated from the vanquished local communities,
were returned to them for their subsistence use in compensation for their providing corvée labor to farm state lands and to carry out state projects.”

Denmark

98-99: “without irrigation, drained fields, or other carefully measured and divided production units, the landscape of Denmark was open and difficult to control directly. … Perhaps it was the difficulties of instituting control based on direct ownership of the means of staple production that limited the power of the Danish chiefs and restricted the evolution of more complex social forms.”

99: Weak chiefdoms came and went, sources of power were mostly warrior might and ideological legitimacy. Economic power played a limited role.

102: “the system of land tenure became institutionalized and formalized as a broader ideology that positioned the chiefs at the center of the society and its economy. The ownership of pastures by the Danish chiefs would have reinforced an emergent political economy based on the maximization of production of cattle, the society’s most basic wealth.”

Chp. 4 Military Power

142: “two important points. First, walls are a sign of political weakness and incapacity. Second, the linkage of warfare to the political economy is key.”

Chp. 5: Ideology as a source of power

192: “A strong central political institution depends less on any one source of power than on the interrelationship among the power sources and on its ultimate grounding in the political economy.”

Chp. 6: The emergence of complex political institutions

194: “In the cases considered, the primary determinant appears to have been the nature of the developing political economy.”

207-8: “The material flows of the political economy provide the wire that binds the sources of power together. … The ideology in turn institutionalizes the order of the economy as constituted in ownership rights and social and political hierarchies.”

210-211: “In modern societies, for example, the powers of churches, states, and businesses are partly set against each other and can function in distinct spheres of authority and action. … more complexity is therefore often less centralized … Under some situations … the sources of power are effectively co-opted by using the surplus generated from intensified agriculture to finance control over warriors and police, craft specialists and managers, priests and ceremonies. But if the sources of power cannot be centrally controlled, the various sources of power also are difficult to control, and multicentric societies develop. The multiplicity of lines of social evolution should not obscure the common principles and processes of power politics. Attempts to extend and
resist central power characterize social evolution, and the means to finance political rivalries in social life profoundly affect long-term evolutionary trajectory.”

**Ellingson, The Myth of the Noble Savage**

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The myth of the Nobel Savage is that anyone ever portrayed native peoples as noble savages. This book shows that a 19th Century racist anthropologist, Crawfurd, invented the term in order to debunk it and to discredit just about anyone who said anything good at all about native peoples. It’s still used that way today. Ellingston shows that there were only two apparent uses us the term before Crawfurd and neither of them used it to mean what Crawfurd said it did. Rousseau is the main target of the noble savage myth. He never used the term, nor did he write sympathetically about native peoples. To him, those people weren’t true savages they were living in the corrupt state of man. Ellingston chronicals the overwhelmingly negative portrayals of native people’s by Europeans from the 1600s to the 1800s. He finds nothing like the noble savage in any portrayal. The most positive writings you can find pair positive and negative characteristics.

*Kindle notes: the numbers refer to kindle “locations” not to page numbers*

the idea that any people, including American Indians, are or were "savages" is a myth that should long ago have been dispelled. -- 32

the title refers to a living, contemporary myth that most of us accept as fact; and because the myth itself deceives us by claiming to critique and offer an expose of another "myth," the existence of Savages who were really noble. -- 33

The supposed expose asserts that the "myth" of savage nobility was created in the eighteenth century by Jean-Jacques Rousseau as part of a romantic glorification of the "savage" to serve as a paradigmatic counterexample for constructing attacks on European society, and that belief in the existence of actual Noble Savages has been widespread ever since. -- 35

The real myth, in other words, is what we have been deceived into thinking is the reality behind the myth. -- 39

Serious investigators have known since the 1920s that Rousseau did not create the myth, -- 45

the term "Noble Savage" was invented in 1609, nearly a century and a half before Rousseau, by Marc Lescarbot, a French lawyer-ethnographer, as a concept in comparative law. We will see the concept of the Noble Savage virtually disappear for
more than two hundred years, without reemerging in Rousseau or his contemporaries, until it is finally resurrected in 1859 by John Crawfurd. -- 62

It is Crawfurd's construction, framed as part of a program of ideological support for an attack on anthropological advocacy of human rights, that creates the myth as we know it, including the false attribution of authorship to Rousseau; and Crawfurd's version becomes the source for every citation of the myth by anthropologists from Lubbock, Tylor, and Boas through the scholars of the late twentieth century. -- 65

Dryden's well-known 1672 reference to the Noble Savage revealed what was obviously an original invention of the concept by Lescarbot -- 73

the "Noble Savage"-a mythic personification of natural goodness by a romantic glorification of savage life-projected -- 163

Marvin Harris. -- 167

considerable difference existed as to the specific characterization of this primitive condition, ranging from Hobbes's "war of all against all" to Rousseau's "noble savage," -- 168

the Noble Savage and Rousseau's purported role in its creation remains a leading critical concern -- 172

None of these authors apparently feels any need to support the claim of Rousseau's authorship with a citation; -- 182

Rousseau was much less sentimentally enthusiastic about savages than many of his contemporaries, did not in any sense invent the Noble Savage idea, -- 189

(Fairchild -- 190

Gaile McGregor, -- 193

Rousseau's overall estimate of that level of existence is … far from enthusiastic…. -- 195

Rousseau's aim was basically relativistic. -- 196

Rousseau's invention of the Noble Savage myth is itself a myth. -- 198

not only is everything we have believed about the myth of the Noble Savage wrong, but it is so because our profession has been historically constructed in such a way as to require exactly this kind of obviously false belief. -- 202
The single clear citation of the term "Noble Savage" in either Fairchild (1928) or McGregor (1988), which is also cited as the term's earliest occurrence by the Oxford English Dictionary, -- 262


this comparative-relativist viewpoint leads Lescarbot again and again to draw unfavorable comparisons of European to Indian conduct and to criticize what he sees as corruptions and injustices in his own society. -- 360

Nevertheless, Lescarbot's overall view of the Indians remains that of a committed advocate of colonial domination and, as such, is diametrically opposed to any project of idealization. -- 368

16og -- 414

English translation of Lescarbot's own voyage and ethnography, Nova Francia, was published in London the same year. With its appearance, the Noble Savage also made his entrance into English literature. -- 414

the Men there are more humane, -- 415

they are trucly noble -- 416

not having any action but is generous, -- 417

a closer look at Lescarbot reveals that his Noble Savage is entirely different from the one known to later myth. -- 426

by their free practice of hunting, which is also an "image of war" and defense of the innocent, the "savages" of America occupy a status that corresponds, from a legal standpoint, to the nobility of Europe. -- 449

In a technical legal sense, then, the conclusion is not only appropriate, but legally inescapable, that "the Savages are truly Noble." -- 451

Hunting was, after all, one of the marques de noblesse, the emblematic privileges that distinguished nobles from commoners. -- 452

The nakedness of "savage" peoples, dwelt on by virtually every ethnographic account, had assumed an emblematic status for framing the problem of every kind of perceived negativity, from a European comparative standpoint, of features lacking in their cultures. They were said to have "no laws," "no property," "no religion," no analogue of almost any feature that Europeans assumed to be an indispensable characteristic not only of civilization but even of human society. -- 469
The myth of the Golden Age, constructed on the rhetorical foundations of a litany of comparative negations and invocation of the corrupting power of "mine and thine" …, posited both a continuity and a seemingly insurmountable disjunction between European and "savage" cultures. By projecting the Indians as a mirror image of the European past, it excluded them from a cultural present in which laws, books, and judges, and above all the property distinctions of "mine and thine," were the indispensable foundation blocks of civil society. It was not so much that the Indians themselves lived in the past as that they lived in a kind of temporal parallel universe, where the Golden Age extended into adjoining spacetime by the confluence of ecological abundance and a "Zen strategy" (Sahlins 1972: 1-2) of satisfaction with available resources. But their very ability to coexist thus presented problems to European thinkers; not the least of which was the validity of European assumptions of cultural superiority, on the one hand, and the viability of cultures that seemed to be built out of nothing, on the other, at least insofar as their representations were constructed, and their essential natures projected, in terms of the enumeration of comparative negations. --478 - 479

If it happens, then, that our savages have venison or other food, all the company have part of it. They have this mutual charity, which hath been taken away from us since that mine and thine have come into the world. -- 486

Lescarbot's vision of "the fair science" of human diversity is as remarkable as his conception of it in terms of a salvage ethnography of cultures doomed to disappear. -- 519

Although there is praise for the "savages" here, there is certainly no idealization. Rather, every assertion of their virtues is balanced by an enumeration of their vices, which is in turn counterbalanced by a reminder of the equal vices of Europeans. -- 531

As for justice, they have not any law, neither divine nor human, but that which Nature teacheth them-that one must not offend another. -- 536

Here Lescarbot faces what to him is the real evidence of their comparatively better health and longer lives and finds a plausible explanation of the disparity in the stresses and corruptions of his own society. -- 552

his project of building a new golden age in the colonies of Canada, which requires colonists able to reject both the claims of superiority of French society to the extent required to wish to escape it and the claims of the "savages" to a moral right of possession of their own lands. -- 562

the concept of the Noble Savage did indeed exist, and in fact was brought into existence together with the call for the foundation of an anthropological science. But Lescarbot's Noble Savage concept is not in any way the same as that which later came to be criticized
as part of the Noble Savage myth. Rather than an idealized equation of morality with nature, it was a technical concept based on legal theory, attempting to account for the problem of societies that could exist in the absence of anything Europeans might recognize as legal codes and institutions, -- 583

rather than being associated with an idealization of "savage" peoples or promotion of them to the status of exemplars for revealing European corruption, it was instead offered in the context of a colonialist project that would promote European dominance, guided by a salvage ethnology that would show later generations how their forefathers had lived, once the inevitable destruction of their culture had been achieved. -- 587

the concept of the Noble Savage itself, so strikingly original a part of Lescarbot's legal and anthropological analysis,2 became a dismal failure rather than a widely emulated paradigm. Too much a part of the vanishing feudalism of the age that inspired it, it simply failed to catch the imagination or the interest of humanist writers, or of their Enlightenment successors -- 608

In the eighteenth century, ideals of divine right and aristocratic paternalism would be replaced by ideals of natural rights and fraternite, and the aristocratic paradigm of nobility would give way to new, more bourgeois-centered reinterpretations of the "social contract" that emphasized the equality of the consenting parties. -- 610

after Dryden's brief evocation of the term, the Noble Savage disappeared from view for the next two hundred years. -- 616

Dryden … is not concerned with the clash of ethnic groups or cultures except to the extent that they provide plot, motivation, and coloring for the clash of noble-minded heroes. If some of these be Indians, they are not Noble by virtue of their "savage" state, but Nobles, pure and simple -- 655

Montezuma, a chivalrous but unknown hero like Almanzor in Conquest of Granada, turns out to be a member of the hereditary nobility, the long-lost son of the murdered king -- 657

Nobility, in the end, comes from hereditary descent; and things such as freedom and bravery follow from it, -- 658

Dryden is a royalist defending royalty -- 659

there is little to indicate that Dryden's views on nobility, savages, or their relationship are any less embedded in notions of hereditary dominance or European superiority than those of Lescarbot, from whom Dryden borrowed the idea of the Noble Savage. Indeed, in The Indian Queen Dryden gives us one of the most remarkable apologies of the period for colonialism, -- 660

Dryden's theme is heroism itself, not the ethnicity of the hero. -- 673
In the interval between Lescarbot's invention of the Noble Savage concept at the beginning of the seventeenth century and its reemergence as a full-blown myth in the 1850s, the Noble Savage appears to have receded into a state of virtual nonexistence. -- 705

Most writers, even in the eighteenth century, when popular myth has it that belief in the Noble Savage was almost universal, simply do not juxtapose the two terms. -- 708

some of the characteristic features of the myth itself. -- 711

First, the Noble Savage myth posits an ontologically essential rather than a traitascriptive nobility. That is, according to the myth, there were many who believed that "savages" were noble by nature, rather than displaying isolated traits. -- 711

Second, the nobility of the Noble Savage myth is an absolute rather than a relative quality. To say "Some Indians are more honest than others" is a very different kind of statement than "Indians are honest" -- 716

Furthermore, the nobility of the mythical Noble Savages consists of their shared moral superiority to Europeans, not a status superiority to each other; -- 721

Finally, we should also remember that the myth vaguely associates belief in the Noble Savage with the egalitarian ideals of the Enlightenment, an association implicit in its linkage with Rousseau, -- 724

Here, the goodness of the savage assumes nothing about the goodness of savages in general, --... It is a purely contingent, instrumental value, reflecting only the strategic usefulness to the observer of the object of observation, who otherwise is viewed in overwhelmingly negative terms. -- 766

For Hennepin, this "civility" of mutual self-respect, of believing everyone entitled to the integrity of his own opinion, proved the most frustrating and maddening feature of "savage" life. Again and again, he would cite instances of Indian opposition to European claims of the right to unquestioning acceptance and obedience based on scriptural authority; -- 905

Hennepin saw in them a unique reason for condemning the Indians: -- 921 they think every one ought to be left to his own Opinion, without being thwarted: they believe, or make as if they believed all you say to them; but 'tis their Insensibility, and Indifference for every thing, especially Matters of Religion, which they never trouble themselves about. -- 922

America is no place to go to out of a desire to suffer Martyrdom, taking the Word in a Theological Sense: The Savages never put any Christian to death upon the score of his Religion; they leave every body at liberty in Belief: -- 924
Hennepin expressed a preference for methods other than genocide, even if he was willing to excuse it as an occasional "necessity": -- 949

The above random selection of early travel-ethnographic writings present us with a continuum of negativity, extending from Cartier's relatively indifferent treatment of the Indians as potential objects of commercial exploitation and erotic gratification to Hennepin's deeply negative assessment of the value of their lives. It would be no great challenge to multiply into the hundreds such negativistic portrayals of "savagery" from the writings of the unphilosophical travelers, complacent in their Eurocentric prejudices.

Their views have to be taken into account if only for the sake of balance, to counteract the tendency built up over a century and a half of unquestioning acceptance of the myth of the Noble Savage, to assume that belief in the nobility of "savages" was ever predominant in the ethnographic literature. But once the overall balance has been taken into account, it would be overkill to dwell on the negativity that pervades European views of the "savage." Let us continue, instead, with the more complex and interesting task of exploring the works of writers who have been perceived as advocates of positive interpretations of "savage" life, with emphasis on writers on the North American Indian, who continues to represent the paradigm case of the "savage" as we move ahead into the eighteenth century and the period known as the Enlightenment. -- 959

Among the eighteenth-century writers on the American Indians, those who have attracted the most attention are Lahontan and Lafitau. -- 973

(1666-1715?) is one of the two key figures selected by Todorov to exemplify the construction of l'ic bon sauvage -- 979

In denouncing the corruption of his own society, Lahontan seizes on the character of the Indians as a rhetorical counterfoil -- 991

this was the single most crucial insight facing many of the European travelers and colonists: that their identity, their ethnicity, their freedom were actually subject to their own choice; and enough of them chose the freedom that they saw available to them by defecting to the Indian side that colonial governments were sometimes moved to institute draconian punishments for Europeans who "went native." Nevertheless, such defectors were common and widely known. Charlevoix, the Jesuit historian, describes an encounter with two of them: -- 1054

It would seem that Lescarbot's dream of a new golden age and a new kind of nobility had become realized in less than a century, and was perceived as such by Lahontan for the very reasons that Lescarbot had argued the nobility of the "savages." But now, in fact, it was the colonial peasants of New France, rather than the Indians, who were "put upon a level with the Nobility," exactly as Lescarbot had foreseen. -- 1136

Lafitau's comparison of American Indians with earlier Europeans was an elaborated and systematized extension of a project initiated by Lescarbot; and a reader of Lafitau cannot help but be impressed by echoes of Lescarbot's equation of Indian practices with those of European feudalistic chivalry. -- 1143
If there is any kind of idealization at work here, it is perhaps an idealization of Lescarbot's old argument for the necessity of "terror," generalized and enhanced into a … paradigm of universal human virtue. But this seems to lead us rather far afield from romantic musings on the Noble Savage as a pure and gentle, simple child of nature. -- 1183

Marc Lescarbot fills two roles often ascribed to Rousseau—inventor of the Noble Savage concept and early proponent of anthropological science. -- 1186

Rousseau's … construction in the Discourse on Inequality of a primordial man that he calls alternately "natural" and "savage" is a deliberate work of fiction. -- 1188

is no light enterprise to separate that which is original from that which is artificial in man's present nature, and attain a solid knowledge of a state which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, and which will probably never exist, yet of which it is necessary to have sound ideas if we are to judge our present state satisfactorily. -- 1192

His explanation of the need for such a speculative enterprise proceeds from a critique of previous theories: The philosophers who have examined the foundations of society have all felt it necessary to go back to the state of nature, but none of them has succeeded in getting there.... "[A]ll these philosophers talking ceaselessly of need, greed, oppression, desire and pride have transported into the state of nature concepts formed in society. They speak of savage man and they depict civilized man.... Let us begin by setting aside all the facts, because they do not affect the question. One must not take the kind of research which we enter into as the pursuit of truths of history, but solely as hypothetical and conditional reasonings, better fitted to clarify the nature of things than to expose their actual origin; reasonings similar to those used every day by our physicists to explain the formation of the earth.’" -- 1194

despite his declared intent to "set aside all the facts," Rousseau, like other writers of his time, looks at ethnographic information on "savages" for clues to the life of man in a "state of nature." -- 1201

Rousseau uses the "savage" as a source of information and ideas to critique aspects of civilized life that less critical writers would prefer to have left swept under the rug of progress. This is the usage that resulted in the popular stereotype that Rousseau promoted the myth of the "Noble Savage." In fact, Rousseau not only never uses the term "Noble Savage," but his conception of savagery is remote from any notion of natural moral goodness. For Rousseau, the savage "could not be either good or bad, and had neither Vices nor Virtues" -- 1203

he was nevertheless "rather wild than wicked" -- 1207

the savage was in some ways happier and more fortunate than civilized man precisely because he was not, and could not be, "Noble": lacking the abstract … concepts of good
and evil that civilization had invented, he was also spared the practical effects of
socioeconomic and moral exaltation and degradation that developed alongside them. –
1208 CHECK …

man in a state of nature was "placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of
brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civilized man" (Rousseau i755b: 115), advanced far
above the animals but possessing few of the qualities that would come with the advance
toward civilization. His mind was unable to form abstract ideas -- 1209

Discontented with your present condition … you will wish perhaps you could go
backwards in time-and this feeling must utter the eulogy of your first ancestors, … But it
is not possible to go backward in time; and Rousseau, for one, has no wish to do so. What
then? Must we destroy societies, annihilate meum and [tuum] and return to live in the
forests with the [Wolves and] bears? A conclusion in the style of my adversaries, which I
would sooner forestall than permit them to disgrace themselves by drawing. Oh you ...
who can leave your fatal acquisitions, your troubled spirits, your corrupt hearts and your
frenzied desires in the midst of cities, reclaim-since it is up to you to do so-your ancient
and first innocence; go into the woods and lose the sight and memory of the crimes of
your contemporaries, and have no fear of debasing your species in renouncing its
enlightenment in order to renounce its vices. As for men like me, whose passions have
destroyed their original simplicity for ever, who can no longer nourish themselves on
herbs and nuts, nor do without laws and rulers; those ... who are convinced that the divine
voice called the whole human race to the enlightenment and happiness of celestial
intelligences; all those will endeavour, by the exercise of virtues ... [to] respect the sacred
bonds of the societies of which they are members; they will love their fellowmen and
serve them with all their strength; they will scrupulously obey the laws ... , but they will
nonetheless despise a constitution ... from which, in spite of their cares, there will always
arise more real calamities than seeming advantages.2 -- 1216 – 1218

Precisely because it is impossible to return to primordial innocence, it is impossible for
the civilized and enlightened person to retreat to a state of unthinking, uncritical
acceptance of any way of life, whether that of savagery or of civilization. -- 1227

Rousseau certainly makes use of ethnographic writings in the construction of his fictional
Savage. However, he also clearly distinguishes the so-called Savages of America from
those he considers "true Savages": -- 1232

Rousseau distinguishes the "savage peoples known to us" from his hypothetical
evolutionary construction of "true" savages in a state of nature. -- 1239

Thus, ... revenge became terrible, and men grew bloodthirsty and cruel. This is precisely
the stage reached by most of the savage peoples known to us; and it is for lack of having
sufficiently distinguished … between different ideas and seen how far these peoples
already are from the first state of nature that so many authors have hastened to conclude
that man is naturally cruel. -- 1240 – 1241
the images of natural man projected by theorists may be, as Rousseau (1755a: 83) charges, "diametrically opposite to Experience." In making this charge, Rousseau echoes the classic Renaissance scientific critique of theories constructed without observed evidence, purely on the grounds of logical consistency; -- 1248

Rousseau begins his Discourse by observing, "The most useful and the least developed of all the sciences seems to me to be that of man" -- 1251

In the two or three centuries since the inhabitants of Europe have been flooding into other parts of the world, endlessly publishing new collections of voyages and travel, I am persuaded that we have come to know no other men except Europeans; moreover it appears from the ridiculous prejudices, which have not died out even among men of letters, that every author produces under the pompous name of the study of man nothing much more than a study of the men of his own country.... -- 1256

The "savage," too, is a critic, because he is also a thinking man; like the Europeans, -- 1351

he is unlikely to buy the whole accompanying package of European cultural superiority. Given the apparently declining likelihood of universal genocide, "savages" would continue to live while their ways of life would change, as human lives always do; but they would not inevitably and globally be replaced by European culture, as long as other peoples had any freedom at all to think and make choices concerning their own destinies. -- 1355

In pointing out Rousseau's contributions to anthropology, there is no need to idealize or ennoble him. His own Confessions attest to his ignoble treatment of his contemporaries, particularly women and his own children. His philosophical and personal commitment to Euro-Christian individualism seems at times to be carried to pathological extremes. -- 1369

the convergence of research in disciplines he had barely foreseen—archaeology and ethology—would furnish evidence that, in the first case, humans of the remotest discernible periods had been social beings living in … mutually interdependent communities, even before the emergence of sedentism and agriculture; while, in the second, studies of primate bands would suggest that human ancestors had been social even before the emergence of humans as a distinct species. Rousseau argued that man in the state of nature had no more need of society than monkeys or wolves; but it has been precisely the wolf pack and the primate band that have opened up some of the most interesting issues of animal society and its relation to human ancestry. But twentieth-century research has also led to work on problems such as territoriality and archaeological research on bands of Kalahari Bushmen where sedentization correlates with increasing property accumulation and separation, with implications of breakdown of social equality and close relations, all of which seem to reflect Rousseauian processes and to vindicate other aspects of his analysis. There is no simple assessment we could make
of even the most speculative and seemingly time-bound of his theories. Which may be true of any significant or interesting theory whatsoever. -- 1372 – 1373

the points I have weighed against Rousseau seem minor. … The story I extract here from his writings is the clearest account I can imagine of his relationship to my two main questions: [Rousseau presents] the representation of the "savage," where his role is complex, and the construction of anthropology, where his critiques and projective constructions play an inspirational role. He is an original synthesizer, who brings out clearly the significance of what others had separately and individually hinted. Rousseau brings the world of cultural diversity together into a vision of analytic and critical human unity. It was this unity that a later, harsher, and less humanistic opposition would oppose through its generation of the myth of the Noble Savage -- 1396. -- 1397

If, as the myth would have us believe, Rousseau had been instrumental in the creation or popularization of the Noble Savage concept, we might expect his work to stand as a kind of watershed between earlier, relatively more negative or at least neutral, and later, idealized and romanticized, views of the "savage." This is not the case, either in the ethnographic or the philosophical literature. The same ambiguities, the same oppositions, the same dialectic of vices and virtues continue to dominate the literature after Rousseau as had done so before him. -- 1409

each chapter contributes, in its own very different way, … to a multifaceted reflection on the rising currents of racial negativity that increasingly suffuse the writings of every discipline during the period after Rousseau. -- 1422

Toward the middle of the eighteenth century, perspectives on the American Indians began to undergo a perceptible change. -- 1423

In the Journal of a Voyage to North-America (1720-22), Charlevoix might seem at first glance to have projected the very epitome of the ennoblement of the "savage" in his frequent praise of Indian ways in contrast to European, and even in his deployment of the rhetoric of nobility itself. In his History (1744b), by contrast, … Charlevoix appears as an unrelenting critic not of Europeans but of Indians; and "these Savages" is repeatedly and exclusively used as an epithet of condemnation. -- 1433

the apparent enthusiasm of the earlier journal was never so single-minded as its isolated bits of Lescarbot-derived rhetoric of nobility might have led us to believe. There were always undercurrents of negativity and condemnation lurking beneath the surface optimism of its propagandistic facade; and, we might equally suspect, there remained currents of optimism and admiration hidden below the repeated epithets he later pronounced on "these savages" from the lofty chair of the ecclesiastical historian as he wrote the History. -- 1503

The last, of course, is a dig at Rousseau, whose complexly ambivalent discussion of "savagery" was viewed as an obstacle by other "feeling and reasonable men" who accepted that the outcome of European-"savage" encounters should rightly be the
assimilation of some and the "total destruction" of others. Toward the end of the century, we see the rise of a number of such two-pronged attacks, on the "savages," on the one hand, and on Rousseau, seen as their defender, on the other. Such attacks would furnish an important part of the basis for the construction of the myth of the Noble Savage; although, of course, at the time there was no attempt to connect Rousseau with the rhetoric of nobility, as he had not used it and ... the myth itself did not yet exist. -- 1536 – 1540

The implication is that the Indians themselves were the captives of childish impulses, a charge that would increasingly be levied against them in the nineteenth century. -- 1579

To the same cause are owing the poverty and rudeness of the people who inhabit the commons of Brittany. -- 1618

Corsica, ... The abolition of these common rights is the first step towards civilising this island. -- 1620 – 1621

Here we see the appearance of a theme that will assume increasing prominence in the nineteenth century and play an important role in the rise of the myth of the Noble Savage: the threat to property ownership and established privilege represented by the common people and their consequent equivalence with savages as an antithesis to civilization. -- 1621

the virtues of the savage are reduced to mere courage in danger, to contempt of pain and death, and patience under all the evils of existence. These, no doubt, are useful qualities: but they relate to the individual himself, they centre in his safety or felicity, and have no relation to the ... benefit of others. They are indications of a life of danger and distress; a state of society so depraved, that its members look not for succour and sympathy to each other, but are driven, for solace, into despair or indifference. -- 1635 – 1636

the construction of a careful and systematic ethnographic program of research based on long-term acquaintance and collaboration with members of the group being studied, together with a sophisticated theoretical approach to anthropology. The outstanding example of this is the work of Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-81).3 -- 1672

combined ethnographic interests with a practical commitment to providing the Iroquois with legal and political support against corporate attempts to divest them of their remaining lands. Energized by this ideological commitment, he wrote his major ethnographic study with the explicit intent of evoking a more positive public attitude to the people he depicted -- 1674

Morgan certainly makes more use of the rhetoric of nobility than the purveyors of negativistic stereotypes; but not in the way that the Noble Savage myth would lead us to expect. Many of Morgan's references to nobility are to the nobility of distinction, -- 1681
Morgan is not an advocate of the general nobility of "savages."… his concept of the noble belongs to the last and highest evolutionary stage rather than the "savage" state that lies the closest to nature. -- 1686 – 1687

The hunter state is the zero of human society, and while the red man was bound by its spell, there was no hope of his elevation. -- 1697

The irony of this characterization of "the hunter state" as "the zero of human society" appearing in an ethnography of the Iroquois is, of course, that the Iroquois were not subsistence hunters but agriculturalists. -- 1698

Despite his positive assessment of the effects of "ennobling" influences on aspects of Iroquois character and society and despite his political and legal advocacy on their behalf, Morgan's overall projection of the Iroquois' future seems to differ little from the purveyors of negative stereotypes. We see here a confluence of the current of post-Enlightenment pessimism with the emerging tide of racially centered anthropological discourse that was to characterize the century, progressively eroding whatever positive or relativistic tendencies had existed in previous generations of writers. -- 1769

Negative rhetoric was a vital ideological implement of the war against native and lower-class resistance; and its deployment gave new value to a search for the lowest types of humanity, -- 1784

There had always existed a kind of contest among European travel writers to discover, or to appropriate the authority for representing, the world's worst people -- 1786

It was an ongoing contest that needed no winner, for it validated itself simply by the reiterated application of its own assumptions and procedures. Somewhere out there, everyone knew, there had to be a people that would constitute the "specimen" or "type" of the "savage"-not, indeed, in the scientific sense of being in any way typical, for the qualities sought were the most extreme, the most deviant from all imaginable norms. -- 1791

To those who played this game, its rules and increasingly negative intensity made discursive linkages between "savages" and "nobility" increasingly unlikely and problematic, since the search for the ultimate savage led by definition to the lowest humans, those most removed from the high and ennobling virtues of civilization. -- 1798

Culturally, the construction of a European identity was achieved by setting up a tripartite contrast between the "European," the "Oriental," and the "Savage"; -- 1808

Lapland was undergoing colonization by outsiders; and Linnaeus was not hesitant to express his criticism of oppression by his fellow countrymen in terms that show both sympathy and an appreciation of the humanity of the Saami themselves: -- 1858
Although he continues to see some faults in them … Linnaeus's assessment of the Saami is strongly positive -- 1866 -- 1867

here the ethnographic subjects are themselves the hired laborers on whom the dominant and authoritative party is hopelessly dependent, and within them lurks the ever-present, ever-threatening beast. On the fringes of Europe itself, we begin to sense something of the global scope of the fears and negativities that would energize the ethnography of the new century. -- 1952

Darwin's … meeting with some Fuegians, ‘These were the most abject and miserable creatures I any where beheld...’ -- 1963 – 1964

There is almost nothing of the old dialectic of vices and virtues -- 1969

in relative states of evolutionary progress from savagery to civilization that energize Darwin's critical and imaginative faculties. -- 1998

his highly negative representation of the Fuegians, Darwin's criterion of evaluation is his perception of cultural, rather than racial, inferiority. -- 2001

Darwin's construction of the Fuegians represents a particularly negative extreme, -- 2038

‘the more civilized always have the most artificial governments.... In Tierra del Fuego, until some chief shall arise with power sufficient to secure any acquired advantage ... it seems scarcely possible that the political state of the country can be improved. At present, ... no one individual becomes richer than another. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand how a chief can arise till there is property of some sort by which he might manifest his superiority and increase his power.’ -- 2064

Here, then, is the ultimate critique of the state of savagery: it is too egalitarian to permit the "improvement" of allowing some to accumulate property, wealth, and power at the expense of others. We have already heard this critique from Volney and Morgan; and we shall encounter it again in the anthropology of the nineteenth century, -- 2066

Darwin's racial negativism is neither an individual aberration nor a sign of political extremism but a simple reflection of the belief in white superiority and the inferiority of the "darker races" that pervaded European society and discourse, scientific as well as nonscientific, in the nineteenth century. As in Darwin's case, we see that European writers carried their prejudices with them, so that what appears in the travel-ethnographic literature to be rational assessment of non-European peoples and customs based on firsthand, ostensibly scientific "observation" was to a significant extent an artifact of the prefabricated racialist framework within which representations of the other were constructed. Indeed, it was possible to come to firm "scientific" conclusions about the inferiority of nonwhite peoples without ever "observing" them, as we can see in the work of one of the great early-nineteenth-century British comparative anatomists, William Lawrence. -- 2069
The distinction of colour between the white and black races is not more striking than the pre-eminence of the former in moral feelings and in mental endowments. The latter, it is true, exhibit generally a great acuteness of the external senses.... Yet they indulge, almost universally, in disgusting debauchery and sensuality, and display gross selfishness, indifference to the pains and pleasures of others, insensibility to beauty of form, order, and harmony, and an almost entire want of what we comprehend altogether under the expression of elevated sentiments, manly virtues, and moral feeling. … (Lawrence 1817: 325) -- 2085 -- 2089

The "American school" of racist anthropology was particularly influential in shaping some of the ideas and discourses that are examined in this study. The American racist school took its inspiration from the work of Dr. Samuel Morton (1799-1851), a Philadelphia doctor who conducted extensive measurements on the largest collection of American Indian skulls ever assembled and concluded that the American Indians were a distinct, indigenous race, unrelated to others -- 2123

in the ethnographic literature, Rousseau's work does not form a watershed dividing more negative from more positive views of the "savage." If anything, the opposite is true. But both before and after Rousseau, philosophical attitudes are often more or less simply marked by indifference, neutrality, or ambivalence to the "savage," and by often strangely unreflective convictions of the superiority of European life and thought -- 2200

Giambattista Vico, … is one of the early contributors to the development of a widely accepted Enlightenment theory of sociocultural evolution, expressed at the time in terms of "progress," which postulated the development of human societies through a sequence of three or four stages from savagery to civilization. The theory would assume a more or less definitive form in the 1750s with its evolutionary stages grounded in patterns of subsistence: hunting as the basis of "savage" life, progressing upward into "barbarism" with the formation of pastoralist animal-herding societies, and advancing toward civilization with the emergence of societies based on agriculture and "commerce." -- 2202 -- 2203

depending on which evolutionary stages were given primary emphasis, the "savage" could be virtually ignored or given cursory treatment. Such is the case with Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws (1748), published seven years before Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality, in which, of the two great ethnological paradigm cases, the Oriental receives far more emphasis than the Savage, whose minor role is generally neutral or negative. -- 2227

For Montesquieu, as for other Enlightenment theorists of sociocultural evolutionary progressivism, the Savage is necessarily diametrically opposed to the Noble. -- 2236

We must wonder at the success of the Noble Savage myth in convincing so many scholars that widespread belief in such an antievolutionary notion as the Noble Savage is to be found in such an evolutionary age. -- 2237
Encyclopedia (Diderot 175-1-80) in which Diderot, d'Alembert, Rousseau, and the other major and minor philosophes collaborated. Louis de Jaucourt's short article "Sauvages," - 2242

SAVAGES, n. in. plur. (Mod. Hist.) barbaric peoples who live without laws, without government, without religion, & who have no fixed habitation. -- 2244

A great part of America is populated with savages, the majority of them ferocious, & who nourish themselves with human flesh. … Natural liberty is the sole object of the policy of the savages; with that liberty, only nature and the climate exercise dominance over them. (1765: 29) -- 2246 – 2255

In Jaucourt's brief account, the rhetoric of nobility does not appear at all. The evaluation is ambivalent, with negative qualities such as ferociousness and cannibalism juxtaposed to positive features such as natural liberty and imagery of the Golden Age. -- 2255

… none of the sociocultural progressivists after Rousseau projected a positive, or even a neutral, representation of savagery. -- 2286

William Falconer, … presented an excruciatingly detailed catalog (258-321) of the deleterious effects of savage life on character, morals, intellectual development, customs, government, religion, and various other aspects of those unfortunate enough to endure it-most prominent among whom, of course, were the American Indians. -- 2286 – 2288

Diderot's 1772 essay, Supplement an voyage de Bougainville, is often taken as the epitome of eighteenth-century portrayals of the Noble Savage (e.g., in Todorov 1993: 276-77). In examining it, we should note first that the discursive Noble Savage does not appear in it at all. -- 2294

Diderot's imagined "savage" is far from being a simple and romantic child of nature. Rather, he is a cold and calculating economic machine, rationally computing the value of sexual relations to build up a pool of population resources -- 2323

Thus the sexual freedom of the Tahitians is grounded in considerations quite distinct from those of sexual gratification and romantic love. -- 2328

Diderot's "savage" is less a creature of "romantic naturalism" than of masculine competitive sexual hegemony and rationalist economic exploitation. -- 2334

in the first half of the nineteenth century, … Along with the new direction in ethnographic area focus came innovations in ethnographic method. One such innovation was the practice of what anthropologists would later call participant observation, -- 2348 – 2349

by the 1830s it was applied to American Indian ethnography by Charles Murray and George Catlin -- 2354
Charles Augustus Murray (1806-95), -- 2355

Murray finds no nobility in the "savages." His use of the rhetoric of nobility is limited to noble forests (1839: 1:249), noble parks (1:260), and noble animals (1:122). The attractor that draws Murray to the Pawnee is not nobility but the picturesque. -- 2438

George Catlin (1796-1872), his contemporary, used painting as his primary medium. -- 2465

Like Murray, Catlin is a devotee of the picturesque and a "romantic." -- 2470

The world that Catlin entered in the Plains in the 1830s was not the pristine state of nature that he imagined. Transformed by the introduction of the horse after the Spanish arrival in Mexico three centuries earlier, the equestrian-nomadic Plains hunting cultures had become fully established only within the last century; and the economic prosperity he observed there, with its inevitable effects on features ranging from social hierarchy and warfare to the elaboration of richness of costumes, customs, and ritual, had been fundamentally altered by the Euro-American-Indian trade network, -- 2488

where Murray finds deceitful theatrics, Catlin finds overtones of the Golden Age, together with a sharing of human qualities that he obviously considers worthy of admiration. But the greatest difference in the two observers is Catlin's concern with "justice," which, along with the aesthetics of the picturesque, is a primary energizing force in his narrative. -- 2537

Ethnography, by increasing understanding, can aid the cause of justice; and this, for Catlin, is the highest value of ethnographic observation. -- 2543

What most strongly brings Lescarbot's work to mind, however, is Catlin's use of the rhetoric of nobility. -- 2554

Here, in this credal affirmation of belief in picturesque immortality, is by far the strongest, most global, and most pervasive linkage of the "savage" with nobility since Lescarbot himself. And it seems that Catlin shares Lescarbot's salvage-ethnography orientation, but with a particularly fatalistic twist, characteristic of his age, based on his anticipation of the Indians' impending doom. -- 2564

very few of Catlin's references to nobility have to do with nobility of character, or even with the nobility of Indians in general. The passages just cited refer to the Indians as a "noble race"; but they comprise just three out of sixty of Catlin's uses of the term "noble" and its derivatives, without any indication of what the term means for him. -- 2571

All "savages," then, are not equal, nor are they equally noble. Indeed, following the comparative paradigm that we have seen to dominate ethnographic writings since the rise of eighteenth-century sociocultural evolutionary progressivism, the most "savage"
lifestyles—that is, those farthest removed from civilized advancements—are the least noble; -- 2591

among Catlin's references to nobility, the second-largest group, more than one-third of the total, are concerned with the nobility of distinction and the exaltation of one individual or group over another. -- 2593

nearly half of the uses of the rhetoric of nobility in his book refer to the nobility of nonhuman objects and beings. -- 2602

he also finds instances of nobility among more acculturated groups living in close proximity to white society. Although he repeatedly laments the poverty and alcoholism endemic among such groups, he admits that "there are many noble instances to the contrary" -- 2621

overall balance, Catlin's rhetoric of nobility is generally grounded in picturesque aesthetics, individual uniqueness, and status distinctions; but in detail, it is complex and multifaceted and at times apparently contradictory. -- 2625

the intensity and extensiveness of Catlin's use of the rhetoric of nobility may have helped to pave the way for the construction of the myth of the Noble Savage. Although his linkages of the "savage" with nobility are far from the kind posited by the myth, he nevertheless does invoke the image of the "noble" far more than any other ethnographic writer, and so may have stimulated the interests and oppositional energies of the faction that ultimately brought the myth into being. -- 2663

it is easy for us to underestimate the degree to which he was recognized as a serious ethnographic researcher after the publication of his book, or the ways in which he influenced other anthropologists of the period. -- 2667

Given this kind of influence in anthropological circles, it would be more accurate to think of Catlin as a pioneer in visual anthropology and the theory and practice of participant observation than simply as a painter and popularizer of ethnographic subjects. But given Catlin's political commitment to the advocacy of Indian rights, his influence would inevitably be short-lived, as antagonistic forces arose in anthropology over the next two decades to challenge the rights and ultimately even the humanity of non-European peoples. -- 2670

much of the scholarship on the Noble Savage has focused on fictional genres, in which the presence of "savage" heroes in an aesthetic context of emerging "romantic" sensibilities would seem to provide prima facie evidence for the growing popularity of Noble Savage figures -- 2676

no fiction of the period actually featured Indians in isolation from the expanding white civilization that provided the primary interest for contemporary audiences, such "noble savages," if they existed (Barnett provides only one example employing the rhetoric of
nobility), occupied a very minor, contingent, and problematic place in the literature. -- 2699

Thus even the supposed "noble savage" of this restricted definition reveals himself as a contingently generated special instance of the nobility of distinction -- 2705

That all discourse of "savage" peoples is essentially political should be obvious enough -- 3042

to label a people "savage" enabled particular, more totalizing control moves that were not possible in political interactions with established states such as the Chinese or Ottoman Empire. Dealing with "civilized" or even "semicivilized" state societies required diplomacy and negotiation, … Dealing with "savages," by contrast, required simpler and more direct steps toward conquest, control, territorial extirpation, and, in some cases, extermination.

This dynamic partly accounts for the growing negativity of connotations of the term "savage" and the expansion of the sphere of its application to a successively wider range of peoples in the nineteenth century. -- 3046 -- 3049

It needs only a moment's reflection on the nature of the colonial system to understand why they must necessarily outweigh more positive representations. But, as with ethnographic writings, negative representations are relatively uninteresting, and it is enough for us to note their existence before moving on to the more interesting positive cases. -- 3070

For Howitt, nobility resides in Christian principles, not in the state of nature. -- 3130

Thus, although savages may possess virtues, they lie dormant, at best nonextinct, until awakened and "called forth" by the ennobling influence of Christianity. -- 3134

then, where we find the strongest moves toward the reemergence of the discourse of the Noble Savage, it is not among the philosophical critics of the Enlightenment, or the first theorists of anthropology, but among the soldiers and colonial governors of the British Empire. -- 3183

The idea that "wild" or "savage" native peoples were to be brought to a state of "domestication" was widespread in the rhetoric of both racist anthropology (see below) and colonial administration. -- 3193

The Noble Savage disappears after Lescarbot and Dryden and does not reemerge in Rousseau. -- 3219

if we wish to find the origin of the Noble Savage myth, we should look into the works of advocates of racial inequality and hierarchical domination. For the myth appears to have been introduced by a racist faction in the Ethnological Society of London, in a political
coup to divert the society from the ideological orientation it had maintained since its origins in the antiracist, pro-human rights movement. -- 3256

Ethnology was balanced on the threshold between institutional extinction and transformation, with the only alternative to its death being a radical change of direction to move it along with the swelling currents of new developments. Hunt resolved to push it over the edge. -- 3387

James Hunt (1833-69) had developed an interest in ethnology by 1854, when, at the age of twenty-one, as he tells us, he "became a disciple" of Dr. Robert Knox, promoter of the doctrine that "race is everything in human affairs." -- 3390

There was a large and influential party in this country, who desired that the world should be governed on philanthropical principles. Another party, unfortunately not quite so large, would like the world to be governed on scientific principles. -- 3398

persons suffering from what I will call respectively the religious mania, and the rights-of-man mania.... This disease afflicts alike statesmen, philosophers, and men of science. It is apparently produced in early manhood from having thoroughly assimilated in their mind the one gigantic assumption of absolute human equality, which is generally known under the title of rights of man.... -- 3401

citing Lawrence as his model, Hunt has hijacked the rhetoric of the reformers, and in fact is using the martyrdom of Lawrence to attack the egalitarian politics that Lawrence's work supported. -- 3429

my emphatic opinion that the existence of a well-selected hereditary aristocracy in any country is more in accordance with nature's laws than those glittering trivialities respecting human rights -- 3435

(Hunt -- 3438

in another article, Hunt envisions hierarchy as a metaphysical, almost mystical, quality of the structure of the physical universe itself. -- 3438

drawn into the conflict as a defender of the scientific "truth" of racial superiority. -- 3444

Hunt's takeover succeeded for several years in turning the Ethnological Society from its formerly antiracist position to a pro-racist orientation, and afterward severely compromised its ability to serve as an effective organizational opposition to the avowedly racist Anthropological Society throughout the remaining years of its existence. The ideological crippling of the Ethnological Society, in turn, had a significant bearing on the nature of the discipline that would result from the merger of the two societies in the 1870s. -- 3609

John -- 3613
Crawfurd (1783-1868), a former colonial diplomat and author of a respected natural history/ethnography of Indonesia -- 3614

the Noble Savage -- 3985

appears to have been reintroduced by Crawfurd, soon to be elected president of the Ethnological Society of London, in a paper, "On the Conditions Which Favour, Retard, or Obstruct the Early Civilization of Man," -- 3985

Crawfurd employs a radical departure from his previous rhetorical style to construct, vividly and unforgettably, a foundation myth for the emergence of a newly racialized anthropology. Crawfurd's myth is grounded in both visionary experience and scriptural citation. For the visionary experience, he cites a description of the savage by Sir Humphrey Davy -- 3996

Crawfurd proceeds to construct the myth on the dual foundation provided by the Davy and Darwin citations, using them to lead into, respectively, a preliminary misquote of Dryden and a concluding misinterpretation of Rousseau. Thus, first of all, Davy's fictionalized dream provides the visionary foundation for the invocation of Dryden and the resurrection of the Noble Savage but in a discursive mode radically transformed from Lescarbot's and Dryden's original constructions of it two centuries earlier. -- 4023

I cannot set much value on the freedom of -- 4027

the being who was liable to be knocked on the head by the first stronger man he met, for the sake of the possession of a dead rat or a cocoa-nut; nor can I conceive anything noble in the poor naked, crouching creature, trembling with cold and starving from hunger. (Crawfurd -- 4027

I imagine a week's residence-even a night's lodging with the Fuegians would have brought jean Jacques Rousseau to a saner conclusion. -- 4031

Here, at last, is the myth we have been seeking. -- 4034

the point of the myth's construction as a rhetorical rather than as a substantive project, one designed to give voice to an argument deliberately concealed in the form of its own construction. -- 4037

the apparent emphasis on the Fuegians conceals an offensive aimed at a much broader range of targets. Crawfurd had more important "savages" in his sights. -- 4042

the term "savage" had acquired increasingly negative connotations, even as it acquired an increasingly precise technical definition -- 4043
"savage" had become increasingly synonymous with "hunter-gatherer," even if there was still a tendency among some writers to apply the term to tribal subsistence agriculturalists as well as hunters. -- 4045

By sneaking his barbarian horde through the rhetorical gates, Crawfurd has not only raised a specter of menace to which he transfers the scorn generated by the harmlessly pitiful Fuegians but also considerably raised the political stakes. "Barbarians," as distinct from "savages," included agriculturally based societies of every conceivable type, -- 4061

The opposition now was simply between "civilized white" society and all others, while the extension of the scorn generated by the original hyperbolically absurd juxtaposition of "noble" and "savage" translated logically-but with great emotional intensity-into a denial of the possibility of attribution of good qualities to any people who were not white. -- 4063

the effect of having demolished the illusion of savage nobility once and for all, to the discredit of any and all unspecified but obviously inferior claimants of undeserved respect, was so self-convincing and self-perpetuating that the original creation of the myth could be left behind and the mere repetition of the term "Noble Savage" would suffice to serve as a devastating weapon against any opposition to the racist agenda. -- 4066

what did the ideologues of racial dominance consider truly noble? -- 4074

John Beddoe, used the term as an epitaph for races already dead or perceived to be dying, in effect ennobling the process of racial extermination: -- 4075

Nobility, in the context of the racially polarized anthropology of the era, quite obviously oscillated between the polarities of supremacy and subordination in interracial dynamics, with the latter in turn bounded by the poles of servitude and extermination. No other choices were possible, since nobility, just as much as in Lescarbot's time, was still inexorably established by "Heaven's laws," however hard Hunt may have worked to rhetorically disguise them as scientific laws. The myth of the Noble Savage was created and used to uphold this bleak construction of the universe. -- 4085

the usefulness of the Noble Savage myth to Hunt's faction, in remarks intended to absolve British colonists from responsibility for what was seen as the impending extinction of the Nuu-chah-nulth ("Nootka") Indians of Vancouver Island. -- 4089

the mere presentation of a foreign and novel state of existence may frighten the "noble savage," first out of his wits, and then out of existence altogether. -- 4091

If the tendency is that they die out, that tendency, this a natural one, cannot be fully arrested. -- 4094
the myth of the Noble Savage became yet another weapon in the ideological arsenal, ultimately useful for the scientific-racist project of helping to naturalize a genocidal stance toward the "inferior" races. But the myth was so powerful and successful that it began to capture the imagination even of anthropologists who disagreed with Crawfurd's racial theories -- 4095

John Lubbock, -- 4098

There are, indeed, many who doubt whether happiness is increased by civilization, and who talk of the free and noble savage. But the true savage is neither free nor noble; -- 4099

E. B. Tylor, -- 4101

"What we now know of savage life will prevent our falling into the fancies of the philosophers of the last century, who set up the 'noble savage' as an actual model of virtue to be imitated by civilized nations" -- 4102

By now, the Noble Savage myth had become so well established in anthropology that it pervaded -- 4104

the entire discipline, influencing even those who had never known Crawfurd or shared his racist agenda, such as Franz Boas. I hope that ... I have not created the impression that we are dealing with peoples living in an original state of simplicity and naturalness as Rousseau conceived of them. -- 4104

the myth of the Noble Savage had become part of the ideological foundations of anthropology in the English-speaking world-and, moreover, one that would endure for nearly a century and a half, long after most other elements of mid-Victorian anthropological ideology had fallen subject to critique or rejection. -- 4107

In the five years from 1859 to 1864, three great anthropological discursive hoaxes had been successfully constructed and sold to a broad consumership: the "Noble Savage," the "missing link," and "miscegenation." The two that enjoyed the greatest immediate success would be the first to be exposed, although they would leave lasting effects on the English language. Crawfurd had been instrumental in promoting two of the three, including the Noble Savage, which would have the longest-running success of all. He had no need to risk betting his winnings on a horse of an ambiguous color. -- 4478

Like the ideals of equality and human rights, which it was created to undermine, the myth has undergone numerous transformations and recontextualizations, -- 4485

positive evocations of the Noble Savage on -- 4532

the Web seem to be applied mostly to the self, -- 4532
not to actually existing ethnic groups or to hypothetical early humans in a "state of nature." And, finally, none of them seems to identify Rousseau as the purported source of the concept. -- 4533

What about the sites that interpret "Noble Savage" in a negative way? -- 4535

in contrast to the positive sites, virtually all of them do apply "Noble Savage" not only to others who are explicitly or implicitly assumed to be in some sort of pre-or noncivilized state of closeness to nature but also, in some cases, more specifically, to actually existing "tribal" peoples. -- 4536

And, characteristically, in most cases they explicitly identify Rousseau as the source of the Noble Savage idea. In other words, the negative sites overwhelmingly replicate and endorse the Crawfurdian myth. -- 4538

By far the largest group of authors and sponsors of negative/Crawfurdian Noble Savage websites are those associated with academic institutions. -- 4544

they almost without exception faithfully reproduce the rhetoric of the Crawfurdian myth familiar to us from other sources. Again and again, we encounter in them the same uncited attributions of authorship to Rousseau, the same essentialist framing of nonwhite peoples in terms of the rhetoric of "savagery," the same pronouncement of summary judgments denying their purported claims to "nobility." -- 4553

the myth of the Noble Savage has permeated academic -- 4558

discourse in the one hundred forty years of its existence. It shows up in writings on anthropology, cultural studies, philosophy, political science, literary and art criticism, American and European history, and various other disciplinary contexts. It is absorbed from the instructors' course materials and reproduced more or less faithfully by students, -- 4558

the tacit assumption that a child is a "noble savage" that needs to be nurtured and encouraged. Social thinkers ranging from jean Jacques [sic] Rousseau to Abraham Maslow begin with the assumption about human goodness -- 4579

The pattern we see beginning to emerge from the fundamentalist websites, then, is that invocations of the myth of the Noble Savage refer not to mistaken assumptions of the goodness of man in a state of nature but rather to the dangers of belief in the goodness of human nature. The targets of such attacks only incidentally include non-Western peoples -- 4604

Not only do the fundamentalist sites seem dependent on rhetorical and logical framings of the Noble Savage borrowed from academic sources, they also closely resemble the academic websites in their evocation of the myth of Rousseau's authorship, their rhetorical equation of nonwhites and "savages," and their assumption of a widespread
belief in savage "nobility" that needs to be refuted. Essentially, both are promoting the same Crawfurdian myth, -- 4619-- 4620

not only … anthropology but also a much wider popular audience still welcomes the continual rediscovery and reiteration of a "new" insight that few realize was originally deliberately planted in the discipline to serve the interests of mid-nineteenth-century racism, and which ironically now serves to express the intention to see others as equally human, even as it perpetuates the derogatory, essentializing terminology of those who first devised it. -- 4651

The creature that seized such a strong hold on the anthropological imagination in the last decade of the twentieth century, as it turns out, was not actually created by an anthropologist: it was "the Ecologically Noble Savage," introduced in an article of that title by the conservation biologist Kent H. Redford (1990a). -- 4666

the myth of the noble savage.... -- 4671

that Indians lived in conformity with nature, that inspired this century's reincarnation of the noble savage.... Prominent conservationists have stated that in the past, indigenous people "lived in close harmony with their local environment." -- 4671

Without presenting further documentation that anyone other than himself had explicitly conceived of "savages" as "ecologically noble," Redford goes on to cite recent evidence that "refutes this concept of ecological nobility" -- 4673

His evidence covers a range of issues and cases, including cases of human alteration of ecosystems, sometimes extensive, in precontact America; -- 4674

Redford's -- 4681

article makes only brief, passing references to particular cases and quotes sources without any specific citations. -- 4681

Jared Diamond (1992), would deploy a series of longer quotations and partial citations to launch an attack on "Rousseauian fantasy" (8) and European idealizations of "noble savages" (318) that he viewed as preventing realization of the extensive environmental damage wrought by indigenous peoples. -- 4682

Ecologically Noble Savage has managed to attach itself to so many concepts and issues that it appears capable of assuming just about any meaning at all; and we must inevitably wonder whether something so universally meaningful can have any particular meaning. -- 4711

although many individual cases are disputed, most of those who attack notions of "Ecologically Noble Savages" agree that some cases seem to support conservation, while most of their opponents agree that indigenous peoples can and sometimes do cause
damage to their environments. The core of the debate, then, seems to be a rather ordinary dispute over conflicting interpretations of growing information -- 4796

despite the key role of Noble Savage rhetoric in promoting nineteenth-century racist anthropology, its reappearance in any particular context does not necessarily imply racist motivations or agendas. -- 4800

many such usages are framed in terms of the antiracist goal of critiquing overromanticized views of native peoples that might lend themselves to racist stereotyping or counterattack and to negative political consequences. As we have seen, this is avowedly the intent of some of the participants in the Ecologically Noble Savage debate. -- 4802

Thus, while the predictions of the Ecologically Noble Savage literature that romantic expectations of ecological "nobility" might lead to a backlash against indigenous peoples perceived as violating those expectations were, in a sense, borne out by the reactions to the Makah whale hunt, the existence of the literature itself provided an ideological and rhetorical weapon for opponents to encourage the development of such expectations, and so intensify the violence of the reaction to them in their attacks on the Makah. -- 5030

The myth of the Noble Savage has succeeded in its intended purpose of obfuscation. It draws us in by its invitation to an act of disbelief in an apparent absurdity, -- 5041

By accepting the invitation, we accept the rhetorical construction of certain peoples as "savages"; and by accepting the challenge to -- 5045

prove or disprove their nobility, we accept the validity of an essentializing distinction of human worth drawn ultimately from the ideology of feudalist class values. -- 5045

There is such a thing as nobility, there are such people as savages-and we imagine the absurdity to lie in the juxtaposition of the two rather than in our failure to problematize either. -- 5048

Thus our commitment to an act of critical disbelief has generated a rather spectacular convergence of acts of unquestioning faith. -- 5049

Much of what has previously been taken as expression of belief in the Noble Savage we now find to be the lingering transformations of the Golden Age discourse of comparative negation and the dialectic of vices and virtues, playing itself out in oscillating interaction with the opposing energies and increasingly negativizing forces of Enlightenment sociocultural evolutionary progressivism and nineteenth-century racism. Manifestations of the rhetoric of nobility reveal themselves to be contingent and attributive evocations of aesthetic nobility and the nobility of distinction. -- 5068
In French, sauvage does not necessarily connote either fierceness or moral degradation; it may simply mean "wild," as in fleurs sauvages, "wildflowers." The term once carried this kinder and gentler connotation in English as well,' although it does so no longer. -- 5095

If the issues we are dealing with are only historical and discursive, why should a reader flinch at Fairchild's condemnation of a slave longing for freedom as evidence of the "Noble Savage" as yet another example of "romantic naturalism" and European sentimental fawning over the imagined goodness of darker races? -- 5109

the urge for freedom and -- 5114

human rights, -- 5114

are not simply romantic fantasies projected on exotic others by the European mind. -- 5114

Not only has the myth not faded into historical obscurity with the passing of the particular circumstances that engendered it, and not only has it undergone. -- 5164

multiple reframings and revitalizations over the decades; ultimately, it has succeeded in far outstripping the bounds of its anthropological origin and penetrated broadly and deeply into the conceptual-discursive worlds of scholarly and popular culture. -- 5165

anthropology may in fact have needed the Noble Savage myth, or something like it, to raise its own defensive smoke screen. -- 5245

Accepting the myth of the Noble Savage constituted an effective demonstration of loyalty. Affirmation of the sarcasm inherent in the term showed that anthropologists would never sell out or "go native," never cross the line that separated the "savage," as such irrevocably marked as an inferior being, from the Noble-still, in the last analysis, a status reserved not only for one side of the racial division that the myth helped to support but also, as the word implies, further restricted to a dominant elite. -- 5254

Crawfurd succeeded in creating a discursive and conceptual virus, one that insinuates itself into our thought and words and scrambles our data and programs, ultimately corrupting our work and impairing our access to the most valuable part of the anthropological heritage: the critical awareness of our shared humanity that should have been anthropology's first and greatest gift to ourselves and the peoples we study. -- 5259

Endicott & Endicott, … Batek of Malaysia

Abstract: In their ethnography, Karen and Kirk Endicott present the Batek people of Malaysia. In studying gender relations, they unexpectedly discovered a gender egalitarian society. They divided their ethnography into six categories to focus on different aspects of Batek life. Besides introducing the Batek, the Endicotts provided information on how the Batek view of gender is evident in their social life, division of labor, and childhood development. They also describe how gender ideas have changed over the years and what may have caused the Batek to be gender egalitarian. In particular, our group took an interest in Batek childhood development and social life, especially marriage and divorce. We found that like many hunter-gatherer societies, men are very involved in child care. Adults of both genders have the freedom to do as they wish: marry, divorce, hunt, gather, become a shaman, etc. These are intriguing and important examples of how gender egalitarianism is evident in a society. The Endicotts attribute this successful gender egalitarianism to three things: the economic independence of women, the wide distribution of authority and power, and strong belief in nonviolence. In exploring deeper into this topic we found out that many other gender egalitarian societies exist throughout the world. True gender egalitarian societies usually exist on the band or tribal level, i.e. hunter-gatherer and foraging societies. These societies are not only in Southeast Asia, but also found in Africa, Oceania, and Latin America. Even though state-level societies have a great deal of gender stratification, they too can still exhibit gender egalitarian undertones.

Third, and perhaps the most important, is the people’s strong belief in nonviolence. Domestic violence is a problem in many societies, but research shows that dominance is the main determining factor and that egalitarianism and sexism have little to do with it (Cumbie 115). However, among the Batek, all violence is prohibited. Violence is equated with madness and those who get too violent are expelled from the camp. As men are physically stronger than women, they could easily take control and power by brute force. Yet if a woman wishes to switch camps but a man does not, she may simply leave without him. Their belief in nonviolence is deeply rooted in all aspects of their culture. They believe that their deities will punish extreme violence with death. Violence is a form of disrespect and could cause someone to contract depression. Growing up, Batek children play noncompetitive games and learn to abhor violence. Even without government, disputes are settled without violence. If it cannot be resolved by talking peacefully, one party may move to a different camp. Such a deeply rooted
belief in nonviolence not only helps create a gender egalitarian society but allows it to remain despite sedentarization or other changes the Batek may undergo.

*Endicott & Endicott, the actual book*


39-41: Without naming it, they describe the Batek as typical band society.
39: “Most Batek social interactions took place in camps, the temporary settlements they made and occupied for days or weeks until moving to another location. … Batek camps usually consisted of five to ten thatched lean-to shelters, each of which might be occupied by a separate conjugal family (husband, wife, and their young children), one or more children, an unmarried adult with or without children, or a small group of adolescents.”
40: “Any particular camp was merely a moment in a continual process of residential movement and change. When people abandoned a camp, they often split into two or more groups, some moving together to new locations and some joining other, already existing camps.”
41: “There was always a sense of excitement and anticipation in the air when they set up a new camp. Both men and women set about gathering the logs, bamboo, saplings, and thatch needed to build their shelters.
   Women constructed the lean-tos and men made the sleeping platforms.”
43-44: “What we call personal autonomy is based on the Batek expectation that everyone could do whatever they wanted to do as long as it was consistent [44] with their obligation to help and respect others. This does not mean that Batek did not cooperate with each other in various ways but merely that such cooperation was voluntary. For example, if a group of men went out to collect rattan together, they did so because they wanted to, not because someone forced them to.
   A related component of personal autonomy is the idea that no one had the authority to coerce anyone else to do anything that person did not want to do. People could try to persuade others to do something, using every rhetorical device they could muster, but anyone could simply refuse …, without any need to explain the refusal. Batek did not accept the authority of anyone else over themselves.”
44: “The principle of personal autonomy was associated with an expectation that everyone would be as self-reliant as possible, even though they could depend on others to give them food and help if necessary. Although the Batek did not make a fetish out of working hard or steadily, most seemed to fell guilty if they loafed for very long. …
   … A few people were, in our view, somewhat lazy, but Batek seemed willing to excuse this to some extent for various reasons.”
45: “The principle of personal autonomy provided both men and women the freedom to do almost anything they wanted to do. Husbands and wives often cooperated and worked together, but as equal, autonomous partners.”
48: “The obligation to share food was a central principle of Batek social life …. Batek generally considered unharvested resources to be free to anyone for the taking, but once food was harvested or bought from a trader or shop, it had to be shared with other
members of the camp. Sharing was done on the basis of generalized reciprocity: sharing without calculating exact returns for what a person gave and received from the sharing network. Small amounts of food could be consumed by the procurer’s conjugal family alone, but if a family had more than it needed, it shared the surplus with other families, usually families nearby. Usually food was shared only with other camp members, but sometimes temporary visitors from other areas would be included, especially if they were closely related to a camp member.

Usually the people who obtained the food decided how to share it, but occasionally other people asked them for food or just showed up at their fire at mealtime.”

49: “Sharing food was an obligation for Batek, not something the giver had much discretion over. The sharing obligation was enforced by strong social pressure. … The ubiquity of food sharing didn’t mean that people always wanted to share … The food-sharing network was the Batek’s safety net. Besides ensuring that everyone, regardless of productive capacity, had food regularly, the sharing network ensured that all men and women, whether married or not, had direct access to the foods usually procured by the opposite sex. And because food sharing was an obligation rather than a voluntary act, it did not give power to food getters over food recipients.

In theory nonconsumable goods a person made or obtained in trade, including cash, were considered personal possessions that did not have to be shared. In practice, however, the general obligation to help others led to a relatively even distribution of material wealth.”

50: heading “Nonviolence”

“Batek, like most other Orang Asli, considered all violence, aggression, and physical coercion unacceptable … To them being violent was something only outsiders would do. One man told us that the ancestors had forbidden Batek to engage in war. In former times, when Batek were attacked by slave-raiders, the Batek fled rather than fighting back. Kirk once asked a Batek man why their ancestors had not shot the attackers with poisoned blowpipe darts. The man looked shocked at the question, ‘Because it would kill them!’ … in answer to our hypothetical question about what people would do about a persistently violent person, we were told that the group would abandon that person, fleeing if necessary.

Except for occasional scuffles between small children and the odd swat from a frustrated parent, we never saw any Batek commit violent acts. Batek methods of socialization were very successful at curbing violent impulses in children at an early age. By the time they were old enough to play with each other without adult supervision, children rarely deliberately hurt each other. We never witnessed a violent altercation between adults, although we heard about a few instances … in 1976, we heard that a woman in another camp, whom we knew quite well, had hit her two-year-old boy over the head with a piece of bamboo and knocked him unconscious. The boy’s grandmother was so angry that she hit the mother in turn. We were later told that the mother had actually killed two of her previous babies by hitting them. Some people said her behavior was a bit insane. As far as we know, she was never punished either by the superhuman beings or by society, although people were furious at her after the last incident.

The prohibition against violence removed the potential for stronger people to coerce weaker ones. Women and men alike were protected from abuse, spouse beating,
and other acts of physical violence that are committed—and often accepted—in many societies.”

51: heading “Noncompetition”

“Competition, like interpersonal violence, was almost nonexistent in Batek social life. We never saw people deliberately trying to outdo each other or drawing attention to their accomplishments. Although people seemed to be pleased when they succeeded at something, Batek etiquette required people to be modest and self-effacing …

… children’s games were not competitive. In many hours of observing children’s play, Karen never saw them playing in a way that created winners and losers. …

In a sense the lack of competition was merely a side-effect of some of the other principles of social life, including the prohibitions against aggression and hurting the feelings of others. … The relative lack of competition in Batek society, we believe, helped prevent either sex from dominating or outdoing the other in areas in which one might have had inherent advantages.”

53-4: “Batek always lived in groups of conjugal families and individuals who chose, for their own reasons, to camp together at a particular time. Camp-[54] groups changed size and composition constantly, as some families moved into a camp and others left to join other camps or form new ones.”

54: “People chose their camp-mates on the basis of common economic interests, kinship ties, and friendships. In theory a person or conjugal family could join any other Batek camp-group, but in practice people usually did not join a camp unless they had close relatives or friends in it.”

55: “Although river-valley groups tended to stay in their own watersheds and use the local resources, they did not claim exclusive ownership of the land and its resources or actively prohibit others from camping and foraging there.”

57: “Batek culture neither revered virginity nor encouraged young men and women to remain virgins until marriage. Rather, young people were expected to indulge their sexual desires. … Sometimes it was difficult for an observer—and apparently for Batek also—to distinguish between the premarital relationships of young people from marriage, since there was no mandatory marriage ceremony. Young adults often went through three or four short-lived marriages, which might last only a few days or might continue for a year or more. Sometimes a couple had an on-again, off-again marriage for a few years before either settling into their marriage or divorcing once and for all.”

58: “Practical action rather than ritual defined marriage. There was no wedding ceremony, although sometimes a new couple gave a small feast. The true beginning of a marriage was when the couple set up house together and assumed the economic and social roles of husband and wife. …

Divorce was as casual and almost as frequent as marriage in the years of early adulthood.”

58-9: “After a series of marriages and divorces in early adulthood, most Batek entered into a more stable marriage, or, as Batek put it, they found someone [59] who ‘stuck’ to them. Such a marriage might last until one person died, although some ended in divorce after a period of years. A characteristic of these stable marriages, which the marriages of early adulthood normally lacked, was the presence of children. It is unclear why early marriages usually produced no children”.

59: “Divorce, like marriage, was easily carried out in Batek society. If a couple began to live in separate shelters, they were considered divorced.”

60: “Extramarital affairs were fairly common. … Although Batek permitted polygamy, almost all Batek marriages were monogamous.”

63: “The Batek had no formal political organization coordinating their activities. Decision making about all economic and social matters resided ultimately with individuals and conjugal families. Yet most decisions were not made in isolation. … Before a move, people discussed informally or in a meeting where to go and what to do. All interested parties, male and female, expressed their views, and those conjugal families that decided to do the same thing in the same area would move there together, while other families might go somewhere else. …

 Although Batek had no authority structure, they had two kinds of leaders: headmen and natural leaders …. Headmen were introduced by Malays, while natural leaders developed within Batek society.”

64: “What we call ‘natural leaders’ … were people whom the Batek themselves looked to for guidance. Natural leaders were usually older, intelligent, capable individuals—male or female—who had strong charismatic personalities. They were said to have a ‘big name’ … meaning they were known widely by reputation. They were leaders because people voluntarily turned to them for help and advice.”

66: “The general flux of camp composition resulted in some camps containing more than one leader and others containing none, although in that case one of the respected older people usually became a temporary informal leader. When more than one leader lived in a camp, they cooperated like everyone else. We seldom saw evidence of conflict or competition between leaders. …

 Well-known shamans had some political significance. Although they did not have power, they had influence in religious matters because of their expertise.”

66-7: heading “Dispute Management”

 “Batek did not vest natural leaders or headmen with the authority to pass judgment on others or settle disputes. The disagreements that came up in the course of everyday life were handled by the persons directly involved rather than by an outside arbiter or judge. As discussed above, people almost never used violence or threats of violence in trying to settle disputes; such behavior was considered totally unacceptable. Instead, Batek used two peaceful ways of dealing with disagreements. The first was to talk about them, either in a direct discussion between the persons involved or in the form of loud complaints to anyone who was willing to listen, sometimes during the evening hours in cross-camp arguments, discussions, or simultaneous monologues. … Among Batek, such discussions might lead to a consensus about who was in the wrong on a particular issue, and the group might try to bring the pressure of public disapproval on the offender to induce him or her to make retribution—emotional or material—to the victim. If tensions persisted, disputants employed their other method of dealing with disagreements: moving away from each other until tensions waned. Such separations were easily accomplished, as people could join up with other camp-groups at any time.”
Evans-Pritchard: Social Anthropology


66: “The prevailing opinion about primitive man in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that his life 'solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short', lacked foundation in fact; but it is difficult to see what other conclusion could have been reached from the accounts of contemporary travellers, who for the most part described the primitives they saw in such terms as they have 'nothing that can entitle them to humanity but speech' — this is Sir John Chardin speaking of the Circassians whose country he traversed in 1671 — or that they 'differ but little from beasts' — this is Father Stanislaus Arlet speaking about the Indians of Peru in 1698. These early travel accounts, whether they portrayed the savage as brutish or noble, were generally fanciful or mendacious, superficial, and full of inappropriate judgments.”

Flannery & Marcus: The Creation of Inequality

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xi: “In the pages that follow we document our ancestors’ creation of inequality by drawing on both archaeology and social anthropology. Several widespread regularities become apparent. First, out of the hundreds of possible varieties of human societies, five or six worked so well that they emerged over and over again in different parts of the world. Second, out of the hundreds of logical premises that could be used to justify inequality, a handful worked so well that dozens of unrelated societies came up with them.”

3: “400,000 years ago they already had wooden spears and throwing sticks for hunting and stone tools for digging, cutting, chopping, and scraping.”

20: “Some of the first Westerners to visit clanless foragers considered them Stone Age people frozen in time. The idea was so naïve and demeaning that it triggered a backlash. Soon revisionists were claiming that recent foragers can tell us nothing about the past, because they are merely the victims of expanding civilization. That revisionism went too far, and now the pendulum is swinging back to a more balanced approach.”

20-21: “But as recently as 1920 there were still indigenous foragers at the top of [21] the world. Largely unaffected by the industrialized West, who earned their living under conditions reminiscent of the Ice Age.”

23: Says Eskimo had several types of marriage: 1M-1F, 1M-2F, 2M-1F, 2M-2F, depending on demographic conditions.

24: “The meat was then divided by rule, with the slayer receiving the frontal portion and his hunting companions the rest. So crucial was food sharing that the Eskimo used ridicule to prevent hoarding and greed. … Troublemakers were given the silent treatment and might even be left behind
when a camp moved. It was expected that a truly dangerous, aggressive individual would
be killed by his own family. If, however, a neighbor did it, he might have to flee to avoid
the family’s revenge.

Life in the Arctic was stressful, but the behaviors just described are not unusual
for clanless society. It was a truly egalitarian society in which the slightest attempt to
hoard or put oneself above others was discouraged. A skilled hunter and good provider
might be universally respected, but even he was expected to be generous and
unassuming.”

23: “Even during the bitterest cold of 30,000 to 18,000 years ago, equatorial Asia and
Africa would have been temperate or even frost-free.”
31: On the !Kung, “Although the senior males in this camp were respected, none had any
real power or authority; their society was as egalitarian as any ever studied.”
32: “These headmen had no coercive authority and accepted no privileges for fear of
arousing jealousy.

!Kung social logic included a premise … ‘We were here first.’ The people who
had lived at a certain waterhold longer than anyone enjoyed the privilege of deciding who
else could be there.”
33: “It is notable how hard the !Kung worked to prevent a meritocracy of good hunters
from arising. …

A second behavior, already seen among the Eskimo, was the use of humor to
prevent feelings of superiority. … No hunter was allowed to boast, and refusing to share
would not have been tolerated.

Again we see one of the most basic premises of egalitarian society: If one wants
to be well thought of, he will be generous. If he strays from this ideal, he will be
reminded of it with humor. If he persists in not sharing, he will be actively disliked.”
35: “An average Hadza camp had 18 adults, but camps could be as small as one hunter or
as large as 100 people.”
36-37: “Like other foragers in this chapter, the Hadza had an egalitarian, consensus-based
society in which leadership was noncoercive, really amount- [37] ing to no more than the
advice of a few respected senior men.”
43-4: “As with many foragers, there was a protocol to be followed. Each woman owned
the wild yams she had collected and reserved them for her immediate family. A big fish
belonged to the man whose harpoon killed it. A wild pig [44] belonged to the man whose
arrow struck it first, with this expection: when a young unmarried man killed a pig, its
meat would be distributed by an older hunter, with the choice parts going to senior men.

The deference to one’s elders was typical of Andaman society.”
44: “Each of the 13 ethnic groups in the Andamans deferred to a group of elders called
maiola. Each also had an informal headman called a maia igla. Despite being groomed
for the position for years, the maia igla had no real authority only the power of
persuasion. His wife had similar influence among the women of her group.”
51: Heading: “Potential inequality in foraging societies with clans.”
Body: “By itself, the formation of clans and moieties did not dramatically increase
inequality. To be sure, the men in Aborigine clans did not believe in gender equality”
52: “It is also true that some headmen inherited their position, but it carried limited
authority and served mainly to preserve the clan’s ritual secrets. Young Aborigines
deferred to their elders but fully expected to become elders themselves one day. Perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence that any clan outranked another.”

54-5: “Each hunting-and-gathering society discussed so far had its own distinctive character. All however, featured a set of common principles, a few which we list here.

1. Generosity is admirable; selfishness is reprehensible.
2. The social relationship created by a gift is more valuable than the gift itself.
3. All gifts should be reciprocated; however, a reasonable delay before reciprocating is acceptable.
4. Names are magic and should not be casually assigned.
5. Since all humans are incarnated, ancestors’ names should be treated with particular respect.
6. Homicide is unacceptable. A killers’ relatives should either execute him or pay reparations to the victim’s family.
7. Do not commit incest; get your spouse from outside your immediate kin.
8. In return for a bride, the group should provide her family with services or gifts.
9. Marriage is a flexible economic partnership; it allows for multiple spouses and variations.

In addition to these principles, which imply no inequality among members of society, we also encountered some premises that allowed for a degree of inequality. These were as follows:

10. [55] Men have the capacity to be more virtuous or ritually pure than women.
11. Youths should defer to seniors.
12. Late arrivals should defer to those who were here first.

In those societies that featured lineages, clans, or ancestor-based descent groups, the following new premises appeared:

13. When lineages grow and divide, the junior lineages should defer to the senior lineage, since the latter was here first.
14. You are born into your family, but you must be initiated into your clan.
15. The bad news is that initiation will be an ordeal. The good news is that you will learn ritual secrets, become more fully a member of your ethnic group, and perhaps gain virtue.
16. Any offense against a member of your lineage or clan, such as murder or serious insult, is an offense against that entire social unit. It requires a group response against some member (or member) of the offending group.
17. Any armed conflict should be followed by rituals of peacemaking.

“Many of the aforementioned principles are considered ‘cultural universals,’ shared by virtually all societies. It should come as no surprise that another widespread social attitude is ethnocentricity. Each society believes that its behavior is appropriate, while its neighbors do things improperly. Foragers, however, tend to be philosophical about these differences. …

“Another widespread principle is that in life there are no accidents; everything happens for a reason. If you fall ill, it is because you have offended a spirit. If you die it is because someone worked witchcraft on you. …”

56: “Questions about the antiquity of the sacred come up frequently. Many Western scientists cannot believe that people as pragmatic as hunters and gatherers would invest
their energy in something as irrational as belief in the sacred. A number of biologists and psychologists … have concluded that religion might have a genetic basis.

For their part, anthropologists are skeptical about the existence of genes for religion. They can think of man ways that a concept of the sacred could emerge from logic alone.”

58: “If our ancestors had been as pragmatic as some scientists believe, there would have been no need for a concept of the sacred. But in addition to being verbal and intelligent, our ancestors were arguably the most emotional, moralistic, and (sometimes) irrational creatures on earth.”

58: “No one has ever seen members of two chimpanzee troops meet at the border between their territories and exchange food.”

59: “Those who study apes, however, tell us that their dominance hierarchies provide stability to their societies. Without a hierarchy, where was the stability in foraging society going to come from?”

59-60: “When we look at hunters and gatherers, we see a dominance hierarchy as clear as that of chimpanzees. It is, however, a hierarchy in which the alphas are invisible supernatural beings, too powerful to be overthrown by conspiracy or alliance, and capable of causing great misfortune when disobeyed. The betas are invisible ancestors who do the bidding of the alphas and protect their living descendants from harm. The reason human foragers seem, superficially, to have no dominance hierarchy is because no living human can be considered more than a gamma within this system.

Confirmation of this hierarchy will appear later in the book, as we watch inequality emerge in human society. We will see would-be hereditary leaders who attempt to link themselves to revered ancestors or even to supernatural beings. By the time we reach the civilizations of Egypt and the Incas, we will [60] be introduced to kings who actually claimed to be deities. Such strategies for justifying inequality would not have worked if humans did not already consider themselves part of a natural/supernatural dominance hierarchy.”

60: “Religious conservatives have long argued that secular laws are derived from ultimate sacred propositions. They will be pleased to learn that their view is supported by what we know of foragers. They may be less pleased to learn that ultimate sacred propositions are not eternal and unchanging. … Religions transmitted by word of mouth changed constantly to keep up with innovations and altered circumstances.

…

“So, if today’s multinational religions sometimes seem resistant to social and scientific breakthroughs, Guttenberg will have to share some of the blame.”

63-65: “Freed from the continual status confrontations of ape society, human foragers created extensive networks of cooperating pseudo-relatives. They transmitted their cosmology and sacred propositions to the next generation with [65] rituals involving song, dance, and art.”

65: “As long as no living human was more than a gamma, the social playing field was level. …

… we will encounter societies that revised their cosmology to create inequality. We will see some lineages that claim to have descended from the older of two cosmic brothers, allowing them to outrank the descendants of the younger brother. Others will argue that, in contrast to everyone else’s beta ancestors, their lineage descended from a
celestial alpha. The closer relationship to the sacred entitled them to be the social unit from which all future leaders would come. Thus the concept of the sacred, which had once strengthened human society by encouraging selflessness and reducing status confrontation, would one day be manipulated to create a hereditary elite.”

Chapter 5, pp. 66-67, “Inequality without agriculture” uses Native Americans on the pacific coast from LA to Alaska as examples. They all had fairly complex societies (chiefdoms) that had developed out of earlier, smaller, more egalitarian societies.

68: “Some 7,500 years ago, the Santa Barbara region and the Channel Islands were occupied by nomadic foragers who divided their efforts between the inland acorn groves and the marine resources of the Pacific. For the next 5,000 years, as far as one can tell from the archaeological record, their society seems to have been egalitarian. These coastal foragers were limited in their ability to capture large fish by their simple watercraft, which were made of bulrushes and waterproofed with natural asphalt from the California tar pits.

The turning point in Channel Island prehistory seems to have come between A.D. 500 and 700. The key innovation was the creation of a large ocean-going plank canoe.”

68-69: “Between 500 and 1150, the romol began to alter the archaeological record. First, the ancestors of the historic Chumash began pulling in swordfish and tuna, large fish that would have capsized a bulrush vessel. Second, each plank canoe could carry a ton of asphalt from the mainland for future caulking. Third, the Channel Islanders become producers and middlemen in the shell trade along the California coast.”

69-70: “Chiefs monopolized the ownership of plank canoes. They also controlled access to hunting and seed collecting territories, served as war leaders during periods of raiding, and presided over ceremonies. The two latter roles were interrelated, since the refusal of a chief’s invitation to a ceremony was considered an insult punishable by group violence.”

70: “There is one more lesson we can learn from the Chumash. Spanish eyewitnesses observed that a small percentage of Chumash men lived and worked as women, even dressing in the paired, knee-length buckskin skirts of a woman. These men were referred to as joyas, the Spanish word for ‘jewels.’

To the Chumash, the fact that some members of the community lived as members of the opposite sex was accepted as part of nature’s plan; … [A Spanish soldier ‘estimated that there were two or three of these men in each village.’]

70-1: “In later chapters we will see more examples of transgendered Native American men and women, often referred to by their societies as ‘two-spirit people.’ [71] Almost without exception, two-spirit people were seen as having been super-naturally destined to live life as a member of the opposite sex. They were not merely accepted by their society but considered more attuned to the spirit world than the average individual.”

72: “According to anthropologist Wayne Shuttles, the potlatch was a modest ceremony prior to 1840. After that date, two processes converted it to an instrument of competition. The first was the colonial suppression of warfare. The second was the Euro-American fur trade, which substantially increased the wealth of Kwakiutl leaders.”

72: On Vancouver Island, “the Nootka were the more southern of these two Wakashan-speaking peoples. There were roughly ten groups of Nootka, each occupying its own inlet among the coast.”
73: “The basic unit of Nootka society was a local group led by a hereditary chief called a ha-wil. He and his family wore distinctive clothing, elaborate hats, robes trimmed with sea-otter fur, and ornaments of abalone, dentalium (tooth shee), and native cooper. The chief himself did no menial labor.”
74: “The Nootka of the period 1870-1900 showed a level of inequality that seems surprising compared to foraging societies like the Basarwa and Aranda, or even the Chumash. In Drucker’s reconstruction, however, we can see that many principles of Nootka inequality could have been created out of the preexisting principles of egalitarian foraging society.”
77: “Chiefs … owned the large houses in which dozens of people spent the winter. Within these houses, each person’s sitting places reflected his or her rank.”
79: “Prentiss believes that social inequality may have been present in the region by AD 400 but did not become pronounced until 800-1200. Three processes were evident during the latter period. … Prentiss and her collaborators believed that between 800 and 1200, a growing number of impoverished families were willing to accept a subservient role in wealthy households in return for food, shelter, and protection. In turn, more successful families sought to preserve their accumulated wealth by passing on their resources, luxury items, and intellectual property to their offspring. This would represent a significant change in logic from an egalitarian foraging society, where hoarding and refusing to share were anathema.
While she does not phrase the process in such terms, we believe that Prentiss is describing what anthropologists called debt servitude, or even debt slavery. The first step in such a process is to loan food and valuables to impoverished neighbors. The second step is to foreclose on the loan. Families who accept food and shelter from wealthy neighbors are in a poor position to deny the latter’s claims to luxury items and hereditary privileges.”
83: “Two types of inequality … were visible during the Tlingit feasts of merit. The most important and pervasive type was inherited nobility. Aristocrats inherited titles and privileges from key ancestors and passed them on to their children in front of witnesses. The second type of inequality, less pervasive, was achieved prestige. Highly motivated aristocrats were able to sponsor more feasts and give away more gifts than others. Such displays enhanced a man’s reputation during his lifetime, but there was no way to transfer the reputation to his children; they were still too young to have achieved anything.”
84: “The Tlingit understood exactly how to deal with the Haid and Tsimshian because those groups also had nobles, commoners, and slaves. The farther east the Tlingit traveled, however, the more they encountered egalitarian hunting-and-fishing societies.”

551: “With the rise of agricultural villages 9,000 years ago in the Near East, 5,000 years ago in Egypt and 4,000 years ago in Mexico, the environment for self-love had improved. In many parts of the world, however, the adoption of agriculture did not lead immediately to inequality. Lots of societies struck a balance between personal ambition and the public good, and in some regions that balance lasted well into the twentieth century. There are archaeological hints, to be sure, that many of today’s achievement-based societies once flirted with greater inequality. Most of those flirtations, however, ended with a return to egalitarian behavior.”
By what date did societies first show signs of achievement-based leadership? Perhaps 9,000 years ago in the Near East, 4,000 years ago in the Andes, and 3,500 years ago in Mexico. And what would be some of the clues? Archaeologists look for the building of men’s houses, either the larger and more inclusive type or the smaller and more exclusive type. They also look for accumulations of trade items that might be used in entrepreneurial exchange. They analyze residences and burials carefully, and unless they find convincing evidence that certain families’ children were entitled to sumptuary goods, they are likely to conclude that any obvious differences in prestige were achieved, not inherited.

Archaeologists examine as many of society’s villages as they can, looking for any evidence that hamlets were obliged to contribute tribute or labor to a larger village nearby. When no such evidence appears, an achievement-based society is indicated.”

How did the old hunter-gatherer logic come to be changed, creating routes to renown? Even foragers considered some individuals more virtuous than others and believed that one could increase one’s virtue over a lifetime. Building on this principle, many village societies created a series of formal steps to increase one’s virtue through the learning of sacred lore.

Another route, using entrepreneurial exchange, was created by manipulating three principles we saw among foragers: (1) Generosity is good; (2) Exchanges of gifts create social bonds; and (3) The farther away one’s trade good some from, the more impressed one’s peers will be.”

Once the latter principle was accepted, embarrassing one’s rivals with spectacular gifts became an acceptable path to renown. An unanticipated consequence of competitive exchange was that whole families and clans might be pressured into bankrolling the aspiring Big Man. If he were defeated by a rival, they would kiss their investment goodbye.

Leading warriors into combat, counting coup, or returning with captives or body parts thus became another route to prestige.

Hereditary rank “was not the inevitable outcome of population growth, intensive agriculture, or climate improvement, even though all those factors could create a favorable environment for inequality. The key process involved one group of human agents battling for greater privilege, while other agents resisted with all the strength they could muster.”

Several inequalities in achievement-based society helped justify hereditary rank, “included were the differences in prestige between Big Men and rubbish men; between people who had climbed the ritual ladder and those who had not; between the clan that arrived first and everyone else; and between the man chosen for success by a demon and lesser men.

What are the archaeological clues for the appearance of rank society? That is not as easy a question as it sounds, because rank came in so many forms.”

Among rank societies, war became a tool for chiefly aggrandizement. When that aggrandizement simply meant the acquisition of titles (as in parts of Samoa) it did not necessarily change the basic principles of society. When aggrandizement meant the acquisition of land (as in Madagascar and Hawai‘i), it could produce territories too large
for the management principles of rank society. That set the state for the political hierarchy characteristic of kingdoms.

Many of the earliest kings, in the course of changing the way they administered their territories, created new strategies. Instead of continuing to move his residence so that all providences could share in his support, the Hawai’ian king appointed a trusted governor for each province. Instead of letting each ethnic group provide its own age regiments, Shaka created state-level regiments that were loyal only to him. Instead of appointing their brothers to administer parts of their realm, some Egyptian kings chose talented commoners who were less likely to usurp the throne.

The first kingdoms or oligarchic states appeared 5,000 years ago in Egypt and Mesopotamia and 2,000 years ago in Mexico and Peru. We find it hard to date the moment of state formation, because the creation of a state often required several generations of aggressive rulers. And despite all the similarities [556] we have see in first-generation states, they were neither common nor inevitable. As late as the twentieth century, many parts of the world still displayed nothing more complex than rank societies.

What are the clues that a kingdom has been created? At the regional scale, archaeologists look for signs that the political hierarchy had at least four levels, the upper three of which featured administrators. They look for standardized temples of a state religion, as well as for secular buildings whose ground plans reflect councils or assemblies. At the capital they look for palaces built by corvée labor and tombs with sumptuary goods appropriate for royalty. At Level 2 administrative centers there may be smaller versions of such residences and tombs, often displaying the standardized architecture of a top-down administration. Another clue would be workers’ receipt of rations doled out with standardized bowls, griddles, or redeemable tokens.”

556: “Who created the world’s first empire? While many archaeologists would point to Sargon of Akkad, he may have received more credit than he deserves. An earlier king, Lugal-zagesi, claims to have held sway from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean. And even before Lugal-zagesi rose to power, some Egyptian kings may have subjugated the whole region from Nubia to the Southern Levant.

Empires, in other words, are probably more than 4,300 years old. And long with empires came ethnic stereotyping, an escalation of simpler societies’ long standing ethnocentrism. …

Early kingdoms and empires did more than this, of course, Many state regimes took away whatever vestiges of equality the individual commoner had left. In the Aztec state, even commoners who cultivated cotton were forbidden to wear cotton mantles.”

558: “Let us briefly consider what our life would be like if we were to leave it in the hands of egalitarian hunter-gatherers or achievement-base farmers. … a certain degree of sexism and age-based discrimination would remain. …

Our society would also retain its ethnocentrism. Our treatment of other groups, however, would no longer include religious proselytizing.”

559: “Our society’s tolerance of variation would extend to marriage. … We would permit same-sex weddings, such as those involving Native American ‘two-spirit’ people. …

Since many foragers practiced infanticide, our new leaders would not outlaw abortion. …

Tribal societies had no laws preventing child labor. …
…hunters and gatherers saw no contradiction in combining magic, science, and religion. Our belief in the separation of church and state would surprise them. … whenever their cosmology interfered with the adoption of a useful scientific or technological innovation, they would change the cosmology.

Foragers had an ethic of sharing that would alter business as we know it. They would never allow CEOs to earn thousands of times what assembly-line workers earn. Achievement-based villagers, for their part, would pressure management into throwing huge feasts for the workers and their families. They would also insist on a safety net for the less fortunate, such as the Tewa distribution of food to poor families.

Hunters and gatherers would admire philanthropists. At the same time, they would keep those generous millionaires from getting too pleased with themselves. They would rely on sarcastic comments such as, ‘You call that a charitable donation? The check was barely worth cashing.’

As for people who have the opposite problem—those who have accepted so much from others that they cannot pay it back—achievement-based villages would have a solution. Such people would be turned into servants or slaves, forced to work off their debt through hard labor.”

560: “Traditional foragers reacted angrily to theft and had little patience with repeat offenders. They believed in capital punishment and had no concept whatsoever of long-term imprisonment.”

560: “many achievement-based villages were willing to massacre their enemies, burn their villages, poison their wells, and turn them into slaves”.

563: “each escalation of inequality required the overcoming of resistance. There seems to have been an ongoing struggle between those who desired to be superior and those who objected.”

564: “We may never be entitled to sumptuary goods, but we can work to increase our virtue. And it is no one’s fault but our own if we allow our society to create ‘nobles by wealth.’ We can resist just as surely as any self-respecting !kung would do.”

**Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, African political systems**

According to Salzman, these people argued that anthropological evidence disproved Hobbes way back in 1940:


Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, intro

4-5: “We have not found that the theories of the political philosophers have helped us to understand the societies we have studied and we consider them of little scientific value; for their conclusions are seldom formulated in terms of observed behavior or capable of being tested by this criterion. …

… Political philosophers in modern times have often sought to substantiate their theories by appeal to the facts of primitive societies. They cannot be blamed if, in doing so, they have been led astray, for little anthropological research has been conducted into primitive political systems compared with research into other primitive institutions, customs, and beliefs, and still less have comparative studies of them been made. We do not consider that the origins of primitive institutions can be discovered and, therefore, we do not think that it is worthwhile speaking for them. We speak for all social anthropologists when we say that a scientific study of political institutions must be inductive and comparative and aim solely at establishing and explaining the uniformities found among them and their interdependencies with other features of social organization.”

Freuchen, Book of the Eskimos

http://courses.knox.edu/anso231/bk_eskimos.htm
November 29, 1960
Chapter 7. Eating and Visiting

“Under such conditions, there has naturally been no formation of societies. The only real social unit is the family, economically sufficient unto itself, and under the absolute rulership of the husband and provider. Most often, though, a few families—no more than four or five—will live together in a settlement. Rarely do they live in their houses for more than a few months of the winter, the rest of the time being spent on hunting trips. An Eskimo is not really regarded as "belonging" to any place until he is buried there.

Formally, the families in such a settlement have not given up any of their independence, since there is no chief. The men hunt together under the leadership of the hunter who is regarded as "the most successful." He is "the one who thinks for everybody"; he decides where and when the settlement is to go traveling, what game is to be hunted, etc. Very often, he is also endowed with the talents of an angakok, a conjurer with helping spirits at his command. This gives added weight to his words. You will never find two such strong-men at a settlement. If in the shuffling of families between settlements such a situation should arise, one of them will quickly move away with his family. If not, rivalry and open enmity will result.

Basically, the Eskimos regard the land and the game as belonging to everybody, inasmuch as they are all at the mercy of "the great woman who lies at the bottom of the sea and who sends out the game." Consequently, no hunter is ever spoken of as being good or bad, merely as being "successful" or "unsuccessful," and the unsuccessful hunter and his family have as much right to live as everybody else. The practical advantage of
hunting in a group, therefore, is that each man gets part of the proceeds even if he does not actually fell any animal.

…

Every single walrus we got gave gains to everyone in the party. Big heaps of meat became my property, and with tears in my eyes I would thank the hunter who first had thrust his harpoon in the animal. They laughed uproariously at that, but even the best joke can be repeated too often, and old Sorqaq—who had been a great angakok and chief hunter in his day—took it upon himself to put me straight:

"You must not thank for your meat; it is your right to get parts. In this country, nobody wishes to be dependent upon others. Therefore, there is nobody who gives or gets gifts, for thereby you become dependent! With gifts you make slaves just as with whips you make dogs!"

With these words, the old sage made me understand that we were all human beings helping each other under the hard conditions of the Arctic, and nobody should suffer the indignity of charity.”

**Fried: The Evolution of Political Society**

P. x: “The simplest human societies of which we have knowledge are those classified and described in this book as ‘egalitarian.’” I.e. he’s defining hunter-gatherer society as “egalitarian” society.

P. xi: “I have been led to write this book by my ignorance of any modern attempt to link up the contributions that have been made in various subdisciplines into a more or less unified theory of the emergence of ranking, social stratification, and the state.”

**Chp. 2: Egalitarian Society: Preliminary Considerations**

33: “An egalitarian society is one in which there are as many positions of prestige in any given age-sex grade as there are persons capable of filling them.”

34: “Most egalitarian societies have powerful leveling mechanisms that prevent the appearance of overly wide gaps in ability among members.”

35: Egalitarian society is based on reciprocity. Three models of reciprocity for Sahlins; the first emphasizes (reciprocal) altruism and solidarity. It has a vague obligation to reciprocate. But the obligation is largely implicit, “setting no equivalents or time limits, and being in the general nature of expectations that when the opportunity arises a return will be made … balance is not required: Those who can, give and continue to give. It is equally true to say that those who need, take and continue to take. … They may do so even if the donor fails his responsibility to give while still having things to be given. It is exceptionally difficult to talk about ‘theft’ in such a context”. [RESPONSE: This sounds like the tolerated theft that Binmore talked about.]

35-36: Balanced reciprocity is the second model.

36: The third model is “negative reciprocity.” Seeking advantage.

[About here he starts talking exclusively about primate society not primitive human society.]
40: “Primate behavior is quite variable and presents nothing like a unified model from which human behavior may be considered to have emerged.”

42-43: “It might be thought from the foregoing discussion that one universal feature of primate society is the dominance hierarchy.” But that’s a slight exaggeration based on the most recent evidence.

43: “the dominance picture is less uniform than indicated. Dominance is clearest and apparently most significant among rhesus; it is least clear and apparently least significant as an organizing principle among the animals closest to man in the scale of phylogenetic evolution, the gorillas and chimpanzees.”

44: In all primate societies “with the exception of the smallest infants, all animals are essentially on their own in the food quest. Even isolated instances of food sharing are rare.”

45: Low-ranking group members do get one advantage they would not from group membership the right to collect food w/in the group’s territory.

47-48: “Perhaps the most amazing thing, considering the mythology about animal society and the strength of Hobbesian images of uncivilized society, is the discovery that a number of primates—gorillas and chimpanzees in particular—live in relatively open social groups. Not only is it possible for animals to shift groups, but the ones who do so most frequently, as far as we know, are adult males. The process occurs without fighting.”

48: “Primate societies lack at least three things that by their absence help account for the qualitative gap between fully cultural societies and all others. One of these things is the division of labor, another is sharing, and the third is a means of specifying different types and degrees of relationship. … the development of social structure tends to be noncumulative. The outcome is simplicity of patterning.”

48: “Though simple pecking orders never provide the basis of organization of human society, all human societies include various forms of dominance hierarchy.”

Chapter 3: Simple Egalitarian Societies

51: “‘While Hobbes’ state of nature was intolerable and Locke’s was inconvenient, Rousseau’s was idyllic’ (Sait, 1938, p. 103). However appropriate their existential judgments, the social orders described by these and many other political philosophers of great eminence simply never existed. What then was the nature of the simplest cultural societies?”

52: Introduces two institutions: Rank and stratification. “Ranking exists where there are fewer positions of valued status than persons capable of filling them. … rank can and in some instances does exist totally independent of the economic order.

Stratification, by contrast, is a term that is preferably limited to status differences based on economic differences. Stratification in this sense is a system by which the adult members of a society enjoy differential rights of access to basic resources. … Thoreau is dead, and Walden Pond, though in a state-protected reservation, has been swallowed between a suburb of Boston and superhighway 128.”

53: “Simple human societies are egalitarian and lack both ranking and stratification. How, then, do they run?”
“One of the major differences between most ethnographically known simple societies and those that must have flourished in the Pleistocene period and persisted well into recent historical times is the nature of the habitat.” Those that survived were on relatively marginal land. “Perhaps 1,000 years ago or less, many quite simple human societies were settled in well-watered areas with rich vegetation, abundant animal life, and moderate climate. At the present time there seem to be no independent cultures of preneolithic productive economy in any area of the world even remotely fitting this description.”

Studying existing primitive human societies, we have to keep in mind that the ones that survive, have survived because they are on marginal lands.”

“In no simple society known to ethnography is there any restriction on access to the raw materials necessary to make tools and weapons. This statement can be made flatly about resources in the habitation area of a given unit, and with moderate reservations it may be extended to resources located in alien areas. For example, a description of Eskimo west of Hudson Bay warns: ‘At the outset it should be stressed that the very notion of exclusive rights in land or hunting and fishing territory—whether private, familial or communal—is nonexistent and outside the conception of these Eskimos. . . . these grounds are open to everybody, also non-Eskimos, and any game or fish is . . . all and no one’s property, as long as it has not been touched. The same view is taken of other resources’”. He’s quoting Steenhoven 1962, p. 57, *Leadership and Law among the Eskimos of the Keewatin District*.

“All simple societies maintain fairly distinct divisions of labor between the sexes. Within these divisions, however, all adults are expected to fulfill almost all roles, particularly in subsistence-oriented activities. Nobody can exist in such a society on the basis of professional performance of a limited specialization. If there is any exception to this rule it lies not in the field of religion, for all available evidence indicates that the specialized religious practitioner in simple societies carries out a rather normal role in food production. The exception is the lazy person. Considerable pressure is directed against laziness, but, if the person can stand being the butt of jokes or if he is perhaps a little hungrier than his energetic neighbor or does not care what others think of him, he may survive as a drone.” Note 3: “It is by no means certain that the laggard will fare poorly in this regard . . . the case of Negwadi, who lived a life of ease and eating among her diligent fellow Dobuans”.

Cooperative teams are frequently required in the productive process, but the circumstances of their assembly vary widely. The mere fact of assembly does not necessarily mean that labor is concerted; a number of berry pickers may work in close proximity without any significant cooperation. It is true, however, that work of this kind is usually preferred in company that converts a simple repetitive task into a pleasurable social gathering. The obvious gain from such esprit may be at least partially reduced by loss of work efficiency due to diversion.”

Cooperative labor parties, whether for hunting or gathering, take place with very little apparent leadership except for certain interesting situations . . . whatever leadership is generated for such events is not applied to other aspects of the group life.”

There can be no question that all ethnographically known societies have institutionalized individual (“private”) property in nonstrategic objects. . . . There are in
all known societies things that are property on two accounts: First, while they are being used they may not be removed from the user without social disruption. Second, the user can give such a thing to someone else thereby accomplishing the creation of some kind of obligation for some kind of return and the enhancement of his own prestige. … the obligation for return lies at the heart of the most widespread mechanism of economic distribution, namely reciprocity.”
66: “the prestige which even the mightiest hunter enjoys is not transferable to other areas and does not constitute a firm basis for political power.”
70-71: “It has been a long time since any serious support could be mustered for Thomas Hobbes’ view of primitive society”. They don’t slavishly follow tradition either.
71-72: “a major source of social unrest in more complexly organized societies is obviously lacking. The significant sources of food available to simple societies are not foreclosed to any member of the group and, as shown, usually are available to outsiders as well. Whatever men and women may fight about in egalitarian societies, it cannot be land.”
72: “It is somewhat more likely that conflict may be engendered by food. No effective means exist in simple societies to restrict access of individuals to land. But with food, different amounts are found in different hands—based on differential skill, diligence, perseverance, luck, that have you. The positive action of society is needed to overcome the unequal distributions of nature. As we have seen, however, systems to accomplish this end are deeply embedded in all ethnographically known simple societies.”
74: “Trouble can arise if someone refuses to accept a gift.” [one Bushman said] “he accepted gifts even when the last thing he wanted was to be obliged to the donor.”
75: “in a simple egalitarian society the taking of something before it is offered is more akin to rudeness than stealing.”
79: “Do conflicts break out in simple societies as a manifestation of a competitive drive for power? The evidence is largely negative and confirms in a gross way the theoretical stipulation contained in our definition of egalitarian society. Rather than being structured hierarchically, such societies have as many people of paramount prestige as can display the qualities necessary.”
82-83: “No ethnographically known human society has completely lacked leadership …. Leadership in simple egalitarian societies can be described in terms of a small number of very general patterns: First, it rests upon authority and lacks connotations of power except as shall be noted below. Second, it tends to be displayed in transient fashion, moving from one competent person to another. Third, the shifts in the locus of leadership are less associated with persons than with situations. Fourth, the limited presence of power is associated with exceptionally small groups like families and vanishes as the scope of the group widens. Fifth, authority has a much wider range than power but also declines sharply with expansion of the scope of the group considered. Finally, variations in the effectiveness of the preceding five principles are related to variations in ecology and demography. Denser populations associated with more productive subsistence regimes have more extensive leadership areas and, to a lesser extent, more powerful underlying leadership.”
83: “It is difficult, in ethnographies of simple egalitarian societies, to find cases in which one individual tells one or more others, “Do this!” or some command equivalent. The literature is replete with examples of individuals, saying the equivalent of “If this is done,
it will be good,” possibly or possibly not followed by somebody else doing it. More usually the person who initiates the idea also performs the activity. Since the leader is unable to compel any of the others to carry out his wish, we speech of his role in terms of authority rather than power”.

83-84: Considering the thesis: “the notion that the state is the political order of the family unit writ large. … Despite this eminent group of spokesmen, the thesis is based upon a culture-bound view of the family, especially in those versions which assume some form of partia potestas, the theoretically uncurbed power of the father. It has long been clear that in many societies the kinship of the father is devoid of any of the role content usually associated with pater; to the extent that some portions of this role are carried out they may be assigned to mother’s brother or some other person. More significantly, however, there is no abstract structural necessity for the family to be structured hierarchically with a fixed locus of power.”

90: Discusses whether Eskimo societies have laws in any sense. Some say yes based on the fact that the community does sometimes impose sentences of death on individuals. 91: But the author disagrees, “it is my opinion that we have only the ‘form of a decision’ and none of the other criteria [for the process of law]. There is no authority for it is not recognized by the malefactor or those who would avenge him. For that matter, the recognition that he might be avenged indicates that even those who carry out the action have no faith in its legitimacy. To talk of obligation under such circumstances is ridiculous: Nothing that happens is binding upon any of the parties except as they are members of a society carrying out the patterns of their culture. … All Eskimo cases are notable for the fact that they seem to exist by themselves; the only precedents that may be formed are those advanced by outside observers.”

91: “As for sanction …, it obviously exists to the extent that at some point violence is directed against an offender. But while law without sanction is chimerical, sanction itself cannot define law. … there is nothing in the case record of aboriginal Eskimo situations that establishes anything like an effective concept of legitimate employment of sanctions.”

91-92: Discusses problems created by observers’ use of the word “law” to describe things that might not have met the definitional criteria of law.

95: As already noted, among Eskimos “there may be a strong attachment to certain areas, which they know best, there is no concept of trespass, … among the !Kung Bushmen … nominal rights to water and veldkos are said to be vested in a headman who cannot, in effect, deny permission for their use.”

95: “Australian band territories are not closed, however well described their boundaries.”

98: Observations from Eskimos, Bushmen, and aboriginal Australians all indicates, “Sharing seems to increase with scarcity.”

98: To some limited extent, “all human societies are open systems with regard to membership. Individuals can enter alien groups at almost any point in their life cycles, but formal procedures must be followed.”

101: “it is not possible to make flat generalizations at this time characterizing egalitarian band societies as either peaceful or warlike.”

101-102: Actual time when people are at war or preparing for it is very small. They don’t sign peace treaties, so times at which there are feelings of hostility are frequent and long. But to call this war for lack of formal peace would be culturally inaccurate “None of the
societies described in the literature build fortifications. None have been reported to
stockpile food and supplies for military purposes. None engage in special training
activities for warriors. None possesses a special military technology but use ordinary
tools and weapons of the hunt when they fight men. Discounting latency periods when
frictions lie dormant, and apart from the few hours or few days that are actually
consumed in a clash or raid, it may be said that a state of peace prevails.”

102: What fighting existed was rather low in intensity, perhaps so low that it isn’t rightly
called war at all. There were casualties, but not protracted attacks.

104-5: “What we do know about military organization in such societies indicates a
complete absence of command or coordination; every man stands and fights or runs away
by himself.” This is exceptionally significant because so many people suppose that
political leadership begins with military leadership.

105: “I cannot apply anything that has been said to the emergence of the state, because
that event lies still far ahead, after ranking and stratification have come upon the social
cene and been matured. What has been said, however, does apply to the evolution of
ranking and stratification from an undifferentiated egalitarian based.”

106-7: Deals with what separated humans from other primates.

106: “The paramount invention that led to human society was sharing because it underlay
the division of labor that probably increased early human productivity above the level of
competitive species in the same ecological niches. Sharing and the division of labor are
also eminently suited to the solution of maintenance problems as the human species
radiated over much of the globe, encountering most of the possible types of
environment.”

106-7: “Of almost equal importance was the concomitant reduction in the significance of
individual dominance in a hierarchical arrangement within the community.”

107: “These basic inventions, plus a few others of very great significance in such areas as
tool and fire use and symbolic communication per se, must have placed our early man
ancestors at an enormous advantage because their success dominates the history of the
past two million years. Though the bands probably very rarely exceeded fifty individuals
until Upper Pleistocene times, they obviously kept splitting, sending off shoots until, as
remarked above, most regions of the earth had some people as inhabitants.

The threat to this very successful level of sociocultural development was less a
hostile, untamed environment, niggardly resources, or fierce predators, than the
emergence of new forms of society. Even at that many of the simplest societies persisted,
some of them in excellent environments, until the primitive world model was genuinely
shattered by completely new inventions in technology and innovations in economic and
political organization.”

Chp. 4: Rank Societies

109: A rank society is one in which positions of valued status are somehow limited so
that not all those of sufficient talent to occupy such statuses actually achieve them. Such a
society may or may not be stratified. That is, a society may sharply limit its positions of
prestige without affecting the access of its entire membership to the basic resources upon
which life depends.”
113: “Though few egalitarian bands manage to surpass fifty individuals living together with any degree of stability, few rank communities would fall below this figure, and most would have populations in the hundreds.”

117: “In rank society the major process of economic integration is redistribution, in which there is a characteristic flow of good into and out from a finite center. Invariably that center is the pinnacle of the rank hierarchy or, as complexity mounts, the pinnacle of a smaller component network within a larger structure.

A classic example of a redistributive economy is that of the cultures of the North Pacific Coast: [Drucker quote starts here.]

Among the Indians of the North Pacific Coast the social units—localized kin groups—were the owners of wealth, not individuals. … major riches such as the lands, houses, and important wealth tokens were group property. Even the objects possessed by the individual were made available to the group in case of necessity. Though the highest-ranking member of each group spoke of himself, or was spoken of by others, as the ‘owner’ of his group’s house or houses, its real estate, and most of its treasures, he was the administrator of his group’s possessions, not an individual owner (Drucker, 1965, p. 50).”

118: “It is the carrying out of large-scale distributions on the way to achieving the status of redistributor that accounts for the often puzzling observation in the past of the impoverished chief. Now we know that such persons were rich for what they dispensed and not for what they hoarded.”

121: “Unlike rank society, which is dominated by the ideology of kinship, band society seems to be dominated by the ideology of coresidence. … Despite the great importance of kinship as the principle of association, there is little uniformity about the precise character of the kinship system. … kinship terminology has little or no diagnostic value as a criterion of egalitarian, rank, or stratified organization.”

127: “Genealogies, unnecessary in a clan, become charters of preferred status in a lineage.”

129-130: “there is little significant division of labor. For the most part everybody does the same tasks. There is the barest beginning of professional specialization …and there is a small but visible tendency to relieve persons of high rank of some or all participation in some phases of work.”

131: “In societies which blend emergent ranking systems with substantial egalitarianism the persons holding the rank positions may be the hardest working people in the system. This is a foreseeable concomitant of the fact that their positions rest upon [their] generosity”.

131-2: “Wealth alone does not a (big man) make; he has to give much of it away”.

133: “In rank society leaders can lead, but followers may not follow. Commands are given, but sometimes they may not be obeyed. … In rank society … there are few if any effective sanctions that can be used to compel compliance.”

137: “The individual of high rank is frequently also of comparable religious standing.”

144-153: What social control exists is very ad hoc and unclear, so that we can’t really say that they have laws.

153: “differences between egalitarian and rank society, although profound in implication, are fairly subtle in the manner in which they are played out …. Many of the institutions remain the same; others are altered only to the slightest degree.”
In a sense what takes place in the move from egalitarian to ranking society is analogous to what some biologists refer to as ‘preadaptation.’ … aggregating minor changes which themselves exert only small visible effects on the status quo but suddenly occupy quite different functional roles when society is transformed. Ranking is like this. Until coupled with stratification it disturbs the old equalitarian order only slightly …. As such its significance is impossible to overestimate.”

“Most rank societies are strongly based on villages. … the largest continuously functional unit and the village tend to be congruent.”

“the village is usually the largest effective social group, and it is the land associated with this group that tends to be the largest expanse which people regard as theirs to have, hold, and struggle over.”

“the gross size of the territory tends to be very much smaller than the enormous ranges within which the simple egalitarians wander and camp. Another concomitant is the sharper bounding of the area believed to be associated with the residential group. … [but this] can be grossly overdone.” There is a lot of fluidity between villages.

“in this Tonga society, as in most rank societies, the concept of title, of legally specific ownership, is absent. A population, with its ranked head, is associated with area but” they have little power to keep out newcomers. “It is worth remarking that Tonga village headmen are described by Colson as leaders whose effectiveness rests upon prestige and authority rather than force and privileged access to sanctions. … ‘the headman cannot allot land, for he possesses none save that which he has cleared himself’ (Colson, 1951, . 119). However, “While some societies handle land tenure matters more or less like the Tonga, other show great variation. … two factors can be discerned to appear in a multitude of guises. The underlying egalitarian economy in rank society drastically limits the power of those in high-ranking status to manage the distribution of usufructory rights to strategic property. Beyond this, however, the ranking system itself not only is one of the templates of local organization but offers a potent means of linking discrete communities.”

“rank societies tend to be combative, that many of them exist in what may be seen as a chronic state of war, and that terror and psychological warfare are common means of maintaining group integrity in the face of competition for survival. … however … most rank societies engage with equal or greater frequency in other intercommunity activities, most notably in feasts, parties, ceremonies, and other events predicated upon organized hospitality. It is in the context of such events that ranking reaches its apogee as the effective organizer of the population.”

“While war is irregular in spacing and concentrates little energy, major intervillage ceremonials are comparatively regular, require long periods of elaborate preparation, and play a significant role in regulating the general economy of participating villages.”

“the military organization of rank societies is but a partial utilization of the pre-existing kin and community structure.” I.e. it’s not the source of rank.

Considers how rank society grew out of egalitarian society. “Rank society grew out of egalitarian society without the conscious awareness of the member of the society in which it occurred”.

“In the move from egalitarian to rank society, the first thing to note is the persistence of the main frame of economic relations. In terms of access to the things necessary to maintain life, equality is retained. Standards of living, even with regard to
items beyond subsistence, are also generally equal. The outstanding differences are essentially based upon varying increments of prestige and upon the hierarchical ordering of status positions.”

184: “rank society is quite durable, but … there are circumstances under which further developments occur which introduce much more fundamental kind of inequality.”

Chp. 5: Stratified Societies

As far as my research is concerned, this whole chapter addresses the question of how individuals lost their ECSO freedom. The author has a very similar concept in mind.

186: “A stratified society is one in which members of the same sex and equivalent age status do not have equal access to the basic resources that sustain life. It seems both convenient and tactically wise to consider the basic resources of a society in an ecological context and therefore to some extent relative rather than absolute.”

187: “our concept of basic resources refers to what might be considered capital rather than consumer goods. Central are the things to which access must exist in order for life to be maintained for the individual. Given these things, or, better, given unrestricted access to those things, anyone can manage his own support, particularly given a domestic division of labor. We are less interested in such actual consumables as food itself, or specific tools, than in the ultimate source of food and the raw materials from which tools are fashioned.”

188-9: “In stratified societies there are impairments in the way of access; they can be exceptionally diverse but can be reduced to two very broad categories: First is total exclusion by virtual of assigning all available usufructs to specific individuals or groups, the latter being composed of members fewer than the total population of society. This condition implies that periodic redistribution of usufructory rights either does not occur or is confined to a portion of the population and not the whole. … A second category of impairment of access arises as a consequence of society size and complexity. … in complex societies … most transactions occur in ways and locations remote from the production of basic subsistence, but in simple societies the problem is one of getting some kind of access to the sources of food. The obtaining of such access requires payments or labor outputs in excess of those required of people with direct access rights. Indeed, it is precisely at this juncture that the economic phenomenon of exploitation is born as the person with impeded rights of access must buy this right with a share of his labor”.

190: “In complex societies … the division of labor is so complex as to have a great portion of the labor force working at specialized tasks far removed from the production of subsistence. Consequently, a major portion of the population in such a society will never act in direct relation to basic resources. Their existence continues to depend entirely on diverting great portions if not the entirety of the returns of their labor to acquiring subsistence goods. … Unlike simple cultures … in a complex civilization it is not possible for individuals to reproduce that culture’s technology, even if granted access to all necessary raw materials.”

196: “If restricted access to basic resources is not a universal characteristic of human societies and if it appeared fairly late in history and at different places at different times, what can be its initiating conditions? … I offer the following as a provisional list:
population pressure; shifts in customary postmarital residence patterns; contraction or
sharp natural alteration of basic resources; shifts in subsistence patterns arising from such
factors as technological change or the impingement of a market system; development of
managerial roles as an aspect of maturation of a social and ceremonial system.”
201: “While the institution of individual private property is of great importance,
particularly in the later evolution of economic and social systems, it is ethnocentric to
view it as the only form of “private” property. In many societies the system of
stratification is couched in terms of unilateral or bilateral core kin groups holding
preferential rights of access to basic resources.”
201-2: “The thesis that stratification is related to demographic density is far from
original. … In Northern Nigeria the practice some fifty or more years ago was for
individuals and families to apply to a “chief” or to a family head for usufructory rights to
land. Such a grant could have been without temporal limit but gave no privilege of
alienation by exchange.

Then in 1921 Meek himself observed: that in crowded areas applicants for land
were inclined to offer, and chiefs to accept, more than the modest presents which
are normally given, not as rent, but as an acknowledgement of the chief’s political
authority, which includes the authority to dispose of vacant lands. In virtue of
these larger payments there was a growing tendency for the occupier to regard his
farm as alienable property (Meek, 1946, pp. 149-50).”
214: “warfare increases in frequency as societies become more complex … warfare
seems to institutionalize stratification only when the social orders of one or more parties
to the warfare are already stratified.”
216: “Rather than war and military roles as being the source of stratification, it seems that
stratification is a provoker of war and an enhancer of military status.”
216: “Slavery, being a form of stratification, cannot be its root or cause. … slavery has
been asserted to exist in societies otherwise described as egalitarian. If so, this might
indicate that slavery was one of the initial forms of stratification.”
224: “Societies that are stratified but lack state institutions are not known to the
ethnographer.”
225-6: “such a picture does not present the emergence of the state as a simple event. The
state forms in embryo in the stratified society, which, by this reasoning, must be one of
the least stable models of organization that has ever existed. … the stratified community,
to maintain itself, must evolve more powerful institutions of political control than ever
were called upon to maintain a system of differential ranking. To be sure many of the
specific institutions are essentially ideological and amount to internalization of norms,
which requires the identification of the unprivileged with such political slogans as ‘the
sanctity of private property’ or ‘the good of the state.’ … the acceptance of such slogans
and the concurrent behavior it induces is invariably backed by a variety of forms of naked
power.”

Chp. 6: the state

229: “a state is better viewed as the complex of institutions by means of which the power
of the society is organized on a basis superior to kinship. Note that all the power available
in a society does not necessarily become pre-empted by the state.”
231: “All contemporary states … are really secondary states; the pristine states perished long ago.”
231-2: “When the pristine state emerges it does so in a political vacuum. That is, there is no other more highly developed state present that might help it toward stateship. A pristine state does not appear as a reaction to colonial pressures.”
232: “It is not the case however, that pristine states grew without company.”
232-5: Given that definition there have been very few pristine states in history, and it’s hard to tell what states were pristine.
238: “It is in the maintenance of internal sovereignty, however, that some of the most fascinating questions about political organization lie. … sovereignty is tied to legitimacy and that in turn requires more than naked power. No state known has ever been devoid of an ideology that consecrated its power and sanctioned its use.”
241: “the appearance of a pristine state in an area frequently precludes further spontaneous pristine development as adjacent societies are forced into secondary molds.”

Gadgil, Drinking Water in Developing Countries

Drinking Water in Developing Countries
Annual Review of Energy and the Environment
Vol. 23: 253-286 (November 1998)
e-mail: ajgadgil@lbl.gov
Ashok Gadgil, Drinking Water in Developing Countries.
ABSTRACT: Safe drinking water remains inaccessible for about 1.1 billion people in the world, and the hourly toll from biological contamination of drinking water is 400 deaths of children (below age 5). This paper reviews the general guidelines for drinking water quality and the scale of the global problem. It reviews the various water disinfection technologies that may be applicable to achieve the desired quality of drinking water in developing countries. It then summarizes financing problems that deter extending access to safe drinking water to the unserved population and identifies feasible policy positions for enhancing availability of drinking water in these countries.

Gardner, … Paliyan


P. 24: adopted nomadic lifestyle to avoid violence from lowland peoples.
93: “The Paliyans’ relatively nonviolent way of life testifies to the effectiveness of their techniques for dealing with interpersonal problems. … one factor in their success may be a tradition of avoiding actions that could compound the conflicts and stresses. Respect for
all must be maintained by those who are at odds and by those participating in solving the problem.”

95-99: Discussion of violence shows no instances of violence escalating to lethal levels.

Gardner “Foragers Pursuit of Individual Autonomy.”


p. 543, ABSTRACT: “Examination of 12 theories about the causes of foragers' individualism, egalitarianism, and social structural simplicity and flexibility reveals complementation of many of their main arguments and the possibility that diverse aspects of the pursuit of individual autonomy are interrelated. Two theories are, therefore, proposed and examined: (i) that some foraging cultures possess an individual-autonomy syndrome and (2) that foragers' pursuit of individual autonomy is multidetermined. Hologeistic cross-cultural comparison provides initial corroboration of the first theory, and preliminary work shows that the second has promise”

543: “Four relatively general theories of foragers' pursuit of individual autonomy all bear upon subsistence economy:

1. The adaptive-child-training theory. Students of cross-cultural comparison have found that, while non-foragers tend to push children toward obedience and responsibility, foragers tend to press for self-reliance, independence, and individual achievement …

2. The nomadic-food-quest theory. Lee and DeVore (1968: 11-12) view foragers' egalitarian, flexible, individualized social life as being shaped by their nomadic food quest, dispersed and variable food resources, avoidance of food storage, and visiting between resource areas. Nomadic procurement of food, for instance, restricts the amount of personal property possible and minimizes interpersonal differences. With "the environment itself... [being] the storehouse" (p. i2), the distribution and supply of food lead to small flexible groups, with visiting and continual redistribution of population among the bands. Individual freedom of movement is allowed, and group fission is a ready way of resolving conflict.”

544: “3. The foraging-mode-of-production theory. Leacock and Lee (1982:7-9) cover a similar set of variables but phrase them in terms of mode of production. They argue that because of collective ownership of means of production, right of reciprocal access to the resources of others, limited accumulation, generalized reciprocity within and between camps, access to the forces of production, and a tempering of individual tool ownership by gift giving and exchange, band-living foragers around the world exhibit certain social and ideological similarities. Their shared features include egalitarianism, "strong anti-authoritarianism," "great respect for individuality," and "marked flexibility in band membership and in living arrangements generally" (1982:7-8). Specific links between mode of production and superstructure are not, however, made clear. …

4. The resource-depletion theory… In most cases the arguments are based on distributions: foragers said to exhibit such characteristics are the ones coping with certain kinds of food quest or culture contact. Eight relatively specific theories deserve review:

5. The storage theory…
6. The collective hunting theory…
7. The avoidance-of-social-disruption theory. Tumbull (1968) offers a partially ecological explanation of the "flux . . . expressed as recurrent fission and fusion which ... may be characteristic of the majority of [hunters and gatherers]" (p. 132). He argues that (day-by-day or seasonal) reconstitution of cooperating groups can serve as a systematic means for averting social disruption in band societies whose environments offer choices of subsistence techniques”.

8. “The marketing theory…”
9. The depopulation-displacement theory. Hickerson (1960), who also considers the impact of external marketing, and then Service (1962) and Deetz (1968) tell us that spatial and social reorganization result from depopulation or displacement in contact settings. Hickerson's point is that it is inaccurate to portray the Chippewa as "endemic individualists" before the middle of the 17th century. …

10. A composite theory…
11. The subordination-dependence theory”
12. The domination-escape theory”

545: “9. The depopulation-displacement theory. Hickerson (1960), who also considers the impact of external marketing, and then Service (1962) and Deetz (1968) tell us that spatial and social reorganization result from depopulation or displacement in contact settings. Hickerson's point is that it is inaccurate to portray the Chippewa as "endemic individualists" before the middle of the 17th century. …

Among foragers and others who are described as pursuing individual autonomy, certain cultural features show up again and again: pressure on children for self-reliance, independence, and individual achievement; individual decision making in matters having to do with family, power, property, ritual, etc.; extreme egalitarianism, including extreme gender egalitarianism;3 techniques for [548] prestige avoidance and social leveling; absence of leaders; what Meillassoux and Woodbum call instantaneous or immediate economic transactions; individual mobility and a corresponding openness and turnover in band membership; resolution of conflict through fission and mobility rather than by violence or appeal to authorities; bilateral social structure; a general tendency toward informal arrangements and individually generated [549] ad hoc structures; and relatively high levels of interpersonal variability in concepts, beliefs, and manner of expression. This is far more than a list of coincidentally shared traits. Many of them can be recognized as probable manifestations of, means for, outcomes of, or (in some cases) perhaps preparation for individualized decision making. What is more, the theorists themselves propose that a number of the traits are intimately related to each other (fig. 2). The product of this second diagrammatic exercise is a theory in its own right: that many of the features commonly found in foraging societies fit together in a veritable "individual-autonomy syndrome." How might such a syndrome arise, and why do there appear to be numerous examples of it in the literature?”

550: “Figure 2 shows that 8 of the 13 features are involved in positive feed-back loops--loops which could drive many of the variables and perhaps the syndrome as a whole toward extreme forms.6 Notably, although egalitarianism is not involved in any of the feedback loops, it is pushed by all of them. …

Western ideological traditions complicate extending the terms "individualistic" and "egalitarian" to band-level societies (Dumont 1966, Morris 1978, Nelson and Olesen
1977), despite the ironic fact that foragers are better able and more likely to exhibit extreme, consistent, uncompromised individualism and egalitarianism than people of Western societies. "Egalitarian" is overly specific, too. "Loose" and "atomistic" have distracting, negative denotations. "Loose"-by which Pelto meant individualistic and elastic-conveys incorrectly the idea that both structure and behavioral controls are lacking. People in "loose" societies may, in fact, be highly self-disciplined. And "atomism," in either its social and economic sense or its psychological sense, suggests to an inappropriate extent a lack of connection between individuals. It conjures up a picture of a kind of system which is only occasionally encountered, one characterized by interpersonal repulsion and alienation; it gives no indication that one more often finds the members of an "atomistic" society exhibiting principled self-reliance within community settings. …

Myers identifies himself as one of several ethnographers trying recently "to fend off the assimilation of 'their' autonomy to 'our' individualism" (1988:276; see also Myers 1986)."

551-2: “Inheritance of movable property (col. 76). Inheritance by children of either sex or both (C) expresses egalitarianism, as does the practice by which "a man's movable … [553] property is destroyed or given away . . . or is otherwise not subject to any rule of inheritance" (0). These are differentiated from inheritance rules and practices which are unilineal or which evidence a bias toward sons.”

555: “To summarize, the 19 associations reported in figure 3 and 2 of the 3 which are not so reported are positive. Although 2 of the + coefficients are near zero and 10 more are quite modest, 9 are between 0.30 and 0.73 and 8 are statistically significant. These associations provide more support for the idea of an individual-autonomy syndrome among foragers than we would expect by chance alone. Though not strongly supported, the theory certainly warrants closer scrutiny.”

558: “Foragers, with their diverse natural settings and contact histories, should vary from society to society in the precise subsets of factors contributing to their seeking individual autonomy and in the weighting of those factors… Enough has been shown for us to deem it a mistake to suggest that the character of foragers must be explicable in terms of one or another of the several most prominent theories of the moment. It is evidently also a mistake to characterize or typify foragers in terms of one pattern. For instance, the individual-autonomy syndrome appears to have a limited distribution; by the measures used here, only 22% of the sample societies possess it and a mere 19% more exhibit two of its three main aspects.”

Gellner, Anthropology and Politics


33-4: “The main consequence of the adoption of food production and storage was the pervasiveness of political domination. A saying is attribute to the prophet Muhammad which affirms that subjection enters the house with the plough. This is profoundly true. The moment there is a [34] surplus and storage, coercion becomes socially inevitable, having previously been optional. A surplus has to be defended. It also has to be divided. No principle of division is either self-justifying or self-enforcing; it has to be enforced by some means and by someone.
This consideration, jointly with the simple principle of preemptive violence … inescapably turns people into rivals. Though violence and coercion were not absent from pre-agrarian society, they were contingent. They were not, so to speak, necessarily built into it. But they are necessarily built into agrarian society, if by this one means a society possessed of a stored surplus”.

178: “Hobbes was quite wrong when he claimed that the condition of pervasive latent war makes life ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’.

179: Ibn Khaldun was closer to the truth when he maintained the very opposite of Hobbes’s position, namely, that anarchy and anarchy alone led to social cohesion.”

209: “The idea that early, or should one rather say stateless man, is a collectivist rather than an anarchist is …widespread … They show Thomas Hobbes to be wrong: the life of pre-state man is not solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Rather, it is gregarious and cohesive, relatively well-off, human and participatory, and with about as good a chance of longevity as that of his centrally governed contemporary.”

**Gintis et al, Zoon Politikon**


327: ABSTRACT: We provide the most up-to-date evidence available in various behavioral fields in support of the hypothesis that the emergence of bipedalism and cooperative breeding in the hominin line—together with environmental developments that made a diet of meat from large animals adaptive as well as cultural innovation in the form of fire and cooking—created a niche for hominins in which there was a high return for coordinated, cooperative scavenging and hunting of large mammals. This was accompanied by an increasing use of wooden spears and lithic points as lethal hunting weapons that transformed human sociopolitical life. The combination of social interdependence and the availability of such weapons in early hominin society undermined the standard social dominance hierarchy of multimale/multifemale primate groups. The successful sociopolitical structure that ultimately replaced the ancestral social dominance hierarchy was an egalitarian political system in which lethal weapons made possible group control of leaders, and group success depended on the ability of leaders to persuade and of followers to contribute to a consensual decision process. The heightened social value of nonauthoritarian leadership entailed enhanced biological fitness for such leadership traits as linguistic facility, ability to form and influence coalitions, and, indeed, hypercognition in general.

327: “Overview
This paper deploys the most up-to-date evidence available in various behavioral fields in support of the hypothesis that the emergence of bipedalism and cooperative breeding in the hominin line—together with environmental developments that made a diet of meat from large animals adaptive as well as cultural innovations in the form of fire, cooking, and lethal weapons—created a niche for hominins in which there was a significant advantage to individuals with the ability to communicate and persuade. These forces added a unique political dimension to human social life that, through gene-culture coevolution, became a human mental capacity intentionally to construct and reconstruct the social order. Homo sapiens became, in the words of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (2002 [350 BC]), a zoon politikon.

Strong social interdependence plus the availability of lethal weapons in early hominin society undermined the standard social dominance hierarchy, based on pure physical prowess, of multimale/multifemale primate groups. The successful political structure that ultimately replaced the ancestral social dominance hierarchy was an egalitarian political system in which the group controlled its leaders. Group success depended on the ability of leaders to persuade and motivate and of followers to submit to a consensual decision process. The heightened social value of nonauthoritarian leadership entailed enhanced biological fitness for such traits as linguistic facility, political ability, and, indeed, human hypercognition itself. This egalitarian political system persisted until cultural changes in the Holocene fostered the accumulation of material wealth, through which it became possible again to sustain a social dominance hierarchy with strong authoritarian leaders.”

332: “The hominin control of fire cannot be accurately dated. We have firm evidence from about 400,000 years ago in Europe (Roebroeks and Villa 2011) and about 800,000 years ago in Israel (Alperson-Afil 2008), but it is likely that this key event had originated in Africa much earlier (Gowlett and Wrangham 2013).

333: “In Africa, behaviorally modern humans could have used long-range projectile weaponry (atlatl darts and arrows) in conflict for at least 50,000 years (Ambrose 2008; Roach et al. 2013; Shea 2006; Wadley et al. 2009; Wilkins et al. 2012; Wynn 2009). The recent hunting evidence includes a Levalloisian spear point embedded in a prey skeleton (Boëda et al. 1999). Group conflict likely accounts for the limited sampling we do have for humans of Pleistocene death-by-projectiles (Keeley 1996; Thorpe 2003), which includes at Grimaldi a child with a point embedded in its spine (27,000–36,000 BP), in the former Czechoslovakia weapons traumas and cranial fractures on adult males (24,000–35,000 BP), in Egypt an adult male with a point embedded in his arm (20,000 BP), and a Nubian cemetery where 40% of the interred exhibited weapon traumas (12,000–14,000 BP). Tacon and Chippendale (1994) have documented Australian rock art dating back to 10,000 BP that depicts armed combat, with increasing numbers of combatants by 4000 BP. …

If behaviorally modern human beings have used long-range projectile weapons against prey for at least 50,000 years, doubtless they sometimes turned such weapons against other humans over the same period.”

334: “recent work suggests that the origins of human language are also much older than commonly assumed (Dediu and Levinson 2013), originating in all likelihood more than 700,000 years ago.
Fighting between groups ranges from single revenge killings to careful raids in which safety of the raiders is as important as inflicting damage on the enemy, to intensive warfare with genocidal attacks and face-to-face large-scale battle (Keeley 1996; Kelly 2000; Otterbein 2004).”

335: “All contemporary foragers arm themselves with lethal hunting weapons, and at times these weapons are deployed by individuals against within-group adversaries and by the group in executing serious deviants (Boehm 1997; Knauft 1991). Both types of homicide, while rare, are well documented, despite a universally strong ethos that strongly disapproves of killing a group member (Brown 1991). To keep their systems of social cooperation viable, foragers strive to peaceably adjudicate the conflicts in their midst (Boehm 2000).

These moral inhibitions are relaxed when ethnocentrism comes into play. The use of weapons between groups can entail massive casualties when desired cooperative relations among groups fail and conflict gains the upper hand (Wiessner 1977). However, even given a pattern of recurrent ethnocentric fighting between groups, hunter-gatherers may succeed in managing these conflicts (Boehm 2013). While the active management of hostilities is universal within bands, such between-group efforts remain both sporadic and unpredictable. Weapons can make forager bands very dangerous to one another to the point of genocide, and some groups live with such hostilities without trying to curtail them.”

335: “These societies [delayed return systems] exhibit forms of social stratification akin to those in modern societies: social dominance hierarchies in the form of lineages and clans. However, the fossil record suggests that delayed-return human society is a quite recent innovation, appearing some 10,000 years ago, although in ecologically suitable locations, it may have existed earlier (most such locations are now below sea level). Homo sapiens thus evolved predominantly in the context of immediate-return systems.

The important factor in delayed return is not the cognitive capacity for delayed gratification or long-range planning, which certainly existed in immediate-return societies, but rather the availability of cumulable material wealth. Material wealth allows those who seek social dominance to control allies and resources and thereby thwart the capacity of subordinates to disable and kill them. … In fact, the appearance of farming and private property in land led to high levels of political inequality in only a few societies, and states with a monopoly in coercive power emerged only after a millennium of settled agriculture. Nor were early farming societies more economically stratified than hunter-gatherer societies (Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009). The accumulation of material wealth is thus merely a precondition for the reestablishment of social dominance hierarchies. To avoid confusion, we will call societies that lack forms of material wealth accumulation simple rather than immediate-return societies.

Simple societies, Woodburn (1982:434) suggests, are “profoundly egalitarian . . . systematically eliminating distinctions . . . of wealth, of power and of status.” Fried (1967), Service (1975), Knauft (1991), and others likewise comment on the egalitarian character of simple hunter-gatherer societies. The simple versus delayed return dichotomy is somewhat overdrawn, since there is in fact a continuous range of variation between the two archetypes. Many Pleistocene humans used some storage, even if they were nomadic, and they remained strongly egalitarian. The majority of the 58 Late Pleistocene appropriate foraging societies coded by Boehm (2012; see discussion below),
including the !Kung considered by Knauf (1991), are of an intermediate type. What factors are responsible for such unusual egalitarianism? Here, we will argue it is due to the combination of interdependence and ability to punish transgressors.”

The human ecological niche requires food sharing not only daily but also on a longer-term basis because of the occasional injuries or illnesses to which even the best hunter or gatherer may be subjected (Hill et al. 2011; Sugiyama and Chacon 2000). Thus, each individual forager, especially in the immediate-return form of foraging, is utterly dependent on the others in their camp, band, or even wider sharing unit. This strong interdependence dampens the tendency to free ride on others’ efforts and favors strong individual tendencies toward egalitarianism as well as sophisticated fairness norms concerning the division of the spoils (Kaplan and Hill 1985a; Whallon 1989).

Fire and cooking thus coevolved with the emergence of a normative order and social organization based on ethical behavior.

… The second element is that egalitarianism is imposed by the community, creating what Boehm (1999) calls a reverse dominance hierarchy. …

We can regard this phenomenon as an extension of the leveling coalitions seen among primate males (Pandit and van Schaik 2003). Female chimpanzees in captivity act collectively to neutralize alpha male bullies (de Waal 1996), and wild chimpanzees form large coalitions to banish, badly wound, or even kill high-ranking males. Bonobos in the wild have been observed to behave similarly. By comparison with humans, however, leveling coalitions among primes are limited to the genus Pan and generally quite small.”

Reverse dominance hierarchy is documented by Boehm, who located 339 detailed ethnographic studies of hunter-gatherers, 150 of which are simple hunter-gatherer societies. He coded 50 of these societies from around the world. He calls these simple hunter-gather societies Late Pleistocene appropriate (LPA). Despite the fact that these societies have faced highly variable ecological conditions, Boehm finds that their social organization follows the pattern suggested by Woodburn (1982) and elaborated by Boehm (1997). The LPAs exhibit reverse dominance hierarchy and subscribe to a common human social morality. This morality operates through internalized norms, so that individuals act prosocially because they value moral behavior for its own sake and would feel socially uncomfortable behaving otherwise.

How do we explain this unique pattern of sociopolitical organization? Woodburn attributes this to humans’ access to lethal weapons that neutralize a social dominance hierarchy based on coercion.”

According to our best evidence, the hunter-gatherer societies that defined human existence until some 10,000 years ago also were involved in widespread communal and cooperative child rearing (Hrdy 1999, 2000, 2009) and hunting (Boehm 1999, 2012; Bowles and Gintis 2011; Boyd and Silk 2002), thus tightening the bonds of sociality in the human group and increasing the social costs of free-riding behavior.

Nonhuman primates never developed weapons capable of definitively controlling a dominant male. … (1996) Wrangham and Peterson recount several instances where even three or four male chimpanzees viciously and relentlessly attack a male for 20 minutes without succeeding in killing him (but see Watts et al. 2006). …

The human lifestyle, unlike that of chimpanzees, requires many collective decisions, such as when and where to move camp and which alliances to sustain or cut.
This lifestyle thus requires a complex sociopolitical decision-making structure and a sophisticated normative order. Many researchers incorrectly equate dominance—as found among chimpanzees—with leadership. …

Capable leadership in the absence of a social dominance hierarchy in egalitarian human societies is of critical importance to their success. However, despite their exceptionally generous treatment of band members, human leaders are granted by their superior position—and with the support of their followers—with certain material benefits and fitness (Price and Van Vugt 2014), such as multiple wives. Leadership, as we have seen, is based not on physical prowess and coercion but rather on the capacity to motivate and persuade. …

It is important not to confuse reverse dominance hierarchy—which is based on a predisposition to reject being dominated—with a specific predisposition for egalitarian outcomes. Rather, persuasion and influence become a new basis for social dominance (Clutton-Brock 2009), which tends to be no less powerful for its subtlety. Wiessner observes that successful small-scale societies “encourage the capable to excel and achieve higher status on the condition that they continue to provide benefits to the group. In no egalitarian institutions can the capable infringe on the autonomy of others, appropriate their labor, or tell them what to do” (2006:198). …

337: “While there are clear behavioral patterns in nonhuman primates that serve as the basis for human reverse dominance hierarchy, all multimale/multifemale nonhuman primate societies are in fact based on strongly expressed social dominance hierarchies.”

338: “We hypothesize that, following the development of lethal weapons and the suppression of dominance hierarchies based on physical prowess, successful hominin and human social bands came to value individuals who could command prestige by virtue of their persuasive capacities. While it was by no means necessary that this behavior emerge from the collapse of a social dominance hierarchy based on force, it did in fact emerge in the human line, and no other solution to the problem of leadership has been observed in the primate order.

The human egalitarian solution emerged in the context of bands insisting that their leaders behave with modesty, generosity, and fairness (Boehm 1993). A sagacious and effective leader will attempt to parley his important social position into material and fitness benefits but not so much as to induce followers to replace him with a less demanding leader. Persuasion was the name of the game, and excessive exercise of power would reverse the leader’s fortunes. Persuasion depends on clear logic, analytical abilities, a high degree of social cognition (knowing how to form coalitions and motivate others), and linguistic facility (Plourde 2010). … In short, 2 million years of evolution of hyper-cooperative multifamily groups that deployed lethal weapons to hold down hierarchy gave rise to the particular cognitive and sociopolitical qualities of Homo sapiens. …

… Our reading of the evidence suggests that human hypercognition, despite the extreme energy costs of maintaining a large brain, was fitness enhancing because of increased cognitive and linguistic ability, which entailed heightened egalitarian leadership qualities. These leadership qualities increased the fitness of band members, who responded by ceding enhanced fitness benefits to leaders (Price and Van Vugt 2014).”
340: “The hominin niche increasingly required sophisticated coordination of collective meat procurement, the occasional but critical reliance on resources produced by others, a complementary willingness to provide others with resources, and procedures for the fair sharing of meat and collective duties. The availability of lethal weapons in early hominin society could have helped to stabilize this system because it undermined the tendencies of dominants to exploit others in society. Thus, two successful sociopolitical structures arose to enhance the flexibility and efficiency of social cooperation in humans and likely their hominin ancestors. The first was the reverse dominance hierarchy, which required a brain large enough to enable a band’s rank and file to create effective coalitions that could definitively put an end to alpha male hegemony and replace this with a lasting egalitarian order. Leaders were kept weak, and their reproductive success depended on an ability to persuade and motivate, coupled with the rank-and-file ability to reach a consensus with such leadership. The second was cooperative childrearing and hunting, which provided a strong psychological predisposition toward prosociality and favored internalized norms of fairness. This system persisted until cultural changes in the later Holocene fostered material wealth accumulation, through which it became once again possible to sustain a social dominance hierarchy based on coercion.

This scenario has important implications for political theory and social policy because it suggests that humans are predisposed to seek individual dominance when this is not excessively costly and also to form coalitions to depose pretenders to power. Moreover, humans are much more capable of forming large, powerful, and sustainable coalitions than other primates because of our enhanced cooperative psychological propensities. Such coalitions also served to reinforce the moral order as well as to promote cooperation in hunting, warding off predators, and raiding other human bands. This implies that many forms of sociopolitical organization are compatible with the particular human amalgam of hierarchical and anti-hierarchical predispositions that can result in either independent egalitarian bands or well-amalgamated large societies.

In particular, this implies that there is no inevitable triumph of liberal democratic over despotic political hierarchies. The open society will always be threatened by the forces of despotism, and a technology could easily arise that irremediably places democracy on the defensive. The future of politics in our species, in the absence of concerted emancipatory collective action, could well be something akin to George Orwell’s 1984 or Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. However, humans appear constitutionally indisposed to accept a social dominance hierarchy based on coercion unless the coercive mechanism and its associated social processes can be culturally legitimated. It is somewhat encouraging that such legitimation is difficult except in a few well-known ways based on patriarchy, popular religion, or principles of liberal democracy.”

Goldschmidt, Ethics and the Structure of Society

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506: “the present paper brings data from the culture of Northwest California, a culture which reflects in surprising degree certain structural and ethical characteristics of emergent capitalistic Europe. This was the culture of the Yurok, Hupa, Karok and some of their neighbors”. The existence of these patterns among a primitive people has in itself important implications for the assumptions as to the inherent differences of primitive and industrial societies.

507: “The structure of Northwest California society may be briefly stated. On the economic side there are the following: The universal application of the concept of property, privately and individually held; the use of money as a universal means of exchange; the existence of wealth and its accumulation for purposes of prestige. On the social side these characteristics are paramount; The organization of the tribe into villages and households; the general but not universal patrilineal descent; absence of clans or any other inalienable group affiliations; absence of any vested authoritarian position, and the maintenance of power through control of wealth with social stratification not clearly marked into classes, but of overweening importance.”

507: “All property, whether natural resources, money, or items of wealth, are privately (and for the most part individually) owned. By resource property is meant fishing, hunting and gathering grounds. Like no other hunting-gathering people of which I have knowledge (and very few primitive peoples generally), these resources are held as private property by individuals for their own use and control, and not in trust or as titular head for some larger group. This ownership was individual. The sharp definition of title includes such considerations as:

(1) The separation of title to separate types of products such as right to stranded Whales along a specified segment of seacoast; or the right to the flippers off all sealions that are killed by hunters along a section of coastline.”

508: “Ownership was complete, with free right of alienation. … Where private property is recognized among primitive peoples, its importance is frequently vitiated by the mandatory generosity with respect to goods. Not so among the Northwest Californians. Generosity with food is expected as a general thing, but not to the impairment of one's own interests.”

509: “in Northwest California money buys everything—wealth, resources, food, honor, and wives.”

509: “The third category of property is wealth-goods which served as the recognized goal of the individual, the possession of which marked his social position." Wealth consisted chiefly of paraphernalia used in one or another of the religious ceremonials of the people.”

509: “Though there were functioning social groups to which each person belonged, and though status distinctions were of greatest importance, still the most significant characteristic of the structure was the general absence of preordained group membership and ascribed social position." All social affiliation contained a measure of individual consent, and all social position a measure of personal achievement. Groups to which the individual was attached included the family or household unit, the sweathouse group, the village, and the tribe.”
510: “a person might break with his family without social disapproval. … This does not mean that the family was unimportant or that family ties were loosely regarded (the contrary is clearly the case), but only that there was a measure of personal consent and lack of pre-ordained identification even in this basic institution.”
511: “Though persons were identified by their village of residence and their tribe of origin, neither of these groups had any direct claim upon the action of the individual; there was no village nor national government, no village or tribal action in wars. Significantly, the affiliation could effectively be broken by moving to a distance”
511: “Bastards had no social standing by virtue of their illegitimacy. Slaves were held, but their position was not quite so hopeless. … Thus class position was not entirely open.

But in Yurok and Hupa theory it was open. Myths contain repeatedly the element of movement from poverty to riches.” The youth is told that he can achieve by proper effort.”
512: “authority rested in large measure with the strong, and that this strength was fiscal strength.”
513: “The capitalist structure of the society may be summarized as follows: a system in which the individual was placed chiefly by personal acquisition of wealth which in theory was freely attainable by all, with both status and power resting upon the ownership of property.”
514: “poverty was not found here.”

Gowdy: Limited wants, unlimited means

TULANE: GN 388 .L55 1998

Burch: The future of hunter-gatherer research.


Roscoe says on p. 158, “Burch (1998:201) has noted as a pressing practical issue that there are “few if any societies of foragers left in the world that have not been profoundly affected by, and to some extent integrated into, much larger-scale systems.” As a result, “hunter-gatherer research may soon become historically oriented rather than field oriented.””
201: “Research on foraging societies is likely to be very different in the next quarter century than it was in the last, and hunter-gatherer studies may cease to exist as a distinct specialty within sociocultural anthropology.
201-202: “there are few if any societies of foragers left in the world that have not been profoundly affected by, and to some extent integrated into, much larger-
scale systems (Peterson 1991a, 1991b). In short, the very subject matter of our investigations is disappearing.”
211: “there is too much variation within the class of hunter-gatherer societies to make it a useful category for theoretical purposes.”

Leacock: Women’s Status in Egalitarian Society: Implications for Social Evolution

139: “I shall attempt to show that … their egalitarianism applied as fully to women as to men.”
140: “Women were autonomous in egalitarian society … they held decision-making power over their own lives and activities to the same extent that men did over theirs”
141: “the control women exercised over their own lives and activities is widely, if not fully, accepted as ethnographic fact. However, assumptions of a somehow lower status and deferential stance toward ‘dominant’ men are made by most writers on the subject. The very existence of different roles for females and males is seen as sufficient explanation, given women’s responsibility for childbearing and suckling. The possibility that women and men could be ‘separate but equal’ is seldom considered”.
142-3: “Among foraging peoples, seasonal patterns of aggregation and dispersal vary according to the ecological features of different areas and the specific technologies employed to exploit them …. However, that aggregates of several families operate as basic social-economic units which coalesce with and separate from other such units remains constant. These aggregates are highly flexible.”
143: “What is hard to grasp about the structure of the egalitarian band is that leadership as we conceive it is not merely ‘weak’ or ‘incipient,’ as is commonly stated, but irrelevant …. The Fact that consensus, freely arrived at, within and among multifamily units was both essential to everyday living and possible has implications that we do not usually confront. Individual autonomy was a necessity, and autonomy as a valued principle persists to a striking degree among the descendants of hunter/gatherers. … I suggest that personal autonomy was concomitant with the direct dependence of each individual on the group as a whole. Decision making in this context calls for concepts other than ours of leader and led, dominant and deferent, no matter how loosely these are seen to apply.”
144: Food was shared equally. “there was no differential access to resources through private land ownership and no specialization of labor beyond that by sex … the direct relation between production and consumption was intimately connected with the dispersal of authority. Unless some form of control over resources enables persons with authority to withhold them from others, authority
is not authority as we know it. Individual prestige and influence must continually validate themselves in daily life, through the wisdom and ability to contribute to group well-being.”

144: “The basic principle of egalitarian band society was that people made decisions about the activities for which they were responsible. Consensus was reached within whatever group would be carrying out a collective activity. Infringements on the rights of other were negotiated by the parties concerned.”

144: “The dispersal of authority in band societies means that the public-private or jural-familial dichotomy, so important in hierarchically organized society, is not relevant.”

145: “nothing in the structure of egalitarian band societies necessitated special deference to men. There were no economic and social liabilities that bound women to be more sensitive to men’s needs and feelings than vice versa. This was even true in hunting societies, where women did not furnish a major share of the food.” Evidence from the Montagnais-Naskapi of the Labrador Peninsula. A 17th Century colonial observer “expressed his disapproval of the fact that men had no apparent inclination to make their wives ‘obey’.

145: “Women did some individual hunting … and they participated in hunting drives that were often of great importance. Men did a lot of non-hunting. Warfare was minimal to nonexistent. The association of hunting, war, and masculine assertiveness is not found among hunter/gatherers expect, in a limited way, in Australia. Instead, it characterizes horticultural societies in certain areas, notably Melanesia and the Amazon lowlands.”

147: Deals very briefly with domestic violence. Notes that women often fought back.

147: They had no distinction between paid out-side work and unpaid household chores.

148: “Despite this evidence, relative male dominance and female deference is a constant theme in the ethnographic record.”

Graeber: Toward Anarchist Anthropology


Skimmed this short, 103-page book. It wasn’t that useful for my project. It was more of a political treatise than a book of academic anthropology of any kind, but it was interesting, and it had some useful tidbits:

10-11: “a fundamental misconception: that imagining better worlds was itself the problem. Stalinists and their ilk did not kill because they dreamed great dreams … but because they mistook their dreams for scientific [11] certainties. This led them to feel they had a right to impose their visions through a machinery of violence. Anarchists are proposing nothing of the sort, on other count.”

53-4: “In fact we know almost nothing about life in the Paleolithic, other than the sort of thing that can be gleaned from studying very old skulls (i.e., in the
Paleolithic people had much better teeth; the also died much more frequently from traumatic head wounds). But what we can see in the more recent ethnographic records is endless variety. These were hunter-gatherer societies with nobles and slaves, there are agrarian societies that are fiercely egalitarian.”

75: “what, precisely, are the possible dimensions of non-alienated experience? How might its modalities be catalogued, or considered? Any anarchist anthropology worth its salt would have to pay particular attention to this question because this is precisely what all those punks, hippies, and activists of every stripe most look to anthropology to learn. It’s the anthropologists, so terrified of being accused of romanticizing the societies they study that they refuse to even suggest there might be an answer, who leave them no recourse but to fall into the arms of the real romanticizers.”

96: “While anthropologists are, effectively, sitting on a vast archive of human experience, of social and political experiments no one else really knows about, that very body of comparative ethnography is seen as something shameful. As I mentioned, it is treated not as the common heritage of humankind, but as our dirty little secret.”

97: “It is, for example, the only discipline in a position to make generalizations about humanity as a whole—since it is the only discipline that actually takes all of humanity into account, and is familiar with all the anomalous cases. … Yet it resolutely refuses to do so.”

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**Graeber: Modes of Production**

IN ARTICLES FOLDER

“I've made the argument that wage labor is rooted in slavery extensively in the past-see e.g., Graeber 2006.”

62: “Observation 1: The concept of the ‘mode of production’ was distinctly under-formulated”

64: “Observation 2: The concept of the ‘mode of production’ largely dissolved when removed from the framework of the state”

66: Observation 3: The main result of the eclipse of the mode of production concept has been a naturalization of capitalism; this becomes particularly evident when looking at the way ‘Continuationists’ treat wage labor and slavery

69: Thesis 1: The key mistake of the mode of production model was to define ‘production’ simply as the production of material objects; any adequate theory of ‘production’ would have to give at least equal place to the production of people and social relations

71: Thesis 2: If one applies Marx’s analysis of value in capital to the production of people and social relations, one can more easily see some of the mechanisms which obscure the most important forms of labor that exist in most societies, and the real stakes of human
existence, thus allowing ‘scientific’ observers to reduce human beings to automatons competing over abstractions like ‘wealth’ or ‘power’

76: Thesis 3: One of the great insights of world-systems analysis is to show how very simple forms of social relation most typical of long-distance relations between people who do not know much about each other are continually introjected within those societies to simplify social relations that need not be that way

77: Thesis 4: If one reinterprets a ‘mode of production’ to mean a relation between surplus extraction and the creation of human beings, then it is possible to see industrial capitalism as an introjected form of the slave mode of production, with a structurally analogous relation between workplace and domestic sphere

79-80: We can observe the following traits shared by slavery and capitalism:
(1) Both rely on a separation of the place of social (re)production of the laborforce, and the place where that labor-power is realized in production – in the case of slavery, this is effected by transporting laborers bought or stolen from one society into another one; in capitalism, by separating the domestic sphere (the sphere of social production) from the workplace. In other words, what is effected by physical distance in one is effected by the anonymity of the market in the other.

(2) The transfer is effected through exchanging human powers for money: either by selling workers, or hiring them (essentially, allowing them to rent themselves). (3) One effect of that transfer is ‘social death’, in the sense that the community ties, kinship relations and so forth that shaped the worker are, in principle, supposed to have no relevance in the workplace. This is true in capitalism too, at least in principle: a worker’s ethnic identity, social networks, kin ties and the rest should not have any effect on hiring or how one is treated in the office or shop floor, though of course in reality this isn’t true.

(4) Most critically, the financial transaction in both cases produces abstract labor, which is pure creative potential. This is created by the effects of command. Abstract labor is the sheer power of creation, to do anything at all. Everyone might be said to control abstract labor in their own person, but in order to extend it further, one has to place others in a position where they will be effectively an extension of one’s will, completely at one’s orders. Slavery, military service and various forms of corvée are the main forms in which this has manifested itself historically. Obviously, this too is something of an unrealized ideal: this is in fact precisely the area of most labor struggle. But it’s worthy of note that feudalism (or manorialism if you prefer) tends towards exactly the opposite principle: the duties owed by liege to lord were very specific and intricately mapped out.

(5) A constant ideological accompaniment of this sort of arrangement is an ideology of freedom. As Moses Finley first pointed out (1980), most societies take it for granted that no human is completely free or completely dependent, rather, all have different degrees of rights and obligations. The modern ideal of political liberty, in fact, has historically tended to emerge from societies with extreme forms of chattel slavery (Pericles’ Athens, Jefferson’s Virginia), essentially as a point of contrast. Medieval jurists, for example, assumed every right was someone else’s obligation and vice versa; the modern doctrine of liberty as a property of humans one could possess was developed precisely in Lisbon and Antwerp, the cities that were at the center of the slave trade at the time; and the most common objection to this new notion of liberty at the time was that if one owns one’s freedom, it should then also be possible to sell it (Tuck, 1979). Hence the doctrine of personal liberty – outside the workplace – or even [80] the notion of freedom of contract,
that one so often encounters in societies dominated by wage labor, does not really mean we are dealing with a fundamentally different sort of system. It means we are dealing with a transformation. We are dealing with the same terms, differently arranged, so that rather than one class of people being able to imagine themselves as absolutely ‘free’ because others are absolutely unfree, we have the same individuals moving back and forth between these two positions over the course of the week and working day.

81: Thesis 5: Capitalism’s unlimited demand for growth and profit is related to the transcendent abstraction of the corporate form. In any society, the dominant forms are considered transcendent from reality in much the way value forms tend to be and when these transcendent forms encounter ‘material’ reality, their demands are absolute.

**Graeber: Debt**


21: “A history of debt, then, is thus necessarily a history of money-and the easiest way to understand the role that debt has played in human society is simply to follow the forms that money has taken, and the way money has been used, across the centuries-and the arguments that inevitably ensued about what all this means.”

23: “The story of money for economists always begins with a fantasy world of barter.”

29: “The definitive anthropological work on barter, by Caroline Humphrey, of Cambridge, could not be more definitive in its conclusions: "No example of a barter economy, pure and simple, has ever been described, let alone the emergence from it of money; all available ethnography suggests that there never has been such a thing."” (Chapman 2005. See also Heady 2005)

49-52: what exactly was the point of extracting the gold, stamping one's picture on it, causing it to circulate among one's subjects-and then demanding that those same subjects give it back again?

This does seem a bit of a puzzle. But if money and markets do not emerge spontaneously, it actually makes perfect sense. Because this is the simplest and most efficient way to bring markets into being. Let us take a hypothetical example. Say a king wishes to support a standing army of fifty thousand men. Under ancient or medieval conditions, feeding such a force was an enormous problem-unless they were on the march, one would need to employ almost as many men and animals just to locate, acquire, and transport the necessary provisions. On the other hand, if one simply hands out coins to the soldiers and then demands that every family in the kingdom was obliged to pay one of those coins back to you, one would, in one blow, turn one's entire national economy into a vast machine for the provisioning of soldiers, since now every family, in order to get their hands on the coins, must find some way to contribute to the general effort to provide soldiers with things they want. Markets are brought into existence as a side effect.
This is a bit of a cartoon version, but it is very clear that markets did spring up around ancient armies; one need only take a glance at Kautilya's Arthasasatra, the Sassanian "circle of sovereignty," or the Chinese "Discourses on Salt and Iron" to discover that most ancient rulers spent a great deal of their time thinking about the relation between mines, soldiers, taxes, and food. Most concluded that the creation of markets of this sort was not just convenient for feeding soldiers, but useful in all sorts of ways, since it meant officials no longer had to requisition everything they needed directly from the populace, or figure out a way to produce it on royal estates or royal workshops. In other words, despite the dogged liberal assumption—coming from Smith's legacy—that the existence of states and markets are somehow opposed, the historical record implies that exactly the opposite is the case. Stateless societies tend also to be without markets.

As one might imagine, state theories of money have always been anathema to mainstream economists working in the tradition of Adam Smith. In fact, Chartalism has tended to be seen as a populist underside of economic theory, favored mainly by cranks. The curious thing is that the mainstream economists often ended up actually working for governments and advising such governments to pursue policies much like those the Chartalists described—that is, tax policies designed to create markets where they had not existed before—despite the fact that they were in theory committed to Smith's argument that markets develop spontaneously of their own accord.

This was particularly true in the colonial world. To return to Madagascar for a moment: I have already mentioned that one of the first things that the French general Gallieni, conqueror of Madagascar, did when the conquest of the island was complete in 1901 was to impose a head tax. Not only was this tax quite high, it was also only payable in newly issued Malagasy francs. In other words, Gallieni did indeed print money and then demand that everyone in the country give some of that money back to him. Most striking of all, though, was language he used to describe this tax. It was referred to as the "impôt moralisateur," the "educational" or "moralizing tax." In other words, it was designed to adopt the language of the day to teach the natives the value of work. Since the "educational tax" came due shortly after harvest time, the easiest way for farmers to pay it was to sell a portion of their rice crop to the Chinese or Indian merchants who soon installed themselves in small towns across the country. However, harvest was when the market price of rice was, for obvious reasons, at its lowest; if one sold too much of one's crop, that meant one would not have enough left to feed one's family for the entire year, and thus be forced to buy one's own rice back, on credit, from those same merchants later in the year when prices were much higher. As a result, farmers quickly fell hopelessly into debt (the merchants doubling as loan sharks). The easiest ways to pay back the debt was either to find some kind of cash crop to sell—to start growing coffee, or pineapples—or else to send one's children off to work for wages in the city, or on one of the plantations that French colonists were establishing across the island. The whole project might seem no more than a cynical scheme to squeeze cheap labor out of the peasantry, and it was that, but it was also something more. The colonial government was were also quite explicit (at least in their own internal policy documents), about the need to make sure that peasants had at least some money of their own left over, and to ensure that they became
accustomed to the minor luxuries—parasols, lipstick, cookies—available at the Chinese shops. It was crucial that they develop new tastes, habits, and expectations; that they lay the foundations of a consumer demand that would endure long after the conquerors had left, and keep Madagascar forever tied to France.

Most people are not stupid, and most Malagasy understood exactly what their conquerors were trying to do to them. Some were determined to resist. More than sixty years after the invasion, a French anthropologist, Gerard Althabe, was able to observe villages on the east coast of the island whose inhabitants would dutifully show up at the coffee plantations to earn the money for their poll tax, and then, having paid it, studiously ignore the wares for sale at the local shops and instead turn over any remaining money to lineage elders, who would then use it to buy cattle for sacrifice to their ancestors.19

Many were quite open in saying that they saw themselves as resisting a trap. Still, such defiance rarely lasts forever. Markets did gradually take shape, even in those parts of the island where none had previously existed. With them came the inevitable network of little shops. And by the time I got there, in 1990, a generation after the poll tax had finally been abolished by a revolutionary government, the logic of the market had become so intuitively accepted that even spirit mediums were reciting passages that might as well have come from Adam Smith.

Such examples could be multiplied endlessly. Something like this occurred in just about every part of the world conquered by European arms where markets were not already in place. Rather than discovering barter, they ended up using the very techniques that mainstream economics rejected to bring something like the market into being.”

79: Quotes story from Freuchin 1961: 154 *The Book of the Eskimo*. In the story a successful hunter gives free meat to an unsuccessful one and asks not even for thanks. Graeber quotes the book quoting the hunter, “since we are human we help each other. We don’t like to hear anybody say thanks for that. What I get today you may get tomorrow. Up here we say that by gifts one makes slaves and by whips one makes dogs.” In note 13, p. 402, Graeber writes, “It’s not clear what language this was said in, considering that Inuit did not actually have an institution of slavery. It’s also interesting because the passage would not make sense unless there were some contexts in which fit exchange did operate, and therefore, debts accrued. What the hunter is emphasizing is that it was felt important that this logic did not extend to the basic means of human existence, such as food.”

82: “‘Freedom,’ in the Bible, as in Mesopotamia, came to refer above all to release from the effects of debt.”

84: “On the one hand they are outcries against the market; on the other, they tend to frame their objections in commercial terms—as if to argue that turning human life into a series of transactions is not a very good idea.”

94: “forms of radical equality and radical inequality do exist in the world, that each carries within it its own kind of morality, its own way of thinking and arguing about the rights and wrongs of any given situation, and these moralities are entirely different than that of tit-for-tat exchange. … I will provide a rough-and-ready way to map out the main possibilities, by proposing that there are three main moral principles on which economic
relations can be founded, all of which occur in any human society, and which I will call communism, hierarchy, and exchange.

COMMUNISM

I will define communism here as any human relationship that operates on the principles of ‘from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.’”

95: “‘communism’ is not some magical utopia, and neither does it have anything to do with ownership of the means of production. It is something that exists right now—that exists, to some degree, in any human society, although there has never been one in which everything has been organized in that way, and it would be difficult to imagine how there could be. All of us act like communists a good deal of the time. … Almost everyone follows this principle if they are collaborating on some common project.”

98: “I will call this ‘baseline communism’: the understanding that, unless people consider themselves enemies, if the need is considered great enough, or the cost considered reasonable enough, the principle of ‘from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs’ will be assumed to apply. Of course, different communities apply very different standards.”

99: “The surest way to know that one is in the presence of communistic relations is that not only are no accounts taken, but it would be considered offensive, or simply bizarre, to even consider doing so.”

100: “we are not really dealing with reciprocity here—or at best, only with reciprocity in the broadest sense. What is equal in both sides is the knowledge that the other person would do the same for you, not that they necessarily will. …

166-7: Story of Equiano kidnapped into slavery; several times promised his freedom only to have his owners renege on the offer. [167] “Readers of Equiano’s book are often troubled by one aspect of the story; that for most of his early life, he was not opposed to the institution of slavery. … To be made a slave is to be stripped of any possible honor. Equiano wished above all to regain what had been taken from him. The problem is that honor is, by definition, something that exists in the eyes of others. To be able to recover it, then, a slave must necessarily adopt the rules and standards of the society that surrounds him, and this means that, in practice at least, he cannot absolutely reject the institutions that deprived him of his honor in the first place.”


178: “In the very earliest Sumerian texts, particularly those from roughly 3000 to 2500 BC, women are everywhere. Early histories not only record the names of numerous
female rulers, but make clear that women were well represented among the ranks of doctors, merchants, scribes, and public officials, and generally free to take part in all aspects of public life. One cannot speak of full gender equality: men still outnumbered women in all these areas. Still, one gets the sense of a society not so different than that which prevails in much of the developed world today. Over the course of the next thousand year or so, all this changes. The place of women in civic life erodes; gradually, the more familiar patriarchal pattern takes shape, with its emphasis on chastity and premarital virginity, a weakening an eventually wholesale disappearance of women’s role in government and the liberal professions, and the loss of women’s independent legal status, which renders them wards of their husbands. By the end of the Bronze Age, around 1200 BC, we begin to see large numbers of women sequestered away in harems and (in some places at least), subjected to obligatory veiling.”


198: If Plato’s work testifies to how profoundly the moral confusion introduced by debt has shaped our traditions of thought, Roman Law reveals how much it has shaped even our most familiar institutions.

... Roman law has some to provide the language and conceptual underpinnings of legal and constitutional orders everywhere. ... and it is Roman Law that provides almost all our basic conceptions about contract, obligation, torts, property, and jurisdiction—and, in a broader sense, of citizenship, rights, and liberties on which political life, too, is based.

... Roman law has a few notoriously quirky features ... The most notorious of these is the unique way it defines property. In Roman law, property, or domunium, is a relation between a person and a thing, characterized by absolute power of that person over that thing. ... it’s not clear what it would mean for a human to have a ‘relation’ with an inanimate object. Human beings have relations with one another. ... There’s no need to worry about property rights if no one else is there.

Clearly, then, property is not really a relations between a person and a thing. It’s an understanding or arrangement between people concerning things.”

199: “Roman law does insist that the basic form of property is private property, and that private property is the owner’s absolute power to do anything he wants with his possessions. ... no other tradition makes it [absolute ownership] the very basis of property law—since, after all, doing so made almost all actual law little more than a series of exceptions. ... the notion of absolute property is really derived from slavery.”

201: “the earliest Roman debt law was equally unusual in its harshness, since it allowed creditors to execute insolvent debtors.”

202: “What made Roman slavery so unusual ... was a conjuncture of two factors. One was its very arbitrariness. ... there was no sense that certain people were naturally inferior and therefore destined to be slaves. Instead, slavery was seen as a misfortune that could happen to anyone. ... there was no reason that a slave might not be in very way superior to his or her master: smarter, with a finer sense of morality, better taste, and a greater understanding of philosophy. The master might even be willing to acknowledge this. There was no reason not to, since it had no effect on the relationship, which was simply one of power.

The second was in the absolute nature of this power.”
The most insidious effect of Roman slavery, however, is that through Roman law, it has come to play havoc with our idea of human freedom. The meaning of the Roman word libertas itself changed dramatically over time. As everywhere in the ancient world, to be "free" meant, first and foremost, not to be a slave. Since slavery means above all the annihilation of social ties and the ability to form them, freedom meant the capacity to make and maintain moral commitments to others. The English word "free," for instance, is derived from a German root meaning "friend," since to be free meant to be able to make friends, to keep promises, to live within a community of equals. This is why freed slaves in Rome became citizens: to be free, by definition, meant to be anchored in a civic community, with all the rights and responsibilities that this entailed.

By the second century AD, however, this had begun to change. The jurists gradually redefined libertas until it became almost indistinguishable from the power of the master. It was the right to do absolutely anything, with the exception, again, of all those things one could not do. Actually, in the Digest, the definitions of freedom and slavery appear back to back:

> Freedom is the natural faculty to do whatever one wishes that is not prevented by force or law. Slavery is an institution according to the law of nations whereby one person becomes private property (dominium) of another, contrary to nature.

Medieval commentators immediately noticed the problem here. But wouldn't this mean that everyone is free? After all, even slaves are free to do absolutely anything they're actually permitted to do. To say a slave is free (except insofar as he isn't) is a bit like saying the earth is square (except insofar as it is round), or that the sun is blue (except insofar as it is yellow), or, again, that we have an absolute right to do anything we wish with our chainsaw (except those things that we can't.)

In fact, the definition introduces all sorts of complications. If freedom is natural, then surely slavery is unnatural, but if freedom and slavery are just matters of degree, then, logically, would not all restrictions on freedom be to some degree unnatural? Would not that imply that society, social rules, in fact even property rights, are unnatural as well? This is precisely what many Roman jurists did conclude-that is, when they did venture to comment on such abstract matters, which was only rarely. Originally, human beings lived in a state of nature where all things were held in common; it was war that first divided up the world, and the resultant "law of nations," the common usages of mankind that regulate such matters as conquest, slavery, treaties, and borders, that was first responsible for inequalities of property as well.

This in turn meant that there was no intrinsic difference between private property and political power—at least, insofar as that power was based in violence. As time went on, Roman emperors also began claiming something like dominium, insisting that within their dominions, they had absolute freedom—in fact, that they were not bound by laws.

At the same time, as Roman society shifted from a republic of slave-holders to arrangements that increasingly resembled later feudal Europe, with magnates on their great estates surrounded by dependent peasants, debt servants, and an endless variety of slaves—with whom they could largely do as they pleased. The barbarian invasions that overthrew the empire merely formalized the situation, largely eliminating chattel slavery, but at the same time introducing the notion that the
noble classes were really descendants of the Germanic conquerors, and that the common people were inherently subservient.

Still, even in this new Medieval world, the old Roman concept of freedom remained. Freedom was simply power. When Medieval political theorists spoke of "liberty," they were normally referring to a lord's right to do whatever he wanted within his own domains. This was, again, usually assumed to be not something originally established by agreement, but a mere fact of conquest: one famous English legend holds that when, around 1290, King Edward I asked his lords to produce documents to demonstrate by what right they held their franchises (or "liberties"), the Earl Warenne presented the king only with his rusty sword. Like Roman dominium, it was less a right than a power, and a power exercised first and foremost over people—which is why in the Middle Ages it was common to speak of the "liberty of the gallows," meaning a lord's right to maintain his own private place of execution.

By the time Roman law began to be recovered and modernized in the twelfth century, the term dominium posed a particular problem, since it had come, in ordinary church Latin of the time, to be used equally for "lordship" and "private property." Medieval jurists spent a great deal of time and argument establishing whether there was indeed a difference between the two. It was a particularly thorny problem because, if property rights really were, as the Digest insisted, a form of absolute power, it was very difficult to see how anyone could have it but a king—or even, for certain jurists, God. This is not the place to describe the resulting arguments, but I feel it's important to end here because in a way, it brings us full circle and allows us to understand precisely how Liberals like Adam Smith were able to imagine the world the way they did. This is a tradition that assumes that liberty is essentially the right to do what one likes with one's own property. In fact, not only does it make property a right; it treats rights themselves as a form of property. In a way, this is the greatest paradox of all. We are so used to the idea of "having" rights—that rights are something one can possess—that we rarely think about what this might actually mean. In fact (as Medieval jurists were well aware), one man's right is simply another's obligation. My right to free speech is others' obligation not to punish me for speaking; my right to a trial by a jury of my peers is the responsibility of the government to maintain a system of jury duty. The problem is just the same as it was with property rights: when we are talking about obligations owed by everyone in the entire world, it's difficult to think about it that way. It's much easier to speak of "having" rights and freedoms. Still, if freedom is basically our right to own things, or to treat things as if we own them, then what would it mean to "own" a freedom? Wouldn't it have to mean that our right to own property is itself a form of property? That does seem unnecessarily convoluted. What possible reason would one have to want to define it this way?

Historically, there is a simple—if somewhat disturbing-answer to this. Those who have argued that we are the natural owners of our rights and liberties have been mainly interested in asserting that we should be free to give them away, or even to sell them. Modern ideas of rights and liberties are derived from what, from the time when Jean Gerson, Rector of the University of Paris, began to lay them out around 1400, building on Roman law concepts, came to be known as "natural rights theory." As Richard Tuck, the premier historian of such ideas, has long noted, it is one of the great ironies of history that
this was always a body of theory embraced not by the progressives of that time, but by conservatives. "For a Gersonian, liberty was property and could be exchanged in the same way and in the same terms as any other property"—sold, swapped, loaned, or otherwise voluntarily surrendered. It followed that there could be nothing intrinsically wrong with, say, debt peonage, or even slavery. And this is exactly what natural-rights theorists came to assert. In fact, over the next centuries, these ideas came to be developed above all in Antwerp and Lisbon, cities at the very center of the emerging slave trade. After all, they argued, we don't really know what's going on in the lands behind places like Calabar, but there is no intrinsic reason to assume that the vast majority of the human cargo conveyed to European ships had not sold themselves, or been disposed of by their legal guardians, or lost their liberty in some other perfectly legitimate fashion. No doubt some had not, but abuses will exist in any system. The important thing was that there was nothing inherently unnatural or illegitimate about the idea that freedom could be sold.

Before long, similar arguments came to be employed to justify the absolute power of the state. Thomas Hobbes was the first to really develop this argument in the seventeenth century, but it soon became commonplace. Government was essentially a contract, a kind of business arrangement, whereby citizens had voluntarily given up some of their natural liberties to the sovereign. Finally, similar ideas have become the basis of that most basic, dominant institution of our present economic life: wage labor, which is, effectively, the renting of our freedom in the same way that slavery can be conceived as its sale. It's not only our freedoms that we own; the same logic has come to be applied even to our own bodies, which are treated, in such formulations, as really no different than houses, cars, or furniture. We own ourselves, therefore outsiders have no right to trespass on us. Again, this might seem an innocuous, even a positive notion, but it looks rather different when we take into consideration the Roman tradition of property on which it is based. To say that we own ourselves is, oddly enough, to cast ourselves as both master and slave simultaneously. "We" are both owners (exerciting absolute power over our property), and yet somehow, at the same time, the things being owned (being the object of absolute power). The ancient Roman household, far from having been forgotten in the mists of history, is preserved in our most basic conception of ourselves—and, once again, just as in property law, the result is so strangely incoherent that it spins off into endless paradoxes the moment one tries to figure out what it would actually mean in practice. Just as lawyers have spent a thousand years trying to make sense of Roman property concepts, so have philosophers spent centuries trying to understand how it could be possible for us to have a relation of domination over ourselves. The most popular solution—to say that each of us has something called a "mind" and that this is completely separate from something else, which we can call "the body," and that the first thing holds natural dominion over the second—flies in the face of just about everything we now know about cognitive science. It's obviously untrue, but we continue to hold onto it anyway, for the simple reason that none of our everyday assumptions about property, law, and freedom would make any sense without it.”

210: “Most of our most precious rights and freedoms are a series of exceptions to an overall moral and legal framework that suggests we shouldn't really have them in the first place.
Formal slavery has been eliminated, but (as anyone who works from nine to five can testify) the idea that you can alienate your liberty, at least temporarily, endures. In fact, it determines what most of us have to do for most of our waking hours, except, usually, on weekends. The violence has been largely pushed out of sight. But this is largely because we're no longer able to imagine what a world based on social arrangements that did not require the continual threat of tasers and surveillance cameras would even look like."

212: “It is one of the great ironies of history that modern racism—probably the single greatest evil of our last two centuries—had to be invented largely because Europeans continued to refuse to listen to the arguments of the intellectuals and jurists and did not accept that anyone they believed to be a full and equal human being could ever be justifiably enslaved.”

213: “If we look at Eurasian history over the course of the last five thousand years, what we see is a broad alternation between periods dominated by credit money and periods in which gold and silver come to dominate—that is, those during which at least a large share of transactions were conducted with pieces of valuable metal being passed from hand to hand. Why? The single most important factor would appear to be war. Bullion predominates, above all, in periods of generalized violence. There's a very simple reason for that. Gold and silver coins are distinguished from credit arrangements by one spectacular feature: they can be stolen. A debt is, by definition, a record, as well as a relation of trust. Someone accepting gold or silver in exchange for merchandise, on the other hand, need trust nothing more than the accuracy of the scales, the quality of the metal, and the likelihood that someone else will be willing to accept it.”

215: “The origins of interest will forever remain obscure, since they pre-dated the invention of writing.”

219: “By the time of the New Kingdom (rsso-1070) there is more evidence for markets, but it's only by the time we reach the Iron Age, just before Egypt was absorbed into the Persian empire, that we begin to see evidence for Mesopotamian-style debt crises.”

249: “The ultimate effect was a kind of ideal division of spheres of human activity that endures to this day: on the one hand the market, on the other, religion. To put the matter crudely: if one relegates a certain social space simply to the selfish acquisition of material things, it is almost inevitable that soon someone else will come to set aside another domain in which to preach that, from the perspective of ultimate values, material things are unimportant; that selfishness—or even the self-are illusory, and that to give is better than to receive. If nothing else, it is surely significant that all the Axial Age religions emphasized the importance of charity, a concept that had barely existed before. Pure greed and pure generosity are complementary concepts; neither could really be imagined without the other; both could only arise in institutional contexts that insisted on such pure and single-minded behavior; and both seem to have appeared together wherever impersonal, physical, cash money also appeared on the scene.”

251: “Granted, this is not the way we're used to thinking of the Middle Ages. For most of us, "Medieval" remains a synonym for superstition, intolerance, and oppression. Yet for most of the earth's inhabitants, it could only be seen as an extraordinary improvement over the terrors of the Axial Age.”
"We are used to thinking of such bureaucratic interventions—particularly the monopolies and regulations—as state restriction on the market—owing to the prevailing prejudice that sees markets as quasi-natural phenomena that emerge by themselves, and governments as having no role other than to squelch or siphon from them. I have repeatedly pointed out how mistaken this is, but China provides a particularly striking example. The Confucian state may have been the world's greatest and most enduring bureaucracy, but it actively promoted markets, and as a result, commercial life in China soon became far more sophisticated, and markets more developed, than anywhere else in the world. This despite the fact that Confucian orthodoxy was overtly hostile to merchants and even the profit motive itself. Commercial profit was seen as legitimate only as compensation for the labor that merchants expended in transporting goods from one place to another, but never as fruits of speculation. What this meant in practice was that they were pro-market but anti-capitalist."

"This is important to note because the conventional account tends to represent China's experiment with paper money as a failure, even, for Metallists, proof that "fiat money," backed only by state power, will always eventually collapse.57 This is especially odd, since the centuries when paper money was in use are usually considered the most economically dynamic in Chinese history. Surely, if the United States government was eventually forced to abandon the use of federal reserve notes in 2400 AD, no one would be arguing that this showed that the very idea was always intrinsically unworkable. Nonetheless, the main point I'd like to emphasize here is that terms like "fiat money," however common, are deceptive. Almost all of the new forms of paper money that emerged were not originally created by governments at all; they were simply ways of recognizing and expanding the use of credit instruments that emerged from everyday economic transactions. If it was only China that developed paper money in the Middle Ages, this was largely because only in China was there a government large and powerful enough, but also, sufficiently suspicious of its mercantile classes, to feel it had to take charge of such operations."

"Legally, our notion of the corporation is very much a product of the European High Middle Ages. The legal idea of a corporation as a "fictive person" (persona ficta)—a person who, as Maitland, the great British legal historian, put it, "is immortal, who sues and is sued, who holds lands, has a seal of his own, who makes regulations for those natural persons of whom he is composed"166—was first established in canon law by Pope Innocent IV in 1250 AD, and one of the first kinds of entities it applied to were monasteries—as also to universities, churches, municipalities, and guilds. … while we are used to assuming that there's something natural or inevitable about the existence of corporations, in historical terms, they are actually strange, exotic creatures."

"Under Elizabeth, for example, the punishment for vagrancy (unemployment) was, for first offense, to have one's ears nailed to a pillory; for repeat offenders, death. … consider Adam Smith: It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.68

The bizarre thing here is that, at the time Smith was writing, this simply wasn't true.69 Most English shopkeepers were still carrying out the main part of their business on credit, which meant that customers appealed to their benevolence all the time. Smith could hardly have been unaware of this. Rather, he is drawing a utopian picture. He wants to imagine a world in which everyone used cash, in part because he agreed with the emerging middle-class opinion that the world would be a better place if everyone really did conduct themselves this way, and avoid confusing and potentially corrupting ongoing entanglements. We should all just pay the money, say "please" and "thank you," and leave the store. What's more, he uses this utopian image to make a larger point: that even if all businesses operated like the great commercial companies, with an eye only to self-interest, it wouldn't matter. Even the "natural selfishness and rapacity" of the rich, with all their "vain and insatiable desires" will still, through the logic of the invisible hand, lead to the benefit of all. 345: “It would seem that almost all elements of financial apparatus that we've come to associate with capitalism-central banks, bond markets, short-selling, brokerage houses, speculative bubbles, securitization, annuities- came into being not only before the science of economics (which is perhaps not too surprising), but also before the rise of factories, and wage labor itself.”

346: “Starting from our baseline date of 1700, then, what we see at the dawn of modern capitalism is a gigantic financial apparatus of credit and debt that operates-in practical effect-to pump more and more labor out of just about everyone with whom it comes into contact, and as a result produces an endlessly expanding volume of material goods.”

351-2: “This is a scandal not just because the system occasionally goes haywire, as it did in the Putumayo, but because it plays havoc with our most cherished assumptions about what capitalism really is- particularly that, in its basic nature, capitalism has something to do with freedom. For the capitalists, this means the freedom of the marketplace. For most workers, it means free labor. Marxists have questioned whether wage labor is ultimately free in any sense (since some-one with nothing to sell but his or her body cannot in any sense be considered a genuinely free agent), but they still tend to assume that free wage labor is the basis of capitalism. And the dominant image in the history of capitalism is the English workingman toiling in the factories of the industrial revolution, and this image can be traced forward to Silicon Valley, with a straight line in between. All those millions of slaves and serfs and coolies and debt peons disappear, or if we must speak of them, we write them off as temporary bumps along the road. Like sweatshops, this is assumed to be a stage that industrializing nations had to pass through, just as it is still assumed that all those millions of debt peons and contract laborers and sweatshop workers who still exist, often in the same places, will surely live to see their children become regular wage laborers with health insurance and pensions, and their children, doctors and lawyers and entrepreneurs.

When one looks at the actual history of wage labor, even in countries like England, that picture begins to melt away. In most of Medieval northern Europe, wage labor had been mainly a lifestyle phenomenon. From roughly the age of twelve or fourteen to roughly twenty-eight or thirty, everyone was expected to be employed as a servant in someone else's household-usually on a yearly contract basis, for which they received room,
board, professional training, and usually a wage of some sort—until they accumulated enough resources to marry and set up a household of their own. The first thing that "proletarianization" came to mean was that millions of young men and women across Europe found themselves effectively stuck in a kind of permanent adolescence. Apprentices and journeymen could never become "masters," and thus, never actually grow up. Eventually, many began to give up and marry early—to the great scandal of the moralists, who insisted that the new proletariat were starting families they could not possibly support.

[352]
There is, and has always been, a curious affinity between wage labor and slavery. This is not just because it was slaves on Caribbean sugar plantations who supplied the quick-energy products that powered much of early wage laborers' work; not just because most of the scientific management techniques applied in factories in the industrial revolution can be traced back to those sugar plantations; but also because both the relation between master and slave, and between employer and employee, are in principle impersonal: whether you've been sold or you've simply rented yourself out, the moment money changes hands, who you are is supposed to be unimportant; all that's important is that you are capable of understanding orders and doing what you're told.

[387] "Much of the existing economic literature on credit and banking, when it turns to the kind of larger historical questions treated in this book, strikes me as little more than special pleading. True, earlier figures like Adam Smith and David Ricardo were suspicious of credit systems, but already by the mid-nineteenth century, economists who concerned themselves with such matters were largely in the business of trying to demonstrate that, despite appearances, the banking system really was profoundly democratic. One of the more common arguments was that it was really a way of funneling resources from the "idle rich," who, too unimaginative to do the work of investing their own money, entrusted it to others, to the "industrious poor"—who had the energy and initiative to produce new wealth. This justified the existence of banks, but it also strengthened the hand of populists who demanded easy money policies, protections for debtors, and so on—since, if times were rough, why should the industrious poor, the farmers and artisans and small businessmen, be the ones to suffer?

This gave rise to a second line of argument: that no doubt the rich were the major creditors in the ancient world, but now the situation has been reversed. So Ludwig von Mises, writing in the 1930s, around the time when Keynes was calling for the euthanasia of the rentiers:

Public opinion has always been biased against creditors. It identifies creditors with the idle rich and debtors with the industrious poor. It abhors the former as ruthless exploiters and pities the latter as innocent victims of oppression. It considers government action designed to curtail the claims of the creditors as measures extremely beneficial to the immense majority at the expense of a small minority of hardboiled usurers. It did not notice at all that nineteenth-century capitalist innovations have wholly changed the composition of the classes of creditors and debtors. In the days of Solon the Athenian, of ancient Rome's agrarian laws, and of the Middle Ages, the creditors were by and large the
rich and the debtors the poor. But in this age of bonds and debentures, mortgage banks, saving banks, life insurance policies, and social security benefits, the masses of people with more moderate income are rather themselves creditors.39 Whereas the rich, with their leveraged companies, are now the principal debtors. This is the "democratization of finance" argument and it is nothing new: whenever there are some people calling for the elimination of the class that lives by collecting interest, there will be others to object that this will destroy the livelihood of widows and pensioners. The remarkable thing is that nowadays, defenders of the financial system are often prepared to use both arguments, appealing to one or the other according to the rhetorical convenience of the moment. On the one hand, we have "pundits" like Thomas Friedman, celebrating the fact that "everyone" now owns a piece of Exxon or Mexico, and that rich debtors are therefore answerable to the poor. On the other, Niall Ferguson, author of The Ascent of Money, published in 2009, can still announce as one of his major discoveries that: Poverty is not the result of rapacious financiers exploiting the poor. It has much more to do with the lack of financial institutions, with the absence of banks, not their presence. Only when borrowers have access to efficient credit networks can they escape from the clutches of loan sharks, and only when savers can deposit their money in reliable banks can it be channeled from the idle rich to the industrious poor.40 Such is the state of the conversation in the mainstream literature. My purpose here has been less to engage with it directly than to show how it has consistently encouraged us to ask the wrong questions. Let's take this last paragraph as an illustration. What is Ferguson really saying here? Poverty is caused by a lack of credit. It's only if the industrious poor have access to loans from stable, respectable banks—rather than to loan sharks, or, presumably, credit card companies, or payday loan operations, which now charge loan-shark rates—that they can rise out of poverty. So actually Ferguson is not really concerned with "poverty" at all, just with the poverty of some people, those who are industrious and thus do not deserve to be poor. What about the non-industrious poor? They can go to hell, presumably (quite literally, according to many branches of Christianity). Or maybe their boats will be lifted somewhat by the rising tide. Still, that's clearly incidental. They're undeserving, since they're not industrious, and therefore what happens to them is really beside the point.

For me, this is exactly what's so pernicious about the morality of debt: the way that financial imperatives constantly try to reduce us all, despite ourselves, to the equivalent of pillagers, eyeing the world simply for what can be turned into money—and then tell us that it's only those who are willing to see the world as pillagers who deserve access to the resources required to pursue anything in life other than money. It introduces moral perversions on almost every level. ("Cancel all student loan debt? But that would be unfair to all those people who struggled for years to pay back their student loans!" Let me assure the reader that, as someone who struggled for years to pay back his student loans and finally did so, this argument makes about as much sense as saying it would be "unfair" to a mugging victim not to mug their neighbors too.)

The argument might perhaps make sense if one agreed with the underlying assumption—that work is by definition virtuous, since the ultimate measure of humanity's success as a
species is its ability to increase the overall global output of goods and services by at least 5 percent per year. The problem is that it is becoming increasingly obvious that if we continue along these lines much longer, we're likely to destroy everything. That giant debt machine that has, for the last five centuries, reduced increasing proportions of the world's population to the moral equivalent of conquistadors would appear to be coming up against its social and ecological limits. Capitalism's inveterate propensity to imagine its own destruction has morphed, in the last half-century, into scenarios that threaten to bring the rest of the world down with it. And there's no reason to believe that this propensity is ever going to go away. The real question now is how to ratchet things down a bit, to move toward a society where people can live more by working less. I would like, then, to end by putting in a good word for the nonindustrious poor. At least they aren't hurting anyone. Insofar as the time they are taking time off from work is being spent with friends and family, enjoying and caring for those they love, they're probably improving the world more than we acknowledge. Maybe we should think of them as pioneers of a new economic order that would not share our current one's penchant for self-destruction.

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In this book I have largely avoided making concrete proposals, but let me end with one. It seems to me that we are long overdue for some kind of Biblical-style Jubilee: one that would affect both international debt and consumer debt. It would be salutary not just because it would relieve so much genuine human suffering, but also because it would be our way of reminding ourselves that money is not ineffable, that paying one's debts is not the essence of morality, that all these things are human arrangements and that if democracy is to mean anything, it is the ability to all agree to arrange things in a different way. It is significant, I think, that since Hammurabi, great imperial states have invariably resisted this kind of politics. Athens and Rome established the paradigm: even when confronted with continual debt crises, they insisted on legislating around the edges, softening the impact, eliminating obvious abuses like debt slavery, using the spoils of empire to throw all sorts of extra benefits at their poorer citizens (who, after all, provided the rank and file of their armies), so as to keep them more or less afloat—but all in such a way as never to allow a challenge to the principle of debt itself. The governing class of the United States seems to have taken a remarkably similar approach: eliminating the worst abuses (e.g., debtors' prisons), using the fruits of empire to provide subsidies, visible and otherwise, to the bulk of the population; in more recent years, manipulating currency rates to flood the country with cheap goods from China, but never allowing anyone to question the sacred principle that we must all pay our debts.

At this point, however, the principle has been exposed as a flagrant lie. As it turns out, we don't "all" have to pay our debts. Only some of us do. Nothing would be more important than to wipe the slate clean for everyone, mark a break with our accustomed morality, and start again.

What is a debt, anyway? A debt is just the perversion of a promise. It is a promise corrupted by both math and violence. If freedom (real freedom) is the ability to make friends, then it is also, necessarily, the ability to make real promises. What sorts of promises might genuinely free men and women make to one another? At this point we
can't even say. It's more a question of how we can get to a place that will allow us to find out. And the first step in that journey, in turn, is to accept that in the largest scheme of things, just as no one has the right to tell us our true value, no one has the right to tell us what we truly owe.”

Graeber & Wengrow: How to change the course of Human history

David Graeber David Wengrow, “How to change the course of human history (at least, the part that's already happened).” Eurozine, 2 March 2018

§3. But did we really run headlong for our chains?

“Rousseau himself never claimed the State of Nature really happened. It was all a thought-experiment. In his Discourse on the Origin and the Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind (1754), where most of the story we’ve been telling (and retelling) originates, he wrote:

… the researches, in which we may engage on this occasion, are not to be taken for historical truths, but merely as hypothetical and conditional reasonings, fitter to illustrate the nature of things, than to show their true origin.”

“Rousseau wasn’t a fatalist. What humans make, he believed, they could unmake. We could free ourselves from the chains; it just wasn’t going to be easy.”

4. How the course of (past) history can now change [in full]

So, what has archaeological and anthropological research really taught us, since the time of Rousseau?

Well, the first thing is that asking about the ‘origins of social inequality’ is probably the wrong place to start. True, before the beginning of what’s called the Upper Palaeolithic we really have no idea what most human social life was like. Much of our evidence comprises scattered fragments of worked stone, bone, and a few other durable materials. Different hominin species coexisted; it’s not clear if any ethnographic analogy might apply. Things only begin to come into any kind of focus in the Upper Palaeolithic itself, which begins around 45,000 years ago, and encompasses the peak of glaciation and global cooling (c. 20,000 years ago) known as the Last Glacial Maximum. This last great Ice Age was then followed by the onset of warmer conditions and gradual retreat of the ice sheets, leading to our current geological epoch, the Holocene. More clement conditions followed, creating the stage on which Homo sapiens – having already
colonised much of the Old World – completed its march into the New, reaching the southern shores of the Americas by around 15,000 years ago.

So, what do we actually know about this period of human history? Much of the earliest substantial evidence for human social organisation in the Palaeolithic derives from Europe, where our species became established alongside Homo neanderthalensis, prior to the latter’s extinction around 40,000 BC. (The concentration of data in this part of the world most likely reflects a historical bias of archaeological investigation, rather than anything unusual about Europe itself). At that time, and through the Last Glacial Maximum, the habitable parts of Ice Age Europe looked more like Serengeti Park in Tanzania than any present-day European habitat. South of the ice sheets, between the tundra and the forested shorelines of the Mediterranean, the continent was divided into game-rich valleys and steppe, seasonally traversed by migrating herds of deer, bison, and woolly mammoth. Prehistorians have pointed out for some decades – to little apparent effect – that the human groups inhabiting these environments had nothing in common with those blissfully simple, egalitarian bands of hunter-gatherers, still routinely imagined to be our remote ancestors.

To begin with, there is the undisputed existence of rich burials, extending back in time to the depths of the Ice Age. Some of these, such as the 25,000-year-old graves from Sungir, east of Moscow, have been known for many decades and are justly famous. Felipe Fernández-Armesto, who reviewed Creation of Inequality for The Wall Street Journal,2 expresses his reasonable amazement at their omission: ‘Though they know that the hereditary principle predated agriculture, Mr. Flannery and Ms. Marcus cannot quite shed the Rousseauian illusion that it started with sedentary life. Therefore they depict a world without inherited power until about 15,000 B.C. while ignoring one of the most important archaeological sites for their purpose’. For dug into the permafrost beneath the Palaeolithic settlement at Sungir was the grave of a middle-aged man buried, as Fernández-Armesto observes, with ‘stunning signs of honor: bracelets of polished mammoth-ivory, a diadem or cap of fox’s teeth, and nearly 3,000 laboriously carved and polished ivory beads’. And a few feet away, in an identical grave, ‘lay two children, of about 10 and 13 years respectively, adorned with comparable grave-gifts – including, in the case of the elder, some 5,000 beads as fine as the adult’s (although slightly smaller) and a massive lance carved from ivory’.

Upper Paleolithic burial site at Sungir, Russia. Source: Wiki Commons

Such findings appear to have no significant place in any of the books so far considered. Downplaying them, or reducing them to footnotes, might be more easy to forgive were Sungir an isolated find. It is not. Comparably rich burials are by now attested from Upper Palaeolithic rock shelters and open-air settlements across much of western Eurasia, from the Don to the Dordogne. Among them we find, for example, the 16,000-year-old ‘Lady of Saint-Germain-la-Rivière’, bedecked with ornaments made on the teeth of young stags hunted 300 km away, in the Spanish Basque country; and the burials of the Ligurian coast – as ancient as Sungir – including ‘Il Principe’, a young man whose regalia included a sceptre of exotic flint, elk antler batons, and an ornate headdress of perforated shells and

...
deer teeth. Such findings pose stimulating challenges of interpretation. Is Fernández-Armesto right to say these are proofs of ‘inherited power’? What was the status of such individuals in life?

No less intriguing is the sporadic but compelling evidence for monumental architecture, stretching back to the Last Glacial Maximum. The idea that one could measure ‘monumentality’ in absolute terms is of course as silly as the idea of quantifying Ice Age expenditure in dollars and cents. It is a relative concept, which makes sense only within a particular scale of values and prior experiences. The Pleistocene has no direct equivalents in scale to the Pyramids of Giza or the Roman Colloseum. But it does have buildings that, by the standards of the time, could only have been considered public works, implying sophisticated design and the coordination of labour on an impressive scale. Among them are the startling ‘mammoth houses’, built of hides stretched over a frame of tusks, examples of which – dating to around 15,000 years ago – can be found along a transect of the glacial fringe reaching from modern-day Kraków all the way to Kiev.

Still more astonishing are the stone temples of Göbekli Tepe, excavated over twenty years ago on the Turkish-Syrian border, and still the subject of vociferous scientific debate. Dating to around 11,000 years ago, the very end of the last Ice Age, they comprise at least twenty megalithic enclosures raised high above the now-barren flanks of the Harran Plain. Each was made up of limestone pillars over 5m in height and weighing up to a ton (respectable by Stonehenge standards, and some 6,000 years before it). Almost every pillar at Göbekli Tepe is a remarkable work of art, with relief carvings of menacing animals projecting from the surface, their male genitalia fiercely displayed. Sculpted raptors appear in combination with images of severed human heads. The carvings attest to sculptural skills, no doubt honed in the more pliable medium of wood (once widely available on the foothills of the Taurus Mountains), before being applied to the bedrock of the Harran. Intriguingly, and despite their size, each of these massive structures had a relatively short lifespan, ending with a great feast and the rapid infilling of its walls: hierarchies raised to the sky, only to be swiftly torn down again. And the protagonists in this prehistoric pageant-play of feasting, building, and destruction were, to the best of our knowledge, hunter-foragers, living by wild resources alone.

What, then, are we to make of all of this? One scholarly response has been to abandon the idea of an egalitarian Golden Age entirely, and conclude that rational self-interest and accumulation of power are the enduring forces behind human social development. But this doesn’t really work either. Evidence for institutional inequality in Ice Age societies, whether in the form of grand burials or monumental buildings, is nothing if not sporadic. Burials appear literally centuries, and often hundreds of kilometres, apart. Even if we put this down to the patchiness of the evidence, we still have to ask why the evidence is so patchy: after all, if any of these Ice Age ‘princes’ had behaved anything like, say, Bronze Age princes, we’d also be finding fortifications, storehouses, palaces – all the usual trappings of emergent states. Instead, over tens of thousands of years, we see monuments and magnificent burials, but little else to indicate the growth of ranked societies. Then there are other, even stranger factors, such as the fact that most of the ‘princely’ burials
consist of individuals with striking physical anomalies, who today would be considered giants, hunchbacks, or dwarfs.

A wider look at the archaeological evidence suggests a key to resolving the dilemma. It lies in the seasonal rhythms of prehistoric social life. Most of the Palaeolithic sites discussed so far are associated with evidence for annual or biennial periods of aggregation, linked to the migrations of game herds – whether woolly mammoth, steppe bison, reindeer or (in the case of Göbekli Tepe) gazelle – as well as cyclical fish-runs and nut harvests. At less favourable times of year, at least some of our Ice Age ancestors no doubt really did live and forage in tiny bands. But there is overwhelming evidence to show that at others they congregated en masse within the kind of ‘micro-cities’ found at Dolní Věstonice, in the Moravian basin south of Brno, feasting on a super-abundance of wild resources, engaging in complex rituals, ambitious artistic enterprises, and trading minerals, marine shells, and animal pelts over striking distances. Western European equivalents of these seasonal aggregation sites would be the great rock shelters of the French Périgord and the Cantabrian coast, with their famous paintings and carvings, which similarly formed part of an annual round of congregation and dispersal.

Such seasonal patterns of social life endured, long after the ‘invention of agriculture’ is supposed to have changed everything. New evidence shows that alternations of this kind may be key to understanding the famous Neolithic monuments of Salisbury Plain, and not just in terms of calendric symbolism. Stonehenge, it turns out, was only the latest in a very long sequence of ritual structures, erected in timber as well as stone, as people converged on the plain from remote corners of the British Isles, at significant times of year. Careful excavation has shown that many of these structures – now plausibly interpreted as monuments to the progenitors of powerful Neolithic dynasties – were dismantled just a few generations after their construction. Still more strikingly, this practice of erecting and dismantling grand monuments coincides with a period when the peoples of Britain, having adopted the Neolithic farming economy from continental Europe, appear to have turned their backs on at least one crucial aspect of it, abandoning cereal farming and reverting – around 3300 BC – to the collection of hazelnuts as a staple food source. Keeping their herds of cattle, on which they feasted seasonally at nearby Durrington Walls, the builders of Stonehenge seem likely to have been neither foragers nor farmers, but something in between. And if anything like a royal court did hold sway in the festive season, when they gathered in great numbers, then it could only have dissolved away for most of the year, when the same people scattered back out across the island.

Why are these seasonal variations important? Because they reveal that from the very beginning, human beings were self-consciously experimenting with different social possibilities. Anthropologists describe societies of this sort as possessing a ‘double morphology’. Marcel Mauss, writing in the early twentieth century, observed that the circumpolar Inuit, ‘and likewise many other societies . . . have two social structures, one in summer and one in winter, and that in parallel they have two systems of law and religion’. In the summer months, Inuit dispersed into small patriarchal bands in pursuit of freshwater fish, caribou, and reindeer, each under the authority of a single male elder.
Property was possessively marked and patriarchs exercised coercive, sometimes even tyrannical power over their kin. But in the long winter months, when seals and walrus flocked to the Arctic shore, another social structure entirely took over as Inuit gathered together to build great meeting houses of wood, whale-rib, and stone. Within them, the virtues of equality, altruism, and collective life prevailed; wealth was shared; husbands and wives exchanged partners under the aegis of Sedna, the Goddess of the Seals.

Another example were the indigenous hunter-gatherers of Canada’s Northwest Coast, for whom winter – not summer – was the time when society crystallised into its most unequal form, and spectacularly so. Plank-built palaces sprang to life along the coastlines of British Columbia, with hereditary nobles holding court over commoners and slaves, and hosting the great banquets known as potlatch. Yet these aristocratic courts broke apart for the summer work of the fishing season, reverting to smaller clan formations, still ranked, but with an entirely different and less formal structure. In this case, people actually adopted different names in summer and winter, literally becoming someone else, depending on the time of year.

Perhaps most striking, in terms of political reversals, were the seasonal practices of 19th-century tribal confederacies on the American Great Plains – sometime, or one-time farmers who had adopted a nomadic hunting life. In the late summer, small and highly mobile bands of Cheyenne and Lakota would congregate in large settlements to make logistical preparations for the buffalo hunt. At this most sensitive time of year they appointed a police force that exercised full coercive powers, including the right to imprison, whip, or fine any offender who endangered the proceedings. Yet as the anthropologist Robert Lowie observed, this ‘unequivocal authoritarianism’ operated on a strictly seasonal and temporary basis, giving way to more ‘anarchic’ forms of organisation once the hunting season – and the collective rituals that followed – were complete.

Scholarship does not always advance. Sometimes it slides backwards. A hundred years ago, most anthropologists understood that those who live mainly from wild resources were not, normally, restricted to tiny ‘bands.’ That idea is really a product of the 1960s, when Kalahari Bushmen and Mbuti Pygmies became the preferred image of primordial humanity for TV audiences and researchers alike. As a result we’ve seen a return of evolutionary stages, really not all that different from the tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment: this is what Fukuyama, for instance, is drawing on, when he writes of society evolving steadily from ‘bands’ to ‘tribes’ to ‘chiefdoms,’ then finally, the kind of complex and stratified ‘states’ we live in today – usually defined by their monopoly of ‘the legitimate use of coercive force.’ By this logic, however, the Cheyenne or Lakota would have had to be ‘evolving’ from bands directly to states roughly every November, and then ‘devolving’ back again come spring. Most anthropologists now recognise that these categories are hopelessly inadequate, yet nobody has proposed an alternative way of thinking about world history in the broadest terms.

Quite independently, archaeological evidence suggests that in the highly seasonal environments of the last Ice Age, our remote ancestors were behaving in broadly similar
ways: shifting back and forth between alternative social arrangements, permitting the rise of authoritarian structures during certain times of year, on the proviso that they could not last; on the understanding that no particular social order was ever fixed or immutable. Within the same population, one could live sometimes in what looks, from a distance, like a band, sometimes a tribe, and sometimes a society with many of the features we now identify with states. With such institutional flexibility comes the capacity to step outside the boundaries of any given social structure and reflect; to both make and unmake the political worlds we live in. If nothing else, this explains the ‘princes’ and ‘princesses’ of the last Ice Age, who appear to show up, in such magnificent isolation, like characters in some kind of fairy-tale or costume drama. Maybe they were almost literally so. If they reigned at all, then perhaps it was, like the kings and queens of Stonehenge, just for a season.”

§5. Time for a re-think

“As Claude Lévi-Strauss often pointed out, early Homo sapiens were not just physically the same as modern humans, they were our intellectual peers as well. In fact, most were probably more conscious of society’s potential than people generally are today, switching back and forth between different forms of organization every year. Rather than idling in some primordial innocence, until the genie of inequality was somehow uncorked, our prehistoric ancestors seem to have successfully opened and shut the bottle on a regular basis, confining inequality to ritual costume dramas, constructing gods and kingdoms as they did their monuments, then cheerfully disassembling them once again.

If so, then the real question is not ‘what are the origins of social inequality?”, but, having lived so much of our history moving back and forth between different political systems, ‘how did we get so stuck?’”

“The first bombshell on our list concerns the origins and spread of agriculture. There is no longer any support for the view that it marked a major transition in human societies. In those parts of the world where animals and plants were first domesticated, there actually was no discernible ‘switch’ from Palaeolithic Forager to Neolithic Farmer. The ‘transition’ from living mainly on wild resources to a life based on food production typically took something in the order of three thousand years. While agriculture allowed for the possibility of more unequal concentrations of wealth, in most cases this only began to happen millennia after its inception.”

“In at least some cases, like the Middle East, the first farmers seem to have consciously developed alternative forms of community, to go along with their more labour-intensive way of life. These Neolithic societies look strikingly egalitarian when compared to their hunter-gatherer neighbours, with a dramatic increase in the economic and social importance of women, clearly reflected in their art and ritual life”.

“Another bombshell: ‘civilization’ does not come as a package. The world’s first cities did not just emerge in a handful of locations, together with systems of centralised government and bureaucratic control. In China, for instance, we are now aware that by
2500 BC, settlements of 300 hectares or more existed on the lower reaches of the Yellow River, over a thousand years before the foundation of the earliest (Shang) royal dynasty. On the other side of the Pacific, and at around the same time, ceremonial centres of striking magnitude have been discovered in the valley of Peru’s Río Supe, notably at the site of Caral: enigmatic remains of sunken plazas and monumental platforms, four millennia older than the Inca Empire. Such recent discoveries indicate how little is yet truly known about the distribution and origin of the first cities, and just how much older these cities may be than the systems of authoritarian government and literate administration that were once assumed necessary for their foundation. And in the more established heartlands of urbanisation – Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, the Basin of Mexico – there is mounting evidence that the first cities were organised on self-consciously egalitarian lines, municipal councils retaining significant autonomy from central government. In the first two cases, cities with sophisticated civic infrastructures flourished for over half a millennium with no trace of royal burials or monuments, no standing armies or other means of large-scale coercion, nor any hint of direct bureaucratic control over most citizen’s lives.”

“it is simply not true that ruling classes, once established, cannot be gotten rid of except by general catastrophe. To take just one well-documented example: around 200 AD, the city of Teotihuacan in the Valley of Mexico, with a population of 120,000 (one of the largest in the world at the time), appears to have undergone a profound transformation, turning its back on pyramid-temples and human sacrifice, and reconstructing itself as a vast collection of comfortable villas, all almost exactly the same size. It remained so for perhaps 400 years. Even in Cortés’ day, Central Mexico was still home to cities like Tlaxcala, run by an elected council whose members were periodically whipped by their constituents to remind them who was ultimately in charge.”

“Egalitarian cities, even regional confederacies, are historically quite commonplace. Egalitarian families and households are not. Once the historical verdict is in, we will see that the most painful loss of human freedoms began at the small scale – the level of gender relations, age groups, and domestic servitude – the kind of relationships that contain at once the greatest intimacy and the deepest forms of structural violence.”

Gray, Play as a Foundation for Hunter-Gatherer Social Existence


Downloaded to articles folder. Haven’t read the whole article, but I’ve scanned it for “quit”. I’ve corresponded with the author.
Abstract:
The author offers the thesis that hunter-gatherers promoted, through cultural means, the playful side of their human nature and this made possible their egalitarian, non-autocratic, intensely cooperative ways of living. Hunter-gatherer bands, with their fluid membership, are likened to social-play groups, which people could freely join or leave. Freedom to leave the band sets the stage for the individual autonomy, sharing, and consensual decision making within the band. Hunter-gatherers used humor, deliberately, to maintain equality and stop quarrels. Their means of sharing had gamelike qualities. Their religious beliefs and ceremonies were playful, founded on assumptions of equality, humor, and capriciousness among the deities. They maintained playful attitudes in their hunting, gathering, and other sustenance activities, partly by allowing each person to choose when, how, and how much they would engage in such activities. Children were free to play and explore, and through these activities, they acquired the skills, knowledge, and values of their culture. Play, in other mammals as well as in humans, counteracts tendencies toward dominance, and hunter-gatherers appear to have promoted play quite deliberately for that purpose.

481: “The most basic freedom in play is the freedom to quit. The freedom to quit ensures that all of the players are doing what they want to do. It prevents leaders from enforcing rules that are not agreed upon by all. People who are unhappy will quit, and if too many quit play will end.”

485: “One implication is that players must not dominate or bully other players. People who feel dominated will quit. Another implication is that players must attempt to satisfy the needs and wishes of all the other players, at least sufficiently to keep them from quitting. In this sense, each person, regardless of ability, must be deemed equally worthy. … There will be a tendency for the better players to dominate—to make all the rules, to give orders to others, and so on. However, if they do that, or do it too obviously, the others will quit. So, to the degree that the better players lead, they must learn to do so without dominating, without destroying the other players’ sense of choice.”

486: “Consensus does not mean that everyone has to agree that the new rule is the best possible rule. It only means that everyone consents to the rule; they are happy enough with the rule that they aren’t going to walk away from the game because of it. Often a great deal of discussion and compromise is required to reach such consensus. A simple majority vote would not suffice, because the minority might feel unhappy and quit; and, again, if too many quit, the game is over. …

In sum, the key elements that underlie social relationships and governance in a well-operating social game are voluntary participation, with attendant freedom to quit at any time; allowance for much individual autonomy within the rules of the game; equal treatment of all players, not in the sense of treating them all the same but in the sense of taking their needs equally into account; obligatory sharing of game-related materials; and consensual decision making. Of these characteristics, the first can reasonably be considered to be the most basic. The freedom of each player to quit is what ensures that those who want the game to continue will behave in ways consistent with the remaining four elements. If players were compelled to stay in the game, then the more powerful players could dominate, and the autonomy, equality, sharing, and consensual decision making would be lost.”
Gurven & Kaplan: Longevity among Hunter-Gatherers

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321: “Average worldwide human life expectancy reached 66 years in the first quinquennium of the twenty-first century, with extremes at the country level ranging from 39 years in Zambia to 82 years in Japan (United Nations 2007). Average life expectancy has increased linearly at almost three months per year over the past 160 years, with improvements in sanitation, nutrition, and public health accounting for much of this change (Riley 2001; Oeppen and Vaupel 2003).”

322: “Our conclusion is that there is a characteristic life span for our species, in which mortality decreases sharply from infancy through childhood, followed by a period in which mortality rates remain essentially constant to about age 40 years, after which mortality rises steadily in Gompertz fashion. The modal age of adult death is about seven decades, before which time humans remain vigorous producers, and after which senescence rapidly occurs and people die. We hypothesize that human bodies are designed to function well for about seven decades in the environment in which our species evolved. Mortality rates differ among populations and among periods, especially in risks of violent death. However, those differences are small in a comparative cross-species perspective, and the similarity in mortality profiles of traditional peoples living in varying environments is impressive.

After publishing their life table for Yanomamo Amerindians of Venezuela 30 years ago, Neel and Weiss (1975) made an “appeal to anthropologists...to produce comparable bodies of [demographic] data.” This is our attempt to synthesize the best information about mortality in relatively isolated, small-scale foraging-based populations. The sample of groups used in this analysis is larger than in any other previous study (e.g., Kaplan et al. 2000; Kennedy 2003; Pennington 2001; Gage 1998).”

323: “Our approach is to assess the mortality profiles of all extant hunter-gatherers for which sufficient high-quality demographic data exist.”

326: “In Table 2, we see that on average 57 percent, 64 percent, and 67 percent of children born survive to age 15 years among hunter-gatherers, forager-horticulturalists, and acculturated hunter-gatherers. Of those who reach age 15, 64 percent of traditional hunter-gatherers and 61 percent of forager-horticulturalists reach age 45. The acculturated hunter-gatherers show lower young adult mortality rates, with 79 percent surviving to age 45, conditional on reaching age 15.

All groups show evidence of significant post-reproductive life among women. Mean number of expected years of life, conditional on reaching age 45, is about two decades (20.7, 19.8, and 24.6 for hunter-gatherers, forager-horticulturalists, and acculturated hunter-gatherers).…”
There is some variability among groups. Among traditional hunter-gatherers, the average life expectancy at birth (e0) varies from 21 to 37 years, the proportion surviving to age 45 varies between 26 percent and 43 percent, and life expectancy at age 45 varies from 14 to 24 years (Figure 1; Table 2 and Figure 3).”

327: E0 from the table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>e0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hadza</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ache</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!Kung</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agta</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

331: “The results obtained from these groups are similar to those from Sweden in 1751 (see panel d in Figures 1 and 2), where mean life expectancy was 34 years and e45 was an additional 20 years (Berkeley Mortality Database). For groups living without access to modern health care, public sanitation, immunizations, or adequate and predictable food supply, it seems that still at least one-fourth of the population is likely to live as grandparents for 15–20 years.

332: Chart explanation has life expectancies for various groups:

!Kung e0=36
Hadza e0=34
Hiwi e0=27
Ache e0=37
Tsimane e0=42
Yanomamo e0=40
Sweden 1751–59 e0=34
Prehistoric e0=20
Wild chimps e0=13

333: “The effective end of the human life course under traditional conditions seems to be just after age 70 years.”

334: “The sample of premodern populations shows an average modal adult life span of about 72 years, with a range of 68–78 years”

334: “While many individuals remain healthy and vigorous workers through their 60s, few are in good health and capable of significant work in their 70s, and it is the rare individual who survives to age 80.”

335:

Table 4: Model Ages of Death [audio version leaves out the table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Modal Age at Death</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Percent of adult heaths at modal year</th>
<th>Percent of adult deaths at and above mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hadza</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table: Hunter-Gatherer Mortality Hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Homicide</th>
<th>Warfare</th>
<th>All violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hadza</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanomamo</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ache (forest)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ache (settled)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!Kung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsimane</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiguenga</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory Aborigines</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakairi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gianji</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of all deaths among all groups</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of violent deaths among all groups</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[339-340: “Figure 7 shows the ratio of the average hunter-gatherer mortality hazards to US hazards in 2002. Infant mortality is over 30 times greater among hunter-gatherers, and early child mortality is over 100 times greater than encountered in the United States. Even late childhood mortality is about 80 times greater among hunter-gatherers. Not until the late teens does the relationship flatten, with over a tenfold difference in mortality. This difference is only fivefold by age 50, fourfold by age 60, and threefold by age 70.”]

341: From the table:
“Violence and warfare are variable across groups. Agta, Ache, Yanomamo, and Hiwi suffer from high levels of homicide, affecting adult males disproportionately. Homicide is low among Hadza, Tsimane, and Northern Territory Aborigines. Ache display a very high level of homicide, although much of this is infanticide, child homicide, and a result of skirmishes with rural Paraguayans. Infanticide is fairly high among Ache and Yanomamo, occasional among !Kung and Tsimane, and rare among Hadza.”

“It is usually reported that Paleolithic humans had life expectancies of 15–20 years and that this brief life span persisted over thousands of generations (Cutler 1975; Weiss 1981) until early agriculture less than 10,000 years ago caused appreciable increases to about 25 years. Several prehistoric life tables support this trend, such as those for the Libben site in Ohio (Lovejoy et al. 1977), Indian Knoll in Kentucky (Herrmann and Konigsberg 2002), and Carlston Annis in Kentucky (Mensforth 1990). Gage (1998) has compiled a set of reconstructed prehistoric life tables with similar life expectancies and computed Siler estimates for a composite prehistoric mortality profile. This and most other prehistoric profiles show l50 of 2–9 percent and e45 values of 3–7 years. There is a large paleodemographic literature concerning problems of age estimation in skeletal samples and bias in bone preservation among older individuals (see Buikstra and Konigsberg 1985; Buikstra 1997; Walker, Johnson, and Lambert 1988; Hoppa and Vaupel 2002). Howell (1976) has identified many problems with prehistoric life tables. This literature is too large to discuss here and we direct readers to recent treatments by O’Connell et al. (1999), Kennedy (2003), and Konigsberg and Herrmann (2006).”

“Post-reproductive longevity is a robust feature of hunter-gatherers and of the life cycle of Homo sapiens. Survivorship to grandparental age is achieved by over two-thirds of people who reach sexual maturity and can last an average of 20 years.”

“The average modal age of adult death for hunter-gatherers is 72 with a range of 68–78 years. This range appears to be the closest functional equivalent of an “adaptive” human life span.

Illnesses account for 70 percent, violence and accidents for 20 percent, and degenerative diseases for 9 percent of all deaths in our sample. Illnesses largely include infectious and gastrointestinal disease, although less than half of all deaths in our sample are from contact-related disease.

Comparisons among hunter-gatherers, acculturated hunter-gatherers, wild chimpanzees, and captive chimpanzees illustrate the interaction of improved conditions and species differences. Within species, improved conditions tend to decrease mortality rates at all ages, with a diminishing effect at older ages. …

A fundamental conclusion we draw from this analysis is that extensive longevity appears to be a novel feature of Homo sapiens. Our results contradict Vallois’s (1961: 222) claim that among early humans, “few individuals passed forty years, and it is only quite exceptionally that any passed fifty,” and the more traditional Hobbesian view of a nasty, brutish, and short human life (see also King and Jukes 1969; Weiss 1981). The data show that modal adult life span is 68–78 years, and that it was not uncommon for individuals to reach these ages, suggesting that inferences based on paleodemographic reconstruction are unreliable. One recent study that avoids several common problems of skeletal aging used dental-wear seriation and relative macro-age categories (ratio of old
to young) to demonstrate an increase in the relative presence of older adults from australopithecines to early Homo and, more strikingly, among Upper Paleolithic humans (Caspari and Lee 2004; but see Hawkes and O’Connell 2005). More compellingly, a recent re-estimation of several common paleo-mortality curves based on hazard analysis and maximum likelihood methods shows a life course pattern similar to that of our ethnographic sample (Konigsberg and Herrmann 2006).”

353: “While average life expectancy has changed significantly over recent history, it is an open question whether gains will continue linearly and whether the maximum life span itself will continue to increase (Vaupel 1997; Wilmoth 1998).

One view is that there is a fixed upper limit to the human life span at about 85±6 years (Wood et al. 1994), where the distribution of deaths becomes compressed or “rectangularized” over time as improved medical care and public health increasingly reduce early-age death (Fries 1989; Weiss 1989). An alternative view posits that there is no set limit to the human life span and that improvements in medical care, treatments, and living conditions will continue to produce increases in longevity (Wilmoth 1998). Wood et al. (1994) characterize these two views as gerontological versus epidemiological. …

We suggest that neither view is fully correct and that a hybrid of the two approaches is more productive.”

355: “The ethnographic record of hunter-gatherers includes hundreds of cultures, but only about 50 groups have been studied. The sample of foraging societies presented here does not adequately cover all geographical areas. Only five foraging societies have been explicitly studied using demographic techniques—Hadza of Tanzania (Blurton-Jones, Hawkes, and O’Connell 2002; Blurton-Jones et al. 1992), Dobe !Kung (Howell 1979), Ache of Paraguay (Hill and Hurtado 1996), Agta of Philippines (Early and Headland 1998), and Hiwi of Venezuela (Hill et al. 2007).”

See these references:


1943.” But it has 65 citations on google scholar
SEE ALSO HARDCOPY HIGHLIGHTS (all notes from journal version)
121: “What sometimes has been considered the essence of the property relation in western society, viz., exclusive use, enjoyment and disposition of an object for an unlimited period of time is only one specific constellation of property rights, a limiting case, as it were.”
123: “In all societies, then, property comprises a ‘bundle of rights,’ not a single right, nor an absolute right. These rights may be of different kinds.”
124: “If one simply starts with some vaguely defined notion of ‘ownership’ and inquires in verbal terms alone about it among primitive peoples, and investigation of property as an institution among the does not get very far.”
125-126: “It is an extraordinary fact, and probably one of historical importance from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, that the question who owns property in primitive societies has not only received an undue amount of attention, as compared with the problem of the analysis of the nature and kinds of
rights exercised, but that it has been conceived in terms of such simple alternatives as individual versus communistic ownership. Despite the insistence of contemporary anthropologists that the antithesis is a false one, that ‘communism’ as applied to primitive peoples is a fuzzy term, that as ordinarily used communistic primitive peoples is a fuzzy term, that as ordinarily used communist property rights are not typical of primitive societies and that plenty of evidence for individual [126] ownership exists, there are those who like Seagle, still remain unconvinced.”

126: “Malinowski is a beautiful case in point because he has been unusually explicit in the exposing the difficulties he experience in working through a satisfactory exposition of ownership among the Trobrianders. … His conclusion was that, ‘ownership, therefore, can be defined neither by such words as ‘communism,’ nor ‘individualism,’ nor by reference to ‘joint-stock company’ systems or ‘personal enterprise,’ but by the concrete facts and conditions of use. It is the sum of duties, privileges and mutualities which bind the joint owners to the object and to each other.’ As Hoebel comments, ‘… in this he is very close to the Hohfeldian type of thinking and terminology.’

127: “Rights in land, for example, have been denied to hunting and pastoral peoples …. Recent investigation and analysis, however, indicate that such clear-cut differences simply do not exist. As Herskovits points out, the denial of land ownership among hunters and pastoralists was linked with the pseudo-history of the social evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century. … F. G. Speck was a pioneer in demonstrating that the Algonkian hunters of the North American forests did have property rights in hunting grounds …. Land tenure among hunting peoples in other parts of the world as well as among pastoralists has been subsequently demonstrated.” [cites Herskovits, chp. 12.]

131: Says they have sanctions to protect property outside of a legal system.

132: “The existence of property as a universal social institution, once the empirical facts are taken into account, is not actually challenged by the legal theory.”

132: “Variation in sanctions leads to the general conclusion that different means may be employed in different societies to achieve the same ends. But sanctions of some kind are as universal as property rights themselves.”

134: “If property is a ubiquitous institution it is easy to understand how it was that some eighteenth century thinkers came to include property rights in the general class of ‘natural rights.’”

135: “From a standpoint of our contention that property rights of some kind are in fact not only universal but that they are a basic factor in the structuralization of the role of individuals in relation to basic economic processes, it is significant that eighteenth century thinkers sensed the fundamental importance of property rights, even though their reasoning was along different lines.”
**Hann: property**


112-113: Gluckman’s contribution emphasized the delegation of rights in a political hierarchy. Thus land might be ‘ultimately’ owned by a king (as it is in Great Britain), but the typical African king delegated rights to regional chiefs, who in turn delegated to village headmen. The headman allocated plots to the households of the settlement; each wife might receive her own plot to cultivate, which Gluckman referred to as an ‘estate of production’. It is futile to seek the ‘hierarchy of estates of administration’ for an equivalent to a European private owner. Land tenure was neither perfectly collective nor individual, but mirrored the social structure of the group. In the case of an acephalous group, rights over any land that fell out of use reverted upwards to the group as a whole. The most basic principle in sub-Saharan Africa, where land was not generally very scarce, was that the political authorities were obliged to provide each citizen with as much land as they needed for their subsistence.”

**Hann (ed): property Relations**


**Hann: Intro**


11: “[modern hunter-gatherers cannot be treated as isolated fossils: their contemporary property relations may well be the specific historical product of contracts with more power groups and economic marginalization. Having said this, archeological evidence indicates that the picture of Hadza hunter-gatherers presented in this volume by James Woodburn has some plausibility for the hunter-gatherers of pre-history. Hadza society is characterized not by exclusive territorial rights and well-defined links between persons and specific objects, but by an emphasis upon sharing and social mechanisms to ensure that egalitarianism is maintained. A similar picture has been famously painted by Richard Lee following his fieldwork among the !Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari (1979). James Woodburn rejects Lee’s use of the term ‘primitive communism’ on the grounds that both Hadza and !Kung also have clear notions of individual ownership. However, it does not
follow from this that they can exclude others, for example from a share in the meat of an animal that has been killed.”

11-12: “The egalitarianism of ‘tribal horticulturalists’ … is compatible with pronounced political stratification, in which offices such as that of chief or king may be inherited, and an aristocratic elite may demand deference from the mass of commoners. However, in other respects these societies remain societies of equals: there is comparatively little differentiation in terms of consumption standards, and everyone has the same [12] fundamental entitlement to the resources necessary to earn a livelihood. In practice this means above all the guarantee to each member of the society of sufficient land to meet subsistence needs. … An example is provided in this volume by James Carrier’s description of how land is held on the Melanesian island of Ponam, New Guinea. The most important social unit is the collectivity of the kin group. … However, other things which Ponam Islanders hold may be transcended impersonally as commodities, thereby resembling privately owned commodities in the modern liberal paradigm.”

12: “The popular modern sense of property may be foreshadowed in Roman law, which allowed for the ownership of slaves as private property; but in fact the great bulk of land in the ancient world was farmed by peasant smallholders and transmitted within their communities according to custom. Most historians would argue that the same was true under feudalism. In a formal legal sense the land was ultimately owned by the king, who granted land to lords or ‘tenants-in-chief’ in exchange for services. These in turn granted plots to ‘mesne’ tenants, who might or might not be the actual cultivators. At each level the tenant acknowledged obligations to provide services in return for the rights devolved to him. The peasants had exclusive rights to use particular plots of land and to transmit them to their heirs; but did English villagers of the thirteenth century view their land as a commodity that individuals could own and transact on a market? According to George Homans, the concept of private property in land was not yet a central principle of social organization. Villagers were a ‘social organism’ rather than an arrolement of individuals; they ‘acted as a community not only in the framing of ‘champion’ land and in dealing with the lord of the manor; they acted as a community in many of their dealings …. The land, their principal productive resource, was not yet a focus of exclusive individual ownership claims. Beyond the formal, [13] legal sense in which title lies with a political ruler, the substantive reality remained that land rights were exercised inclusively, according to the custom of the community.”

13: Mentions Alan Macfarlane who sees individual private property beginning as early as the thirteenth century.

13: “Other historians who assign a key wrote to the English in the spread of new forms of property relations all over the world have identified the onset of industrialization in the late eighteenth century as the critical period of change”. This was when the enclosure movement reached its climax, and moral communities lost the last vestiges of their control.

15: “[The chief agents [of the spread of the liberal model of property relations] were those European countries which established colonial empires and refused to recognize the rights of indigenous people where these did not expend labour on the land in the manner approved by Europeans.” He mentions Australia and the U.S. west as examples. “Analogous patterns of conquest were played out in most parts of the European empires.”
15-16: Meek cites the verdict of Lucy Mair of Uganda agreement of 1900: ‘A government which supposed itself to be confirming rights turned Chiefs by a stroke of the pen into landlords entitled to exact rent from their former subjects and to dispose of their land for cash’…. But the alternative course sometimes followed: that of proclaiming the native territories to be common land [16] (understood as open-access land) was no less a misrepresentation of the pre-colonial reality. In most cultivating societies, individuals and families did have exclusive rights to use specific tracts of land, thought very seldom to own them in the sense of English freehold, including the right to alienate.”

16: “The extension of the principle of private ownership continued to the end of the colonial empires and beyond their formal termination. This extension was inseparable from other interventions in tribal and peasant societies, including the introduction of new tax obligations, commercial crops, new forms of money, and possibilities of migration to high commercialized urban environments where the domination of private property was unchallenged. New forms of ownership were often a basic requirement for other social and economic changes, but they were frequently resisted. Jack Good (1980) has documented a case form Northern Ghana where a group of strangers needed to register land as private property …. This registration was resented by members of the local acephalous society, who considered that they were the ultimate owners of the land in question. In their view no individual members of the group had authority to alienate to outsiders. … However, in other cases the new property relations were readily accepted by indigenous communities, or at least by certain enterprising elites.”

16: “no part of the world has entirely escaped the extension of the private property model in the twentieth century.”

24: “By the time European states began to colonize and administer native peoples they did so with one sharp dichotomy uppermost in their thinking: that between collective and private land tenure.”

25-6: “Malinowski stressed the need to move beyond ‘the legal point of view’ and to transcend the ‘false antithesis’ of the individual versus communal dichotomy (1935: 318-19). His discussion of Trobriand land tenure pays careful attention to webs of ideas, [26] ‘mythological foundations’ and kin relations”.

26: “Yet Malinowski was simultaneously so preoccupied with the need to emphasize the individualistic character of Trobriand life that the very dualism he condemned intruded continuously into this analysis. Some of his students were more successful in avoiding this trap. … when [Robert Firth] thought that tribal economies such as the one he studied on the island of Tikopia could be investigated using the concepts of modern Western economies, and that many items of production were held as individual property. However when he came to consider vial resources such as land and canoes he found that ‘individual ownership’ can only be expressed in degrees of responsibility for and enjoyment of the group property’ (1965: 278). Max Gluckman adapted Sir Henry Maine’s definition of ‘estates of administration’ in order to explain how tribal land might be farmed in highly individualist ways … and yet subject to several nesting levels of control and ownership, the details of which would correspond to the social structure of the group. For example among the Bartose, cultivators of fertile mounds in the Zambesi valley, land was allocated on the basis of need by the village headman to household heads. It would revert back to the headman for reallocation when no longer needed by the household. Sometimes land might revert back to a higher level and the Lozi king was
ultimate owner’. This did not give him the right to sell land as a commodity, nor did it qualify his subjects’ entitlements to as much land as they needed (Gluckman 1965a, 1968) [Reference: The Idea of Barotse Jurisprudence and Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property.]

34: “Although theories about primitive communism have been influential in anthropology since the writings of Morgan and Engels, it is only comparatively recently that property concepts and practices in foraging societies have attracted sustained anthropological investigation”.

36: “Carrier [in this volume] argues that some aspects of property relations on the island of Ponam are effectively identical to the exclusive rights of private property in modern Western Societies. Other aspects, however, are very different. The land on this island … is held and used according to a complex pattern determined by kinship”.

39: “The British colonization of Cyprus after 1878 undermined the complex indigenous system of property relations that had developed while the island was part of the Ottoman empire.”

45: “The approaches followed in this volume are wide-ranging, but they have some unifying characteristics. Above all, they show that some very powerful models of property relations [i.e. the liberal and Marxists paradigms] in the modern world are too simplistic.”

46: “The most cogent modern contribution to debates about property to my mind remains that of the political theorist C. B. Macpherson (1962, 1978) who has argued for an updating of liberalism in terms of a ‘new paradigm’, based not on Locke and an individual’s right to exclude others, but on the right not to be excluded from what he terms the ‘means of labour’. The guarantee of access can be understood theoretically as a political problem of democratic control. … Whatever the focus, the concrete empirical nature of modern anthropological research affords a closer understanding of human needs and of the property aspirations of real, flesh and blood individuals. The exact mix of inclusive and exclusive forms will continue to evolve. Calls for a ‘reintegration of the personal’ in contemporary societies may require the strengthening, at some levels, of exclusive links between people and things; but this need not be inconsistent with the call for democratic control at other levels.”

47: “As the ‘thingness’ of property gives way to a broader conception of the entitlements of citizens, it seems likely that there will be more pressure to abandon liberal chimeras and to recognize explicitly that the distribution of property is necessarily a function of the overall political organization. Anthropologists have always understood this and emphasized the interconnectedness of social phenomena. Linking their analyses of the political economy of property “with investigations into culturally specific relationships and values, they are well placed to chart the fusions of our common, post-liberal, post-capitalist futures.”

Woodburn: Sharing not exchange

He argues here that hunter-gatherer sharing, at least those with an “immediate return system” do not view their sharing as a generalized form of exchange. Immediate return means they consume what they have when they have it. Delayed return systems do cache some goods, and therefore have more individualization in property ownership.

48-50: Some reasons we know it’s not some kind of generalized exchange: 1. They know how to dry meat and keep it for months. [49] The don’t, “because they are obliged to share it”. 2. They have limited control over who gets the meat. 3. Generosity is not stressed. 4. “Receiving meat does not bind the recipient to reciprocate. Many men are ineffective hunters because they are lazy or lack the necessary abilities or skills. … Donors tend to remain on balance donors over long periods. Recipients tend to remain on balance recipients over long periods.” 5. “Success in hunting provides little insurance for the future. Donation establishes no significantly greater claim on future yields than would be the case without donation.” [50] “We should not be surprised that shares have to be demanded, as donors drive little advantage form sharing.”

50: “It follows from these basic points that to treat this type of sharing as a form of exchange or reciprocity seriously distorts our understanding of what is going on. Hunter-gatherer meat-sharing is manifestly not directed or balanced exchange or reciprocity. My argument is that to treat such sharing as any form of exchange or reciprocity is inappropriate where donation is obligatory and is disconnected from the right to receive.”

50: “As John Price argued in a pioneer paper (1975: 3-27), sharing is ‘the most universal form of human economic behavior, distinct from and more fundamental than reciprocity’. In the present chapter I seek to develop Price’s insight by analyzing the nature and significance of sharing in some societies in which sharing is particularly stressed in ideology and in practice.”


51: “The notion of single ownership of a kill is very widespread in hunter-gatherer societies, both those with immediate-return systems and those with delayed-return systems …. It is this fact that makes the use of the term ‘donor’ appropriate in this discussion even though in many cases the donor has little influence over who gets the meat.”

52: “Storing meat for later consumption is unacceptable. … Everybody, however undeserving or unpopular, should, and almost always will get their share. But they have to claim it.”

53: “The Hadza do not normally assert rights over land or fixed resources. Access to land and resources is obtained automatically by being born Hadza. People do not inherit rights to any particular region. They tend to be associated with areas with which their parents were associated, but they have no greater rights to live in these areas than anyone else.”

60: “If the rewards for hunting are not great, if hunters have to go through what they may well regard as the unfairness of being dispossessed of most of the meat and being given little public recognition for their skills, why do they bother? … A high proportion of the most successful Hadza hunters are rather solitary people, not much interested in social
rewards. Their reward lies directly in the satisfaction of accomplishing a highly skilled and difficult task. … A successful Hadza hunter may have more chance of entering into a marriage with a woman …. But the solitary disposition of many hunters tends to conflict with success in marriage …. The direct personal satisfaction and sense of achievement derived from successful hunting matter more.”

60: “The obligation to share, and the constant, remorseless pressure put on people to meet this obligation, do depress production. The evidence suggests that people would hunt more if they could derive more personal benefit from the yield of hunting.”

60-61: “What is unique about immediate-return hunter-gatherer systems is that the lack of accumulation and investment and the depression of production can readily be accommodated without in any way threatening people’s health and welfare. As nutritional research in which I participated [61] in the 1960s demonstrated, the nutritional status of the Hadza was exceptionally good by East African standards. It remains good in the 1990s. Access to adequate nutrition is not a problem”.

61: “people are disengaged from property, from the potentiality in property for creating dependency. Disengagement is the right word. The Hadza are keenly aware of the possibility of the property rights that they reject, of the ever-present danger that individuals or groups may succeed in usurping such rights. People have direct access to the resources they need for adequate nutrition unmediated by ties of dependence …. More generally people are systematically deprived of opportunities for differentiating themselves from others and for making others dependent on them by accumulating property.”

61: “hunter-gatherer sharing in immediate-return systems is best seen as a political phenomenon. What it does is to limit profoundly the possible development of inequalities of power, wealth and status (See Woodburn 1982a). Like the rest of us, Hadza men and women are highly conscious of the dangers of dependence and subordination and do their best to avoid them. Unlike the rest of us, they have an economy which permits the realization of a much greater degree of freedom from dependence and subordination than is possible almost anywhere else.”

62: “I have described Hadza meat-sharing as analogous in certain respects to taxation in our own societies. People are in both cases obliged to give up a portion of the yield of their labour. In both cases donation does not define future entitlement. Most welfare benefits in our societies are not linked to prior or to subsequent payment of tax. We, quite rightly, do not think of the redistributive aspects of our taxation systems as being a form of generalized reciprocity or exchange. In spite of the huge differences in scale, and the fact that Hadza meat-sharing is not linked with centralized authority …, it is time that we cognized that they too redistribute. Their transactions are defined more by political pressures than by personal choices.”

63: Modern redistribution and hunter-gatherer redistribution have more in common that people recognize: “Those who provide goods for such sharing or for such redistribution do so, often unenthusiastically, because they have to do so. They are dispossessed of part of what is seen as theirs. They derive little personal advantage from such transactions. Those who receive the benefits regard them as entitlements which do not have to be earned or even acknowledge.”
Anderson: Property as a way of knowing on Evenki lands in Arctic Siberia


65: “local ideas of appropriation have been governed by complex ways of relating to the tundra within what might be described as a sentient ecology. … The intersection of two ways of attending to land created what to the Western eye is a somewhat ambiguous tenure system, but it ensured that every member of the community was entitled to participate in production. Although recent attempts to rationalize and individuate land tenure were nurtured within the old state socialist regime, at the present juncture they represent a radical transformation of social relationships. Thus, it is not surprising that they are experienced by local people as a form of theft.”

82: “this case study of multiple modes of appropriation within a rapidly changing social context supports a broad interpretation of ‘property’ but it also calls for a nuanced study of different categories of the person and of how appropriation is effected. Evenki notions of appropriation suggest that in order to understand the legitimate entitlement of a person to land, one must consider how that person attends to the landscape. A proper Evenki entitlement reflects not only a lifetime of contact within a territory but a proper way of knowing all the sentient persons on that landscape. [recognizing] the agency of other than human persons.”

Carrier Property … Melanesian anthro


86: “Melanesian societies are characterized by an inclusive notion of property, wherein an object is embedded in and reflects durable relationships between those people implicated in its past. This attribute is taken to distinguish Melanesia from the modern West, where property is taken to be exclusive, under the sole control of and associated only with the person who happens to own it at the moment.”

103: “most people in Melanesia are more likely to transact and think about objects in gift terms more often than are most people in the West. However, … Melanesians have commodities and exclusive property just as surely as Westerners have gifts and inclusive property”.

Macfarlane, The mystery of property

most of the great social theorists have seen the development of individualized property relations as the central and decisive factor in the rise of modern civilization and, in particular, capitalism.” Mention Locke’s theory of property as a natural right, and Marx theory that it emerged late.

It thus seems clear that the development of secure private property has had immense consequences. But how and when did it develop?”

as many anthropologists have documented, concepts of highly individualized, absolute property tend to be absent in many tribal societies. [quotes Gluckman, ‘it is too simple to talk of them as marked be either communism or individualism’. … Lowie effectively attacked the idea of ‘primitive communism’, though he admitted that collective ownership was indeed common”.

the development of ploughing seemed to encourage private land ownership as land rather than labor became the scare resource”. Population density also seems to be a factor. Christian leaders pushed for and protected property. Writing also made it possible for people to write down titles.

I have argued that the widespread view that a revolutionary change in property relations took place in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, for the first time creating modern private property, is far too simple.” To some extent the change started as early as the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Wagoner: An unsettled frontier


I trace the history of property relations in a rural South Dakota county, where personal and group identities have been shaped through federal policies that categorized residents by land tenure and race.”

Each group’s ancestors were ‘settled’ here either by federal mandate or invitation, and each is dependent on federal subsidies that bolster an unviable economy. Residents on this unsettled frontier have more in common than they may wish to see, and the history of the region discloses less independence than they care to admit. A deep, though differently articulated, love of the land, is fundamental to group identities and their awkward symbiosis.”

Scott: Cyprus

Article mentions how British colonial policy, to create private property, trampled on more complex, collectivist property rights that had developed in Turkey under the Ottomans. But it’s really about what happened after partition in the 70s.

**Harris: Cannibals and Kings**


This is a popular book by a full professor of Anthropology at Columbia. The citations are all relegated to a special section at the end of the book. Hoppe cites this, “on the private provision of public goods by “big men”. “ pp.104ff, but he doesn’t discuss BIG men on this page and there are no footnotes in the book.

Page x: “Stone age populations lived healthier lives than did most of the people who came immediately after them: during Roman times there was more sickness in the world than ever before, and even in early nineteenth-century England the life expectancy for children was probably not very different from what it was 20,000 years earlier. Moreover, stone age hunters worked fewer hours for their subsistence, than do typical Chinese and Egyptian peasants—or despite their unions, modern-day factory workers. As for amenities such as good food, entertainment, and aesthetic pleasures, early hunters and plant collectors enjoyed luxuries that only the richest of today’s Americans can afford. For two days’ worth of trees, lakes, and clear air, the modern-day executive works five. Nowadays, whole families toil and save for thirty years to gain the privilege of seeing a few square feet of grass outside their windows. And they are the privileged few. Americans say, “Meat makes the meal,” and their diet is rich (some say too rich) in animal proteins, but two-thirds of the people alive today are involuntary vegetarians. In the stone age, everyone maintained a high-protein, low-starch diet. And the meat wasn’t frozen or pumped full of antibiotics and artificial colors.”

9: “The accepted explanation for the transition from band life to farming villages used to go like this: Hunter-collectors had to spend all their time getting enough to eat. They could not produce a ‘surplus above subsistence,’ and so they lived on the edge of extinction in chronic sickness and hunger. Therefore, it was natural for them to want to settle down and live in permanent villages, but the idea of planting seeds never occurred to them. One day an unknown genius decided to drop some seeds in a hole, and soon planting was being done on a regular basis. People no longer had to move about constantly in search of game, and the new leisure gave them time to think. This led to further and more rapid advances in technology and thus more food—a ‘surplus above subsistence’—which eventually made it possible for some people to turn away from farming and become artisans, priests, and rulers.

The first flaw in the assumption that life as exceptionally difficult for our stone age ancestors. Archeological evidence from the upper Paleolithic period—about 30,000 B.C. to 10,000 B.C.—makes it perfectly clear that hunters who lived during those times enjoyed relatively high standards of comfort and security.” He goes on to mention examples of their craftsmanship that have survived.
14: “What is actually known about the physical health of Paleolithic populations? Skeletal remains provide important clues. Using such indices as average height and the number of teeth missing at time of death, J. Lawrence Angel has developed a profile of changing health standards during the last 30,000 years. Angel found that at the beginning of this period adult males averaged 177 centimeters (5’11”) and adult females about 165 centimeters (5’6”). Twenty thousand years later the males grew no taller than the females formerly grew—165 centimeters—whereas the females averaged no more than 153 centimeters (5’0”). Only very recent times have populations once again attained statutes characteristic of the old stone age peoples. American males, for example, averaged 175 centimeters (5’9”) in 1960. Tooth loss shows a similar trend. In 30,000 B.C. adults died with an average of 2.2 teeth missing; in 6500 B.C., with 3.5 missing; during Roman times, with 6.6 missing. Although genetic factors may also enter into these changes, stature and the conditions of teeth and gums are known to be strongly influenced by protein intake, which in turn is predictive of general well-being. Angel concludes that there was a ‘real depression of health’ following the ‘high point’ of the upper Paleolithic period.”

14: Cites evidence of average life expectancy of 28.7 years for females, 33.3 for males, another study with 32.5 for females. “To put these data in proper perspective, according to the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company the life expectancy at birth for non-white males in the United States in 1900 was also 32.5 years.” (Of course much of the cause of low HG life expectancy was infant mortality.)

15: Angel also found that many of these deaths were caused by unnatural causes. “Infanticide during the Paleolithic period could very well be as high as 50 percent—a figure that corresponds to estimates made by Joseph Birdsell … on the basis of data collected among the aboriginal populations of Australia. And an important factor in the short life span of Paleolithic women may very well have been the attempt to induce abortions …. Contemporary hunter-collectors in general lack effective chemical or mechanical means of preventing pregnancy”.

69: “In most band and village societies before the evolution of the state, the average human being enjoyed economic and political freedoms which only a privileged minority enjoy today. Men decided for themselves how long they would work on a particular day, what they would work at—or if they would work at all. Women, too, despite their subordination to men, generally set up their own daily schedules and paced themselves on an individual basis. There were few routines. People did what they had to do, but the where and when of it was not laid out by someone else. No executives, foremen, or bosses stood apart, measuring and counting. No one said how many deer or rabbits you had to catch or how many wild yams you had to dig up. A man might decide it was a good day to string his bow, pile on thatch, look for feathers, or lounge about the camp. A woman might decide to look for grubs, collect firewood, plait a basket, or visit her mother. If the cultures of modern band and village peoples can be relied upon to reveal the past, work got done this way for tens of thousands of years. Moreover, wood for the bow, leaves for the thatch, birds for the feathers, logs for the grubs, fiber for the basket—all were there for everyone to take. Earth, water, plants, and game were communally owned. Every man and woman held title to an equal share of nature. Neither rent, taxes, nor tribute kept people from doing what they wanted to do.
With the rise of the state all of this was swept away. For the past five or six millennia, nine-tenths of all the people who ever lived did so as peasants or as members of some other servile caste or class. With the rise of the state ordinary men seeking to use nature’s bounty had to get someone else’s permission and had to pay for it with taxes, tribute, or extra labor."

70: “In many ways the rise of the state was the descent of the world from freedom to slavery.”

**Hawkes et al—How Much is Enough?**

TULANE: BF 1 .E73


SEE HARDCOPY HIGHLIGHTS. This is the one that says they don’t have limited needs because they optimize.

**Hawkes: Is Meat the Hunter’s Property? Big Game, Ownership, and Explanations of Hunting and Sharing**

TULANE: GN 799 .F6 M43 2001


See hardcopy highlights. Essentially, “no” meat is not the hunter’s property. Big game is treated as a common resource. People hunt to gain reputation so that others will want to camp with them if the band splits.

**Hawkes, et al. Hunting and Nuclear Families**

COPIED TO ARTICLES Could see article


ABSTRACT: Hadza hunter-gatherers display economic and social features usually assumed to indicate the dependence of wives and children on provisioning husbands and fathers. The wives and children of better Hadza hunters have been found to be better-nourished, consistent with the assumption that men hunt to provision their families. Yet, as is common among foragers, the Hadza share meat widely. Analyses of meat-sharing data confirm that little of the meat from large
prey went to the hunter’s own household. These analyses also show that neither a man’s hunting success nor the time he spent hunting made any difference in how much meat his family got from the kills of others. Here we address questions posed by this set of observations. What explains the better nutrition of the children of better hunters if they did not get differential rations of meat? If better hunters got no more meat for their effort and poorer hunters were not punished with less, what incentive could account for the continuing disproportionate contribution that some men made to the group’s nutrition? If women were not dependent on their husband’s hunting success for meat, an obvious incentive for women to marry hunters disappears. We briefly consider the implications of these patterns for the evolution of marriage and nuclear families.

Most of the meat that anyone eats comes from captures made by men in other households. Wide meat sharing makes the successes of all hunters a matter of direct interest to everyone. Both wide sharing and great emphasis on the desirability of meat have long been highlighted by ethnologists (Wiessner 1996)... Many assume that hunters share to provide insurance against the risk of hunting failures, exchanging meat for obligations to repay it later. Quantitative observations in some ethnographic settings show food being distributed to repay past debts (e.g., Hames 2000, Gurven et al. 2000), but this is not so in other cases, especially for meat (e.g., Kaplan and Hill 1985, Hawkes 1993a, Bliege-Bird and Bird 1997, Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton-Jones 2001).

Hunting skill can be among the most important determinants of men’s social standing, much more important when big animals are taken than when they are not.”

“Among the Ache, men with better hunting reputations have much higher fertility than other men (Hill and Hurtado 1996). The pattern shown here—that better Hadza hunters have harder-working wives—suggests that better hunting reputations make Hadza men more successful competitors for mates. ... Better hunters between the ages of 40 and 65 are more likely to have wives younger than 45, implying that they are more likely to desert their first wives in mid-life and start new families with younger ones. These patterns suggest that better hunters are more likely to out-compete suitors for both first and second wives”

“Women may prefer to marry better hunters for an array of reasons. Men of higher status may be better protectors, and other benefits may flow from association with them (Blurton-Jones et al. 2000). The subsistence benefits claimed by the hunting hypothesis, however, are much less important than widely assumed and perhaps even absent altogether. Wives and offspring receive little or no more meat than others from the hunting of their husbands/fathers. They do, however, benefit from the hunting of all men who target big animals. ... The modern Hadza example, with parallels among other recent hunter-gatherers, offers empirical support for the hypothesis that men’s work is often driven by male competition. This hypothesis may be an especially useful tool for developing evolutionary scenarios about the initial emergence of men’s work as a substantial source of human subsistence.”
Hunter-gatherer adult mortality resembles mortality in the rural third world and in historical pre-industrial populations.

231-2: “Young foragers have much to learn, but they seem able to learn it even when deprived of big stretches of their juvenile bush experience. … We cannot argue that the human juvenile period is so long because so much needs to be learned before reproduction.”

261: “Modern hunter-gatherer adult mortality is much lower than that estimated by archeological demographics. However, modern hunter-gatherers resemble all human populations for which we have written records of birth and death dates (the poorest in the contemporary third world and the premedicine populations studied by historical demographics) in their low adult mortality and long lifespan, much longer than any other primate’s. Some key studies (Walker, Johnson, and Lambert 1988; Molleson et al 1993) imply serious problems with conclusions from archeological demography.”

262: “Contemporary hunter-gatherer mortality may be reduced by influences from the modern world that surrounds them. I summarized evidence that these effects were small in the case of the Hadza, the !Kung, and especially the Ache. The mortality schedules observed in these populations are probably a very good representation of our evolved mortality.”

263: “Hunter-gatherers in pre-agricultural times were larger than contemporary hunter-gatherers …

… Large chunks of the juvenile period spent away from the bush did not impair development of important Hadza foraging skills (Blurton-Jones and Marlowe 2002).”

265: “[Citing Kaplan et al 2000] in subsistence societies only elders produce surplus food. Young parents are unable to produce as much as their offspring consume.”

306: “We have been harsh in our closing criticism of the Caspari and Lee … study, but … we cannot make progress in paleodemographic interpretations through the blind statistical treatment of data. … Only in this way can we continue to discuss what paleodemography tells us about life history in the past and to argue whether our paleoanthropological ‘facts’ about life history are any better than ill-supported hunches.”

Paine and Boldsen, “Paleogmographyic Data”


308: “The projections call into question the widespread assumption based on historical demography that before the nineteenth century, few individuals lived past age 50.”

Didn’t read beyond the abstract

Skinner & Wood


331: “Based on the few life history variables for which data are available from the hominin fossil record, a modern human pattern of life history does not appear to have been present in any hominin taxon before the appearance of our species.”

Didn’t read beyond the abstract.

Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, Weirdest people in the world

FIND PUBLICATION INFO (CITING HERE A PDF, SIMPLY DATED MARCH 2009)
HENRICH, JOSEPH, STEVEN J. HEINE, AND ARA NORENZAYAN, “THE WEIRDEST PEOPLE IN THE WORLD: HOW REPRESENTATIVE ARE EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS FROM AMERICAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS? WHAT DO WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY?”

SHORT ABSTRACT
Broad claims about human psychology and behavior based on narrow samples from Western societies are regularly published. Are such species generalizing claims justified? This review suggests not only substantial variability in experimental results across populations in basic domains, but that standard subjects are unusual compared with the rest of the species—outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, spatial reasoning, moral reasoning, thinking styles, and self concepts. This suggests (1) caution in addressing questions of human nature from this slice of humanity, and (2) that understanding human psychology will require broader subject pools. We close by proposing ways to address these challenges.

LONG ABSTRACT
Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology, cognition, and behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from highly educated segments of Western societies. Researchers—often implicitly—assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that standard subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species—frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The comparative findings suggest that members of Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, or behavior—hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggest that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.

SEE ALSO: ELECTRONIC HIGHLIGHTS
Herskovits—Economic Anthropology


Part 4 deals with ownership in primitive societies.

331: "Agricultural peoples hold in common large portions of their available land--even land that is worked."
340: "among hunting peoples, common rather than communal ownership of land is the rule."
341: "Some tribes have are found which have no sense of real property at all." Others have some sense of property, but it is weaker than ours.
349 Among herding peoples, "grazing land as such is rarely if ever owned by individuals, and ... a presumption of group ownership is strong."
368: "among [nonliterate] agricultural peoples the concept of private property in land, as such, exists but rarely, and that what is prized is the exclusive right to benefit from produce raised on a given plot. ... the range of variation among nonliterate peoples runs the gamut from group possession to private ownership."
370: "The concept of land tenure in nonliterate societies as a kind of 'inherited use ownership' would seem to clarify a good many points. It explains, for instance, why rent is so rarely encountered, while it resolves the controversy regarding private as against communal holding of land. For as far as the land itself is concerned, though it is in the vast majority of instances tribally controlled or, where this is not the case, owned by families, the right of the individual to retain it for his use gives tenure the complexion of ownership. Private ownership of land, however, implies greater rights than are generally accorded in the systems of nonliterate peoples, while fully communal tenure assumes that the individual has fewer rights than are found in practice. Nonliterate folk, that is, are concerned with the products of the land, not with the land itself."

Heuser: Misleading Paradigms of War, States and Non-State Actors


3: “this article argues that the mass-killing of *unarmed* people of all ages and sexes is not only a form of war, but perhaps the oldest form of war, and that we must integrate it into our paradigm if we want to understand war.”
4: “Finally, if the paradigm ‘war’ is adjusted to include the mass killing of noncombatants and the put more emphasis on civil wars and insurgencies, we have to take leave once and for all of the Early Modern political concept of the
state as the entity best suited to protect its citizens from war, as states and proto-
state entities have perpetrated the mass killing of unarmed groups of people”

Heading: “Massacres of the Innocent: The Oldest Form of War?”

4: While the presence of *homo sapiens sapiens* on this planet can be traced back
more than a hundred millennia, there is no firm evidence that we used war—
organized group fighting resulting in deaths—to settle our conflicts for more than
10,000 years at most. Indeed, it is still the prevailing opinion among paleo-
anthropologists that it was the agricultural revolution (which spread through
Europe from about 9000 to 4000 BCF) that ushered in warfare, when human
groups stood to gain from killing others to steal the fruits of their agricultural
labour. Evidence drawn from hunter-gatherer cultures that survived into time
when their habits could be recorded scientifically by outsiders can only be applied
speculatively to all the human societies that lived 100,000 to 10,000 years ago.17

NOTE 17: “In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Azar Gat makes much of
this in his *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
16ff.”

4: “It seems that, to date, all archeological evidence of violent death dating back
to pre-agricultural times is inconclusive as it is limited to finds of *single* bodies
with man-inflicted wounds, which does not point to warfare which by definition is
a group activity, or in a duel or by murder, as a human sacrifice.”

5: “This points to raiding parties, which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
was still the most common form of warfare among surviving hunter-gatherer
people and nomadic tribes. The dividing-line between raiding parties and
massacres is thin; in both an armed party confronts an unarmed group of people
of all sexes and ages, in one case primarily to pillage (with the deaths occurring
perhaps more as collateral damage), in other with the primary purpose of killing
people (with booty carried off as incidental benefit). Is the earliest form of the
violent settlement of human conflict not the combat between two armed groups,
but an armed band slaughtering a mixed group of presumably unarmed people?”

5: “our Western literary traditions, group back at most 3000 years with the *Iliad*
and the Hebrew Bible or *Tanakh*, give great prominence to organized combat and
killing between groups of (male) warriors …. We thus have the paradigm of
socio-political entities conducting war … men recruited from them fighting it out
on a battlefield, observing certain rules.

Yet even then, in the Trojan War or in several of the wars of the Israelites,
the fate of non-combatants on the losing side tended to end in massacre.”

NOTE 18 “…M. Bricker, “Upper Paleolithic Archaeology”, *Annual Review of
Anthropology* 5 (1976), 133-148, and www.touregupt.net/ebph3.htm”

23: “So why is the sovereignty of the state the crucial value to be protected, not
the lives of the human beings who live in states, and for whose benefit alone the
state was ‘invented’?”
Hickel: Real extent of poverty

The True Extent of Global Poverty and Hunger: Questioning the good news narrative of the Millennium Development Goals

753-4: “In 2011 the World Bank estimated that India had 300 million people living below $1.25/day and claimed that the proportion of impoverished people had been decreasing steadily. But that same year nearly 900 million Indians, or nearly 75% of the population, were subsisting on less than 2100 calories per day. And this was a significant increase from 1984, when only 58% of the population suffered this level of calorie deprivation. So the World Bank has been celebrating a ‘reduction’ of poverty in India while hunger has been rising decisively. Moreover, in 2014 new research in India showed that 680 million people ‘lack the means to meet their essential needs’, which is more than double what the World Bank’s numbers suggest.

In many countries living just above the IPl means living in destitution. economist Adam Wagsta has shown that in India a child living just above the IPl has a 60% risk of being underweight. In Niger babies born to families just above the IPl face an infant mortality risk of 160/1000, more than three times the world average. In such cases $1.25 per day is insufficient to achieve the ‘adequate’ standard of living”.

761: “The average rickshaw driver in India, for example, requires around 3000–4000 calories per day.”

761: “In reality between 1.5 and 2.5 billion people do not have access to adequate food, and between 3.5 and 4.3 billion remain in poverty – that is, they do not have resources adequate to achieve normal human life expectancy and meet their basic needs as laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These numbers are two to four times higher than the UN would have us believe. And they have been generally rising, not falling.

… the FAO itself admits that ‘the link between growth and nutrition is weak’, and given that we already produce enough food each year to feed everyone in the world at 3000 calories per day.”

Hickford, Most Interesting Savages

'Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages on the Globe': An Approach to the Intellectual History of Maori Property Rights, 1837-53
Author: Hickford, M.
Source: History of Political Thought, Volume 27, Number 1, 2006, pp. 122-167(46)
Abstract:
This article contends that the intellectual history of developing British imperial policy towards indigenous peoples' property rights to land in the mid-nineteenth century is best approached through seeing policy as made in the context of two intellectual vocabularies that were conjoined: the stadial theory of history and the law of nations. New Zealand provides an example of these languages in contestable play between the 1830s and 1853 at a time when the expanding
British Empire as a whole vied with issues such as 'native title' and the placement and control of settler populations.

Hill et al—book, articles, and correspondence

Hill & Hurtado—Ache Life History

Notes on Ache Life History: The Ecology and Demography of a Foraging People
By Kim Hill, A. Magdalena Hurtado
Oxford: Radcl. Science RSL Level 2 F 2679.2G9 HIL
Copyright page: Kim Hill is Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of New Mexico; A Magdalena Hurtado is Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of New Mexico.

xii: One of the authors spent a lot of time living with the Ache. “Property was never really private, and sharing was the most important aspect of the behavioral code. Bragging and self-aggrandizement were considered repugnant, and privacy was absolutely nonexistent. ... Among the Ache there were no revolutionaries, no visionaries, and no rebels. Joking and happy-go-lucky demeanor were universal”.

xiv: “He heard children crying from hunger and saw the deaths of some good friends—events that reminded us again not to romanticize this way of life that we had learned to respect.”

78-9: “The Ache are a Tupi-Guarani speaking group of hunter-gatherers who may have lived in Paraguay for as long as 10,000 years according to archeological data. They show many similarities to other trekking and foraging groups originally present in Eastern Brazilian Highlands … hunting is productive and contributes the majority of food in the Ache diet. … The Northern Ache experienced first peaceful contact in the early 1970s. Shortly after that contact nearly one-third of the population died from contact-related respiratory disease. After contact in the 1970s the Ache began a transition to reservation life. Currently settlement life includes small-scale subsistence horticulture, some cash crop agriculture, and wage labor primarily by adolescent males. Ache social and political life is in a state of transition as well, with missionary and Paraguayan peasant influence increasing through time. Although the Ache are one of the poorest groups of people in the Americas they are generally content as long as their children are healthy and they maintain good relations with their neighbors.”

151: “The pessimists have viewed primitive life as essentially ‘nasty, brutish, and short (as Hobbes wrote in 1651), while the romantics have suggested that primitive peoples can often be characterized as living in an ‘original affluent society’ (Sahlins 1972) in which needed resources are easy to acquire and people live in happy harmony with nature and each other. Neither view is accurate, but romantic notions about the ease of primitive life are probably furthest from the truth and reflect the greatest lack of understanding about the difficulties of life in the past. Mortality, health, and growth data are objective measures of the many hardships of life in traditional societies and do not support romantic assertions
that native populations enjoyed exceptionally good health before contact exposed them to modern health hazards. **Some cultural anthropologists**, unaware of the vast literature showing that these measures can be used to assess nutrition, work load, and environmental hazards of life accurately, continue to argue naively that their study population is an example of the “original affluent society” just because adults are observed to spend few hours per day in the food quest. This is equivalent to suggesting that the American homeless are really affluent because they work few hours per week, despite the fact that objective health measures would clearly show otherwise.”

152-3: Life-threatening hazards exist in the environment including lightening, windstorms knocking down trees, floods, exposure to the cold, conspecifics, parasites, and animals such as jaguars and snakes.

155-6: “the Ache expressed an extremely ‘biological’ view of illness and death compared with what we have witnessed in other isolated traditional societies.” They don’t have shamans or healers, or much faith in their ability to recover from diseases.

157: “Because of the reservation Ache are no longer mobile, disabled individuals are no longer left behind or abandoned no matter how old or feeble they become. Although some individuals remain overtly callous to the misfortunes of others, many are now intensely devoted to caring for their sick or disabled relatives.”

159: “Conspecific violence was by far the most important cause of death in the study population during the past century, account for just over half of all deaths experienced in the forest.” 40% was attributed to internal violence among Ache including infanticide; 60% external in warfare with Paraguayans or non-Ache indigenous people. “The second major cause of death in the forest was illness and disease, which accounts for about a fourth of all deaths. … Accidents are the third most common cause of death and account for about one death in eight. … Finally, degenerative and congenital diseases account for about one death in fifteen.”

163: “Only four cases of ‘adult’ homicide (unsanctioned by the social group) took place in the past century.”

165-6: Comparison of the Ache with !Kung and Yanomamo shows violence is a much bigger cause of death among the Ache. “The Ache are much more likely than either the Kung or the Yanomamo to die from something other than illness. Violent deaths, including accidents, account for about 11% of Kung deaths, 20% of Yanomamo deaths, and approximately 70% of all Ache deaths. … We suspect that this difference is partially due to the fact that the Ache sample is the only one of the three that describes a group prior to peaceful contact with the outside world. Thus, forest-living Ache were not exposed to a variety of modern pathogens and experienced no state-level interference to mediate rates of violence within the society.”

168: “Conspecific violence (death at the hands of another human)”

193: Evidence from the Ache, Kung, and Yanomamo peoples does not support the widely-held belief that few people lived beyond 45-50 years in distant past human societies or more recent aboriginal societies. “No living human population has ever been observed with such high adult mortality rates”.
The Ache data contradict a widely held notion that life in primitive societies is nasty, brutish, and short. Although levels of violence are high relative to modern societies, and the situation might appear ‘brutish’ to some observers, life was not necessarily short. An Ache woman who survived to age twenty could expect on average to live until age sixty, and an Ache man at age twenty could expect on average to live until age fifty-four. About a third of all Ache ever born lived to age sixty. Thus our data fit well with Howell’s (1979) conclusion that hunter-gatherers did not necessarily have short lifespans.

Mortality rates increased dramatically during the six years following first peaceful contact but have since dropped to below the forest rates.

Finally, the data dispel any romantic notions about life in the forest being somehow easier or more attractive. Mortality rates during the past fifteen years at reservations have been much lower than those experienced in the forest. This is the opening of the final paragraph of the chapter, and it’s all about mortality.

Children “grew slowly in comparison with American children and almost certainly experienced chronic low levels of nutritional stress. … Very old individuals were often abandoned or killed when they became too great a burden to the residential band.”

Finally an in-depth address to Sahlins’s claim:

“A more general anthropological implication of the analysis presented in this chapter is that the concept of the ‘original affluent society’ (Sahlins 1972) as a characterization of hunter-gatherers is flawed. The Ache eat better than almost any other group of foragers ever studied (Hill et al 1984), and they weigh considerably more than well-known groups such as the !Kung, yet data clearly indicate that they do not get ‘enough food to meet their needs.’ More food is shown to impact positively on fertility of both sexes and may also increase child survival (though the evidence is weak). Since individuals consistently voice a desire for higher fertility, and high survivorship, and such a preference would be favored by natural selection under many conditions, there is no basis for the assertion that the Ache obtain all the food they need. Regardless of how many hours they work at acquiring food, neither the Ache nor members of any other foraging society can be shown to meet their food needs in any biological sense. Indeed, neither the Ache nor any other traditional people with whom we have worked in the past two decades agrees with the proposition that they obtain all the food they need. Instead they emphatically insist that they are hungry and would prefer more food (as do the !Kung), with their incessant begging from visitors.

This conclusion could easily have been predicted without the Ache data. Most nutritional anthropologists and world health workers have known for decades that small body stature universally signals undesirable conditions and, conversely, that unhealthy living conditions (nutrition, pathogens, disease, etc.) lead to small body size. No group of people in the world, except perhaps African pygmies, has ever been shown to be small for genetic reasons …, and members of small traditional populations such as the Ache or the Kung often grow as large as modern Americans when provided with equivalent nutrition and health conditions during childhood …. Most traditional peoples suffer mild food stress, and more food would result in greater body size, higher fertility, and probably better
juvenile survivorship. If we believe that individuals universally care about health, survival, fertility, and the survival of their offspring, then we must recognize that a failure to meet optimal health, survival, and fertility levels indicates that they do not meet their food requirements. Indeed, food ‘needs’ themselves can only be objectively assessed with reference to whether optimal health is obtained.

The ‘original affluent society’ myth suggesting that our ancestors easily met their daily needs before we became greedy and began to desire more than that which is necessary is an idea that tells us more about late twentieth century anthropological thought than it does about the lives of foraging peoples. The ‘original affluent society’ concept has no basis in empirical reality or biology, but it is also a cruel hoax because it leads members of modern societies to avoid the empathy of guilt that they should feel when considering the plight of people living under difficult conditions. Indeed, after seventeen years of working with foragers in three different countries and hearing the complaints of hunger, the cries of children, and having watched people suffering from less than desirable health, it is difficult for us to feel charitable towards those who have perpetrated this farcical myth in modern anthropology. Not surprisingly, the foragers with whom we have shared our lives feel the same way. ‘If he thinks that this is all the food we want, let him come down here and eat with us, and feed his children that we feed ours” (Dawiya, a Hiwi forager, commenting in 1988 on our story about a man who claims that the Hiwi only work a few hours per day because they obtain plenty of food).”

396: “The fertility reduction after the demographic transition to levels that clearly do not maximize fitness … may not be a unique historical phenomenon. Fertility levels lower than those that would apparently maximize long-term fitness may characterize some (many?) traditional societies as well as modern industrial societies. … The Ache seem to have lower fertility than would maximize their long term fitness, yet no current model can explain why this is so.”

Chapter 14: Conclusions

467-8: The Ache and the Dobe !Kung are now the best demographically studied hunter-gatherer societies. “Because the Ache demographic patterns are so thorough documented it may be tempting to think of the Ache as ‘representative’ of foraging people. Just such a view has commonly been applied to the Kung for the past twenty years. Of course in the current academic political climate the !Kung are a more attractive model because they show apparent population control through low fertility and also exhibit low levels of violence. These traits are congruent with the way many observers wish to portray our ancestors. Because of the appealing nature of Kung demographic parameters and other aspects of their behavior and society (egalitarian conservationists living monogamously, sharing communally in a society where women are politically equal to men and do not depend on them economically), a new and romantic noble savage myth has been built around them with widespread popular acceptance of the idea that they represent our ancestors. The Ache provide a counter image which is considerably less appealing to many, but clearly just as valid.

But it would be a great mistake to replace the Kung model with an Ache one. … Neither is representative of hunter-gatherers in general … the Ache
population as we studied it cannot have been representative of the Ache
population over the last 5,000 years. At a growth rate of 2.5% per year, a small
band of 20 Ache would grow in 5,000 years to a population of \(3.9 \times 10^{55}\)
individuals! The Ache we studied are therefore representative of foragers under
very special and favorable conditions. Are the Kung more representative of our
past? … There are huge gaps in our knowledge, and in truth we can say that we
still know very little.”

471-2: Apparently, human foragers tend to breed at a higher than sustainable rate.
They speculate about what bring it down. Greater infant mortality would do it, but
“Such high mortality has never been observed in any traditional population.”
Speculates that occasional population crashes could do it.

474-5: Attempt to summarize their findings with a few questions. “First, why
have we found so little evidence of a cost of reproduction in the Ache study? Is
this because of methodological flaws in our study, or because the Ache
represented in our sample experienced conditions where there were no significant
costs of reproduction? An answer to this question will be crucial for explaining
human fertility variation in traditional societies …. Second, is our model of age at
first reproduction basically correct? … Third, what is the functional explanation
for menopause? … fourth, how important is the adult morality [sic] rate for
determining the overall character of the human life history? … [finally] What role
do rapid population growth and periodic population crashes play in human
evolutionary history?”

479: “For decades, scientists have alluded to the relevance of ‘ancestral’
conditions for understanding present-day demographic parameters, and much of
human biology. Isolated groups of foragers and incipient horticulturalists are the
closest human context to these presumed conditions. However few have
attempted to specify the causal linkages that need to be isolated in foraging
populations in order to elucidate modern health profiles.”

**Hill, et al—Men’s Time Allocation**

Very useful article. See hardcopy highlights.

**Hurtado et al: Female Subsistence Strategies**

Didn’t really need this one; they don’t address the question of how much hunter-
gatherers work.
Hawkes et al—How Much is Enough?


Abstract: The notion that hunter-gatherers need little and so limit what they take from available resources has been extremely influential in anthropology. We present an optimal foraging model that suggests testable predictions that are inconsistent with the postulate of “limited needs”. We evaluate these predictions in light of data from the Aché of eastern Paraguay and other groups, and find that the hypotheses based on the limited needs postulate are generally falsified, whereas those derived from the optimal foraging model are generally supported. This article argues that HGs don’t have limited needs because they engage in maximizing behavior. I think this shows more that the affluence theorists have a very bad definition of affluence than that HGs necessarily aren’t affluent, but it needed to be written. And it has some good stuff about the history of views of affluence:

3-4: “Throughout the first half of this century, political economists and anthropologists (Childe and White, among others) held that technical innovations that allowed the production of surplus played a key role in cultural evolution in that they freed certain individuals in a few societies from the onerous task of food procurement or production and enabled them to get on with the creative work of building culture.”

4: “several papers in the Man the Hunter volume … made limited needs a key element of the new conventional wisdom concerning foragers.”

4: The recognition that foragers were not continually threatened with starvation was an important contribution of the ethnography of the 1960s, but the conclusion that hunters typically had limited needs begs an important question. Although a nutritional minimum is theoretically calculable …, the definition of needs, nutritional or otherwise, varies greatly across time and space, even among hunters.”

Correspondence

RESPONSE: You show convincingly that many hunter-gatherer societies were not affluent as Sahlins suggests. Even if they worked little, but there was great evidence of food stress. But you seem to take it for granted that Sahlins is correct in saying that they really did work only 3-5 hours per day. Is that correct? Did they actually work very little and sleep more than we do? Did you collect data on this? If they worked little while experiencing food stress, why didn’t they work more?

Also, do you believe this result is characteristic of most hunter-gatherers in human prehistory? Should we expect that for the several hundred thousand years before the invention of agriculture, that most humans were chronically
undernourished? Is that typical of primates? If so, do we have any idea why foraging humans tend to be less suited to their environment than other primates? Or is it to be expected that most primates or most animals will breed to the point at which the face chronic food stress?

Dear Dr. Hurtado,

I have a question about your book. I am sorry to bother you, but one thing about it left me wondering. I am a political theorist who has been reading anthropology to address claims that property rights advocates have been making about pre-property rights societies. The amount hunter-gatherers work is important to this research.

Your book shows that the Ache were not "affluent" hunter-gatherers as Sahlins contends by showing that even if they work little, they exhibited signs of food stress. But the book did not address Sahlins's claim that hunter-gatherers work very little. It even seems to concede the point. I was wondering whether you collected any data on this and whether you found that Sahlins's claim holds up in this area? If they worked little but suffered food stress, do you have any idea whether working more would have helped reduce their food stress or whether they were constrained by lack of available resources?

Thank you,

Karl

Kim Hill’s email: Kim.Hill@asu.edu

REPLY FROM HILL:

Karl: The Ache work long hours as do most (but not all) hunter-gatherers. The empirical data are in the following papers. We have critiqued Sahlins notion of original affluent society because virtually all HG suffer from food stress (eg. more food increases survival and fertility), and most work long hours if you take into account all their activities (food processing time is often extensive and takes place in camp during what Sahlins considered leisure time). Some groups work fewer hours but suffer very great food stress and one must surmise that there are good reasons why they dont work more (either unavailable opportunities for economically viable foraging, or some risks and opportunity costs that are unattractive).

One other quick comment. It is not clear how many H-G societies are truly "pre-property rights" societies. Most have strong social norms (backed by
punishments) about access to different forms of property. Humans have regulated such activities for a long time, possibly the entire 150ky history of our species.

Hope that helps,
Kim Hill


SECOND REPLY FROM HILL:

Yeah it should be mortality rate, though morality rate is indeed a humorous substitution.

In general all wild mammal populations (including human h-g) are food limited. That is why at equilibrium they show zero growth. The resource limitation acts on juvenile survival and then on adult fertility parameters. Rarely does food stress ever get serious enough to impact on adult mortality. Since natural selection designs brains that prefer higher juvenile survival it would be unlikely to have hunter-gatherers not working just because they didn’t feel they needed to (food will improve juvenile survival). Thus there is no theoretical basis in any mammal to expect “the original affluent society” to exist. Animals and humans don’t work maximum hours per day because there are tradeoffs with other important activities and biological goals, etc. Serengeti lions hunt 2-3 hrs a day even when the population is declining from food stress.

Yes, when you move wild animals to zoos they always show substantially higher growth rates, fertility and mortality (but sometimes impacted by new infectious diseases).

The property rights stuff is outside my area of expertise, but I would note that most traditional human societies have corporate not individual property rights. This is because humans are cooperative breeders and live in extended kin groups that cooperate to reproduce -- a bit like social insects, more like meerkats and many birds. Much of the debate you mention seems to be over the transition from corporate property rights to individual property rights -- something pretty new in human history maybe, and linked to a particular world view. Hunter-gatherers live in extended kin groups and maintain control over valuable resources including both food sources and potential mates. Much of human culture consists of social norms or conventions that specify rights to valuable resources.
THIRD AND BEST REPLY FROM HILL:

Well property rights aside, and sticking to your main point, no I dont think you can say that everyone today is better off than everyone was in the hunter-gatherer period. These kinds of generalizations are always statistical averages and never apply to all subsets of comparison populations. This is a bit like saying that all men are taller than all women. Statistically men are taller but of course there are plenty of women that are taller than plenty of men. The crux of your issue is really the definition of what it means to be better off. People in modern societies have better health on average and longer lifespans, but there is more to life than longevity. Hunter-gatherers often have more satisfying social environments in my opinion (I have lived more than 30 years with different groups of hunter-gatherers). Modern societies are plagued by emotional, physical and mental problems that probably weren't very common in the past. We know more about some of this, for example the shift from hunter-gatherer diets to modern diets has caused plenty of misery and unhappiness in the form of obesity, diabetes, heart disease, etc. We know less about the psychological and emotional mismatch between our evolved cognition and the modern environment. But hunter-gatherers seem to have less depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, suicide, feeling of alienation, etc. There are no "campus massacres" in the hunter-gatherer ethnographic literature for example. All these observations and many more suggest that the advances of modern societies have also come with costs. Yeah, you are right, there were no homeless, or unemployed hunter-gatherers, and probably fewer that endured forms of blatant exploitation and slavery etc than we see in modern contexts. Hunter-gatherer societies are often highly cooperative and even people with weaknesses and disabilities often were incorporated into some meaningful social existence where they had a niche in the larger cooperative society.

FOURTH REPLY FROM HILL:

Well in general, living organisms grow until they reach their carrying capacity. This means that resource scarcity leads to increased mortality or lowered fertility until zero pop growth. Of course this isn't happening yet in the modern world because cultural adaptation is very rapidly increasing the carrying capacity. But in most of human history people must have felt the demographic consequences of resource shortage - thus life was indeed a bit hard. I dont know anybody who has lived as a hunter-gatherer that prefers that lifestyle overall to an easier one -- poor health and hunger are very unpleasant despite the social benefits.

Yeah you can quote me, but I d like to look at how you phrase it, since often a subtle turn of words can mean something different that I would want to imply. For example, Im not so sure I would say that HG are necessarily egalitarian - some have very stratified social systems compared to the idealistic version of their lives (but far less stratified than other production modes generally). Hunter-
gatherer residential units are highly cooperative, but some of that is due to
corporate kin groups carrying on collective genetic production, and some is due to
cooperation between non kin. Again, Im not sure I would conclude that the
cooperation is voluntary because much of it is backed by social sanctions. But the
point is that they are indeed very cooperative and often internalize the value
system of cooperation that is backed by social sanctions (for those who are
tempted to become cheaters).

**Hoebel: The Law of Primitive Man**


Cited by libertarians, e.g. Benson, for showing that property can exist outside of
society. Cited by Benson also to support the claim, “private property rights are a
common characteristic of primitive societies”. What Hoebel actually says is quite
different:

51: “A good problem would be that of drawing the real shape of institutions said to be
‘communistic’ as against ‘private,’ or ‘corporeal’ as against ‘incorporeal.’ These simple,
all-embracing concepts are not fundamentals in themselves and they easily become
unsatisfactory substitutes for clear analysis of the oftimes complex niceties of primitive
legal institutions. … catchall labels … have no place in the social science of comparative
jurisprudence”.
51: “To this end, materials from the Yurok Indians of northern California may be
scrutinized with profit.”
52: “although the Yuroks had no formal government, they nevertheless exhibited a welter
of legal relationships in the realm of personal law.

   Wealth, its accumulation and display, was an interest of the greatest vitality for
these people”
52: “In this setting every person, except bastards and slaves, had a full quiver of demand-
rights, privilege-rights, powers, and immunities which he could fit to his litigious bow on
the slightest provocation. Although there was no specialized law-enforcement personnel
among the Yuroks, there was nevertheless a regularized procedural technique for
enforcing conformance to the accepted legal standards”.
53: “Except for the bastards and slaves, who had no legal rights, every person possessed a
fixed and immutable wergild, every material object its fixed worth, determined by what
had been paid for it in previous economic transactions, and every intangible property-
right its customarily recognized valuation. Bride-purchase, which alone made a marriage
valid, determined wergild, for the laga of a person was equivalent to the price one’s
father had paid for one’s mother.”
54: “Land ownership involved not only powers and privilege-rights for the title holder,
but unique and interesting duties as well. … the family of which M---- was headman did
not own the beach as such but possessed a long-established demand-right that the flippers
of all sea lions caught along the Pacific coast for a distance of about four miles in either”

NEED TO SEE P. 55
Chapter 5. The Eskimo: Rudimentary law in a primitive anarchy, p. 67-99

69-70: “The underlying postulates of jural significance in Eskimo culture are the following: …
Postulate IV. All natural resources are free or common good.
Postulate V. It is necessary to keep all instruments of production (hunting equipment, etc.) in effective use as much of the time as it is possible.
Corollary 1. Private property is subject to use claims by others than its owners.
Corollary 2. No man may own more capital goods than he can himself utilize.
Postulate VI. The self must find its realization through action. …
[70] Corollary 4. Creation or personal use of a material object results in a special status with respect to ‘ownership of the object.”

Chapter 6: the Ifugao: primitive law in northern Luzon p. 100-127

100: He cites Barton as his primary source for the Ifugao, a rice-growing community in the interior of northern Luzon (the northern island of the Philippines). The Ifugao are important because, “they reveal how wrong are the political theorists who hold that law and government are wholly indivisible.”
102-103: Describes how he Ifugao strive for wealth and use it for conspicuous consumption and for throwing festivals.
103-104: “The basic postulates of legal significance for the Ifugao …:
[104] Postulate 1. The bilateral kinship group is the primary social and legal unit, consisting of the dead, the living, and the yet unborn.
Corollary 1. An individual’s responsibility to his kinship group takes precedence over any-self-interest. …
Corollary 4. The kinship group shall control all basic capital goods.
Corollary 4’. Individual possession of rice lands and ritual heirlooms is limited to trust administration on behalf of the kin group. …
Postulate IV. Capital goods may be lent at interest.
Corollary 1. Control of wealth gives power and social prestige: property is important.”

Chapter 7. Comanche, Kiowa and Cheyenne: Plains Indian Law in Development, 127-176

143: “Postulate VI. All land is public property.
Postulate VII. Except for land and the tribal fetishes all material goods are private property, but they should be generously shared with others.”
Chapter 8. The Trobriand Islanders: Primitive law as seen by Bronislaw

Malinowski, 177-201

Citations primarily from Crime and Custom in Savage Society, although he also cites many other Malinowski works.

191: “Postulate VIII. ‘Humanity’ is divided into four clans.
Postulate IX. Priority in claims to land and rank is determined by the order of emergence from holes in the ground by the subclan ancestors.
Postulate X. High rank entails privileges not to be enjoyed by commoners.”

192: “The Trobriand Islanders live in permanent villages arranged in a circular pattern. The village belongs to a matrilineal subclan. Surrounding the village are the lands belonging to the subclan…

Although the mother never lives in the midst of her ancestral lands, her right to the product of these lands for the support of herself and her children is inviolable.”

193: “Leadership rests on the combined principles of rank and wealth. Every village, which belongs to a subclan, has its headman who is nominally the senior member of the senior lineage within the subclan. If an ordinary headman, a lesser chief called gumgua’u, his powers extend only to the boundaries of his own village. If he is a full chief (guya’u), his influence will spread over several villages and their subchiefs. If he is a paramount chief among the full chiefs, it will extend over an entire district.

…

Obeisance must always be done a person of high rank. … No man’s head may ever be on a higher plan than that of a chief.”

194: The Trobriand chief “marries at least one woman in each village under his suzerainty, excepting, of course, his own. Then not only her brother but also her entire subclan combine to give urigubu to him as ‘a glorified brother-in-law of the whole community.’ … they turn over roughly five times as much as given to the wife of a commoner … . In the old days, when a great chief had as many as eighty wives, Malinowski estimated that he received about four hundred times as many yams as did a commoner.” [Unclear whether this refers to Sexual Life or Coral Gardens and their magic.]

195: Chiefs have their own gardens. They have their pick of women. “‘irrespective of her previous attachments.’ [quoting Sexual Life of Savages, p. 137]” … “Thus we see a hereditary nobility wielding ceremonial and political power and enjoying privileges of rank far above the ruck of ordinary men.” [referring to Malinowski’s Sexual Life (above) and Argonauts, p. 65]

The Ashanti: Constitutional Monarchy and the Triumph of Public Law, p.

211-254

A pre-literate state on the Gold Coast of West Africa.

252-254: the postulates of their law
Postulate X. Basic property belongs to the ancestors.

Corollary 1. Basic property is only administered in trust by its temporary possessors.

Postulate XI. A headman or chief is the carnal viceroy of the ancestors of the kingship group he governs, and a stool is symbolic of the collectivity of the ancestors.

Part III: Law and society, Chapters 10-12

280-281: describes how the Cheyenne had a right to borrow tools and such without asking. When horses came along, this became very inconvenient. So, “the Elk Soldier Society” made a rule that a horse was property.

286-287: “All legal systems give cognizance to the existence of rights to private property in some goods; but among primitives land is legally treated as belonging directly or ultimately to the tribe or the kinship group; it is rarely sustained legally as an object of private property.”

290-291: “The methodology for such an undertaking is to scrutinize all contemporary or recently existing primitive societies that live by simple hunting and collecting devices to see whether there are any common social characteristics present or specifically absent from their cultures. If their presence or absence may be causally linked to the distinctive features of all simple hunting and gathering technologies, then we may reasonably infer the likelihood of the presence or absence of these very traits in early simple hunting and gathering societies. So also, when comparative anthropological studies establish a universal nuclear core of general traits as being present in all empirically observed cultures then it is scientifically reasonable to infer that these traits, which form the ‘common denominator of culture,’ were also probably present in early prehistoric cultures, even though they cannot be ascribed to any known archaeological evidence. The universal existence of an incest tabu would be an example in point.”

293-4: “As for the law, simple societies need little of it. If the more primitive societies are more lawless than the more civilized, it is not in the sense that they are ipso facto more disorderly; quite the contrary. It is because they are more homogeneous; relations are more direct and intimate; interests are shared by all in a solid commonality; and there are fewer things to quarrel about. Because relations are more direct and intimate, the primary, informal mechanisms of social control are more generally effective. Precisely as a society acquires a more complex culture and moves into civilization, opposite conditions come into play. Homogeneity gives way to heterogeneity. Common interests shrink in relation to special interests. … Access to material goods becomes more and more indirect, with greater possibilities for uneven allocation, and the struggle among the members of a given society for access to the available goods becomes intensified. Everything moves to increase the potentialities for conflict within the society. The need for explicit controls becomes increasingly greater. … the more civilized man becomes, the greater is man’s need for law, and the more law he creates. Law is but a response to social needs.

The simple community of the power primitive societies ordinarily consists of a few closely related families who comprise a kindred. Relationship is bilateral; i.e., kinship to the mother’s relatives is felt to be equally as strong as to the father’s. The community group, [294] although it may be ethnologically a segment of a tribe, is autonomous and politically independent. There is no tribal state. Leadership resides in family or local group headmen who have little coercive authority and are hence lacking in
both the means to exploit and the means to judge. They are not explicitly elected to office; rather, they lead by the tacit consent of their followers, and they lose their leadership when their people begin no longer to accept their suggestions—when they begin to accede to the ideas of some other man. As it is, their leadership is confined to action in routine matters. The patriarchal tyrant of the primitive horde is nothing but a figment of nineteenth-century speculation. The simplest primitive societies are democratic to the point of anarchy. But primitive anarchy does not mean disorder.”

297: Quotes Brown “‘There does not appear to have been in the Andamans any such thing as punishment of crime.’”

317: “The clan is peculiarly suitable to gardening peoples because of its usefulness as an administrative unit in the allocation of land rights. In virtually every horticultural society it holds de facto control of the land. Even when the ultimate title is vested de jure in the tribal chief or the national king (viz., the Ashanti) the actual land-administering unit is the clan. The land is the stable base of all existence, and as long as the clan prevails no person or family goes landless, for no individual can alienate his holdings outside the clan, and the clan gives up its title only in utmost extremity. There is no agrarian problem for primitive societies.”

328-329: “In surveying the truly primitive societies, those that lie beyond the newly emergent civilizations of the Mediterranean, no specific trend in the separation of the individual from his kinship group as a legal entity can really be discerned. … “through the whole gamut of primitive societies basic property, real property, and family chattels of magic or prestige potency, cannot be alienated by action of any single individual. The individual who makes a contract for the pledging or sale of such goods is invariably no more than the agent or trustee for the family estate. He cannot act without family consent. …

The “Mainean shift” does not really become effective until after the beginning of the urban revolution in full Neolithic times. It is [329] then, not on the more primitive levels, that the individual begins to be loosened from his kinship group. For urbanization dissolves the strength of the kinship tie. It concomitantly steps up the need for centralized local control by throwing together multitudes of persons whose local, or tribal, backgrounds are different and whose customs and their underlying postulates are frequently in conflict at many points. City life proliferates law.”

**Hogbin: Law & Order in Polynesia**


Cited by Hayek
Introduction by Malinowski


P. xxiii: “Adopting Roscoe Pound’s definition of law as ‘social control through the systematic application of the force of politically organized society,’ Radcliffe-Brown is driven to the conclusion that ‘some simple societies have no law, although all have customs which are supported by sanctions.’

Xxiv: “I would not quarrel on terminology. Whether we call a certain rule of conduct law or custom, the really important thing about it is to study whether this rule is actually obeyed, what are the conditions of its validity, and what are the social mechanisms by which it is enforced.”

Xxv: “The real difficulty in the study of primitive legal conditions is how to account for the submission to custom over that area of human behaviour which is completely outside the political influence…. The primitive family, village and kinship groups are not subject to courts of law, to policeman, to codes, to judges, or public prosecutions. And yet the laws are kept—to a large extent.”

Xli: “In the Trobriands I had found that people keep to what custom—or, more correctly, law—binds them to do because they know that not far ahead there looms the occasion when in the name of the same law they will be entitled to demand the counter-service.”

Xlii-xliii: “Dr. Hogbin’s book also effectively disposes of perhaps the most misleading fallacy there is in social anthropology, that about ‘primitive communism.’ Here again the interlocking type of joint claims and obligations which we find in the use of and titles to such as object as…, has nothing to do with such an indiscriminate or promiscuous right as alone would be comparable with that modern communal ownership which we like to regard in prospective ideal as communism. The implements of fishing, the rights in sailing a canoe, the property of the joint family, the ownership in coconuts, all these show that there is a complete system of claims and uses the interrelation and the working of which must be studied in detail and not disposed of as primitive communism.”

Section: IX.—Land Tenure as a System of Primitive Law, pp. xlii-xliv

Xlii-xliii: “The study of land tenure in several districts of New Guinea has convinced me that here as a rule a very complicated state of affairs makes enquire as difficult as it is important. The purely formal legal approach inevitably reveals a long list of claims or titles to land. Taking such claims conjointly, they appear as a rule to establish complete communism, the right of everybody to every aspect and approach of the communal territory. It is only when we study the manner in which the various titles enter as productive forces into the process of agriculture, that we really get an insight into the high degree of differentiation and specialization of individual claims.

In the Trobriands for instance the chief claims all the soil of his district as his. The claim is not idle. On the one hand, he can claim through several channels tribuefom the soil. A certain percentage of the yield, which I assessed at about one quarter or one fifth of the total, finds its way into his storehouse. This, as we
know already, he does not use or misuse, or waste, but employs for the benefit of the community. Apart from that, however, he has even more [xliii] definite duties with regard to the soil. He has to defend it against the encroachment of belligerent neighbours who, after victory, destroy a great many things that have been built up on the land. He also in other ways contributes towards the organization of agriculture.

Titles to land are also vested in headmen of smaller territorial groupings, who again play an essential part and derive some benefit from their share in ownership. The magician, the titular owner of a field or a plot, the actual user, all contribute to the joint exploitation and their purely form or legal claims have one and all a counterpart in the concerted activity of gardening. It would be just as incorrect to dismiss the relevancy of such legal titles as to take them at face value and simply inscribe them into a consecutive list. The functional method demands that legal rules should be studied in their effective influence on human behavior.

It seems to me that as a working hypothesis we might plausibly assume that land-tenure is a subject for anthropological study everywhere. Man everywhere surrounds his mother earth, the land which feeds him and the environment which gives him shelter and protection, with beliefs and ideas. He as a rule surrounds it with a mythical and historical tradition and defines his relation to land in more or less precise legal statements. At the same time he uses the land and appropriates, distributes and consumes the produce from it. It is in my opinion the correlation between the mythical and legal ideas on the one hand and the economic activities on the other which forms the substance of land tenure.”

Lxvii: “If anthropology can influence jurisprudence to the extent of making it recognize the positive side of law and also acknowledge that law is only part and parcel of a wider system of norms, this will be of some benefit to all social science.”

Lxxi: “The long and short of the story is that whether we are interested in primitive or modern law, we must study principally the working and not the form of rules. In the practical application of anthropology to primitive societies, we must advise the administrator to be very careful how he changes native custom and law and replaces it by the rulings of a higher civilization. Because however good a norm of conduct might be it is worse than useless when it does not work.”

Hogbin, Herbert Ian, Law and order in Polynesia: the actual book

77: “we are asked to picture the gradual emergence of individual rights and responsibilities, personal authority and leadership, from a primeval state of communism in which the duties of every individual were automatically regulated by membership of his group. In the case of law in particular, this hypothesis has been invoked to explain another assumption which is itself false—the supposed absence of law in primitive society.”
The kind of “primitive communism” he’s arguing against is one in which there is not need for law because the people are interchanged personalities who are all will to do what’s right.

Each tribe is made up of a number of joint families, groups of individuals who are closely related. The joint family forms a compact unit, for it is practically autonomous, and the members own land and property jointly.

“A man is not fee to gather coconuts just as he may want them. The property on which they grow is also owned jointly by a body of people, of whom, the members fishing group form a part. This body is a joint family. Provided a man is living on or near the property of his joint family, he may take a coconut …. But … he may not be living anywhere near his property. In that case he has to rely on what his relatives bring him.”

Nowadays the group rarely exceeds fifteen individuals. A few joint families have twenty-five members, but there are others with only three or four. Formerly some probably had as many as fifty. Here, as in the co-operating group, the headman, who exercises authority over all the rest, is the eldest member.”

Family quarrels sometimes cause groups to split into two, and occasionally an arrangement is made to divide the property so that each takes half. Fights also bring new joint families into being.”

The authority of the headman is most important in matters concerning property owned commonly by the group”.

The villages of luangiu and Pelau are divided into strips of up to five hundred square yards in area. Every joint family owns at least one of these strips, and sometimes two or three, but owing to the matrilineal principle of descent into the house-owning group, all members of a joint family live on land, not of their own group, but of that of their wives.

In addition to one or more strips, some joint families own outlying islands.”

The joint family has complete control over its island property, and no one who does not belong to it may step ashore without permission.”

the owners of strips of land in the village forfeit all rights to coconuts which fall to the ground. These belong to whoever picks them up.”

“[the headman] directs the economic undertakings and ceremonies, and organizes his group when vengeance is sought. In these matters his subordinates obey him from motives of self-interest. … The headman himself, as a rule, makes no absurd demands, for he knows that if he did they would be ignored, since he has no power to enforce obedience when all are determined to disregard his authority.”

The whole of the archipelago was theoretically conceived as belonging to the tui Tonga who reserved certain districts for his own use and allotted the rest among the great chiefs. They in return paid tribute twice a year”.

The people lived on land which was believed to be the property of the tui Tonga; he parceled it out to his chiefs, and they divided it among their dependents. The payment of tribute was the complement of this belief. The commoners gave presents to the chiefs in return for permission to live upon their land, and they gave presents to the tui Tonga in return for the original allocation. Tribute was thus an acknowledgement that commoners were dependent upon their chiefs for their means of livelihood and that the chiefs were dependent upon the tui Tonga.”
Hornborg, Have We Always Been Capitalists?

Ecological Embeddedness and Personhood: Have We Always Been Capitalists? quick view
Alf Hornborg

Skimmed it very quickly. It didn’t appear all that valuable. I could look again.

Howell, Society & Cosmos


5: “the term ‘Orang Asli’ will be used for the aborigines [of the Malay Peninsula] as a whole, a designation which simply means ‘original people.’”
7: Map showing the distribution of Aslian Languages on the Malay Peninsula. “Bateg Deq,” “Bateg Nong,” Che’Wong, the Semaq Beri, and Semai are all listed as distinct languages with distinct areas.
34: “The Chewong display no aggression, nor are they competitive in matters of achievement. This peaceful way in which they live and conduct their affairs is not unique to the Chewong, but can be found among several Orang Asli groups”.
35: “None of the Orang Asli has any history of warfare, either recorded by the outside world or represented in myths and legends. The Chewong language has no indigenous words for war, fight, quarrel, aggression, attack, crime, or punishment. Their reaction to encountered violence in the past has been to run away from it.”
37: “All the time I was there I never witnessed a quarrel, nor an outburst of anger, except among small children. In this they differ from the Semai” …

One is often told in the literature … that in a hunting society the best hunters have a high status … This is not true with the Chewong. There is a total lack of inter-personal competitiveness. No value is placed on being better than the rest at something. In fact whenever someone does distinguish him- or herself in some activity this is ignored and people become uncomfortable if this is commented on by an outsider. …

No rivalry is thus displayed in connection with performance. Children’s games have no element of competitiveness.”

Hudson & Levine, Privatization


1-2: “To prehistorians, the social sciences have all but closed their eyes to the archaeological record. Economists are notorious for taking private property for granted as being original and elemental in human history, and hence needing no historical explanation for its evolution. Public resource ownership and management are assumed to be symptoms of economic decadence, arising relatively late in civilization to strife private enterprise and kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.”

2: “it was Bronze Age Mesopotamia—specifically, Sumer in the fourth and third millennium BC—that developed the earliest entrepreneurial practices. Only in the second and first millennia did Indo-European speakers adapt these practices to a more individualistic, and indeed oligarchic context.

… Syrian and Phoenician merchants appear in the 8th Century BC, bringing interest-bearing debt to Greece and Italy. … privatization of the land an usurious credit did not liberate antiquity, but led to widespread economic enslavement by promoting monopolization of the land—the amassing of properties into vast slave-stock

For the past century, economic philosophers have rationalized private ownership as a universally valid and ultimately equitable principle. Yet anthropologically oriented historians have found something quite different in many epochs and regions: communal practices that discourage personal gain-seeking enterprise.”

4: “Laveleye … (1878…) found ancient attitudes toward property governed by the idea of ensuring for all the families the means of self-support on the land: ‘Whether in Europe, Asia and Africa, alike among Indians, Slavs and Germans, and even in modern Russia and Java, the soil was the joint property of the tribe, and was subject to periodical distribution among all the families, so that all might live by their labour, as nature has ordained.’ …

The primitive egalitarian was the true ‘state of nature’ in Laveleye’s view, not John Locke’s fantasy of private land ownership stemming from a primordial social contract. Surveying the fields of history and anthropology, Laveleye … found private property in land to be a relatively late development, emerging only in Roman Times.”

[Citing: Laveleye, Emile de (1878), Private Property (tr. G.R.L. Marriott, London)]

8-9: “[Speaking about southern Mesopotamia apx 2400-2600BCE] most of the economic surplus was concentrated in the temples, as most families cultivated on the land on a near-subsistence basis. Personal wealth was obtained mainly by interfacing with the temples, civilization’s first business corporations. It was the temples that first developed the practice of charging groundrent and interest …
… we can see the logic in public enterprise appearing prior to private enterprise. The accumulation of capital requires a sustained generation of economic surpluses. These in turn require forward planning and account-keeping."

9: “Public accounting helped pave the way for private management to emerge. … For [the Indo-European speakers who settled in the Aegean and Italy] property was not primordial; it developed as a relatively late, symbiotic formation, catalyzed by innovations made by Bronze Age Sumer’s temples and palaces. It thus emerged out of the womb of public enterprise …

When private control of workshops and rent-yielding properties first developed, it did so at the top of society. Ownership was asserted by palace rulers and their families, by leading members of the royal and temple bureaucracies, and by headmen of towns belonging to the imperial system.”

10: “To begin one’s study of the history of commercial enterprise and private property only in classical antiquity is thus to miss the crucial first act of this great economic drama.

… Contemporary research by Assyriologists points to the state as the great catalyst of private enterprise. It was the Sumerian public institutions that created usufruct-yielding lands and set them corporately apart from the periodically reallocated communal subsistence lands.

These public lands included temple lands cultivated directly by dependent personnel belonging to the public institutions; temple or palace lands cultivated by community members on a sharecropping basis; and prebend lands whose crop-rent was set aside for the temple administrators.

Royal property was administered at the ruler’s discretion, and in this sense may be considered to be the first truly private property. … We see … an economic ‘big bang’ c. 3200 BC with the development of writing (first in conjunction with account-keeping), an elaboration of the temples into specialized workshops and other functions, seals and sealing apparatus for administrators, and the use of silver-money. What followed was a diffusion of these innovations from southern Mesopotamia to its trading periphery over the course of the Bronze Age.”

12: “It is well documented that by the 24th Century BC in Lagash, rulers appointed their own family members to leading temple positions.”

12-13: From the well documented Third Dynasty of Ur (2112-2004 BC) through the Old Babylonian period, cuneiformists find nepotistic linkages and a worldly Realpolitik in the interface between the temple and communal sectors. Rulers and administrators are found [13] managing public property virtually as their own, mixing their official correspondence with that of their family members and personal business.”

13: “As the first rent-collecting landlords, Sumer’s Temple and palace workshops (along with their lands and inventories) acted as catalysts for property managed economically to generate a net revenue.”

14: “Temple and prebend-holders thus became history’s first documented rentiers, that is, individuals living off the proceeds of land worked by others.”

21: “A parallel to what happened in Dark Age Greece can be seen in Russia’s recent privatizations. As the Communists fell from power in the early 1990s, high-ranking Party officials…registered state factories and other properties in their own names.

…
[In Classical Greece] This need to mobilize armed forces evidently contributed to a democratization, at least as long as communities relied on their own demos-infantry and followed the time-honored practice of giving war veterans their own plots of hitherto public lands (often land that had been seized from defeated populations.)

22: “Public ownership of subsoil mineral rights is a tradition that has survived into the modern epoch” although it has been twice privatized, falling into the hands of monarchs, and in the current wave of privatization, given to companies who use political pull to pay less tax than other sectors.

25: Discusses Wace: “Doubting that the storehouses outside the wall were appendages of the royal administration, he concluded that they were owned by ‘wealthy merchants or nobles’ belonging to a Mycenaean ‘upper middle class.’ This was an ethnocentric fantasy … for subsequent archaeological interpretation has confirmed that these houses were part of the public storage and warehousing network.”

26: “Perhaps a less modern term than ‘merchant’ should be used. One is tempted to revert to the Babylonian word tamkarum, the quasi-public individual acting on his own while having public status in the palace hierarchy … the tamkaru dealt on their own account as well as on behalf of the large temple and palace institutions …

… Individualism first emerges, culturally and economically, not from members of the ‘communal’ (non-public sector), but from palace rulers and their families. …

Personal property in the modern sense developed originally in the palace sector. It was the ruler’s own property that was the first to be made immune from communal-sector redistribution. … military conquest was a major catalyst of privatization. Palace warlords captured what originally had been public institutions, and transformed them into instruments of their personal economic power.

Mercantile trade became private in classical Athens and Rome, and indeed, dominated by foreigners.”

26-7: In medieval Europe “AT first glance these outsiders would seem to have been [27] private merchants as in the modern sense, yet the Jews brought into England by William the Conqueror were the ‘king’s surf,’ wards of the crown, just as they were ‘servants of the chamber’ under German Emperor Frederick II … This illustrates once again the public/private symbiosis which characterizes enterprise down to the present day.”

27: “Interest-bearing debt became the prime lever of classical privatization, enabling wealthy family heads to pry away the land of smallholders.”

28: “no interest-bearing claims are found in the non-bifurcated economies of Mycenaean Greece”

Chapter 1: Hudson, Dynamics of Privatization

This paper traces the process by which land tenure, credit and commercial handicraft workshops were privatized through the first two-thirds of documented history, from Sumer c. 3500 BC through the Roman Republic. During the se millennia the privatization dynamic was complex, unplanned and often chaotic, but some common characteristics can be discerned:

1. Corporate enterprise first developed in Sumer’s city temples, while personal landownership emanated mainly from the palace sector. This meant that privatization tended to begin at the top of the social pyramid, starting with the ruler and extending down through his administrative bureaucracy.

2. A symbiosis existed between public and private enterprise, giving Bronze Age and early Iron Age economies a mixed character. … what enabled the earliest commercants to seek economic gain for themselves was precisely their public position. …

3. The Paramount nonmilitary lever of privatizing the land was interest-bearing debt. …

4. Privatization of the land and other means of production ended up stripping away the traditional social obligations of wealth. Privatization thus went together with economic polarization and the debasement of the poor into permanent debt bondage.

5. The fiscal stringency resulting from enterprise passing into private hands obliged governments to tax the less affluent classes more intensively, forcing them into debt. …

6. Culturally, privatization brought in its wake a tolerance for social privatization and what earlier societies had disparaged as hubris, the arrogance of wealth carried to the point of injuring the economically weak. …

Underlying these dynamics were four major types of privatization. One form occurred when Sumerian rulers appropriated communal land and temple estates as their own personal property. …

A second type of privatization occurred when rulers gave property away to their relatives … or companions, or assigned control of these properties … as tribute to local chieftains.”

34-35: “A related type of privatization occurred as a byproduct of political decentralization, most notably when palace control collapsed. In such crises, royal managers or warlords tended to seize the royal lands and workshops.”

35: “A Four type of privatization became the most prevalent: the transfer of communally held lands to creditors or other absentee buyers. … The upshot of privatization was economic polarization … while the private sector grew richer largely at the expense of the public sector. …

Also privatized were numerous commercial practices that appear to have originated in the public sector.”
36: “Southern Mesopotamia’s communally held land was not part of the public sector, yet neither was it private in the modern individualist sense of the term. It belonged to the community, and originally was not freely alienable”.
37: It would not be too much to call these temples history’s first formal business corporations.”
38: “By about 28000 BC palaces had become separate functionally as well as architecturally from the temples.”
40: “Medieval Europe’s barons were required to sue their fiefdoms to field military contingents in time of war and support the Crown fiscally out of the land’s usufruct. … However, privatization brought in its wake a casting off of the traditional obligations of wealth. …

   As land tenure and its associated citizenship rights became subject to alienation to creditors, obligations formerly attached to the land were replaced by many taxes on labor, e.g. poll taxes and other regressive levies.”
41: “while rulers based their power on a free army of cultivators willing to fight for their land, they also had to depend on an administrative bureaucracy whose members … sought to profitize for themselves. The result often was a tug of war to obtain the community’s economic surplus and, ultimately, the land.

   Private wealth was consolidated by achieving political control, typically by replacing monarchies with oligarchic senates, the classical example being Rome. …

   Today, the state is considered to be antithetical to private enterprise, yet industrial enterprise was first developed in Bronze Age times by rulers who operated through public institutions. In southern Mesopotamia, private profits were made by royal collectors and temple officers. The sector traditionally viewed as being most inherently private, that of merchants, played a symbiotic role throughout the period under discussion.”
43: “far from public and private being antithetical, private gain-seeking first emerged within the royal sector, with palace rulers playing a catalytic role in establishing personally disposable—and hence, truly private—property. Individualistic behavior in an economic sense may thus be said to have started with the ruler and worked its way down through the social pyramid via his family members, the royal bureaucracy, and the heads of families close to the ruler who were on their way to becoming a hereditary oligarchy.”
44: “the communal sector of self-supporting cultivators, the temples functioning as what one might call public utilities, and the palaces. Each of these three sectors … non of which originally were individualistic or ‘private’ in character. It was the public sector that innovated the basic array of institutions needed for profit-making enterprise: corporate organization, writing and account keeping, contracts and their formalities, weights and measures, and interest-bearing debt. However, Sumerian public investment ultimately catalyzed the growth of a private-sector which ended up undermining temple and palace control. This was just the opposite of the Chicago School scenario whereby private self-seeking is primordial but repeated stifled by state activism and taxation.”
45: “ask why private forms of wealth did not take the lead from the outset. The simple explanation is that a private sector in the modern sense of the term did not yet exist in Bronze Age times.”
46: “In sum, the “private property system” emerged most strongly within Mesopotamia’s surplus-creating sphere rather than in its subsistence sphere, which long remained communally based.

... Personal property in land developed relatively late, at least in the modern sense of an asset owned irrevocably and disposable at will.

Land tenure by communal groupings may be deemed private in the sense that it is not public (i.e. does not belong to the palace, temple or state agency), but it is not yet individualistic ownership. Nor is landownership permanent as long as it remains subject to communal redistribution, or as long as alienations are reversed by royal fiat to ensure that the land remains a widespread means of self-support for the citizen body.”

47: “rates often exceeded the debtor’s normal capacity to pay. Agrarian borrowing was undertaken not as a choice, not with an eye to making a profit on the borrowed funds, but out of dire need.”

49: “Private land appropriators were still far from asserting a Lockian justification for their privatization. No ancient Milton Friedman appeared to say that all this was the best.”

51: “A decade ago, only a few cuneiformists read the Clean Slate proclamations for what they really were. Even the Biblical Jubilee Year and related first-millennium debt ameliorations were viewed as utopian religious statements, no as practical programs. Placing such debt cancellations in the context of civilization’s privatization dynamic now enables us to see just what economic safeguards have been lost.

... Craft labor in the Late Bronze Age seems still to have been public labor. This usually connoted dependent workers with a low social status, often slaves, foreigners, and various classes of unfree domestic dependents. The low status of craft labor in this era was a result of two factors. First, craftsmen often lacked land of their own; this is why they had to work at a craft as their means of self-support. ...

The privatization of craft labor thus involved a supersession of royal and temple workshops by those of landed aristocrats.”

52: “The thesis of public-sector precedence suggests that economic individualism is not the ‘original and natural’ way of doing things, but rather a product of the dissolution of the Bronze Age social cosmos. ... To examine these Bronze Age roots of commercial practices would undermine the mythology of free enterprise.

... It would stand at odds with nearly all popular theories of private property and the state. Constitutional theorists tend to pick up the history of the state only at the relatively late point where it becomes synonymous with government as such, making and enforcing laws, waging wars, and taxing private property holders. ...

If John Lock’s natural-law views were universally valid, Sumer’s archaeological sites would reveal private rather than temple and palace estates and workshops.”

53: “Mesopotamian rulers viewed the privatization of enterprise from a different perspective than that of today’s political philosophers. Modern governments are charged with the duty of defending creditor claims against debtors’ rights to their own economic freedom and means of livelihood. But Bronze Age rulers protected debtors against creditors. In doing this, they had a simple implicit answer to a problem that Locke and subsequent theorists of private property have failed to address: To what extent does the buildup of interest-bearing debts and the rich man’s appropriation of land connote an
expropriation of the assets needed by poorer families to meet their basic needs, forcing them into dependency relationships?"

55: “Individuals now can form limited liability corporations at will, whereas until the mid-19th century it took an act of Parliament to create a corporation. … no one in antiquity recommended the option of productive debt and investment. This idea is as uniquely modern as is that of an equilibrating market-price process. It was left to Adam Smith to put forth the idea of an Invisible Hand of self-interest spurring progress for society at large.”

**Lamberg-Karlovsky, The Archaeological Evidence for International Commerce**

Lamberg-Karlovsky, C. C. “The Archaeological Evidence for International Commerce: Public and/or Private Enterprise in Mesopotamia?” (Chapter 2) …, pp. 73-108

73: “But was there ever a stage in human history in which private property did not exist? A careful study of the earliest texts in Mesopotamia suggest that private possession of land already was extant …. Thus, we are left to conclude that private land ownership already was a prehistoric phenomenon.”

78: “In sum, although the texts suggest large-scale industrial production controlled by the state, the archaeological record suggests that most craft production too place outside of the physical context of a centralized state bureaucracy. This is most clearly evident in the case of pottery.”

79: “Steinkeller’s (1994) conclusion seems in harmony with the archaeological record: the central and enduring feature of the early Babylonian crafts was that they were home-based, and that they operated on a family level. This provided craftsmen with a considerable degree of independence from the state. Depending upon the period, the margin of economic freedom enjoyed by craftsmen differed considerably, of course. In the periods of increased centralization, they would be more closely integrated into the state structures. When the central government weakened, they would be practically independent.

There is one point on which we must rely on inference alone, as neither the texts nor the archaeological record shed light on the question: How did the community’s ordinary population obtain their everyday articles …? …

One hardly can avoid the conclusion that the distribution of these commodities was not directly by state bureaucracies from centralized warehouses. These everyday essential goods were obtained from private craftsmen who produced them for purchase or barter within a market economy. No doubt, as in the case of potters, they also produced specific quotas for delivery to state institutions.”

80: “the documentary evidence allows for the following interpretation: all primary producers were responsible for delivering to the state a set quota, a specific amount of their manufactured product. …

There is no reason to disbelieve that once these quotas were achieved, the laborer was able to profit from his/her/their own private production. Everything produced beyond the quota could be freely disposed of in an open market of barter exchange. It is difficult
to conceive of what other mechanism would have existed for satisfying the growing population’s everyday needs.”
85: “The ethnographic record amply demonstrates the co-existence of public and private property. Among hunters and gatherers the ownership of land is communal, belonging to all, at least to all members of a specific tribe, lineage, etc. Tools, on the other hand, are reckoned as private property. And even in this instance one must note that the communally owned land of one group, be it a family and/or tribe, is perceived of as distinctive from the communal lands claimed by another group. In this regard the communally held lands of each group are regarded by that group as their private property. Similarly among nomads, grazing lands are held as tribal property and seen as distinctive from the grazing lands ‘owned’ by other tribes. And while the grazing land is communally owned, the animals remain the private possession of individuals.”
94-5: “We noted above that expansion appears to be a universal element in the emergence of early state systems. Expansionism characterized not only Mesopotamia, but also the earliest states in Egypt, the Indus Valley, China and the Oxus, as well as Teotihuacan and Chimu in the New World.”
102: [in the discussion section, responding to Wright] “If Michael [Hudson] believes there was a pristine period of time in which the world was communal, then we have a fundamental disagreement. (Professor Hudson shakes his head no throughout this statement.) I believe that private and public are a polarity embedded in each other. One gives definition to the other, and it has always been there, even in the context of the Paleolithic, when the individual person was making the tool.”

Edzar, Private Land Ownership


110: “The oldest cuneiform documents dealing with real estate transfers are made ‘for eternity,’ even more definitively than would be the case with tablets of baked clay.”
111: “sellers in these documents rarely act alone and exclusively on their own behalf. Third parties—members of the seller’s family, as far as they can be identified—join in. They are called ‘those who have eaten (i.e., who have the usufruct of) the purchase price. …
… in some surviving communities, such as the Pueblo Indians, land is still owned collectively and no portion of it may be sold to an outsider.

Be that as it may, by the middle of the third millennium BC we find real estate owned by private individuals, or groups of individuals, they stood in no special relation to the ‘God’ or ‘the State.’ They had the right to cede ownership titles by sale. Unfortunately, we have no idea just how much arable land in given territories or ‘city-states’ was privately owned.”
116: “Whereas the ilkum was rent-free (but a service had to be performed in lieu of rent), the eqel biltim was service-free (n annual amount of grain or silver was due, but not royal service.”
Byccellati, Giorgio, “The Role of Socio-Political Factors in the Emergence of ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ Domains in Early Mesopotamia

131: “the dichotomy between public and private is coterminous with the origin of the city. In this sense the city may be defined as a public group, one whose internal solidarity derives from factors other than the reciprocal private knowledge of its individual members.

… the very distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ was inoperative in pre-urban times. …

All the factors we associate with the urban revolution support this conclusion. The sharper articulation of (1) political controls provided an administrative infrastructure and an ideological suprastructure. …

The dramatic advances in (2) manufacturing technology, monumental architecture, irrigation works and metallurgical production, along with the complex development of long distance trade, put the individual before the finished products. Such products were far removed from nature, and also no longer universally understood in terms of their genesis. They were public, in the sense that they required chains of transformation transcending the perceptual range of any given individual.”

132: “As a new (3) system of communication, writing served to standardize discourse and flatten personal idiosyncrasies. …

(4) The differentiation of social ranks and specialization of occupational crafts created a new perspective in the way humans looked at each other. They came to play functional roles within impersonal systems. As such, many easily stood to lose their own personal identities—witness especially the introduction of slavery. …

Finally, (5) law emerged as something different from custom. Uniform standards were applied to resolve conflicts. …

These considerations suggest a perceptual framework in which the notion of a public domain may have developed in Mesopotamia. True, it did not acquire a lexical identity … the implications inherent in the urban revolution, suggest a structural contrast between the individual and the community.”

140: “‘privatization’ is a process that goes hand in hand with the development of the public sphere. It can be (1) a way in which private individuals take advantage of the public domain for their own advantage. Or, it may serve (2) as a means whereby certain private privileges are protected systematically, no necessarily out of a developed social conscience but because of the benefit this provides for the public domain. It can also develop into (3) a conflictual position where individuals oppose the public institution, and may dead to the establishment of alternative public institutions.”

141: “Hence, the first form of ‘privatization’ may be considered to be the exploration of controls made newly available by the public domain.
The converse is also true: The public domain probably would not have come into existence without the impulse provided by the prospect of private gain. This is how social stratification and economic differentiation made a quantum leap in the wake for the urban revolution.”

142: “the term muskenum referred specifically to an individual so protected, a ‘homesteader’ as we may say in English. His ‘homestead’ (eqel muskenum) could be alienated, but not permanently, because it would revert to him or his family at certain points in time an under certain conditions. …

… protection of the homesteader may be viewed as resulting more from a concern for the public domain than as a phenomenon of privatization. The economic efficiency of the state was better served by virtue of having a class of homesteaders able to maintain themselves. Their homestead was protected not so much against encroachments by the state, as against purchases by private capital holders intent on increasing their investment.”

145: “Such a transposition occurred along two major lines (1) metaphorical and (2) religious. An important byproduct was (3), the development of ceremonial circumstances that catered in a special way to the presentation and fruition of this ideological superstructure. …

There was obviously a vested interest on the part of leaders to develop ideological canons that would uphold their public character and function. Instead of being seen merely as exercising coercive power, the leader would want to project, in his military functions, the image of the shepherd who protects his flock, and who extends his capable help in defending the community against threats to its integrity and interests.”

146: “Instead of being seen as merely a self-servicing master setting up rules for his own advantage, the leader would want to project, in maintaining the legal order, the image of a caring judge upholding the rights of even the weak and oppressed. This is not to say that these images, and others, were wholly fictitious. …

… Whether royal or priestly, leadership was political and its ideology was both secular and religious. … It need not surprise us that religious beliefs should have been used to serve political means, for there is no period in history when this did not occur. But the converse need to surprise us either. There was indeed room for some authentic religious beliefs.”

From the discussion:

148: “Mitchell: The private entrepreneurs who conducted Rome’s business were called publicans. They bind on taxes as private individuals. They had their own businesses, but they are publicani because they collect the public taxes and work in the public sector.”

149-150: Lamberg-Karlovsky: “6500 BC. If you look at the Pre-Pottery Neolithic B sites, what is becoming increasingly apparent is that the context where things are stored is in the domestic house, not centralized storage facilities. Adjacent to it are clearly storage facilities. Someone is bringing up the emmer and the barley as such. It is highly probable, I would argue, that the individuals who lived in those houses commanded that surplus, and that they owned it privately. …

Just for the fun of it, let’s reverse the aspect from privatization and consider the possibility that what you are dealing with is, in effect, a process of communalization.
Suppose the initial conditions of the Neolithic were autonomous household communities, villages that were basically self-sufficient. Suppose that they somehow were directed by headmen, by senior members of lineages etc. That is entirely speculative, but the dominant aspect that would suggest that the surplus is in the hands of domestic households and owned privately. This is capital, if you will. What then happens in the context of urbanization is that the emerging administrative authorities are going to extractively command your private surplus into what now becomes the corporate surplus of the city.”

151: Buccellati: “I agree with your suggestion that there may be communalization. I agree if you would call ‘private’ whatever comes before. I don’t think the villages of the Halaf type were ‘public’ buildings or structures, because the group is too small. I like to see the growth of the group as the standard whereby the public becomes truly public. In that sense, there is communalization, because ‘public’ begins’ only when there is a city.”

Maidman ‘Privatization’ and Private Property at Nuzi


156: “for the most part the government did not intervene in the operation of the private sector. …

Private real estate holdings are ubiquitous in the Nuze texts. …

… How is title to real estate established? … Original settlement is one such way but, however one may imagine this phenomenon, it is undocumented in the records we have, and so much must be set aside. Whether the victorious state allocated land to its warriors or individuals appropriated land following conflict, neither is attested. Neither, therefore, can be discussed other than speculatively.

156-7: “Purchase in its variegated form is ubiquitously described. These [257] forms include outright purchase, complementary purchase which we call ‘exchange,’ purchase of land by means of contracts employing the terminology of adoption, and other forms. None touches on the problem of privatization.

Nor do royal proclamations regarding periodic debt remission, called sudutus in the Nuze texts. …

… the existence of the sudutus may well indicate that, within the private sector, there took place an ongoing shift of real property from the small peasantry to a class of large landlords.

Only one means of real estate transfer attested at Nuzi addresses the central question of how real estate shifts from government to private ownership. And that is by royal grant. But of all the attested means by which real estate is transferred in this community, royal grant must surely be the most poorly documented.”

162: “the unambiguous evidence for privatization at Nuzi—or even the ambiguous evidence, for that matter—is extremely limited. …

… privatization of land, leads one to conclude that privatization existed but was a minor, insignificant phenomenon at most. …
By and large, state and private sectors remained distinct and separate in an ongoing, stable relationship. Most real estate activity appears to have taken place within the private sector.

163: “Internal evidence of the texts supports this impression of vigorous private real estate activity in other ways as well. Wherever the archives yield the history of plots of land, going back sometimes four or five generations to the earliest attested period of Lake Bronze Age Nuzi, such land stays within the families of private individuals. There are no known connections between royal donations and later private transactions. It may be difficult to determine whether the dominant form of property-holding at Nuzi was private or governmental, but the role of the private sector, conceived as either individuals or nuclear families rather than as extended families, was at least very prominent. Such private parties represented an emerging landlord class and, secondarily, a free peasantry.

… Whatever dynamic shifts took place in property relationships at Nuzi took place within the private sphere where the landlord class seems gradually and inexorably to have broken a free peasantry of its legal title to the soil.”

Heltzer, Michael, “The Symbiosis of Public and Private Sectors in Ugarit, Phoenicia, and Palestine

Heltzer, Michael, “The Symbiosis of Public and Private Sectors in Ugarit, Phoenicia, and Palestine,” in Hudson & Levine … Chapter 6, pp. 177-196

177: “At Ugarit we encounter a royal distributive system operating in a kingdom covering about 3,000 square kilometers. An ubiquitous royal control and personal dependency on the royal establishment limited the private sector down to the beginning of the 12th Century, when the country and its thriving commercial economy were destroyed. During 1400-1200 BC, almost a third of the population consisted of royal dependents …, organized into professional groups supervised by royally appointed rbm ‘managers’ or ‘headmen,’ who often were allotted land as ex officio conditional holdings.”

178: “holding land was often legally restricted, and burdened by obligations to perform or provide various services for the king.”

179: “find land confiscated from holders who failed to perform their obligations by paying the taxes due. In all the recorded cases, the king received specific amounts of silver.”

181: “women appear as sellers or buyers of real estate, sometimes as co-owners. It seems that they acted independently and held legal rights as land holders equal to those of their male counterparts.”

182: “Certain acts of adoption were concealed appropriations of property in settlement of debts. … As in other Syrian centers of the period, most adoption contracts that have survived are evidently fictitious, being in fact property transfers. What is striking is the dominant role played by women in these cases.”

183: “A symbiosis of private and royal economies developed. Even if the famous anti-monarchic speech attributed to the prophet Samuel (I Sam. 8), denouncing the royal establishment as compelling the people to serve the monarch’s economic and political
interests, was written at a later date, it reflects how the Canaanite city-state conducted its business in an earlier period.”

**Dandamayev, An Age of Privatization in Ancient Mesopotamia**


197: “In the Third and early second millennium, the palace (‘state’) economy played the leading role in Southern Mesopotamia. In the absence of a market economy, this enormous state-controlled sector was an inevitable and indeed, even a natural means of coping with ‘the difficulties of procurement of raw materials’ …. But based as it was on large bureaucratic machinery and semi-free labor, this economy proved insufficient, and was replaced by private and temple households employing mainly free labor, supplemented by slave labor.

By the Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid periods (626-311 BC), Babylonia had developed three distinct sectors: the royal or palace economy, temple estates, and private households both large- and small-scale. The leading role belonged to the private and temple households.”

199: “The temple’s normal practice was to lease out much of its land to co-called rent collectors, who were responsible for delivering a fixed annual amount of produce to the temple. … Their role was to supervise the collection of rent, subleasing the land rather than cultivating it themselves.”

204: “Economic historians and Assyriologists have long described Ancient Mesopotamia as a self-sustaining subsistence economy, inferring by this label that a market economy did not exist. This opinion reflects the influence of Karl Polanyi’s model of ancient Near Eastern economies as being non-market in character. But documentary evidence has now called this arguments into question.”

206: “It also is unlikely that hired laborers had enough food from their own holdings so that they did not have to resort to any market. Many scholars believe that ancient economies were not profit-seeking (i.e., that their managers or entrepreneurs were not motivated by profit), and artisans and other people had enough land to obtain their own food. But if this was the case, it hardly is possible to explain why Neo-Babylonia free hirelings worked for other individuals and temples at all!”

207: “Long before the period under consideration, much of Babylonia’s land had been privatized nearly to the same degree as occurred in the classical Mediterranean realms. The land had become truly private property held by those who cultivated it, unless they were tenants of military soldiers settled on state lands. Hundreds of documents attest to the fact that land was freely sold for money”.

208: “The Neo-Babylonian economic surplus consisted mainly of rent collected by temples such as Eanna or Ebabbar, and by some important business houses. This rent took the form of many tens of thousands of hectoliters of barley, dates and other agricultural products annually for major public and private institutions.”
Any doubts as to the existence of a market economy in first-millennium Babylonia thus are groundless. What remains to be clarified is how decisive the market system was within the overall economy. …

Certainly a developed private economic sector was typical of first-millennium Babylon, a period of unprecedented growth and privatization. … The labor of free farmers and tenants was the basis of agriculture, even as large landowners increased their sway, for they preferred the services of free tenants, to whom they rented small parcels of land. State or royal land was also settled mostly by free tenants and soldiers. Large-scale landownership thus was accompanied by small-scale land tenure.

Temple property nominally belonged to the principal deity of the temple, and in practice was deemed to be the collective property of the citizens of the temple neighborhood. … During religious festivities, temples distributed meat and other food to members of the local communities, and also supported their communities in times of famine or other disastrous events.

The documentary evidence shows no concentration of property in just a few hands, no mass ruination and enslavement of first-millennium Babylonia. Individuals who were deprived of land or did not possess sufficient property had a wide range of opportunities. They could become hired laborers, or rent land and implements, draught animals and seed, or enter royal service or work for the temples.”

209: “Slave-owners … considered it more profitable to allow their slaves to manage property of their own, and to pay an appropriate quitrent. …

To sum up, in earlier periods of Mesopotamian history the state-controlled economy was able to obtain all important resources (including essential raw materials from abroad), and to supply a considerable number of workmen and officials with food rations, wood, etc. However, the forced semi-free labor used extensively on palace estates required constant supervision, as such workmen rarely showed much interest in the results of their labor.”

From the discussion section:

216: “Buccellati: How about the Old Babylonian period? Do you think there was no market economy?
Dandamayev: I would abstain from any conclusion. You know there are some 20,000 Neo-Babylonian published documents, and I have enough trouble with them. For the Old Babylonian period, I must rely on other scholars. …
Edzard: … I personally have never had the slightest doubt that there was a market in Old Babylonian times. I never understood why this became an object of mystification.”

217: “Mainman: The evidence for Nuzi is somewhat ambiguous in regard to the role of markets.”

Levine, Baruch A. “Farewell to the Ancient Near East: Evaluation Biblical References to Ownership of Land in Comparative Perspective.” Hudson & Levine … Chapter 8, pp. 223-252
“My particular concern is with the private ownership of land in Israel in contrast to royal lands, temple estates and other forms of ownership that we would classify as public.

The Hebrew Bible incorporates within its codes of law, its narratives and court literature, and even in its prophecy and wisdom, extensive references to ancient Near Eastern social, legal and economic practices known to us from comparative cultures.”

“What we have to work with are canonical law codes, which often approximate original documents in their formulation. These collections of laws, preserved in the Torah (Pentateuch), specify terms of land sale and purchase and impose restrictions on such transactions.

We also find reference to the legalities of land ownership which are regularly utilized by scholars to infer the operations of Israelite government and economy.

The biblical evidence for reconstructing the Israelite economy is, therefore, very limited.”

“I will begin by probing two examples illustrating the methodological problems involved in mining the Hebrew Bible for economic information: (1) The subject of royal land grants in the pre-exilic period as an instrumentality for generating private property, and (2) The Economic effects of war on the ownership of family land.

… private land was most often family land in biblical Israel. ‘family.’ The term is ambiguous. In biblical usage, Hebrew *mispaha* is bet rendered ‘sib’ or ‘clan,’ because all indications are that it designated an extended family, if not an even larger unit. In contrast, Hebrew *bait*, literally ‘house, household,’ probably designated, in the first instance, a family sharing the same domicile.”

“Family land thus was private in the sense that it did not belong to the tribe as a whole, or to the realm in the office of the king, or to a temple, city or nation collectively. It was not, however, entirely private inasmuch as restrictions usually were placed in its alienation at arms length, and clan members usually bore obligations with respect to preserving its integrity.

Biblical literature provides suggestive of royal land grants, indicating that at least some privately owned, or family owned land was generated in this way.

The overall result of the given textual situation is that we must look to nonlegal, biblical sources for information on royal grants of land in pre-exilic Israel and Judah.”

“When we read … that Moses, like David, is taunted about granting the leading warriors of Israel fields and vineyards we are actually being told something about the emergence of private land ownership through royal grams.

Caleb conquered the area around Hebron in the Judean hills and was granted these territories by Moses. … the granting of land by rulers to returning warriors, of course, a widely known practice throughout history.”

“The king will predictably take from the populace, and give to his favorites, warriors and courtiers.

… even the few references preserved in biblical literature attest to more widespread practices.”
235: “The only coherent legal code in the Torah that governs land ownership is Leviticus 25, with some corollary provisions appearing in Leviticus 27.”

236: “The Hebrew Bible uses three principal terms of reference to denote land ownership; or, to put it another way, to designate the legal status of land. All three terms run the gamut from collective to private ownership. They are: 1) yerussah, 2) nahalah, and 3) ahuzzah. Of the three ahuzzah is in my view the latest, or youngest …

1) The term yerussah derives from a verb whose primary sense is physical possession by conquest or seizure, and which has the extended meaning of inheritance”.

237: “2) The Hebrew term nahalah … designates the domain of a god in myth. … I doubt if in biblical usage … land classified as nahalah could have been purchased in the first instance; it can only be granted by some authority, human or divine, and consequently received or inherited, as within a family; or, it can be physically possessed as through conquest. …

3) This brings us to ahuzzah. … I am far from comprehending the ahuzzah system to my satisfaction, but there is some progress to report.”

241: “A second term of reference after deror, and which further defines the limitations of ownership, is adverbial lisemitut, ‘irretrievably, finally handed over.’ Land may not be sold under terms that do not allow for its redemption or retrieval. Now, as is known, the stative form sami is attested in the Akkadian documents from Ugarit, where it means ‘transferred, finally handed over.’ … samit always followed by the close ‘forever, day and night, no person may take it away.’ …

… Arable, Israelite land may not be sold in this way. A theological basis is adduced for the restrictions on alienations: All land belongs to God, and even the Israelis, themselves, do not have title to it! They are like Abraham, gerim wemosabim ‘resident aliens,’ the God of Israel having granted them the land of Israel as ahuzzah.”

243: “In summary, Leviticus 25 and 27 describe a system of limited, private ownership of arable land in the land of Israel. The Israelite landowner is treated as a firm legal entity in his own right, rather than merely as a clan, or tribal member. The Temple administers dealings in real estate of the Israelite community. There is an overriding concern with retaining arable land in Israelite hands, so that the clan obligation to act on behalf of a fellow Israelite is stronger in the case of land forfeited to non-Israelites than it would be in case of foreclosure by another Israelite.

… Another biblical source relevant to our understanding of land ownership as legislated in Leviticus 25 and 27 is Nehemiah 5.”

245: “Judeans were foreclosing on each other right and left, reducing one another to virtual serfdom …. In other words, they weren’t keeping the commandments of Leviticus 25 and 27. As a result, what the ahuzzah system had sought to achieve, to protect the rights of individual landowners, was not achieved. …

… we are still far from any valid understanding of Leviticus 25 and 27.”
Mitchel, Public Property and Private Wealth During the Roman Republic

Mitchel, Richard E., “Ager Publicus: Public Property and Private Wealth During the Roman Republic,” Hudson & Levine … Chapter 9, pp. 253-292

253: “The origin of private property in archaic Italy is shrouded in the mist created by the guesswork of our sources about the early development of Rome. Penetration of that mist is further complicated by the debate among modern historical and legal scholars. One school of thought piously defends their orthodox position that private property developed only gradually from what had been communal ownership of land, and that private ownership was once limited to movable good. A schism exists between this school and those who maintain that private ownership of land always existed, however limited in scope and however defined by law or custom.

… ‘Before Jove,’ said Virgil … ‘no farmer tamed the fields, nor was it proper … to mark off or partition the land with boundary stones. The farmers sought everything in common.’”

254: “tradition crediting King Numa Pompilius, good religious king that he was, with establishing the primitive rule that forbade the removal of boundary stones …

… removal of boundary stones was a heinous crime also in classical Greece and the ancient Near East. … boundary stones and private property make their first appearance in the earliest period of Rome’s legendary and romanticized prehistory.

… the tradition told how Romulus gave out to each Roman only a modest parcel of conquered land”.

254-255: “Another pervasive tradition asserted that noble aristocrats migrating to Rome during the course of the monarchy received large parcels of land [255] and small parcels for their followers.”

255: “Romulus had militarily extended Roman territory, and was unwilling to recognize boundaries. …

… other tracts once used by Numa were subsequently given virītim, individually, to the poor by Rome’s third king, Tullius Hostillius. The fourth king of Rome, Ancus Marcius, also divided conquered territory among the citizens, and made the coastal forest public property.…

King Servius Tullius, in turn, declared that public lands acquired by the military success of the poor should not be monopolized by the wealthiest citizens. … An edict was issued demanding that those currently enjoying the use of public lands should give up possession, and that citizens without allotments of land should make their names known. The public lands were then divided among those who had previously worked for others.”

256: “Over the course of two centuries, in a very inconsistent tradition, our sources have portrayed Roman development going from a legendary period of communal property to parity in private property among citizens under Romulus, culminating in Servius Tullius’s recognition of different classes of citizens based upon wealth, which presumably was calculated in terms of land.

Of course, none of the aforementioned can be regarded as reliable information about Rome during the regal period. … However, our sources made several assumptions about the past that must be highlighted. They assume that all citizens originally possessed
a minimum amount of land, and also that discrepancies in landed wealth existed as early as human history. Finally, it was assumed that rich and powerful citizens received the lion’s share of the lands and wealth resulting from Rome’s military success. In many instances these assumptions are at variance with the idealized depiction of the simple and modest life of the earliest Romans.”

258: “As in the case of familia, pecunia likewise initially must have consisted of movables, and did not include houses or land ….

Since both familia and pecunia were subject to the laws of inheritance and family control, but neither seems to cover land, some scholars have concluded that manpower and cattle were once the core of private property. Land was unimportant, because tillage was limited. Therefore, the argument continues, originally private property was limited to movable goods. Land was held in common, not inherited, except perhaps for the herdium. In addition to arguing that familia was originally distinct from pecunia because the former consists of humans and the latter of animals, it further is that familia should be identified with res mancipi, and pecunia wish res nec mancipi.”

259: “There is no reliable evidence from the Twelve Tables that land was ever owned in common.”

260: “Only the nostalgia expressed for a simpler and nobler time controverts these facts. We cannot accept the argument that by the time of the Twelve Tables, private land ownership had become so central that the original role of common property was obfuscated …. There is no evidence of communal property in early Rome for the simple reason it was never a feature of Roman society. There certainly is not vestige of it in Roman law.

… There certainly were collections of legal materials, but the next—that is the first—codification of Roman law was not undertaken until the end of the 3rd century AD. Moreover, Romans were not accustomed to publishing all public documents—even laws—and did not even routinely consult existing records, much less organize them in collections.

There is good reason why no historical record of the Twelve Tables exists in any form, and why no ancient author presents a detailed description or analysis of the Code.”

261: “No standard text of the law ever existed. Before 200 BC, Romans were not concerned with the historical value of usefulness of earlier materials. Consequently, materials were not routinely preserved as part of a record of chronological development.

… Even the historical narrative recorded that the Twelve Tables were destroyed when the Gauls sacked the city in 390 BC. …

… only a few of the laws are placed by our sources in any particular table. Even the organization of the laws into tables is a modern creation, by and large. This organization owes more to modern assumptions about archaic Roman legal practices and the growth of secularization than anything found in the sources.”

262: “In sum, there is little reason to believe that an authentic code known as the Twelve Tables ever existed other than in the form of individualized copies of laws, procedures, and interpretations meant to serve as instructions for parties, mainly students, interested in Roman legal development.”

264: “Individual families, not clans or gentes, are the key to understanding the origins of the aristocracy. Kinship, succession and inheritable private wealth were concerns first
and foremost of individuals within families, not groups of families, e.g. clans or gentes.

…

Roman gentes consisted of individuals bound by personal ties to a particular chief for economic and, I would offer, military interests. Although all members might share the gentilic nomenclature, it was based on a fictional kinship. …

… the archaic state lacked the information and ability to recruit and mobilized troops quickly in any quantity. It thus assigned responsibility to prominent individuals.”

266: “Servius Tullius was the first to require hoplites from prominent local leaders. He thus mobilized the first public military force. Actually, he created the state. His ‘reform’ is described more accurately as the initial incorporation and organization of the ager, the Latin countryside, from which local leaders and their entourages came. When he imposed an organization and created a centuriate system for a particular purpose—to unite the private and regional forces in a common public effort …—there was no older hereditary aristocratic system based on communal property for him to replace. …

By institutionalizing the status of the various local leaders as aristocrats, Servius legitimized their existing control (care it be called ownership at this time?) of land and other resources in their respective districts. … the change was not from communal to private ownership of land but from the private property claims of local strongmen (reinforced simply by their bands of followers) to the public recognition of those claims. Rights of ownership that once grew out of the point of a sword now could be voiced in public forum.

This conclusion is reinforced by the archeological record of Rome under the kings, a record that becomes more voluminous and unambiguous daily.”

269: Between 358 and 299 BC, in what has been described as a ‘drive to acquire land’ …, Rome created eight more rural tribes, established dozens of colonies, and added thousands of acres to ager romanus, most of which must have been ager publicus. On the eve of the First Punic War it is estimated that Roman Territory consisted of 26850 square kilometers, with a population of 900,000 ….

Perhaps as much as a third of the added land resulted from colonial foundations and direct Roman possession, with a similar amount of ager publicus having been sold off or rented. Neither practice, of course, prevented wealthy Romans from taking direct advantage of Roman conquests to obtained greater land holdings …

… during this same period (366-291 BC) … ‘a handful of talented and charismatic individuals’ dominated the political scene. Conclusive evidence is lacking, but it is tempting to attribute their importance to their ability to profit from the socio-economic changes that accrued from the territorial expansion”.

270: “We can only guess that the occupation pattern matched the pattern of Roman conquests, for it is a well-established fact that aristocrats who conquered particular towns, peoples, or regions became their patrons, as did Roman officials sent out to parcel out the lands to settlers or colonists. In other words, those with direct contact with the peoples and places that Rome defeated and enslaved were frequently the ones who benefited the most from the seizure of lands subsequently turned into ager publicus. Over time, their descendants benefited form the hereditary support of clients who emerged from the ashes of the defeated.

The pages of our narrative sources also are filled with the constant complaints of those who did not benefit from Roman expansion. For instance, there is the portrait of the
small farmer called upon to help extend Roman rule and increase Roman territory, who loses his farm because of his absence or because of enemy raids. He fell into debt, was imprisoned or enslaved, and threatened with execution or sale trans Tiberim. The poor—nearly always identified as urban, plebeian, and as soldiers or veterans—cried out for debt relief and land redistribution. The land in question was ager publicus, public land, taken as a direct result of Roman conquests. These cries were heard from the day the city was founded. So were complaints that rich, creditor, patrician commanders oppressed the poor and took the fruits of Rome’s military success, including the ager publicus, for themselves. They contrived to still the complaints of the poor by constantly waging war, thereby keeping those demanding reform occupied outside the city”.

Colonies are the reason we do not hear demands for land redistribution in the 4th century [BC]. From the fall of Veii to the First Punic War (396-264 BC), expect for the setback caused by the Gauls, Roman conquest of the peninsula was rapid … veterans were rewarded with lands in these colonies as their share of the booty, although complaints about not receiving their share continued.”

Moreover, when Livy mentioned that Castrum Frentinum (near Thurium) was settled, the colonists consisted of 3,000 infantry and 300 equestrian veterans. This was a legion, if we subtract the 1,200 to 1,800 supernumerary troops requited from the poor.”

273: “colonists might well avail themselves of other lands, including unoccupied ager publicus. …

… two iugera was the amount of land that a foot soldier received as booty for each year of successful military service.”

274: “Everything we know about the rewards for military success shows that aristocratic commanders, their companions and higher military personnel obtained a disproportionate percentage of all forms of booty …. The evidence also clearly indicates that in the 2nd century BC many individuals possessed large tracts of ager publicus in excess of the legal limit. … the land tended to be treated as private property …

… before the 2nd century there was no dearth of ager publicus available for settlement and no surplus of individuals demanding the right to occupy it. Thus, excessive and illegal occupation was ignored. Individuals made use of as much ager publicus as ‘patrimonial resources would permit,’ and in this respect aristocratic occupants had superior resources …. They used their extensive clientele and slave labor to occupy more and more land. …

… Slaves, of course, were part of the booty shared by soldiers and here again commanders obtained the largest number. These slaves worked the confiscated lands—sometimes lands that had been their own.”

275: “debt-bondage, or nexum. … their plight is often interpreted as the direct result of inalienability of land. Hence, land’s original communal nature meant that an individual pledged himself or members of his family as security. … It was this voluntary debt bondage that was outlawed in the 4th century.”

From the discussion:

279: Hudson: “In the middle of the sixteenth century, in 1552, Bernard Cilpin preached a sermon before Edward V describing how
the rich people are able to find six or seven counselors to use subtleties and
sophisms to cloak the evil of taking their land. Poor men are being expropriated
from their land by the enclosures. The rich have such quick-smelling hounds, they
can lie in London, and turn men out of their farms and tenements, an hundred,
sometimes two hundred miles off. …
… This colloquium stopped, appropriately, with classical Rome, for it was Roman law
that protected the debt polarization leading to the monopolization of land, causing
unprecedented poverty. It hardened to such an extent that Romans did something no
earlier civilization had done: They banned usury, debt bondage and ultimately, slavery in
general.”

Hudson, Summary Review: Early Privatization and Its Consequences

Hudson, Michael, “Summary Review: Early Privatization and Its Consequences,”
Hudson & Levine … pp. 293-308

293: “not even Rome developed an ethical or economic rationale for privatization. It is
rather seen emerging via ‘loopholes’ in the matrix of traditional sanctions designed to
prevent its widespread alienation on more than a temporary basis. Profs. Maidman, Hallo
and Heltzer discuss the stratagem of ‘fictitious adoptions’ used in Nuzi and Ugarit to cloak
in essence were debt foreclosures and sales under economic duress.
… well-placed families operated within Babylonia’s temple or palace
bureaucracies to obtain the land’s crop yield and interest on their own account. Their
economic assertiveness represents an almost timeless phenomenon, akin to the drive by
Europe’s feudal barons seeking to keep the land’s rent for themselves, and to ‘privatize’
what hither to had been royal privilege or traditional communal rights.”
294: “Buccellarti asks whether it really is appropriate to speak of privatization that
occurred by such surreptitious encroachment. …
It certainly is true that nobody in antiquity advanced the idea that private property
and personal self-seeking would bring about a more efficient social system than
communal property or private property managed unselfishly. …
The phenomenon of privatization did exist, however. Although it represented an
ad hoc dissolution of centralized royal power, it brought about new types of
centralization as economic polarization resulted from the unchecked dynamics of interest-
bearing debt and monopolization of the land.”
295: “this colloquium picks up the story ‘in the middle,’ at the point where there already
were public assets to privatize, for how can assets be spoken of as being privatized, after
all, until they have come into being in a non-private form?”
298: “privatization also occurs first at the top, by individuals in the palace regime or
otherwise well connected: the ruler himself; then royal collectors foreclosing on hitherto
communal land (and by the Middle Bronze Age, tribal chieftains taking over temples for
their own families).”
299: “the key criterion making land and other property ‘private’ was its alienability. The
right to sell land or pledge it as collateral can be viewed not only as opening up
opportunities for gain by the well-to-do, but as a stripping away of protection against the loss of self-support for families living on the edge of poverty. …

… it was the imperial ambitions of Hammurapi that led him to delegate authority to local leaders in exchange for their military support. This was the inception of ‘feudalism.’ Inevitably, headmen sought to hold onto the local economic surplus for themselves rather than pass it on to the palace.”

300: “The First land transactions on record are those brought by these rulers, probably using tribute money for their initial acquisitions. No doubt royal appropriation of land within the ruler’s own community was circumscribed by traditional norms of behavior, leaving the conquest of foreign lands as the major ‘state’ acquisition that rulers could keep for their own account or delegate to their companions. The association between foreign conquest and royal land ownership is seen down through imperial Roman times.”

301: “Each region examined at this colloquium exhibits a common economic phenomenon, although not all members thought that it should be called privatization. …

… Prof. Maidman … finds Nuzi a sharp contrast to Babylonia’s property structures and traditions, and points out that only the palace and the ‘private’ sector appear in Nuzi’s records. ‘Communal’ property as such is not involved, for all property already is held privately. …

… Prof. Hallo’s question remains open. … why was there a need to use the loophole of ‘fictive adoptions’ to convey land titles? … such a stratagem suggests the need to circumvent some constraint on alienating subsistence land out of one’s own family.”

304: “‘Privatization’ historically has been associated with absentee landlordship. A natural upshot has been that large land acquirers manage to shed the social obligations hitherto attached to their property by custom. This starves the public sector of revenue.”

**Humphrey, The Social Function of Intellect**


17: "During 2 months I spent watching gorillas in the Virunga mountains I could not help being struck by the fact that of all the animals in the forest the gorillas seemed to lead much the simplest existence--food abundant and easy to harvest (provided they knew where to find it), few if any predators (provided they knew how to avoid them),--little to do, in fact (and little done), but eat, sleep, and play. The same is arguably true for natural man." Cites Sahlins for human laziness.
Hutton: place of material culture in the study of anthropology


p. 1: “Presidential Address”

3: “there is at least a plausible philosophic basis for approaching the study of social anthropology from the aspect of material culture. At least that is so if I am right in believing that the entire elevation of man from an animal status must have been started in some form of concrete progress of a definitely material nature. It is generally admitted that the life of man is still ‘nasty, brutish and short,’ and it has been suggested that man’s rise from a purely bestial condition is traceable in the end to his possession of an opposable thumb …

It seems to be possession of material culture, or at least tools with which to provide it, which, in as great a degree as language (and perhaps not entirely as a result of language), distinguishes the human from other animals. It is after all in the material culture of a people that we can find the only effective tests of the degree of civilization which that people possesses. And while the standard of material culture must be taken as indicating mental potentialities, so too the ability to take over and use the material culture of others must be taken as indicating the possibility of progress.”

Ingold. The appropriation of nature


CHECKED OUT FROM GEORGETOWN

Chapters 2-4: establish that the difference between human work and animal behavior is intentionality. This implies that animal don’t appropriate.

73: “it is the self-conscious co-option of unmodified nature, whether internal or external to the body, that man’s original mastery resides.”

95: “it is, we insist, the intentional component of action that transforms the forager-predator into a gatherer-hunter.”

101: “these relations, among hunters, are of sharing, understood not as a pattern of manifest behaviour nor as a culturally imposed rule, but as an experience of mutual interpersonal involvement.”

113: “The principle of collective appropriation is summed up in the much used, and much abused concept of sharing.”

148: “the supposed ‘owner’ of a territory cannot refuse outsiders access to its resources, and that the office of unannounced intrusion lies not in the suspicion of poaching but in the potential hazard it poses to successful foraging (Riches 1982: 114-15).”

149-150: describes the lack of clear boundaries between the territories of hunter-gatherer bands.
150: “The non-existence of boundaries is problematic for anthropologists, and not at all for the people with whom they work”.

153: “Our provisional conclusion, then, is that tenure in hunting and gathering societies is not of surface area, but of sites and paths within a landscape. In agricultural societies, on the other hand, two-dimensional tenure does come into operation.”

154: “Does this mean that there is no tenure of land in hunting and gathering societies? Certainly not: but to appropriate the nature of tenure in these societies we have to stop thinking about the land in exclusively two-dimensional terms, as surface area.”

155: “The real whole’, wrote the philosopher Henri Bergson, ‘might well be … an indivisible continuity. The systems we cut out within it would, properly speaking, not be parts at all; they would be partial views of the whole’ …. Here, in a nutshell, is the essence of the relationship between the total environment of hunters and gatherers and the countries that are held by local groups. Nature is indivisible and continuous; every country is not a part of the whole containing a specific place, it is rather a partial view of the whole from a specific place, or the whole as it enfolded by that place. That is why the exercise of zero- or one-dimensional tenure by persons or groups is perfectly compatible with the collective appropriation of nature. In holding sites or paths, hunters and gatherers do not divide up the whole among themselves, each group taking its own portion and looking after it exclusively. It would be more true to say that each takes hold of one aspect of the world, or one part of the creative essence that underwrites its total constitution. And tending that essence, every group makes a vital, albeit partial contribution to the maintenance of the whole.”

157-8: “We have shown … that a form of tenure did exist in hunting and gathering societies, but that it did not amount to the tenure of the ground surface. Could it not, then, be argued that to satisfy traditional native claims, no more need be conceded than rights of access to protected sites, allowing the entire area not actually enclosed within these sites to be turned over to the State or private commercial interests? The argument is invalid, for the simple reason that sites derive their identity and significance from their position within the total country. … To take away a country is to extinguish the sites that enfold the country. Conversely, the system of zero- and one-dimensional tenure that we have described can only work on the premise that the country as a whole is held in collective tenure by its entire native [158] population. Yet to regain even fraction of that country, native people have had to contend through a process of law for their title to exclusive blocks, cut out from the whole. In so doing, traditional principles of tenure have inevitably been compromised.”

200: ‘the much maligned category of ‘hunting and gathering may, after all, have some theoretical significance, denoting the practical concomitant of a system of social relations of production marked by generalized access, to which I have already referred as ‘the collective appropriation of nature’.

222: “The opposition between individualism and collectivism, expressed in a variety of guises, is deeply rooted in anthropological thinking. … in … Dumont … the opposition is expressed between the Homo hierarchicus of the ‘traditional world … and the Homo aequalis of the ‘west’. … In the former conception, the collectively ordered totality, ‘society as a whole’, which underwrites his destiny. In the latter, he is a self-contained individual, possessed of autonomy, and free to pursue ends that are given to him by his inherent nature rather than coming to him from society.”
222-3: “In most hunting and gathering societies, a supreme value is place upon the principle of individual autonomy. Opportunities for the expression of hierarchical dominance are systematically denied, and equality is actively asserted. Should we, then, classify hunters and gatherers as ‘traditional’ representatives of Homo Aequalis? And if not, how are we to express the difference between their kind of individualism, and our ‘western’ kind? To anticipate our conclusion: it is that theirs is an individualism grounded in the social totality. In order to reach this conclusion, we have to show how the autonomy of the individual, for from being incompatible with a commitment to the whole, may in reality depend upon it. In the three sections that this is so, first in the field of property rights and so-called ‘ownership’, secondly with regard to the practices of reciprocity, and thirdly as manifested in the organization of the band.”

223: “Implicit characterization of practical, food-producing activities as hunting or gathering is a social principle of collective appropriation, or undivided access to the means of subsistence in the form of living plants and animals. Yet individualistic property concepts, far from being unknown to hunters and gatherers, are a ubiquitous feature of their societies. So, too, are prescriptions that enjoin them to share whatever they may have procured with other members of the local group or band. These have inclined some observers to follow Morgan (1881: 63-78) in attributing the practice of ‘communism in living’ to hunter-gatherer societies, whilst others assert the contrary—that in these societies ‘considerations of private property are supreme’ (Herskovits 1952: 322). But as Herskovits goes on to point out, with good reason, the dichotomy between ‘communism’ and ‘private ownership’ is pretty meaningless unless the rights constitutive of property are more precisely specified, and these rights are known to vary quite substantially from one society to another (1952: 330). Our first task, therefore, must be to isolate the particular forms of possession that, in the ethnographic literature on hunting and gathering societies, have been rendered as ‘ownership’, and to compare them with that we, in our own society commonly understand by the term. We have to consider the possession first of land, secondly of equipment, and thirdly of garnered plant and animal resources.”

223-4: “The division of the landscape into territorial compartments, far from defining zones of exclusive access to particular holders, actually serves to regulate the exploitation of a dispersed resource over a common range, and that it should be seen as an aspect of practical co-operation rather than social competition. Under no circumstances can the land itself be alienated, and although a person could point to a tract extending from a place or on either side of a path as ‘my country’ and expect to be consulted by those intending to use its resources, he is not generally in a position to refuse access to outsiders. Possession here is a matter of looking after the country, or of tending the creative powers that are thought to reside in its core locales. So-called ‘owners’ are thus, in reality, no more than the custodians of parts of a world that belongs to all, and they exercise their rights and responsibilities on behalf of the collectivity. In other words, what an owner possesses, to the exclusion of others, is the privilege of custodianship, not that which is held in custody. … [recalls famous Australian case] Asserting that property ‘implies the right to use or enjoy, the right to exclude others, and the right to alienate’, [the justice] concluded that since Aboriginal custom did not countenance the exclusive use of land or the possibility of its alienation, the claim was invalid.”
Perhaps the possession of tools or other equipment comes closer to our conventional notion of property than the extreme development of the concept of private property has gone hand in hand with the reduction of the bond between producer and product to a bar minimum. Most of what we own we have not produced ourselves. The hunter-gatherer’s ‘private ownership’ of tools and our ‘private ownership’ of commodities represent diametrically opposed situations. In the first, we start from the premise of an intrinsic connection between subject and object, person and thing, and from the assumption that where everyone shares the sills and has access to the raw materials needed for manufacture, tools will tend to remain in the hands of their makers. If they change hands at all, they will do so as gifts, but once this happens their possession can no longer be exclusive. For as long as a vital link is maintained between the donor and the thing given (and it is because of this link that the thing counts as a gift), the ‘hold’ of the recipient will be added to that of the donor, but will not replace it. In a society already characterized by a complex division of labour, where much of what is needed must be obtained by exchange, exclusive ‘private’ ownership can only be the end result of the complete severance of the links between persons and things, which therefore count no longer as gifts but as commodities.

So, these two kinds of individual possession are really quite different. One is founded on the non-exchange of objects positively attached to their makers, the other on the detachment of things from persons in the act of exchange. The latter, far from being a logical elaboration of the former, undercuts its very basis. Of course not every element of the hunter’s or gatherer’s tool-kit is imbued with the same value as a marker of personal identity. Many items, casually made from raw materials available on the spot, and just as casually discarded, may be freely lent or borrowed apparently without thought of restitution in case of loss or damage (Ingold 1980: 156). The duration of such items, as between manufacture and discard, is generally negligible when set in the context of the life-span of the user. Where the bond between persons and things is so tenuous, it is scarcely appropriate to speak of their ‘ownership’ at all. And yet it is not uncommon for them to be embellished with property marks which apparently signify just that, namely their appropriation as the personal effects of particular individuals. The appearance, however, is deceptive. For what in fact are being claimed are not the tools themselves but the resources with which they come to stand in a relationship of physical contiguity.”

It is commonly assumed that whatever a hunter or gatherer takes from nature is initially his (or hers) regardless of what may subsequently happen to it prior to its eventual consumption. Does this not follow logically from the fact that only by dint of the producer’s own labor was it obtained for human use? Any discussion of this question must necessarily take as its starting point the capital disquisition of John Locke.”

A brief discussion of some aspects of Locke’s appropriation theory.

“But the human gatherer, unlike most non-human primates, is not sustained solely by the produce he or she ‘picks up’. Much of what is consumed has been gathered by others, and vice versa. Given the prevalence of food-sharing in hunter-gatherer communities, we are bound to reverse Locke’s question: if the work of procurement makes the resource his who procures it, at what point does it cease to be his, reverting once more to the common? And by what right do those who have laboured not at all in the food quest claim their share?”
“To the extent that people are mutually involved in the production of each others’ existence, the products of their respective labours are due to all. Thus what a man appropriates through his labour, he appropriates on behalf of the collectivity through which—and only through which—he finds his being. It may be exclusively his to dispose of, but it is not his alone to consume. As Dowling points out, on the strength of a long catalogue of ethnographically documented instances from diverse hunting societies, ‘the rights and prerogatives entailed in ownership are primarily those of performing the distribution, not of deciding whether or not the animal will be distributed (1968: 505).”


“The possession of harvested produce, just like the possession of resource locales, turns out therefore to be a matter of custodianship. … But neither to country and resources, nor to produce, can access be refused by those who carry the responsibilities and prerogatives of custodianship. It is not poaching or theft to exploit a place without permission, or to take food that has not been offered or formally requested, for when access is common such crime is unknown. The misdemeanor is rather one of failing to recognize the owner’s privilege of disposal.”

“an inherent problem of all systems in which access to resources is held in common, is that there is nothing to prevent a person from shifting onto others the burden of labouring to procure food …. However, by superimposing, upon the principle of collective access, a system of individual privileges that afford esteem to those who, through the fruits of their labour, are entitled to enjoy them, this problem can be at least partially overcome. … One might suppose, then, that concepts of ownership would be most elaborate, and the pursuit of prestige most compelling, in those societies in which people are most like to be chronically reliant on products which others have laboured to obtained, and whose procurement must be backed by strong positive incentives. … our supposition may indeed be borne out.”

“Having reviewed the possession of each of land, equipment and resources in hunting and gathering societies, it is evident that in all three cases notions of personal property, far from being incompatible with the collective appropriation of nature, are in fact predicated upon it.”

“Far from exercising rights of enjoyment, as against the world, over the means of subsistence, as does the pastoralist in the possession of fenced-in plots, the hunter-gatherer enjoys exclusive rights to the custody of the means of subsistence, which he holds on behalf of the world. In short, the kind of individual possession that we have characterized more precisely as custodianship is possible, and indeed necessary, because the enjoyment of essential resources is common to an unbounded collectivity. And even the exclusive ownership of material equipment, based as it is on the intrinsic connection between items and their makers-cum-users rather than on the severance of such connections in exchange, is founded upon free and generalized access to the raw materials and skills of manufacture.”

“In situations of economic collapse, it is the intra-domestic relations between husband and wife, between mother and child, and between parent and grandparent, that take the strain. Thus the basic cleavages in the hunting and gathering society are not between domestic groups, but between the sexes, and between generations.”
233: “Rather than sharing stuff out in spite of an entitlement to reserve it for his exclusive use, he shares it out because the right of enjoyment is lodged with the collectivity.”
234: “There is a well-established tenet of anthropological orthodoxy which holds that tribes emerged in the course of social evolution from what are known as ‘bands’, and represent a level of integration intermediate between those of the band and the chiefdom.”
235-6: “compare them with the relations that constitute the band, which is generally conceived as a transient assemblage of co-resident individuals and families, its organization arising out of the practical exigencies of subsistence procurement under given environmental conditions … when we speak of ‘band society’, we mean by ‘society’ an association of individuals acting together in work and distribution; when we speak of ‘tribal society’, the reference of society is to an entity that transcends the spontaneous association of individuals, having a corporate identity of its own that governs the life of its constituent elements. Where the band [236] signifies a mode of practical co-operation, the concept of the tribe signals a specific form of social consciousness, by which persons are located within a structure system of segmentary opposition.”
239: “It is precisely this holistic sense that hunter-gatherer society is egalitarian; moreover this equality endures despite the clear and often explicit recognition of differences in ability as between one individual and another. Some men appear quick-witted, others slow; some make good hunters, others persistently fail. But where, in the west, such differences are popularly elevated as the root cause of social inequality, among hunters and gatherers, they remain matters of idiosyncratic variation that in no way compromises the equality of relations founded on their commitment to the whole.”
240: “For him [the individual in a hunting and gathering society] there is no contradiction, no conflict of purpose, between the expression of individuality and his generalized commitment to others. Since the world of others is enfolded with his own person, these are one and the same. In shot, if we wish to express the essential difference between the hunter-gatherers and ourselves, it is that whereas for us … every individual is an independent element of the aggregate collectivity, for them the collectivity is present and active in the life of every individual.”

**Ingold: Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology**


**Ellen—Modes of Subsistence**

Earle: Political Domination and Social Evolution, pp. 940-961

See hard copy highlights, but all I need to know is that he discusses several different evolutionary typologies.

Ingold, Riches, & Woodburn: H&G 1

Tim Ingold, David Riches, James Woodburn (Editors) Hunters and gatherers Volumes 1 and 2.
This two-volume work is made up of papers from the 1986 Hunter-Gatherers conference.


Foley: Hominids, humans, and hunter-gatherers

Foley, Robert. “Hominids, humans, and hunter-gatherers: an evolutionary perspective.” Chapter 13, pages 207-221
207: “Few conferences and subsequent publications have been as influential as Man the Hunter. The book … restored hunter-gatherers to their current position as Rousseau’s ‘noble savages’ and Sol Tax’s ‘original affluent society’. Prior to this they were, in prehistory, tenuously clinging to survival until the invention of agriculture brought their tedious and hazardous life to an end and, in ethnography, the marginal peoples of anthropological research.

The influence of Man the Hunter has been particularly marked in the field of human evolution. … Overall studies in human evolution shifted away from analyzing bones and stones simply to construct a chronology and an evolutionary narrative, and towards behavioral and evolutionary ecology—to an approach in which the evolution of humans was the evolution of the hunter-gatherer adaptation.”

208: “I shall look at two particular problems from the point of view of evolutionary ecology: first, the extent to which anatomically modern humans may have differed from other hominids; and second, the extent to which hunter-gathering, as understood by studies of living hunter-gatherers, was the way of life of all non-agricultural peoples. In other words, I shall try to test Lee and DeVore’s statement that “Cultural man has been on earth for some 2,000,000 years; for over 99 per cent of this period he has lived as a hunter-gatherer. … Of the estimated 80 billion men who have ever lived out a life span on earth, over 90 per cent lived as hunter-gatherers”.
“The Subsistence behaviour of early hominids is one of the most contentious fields of study in the mid-1980s”.

It seems quite probable that the earlier hominids did eat meat, but that this was not integrated into a central place foraging and food-sharing system as found among modern hunter-gatherers.

With anatomically modern human we see the appearance of more modern levels of technological variability and innovation, and that these do not occur with earlier forms of hominid. Earlier hominids were decidedly ‘unmodern’ in their technology, producing the same basic artifacts over enormous time spans.”

“In the previous model, earlier hominids were not substantially different from modern humans, and possessed a subsistence ecology at least partially like that of modern hunter-gatherers. In the view presented here the evolutionary ecology of earlier hominids and modern Homo sapien was markedly divergent. … Despite being omnivorous there is no reason to assume that their [early hominids’] foraging behaviour was of the same level of organization as modern hunter-gatherers in terms of planning depth, scheduling subsistence activity and foraging flexibility. In the absence of clear-cut evidence for central place foraging similar to that of modern hunter-gatherers, inferences about the social and sharing behaviour of early hominids must be tentative only.

In other words, if the term ‘hunter-gatherer’ is to mean more than just wild resource omnivory … (in which case it would include baboons, chimpanzees and many other animals!), then early hominids were neither human nor hunter-gatherers. Trying to understand what they were is one of the most exciting challenges facing palaeoanthropology.”

“we can now revise the assertion of Lee and DeVore … that 99 per cent of the hominid time-span was occupied by hunter-gatherers. Assuming the appearance of modern humans in Africa and their spread throughout the world by 30,000 years ago, then perhaps a figure of around 5 per cent is closer to the mark. … modern humans make their appearance in various parts of the world at dates ranging from possibly as early as 100,000 to as late as 30,000 years ago. …

A length of time between 30,000 and 100,000 years ago is still, however, a substantial one. If hunting and gathering is of this antiquity, then its evolutionary importance for humans could still be [216] considerable. However, this assumes that there has been little evolutionary change since the appearance of modern humans; that subsequent changes are cultural and economic … and that all anatomically modern prehistoric hunter-gatherers were basically the same as those represented by contemporary hunter-gatherers.

Are these assumptions tenable? … Two trends are of particular interest: reduction in body size and changes in degree of sexual dimorphism.”

“The earliest anatomically modern humans are striking for their great stature. … Average male height during the Upper Paleolithic was 1.74 metres, whereas in the Mesolithic it was 1.67 metres. For females the figures are 1.59 and 1.56 metres respectively. This evidence would suggest that there is a marked reduction in human body size, particularly of males, at the end of the Pleistocene.”

“In Europe the female/male ratio of statue during the Upper Paleolithic was 1:1.09, whereas during the Mesolithic it was 1:1.07. The earlier Upper Paleolithic populations were among the most dimorphic of all anatomically modern humans, for
example, male canine are in the Upper Palaeolithic males was 117.1% of females’, compared to 113.5% in Mesolithic populations’.

217: “The traditional view would be that among anatomically modern humans a basic hunter-gatherer way of life, compared to that observed ethnographically, became established. This mode of life remained stable for some 20,000 years. From about 10,000 years ago some of these hunter-gatherer populations … turned to food production. … what is most important about this model is that it assumes evolutionary stasis throughout this period.

As we have seen, this is not consistent with the fossil evidence of the late Quaternary. Upper Palaeolithic humans were larger and more sexually dimorphic than later hunter-gatherers. Perhaps, then, there are important evolutionary processes taking place at this time”.

218-9: “Essentially we have a trend away from robusticity and sexual dimorphism, suggesting, first, that there was probably a reduction in the differences between male and female foraging behaviour, and second, possibly a reduction in male-male competition. … During the late Pleistocene the foraging strategies of [218] males and females may have been quite different from those of modern hunter-gatherers, reflecting a much greater level of hunting, and in particular the hunting of very large animals. … When food comes in large packages, then both cooperation between individuals and provisioning are much more likely to occur, either through kin selection, mutualism, or generalized reciprocal altruism.”

219: The picture beginning to emerge is one where males are responsible for large proportions of the foraging, and are provisioning/sharing with females and young. This is likely to select for larger body-sized males, with considerable socio-ecological consequences—producing a pattern of behaviour quite different from that seen among modern hunter-gatherers. Male-male relationships may have been far more significant, placing emphasis, as is the case among chimpanzees … on male relatedness within social groups. If males are provisioning females and young, then paternal certainty may have been important in the allocation of parental investment. A harem system of polygynous mating (monogamy being less likely in view of the sexual dimorphism involved), or more likely, perhaps, a system of patrilineal control and organization of females, would have ensured paternity certainty. What follows from these suggestions is that foraging and reproductive strategies of Pleistocene anatomically modern humans differed markedly from those of most modern hunter-gatherers. This may have implications for understanding both the development of modern hunter-gatherer behaviour and also the preconditions of agricultural development.

Recent interpretations of Late Pleistocene hunter-gatherers indicate that they displayed greater social complexity than many recent hunter-gatherers.”

219-220: “In this context, what we think of as modern hunter-gatherers is a largely post-Pleistocene phenomenon. Rather than being an adaptation ancestral to food production, it is a parallel development. As the environment changed at the end of the Pleistocene, and in particular as [220] game animals became scarcer and restricted to a smaller size range, human adaptation shifted, and with it came evolutionary changes in humans.

On the one hand there was the shift to modern hunter-gathering. With resource depletion and an increase in the importance of plant foods, females would have become more critical in the food quest, and selection for male body size and male-male
relationships would have decreased. The combined result of these two factors would be both a decrease in body size and a reduction in the degree of sexual dimorphism. This may either have been a direct genetic change, or it may have been mediated through nutritional and environmental factors, as in modern populations where sexual dimorphism decreases with food quality. The small flexible band system, with general egalitarianism and both males and females contributing to the diet in approximately equal proportions, is an evolutionary response to changes in resource availability, quality, and distribution.

The alternative response was the shift to agriculture. …

“Overall, this tentative model of the evolutionary ecology of anatomically modern humans during the Later Quaternary has two principal components. The first is that there is an evolutionary basis to the adaptive, economic and social changes that occurred during this time. The second is that hunter-gathering in the form known to us today is a parallel development to agriculture, not an archaic, ancestral way of life. Both hunter-gatherer and agricultural systems developed as a response to resource depletion at the end of the Pleistocene from the rather different socio-ecology of Late Pleistocene anatomically modern humans. A conclusion to be drawn is that in socio-ecological terms modern hunter-gatherers do not necessarily represent the basal hominid way of life, as was suggested in the *Man the Hunter* conference. Rather, along with modern agriculturalists, they are an evolutionarily-derived form that appeared towards the end of the Pleistocene as a response to changing resource conditions.”

*Smith: Risk and uncertainty*

Smith, Eric Alden. “Risk and uncertainty in the ‘original affluent society’: evolutionary ecology of resource-sharing and land tenure.” Chapter 14, pp. 222-251

247-8: “hunter-gatherers who practice social boundary defense characteristically do allow outsiders access, but only after they have asked permission. Evidence from a number of groups, including that discussed by Cashdan for the San, indicates that this permission is rarely denied outright—indeed, to do so without very good justification (beyond the stated social fact of ownership) would be to invite anger and perhaps even violence on the part of the visitors. In return for granting permission, owners can expect to be granted rights of access when they visit their former guests.”

*Lee: primitive communism*


252-3: “primitive communism was a perfectly acceptable concept on the nineteenth [253] century and well into the twentieth.”
“Despite the emotional loading of the term, there is no great mystery about the phenomenon it describes. Before the rise of the state and the entrenchment of social inequality, people lived for millennia in small-scale kin-based social groups, in which the core institutions of economic life included collective or common ownership of land and resources, generalized reciprocity in the distribution of food, and relatively egalitarian political relations. The basic pattern, which variations, has been observed in literally hundreds of non-state societies, as indicated, for example, in Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (1967). These societies, including bands, tribes, and some chiefdoms, have been known by a variety of names: savage, non-state, pre-state, non-literate, kin-based, primitive—in fact anything but communist. But the basic underlying principles are the same. Something is there that demands explanation.”

“Pre-state societies had no overriding political authority. Political power of any kind was weak. Decisions were made in a diffuse way usually democratically, by consensus, by elders, by family groups, and by a variety of other means. There was no private property in land; land was held in common, or collectively, for example by all or by kind groups; rarely was it held by individuals. Production was for use rather than for exchange. There were no markets, no currency. Where exchange existed, it was based on sharing and reciprocity. The law of hospitality was strong; more than that, it was inviolable. There were strong sanctions against wealth accumulation. Leaders existed, but where they existed they were redistributors, not accumulators. The main bases for what status distinctions did exist include age, gender, and locality. The whole population retained access to the means of production and reproduction. As Marx put it, ‘it was a community of owners who also worked.’ There was no division into economic classes.

Lest I portray too rosy a picture, I hasten to add that some pre-state societies did have the germs of inequality and did have chiefs, ranked lineages, wealth differences and slavery. The North-west Coast Indians are an example, and many other societies in North America, Africa and Polynesia followed this pattern. There are hundreds of other societies, however, including the bulk of the foraging societies, where these institutions were absent or only a present to a small degree. For my argument on the concept of primitive communism to be valid, I do not have to demonstrate that all pre-state societies were perfectly egalitarian, but only that a great many of them fit the definition on most of criteria. And even those chiefly and ranked societies had by no means abandoned all the institutions of communism. Many continued to hold land in common and to practice reciprocal economic relations. Therefore I would designate such societies as semi-communal…

… It is much longer-lived, has much deeper time-depth, than Western capitalist culture. … this culture core is communist: it embraces the collective right to basic resources and an egalitarian political order. By any dictionary definition of communism, our ancestors were communist.”

“Neither Marx nor Engels … can be regarded as the principal discoverer of primitive communism. That honour belongs to a Rochester ethnologist and staunch member of the bourgeoisie, Lewis Henry Morgan.”

Quoting Morgan Houses and house-life of the American Aborigines 1965, p. 61: “The law of hospitality as administered by the American aborigines tended to the final equalization of subsistence. Hunger and destitution could not exist at one end of an
Indian village or in one section of an encampment while plenty prevailed elsewhere in the same village or encampment”.

256: “The notions of the law of hospitality and of communism in living were backed up by an overwhelming barrage of ethno-historic data. Morgan went as far back as the fifteenth-century journals of Columbus’s voyages to document his thesis in relation to the earliest periods of European contact. Among his other sources were the journals of De Soto, Sir Walter Raleigh, Pizzaro, Capt. John Smith, Marquette and Joliet, and Lewis and Clark.”

258: Kluckhold and Leighton, “carefully noted for the Navaho the various forms of collective and communal property that persisted even in the face of the attempts of white men to change them: ‘Among the Navahos certain things are “communal property”, in which no individual or family has vested or exclusive rights. Water resources, timber areas, and patches of salt bush … belong to all The People, and certain conventions are observed in regard to this type of property.”

259: “A second critique is to admit the existence of primitive communism but to belittle and dismiss it. … The fact that ‘they’ are hospitable, share food, and take care of each other is something to be ashamed of rather than a source of pride.”

263: “They couch their struggle in terms of cultural survival; but what does that culture consist of … but at a very deep level, it is communism. It is the absence of private property. Some of the most creative work going on in Canada today … They are trying to find a formula for the preservation of communal organization that will hold up in a Canadian court. And of course this is very ironic, because if one goes back far enough in English law those same communal concepts are there …

… the notion of private property in land, which in the West is taken for granted, is a relatively recent notion. Starting from the Enclosure movements in fifteenth-century England, and spreading rapidly with the spread of capitalism, the whole land-tenure system of Europe and the Americas were transformed from communal to private within the space of a few hundred years”.

264: “What … is the particular character of the ideology in primitive communism? What constitutes the core of primitive communism, what is the appeal, and why have people the world over clung to its institutions so fiercely and given it up so reluctantly? … There is a kind of rough good humour, put-downs, teasing, and sexual joking that one encounters throughout the foraging world. What conceivable reason could there be for the fact of such similar ways of joking?

People in these societies, and to a certain extent tribal peoples as well, have an absolute aversion to rank distinctions among them. You could say they are fiercely egalitarian. They get outraged if somebody tries to put on the dog or to put on airs; they have evolved—individually, it would seem—very effective means for putting a stop to it. These means anthropologists have called ‘humility-enforcing’ or ‘leveling’ devices: thus the use of a very rough joking is to bring people into line—a far rougher kind of joking than middle-class North Americans or Europeans would ever put up with. ‘Please’ and ‘thank you’ are almost completely unknown in these peoples’ vocabulary. Since sharing is a given, why say ‘thank you’?”

265: He illustrates this with a story about an Innu from Labrador who insisted that another man give him his last cigarette before he shared his 200 cigarettes with the other.
Quoting a !Kung, “‘This is the way we talk to each other, because we don’t want anybody to get a big head … If somebody gets a big head and things a lot of himself, he’ll get arrogant; and an arrogant person might hurt someone, he might even kill someone. So we belittle his [the good hunter’s] meat to cool his heart and make him gentle.’”

“…the heart of the way a system of primitive communism is reproduced. It is reproduced by positive injunctions against accumulation or against inequality. … With the growth of inequality people gradually become accustomed to the fact that there’s going to be wealth differences; but initially there’s a lot of resistance to the idea. If somebody among the !Kung … gets two blankets, almost invariably somebody else will come and ask for one blanket; and it is hard to refuse it. You simply cannot build up a little ‘nest egg’ because inevitably you have to give it away. You could say ‘no’ but then people will start grumbling, and gossiping about you. … The levelling device operates on the plane of ideology to reinforce the central values; but it also operates on the very concrete plane of redistributing all the goods that are available.”

“A useful way of looking at primitive communism is to visualize a ceiling of accumulation of goods above which nobody can rise, with the corollary that there is also a floor below which one cannot sink. The ceiling and the floor are dialectically connected; you cannot have one without the other. If there is any food in the camp, everybody in the camp is going to get some of it. The fact is that the obligation to share food and the taboo against hoarding is no less strong and no less ubiquitous in the primitive world than the far more famous taboo against incest. But unlike the incest taboo which persists to the present, the hoarding taboo became a casualty of social evolution.

At a crucial point in the evolution of societies the floor is lowered. I do not know exactly how that happens.”

“it is the long experience of egalitarian sharing that has moulded our past. Despite our seeming adaptation to life in hierarchical societies, and despite the rather dismal record of human rights in many parts of the world, there are signs that humankind retains a deep-rooted egalitarianism, a deep-rooted commitment to the norm of reciprocity, and a deep-rooted desire for what Victor Turner has called communitas—the sense of community …. All theories of justice revolve around these principles, and our sense of outrage at the violation of these norms indicates the depth of its gut-level appeal. That, in my view, is the secret of primitive communism.”

**Ingold, Riches, & Woodburn: H&G 2**

Barnard, Alan and James Woodburn, “Property, power and ideology in hunter-gathering societies: an introduction,” pp. 4-31

10: “For the past hundred years one issue, more than any other, has dominated discussion of property rights in hunter-gatherer societies. This is the question of whether property in these societies is held communally or individually. The view that it is held communally is particularly associated with the work of Morgan (1877), and the view that much of it is held individually is particularly linked with Lowie (…1928). Today there is a wide measure of agreement about the issue among those who have themselves carried out research in hunter-gatherer societies. …almost all would now agree that both important group rights, guaranteeing access to land and productive resources, and important individual rights, allocating artefacts and other products of human labour to individual, coexist. There is also wide agreement … that in some instances we cannot divide up sorts of property according to whether they are individually or communally held. … often, analytically separate individual and group rights exist in the same item of property.”

11-12: “if two provisos are made [to Sahlins’s theory], the crux of the theory has, we believe, stood up well …. The first proviso is that it applies much better to … immediate return systems. … Contemporary hunter-gatherers with immediate-return systems include, in Africa, the Mbuti, the !Kung, the Nharo and the Hadza; in South Asia, the Paliyan, the Hill Pandaram and the Naiken; in South-east Asia, the Batek. Most northern [12] hunter-gatherers have delayed-return systems and so on, too, do Australian Aborigines. All societies with pastoral or agricultural modes of subsistence have delayed-return systems.”

12: “The second proviso is that difficulties must be recognized in the definition of material wants—those wants that according to the theory are set at a low level that is well within people’s capacity to achieve. … people in these societies almost never obtain nearly as much of the more desirable foods … as they would like. And there is a clearly articulated desire for more arrows, more axes, more beads, more clothing, more tobacco, and so on. … The point is not that wants are set low, but rather that production targets are. Demand is not focused on greater production. It does not, for example, lead to pressure to persuade those who hunt little to spend more time and effort on hunting. It is instead strongly focused on the requirement that people who at some particular moment happen to have more of something than they immediately need should carry out their moral obligation to share it out. [i.e.] … demand sharing. …

In all known hunter-gatherer societies with immediate-return systems … people are almost always able to meet their nutritional needs very adequately without working long hours. In setting their production targets low, people are not normally running significant risks of endangering their health and welfare, not even, because of the emphasis on sharing, the health and welfare of the weak and potentially vulnerable.”

15: “People in societies with immediate-return systems are regarded as being born, or naturally, endowed, with rights of direct access to land an ungarnered resources of the area with wich they are associated. These rights are not formally bestowed, nor can they be withheld. There is no question of the exercise of such rights in one’s home area being conditional on allegiance to other individuals or to the group. People are constrained in
the access that they enjoy only by their knowledge and skills as developed within a
framework in which productive tasks performed by men differ in some important respects
from those performed by women. But with this single important exception, access is, in
principle equal to all—married or unmarried, old or young, adult or child. Access to areas
other than one’s own is typically obtained easily. Permission to use such resources is
never normally refused. …

… such rights depend on land and resources being sufficiently plentiful. Where
competition over use of scarce resources becomes severe, then the principle of general
access may be abrogated, rights over land and resources may be parceled out, and access
by competitors may be restricted.”

16: “In hunter-gatherer societies, simple movable property—weapons, tools, clothing,
and so on—seems invariably to be personally owned, but in ways that are strongly
constrained by custom. Typically people make their own weapons and tools, and property
rights in them seem to be based on the notion that, unless overridden by some other
principle, individuals are entitled to the yield of their own labour. In societies with
immediate-return systems, and often also in societies with simple delayed-return systems,
one such overriding principle is that people are not entitled to accumulate movably
property beyond what they need for their immediate use. They are morally obliged to
share it.

For a Hadza, personal ownership of a second axe or a second shirt is unlikely to
last for more than a few hours, or at most, a few days. Eventually endless demands will
result in the additional possession being given away or gambled away if it cannot be
concealed.”

17: “Special rules apply to large game animals which, if hit by more than one arrow or
spear, may well be allocated to the owner of one of the missiles, often the first one to hit
the animal. … [!Kung example] But this is, perhaps, not so serious a loss for the hunter as
might appear. The economic and political advantages of ownership are few. The meat is
obligatorily shared by men, women and children throughout the camp. The owners
receives much the same amount of meat as anyone else and its given minimal social
recognition as a donor …

The Hadza have similar rules requiring that the meat of large animals be shared
without expectation of return, not given as a gift for which eventual reciprocation is
expected … Most of the meat is shared widely among everyone in the camp. But some
special joints of the best meat are treated differently: they are rigidly reserved for the
initiated men’s group. The Hadza are very explicit that the meat doesn’t belong to the
hunter. … This exclusive right is additionally protected by deception: the men say that
the meat is God’s meat, not theirs, and deny that they eat it.”

18: “In general, in societies with immediate-return systems, people hold few rights over
the capacities of other people—over, for example, their hunting labour, their domestic
labour, their sexual capacity, their reproductive capacity. Individual men decide for
themselves if and when they will go hunting, rather than doing so at the behest of a
household head, or a camp leader or anyone else. In these societies, parents are not
entitled to, or able to, control the labour of their children or of their other kinsmen.
Kinship is not, in general, a vehicle for control or for the allocation of rights in or over
other people.
In contrast to the situation in societies with immediate-return systems, women in societies with simply delayed-return systems are treated as jural minors. Certain rights over them and over their labour are held by their male kind and are, when they marry, formally transferred to the husband and his kin.”

19: “In general, in societies with immediate-return systems, women are not subject to the authority of their husbands.”

21: “Recipients are under no obligation to reciprocate though they too must, of course, share when they in their turn obtain more food than they can immediately consume. The problem is that sharing in practice does not balance out. Often only a small proportion of men are highly successful hunters who regularly kill large game animals. Time after time, donors are again donors and recipients are again recipients. The effect of obligatory sharing is to alienate from a skilled minority part of the yield of their labour in the interest of the majority, to deny to this minority the possibility of building power for themselves by converting recipients of their meat into dependants or followers”.

23-4: “What are the principles underlying the development of property rights? Clearly they are many, but one particularly important starting point is as follows: it appears that all societies operate implicitly or explicitly on the principles that whatever I, as an individual, obtain from nature or make by myself using my own labour is residually recognized as in some sense my property, that is, it is mine unless some explicit principle overrides this basic one and the yield of the labour is alienated from me. … Typically, in all [24] societies, the process of alienation deprives me of part (occasionally all) of the yield of my labour, and generally this process is not wholly voluntary, nor regarded by those whom it affects as wholly benevolent in spite of ideological elaborations which may make it appear to be so. It is backed by sanctions of varying severity. For an individual man, woman or child to be left unimpeded to enjoy the entire yield of his or her labour and use it for self-chosen purposes is rare indeed. … The usual position is that I give up part of the yield of my labour in accordance with specifiable rules or obligations while any residue not subject to such rules or obligations is mine.

What I as an individual obtain or make by myself … is mine on the apparently universally recognized grounds that work … transforms material things into property.”

23-4: “the dominant ideology of Australian Aborigines asserts that all wild food [24] resources are brought into existence through men’s religious practice, through ritual labour, the ‘work’ of ritual. ‘Women only collect what men’s religious practice has made available’ (Bern 1979: 125).”

24: “Food produced jointly can be eaten at a communal meal or meals but is actually far more likely to be divided out among those who produced it. … whoever it is allocated to, the consistent point is that ownership is unlikely to be divided. Single owners are the norm. … All of the hunters are … likely to gain a share in the general meat distribution.”

25-6: “[meat is alienated] in accordance with a rival (and again probably universal, in the sense that it is found in some contexts in every society) ideology stressing egalitarian entitlement and the importance of leveling mechanisms. This procedure has something in common with redistributive taxation in Western society …. Naftali [26] Zengu, a Hadza man present at the London conference, spoke strongly of this moral imperative to share.”
Scott, Colin, “Property, practice and aboriginal rights among Quebec Cree hunters,” pp. 35-51

35: “In this chapter, I examine the categories used by Cree hunters of northern Quebec in speaking about the rights of individuals and groups to various objects and resources.”
36-37: capitalist property really is “a web of state-enforced relations of entitlement and duty between persons, some assumed voluntarily and some not” cites Grey p. 79.
37: “In Cree, there is no substantive category either equivalent to or similar to ‘property’ in English, and no verb ‘to own’. …

One can identify three legitimating principles in the Cree system of property, which are very general among hunters. First, a household has certain primary or initial rights in relation to the product of its own labour … High value is placed on the household’s ability, through its internal division of labour, to produce the essentials of life, to make decisions about where and when to deploy its efforts, and to decide specific recipients of gifts.”
37-8: “A second balancing principle … no household may use, restrict, or accumulate resources and products in ways prejudicial to the interests of others; … households are expected to cooperate in particular productive contexts when collective benefit results. The [38] institution of hunting territories and stewards is legitimized in these terms.

The third principle … ungarnered resources, ‘the land’, cannot be alienated for the private benefit of any privileged individual or sector of the community.”
39-40: “bilingual Cree … may have led some ethnographers to see privatized right where collective rights are really fundamental. Cree have sometimes promoted the ‘private property’ analogy in speech with white men because they have perceived the European property fetish, and have hoped to improve the sacredness and legitimacy—in non-native eyes—of the Cree institution.

Internally, the Cree institution is such that if the hunting boss fails as a steward or sharer of resources, others will soon use his grounds [40] without permission and coordination. His ability to manage resources will decline, and another territory boss will sooner or later be recognized by the hunting group and by the wider Cree community.”
40: “In this ultimate sense, Cree state that no one except the Creator can own the land; or that no one, not even the Creator, owns land.

…

To speak of Cree property, then—even ‘communal’ property—would be to gloss over the essential dynamic of the system. Customary rights in the land, living resources and products may be specified, but these relate to the technical and political relations of
managing and sharing resources—resources in which no one, in the last analysis, retains exclusive or absolute rights.”

44: “the claim for the aboriginality of Algonquian territories was interpreted as a challenge to the evolutionist view that hunting societies were based on communal property … others, argued instead that private territories had developed … only in the context of commodity production.

The characterization of Algonquian territories as ‘private’ bears some relation to surface appearances, but not to the underlying principles and actions which govern the Cree territory system. … some ethnography of the period explicitly recognized that Cree/Montagnais/Naskapi ‘ownership’ differed fundamentally from its European ‘analogues’ …

Later ethnography leads to the conclusion that relations between eastern Cree trappers remained cooperative and egalitarian, and that territories never became privatized”.

Myers: Chapter 3: Burning the truck and holding the country: property, time, and the negotiation identity among Pintupi Aborigines

Myers, Fred, “Burning the truck and holding the country: property, time, and the negotiation identity among Pintupi Aborigines,” pp. 52-74

52: “This chapter is concerned with the indigenous meanings attributed to a variety of ‘objects’ among Pintupi-speaking Aborigines of the Australian Western Desert. My argument is that, for the Pintupi, ‘things’ (objects, ritual, land, prerogatives, duties) have meaning … largely as expressions of both autonomy and … ‘relatedness’ or shared identity …. In this regard, land-ownership is not a special kind of property: it is not a special set of rights defining relationships to an ecologically necessary ‘living space.’ Instead, it is one more form of objectifying social relationships of shared identity.”

53: “my discomfort with the notion of property itself: it is too concrete and specific a notion for the meanings that Pintupi give to ‘objects’. …

… I shall show that … a Pintupi can ‘give away’ … some rights to named places without losing his or her intrinsic identity with these places. This inalienability of land—land cannot really be lost—differs from the way most other objects enter into processes of exchange.”

54: “there is a continual negotiation about relationships to them and a willingness include other as .. ‘co-owners’. Such ambiguity is deep-seated in the negotiated quality of much of Pintupi social life.

… Pintupi ideas of ‘ownership’—a conception better translated as one of ‘identification’.”

58: “the preparation of large game is such as to treat it as a social product. A hunter is supposed to give the kangaroo he kills to others for preparation, but his part in the hunt provides him with both the right and the responsibility to direct the disposition of the
cooked animal in exchange (if someone else’s spear .. was used, the actual owner of the hunting implement has this privilege)."

74: “A hierarchy in the organization of relationships to objects takes us away from the simple notion of ‘property rights’ as legal problems and suggests that objects, as property or not, have meanings for people that cannot be limited to the analytic domains in which Western notions too often restrict us. For the Pintupi, I would maintain, one’s identification with place as an object assures an identity in the world on which the more transient exchanges of daily life can take places without threatening to reduce participants to the emptiness of pure despair that economic failure too often brings to people in the Western world.”

Altman & Peterson: Chapter 4: Rights to game and rights to cash among contemporary Australian hunter-gatherers

Altman, Jon and Nicolas Peterson. “Rights to game and rights to cash among contemporary Australian hunter-gatherers,” pp. 75-94

76: “there is, in the Australian material, long-standing evidence that has been taken to suggest that game is collectively appropriated rather than individually owned … accounts of game being taken off the hunter can be found from throughout the continent. In this chapter we provide evidence that this kind of generalization obscures an important distinction between two kinds of game: large game and small game. … In the case of small game … the hunter’s control is complete.”

78: “Game belongs to the person who first disables it. … All people actively participating in the hunt receive some meat unless under some taboo. If the weapon with which the animal has been killed belongs to a person other than the hunter its owner has a right to meat and expects to be able to claim a better cut than might have been received otherwise.”

78-80: “Given that there is an expectation that large game will be shared …, the sense in which large game can be [80] said to be owned is limited. Such ‘ownership extends only so far as being able to allocate the cuts. … a senior man in each of the household clusters [is] given portions which he then redistributes between the households of the cluster. Each hunger is likely to give the meat to a different senior man in a given cluster, according to his own particular kin ties.”

80: “while the hunter may end up with no control over the distribution of game, he will always acquire prestige. People are acutely aware of who the successful hunters are and of the frequency of their success.”

93-4: Conclusion

“In terms of their subsistence economy the Guwinggu can be classified as an immediate-return society, and as in other such societies there is a pervasive emphasis on sharing and generosity. Yet there are limits to the demand for generosity. These limits are found at the household level. The household’s rights in the produce necessary to ensure its own provisioning are a property right which receives explicit recognition in the distinction
made between small and large game. Even in the case of large game the essential rights of the married hunter are recognized, although the control over the greater portion depends on his status and the specific set of co-residents present. It is not that the notion of property is alien in such societies but that there is no mechanism for the accumulation of material wealth. Although the advent of cash creates the possibilities for accumulation, because it is concealable, the goods it buys are not. The disinclination to share appears to have been ‘commonly felt and sometimes acted upon’, … but the ethic of generosity and the paucity of material possessions draws all such possessions into the constant exchanges that create and sustain social relations.”

**Burch: Chapter 5: Modes of exchange in north-west Alaska**


95: “That hunters ‘share’ is part of the received wisdom of anthropology.”
98: “There was only one type of societal property in north-west Alaska, and that was land…. The boundaries between territories were precisely defined, and they were known to every adult.

Ownership of a given territory originally may have been usufruct, in the sense of ‘ownership which emerges, with the full support of custom, as a result of constant use’ by the members of the society concerned …. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century the criterion of use was no longer relevant. The members of each society owned all of the land within its borders, whether they used it or not. The members of many societies also used land belonging to other societies at certain times of year, and under certain conditions, without asserting any claim of ownership to it.”
99: “any individual could travel freely about the territory owned by his own society, subject only to some constraints at the local and domestic family levels”.
101: “Some songs were in general use, but others—particularly magic songs—were strictly private property. Some were sung on public occasions and were well known to the other members of one’s local family, but could be sung only by the owner. Others were secret, and sung only in private. Both types could be given or sold to someone else, at which point they became the personal property of the recipient.”
103: “Real estate, including land and buildings, was not subject to transfer from one person or organization to another except by default …. But literally everything else, once it became the property of one individual or organization, could be transferred to another, either temporarily or permanently.”
106-7: “Through a combination of production and exchanges, effectively-led families were able to accumulate physical property in quantities that would be scarcely conceivable to members of most hunter-gatherer [107] societies.”
108-9: Discussion
108: “The data from north-west Alaska strongly support Gould’s … conclusion that sharing is not the only kind of exchange to be found in hunting and gathering societies. …
In north-west Alaska sharing, in the sense of generalized reciprocity, was restricted to a very specific social context, namely, the local family … However, it could be questioned whether the exchanges that took place within local families involved sharing as much as they did differing degrees of ownership. …

Well-led families are characterized by informants as having been redistribution networks in which all of the tools, utensils, boats, and other goods that were made or acquired by any family member were placed at the disposal of all. There were very few things—amulets, some items of clothing or personal adornment, magic songs—that were exempt from this rule. If one needed something, one took it without even asking. Commodities such as meat and furs were pooled and redistributed as necessary and appropriate by the family head or [109] his wife. It was through hard work, clever trading with outsiders, and effective management of the pooling and redistribution process that some family heads became so much wealthier than others.

Outside the local family context sharing was quite uncommon except in times of great abundance. Indeed, except where partnerships were concerned, exchanges between members of different local families tended to be characterized more by avarice than altruism. As John Simpson … put it after four years’ experience in the region around the middle of the nineteenth century: ‘Perhaps it is not too much to say that a free and disinterested gift is totally unknown among them’. Exchange between members of different families was based on a sound knowledge of the law of supply and demand, and exercised in a geographic setting characterized by marked seasonal and regional differences in supply. The goal of buying low and selling high was well understood ….

The north-west Alaskan data also suggest why it is so easy to conclude that sharing was ubiquitous in traditional times. ‘Everyone in the village used to share’ is a view that is often expressed by native elders today. But of course everyone in most villages used to belong to a single local family, which is the precise context in which generalized reciprocity (or diffused ownership) did occur. It is instructive in this regard to compare single-family villages with multi-family villages such as Point Hope. In the latter the distinction between intrafamily and interfamily relations was clearly drawn, and the generalized reciprocity that one usually associates with the word ‘sharing’ occurred only in the intrafamily context.

This raises the possibility that many, if not most, accounts of generalized sharing among hunters and gatherers have been based on studies of the internal dynamics of single local-family villages. To the extent that this is so, the accounts are not wrong, they simply tell only part of the story. Until this possibility is explored, the view that sharing is the only significant mode of exchange in hunting and gathering societies should be regarded as an assumption requiring investigation, not as a statement of fact.”

Endicott: Chapter 6: Property, power and conflict among the Batek of Malaysia

Endicott, Kirk, “Property, power and conflict among the Batek of Malaysia,” pp. 110-127
This chapter is a description and discussion of the ideas and practices of the Batek De’ of Malaysia concerning the rights of people over material things. It also explores the political concomitants of the Batek views of property.

The economy of the nomadic Batek is very complex, combining hunting, gathering, the collection and trade of forest products, and the occasional small-scale planting of crops...

The basic unit of Batek society is the conjugal family. Each married couple is politically independent and relatively self-sufficient economically, although normally living in camps consisting of two to fifteen related families. The composition of a camp may change daily, as some families leave and new ones join, and the entire group will move to a new location about once per week. The until of a camp is based not on political organization—leadership is informal and based on personal influence along—but on a moral obligation incumbent on each family to share food with all other families in the camp. There are no enduring corporate groups above the level of the conjugal family.

The idea of exclusive ownership of land is an absurdity to the Batek. They say: ‘Only the Batek hala [superhuman beings] can own ... the land’. They believe the land was created for all people to use, both Batek and non-Batek, and no one has the right to exclude anyone else form living and working anywhere they wish. ... There is no sense in which the persons who share a [special connection to land] claim collective rights of ownership or custodianship over it.

The absence of individual or group ownership of land among the Batek contrasts markedly with the situation among the wetsern Semang. ... in the west each ‘tribe’ owns a clearly defined tract of forest and each family has a limited tract within it. Persons may normally wander over the whole of the tribal area, but only by virtue of their being related by blood or marriage to the owners of its subdivisions.

The Batek also regard all unharvested naturally-occurring resources as being unownable. All the wild foods, forest produce a raw materials they use are considered freely available to anyone who wants to harvest them, regardless of where they are located or who found them.

Another contrast with the western natives: “In the west, both fruit trees and poison trees are owned by the individuals who planted or discovered them. ... Foods become personal propeorty when they have been harvested or purchased. The person who ‘extracts’ the resource from nature ... is the owner.”

The Batek expect people to share any food they obtain with other members of a camp, and they adhere closely to this expectation. The general principle is that they must give shares first to their own children and spouse, then to any parents-in-law or parents present, and finally to all other families in camp.

Small animals, ... are usually [117] consumed by the family that catches them, unless its members get a large number, while bigger animals are most often shared with the entire camp....

Sharing food is an absolute obligation to the Batek, not something the giver has much discretion over. ... Recipients treat the food they are given as a right; no expression of thanks is expected for forthcoming ..., presumably because that would imply that the donor had the right to withhold it. If someone were hoarding food, it would not be considered ‘stealing’ for others to help themselves to it. The Aring Batek became notorious in the department of Aboriginal Affairs for stealing food from the medical field
Their attitude seems to be that it is more immoral to withhold food from those who need it than to take it without permission.”

118: “The general obligation among the Batek to share food is linked with an expectation that all members of the group will do their best to support themselves. … Because this expectation is generally upheld, the ideal of sharing can be maintained without undue strain on any particular person or family. The Batek themselves explain that they may give food to someone else one day, but on another day they may receive it from the same person, and that this balances out over the long run. Blind and old people are helped by everyone, but especially their closer relatives. … This system of sharing is obviously open to the possibility of abuse by people who are simply lazy … I once asked why the group did not tell one man, whose laziness was causing some resentment, to leave the group. The horrified answer was ‘Because he is a Betek’. The implication was that they simply could not do such a callous thing to another Batek, whatever his transgressions might be.”

119: “The Batek consider forest produce collected for trade to be the property of the person who procures it. …

Batek own personally anything they make, receive as a gift, or buy with their own money, forest produce or labor. …

Although ownership is normally transferred only by exchange, personal possessions are very freely loaned and borrowed when not being used by the owners. Among friends or relatives it is not even necessary to ask permission.”

121: “Power … can be defined very simply as the ability to force others to do one’s bidding … the Batek system of ownership and sharing is associated with a political system in which individuals have very little power, and the power of the group over the individual, while substantial, is clearly circumscribed.” Goes on to endorse Woodburns analysis of why immediate return societies are egalitarian: absence of any basis for individuals exercising power over others. Highly nomadic, can walk away, and “in these societies individuals are not dependent upon others for the basic necessities of life.”

124: “the only power found in the Batek political system resides in the group and in the superhuman beings. Social pressure is strong in enforcing the behaviors thought crucial to the survival and well-being of the group: the sharing of food, care for the sick and elderly, suppression of violence, and so on. Property rights, such as they are, are enforced by public opinion and social pressure alone. If someone steals a personal possession of another, the group will ostracise the thief until he or she either returns the object or compensates the victim. Outside these areas, however, the behavior of individuals is relatively unconstrained by social pressure. The Batek tolerate a wide degree of individual freedom and eccentricity as long as it does not threaten the well-being of the group.”

125-6: Discussing efforts to introduce agriculture among them: “The nomadic Batek De’regarded the cultivated food as having exactly the same status as wild food and therefore as being free to anyone who cared to collect it. Consequently, they flocked to the clearings of their industrious kinsmen at the time of the harvest and felt perfectly within their rights eating the crops as long as they harvested them themselves. Those who arrived too late for the harvest simply appealed to the traditional Batek obligation for those who have food to share it with those who do not … Of course the Batek who want to [126] take up farming would like to gain the full benefit of their labours, but in order to
do so they would have to adopt an idea of privately owned swidden plots and crops and repudiate the obligation to share any food they have that is excess to their immediate needs.”

_Gison: Chapter 9: Meat sharing as a political ritual: forms of transaction versus modes of subsistence_

Gison, Thomas, “Meat sharing as a political ritual: forms of transaction versus modes of subsistence,” pp. 165-179

“the Buid of Mindoro, Philippines … possess a political ideology of ascribed equality every bit as rigorous as that possessed by African and Asian hunter-gatherers. Indeed in many ways Buid egalitarianism is more consistent and pervasive than that of these hunter-gatherers.”

_Isakson & Sproles, A Brief History of Native American Land Ownership_


Abstract

This study examines the literature in several fields in order to paint a picture of the history of the relationship between Native Americans and land. The study is especially interested in how this relationship evolved over time and in identifying the key events that mark changes in this relationship. Literature from archeology, anthropology, economics, and Native American studies are examined in order to gain insight into the evolution of how Native Americans have related to land over the past few thousand years. Most of the emphasis in this study is upon the more recent past, primarily because it is more relevant to the present (and future), and because there is more information available. First, the study examines some of the key economics literature regarding how private property rights evolve. Second, the study looks at some of the archeological and anthropological literature regarding the relationship between Native Americans and land during two major eras: pre-Columbian and post-Columbian. Finally, the study discusses the implications of the past on the present and future of the relationship between Native Americans and land.

OBTAINED A COY FROM AUTHOR, IN ARTICLES FOLDER
Not as valuable as I’d hoped. Said some things that conflicted with all other reports of hunter-gatherers I’ve read.

5: “So, from an economic perspective, collective ownership of land will naturally evolve into private ownership as the externalities of overuse (of the land) increase, generally with increased population, and as the transaction costs of trading privately owned land decrease. Some Native Americans were experiencing this evolutionary process very soon after contact with the European culture. But, prior to this contact there is very little evidence, as the next section discusses, suggesting that the process was underway.”

6: “The archeological and anthropological evidence during the pre-equestrian era strongly suggests that Native Americans treated land as a common resource. For example, Nies (1996) notes that pre-Columbian, Native American tribes traded personal property, but never land. Oswalt (2002) observes that boundaries between pre-Columbian, Native American tribes were fuzzy at best,”

7: “Anderson and LaCombe (1999) report that pre-Columbian Native Americans adopted concepts of property rights to suite their particular needs. For example, among the hunter – gathers, cooperation was a necessary condition for survival. So, some items were treated as personal property, but not land. Property rights generally followed what Anderson and LaCombe call the “work-use-ownership” principle. If you did the work to acquire a thing and used it productively, it belonged to you. This principle applied to game, plants, and tools. Cooperative efforts, such as collective hunts, required some means of allocating the fruits of the hunt. Generally, those who participated in the hunt got a share of the fruits of their labor, with larger shares sometimes going to the leaders of the hunt or the owner of equipment used in the hunt.”

7: “Anderson and LaCombe (1999) point out that after the introduction of the horse in Mexico by the Spanish in about 1600, the territories of Native American tribes began to expand and collide.”

8: “even with the reduction in transit costs and increased mobility provided by the horse, Native Americans still regarded land as a common resource, … Native Americans were semi nomadic, cultivating crops and hunting small game. Wyman (1945) notes that post-equestrian, Native Americans gave up agriculture for a life style of pillaging and prowling on the plains.”

9-10: Unrealistically plays down the role of war in US-Indian relations: “The Europeans had products never seen before by Native Americans, while the Native Americans had food and especially furs for trade. So, conflicts were rare.”

Johnson & Earle. The evolution of human societies


1. Introduction, 1-40

2: “Whether or not sociocultural evolution has taken place is no longer an issue. Archeological work from all continents documents changes from early small-scale societies to later complex ones. Although there is no intrinsic necessity for every society to evolve in the way we describe here, the three interlocked evolutionary processes of subsistence intensification, political integration, and social stratification have been observed again and again in historically unrelated cases. Foragers diversify and adopt agriculture; villages form and integrate into regional polities; leaders come to dominate and transform social relations. How does this orderly and widespread pattern come to be? 32-33: “We have identified three critical levels of socioeconomic integration as a basis for organizing our discussion in this book: (a) the Family-Level Group, including the family/camp and the family/hamlet; (b) the Local Group, including the acephalous local group and the Big Man collectivity; and (c) the Regional Polity, including the chiefdom and the state.

The Family-Level Group. The family or hearth group is the primary subsistence group. It is capable of great self-sufficiency but moves in and out of extended family camps or hamlets opportunistically as problems or opportunities arise. The family/camp is characteristic of foraging societies of low density …. Camp groups of twenty-five to fifty persons typically form when resources are highly localized or when a group larger than the individual family is required for risk management or for a particular subsistence activity. The group can [33] then dissolve into small segments consisting of single families (five to eight persons) that independently exploit low-density, dispersed resources. … Although homicide is fairly common, organized aggression (warfare) is not. Ceremonialism is ad hoc and little developed. A camp characteristically has a home range but does not claim exclusive access to this territory or strictly defend it against outsiders.

The family/hamlet is characteristic of somewhat higher density societies … in which families cluster into a settlement group or hamlet (twenty-five to thirty-five persons) on a more permanent basis.”

33: “The Local Group. Local groups of many families, running to five or ten times the size of family-level groups, form around some common interest such as defense or food storage. They are usually subdivided along kinship lines into corporate lineages or clans. Depending on the extent of their common interests, these groups are either acephalous village-sized units or larger groups integrated by regional networks of exchange headed by Big Men.”

34: “The Big Man and his managed collectivity are found at higher but variable population densities in areas in which warfare between territorial groups has traditionally been intense. … The local community of perhaps three hundred to five hundred people is
a territorial division, typically containing multiple clan or lineage segments …. The local
group is represented by a Big Man, a strong, charismatic leader who is essential for
maintaining internal group cohesion and for negotiating intergroup alliances. … His
power, however, is dependent on his personal initiative; if his followers desert him for a
competitor, little may be left of the reputation he has tried to build …

*The Regional Polity.* Regional organizations arise out of formerly fragmented
local groups …. Depending on the scale of integration, these are either chiefdoms or
states.

Chiefdoms develop in societies in which warfare between groups is endemic but
becomes directed toward conquest and incorporation rather than toward the exclusion of
defeated groups from their land. …

Always in search of new sources of revenue, chiefs seek to expand their territorial
control by conquest.”

2: *The Family Level, pp. 41-53*

41: “Anthropologists have been slow to acknowledge the family level as a distinct type of
human society. We take for granted that families, households, and kindred groups are
fundamental economic units. Yet we think of families, even in nonstratified societies, as
subordinate to larger social institutions.”

42: “The striking characteristic of family-level societies is their freedom from formal
institutions above the family. … we should regard the flexible rules of the family level as
a natural adaptive consequence of the specific dynamics of low-density foragers. Family-
level economies depend on being able to get and use resources opportunistically. Access
to the life-sustaining bounty of the land must be but little restricted, and the labor and
technology to realize that bounty must be available to all families. … only with the
erosion of the family’s independent access to the means of production do we see the
formation of broader-scale institutions.”

45: “By at least one hundred thousand years ago modern human physiology had evolved
from earlier hominid forms, and it is reasonable to assume that human behavioral
characteristics were already in place. Archaeological evidence certainly suggests that by
forty thousand years ago humans were modern in all physiological senses.”

3. *Family-Level Foragers, pp. 54-89*

54: “Although this characterization [the original affluent society] downplays the seasonal
and periodic hardships encountered by foragers, they do in fact live well in important
ways. … a broad cross-cultural study by Hayden (1981a), which considers time spent
processing food in addition to time spent procuring it, concludes that hunter-gatherers
need expend only two to five hours per day in these activities;”
Case 1: The Shoshone of the Great Basin, pp. 58-65

58: “the band—a patrilocal group with exclusive rights to territory—appears often to be a construct of the anthropologist’s search for structure in a simple society. The band in the sense of a camp certainly exists among foragers, especially where hunting requires a high degrees of sharing. But the band as a territorially defined corporate group regulating marriages and resource use seems inappropriate to foragers, because it would restrict the flexibility of movement on which their survival depends. … Most low-density foragers … are not local because they cannot afford to be.

In our view, it is unreasonable to identify a primitive form of social organization. Rather, like foraging itself, we expect early human social institutions to have been highly variable (cf. Kelly 1995). What is common to human societies is their malleability, the way in which humans form relationships appropriate to life’s conditions. The family level of foragers dramatically illustrates the pragmatic nature of human society from which more complex, institutional forms are fashioned.”

61: “although gatherers may work together for company, there is nothing inherent to the work that makes cooperation necessary.”

62: “Much of the year, then, the Shoshone moved as individual family units consisting of a father, a mother, children, and often a son-in-law, a grandparent, or some other closely related person.”

62: “During the fall and winter, camps of several family units formed around common resources, but these camps of at most fifty people had neither a sense of communal integration nor a group leader …. The reason for the winter camp was the proximity to water and pine nuts, and the fact that winter was a time of potential scarcity when it made sense to pool resources and average risk.”

63: “Among the Shoshone, there was also an apparent absence of strongly demarcated territories. Although families owned pine nut trees and facilities such as irrigation ditches, hunting blinds, and corrals, group territories were in most cases vague …. Rather flexible and nonexclusive rights to use both plant and animal resources appear to have been characteristic. Seward … describes how pine nut territories could be shared, but that trespass was resented and could provoke a camp to stone intruders. Warfare was of minor importance and not organized in precontact times.

Steward’s description of the pragmatic and flexible Shoshone forms the basis of our model of a family-level society in which ceremonialism, leadership, warfare, and territoriality are of little importance.”

Case 2. The !Kung of the Kalahari, 65

66-7: “As in the Shoshone, we witness in the !Kung the basic pragmatism of a family-level society. Decisions on what to eat, where to move, what group to join, and when to leave it are made by the family on the basis of straightforward evaluations of benefits and costs. As a correlate, the ‘affluence of the forager even under severe conditions is evidence, with some reservations.

The !Kung, however, do not live as isolated families but are organized into camps of several families and joined by personal networks of [67] exchange that interconnect
families and their camps across broad regions. The importance of these suprafamily organizations in handling the daily risks of hunting and the longer-range risks of an unpredictable resource base shows clearly the limits to family independence.”

75: “Warfare, in the sense of organized intergroup aggression, is not present among them, and outward signs of violence are discouraged. To be sure, homicide, especially between men in conflicts over women, is not uncommon … Such conflicts, however, are seen as disruptive, and the aggressors are not supported. … Personal violence is not allowed to expand into intergroup conflict because the overriding importance of intergroup ties; rather, disputes are settled by separation.”

78: “Broad sharing of meat handles two problems. First, it distributes food that could not possibly be eaten by a single family without storage; second, it averages the risks of unpredictable hunting so that all families get a share regardless of an individual hunter’s success. … Hunting creates the need for an exchange-based group larger than the nuclear family and socializes it through generalized reciprocity.”

79-80: Yellen and Harpending (1972) have emphasized the lack of territoriality among the !Kung, which they see as inevitable in an unstable environment in which population must continually distribute itself according to variable resource yields.”

80: “To summarize, the !Kung camp has a fluid composition and no clearly demarcated corporate nature. Although the pervasive exchange of meat among camp members may give the camp the appearance of a clearly demarcated group, in many other aspects it is an opportunistic aggregation of independent households.

After the !Kung section

As the assessment suggests, the camp is largely without established leadership.”

82: “Can we imagine that living societies will help us understand how human groups were organized in the distant past? What makes modern societies potential analogs for past social forms is not their inherent primitiveness but the flexibility and adaptability of humans to organize for survival and prosperity under divergent conditions. Thus the Khisan or the Shoshone, like all humans, are not primitive but pragmatic. Their social lives provide analogies of earlier forms, because the economic and demographic conditions under which they existed are similar.

First, by far the longest period was the Lower and Middle Paleolithic (very roughly from 2,000,000 to 35,000 B.P.), the time of human origins both as a biological species and as users of tools.”

83: “What archeological evidence we have suggests that early hominids were organized into small mobile groups. At sites such as the Olduvai Gorge (1,750,000 B.P.) and Olorgesailie (900,00 to 700,000 B.P. …), the concentration of flaked stone tools and remains of butchered animals suggested that early humans may have returned regularly to a base camp where food was shared”.

85: Various Upper Paleolithic artifacts, such as the large and carefully flaked Solurean spear points and bone batons with engraved animals, are almost surely status markers of leadership. … It seems plausible that local groups and even Big Man systems existed for the Upper Paleolithic.”
Three levels of social integration can be seen in all hunter-gatherer societies, but their relative importance varies significantly with resource availability, with the specific form of resource intensification, and with technological development. The family as the basic subsistence unit was nearly universal, although its importance was temporarily diminished when the camp took over some of its economic functions. The camp, of four to six families, was also nearly universal. The region, a collectivity of some ten to twenty camps, was organized to handle problems of security and defense.

In general, foragers are characterized by minimal social differentiation and a strong ethos of equality and sharing.

4. Families with Domestication, pp. 90-122

domesticated food production as such does not necessarily lead to a more complex social and economic system. Apart from the formation of hamlets, we find little to distinguish our cases here from those of the previous chapter: the family remains opportunistic, aggregating and dispersing as the availability of resources dictates, maximizing flexibility and minimizing structural constraints such as territoriality and leadership.

The archeological evidence is clear that agriculture by itself is not responsible for revolutionary changes in societal organization. So far as the archaeological record shows, sedentary village life first occurred in societies dependent on hunting and gathering … the family-level organization that characterized most hunter-gatherer societies after the end of the Pleistocene persisted in at least some instances well after the beginnings of agriculture.

Case 3. The Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon, 93

Case 4. The Nganasan of Northern Siberia, 112

Conclusions

Family autonomy is evidence in a number of ways. Productive capital such as tools, weapons, herds, and gardens is individually owned, and its use by others is regulated and carefully reckoned. Similarly, a family keeps its own food supply, sharing food only reluctantly with families of the same hamlet. The ultimate autonomy of the family, of course, is its freedom to move, to detach from other families and pursue its own interests with minimal interference.
5. The Local Group, pp. 123-140

123: “In chapters 5 to 8 we examine the local group, the institutions of which organize politically autonomous human groups of roughly one hundred to five hundred members.”
124: “As much as these are influenced by rules and traditions, the pragmatics of daily life in families mean that most work, social interactions, and recreation are quite spontaneous and flexible.”
125: “Warfare and territoriality are common among most local groups, with ownership of group lands highly changed and often carefully demarcated.”
126: “Stratification in the local group takes the form of leaders whose status rivalry creates the intergroup collectivity. But these leaders do not have exclusive control of resources and hence the power to oppress. … Some leaders control more resources than others, but their lot is to work harder and lead by example.”
127: “[speak of the Neolithic Revolution], why weren’t such technological achievements made much sooner? As early as forty thousand years ago, for example, it appears that Upper Paleolithic hunters and gatherers had a basic understanding of the principles of plant cultivation … And contemporary foragers seldom seem eager to settle down to village life, which in practice may be more demanding of labor and of personal sacrifices. … As mobile foragers, organized at the family level, humans maintained an open society based on personal intimacy, and enjoyed ‘the only true form of liberty, liberty from the interference of others’ (Wilson 1988: 52).”
128: “Within the pessimistic wing of social evolutionists, this transformation represents anything but progress for human well-being: [extensive quote from Maryanski and Turner 1992: :110].”
133: “At the family level we found a comparative scarcity of leadership and ceremonial occasions. Where they did occur they were ad hoc, vanishing with changing circumstances. Not so the local group”.
134: “His [the local group leader or head man] prestige is their strength, able to be transformed into whatever the group may need in order to defend its interests in a highly competitive environment.”
137: “These evolutionary processes are not unilinear but multilinear, meaning that the specific causes, conditions, and outcomes of social formation vary according to local environments and histories. Still, certain regularities can be described for the three broad adaptive types of foraging, farming, and herding, despite the ample cultural variability to be found within each type.”

6. The Family and the Village, 141-170

Case 5. The Yanomamo of the Venezuelan Highlands

143: “it is indeed competition over resources that ultimately explains Yanomamo warfare”.
170: “The Yanomamo are in essential ways like a family-level society. The greatest
degrees of economic interdependence is found in the teri, territorial groups and owners of
improved agricultural lands who anticipate the corporate kin groups of later chapters. But
because the Yanomamo are crowded in their landscape in comparison with true family-
level societies, a fundamental and far-reaching transformation has taken place: they can
no longer avoid resource competition simply by moving elsewhere, and brave, aggressive
men are now treated as valuable allies rather than as dangerous outcasts.

… a teri that does not itself become fearsome in defense of its estate, embracing
and rewarding brave, violent men, has no place to hide and no future.”

7. The Village and the Clan, 171-202

172: “a greater population density … brings the importance of property in land clearly to
the fore. Noteworthy are the formalized Maring clans, kin-based corporate groups that are
so common at the local group level. Clans claim title to land founded on sacred rights,
and they defend those rights against predatory neighbors.”

Case 6. The Eskimos of the North Slope of Alaska, 172

172: “The North Slope Eskimos offer a remarkably clear example of factors that lead to
the formation of a village-level economy. This case is especially revealing because
although all North Slope Eskimos belong to the same cultural and linguistic group, only
those living on the coast and engaged in cooperative whale hunting (the Tareumiut) have
a developed village economy. The inland Eskimos (Nunamiut) are typical family-level
foragers”.
174: “Most of the year the Nunamiut roam in individual families or extended family
camps that often split into individual households and go their separate ways for a time
before reassembling.”
176: “Among both Eskimo groups the nuclear family is the basic residential and
productive unit. … food is stored and cooked separately.”
176: “Nunamiut social rules require food sharing within the hamlet group and between
exchange partners. Yet ownership of food is carefully noted, and all hunting weapons are
identified by personal marks to avoid disputes over whole killed which animal in
communal hunts. Even spouse exchange is permissible, being viewed as a form of
reciprocity in men’s property rights over their wives’ sexuality.”
177: “The village economy of the Tareumiut is based on cooperative whaling and the
distribution of stored food. … Whale hunters form voluntary associations under the
leadership of an umesaliq (‘boat owner’).”
177: An umesaliq must provide for the security of his followers even in a bad season. …
he is expected to provide clothing and other items to his followers in exchange for their
loyalty. … the Tareumiut remain together throughout the winter, enjoying a degree of
food security unknown among the Nunamiut, whom they criticize for occasionally
abandoning aged or infirm relatives during a lean winter.”
178: “Eskimo social life is imbued with competition and comparison, but among the Nunamiut social pressure to be ‘honest and patient’ keeps the powers of would-be leaders in check. According to Chance …, ‘Nobody ever tells an Eskimo what to do. But some people are smarter than others and can give good advice. They are the leaders.’ … Habitually aggressive men are ostracized from the community.”

Case 7. The Tsembaga Maring of New Guinea, 179

179: “The Tsembaga, an archetypical acephalous society …, are one of about thirty politically autonomous Maring groups living in the highland fringe of central Papua New Guinea”.

180: “Even more so than the Yanomamo, the Tsembaga live in a crowded landscape with hostile warring neighbors, are organized into clans and local groups, and have elaborate ceremonies. Higher population density has led to intensification and direct competition for land, resulting in persistent warfare”.

186: “The Maring generally, as typified by the Tsembaga, consist of hierarchically nested groups that are consistently forming by segmentation and coalescing from necessity. … we recognize a somewhat simplified set of four main levels of organization: the domestic household, the patrilineal household cluster, the clan, and the local territorial group.”

188: “the clan defines ownership rights and restricts access to land. Clan members may exchange land with each other”.

188: “Beyond the local group no institutional structure exists, although there are frequent interactions.”

189: “Although a man depends on his group for access to land, for economic support, and for mutual defense, he must achieve special prominence in his group to have access to a regional network that affords contacts, security, and trade opportunities beyond what the local group may provide.”

191-2: “The most dramatic changes in basic lifeways from, say the Machiguenga to the Tsembaga are in population density and warfare. In our theory a significant increase in population density leads to a shift in subsistence toward agriculture, restricted access to and competition [192] over limited resources, small group territories, and endemic warfare …. That is what has happened to the Tsembaga. Their diet is now almost exclusively vegetarian and agricultural, and their environment is almost totally transformed and managed by human groups. Lands are scared, clearly demarcated, and jealously defended, with the clan restricting access. The territorial group, composed of several clans, must number several hundred for defense purposes, but the territory is small, only a mile or so across, and surrounded by enemies. Access to any resources not available within this small area must be through intergroup trade. The threat of warfare can never be dismissed.”

Case 8. The Turkana of Kenya, 194

194: “As mobile pastoralists who raise animals primarily for household consumption, the Turkana exhibit the individualistic, family-centered economy now familiar to use for
groups like the !Kung or the Nganasan. But their comparatively high population density, and the high risks they face from drought, disease, and raiding, compel them to organize and mobilize family and camp groups into neighborhoods and regional associations”. 197: quoting Dyson-Hudson and McCabe, “Kinship … is an important basis for cooperative relationships. However, … a man [as well as a woman] has great latitude to choose to live with people he likes. … Flux and flexibility characterize [their] social networks”. 198: “A nuclear family’s herds are all owned and managed by the father … there is a strong sense of the essential unity of the family and its herd.” 199: “the Turkana are not conscious of themselves as a tribe. They have no tribal, territorial, or clan leaders, no corporate groups, and no genealogical reckoning beyond the grandparent level. They are highly individualistic and tend to migrate within circumscribed areas; even close-knit extended families usually separate at times in response to their individual needs.”

Conclusions

200: “Another feature, less prominent but always present in some form, is status rivalry and group leadership in the person of the headman responsible for specific ceremonial and economic tasks.” 202: “Stratification involves the differential control of productive resources, and little evidence for it exists at the local group level. By and large, individuals acquire and exploit their own resources. Except in cases of economic cooperation where a leader controls the necessary technology … and in the immediate instance of warfare …, leadership carries not connotation of economic control.”

8. The Corporate Group and the Big Man Collectivity, 203-244

203: “The Big Man is a local leader, one who makes decisions for the local group and represents it in major intergroup ceremonies. As Big Man systems we will consider together the highly dynamic Big Men of Highland New Guinea and the somewhat more institutionalized ‘chiefs’ of the Kirghiz of Afghanistan and the Indian Fishermen of the Northwest Coast of North America. Although the systems are structured differently, they are remarkably similar in terms of social, political, and economic behavior.”

Case 9. Indian Fishermen of the Northwest Coast, 204

204: “the unexpected extent and complexity of their political life, and above all their competitive, entrepreneurial, and seemingly ‘capitalistic’ economy strike many responsive chords.” 208: “The family is the elemental economic unit, acting independently during summer foraging. Most tools, clothing, food, and manufactures are individually produced and owned and do not concern any larger group. But families are organized for much of the
year into ‘house groups,’ …. House groups pool resources and often eat from a common cooking pot.”

209: “elites … are closely bound to productive resources through politically reinforced ties of ownership … commoners … roam more or less freely throughout regional territories, ‘respecting’ different Big Men in succession”.

209: “House groups have many communal features.”

210: “Beyond the house groups are units variously named numayma, lineages, and clans. … When all members of a lineage live in a single village, they are coholders of rights in specific resources such as streams, berry patches, and offshore islands. But membership is fluid: many people are eligible on kinship grounds to join two or more groups, and will join the one most advantageous at the moment. It is also possible for non-kinsman to buy into a group.”

210: “The key to the Northwest Coast political economy is the Big Man or chief. Public life provides many opportunities for expressing differences in rank, and for testing and reordering rank. Ultimately a Big Man’s rank is a reflection of his wealth—that is, of the amount of wealth he can accumulate from the group that acknowledges him as leader.”

211: “The Big Man represents a group, and for many purposes is that group. His wealth is the group’s wealth, and his rank expresses the cumulative rank of his following. …

The Big Man is invested with the titles and emblems representing the group’s territories and wealth objects. … When a Big Man integrates other local groups with his own, he typically buys their emblems or seizes them by force, so that he becomes, albeit in a restricted sense, owner of the group’s resources. Although a Big Man may obtain control of a group by force, perhaps even murdering its original leader, in the long run he must depend on its loyalty, which he must earn by bravery, managerial skill, and generosity.

The Big Man organizes a complex economy characterized by large-scale investments and an elaborate division of labor.”

212: “To support his activities the Big Man requires a share of his followers’ production. A successful hunter or fisher must give one-fifth to one-half of his catch to his Big Man …. If he does not, he will receive few favors in the future and may even be roughed up …

In turn the Big Man spends or redistributes his income, returning part of it to his followers through feasts and other generous acts and using part to pay his specialists for their products.”

212: “Ceremonial occasions are economically complex. Politically they are occasions for Big Men to compete for prestige by giving away, and even destroying, wealth. Envy and humiliation are integral to the feast.”

213: “The Big Man and his followers seek ‘to flatten’ the name of another group by ‘burying’ it beneath piles of gifts.”

215: “Prior to pacification, among the fruits of war were captives, generally referred to as slaves. … In some cases slaves made up as much as 20 to 30 percent of a community’s labor force, and their status was fixed and passed on to their children ….

There is much debate over whether there are economic classes in Northwest Coast societies …. As titleholders who control resources, hold publicly recognized high rank, and pass both property and rank on to their offspring, some Northwest Coast elites could
be considered chiefs rather than Big Men. In that view, there would be three classes in stratified Northwest Coast societies: chiefs, commoners, and slaves.”

Case 10. The Central Enga of Highland New Guinea, 217

223: “Land is owned directly by the household. At marriage a man receives land from his family estate and establishes an independent [224] household. … Although transfer of ownership of the land is restricted and requires the consent of concerned patrilineal kin, the household otherwise retains control of its land.”

226: “The clan is first and foremost a corporate entity, restricting access to land … Where good land is in short supply the rules for allocating such land place a premium on lineal descent. Individuals who are not patrilineal kin can become attached to a clan and gain access to land, but only where the clan as ample land and needs more settlers for security reasons.”

227: “Leadership, a key ingredient in group action, is seen clearly in the clan meeting and related ceremonial and political events. The Big Man, though his status is highest, need to be the one to call the meeting, nor is his word considered binding on the group.”

228: Describes how Big men are both entrepreneurs and group spokesmen, and how they gain their positions by a mix of political and economic means.

232: “Warfare is … restricted by the regional collectivity of Big Men”.

Case 11. The Kirghiz of Northeastern Afghanistan, 233

Conclusions

241: “stratification is clearly evident, albeit in an incipient form, in Big Man societies. In all cases the Big Man controls resources … that help him to spread the risks of food production far beyond the family level. … the Big Man’s economic control varies among the three cases: control of technology in the hunter-gatherer economy, control of long-distance exchange in the pastoralist economy, control of inter-group exchange ceremonies in the horticultural society. But in each case leadership involves economic management and manipulation for individual as well as group advantage.”

9. The Regional Polity, 245-264

248: In the development of regional polities, a wide range exists in the degree of bureaucratization. Chiefdoms are usually seen as nonbureaucratic. Comparatively small in scale, their leaders … have very generalized roles, acting as mangers, judges, warriors, and priests. Although the chief many delegate specific chiefly duties to another, like the Hawaiian land manager …, the delegate is not part of a separate administrative institution”
249: “The social organization of production is hierarchical, subject to regional patterns of specialization and stratification.”
250: “Stratification in the regional polity is pronounced—some would say it is its definitive characteristic. With the emergence of complex chiefdoms and states comes the division into classes: a ruling segment that owns and manages much of the wealth and productive resources and a commoner segment that works in the fields and at other productive tasks. … Gender inequality also can become quite marked. Materially, the many divisions and hierarchies are represented in dress, cultural, quality of house, burials, and the like. The regional polity is a world of divisions and distinctions that both reflect and legitimize economic domination.”

10. The Simple Chiefdom, 265-281

267: “In the simplest terms, a chiefdom is a stratified society based on unequal access to the means of production. … A chief’s control translates into an ability to manipulate the economy in such a way as to derive from it a surplus that can be invested.”

Case 12. The Trobriand Islanders, 267

268: “The Trobriand case is important in coming to an understanding of the transition from a Big Man system to a chiefdom. Many of the characteristics of Big Man systems are present in the Trobriands, but hereditary ranking, institutionalized leadership, and some regional centralization suggest the chiefdoms of Polynesia.”
274: “he may designate another villager as his garden magician, but the leader is the ‘owner’ of magic’.
275: “The most important role of the local group cluster is political. … By manipulating marriage and exchange ties, a chief can bring a support group into what Malinowski (1935) calls a tributary relationship.”
276: “By marrying many females form many dala over a broad region, a high-ranking chief becomes the center of an extensive system of mobilization.”
276-7: “Both locally and regionally, social status is based on the established rank of a person’s dala, which is itself dichotomized into elite and commoner subgroups. Only a man born into a high-ranked dala can accede to power. The leader of a village’s highest ranked dala (if there are more than one) is the village leader; the village leader from the highest-ranked dala of a cluster is the cluster leader. A cluster leader from one of the highest-ranked dala in the region can then use the [277] privileges of his rank to acquire multiple wives and extend his power base regionally to form a support group of up to several thousand members. This pattern of inherited status, established political offices, and regional integration identifies Trobriand society as a chiefdom, but with elements of a system based on the Big Man pattern.”
277: “The kula is a well-described system of exchange”.
277-8: “Since kula objects are exchangeable only for each other, their distribution can be tracked and controlled by [278] chiefs.”
279: “External trade, as we have seen, is essential to both the political economy and the subsistence economy, and chiefs are able to monopolize this trade by their ownership of seaworthy sailing canoes”.

279: “as Malinowski (1935) was quick to recognize, chiefs are equally indispensable in the daily lives of the Trobrianders. Characteristically, small islands are ecologically unstable and poor in resources. As a risk management strategy, Trobriand chiefs act as ‘tribal bankers,’ investing the surplus made available in a normal year or a good year in capital equipment such as canoes, in foreign trade for nonlocal materials and craft goods, in the political ceremonies that determine individual and group status, and in wealth valuables. In a bad year, when there is no surplus, the chief’s management of production guarantees a sufficiency for subsistence needs.”

279: “The power and elite status of the Trobriand chief depends on the centralization and control of the economy. As we have seen, this control stems in part from the requirements of long-distance exchange and in part from the requirements of risk management. Once control was in their hands, chiefs extended it to include monopolies over the production of certain key resources … the intensification process in certain situations offers possibilities for control. In the Trobriands these possibilities include the land tenure system, the storable surplus, and the capital technology of trade. It is by controlling such elements of the subsistence economy that a chiefdom comes into being and perpetuates itself.”

11. The Complex Chiefdom, 281-303

283: “In Polynesia the continuum from simple to complex chiefdoms was well represented …. Indeed, Polynesian ethnography offers an excellent opportunity to consider how an over-arching sociopolitical organization can be maintained despite inherent tendencies to fragmentation.”

Case 13. The Hawaiian Islanders, 284

Case 14. The Basseri of Iran, 294

298: “One of the chief’s functions is to allocate pasture rights to his subjects; the oulad is the corporate unit that receives these rights, in the form of an il-rah, or “tribal road.”

299: “We view the Basseri chief as having two main functions in the political economy. First, he manages the use of pasture land in order to avert the ‘tragedy of the commons’ ….

The chief’s second function is to represent the Basseri to other segments of Iranian society.”
12. The Archaic State, 304-329

304: “States are regionally organized societies whose populations number in the hundreds of thousands or millions and often are economically diverse. In contrast to chiefdoms, the populations of states are usually ethnically diverse as well, and state power depends on balancing and manipulating the divergent interests of these groups. Whereas chiefdoms vest leadership in generalized regional institutions, in state the increased scope of integration requires specialized regional institutions to perform the tasks of control and management. The military is responsible for conquest, defense, and often internal peace; the bureaucracy is responsible for mobilizing the state’s income, meeting many local managerial responsibilities, and, more generally, for handling and monitoring information flow; the state religion serves both to organize production and to sanctify state rule. Along with this elaboration of the ruling apparatus comes increasing stratification. Elites are now related by kinship to the populations they govern; their power, underwritten by economic control, is displayed in the conspicuous use of luxury goods and the construction of splendid buildings.

The ethnic, institutional, and class divisions in state societies create competing interests and divergent sources of power.”

Case 15. France and Japan in the Middle Ages, 306

307: “The term ‘feudalism’ is also misleading for at least two reasons. First, we find that many ‘feudal’ institutions, such as the establishment of personal bonds of fealty between lord and vassal, the obligation of military service to the lord, and the granting of estates in land to loyal vassals, are hallmarks of the economic organization of chiefdoms.” Second, the uniqueness of feudalism comes largely from imperial influences, such as Rome and China.

309: “Japan was a hunter-gatherer economy until rice technology was adopted, perhaps around 250 B.C. Dry rice cultivation coexisted with foraging until about A.D. 300 to 600, when chiefdoms and archaic states arose in close association with irrigated wet rice cultivation.”

311: In Japan “At the beginning of the first Middle Age, settlement was still almost entirely in homesteads and hamlets spread across the countryside. … Local lords had much in common with the more powerful chiefs … Population tended to cluster about the lord’s residence. … Beyond the orbit of the manor however, large depopulated zones existed, sometimes inhabited by scattered hamlets of ‘free peasants.’”

312: “Local lords, formerly autonomous, were now compelled to swear fealty to regional overlords, who had superior might and wealth.”

314: “Land ownership hence became a matter of great concern … legal deeds of ownership accompanied the increasing tendency to buy, sell, and rent land, and peasant uprisings and revolts occurred over issues of land ownership. Some of these issues were increases in taxes and tithes … and the creation of landless peasants as the feudal protection of land access gave way to an increasingly free market in land.”
... The lord’s exclusive position in control of land-based wealth began to fade as wealth was acquired by rising groups of merchants, craftsmen, industrialists, and bureaucrats, all managing their parts of an increasingly complex economy. Leadership came to depend more on control of ‘exchange’ rather than on the means of production”. 315: “In sum, France and Japan in the Middle Ages developed gradually into states, propelled by pressures and opportunities arising from population increase and the intensification of land use. The growth of a peasantry coincided with the expansion of state-level political structures into tribal areas. At what point does the tribesman paying tribute to a chief become a peasant paying rent to a lord …?”,

Case 16. The Inka: An Andean Empire, 315

319-320: “The ayllu, a kin group descended from a single defining ancestor, [320] was used first to prepare the community’s fields required to produce stables for the state and for the community chief; they then together prepared the fields for the community’s households.”

323-4: “After conquering a new region, the state asserted its ownership of all that region’s lands. These lands were then divided into three sections whose produce went respectively to support the state bureaucracy and military, the state religion, and the local community. The community lands remained residually under state ownership, but the right to sue them was granted to the community in exchange for its mit’a—obligatory labor on state and religious lands and on other state projects such [324] as road maintenance, canal construction, and mining. An ideology of reciprocity was maintained: the use of land, the means of subsistence, was given in exchange for labor in state activities”.

326: “The curaca was a central figure in the operation and finance of the Inka empire. Important in pre-Inka times, at least in highland areas, mainly for his leadership in warfare, in Inka times the curaca was selected and supported by the state on the basis of his economic efficacy. The curaca was in a pivotal position: his authority relied both on a local heritage of rights and obligations and on the state’s guarantee of support. In the Mantaro valley … the states of the curaca and the strength of his control were greatly reinforced by imperial incorporation, and the local elites accordingly remained strongly disposed to further the state’s interests in the region.”

Conclusions, 328

328: “Integration on a massive regional or interregional scale is a defining characteristic of states. Minimally this integration involves a bureaucracy, a military establishment, and an institutionalized state religion.”

329: “All states are stratified [he uses stratification in Fried’s sense throughout]. They have to be, because the very institutions of state that are necessary to prevent economic chaos are based on a reliable income for finance. This income is possible only with economic control, and that control translates into rule by an elite, whether socially, politically, or religiously marked. At the state level, stratification appears to be inevitable.
The socialistic and democratic alternatives seem only to decorate a fundamental stratification with an ideology of egalitarianism. As much as we may cringe from this conclusion, the only alternative would be a comprehensive simplification of world economic problems that is impossible with pressing populations.”

329: In archaic states, “In the first instance, stratification is defined by the existence of two classes: a ruling and landowning elite class, and a producer class of commoners. In the second instance a third class is also present: a merchant class, often attached in one way or another to the ruling class.”

13. The Peasant Economy in the Agrarian State, 330-366

333: “In evolutionary terms, the fund of rent is the final and most burdensome from of intrusion of the political economy into the household economy. It began as a reluctant ‘gift’ from the producer to one or more current Big Men, hardened into the tribute demanded by a powerful chief, and eventually became the legally sanctioned right of landowners and bureaucrats to a share of peasant production.”

333: “Our case studies will show state influence at work at all levels of the economy: the intensification of production through such methods as irrigation and use of manufactured tools and fertilizers; the regional integration of the economy through markets for labor and produce; and the stratification of the labor force into many varieties both of primary producers and of owners, managers, and bureaucrats.”

Case 17. The Brazilian Sharecroppers of Boa Ventura, 334

Case 18. The Chinese Villagers of Taitu, 345

Case 19. The Javanese Villagers of Kali Loro, 356

360: “As in our other peasant societies, households tend to be self-contained nuclear families.”

365: “we find the peasant family to be highly vulnerable in a land-scarce, competitive, densely populated economy. Although the family carries most of the risks of production, it enjoys little profit. Why? Primarily because such labor-intensive methods of production … produce low returns to labor; secondarily because elites and governmental agencies are too powerful, and too removed from local control, to feel any pressure to return much of the wealth they extract from the agrarian sector. The capacity for intensification depends to a considerable extent on services provided by the sate, but these merely serve to keep production levels up and avoid mass starvation, not to relieve individual families of the burden of scarcity.”
14. The Evolution of Global Society

388: “Similarly, we have seen ample evidence that the evolution of human society, as an evolution of the political economy, requires political solutions to prevent environmental destruction resulting from population increase. Even in the smallest societies occasions arise, such as the Shoshone antelope shaman (Case 1), in which restrictions have to be placed on the freedom of individuals to exploit common resources. The government reforestation projects of feudal Japan (Case 15) and the chief’s management of migratory herding routes among the Basseri (Case 14) illustrate the need for communitywide restrictions on individual behavior even before the free market revolution.”

388: “The emerging world order reminds us politically of the Big Man systems that integrate the most complex of the local group societies.”

389: “In some very fundamental sense, as population grows, freedom declines. The world does not grow any bigger, so with more people there is less of a share of the world for each. True, technology increases the availability of resources to serve human purposes, but to the degree that the law of diminishing returns applies to technology, people must work harder to meet their needs as the environment becomes more crowded. In Chapter 1 we learned that time allocation data show a general rise in the length of the workday as economic systems evolve from hunting-gathering to extensive agriculture to intensive agriculture and industrialism.”

Katz—Private Property versus Markets

Private Property versus Markets: Democratic and Communitarian Critiques of Capitalism
Author(s): Claudio J. Katz

He criticizes communitarian critiques of capitalism that are based on criticism of the market. He instead endorses democratic critiques of capitalism based criticism of the property regime.

278: “Three claims characterize democratic critiques of the economy: First, property is essentially a form of rule, endowing owners with rights to command the services of others. Second, a fateful continuity underlies the transition from traditional to capitalist economics. Modern property fails to affect a fundamental break with traditional ownership relations. Capitalism is indicted because it preserves the defining feature of premodern property, generating political power to determine the risks and destinations of other people (Waltzer 1983, 291). Third, this school disassociates markets from property: Capitalist ownership, not the market, constitutes the morally compromised aspect of the modern economy.”

280: “While their lords equated economic freedom with leisure, peasants equated free status with independence, drawing a sharp distinction between working for
their own sake and for that of their lords (Hilton 1973, 38-57; Wood 1995, 187-92).”


284: “Locke’s defense of private appropriation, his rejection of the claims of common right usage, plays a role in this account of the transition to capitalism (see Wood 1984). What Locke’s text sanctions is the privatization of property withdrawing access to resources—open fields, wastes, forests—from the jurisdiction of the village”.

284: Locke denies that customary usage has any force against private appropriation, which he places beyond the province of communal authority. This includes appropriation of the free gifts of nature, resources not produced by labor, contravening what Bloch (1966, 182) considers one of the core principles of ancient practice: “the feeling that wild paces and water, untouched by human hand, could not be appropriated by any individual.” Enclosure was one-sided. The lords took greater control of land without compensating the peasants for the rights they had exercised over it.

284: Agrarian rebellions are normally characterized as protests against the encroachment of the market. Smallholders were not, however, implacable foes of commercial principles …. What they resisted was expropriation. They rejected Locke’s (36-7) reading, in which the passage from the earliest ages of the world, when households had independent access to their means of production, to modern times, when improve landlords closed off the commons, is accomplished without loss of status. Juridically free, they were dispossessed. The loss of access to forests, wasteland, and common pasturage undermined the bedrock of their economic independence. The Levellers, many of whom, were petty producers themselves, represented democratic currents in the seventeenth century which disputed the normative implications of Locke’s mode of characterizing the master’s appropriation of another’s labor as equivalent to the smallholder’s own …. On the one hand, capitalist ownership dispensed with all paternalistic obligations to safeguard subjects’ welfare, transferring them to the public domain. On the other, rule over the human interchange with nature was effectively privatized, protected in an ‘economic’ domain beyond the reach of public deliberation and decision making. … Capitalist ownership surrendered the legitimate use of power—to tax, adjudicate, conscript—to the state. At the same time, the power of property reached deeper into material life itself.”

285: “the pernicious consequences Polanyi attributes to market systems— insecurity, inequality, unfreedom, alienation—are more correctly attributable to private property regimes” (Lindblom 1977, 105).
4-5: “Even today, most views concerning prehistoric (and tribal) war and peace reflect two ancient and enduring myths: progress and the golden age. The myth of progress depicts the original state of mankind as ignorant, miserable, brutal, and violent. Any artificial complexities introduced by human invention or helpful gods have only served to increase human bliss, comfort, and peace, lifting [5] humans out of their ugly and hurtful state of nature. The contradictory myth avers that civilized humans have fallen from grace—from a simple and primeval happiness, a peaceful golden age. All the accretions of progress merely multiply violence and suffering; civilization is the sorry condition that our sinfulness, greed, and technological hubris have earned us. In the modern period, these ancient myths were elaborated by Hobbes and Rousseau into enduring philosophical attitudes toward primitive and prehistoric peoples.”

5: “Hobbes’s most famous phrase, their lives were therefore ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ He claimed vaguely that ‘savage people in many places of America’ still lived in this violent primitive condition but gave no particulars and never pursued the point further.”

28-31: “In a study of North American Indian tribes and bands, again only 13 percent of the 157 groups surveyed were recorded as ‘never or rarely’ raiding or having been raided … This leaves only 7 truly peaceful societies (4.5% of the sample) that apparently did not participate in any type of warfare or raiding. All of these were very small nomadic bands residing in the driest, most isolated regions of the Columbia Plateau and the Great Basin. Again, we find the most peaceful groups living in areas with extremely low population distance and hard country from other groups.

Even highly nomadic, geographically isolated hunter-gatherers with low [29] population densities are not universally peaceable. For example, many Australian Aboriginal foragers, including those living in deserts, were inveterate raiders. The seeming peacefulness of such small hunter-gatherer groups may therefore be more a consequence of the tiny size of their social units and the large scale implied by our normal definition of warfare than any real pacifism on their part. Under circumstances where the sovereign social and political unit is a nuclear or slightly extended family band of from four to twenty-five people, even with a sex ratio unbalanced in favor of males, no more than a handful of adult males (the only potential ‘warriors’) are available. When such a small group of men commits violence against another band or family, even if faced in open combat by all the men of the other group, this activity is not called war but is usually referred to as feuding, vendetta, or just murder.

Thus, many small-band societies that are regarded by ethnographers as not engaging in warfare instead evidence very high homicide rates. For example, the Kung San … are viewed as a very peaceful society; indeed, one popular ethnography on them was titled The Harmless People. However, their homicide rate from 1920 to 1955 was for times that of the United States and twenty to eighty times that of major industrial nations during the 1950s and 1960s. Before local establishment of the Bechuanaland/Botswana police, the Kung also conducted small-scale raids and prolonged feuds between bands and against Tswana herders intruding from the east. The Copper Eskimo, who appear as a
peaceful society in the cross-cultural surveys just discussed, also experienced a high level of feuding and homicide before the Royal Canadian Mounted Police suppressed it. Other Eskimo of the high artic who were organized into small bands also fit this pattern. Based on figures from difference sources, the murder rate of the Netsilik Eskimo, even after the Mounties had suppressed interband feuding, exceeds that of the United States by four times and that of modern European states by some fifteen to forty times. At the other end of the New World, the isolated Yaghan ‘canoe nomads’ of Tierra del Fuego, whose only sovereign political unit was the ‘biological family,’ had a murder rate in the late nineteenth century '10 times as high as that of the United States.' Thus armed conflict between social units does not necessarily disappear at the lowest levels of social integration; often it is just terminologically disguised as feuding or homicide.

Both Richard Lee and Marvin Harris, defending the pacifistic nature of Kung and other simple societies compared with our own, decry the ‘semantic deception’ that disguises the ‘true’ homicide rates of modern states by ignoring the murders inflicted during wars. Let us undertake such a comparison for one simple society, the Gebusi of New Guinea. Calculations show that the United States military would have had to kill nearly the whole population of South Vietnam during its nine-year involvement there, in addition to its internal homicide rate, to equal the homicide rate of the Gebusi. As their ethnographer Bruce Knauft notes, ‘only the most extreme instances of modern mass slaughter would equal or surpass the Gebusi homicide rate over a period of several decades.’ There is, then, an equal semantic deception involved in manufacturing peaceful societies out of violent ones by refusing to characterize as war their only possible form of intergroup violence, merely because of the small size of the contending social units.

If many of the ‘peaceful hunter-gatherer bands did in reality engage in armed conflict, were any of them genuinely pacifist? Perhaps the most striking case of peaceful hunters involves the Polar Eskimo of northwestern Greenland. In the early nineteenth century, they consisted of a small band of some 200 people whose circumstances seemed ideally suited to a postapocalyptic science-fiction plot or perhaps a heartless society science experiment. Their icy isolation had been so complete for so long that they were unaware that any other people existed in the world until they were contacted in 1819 by a European explorer. This tiny society, whose members eked a precarious livelihood from a frozen desert, not surprisingly avoided all feuds and armed conflicts, although murder was not unknown. When other Eskimo from Canada and southwestern Greenland reached them after hearing of their existence from Europeans, relations with these strangers and with the Europeans they encountered were always quite amicable. The Polar Eskimo thus provide a counterexample to the recent theory that contact with Western civilization and its material goods inevitably turns peaceful tribesmen into Hobbesian berserkers.

There are a few other examples of peaceful hunter-gatherers. The Mbuti Pygmies and Semang of the tropical forests of central Africa and Malaysia seem to have completely eschewed any form of violent conflict and can legitimately be regarded as pacificistic. However, the Pygmy forgers were in fact politically subordinate to and economically dependent on the farmers who surrounded them (Chapter 9). Although they frequently engaged in nonlethal violence involving weapons, the last small ‘wild’ band of Aborigines in the western Australian desert, the Mardudjara, never (at least while ethnographers were present) permitted such fighting to escalate into killing. Although they possessed shields and specialized fighting weapons, the Mardudjara had no words in
their language for feuds or warfare. The Great Basin Shoshone and Paiute bands mentioned earlier apparently never attacked others and were themselves attacked only very rarely; mostly just fled rather than trying to defend themselves. But these few peaceful groups are exceptional. The cross cultural samples indicate that that vast majority of other hunter-gatherer groups did engage in [31] warfare and that there is nothing inherently peaceful about hunting-gathering or band society."

Kelly: The foraging spectrum and/or Lifeways

"In Enlightenment thought, history was a record of progress, progress that was reflected in technology and material goods as well as in social order and morality. This view provided Europeans with a way to understand human diversity. In a world thought to be created by a perfect God, diversity in humanity reflect differences in the degree of perfection. And just as God stood above the whole of humanity, so could cultures and ethnic groups be ranked in terms of their perfection. Progress, according to European thinkers, arose from increasingly rational though that resulted in the control of nature. Allegedly unable to think rationally, members of ‘primitive’ society were controlled by nature. Today, this image of the foraging lifeway is summed up by Hobbes’s famous words: ‘nasty, brutish, and short.’"

"We began this book with Thomas Hobbes’s famous seventeenth-century description of human life in a time before ‘society.’ It is not a pretty image, and we will repeat the less well-known portion of it here: ‘no place for industry … no society…’ Although Hobbes did not even know of the existence of ‘hunter-gatherers’ when he wrote Leviathan in 1651, his memorable passage came to typify nineteenth- and early twentieth-century definitions of foragers. And part of this definitions was that hunter-gatherers lacked things: technology."

"Some children in foraging societies work hard; others, not such much … Hadza children, for example, forage on their own at four or five years of age, … to provide up to 50 percent of their needs …. Conversely, Ju/hoan children do not forage until into their early teens …. One reason for this difference is that Hadza children do not have to walk
far from camp to forage but Ju/'hoan children do, please them at greater risk from predators and head exhaustion. …

… how much foraging children do depends on the level of danger, skill, and physical strength involved. The importance of each of these is still a matter of debate. The level of danger largely results from the presence of poisonous animals (mostly snakes) and predators such as larger cats, hyenas, wolves, or dingoes; it also depends how difficult it is to negotiate an environment”.

202: “prior to Man the Hunter, foragers were generally considered to live Hobbesian lives, a war of all against all. But after Man the Hunter, anthropologists, and the public envisioned foragers living lives of blissful peace…

… my position: life in foraging societies is not all sweetness and light but neither is it a Hobbesian hell. There are a few foraging societies who know virtually no violence (e.g. the Malaysian Batek and the Indian Paliyan; see Gardner 2000; Endicott and Endicott 2008) but most, unfortunately, do (Table 7-8). Although foraging societies vocalize an ethos of nonviolence and have mechanisms to resolve disputes (see Fry 2006, 2011), ethnographic (and archaeological) data show that many foragers lived with high levels of homicide and warfare …. Wrangham et al (2006) … calculated a median forager homicide rate of 164/100,000; compare this to the U.S. homicide rate in the late 1990s of 5.5/100,000.

But let’s first consider the nature of homicide statistics. Note that the actual number of murders is low—the San Ildefonso Agta rate of 129/100,000 is based on eleven murders (including at least two by outsiders) over a forty-three-year period, or about one murder every four years (Early and Headland 1998). Visit the Agta or the Ju/'Hoansi or the Hadza most years and you too would label them a ‘harmless people.’”

203: Table 7-8. Hunter-Gatherer Homicide Rates [abridged by Karl Widerquist]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Population density (persons/100km²)</th>
<th>Homicide Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hadza</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andamanese</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ju/'Hoansi</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Ildefonso</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agta</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gidjingali</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiwi</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahgan</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yurok</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casiguran Agta</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murngin</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modoc</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ache</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piegan</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes:
“Many are warfare deaths alone … some rates include suicide, infanticide, and murders by external forces”.
“Lee … gives the Ju’Hoansi homicide rate as 29/100,000, based on twenty-two murders over a 50-year period, 1920-1970. However, he notes that murders ceased about 1955 due to the presence of an outside police force; for a thirty-five-year period, this results in a rate of 42/100,000.
“Endicott and Endicott (2008) do not specifically state that the homicide rate is 0/100,000, but they did seek out instances of violence, recording only a few, and only one possible homicide (which would be counted as infanticide). I have the a minimal murder rate of 1/100,000 so that the log could be taken and made comparable to other data in the table.”

204: “Ratio data can fluctuate widely in small populations. By convention, homicide rates are given as the number of murders per 100,000 person-years, but the relevant group size for foragers is far smaller. The ‘peaceful’ Semai, for example, saw only two murders over a twenty-two-year period (Denton 1968). But in such a small population, this translates into a homicide rate of 30/100,000 (Knauft 1987: 458). But what is the relevant population? Robert Denton (1988) replied that the base population is larger than Knauft assumed and that the rate is consequently closer to 1/100,000. In small groups, it takes only a few deaths to alter the rate significantly. The Hadza rate increases from 6.6 to 40/100,000 if three murders by neighboring Datoga are included … And how do we account for “extenuating circumstances?” In five of the eleven San Ildefonso murders, for example, alcohol was a significant contributing factor (as it is everywhere …). Would the rate have been lower without the booze? One solution to these problems is to collect data over long spans of time. But because ethnographers cannot be present for decades, they have to rely on informants’ memories …, which are not always accurate.

The Ache and Hiwi rates stand out in this table: 500 and 1,018 / 100,000, respectively. However these numbers are not directly comparable to other figures. The Hiwi (precontact) rate includes all violent deaths, including murders by Hiwi, murders by Venezuelans, suicide, and infanticide. Breaking the data down (Hill et all. 2007, table 4), murders by Hiwi themselves account for only 7 percent of all deaths (8.5 percent if we assume that those killed by Venezuelans lived; 22 percent of all deaths are a result of homicide if we add the Venezuelan murders). Among the Ache, 39 percent of all infant (0-3 years) deaths result from infanticide or child homicide (e.g. the burial with a deceased parent), as well as 17 percent of all juvenile deaths (4-14 years). About 9 percent of adult deaths are a result of homicide or club fights …. These lower rates are similar to that of the Agta, Ju/Hoansi, and Hadza, where violence, not including infanticide, suicide, or external murders, accounts for 3-7 percent of deaths.

Still, there is variability in violent death among foragers, whether we are talking about intra-group murder, warfare or raiding, infanticide, or other child murders. Hill et all (2007) suggest that low homicide rates are a product of colonial intervention and that prehistoric foragers may have witnessed higher rates. An overarching authority to which individuals could petition for redress can restrict violence (Knauft 1987: 476), and such authority did apparently stem violence among the Ju’Hoansi (Lee 1979), Ache …, Inuit
and Agta ..., although we do not know by how much. Conversely, Blurton Jones et al (2002) discounts the role of outsiders in stemming the Hadza’s murder rate. And whether the past was more violent than the ethnographers present is an issue for archeology to decide (see Kelly 2013).

Foragers tend to have low rates of nonlethal aggression ..., but this comes from the cultural denial of aggression in small egalitarian communities rather than the lack of squabbles.”

205: “In egalitarian societies, people can level and ambitious and potentially violent man through teasing and ridicule before things get out of hand; or they can ‘vote with their feet’ and move away from the troublesome people. Just as there is no overarching mechanism to adjudicate disputes or punish wrongdoers—and, hence, stop interpersonal violence—there is also no mechanism for building a fighting force. When others have glossed over foragers as ‘violent’ (Ember 1978, Keeley 1996), it is instructive to point out that nomadic, egalitarian foragers do not go to war as much as sedentary, nonegalitarian foragers; these two social forms should not be combined. War, as defined here, is relatively uncommon among egalitarian foragers .... Among nonegalitarian foragers, however, violence is culturally sanctioned ... and often raises a man’s status (Knauft 1987). And nonegalitarian foragers are universally sedentary peoples. As we argued in Chapter 4, sedentary foragers arise not from food abundance but rather because population density is so high relative to habitable places on the landscape that residential movement is not possible without displacing another group. War appears when mobility is not an option.”

206: “Table 7-9. Hunter-Gatherer Social Type and Warfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forager Social Type</th>
<th>Warfare Absent</th>
<th>Warfare Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
<td>Ju/'hoansi, Hadza, Aranda, Copper Inuit, Mbuti, Andamanese, Semang, Saulteaux, Vedda, Paiute, Tiwi, Yamana, Slave</td>
<td>Monganais, Gilyak, Ingalik, Micma, Botocudo, Kaska, Aweikoma, Yakaghir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonegalitarian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bella Coola, Haida, Gros, Ventre, Yurok, Comanche, Yokutus, Chiricahua, Kootenai, Tehuelche, Twana, Klamath, Eyak, Eastern Pomo, Aleut</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

208: “In sum, hunter-gatherers will always have some minimal level of violence that results from the rage the builds up among people in small groups who cannot avoid stepping on each other’s goes. Homicide above this level, and more serious violence such as warfare, increases with increasing population pressure. At some level of pressure, people will weigh the benefits of violence higher than the potential cost.”
First edition:


6-7: “Enlightenment philosophy revolved around the notion of progress. … The history of humanity was seen as operating according to universal, natural laws that led to the moral develop of people, and that was evidence by the increasing subjugation of nature by people. … Allegedly unable to think rationally, members of less advanced societies were controlled by nature; thinking rationally, members of advanced societies controlled nature.”

8: “Morgan could describe world history in terms of seven periods, the lower, middle, and upper status of Savagery, the lower, middle, and supper status of Barbarism, and the status of civilization, each with its critical discovery or invention that improved humanity’s condition and insured its progress.”

9: “Two other factors helped place hunter-gatherers near the bottom of the evolutionary scale …. First, they had few belongings. … Hunter-gatherers were nomadic because they were intellectually incapable of developing the technology needed to permit a sedentary existence …. Were their moral and intellectual character to be raised, hunter-gatherers could settle down and reap the material rewards of progress.

Second, because many were nomadic, hunter-gatherer peoples had concepts of private property quite different from Europeans. … the subtlety of the ways in which hunter-gatherers relate people to geography was lost on European explorers …. To them, hunter-gatherers had no conception of private property, a sure sign of arrested moral and intellectual development.”

14-15: The “generalized foraging model” was developed at the “Man the Hunter” conference. “Part of the new model was explicitly set forth in Lee and DeVore’s conception of ‘nomadic style.’ In consisted of five characteristics:

[15] (1) Egalitarianism…
(2) Low population density…
(3) Lack of territoriality…
(4) A minimum of food storage…
(5) Flux in band composition…”

[The focused almost exclusively on band society.]

15-17: “Prior to ‘Man the Hunter’ the hunter-gatherer lifeway [16] had been viewed as one of continual fear and starvation, a perpetual and barely adequate search for food. … Salins argued that ethnographic data actually painted quite a different picture: hunter-gatherers spent relatively little time working, had all the food they needed, and spent leisure hours sleeping or socializing. The devil-may-care attitude toward the future, which many early explorers and ethnographers interpreted as stupidity or foolishness, Sahlin argued as an expression of self-confidence and assurance that the environment would meet one’s own needs. The carelessness with which many hunter-gatherers treat material goods, previously interpreted as the inability to recognize personal property, was, Sahlin argued, a response to a mobile lifestyle in which permanent material goods

...
are a hindrance. In Sahlins' memorable phrase, the foraging economy was a Zen economy: wanting little, [17] hunter-gatherers had all they wanted.”

17: “Sahlins’ primary purpose … was to counter the prevailing argument in anthropology that hunter-gatherers did not have ‘elaborate culture because they did not have the time to develop it. … To overturn this deeply held misconception, Sahlins felt it necessary to use the ‘most shocking terms possible’—thus the overstatement of the original affluent society.”

20-22: “Reexamination of the Ju/'hoansi and Australian work effort do not support Salins’ claim. Kristen Hawkes…Ache’s…. The discrepancy lay in Lee’s original definition of work. Lee counted as work only the time spent in the bush searching for and procuring food, not the labor needed to process food resources in camp. Add in the time it takes to manufacture and maintain tools, carry water, care for children, process nuts and game, gather firewood, and clean habitations, and the Ju/'hoansi work well over a forty-hour week (Lee 1984; Isaac 1990). …

…many hunter-gatherers do not spend much time out foraging … Why don’t they forage more? Do they intend to have an affluent life of leisure?

…Lorna Marshall pointed out that Ju/'hoansi women may not work as hard as they could because in gathering more than needed a woman would soon be confronted by demands to share the fruits of her extra efforts…

Such intentional restrictions on productivity may be common, and with good reason. … [a computer simulation found:] even if a few members of a foraging band should elect to increase their productivity, they could cause disaster for everyone in the group. … hard-working foragers could deplete local resources quickly…could eventually result in group extinction … even small [22] increases in work effort can change an environment that is replete with food into one that is barren. Hurtado and Hill provide tentative support for this argument”.

21: See table:

Table 1.1. Foraging and work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foraging hrs/day female</th>
<th>Foraging hrs/day male</th>
<th>Foraging hrs/day both (mean)</th>
<th>Working hrs/day both (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ache</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi (late wet)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi (early dry)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi (late dry)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi (early wet)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ju/'hoansi</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BaMbuti (nets)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BaMbuti (archers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>BaMbuti (nets)</td>
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<td>BaMbuti (archers)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efe Pygmy</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>≠Kade</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>≠Kade</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>G/wi</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadza</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadza (dry season)</td>
<td>2-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hadza (wet season)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kutse (Bushman)</td>
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<td>Australia Interior</td>
<td>2-4</td>
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<td>Ngadadjara</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Desert</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paliyan</td>
<td>3-4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agta (male)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ihaya Agta (female)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ihaya Agta (female)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batek</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlingit</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22-3: “The concept of original affluence cannot account for variability in forager work effort and reproduction or for conditions that lead to increased work effort and population growth. [several citations.]

It also now appears that many hunter-gatherers are also chronically undernourished and undergo dramatic seasonal fluctuations in weight and nutritional status that, for women, affects fecundity and the welfare of nursing offspring. Members of that quintessential affluent society, the Ju’hoansi, ‘are very thin and complain often of
hunger, at all times of the year. It is likely that hunger is a contributing cause to many deaths which are immediately caused by infectious and parasitic diseases, even though it is rare for anyone simply to starve to death’ (Howell 1986b: 173–4…). … This is not just a product of contact. A growing body of archeological data also demonstrates that prehistoric hunter-gatherer peoples in a variety of environments lived physically demanding lives, and frequently witnessed severe seasonal food shortages (e.g. Yesner 1994).

22-3: “Life among some hunter-gatherers may also be more violent than previously thought. Per capita homicide rates among some hunter-gatherers, including the Ju/'hoansi, are quite high, rivaling those of large North American cities … It is also apparent that some violence is due to the sedentization process that requires people to aggregate into large [23] groups, and to the unrestrained view of alcohol …. Nevertheless, the Ju/'hoansi do experience violence, and many other hunter-gatherers fought and raided one another for revenge, food, and slaves.”

23: “Others have found that alleged egalitarian relations of hunter-gatherers are pervaded by inequality, most notably but not only between the young and the old, and men and women … Archeologists have found increasing evidence of prehistoric nonegalitarian hunter-gatherers in a variety of different environments …, most of whom live under high population densities and stored food on a large scale. … It is certainly erroneous to equate a hunter-gatherer economy with band society.”

25: “‘Virtually no hunter-gatherer in the tropical forest today lives without trading heavily with horticulturalists for carbohydrates, or eating government or missionary rations. Some authors have even suggested that it is impossible to live in the tropical rain forest as a hunter-gatherer without the carbohydrates and iron tools provided by horticulturalists’.”

26: “In the mid-twentieth century, anthropologists saw the effects of contact between hunter-gatherers and ‘outside’ societies as something that could be eliminated or neutralized … allowing reconstruction of the precontact lifeway. In the 1980s, however, some anthropologists argued that the effects of interaction cannot be subtracted from hunter-gatherer lifeways. “

27-28: Lee tries to use the Bushmen to reconstruct the precontact hunter-gatherer way of life. “Schrire and Wilmsen [28] argue that such an approach is impossible, for once the effects of contact are subtracted, there is nothing left. Wilmsen, in fact, argues that his own work with the Bushmen has nothing to say about hunter-gatherers: in the Kalahari, we are some thousand years too late for that’”.

28: “‘Are the features we single out and study held in common, not so much because humanity shared the hunter-gatherer life-style for 99% of its time on earth, but because the hunters and gatherers of today, in searching for the compromises that would allow them to go on doing mainly that, have reached some subliminal consensus in finding similar solutions to similar problems?’ (Schrire 1984b, 18).”

29: “The concern with contact-induced change threatens to reduce analysis of variability among hunter-gatherers to a new stereotype, one that focuses on issues of power and control, that treats modern hunter-gatherers only as disenfranchised rural proletariat, and that ultimately denies the usefulness of the study of modern hunter-gatherers for understanding prehistory. This is as much of an oversimplification as was the generalized foraging model. And it is as much an overstatement to claim that modern ethnography is
useless to prehistory as it is naïve to suppose that the effects of contact can be subtracted from living foragers.”

31-2: “Extensive food storage does appear to be associated with nonegalitarian sociopolitical organizations among foragers, although it is not clear how (or even if) storage itself necessarily results [31] in exploitation of those who cannot control access to the stored resources by those who can”.

32-3: “Among some Austra-[33]lian Aborigines, for example, old men control the distribution of women as wives … Woodburn sees this as establishing inequality and exploitation between older and younger men (1982)—although unlike true classes, where there is limited social mobility, all surviving young men in the group eventually become older men.”

33-4: “Throughout the history of anthropological thought, the stereotypes of hunter-gatherers have changed from one extreme to another … There is nothing wrong with [33] seeking generalizations; indeed that is part of the obligation of a scientist. But generalizations should not mask the underlying variability; rather they should be steps toward understanding it.”

162: “Reconstructions of hominid evolution have long assumed that evidence of sharing and especially the sharing of meat was critical in establishing the first appearance of humanity among Plio-Pleistocene hominids.

However, hunter-gatherers vary along a continuum, from treating resources as if they were common property, to individual ownership”.

163: “Buch finds that generalized sharing only occurs within families among northwest Alaskan Eskimos, not between families, where different forms of exchange exist”.

163: “Hunter-gatherers also share use rights to land in different ways and to varying extents.”

164: “acts of sharing come no more naturally to hunter-gatherers than to members of industrial societies. … The importance of giving gifts and sharing is reinforced throughout life until it becomes deeply embedded in a person’s personality … The act of sharing is often valued as much, if not more, than what actually is shared …, and is important in maintaining an egalitarian social order …, or at least the appearance of an egalitarian order”.

165: “However, acts of sharing among foragers are often preceded by one person’s insistence that another share with him or her. This ‘demand sharing’ is common among hunter-gatherers … Lee (1979:372) and Marshall (1976) describe the Ju’/hoansi as masters of verbal abuse and jesting, much of it intended to encourage adequate reciprocity and meat distribution.”

165: “Sharing, therefore, strains relations between people. Consequently, many foragers try to find ways to avoid its demands. When possible, members of one Gunwinggu band in northern Australia lie to members of another band about how successful they have been at hunting and thus deflect demands for sharing (although at other times they will go to lengths to share surplus food with kinsmen in other bands…)

165-6: “Besides pointing to efforts to limit sharing, ethnographic data also demonstrate that there is variability in how much, what, and with whom hunter-gatherers share. The meat of large game, for example, is always shared, but [166] it is not always shared equally. … Yet many game animals are divided according to specific cultural rules, with certain parts always going to certain relatives of the hunter.”
166: “Table 5-1. Meat Sharing”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Description of meat sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ache</td>
<td>Families keep about 10 percent of game whether the game is large or small; remainder is shared equally to other families taking family size into account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamainde</td>
<td>Meat is equally distributed among the families in a band after controlling for family size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanomamo</td>
<td>Large game shared more than small game; families of hunters receivd about twice the amount of meat from a kill as others; strong kin bias in meat distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yora</td>
<td>Hunters keep for their families about 40 percent of the game they acquire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwi</td>
<td>Families keep about 60 percent of small game; 40 percent of medium-sized game, and 20 percent of large game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunwinggu</td>
<td>Hunters keep for their families about one-third of game they acquire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

172: “Constant tension between a desire to hoard and a need to share produces the anxiety of sharing so often recorded by ethnographers”

172: “Do these good hunters get back what they put in, as the variance-reduction hypothesis would suggest?”

173: “Apparently not, argues Kristen Hawkes”.

177: “single Ache men produce the most and are the most consistent in their production. They share the most and receive the least in return. What do they gain from this? … males who are good hunters also have significantly more surviving children, when extramarital children are included …

Kaplan and Hill suggest … poorer hunters tolerate the extramarital affairs of better hunters in order to keep the meat they acquire in the band.”

178: Good hunters among foraging societies do indeed acquire prestige from being good hunters. Even if their efforts are lampooned and ridiculed, and even if “the hunter may end up with no control over the distribution of game, he will always acquire prestige.”

179: Says that hunters ability declines after 40 and they might save up favors by being good hunters when they are young.

180: Says there are two problems with the model on p. 179: elderly do provide services that can be thought of as an exchange for food; “thus they are not being repaid for the productivity or generosity of their youth.” Second, there would be no enforcement mechanism for the young to repay the old.

181: “At present our ethnographic data are insufficient to provide us with a thorough description of the range of ways foragers share, let alone a thorough account of why this diversity exists.”
183: “Though later research suggested that Algonquian hunting territories were a seventeenth-century adaptation to the fur trade, the idea that hunter-gatherers were territorial became entrenched in anthropological theory. …

The idea that all hunter-gatherers are territorial contributed to the widespread notion that humans are, by nature, territorial. … Participants at the ‘Man the Hunter’ conference reacted strongly against this claim, and in so doing helped revise longstanding anthropological orthodoxy on hunter-gatherer land use.

Before 1966, many anthropologists thought of hunter-gatherers as living in tightly circumscribed areas, suspicious of outsiders. After the ‘Man the Hunter’ conference it appeared that hunter-gatherers went where they pleased when they pleased, and were welcomed by all.”

185: “But in the 1960s, evidence already existed of hunter-gatherer groups that had distinct spatial boundaries who maintained exclusive rights to the use of resources contained within them. Many Northwestern Coast villages, for example, had exclusive rights to the resources of specific stretches of beach …. Among the supposedly nonterritorial Great Basin Shoshone and Paiute, and even the Bushmen, there is variability in the degree of boundary permeability …

Upon reconsideration of ethnographic evidence, we see that no society has a laissez-faire attitude toward spatial boundaries. Instead, all have ways, sometimes very subtle ways, of assigning individuals to specific tracts of land and gaining access to others. … Many hunter-gatherers do not live their lives on delineated tracts of land that they consider to be their own, but individuals do have specific rights or statuses as members of a group or band that connect them with a particular area. … Understanding land tenure, therefore, requires recognition of the many different ways that people relate themselves to one another.”

188: “a widespread (although not universal) pattern in hunter-gatherer land tenure: that connections to land are social and permeable, rather than geographic and rigid, and that there connections have social and political in addition to ecological components.”

192: “Almost all ethnographies note that permission to use resources belonging to another group or individual must be acquired, but it is equally universal that permission is virtually assured if asking for permission is considered a culturally legitimate question. Resources may not be there fore the taking, but they are apparently there fore the asking. The giving of permission is the giving of a gift—and it puts the receiver in debt.”

195: “the benefits of territoriality—perimeter defense—decrease as resources become less dense. At some point the benefits are less than the cost of social-boundary defense.”

258: “empirical data and theoretical arguments support 25 as the average band or residential group size. Allowing for children, elderly, and the incapacitated, a group of about 25 contains about 7 or 8 fulltime foragers which, if food is shared, may minimize each individual’s return-rate variance while holding the rate of local resource depletion to a minimum. …

We examine evidence for cultural controls on fertility, finding that infanticide was probably the most significant. …

More important in fertility and population growth may be biological mechanisms, specifically the intensity of breastfeeding, seasonal variance in [259] diet, and female activity levels.”
“Although there is no intrinsic reason why women should not hunt as much as men do, gathering is an interruptible activity and is more compatible with taking care of children than hunting. We might expect women’s status to be high where they bring in the most food, but this does not appear to be the case. Instead, by bringing in meat from large game that … is shared, men have the potential to acquire the prestige that accompanies sharing …. Women are rare in that position, and this may establish a basic inequality”.

“Anthropologists have used the terms simple and complex to distinguish these two types of foraging societies …. Simple hunter-gatherers include band or family-level groups … while complex hunter-gatherers include tribal groups such as the Northwest Coast’s Kwakiutl. Complex hunter-gatherers are nonegalitarian societies, whose elites possess slaves, fight wars, and overtly seek prestige. Although have long been considered to be exceptions to the presumed rule, products of atypical resource-rich environments, archeologists continue to discover evidence of prehistoric nonegalitarian hunting and gathering societies in many environments. This has created new interest [294] … in these societies”

“Table 8-1. Simple versus Complex Hunter-Gatherers”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Simple</th>
<th>Complex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Unpredictable or variable</td>
<td>Highly predictable or less variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diet</td>
<td>Terrestrial game</td>
<td>Marine or plant foods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement size</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential mobility</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
<td>Low to none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td>Low population density relative to food resources</td>
<td>High population density relative to food resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food storage</td>
<td>Little to no dependence</td>
<td>Medium to night dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social organization</td>
<td>No corporate groups</td>
<td>Corporate descent groups (lineage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organization</td>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
<td>Hierarchical; classes based on wealth or descent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational specialization</td>
<td>Only for older persons</td>
<td>Common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territoriality</td>
<td>Social-boundary defense</td>
<td>Perimeter defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warfare</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavery</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic of competition</td>
<td>Not tolerated</td>
<td>Encouraged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource ownership</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Tightly controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>Generalized reciprocity</td>
<td>Wealth objects, competitive feasts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

296: “The term egalitarian does not mean that all members have the same amount of goods, food, prestige, or authority. Egalitarian societies are not those in which everyone is equal, or in which everyone has equal amounts of goods, food, prestige, or authority, but those in which everyone has equal access to food, to the technology needed to acquire
resources, and to the paths leading to prestige [cites Woodburn]. The critical element of egalitarianism, then, is individual autonomy (Gardner 1991).

Many hunter-gatherer people emphasize autonomy in their everyday lives. The need for autonomy is asserted explicitly, and self-descriptions of many hunter-gatherer societies consist of strong appeals to self-governance”.

296: “there is always a tendency for some individuals to attempt to lord it over others. In responses, egalitarian hunter-gatherers have developed a variety of ways to level individuals … Humor is used to belittle the successful hunter; wives use sexual humor to keep a husband in line; and gambling, accusations of stinginess, or demand sharing maintain a constant circulation of goods and prevent hoarding.”

297: “The self-effacing behavior of foragers … makes sharing easier. A hunter who acknowledges his worthlessness while dropping a fat antelope by the hearth relieves the tension created by sharing. The result is not a group of disgruntled would-be misers and dictators, but individuals who are assertively egalitarian, who live a life in which the open hoarding of goods or the imposition of one’s will upon another is at odds with cultural norms.

Nonetheless, appeals to autonomy and equality by informants often contradict ethnographic reality in which some members have higher status and greater access to resources than others. … Differences in autonomy are perhaps especially pronounced between men and women.”

298: “actual domination of women by men appears to occur where men not only spend time away from their spouses, but also where the environment is perceived as hostile. … Collier found nonegalitarian relationships between men and women as well as among men in societies that some would quite readily class as egalitarian”.

299: “Woodburn argues that inequality existed within Aboriginal society because older men arranged marriages between young, uninitiated men and girls of unborn females (1980). This … means that women are always under the direction of their husbands, brothers, fathers, father’s brothers, or mother’s brothers.”

300: Others argue that women were more equal before contact that just after and that wives were partners, if junior partners, and the junior might have been because women tended to be younger. “there is a fundamental paradox in Aboriginal society between, on the one hand, a strongly egalitarian ethos coupled with high levels of female autonomy in daily life and, on the other hand, structural inequalities that favor males, especially in domestic quarrels and ritual matters.”

302: “There are only a few ethnographic examples that fit the anthropological definition of nonegalitarian hunter-gatherers; these include those who lived along North America’s Northwest Coast …, some peoples of California …, the Ainu of Japan …, and the Calusa of Florida.”

303: “Among egalitarian hunter-gatherers violence is infrequent, although it is often lethal when it does occur, arising from the denial of anger that can come with the politics of nonconfrontation that typify egalitarian societies. It also frequently appears to be related to sexual jealousy and marital infidelity”.

312: “sedentary hunter-gatherers with their ‘abundant’ resources have not had the constraints of a nomadic lifestyle lifted from them, but have traded one set of constraints for another. If sedentary hunter-gatherers acquire wealth… it is not simply because their
resource base is abundant enough to allow for such accumulation, but because the long-
term consequences of sedentism require it”.
323: Speaking of northern California: “Though wealthy individuals could hold sway over
small villages there were no permanent tribal or intervillage leaders, and ‘property and
rights pertain[ed] to the realm of the individual’ …. Inland resources such as oak trees
and salmon-fishing riffles were owned by individuals or families …

The Tolowa and Yoruk did not engage in organized warfare, as groups to the
north did. They were not free of violence, however, for revenge killings did occur
between villages. These were settled by intermediaries with payments of wealth objects
(Gould 1978).

Further north, in the Wakashan and Salishan linguistic regions, residential groups
were more sedentary …. Unlike the Tolowa and Yoruk, all individuals and family lines
were ranked. Chiefs presided over villages and their households owned the majority of
property or the best resource patches; lower-ranking people who used their resource areas
had to give some of the food to the chief, who might use to in a feast. Whales that washed
up on the beach belonged not to the finder, but to the chief with rights to that particular
stretch of beach.”
333: “I suspect that there is a deeply rooted reason for the continued anthropological use
of concepts of ‘the’ hunter-gatherer lifeway, one that betrays potentially significant
misconceptions of human evolutionary history.

Like our intellectual forebears, we still seem to be overwhelmed by ‘the fact that
hunter-gatherers appear to be the most ancient of so-called primitive societies—[by] the
impression that they preserve the most archaic way of life known to humanity, that
characteristic of the whole of the Palaeolithic (Testart 1988…).”
334-5: “None of these authors would argue that living hunter-gatherers are relic
populations untouched by the passage of time. Instead, they would argue that the living
conditions of modern hunter-gatherers (small nomadic groups living exclusively by
foraging) replicate conditions of the past and that the lifeway of modern foragers is
largely structured by these conditions. If the nature of modern foraging lifeways is a
product of living conditions, and if those conditions replicate those of the past, then
modern foragers should more or less replicate those of the past, then modern foragers
should more or less resemble prehistoric ones. Thus, despite pleadings to the contrary,
some anthropologists persist in viewing living foragers as our Paleolithic ancestors,
although they would admit that the window through which we view them is foggy and
-cracked. This approach to living foragers is far more sophisticated than that of the
nineteenth-century evolutionists, but the end result is not very different.

Archeology is a difficult route to knowledge of the past—especially to knowledge
of hunter-gatherers, who leave few remains behind—so it is perhaps forgivable that these
social anthropologists bypass archeology al-[335] together and turn instead to the familiar
fallacy of analogy. In so doing, they seek to reconstruct an original human society by
finding conservative societies that have preserved their prehistoric social organizations,
or by subtracting the effects of colonialism from hunter-gatherers encapsulated by the
expanding world system, and by attempting to distill the diversity among
ethnographically known hunter-gatherers into essential characteristics.”
biologically modern humans do not appear until sometime in the last 120,000 years—long after earlier hominids had established themselves in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

We also do not know if the appearance of biologically modern humans also signals the appearance of behaviorally modern humans. Given that foragers have diverse adaptations to their environments it is difficult to pinpoint one archeological signature as the fingerprint of behaviorally modern humans. ... behaviorally modern humans probably also appeared sometime in the last 120,000 years, and certainly by 40,000 years ago. By this date, and regardless of whether humans arose in Africa or somewhere else, humans were living in much of Africa, Europe, Asia, and Australia. Thus behaviorally modern humans had lived and evolved for at least 40,000 and perhaps 120,000 years in a variety of habitats under a variety of ecological and demographic conditions”.

We must conclude that there is no original human society, no basal human adaptation: studying modern hunter-gatherers in order to subtract the effects of contact with the world system (were that possible) and to uncover universal behaviors with the goal of reconstructing the original hunter-gatherer lifeway is simply not possible—because that lifeway never existed. We should accept as highly possible, even likely, that modern diversity stems from original diversity in the foraging adaptations of behaviorally modern humans.”

the ghosts of Spencer, Hobbes, and Rousseau persist: hunter-gatherers have been thought to display human nature unfettered by the addition of evolution. By implication, they have witnessed no evolution, no history. Clearly, we can now agree that this is wrong.”

there is no reason to suppose that human nature will be drawn more clearly in modern foraging societies than among modern industrial societies. … Foragers, past and present, live under specific environmental and social conditions and within particular historical trajectories, as do all peoples. … They can be used to support any image of human society; generous or greedy, violent or peaceful, monogamous or polygamous, attentive or aloof to children, and so on. This does not mean that the study of foragers has nothing to say about human nature; it is not say, however, that we cannot discover what is common among humans without understanding what is variable. To do otherwise is to simply assume, as the early evolutionists did, what we are trying to discover.”

Archeologists are perhaps even more susceptible than social anthropologists to urge to create a hunter-gatherer stereotype (and I include myself among the guilty). Given the usually impoverished nature of the archeological remains of hunter-gatherer societies, especially those of the Pleistocene, archeologists understandably are tempted to look elsewhere for ways to reconstruct the past. We commonly justify a reconstruction of a prehistoric hunter-gatherer society not by demonstrating the existence of a trait through analysis of archeological data, but by reference to ethnographic anthropologists before us, we assume that the widespread occurrence of a trait is a sign of its antiquity. Instead of claiming that widespread traits are the most ancient ones, as Service, Speck, and other early twentieth-century anthropologists [339] did, we argue that some traits are widespread because they are ‘adaptive’ to hunter-gatherer society and therefore to be expected in all cases, present and past. The result is the same. We have already pointed out that our notions of adaptation have frequently been incorrect, and that the prevalence
of a trait today could be a product of the prevalence of specific causal conditions among the world’s hunter-gatherer peoples, a product of contact, or life in environments with low return rates or highly variable resources. This theoretical issue aside, we rarely even demonstrate exactly how common a trait is. … We have built up remarkably detailed pictures of early human society complete with[.] family bands of twenty-five people who share food, trace kin relations bilaterally, reside bilocally, eat a generalized diet with women gathering plant food and men hunting, build alliances through monogamous marriage, and regulate their population to avoid degradation. But this detailed picture comes not from archeological evidence as much as from ethnographic analogy. Such a misuse of modern hunter-gatherer research provides spurious support for the idea of a single primitive human society, a uniform hunter-gatherer sociocultural stage. If prehistoric hunter-gatherers all look the same in anthropological literature, it is because we supposed them to be that way from the outset.

Does this mean, then, that archeologists should reject the creative use of ethnographic data? Of course not. But the translation of information from ethnography to archaeology cannot be direct. … Ethnographic data can, if we let it, limit our ability to recognize unknown prehistoric forms of organization associated with hunting and gathering. Modern hunter-gatherers differ from prehistoric ones not only because they interact with multinational corporations and colonial governments, but because they may and probably have changed for a variety of other reasons (e.g., environmental change or internal social dynamics). The question is not whether change has occurred, but how much and what kind. Even if a pristine, isolated, uncontacted group of hunter-gatherers were found (and there are none), it could not be used as an analogy to reconstruct prehistory.

SOURCES:
ABSTRACT: Standard economic theory would suggest close linkages between income, broader measures of the quality of life and ‘utility’. To some extent it is hard to test the link between income and utility given the way that utility is proxied by economists, but we do have measures of objective and subjective wellbeing as a potential guide. When we look at broader measures of objective and subjective wellbeing in both rich and poor countries today, the relationship to absolute income is perhaps surprisingly weak. Turning to the past, we know that most people were in an absolute income sense very poor, and faced a considerably lower broad quality of life using objective measures. However, the link between these two factors is not as straightforward as sometimes assumed. At the same time, from the preoccupations of political thinkers and others, it does appear that relative (rather than absolute) income has long been a concern, and that concerns with absolute income at the national level appear to center around avoiding absolute deprivation rather than the advantage of ever more consumption goods. In short, there is plentiful evidence that people in the past were nearly all absolutely poor and broadly worse off according to other objective quality of life measures, less evidence that these two were intimately linked, even less that everyone was miserable, and less again that those who did feel miserable felt so because they were absolutely poor.

Clark (2005) suggests that “the thousands of years of advance representing the difference between forager technology and that of agrarian societies around 1800 did not lead to any signs of a systematic improvement in human material living conditions” as suggested by studies of average heights. Based on available data, heights prior to 0 BC were greater than the average for Eighteenth Century England and the Netherlands. Clark also notes that the people of Tahiti in 1769 (two years after European discovery) were living a stone-age existence – and yet they were as tall or taller than the British who discovered them. As Table 1 makes clear, the stone age Tahitian would have been a similar height to the average Briton 100 years later, as well.”

See Table 1 “Historical Indicators of UK Quality of Life”, p. 284 for life expectancy and other wellbeing statistics. There’s much more than I’ve copied here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


286-287: “the health impact of the Industrial revolution was also negative. In the early Nineteenth Century, rapidly expanding English and Welsh provincial cities saw declining life expectancies – between the 1820s and 1840s these dropped from 35 to 30 years, compared to a national average that stayed level at 41 years”.

288: “For the great majority of people in the World, it would be hard to make the case that civilization, globalization or industrialization had any significant net positive impact on objective quality of life indicators at least until the mid Nineteenth Century, and in many cases later than that.”

**Kirch: The Evolution of Polynesian Chiefdoms**

Not the most useful for my purposes, but here are the tidbits:

2: “although I use the term ‘chiefdom’ to characterize the socio-political organization of Polynesian societies at the contract-era endpoints, this does not mean that I regard them as examples of some evolutionary ‘stage’, or that I subscribe to the ‘neo-evolutionary’ schemes popular in American anthropology during the 1960s and 70s (e.g. Service 1967; Fried 1967). Indeed, for reasons given in detail below, I believe that a stadial or stagal approach to evolution in Polynesia is something of a ‘dead horse’, entirely inadequate as an explanatory framework.”

3-4: “Chiefdoms, as an intermediate level of socio-political organization bridging the acephalous society with more complex state societies, hold a special fascination for anthropologists. Polynesian societies not only exemplify the ‘typical’ chiefdom, they display the limits of variation in organizational structure and complexity of such societies. Within Polynesia we find societies in which chiefs were inseparably linked as kinsmen to commoners, where redistribution was minimal, and production almost entirely a household matter. On the other hand were elaborate chiefdoms such as Hawai‘i, where the chiefly class claimed descent independent from commoners, …”

31: “As is typical with chiefdoms, the organizational basis of Polynesian societies was the conical clan, an extensive group descended from a common ancestor, ranked and segmented along genealogical lines …. Partrilineal in ideological basis, distinctions amongst clan members were made on the basis of genealogical distance from the founding ancestor.”
31: “after initial settlement by founding groups, population growth led to fissioning of local subgroups, or ramages …. The head of each ramage was its senior male, and the head of the original senior ramage remained as chief of the conical clan.”

32-33: “the ramification or branching of the conical clan also corresponds with a characteristic territorial division …. As local [33] groups fission, they expand to occupy new territory, so that a typical high island came to be divided in radial fashion”

36: In the more stratified places like Hawaii, Tong, and the Society Islands, “the direct control of land had passed out of the hands of the commoners, so that it was the chief, not the ramage, that was directly responsible for a territorial unit.”

40: “These basic structural elements [chiefly rankings], and the contradictions and oppositions inherent in them, were carried as part of the ‘cultural baggage’ of every canoe-load of Polynesian voyagers who searched the Pacific for new landfalls.”

270: Easter Island: “Virtually all ethnographic and archeological authorities agree that the ahu were conceived, constructed, and used by local descent groups, and do not reflect some kind of highly centralized, island-wide political authority.”

275-6: “Most striking and symbolic of the state of Easter Island society during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries was the cessation of new image-ahu construction, and the deliberate destruction of the existing ahu and tipping over of the statues … Englert plausibly speculates that this rampant destruction, which undid the toil of countless ancestors of the various lineages, was the work of enemy groups seeking to obliterate the mana of their opponents and weakening their ability to resist by destroying the physical symbols of the ancestors (1970:142). Then again, ‘the cause may have been only an unfocussed desire to destroy the valued property of an enemy’. Equally plausible is the possibility of a class revolt by the commoners against the excessive demands by an oppressive chiefly class, particularly as the ability to provide an agricultural surplus became increasingly difficult. The destruction took place over a period of several centuries, and from historical accounts it is clear that the last statues were pulled down between 1838-64”.

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**Kirch: Hawaiki**


1. Hawaiki is the mythical ancestral Polynesian homeland. Archeologists have found evidence that there is a Polynesian homeland. The culture developed in Tonga and Samoa in the first millennium BCE.

42: “We seek to develop a triangulation method in which the subdisciplines of historical linguistics, archeology, comparative ethnology, and biological anthropology independently contribute their data and assessments to the common objective of historical reconstruction.”
Chapter 7: Material Culture: this chapter is a catalog of stuff the ancestral Polynesians had.

Chapter 8: Social and Political Organization

208: Burrows inferred that the early form of Polynesian social grouping consisted of descent groups which occupied and controlled specific territories. He regarded the later dissociation of land tenure from kinship as a pattern arising independently in various Polynesian societies as a result of parallel processes, a case of cultural convergence.

226: “The found of the modern comparative ethnographic genre in Polynesia, Williams, [described] ‘the head of the social group,’ remarking that ‘this office was one of the fundamental features of the social and political systems of Polynesia’ … Among what we might call pervasive ‘systematic cultural patterns’ with respect to chiefship, William not at that this social group head was ‘the holder of … the recognized title or name of the group’; that he was ‘invested with a degree of sanctity’; that he ‘was the natural high priest of the group’ that he was elected by members of his own social group; that he ‘occupied the place of honour’ at group assemblies; that ‘the land of the group was regarded as being vested in him’; that he had some role in relation to harvests and food supply; and that he had a certain right to ‘first-fruits’ … We think that he correctly distilled the essence of Polynesian chiefship, and will argue that the above list would comprise an excellent extended gloss for the PPN [proto-Polynesian] term *qariki.

227: “The institution of chiefship is pervasive among Polynesian societies … marked everywhere by cognates of the PPN *qariki.” But they go on to say we can’t assume the term has the same meaning in different contexts.

231: “we hope to have now answered our critics … by demonstrating that it is possible to reconstruct, with some precision, the nature of Ancestral Polynesian chiefship. Rather than a naïve projection of the ethnographically based semantic history, taking into account widespread features of chieftainship that can only be shared retentions.”

Kirch and Kahn Advances in Polynesian Prehistory

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Abstract: The pace of archaeological research in Polynesia has intensified in recent years, resulting in more than 500 new literature citations over the past decade. Fieldwork has continued in such previously well-studied archipelagoes as Tonga and Samoa in Western Polynesia, and Hawai‘i and New Zealand in Eastern Polynesia, and has expanded into previously neglected islands including Niue, the Equatorial Islands, the Austral Islands, and Mangareva. The emergence of Ancestral Polynesian culture out of its Eastern Lapita predecessor is increasingly well understood, and the chronology of Polynesian dispersal and expansion into
Eastern Polynesia has engaged several researchers. Aside from these fundamental issues of origins and chronology, major research themes over the past decade include (1) defining the nature, extent, and timing of long-distance interaction spheres, particularly in Eastern Polynesia; (2) the impacts of human colonization and settlement on island ecosystems; (3) variation in Polynesian economic systems and their transformations over time; and (4) sociopolitical change, especially as viewed through the lens of household or microscale archaeology. Also noteworthy is the rapidly evolving nature of interactions between archaeologists and native communities, a critical aspect of archaeological practice in the region.

NOT ALL THAT VALUABLE. SEE ELECTRONIC HIGHLIGHTS.

Says Earle is the only one right now pushing a grand theory. Didn’t mention much criticism of him.

Klein The Human Career


738: “By 250 ka … the human form had come to differ markedly between the two continents, and by roughly 150 ka Europe was occupied exclusively by the highly distinctive Neanderthals, whereas Africa was inhabited by people who looked far more like living humans. … no African fossils that likely date between 250 and 100 ka exhibit Neanderthal specializations, and both individually and collectively, they far more closely resemble living humans.”

741-2: “An obvious objection to Out of Africa is the failure of modern or near-modern humans to expand from Africa immediately after the appeared, by 100 ka …. The people who inhabited Africa between 100 and 60-50 ka may have been physically modern or near-modern, but they were behaviorally very similar to the Neanderthals and other nonmodern humans. The relatively full African and European archeological records show a distinct rupture 50-40 ka, when the Middle Stone Age (MSA) in Africa and the broadly similar Middle Paleolithic in Europe gave way to the Later Stone Age (LSA) and Upper Paleolithic, respectively. It is only LSA and Upper Paleolithic sites, postdating after 50-40 ka, that commonly provide material residues that are indistinguishable from those of many later prehistoric and historic hunter-gatherers.

Some novel features that mark the archeological record beginning 50-40 ka can be found in the bulleted list below …. In the view that this book espouses, these features are not [742] isolated traits that define ‘modern’ behavior, but related outcomes of the innovative burst behind the Out of Africa expansion.

- Substantial growth in the diversity and standardization of artifact types.
- Rapid increase in the rate of artifactual change through time and in the degree of artifact diversity through space.
• First routine shaping of bone, ivory, shell, and related materials into formal artifacts (‘point,’ ‘awls,’ ‘needles,’ ‘pins,’ etc.)
• Earliest appearance of incontrovertible art and personal ornamentation.
• Oldest undeniable evidence for spatial organization of camp floors, including elaborate hearths and the oldest indisputable structural ‘ruins.’
• Oldest evidence for the transport of large quantities of highly desirable stone raw material over scores or even hundreds of kilometers.
• Earliest secure evidence for ceremony or ritual, expressed both in art and in relatively elaborate graves.
• First evidence for human ability to live in the coldest, most continental parts of Eurasia (northeastern Europe and northern Asia).
• First evidence for human fishing and for other significant advances in human ability to extract energy from nature.

The most significant novelty is often taken to be the burgeoning of unequivocal art and personal ornamentation because this suggests a capacity for abstract or ‘symbolic’ thought. However it is impossible to demonstrate that this capacity did not exist tens of thousands of years earlier, when it was expressed only occasionally …. After the initial flowering …, local historical environmental conditions and the vagaries of preservation influenced their presence or expression, and many sites lack them. … The fundamental point, however, is that their variable occurrence after 50-40 ka contrasts sharply with their near uniform absence before, and it is this difference that signals something special.”

743: “the available dates suggest that the archeological markers of advanced behavior appeared first in Africa, probably between 50 and 45 ka, that they spread to western Asia and eastern Europe between 45 and 40 ka, that they spread to western Asia and eastern Europe between 45 and 40 ka, and that they reached western Europe only between 40 and 36 ka. The geographic sequence is plainly what Out of Africa would predict.”

744-5: “the archaeological indicators for African population size about 50 ka are consistent with genetic analyses, summarized in chapter 7, which suggest that the African population from which all living people derive included no more than 10,000 breeding adults.

Given what we know or don’t know about social and demographic change, it then becomes at least as plausible to tie the basic behavioral [745] shift 50 ka to a fortuitous mutation that promoted the fully modern brain.”

745: “but humans virtually everywhere had achieved modern or near-modern brain size by 200 ka. Any neural changes that occurred around 50 ka must thus have been in organization, and fossil skulls provide only speculative evidence for brain structure. Neanderthal skulls, for example, differ dramatically in shape from modern ones, but were just as large if not larger, and on present evidence it is not clear that the difference in form implies a significant difference in function. A link between form and function becomes especially unlikely if, as suggested above, random genetic drift was primarily responsible for the difference in form.”

766: “Is it really that advanced behavior markers appear widely only about 50-40 ka? With regard to art and ornamentation, for example, virtually all specialists agree that they become commonplace only after 50 ka and that older examples are both rare and crude.
… Representational (figurative) art objects and intentionally shaped ornaments (beads or pendants) appear only at sites that postdate 50 ka. However, even if authorities agree that 50 ka marks a sharp change in course, they disagree sharply on what the change means. To some, the rarity and simplicity of supposed art before 50 ka implies that modern cognitive abilities were present but were weakly or infrequently expressed before 50 ka, while to others (including myself), it suggests that the fully modern capacity for culture may have appeared only about this time.”

766-8: One site with earlier artifacts appears to be from 84 go 74 ka and another site between 90 and 60-70 ka. But the evidence is questionable.

750: “Some of the new (and old) evidence is ambiguous, circumstantial, or even contradictory, but if the study of human origins were a jury trial, the verdict would surely bet that modern humans, originating in Africa, swamped or extinguished the Neanderthals. The jury would probably also accept that a behavioral transformation accounted for modern human success, but they might deadlock on whether sociodemographic or genetic change underlay the transformation.

In fact, of course, human origins research differs from a jury trial in that no verdict need ever be final, and new evidence and new jury members are always welcome.”

Knauft, Reconsidering Violence in Simple Human Societies


457: “Homicide rates among the Gebusi of lowland New Guinea are among the highest ever reported.”

458: “For instance, the Semai, according to the subtitle of Dentan's (1979) monograph, are A Nonviolent People of Malaya, and the detailed descriptions by Dentan (1978, 1979) and Robarchek (1977) confirm the general lack of conflict and aggression in Semai social relations. Dentan (1978:98) mentions, however, that "at least two murders have been committed between 1955 and 1977, and there is gossip about a couple of others." The presumed occurrence of two murders during this period would actually produce a substantial homicide rate, since Dentan's study population totaled only about 300 (1979:4). Even if we assume that two homicides constitute the total number of killings in this population over the period 1955 to 1977 (or, alternatively, if our homicide rate per capita population double this size), this is equivalent to a homicide rate of 30.3 per 100,000 population per annum. Interestingly, his figure is of the same order of magnitude as the homicide rate that Lee calculated for the !Kung.”

462: “Of 394 adult deaths in the genealogical survey, nearly one-third (129 = 32.7%) were homicides (Table I). Homicides accounted for 29.3% of female deaths and 35.2% of male deaths.”

462-3: The homicide rate thus calculated is equivalent to at least 568 per 100,000 per annum. Homicides occurring before and after effective Western contact (in 1962) were tabulated separate. The homicide rate was [463] at least 683 per 100,000 per annum during the precontact period … and dropped to 419 thereafter.”
463: “The homicide rates in table 2 for state societies do not include homicide in the course of ‘legitimate’ collective conflicts such as battles or wars or publicly legitimated internal killing. It seems safe to say, however, that the Gebusi rate of killing during 1940-82 is 40 times the current U.S. rate of lethal violence from all such sources combined. … it would appear that only the more extreme instances of modern mass slaughter would equal or surpass the Gebusi homicide rate over a period of several decades.”

464: Table 2 [excerpts] Homicide Rates (per 100,000 Population) …

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepoztlan, Mexico</td>
<td>1920-55</td>
<td>ca. 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland black males</td>
<td>1969-74</td>
<td>142.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanomamo</td>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>165.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican mestizo village</td>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>251.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casiguran Agta</td>
<td>1977084</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murngin (Australia)</td>
<td>1906-26</td>
<td>ca 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goilala (New Guinea)</td>
<td>1896-46</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gebusi (New Guinea)</td>
<td>1963-82</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940-62</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewa (New Guinea)</td>
<td>1959-68</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[See electronic copy for sources]

479: “One of the key independent variables in decentralized human societies is the degree to which status distinctions exist among adult men. … These differentials may correspond only roughly to the complexity of subsistence technology and material-economic development. …

Societies that conspicuously lack culturally recognized adult male status distinctions are particularly egalitarian and can be considered on this basis to form a distinctive class of societies. In these extremely decentralized societies, adult male status is neither differentially ascribed nor achieved through competition. Instead one finds strong, pervasive values mandating generalized sharing and cooperation among coresident men, irrespective of physical prowess, age, or knowledge. These norms act as a pronounced political leveling mechanism. Even those differences that arise on the basis of personal ability—such as differential success in hunting or in curing sickness—are minimized; they do not lead to acknowledged differences in status and are not reflected in recognizable differences in social treatment or difference in daily social interactions. …

In societies that lack adult male status distinctions and effective leadership roles, in contrast to more complex sociopolitical systems, violence tends to be (a) more internal to the residential group; (b) more spontaneous and sudden—arising unpredictably out of a pervasive denial of anger and/or the politics of nonconfrontation in small cooperative domestic groups; (c) more dissociated from the normal ethos of daily life and from underlying social causes of violence; (d) less resaged by punitive or authoritative child socialization; (e) less engendered by territorial rights, property, or ritual status concerns; (f) based more on consensually approved status leveling than on individual status elevation; (g) less publicly eulogized; (h) less collectively opposed and less socially
controlled; (i) less apt to result in escalating revenge, retaliation, or redress (e.g. by fraternal interest-groups); and (j) though limited in aggressive incidents, relatively high in homicide. In all these respects, I suggest, the dynamics of human violence alter with increasing emphasis on adult male status distinctions, e.g., with increasing control and competition over socioeconomic exchange and property.

… The way in which violence develops as simple societies evolve are certainly complex and uneven …. Variations are apt to be influenced by interactions between ecological and culture-historical factors as well as by sociopolitical and psychological dynamics. A unicausal theory of violence patterns based on the presence of absence of adult male status distinctions is unlikely to explain all these processes.”

Knauft—Violence and Sociality in Human Evolution

U-shaped inequality curve

Kottak—Cultural Anthropology

Undergraduate textbook.
Chapter 8: “Political Systems” discusses bands and tribes, chiefdoms, and states
178: “Ethnographic and archeological studies in hundreds of places have revealed many correlations between economy and social and political organization.”
Author prefers “to speak of sociopolitical organization” rather than political organization.
180: “The four labels in Services typology are much too simple to account for the full range of political diversity and complexity know to archeology and ethnography. … Nevertheless Service’s typology does highlight some significant contrasts in political organization.”
180: “Service’s labels: ‘band,’ ‘tribe,’ ‘chiefdom,’ and ‘state’ are categories or types within a sociopolitical typology.”
181: “Modern hunter-gatherers should not be seen as representative of Stone Age peoples, all of whom were foragers.”
191: “The chiefdom and the state, like many categories used by social scientists, are ideal types. That is, they are labels that make social contrasts seem sharper than they are. In reality, there is a continuum from tribe to chiefdom to state. Some societies have many attributes of chiefdoms but retain tribal features. Some advanced chiefdoms have many attributes of archaic states and thus are difficult to assign to either category.”
193: Weber’s 3 dimensions of stratification:
Table 8.2 p. 194:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sociopolitical type</th>
<th>Economic type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Types of regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Band</td>
<td>Foraging</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>Horticulture, pastoralism</td>
<td>(didn’t copy)</td>
<td>Local temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiefdom</td>
<td>Productive horticulture, pastoral nomadism, agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Agriculture, industrialism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Krier: Evolutionary Theory And The Origin Of Property

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Abstract:
“Legal scholars have never settled on a satisfactory account of the evolution of property rights. The touchstone for virtually all discussion, Harold Demsetz’s Toward a Theory of Property Rights, has a number of well-known (and not so well-known) shortcomings, perhaps because it was never intended to be taken as an evolutionary explanation in the first place. There is, in principle at least, a pretty straightforward fix for the sort of evolutionary approach pursued by followers of Demsetz, but even then that approach – call it the conventional approach – fails to account for very early property rights, right at the genesis. The early developments are better explained by a very different approach based on evolutionary game theory. The game theoretic approach can account for a basic system
of property rights rooted in possession; it cannot, however, account for complex property systems. To explain the latter requires the conventional approach. Hence, the two approaches combined suggest a satisfactory account of the origins and development of property rights systems.”

1: “For legal scholars, the evolution of property rights has been a topic in search of a theory. My aim here is to draw together various accounts (some of them largely neglected in the legal literature), from dated to modern, and suggest a way in which they can be melded into a plausible explanation of property’s genesis and early development. What results hardly amounts to a theory, but it does suggest an outline for one. Moreover, it provides a primer on the subject, a reasonably solid foundation for thinking and talking about the evolution of property rights.”

6: “For purposes of constructing an evolutionary account, we have to define property rights in a way that accepts Bentham’s first statement but rejects his second one. The second statement has to be rejected simply because property rights, in the sense of Bentham’s “established expectations,” emerged thousands of years before the existence of any “law.” Primitive property rights were de facto, not de jure. The feature that defined them as de facto property rights, as opposed to de facto some-other-sort-of-rights, is that they concerned assets from which possessors (owners) could choose to exclude others with the expectation that those others would respect that choice. Probably there were often situations in which several individuals shared possession; in such a case, any of them could exclude any non-owner, but not other co-owners. Still, though, the co-owned possession would be private property, because of the right of the co-owners to exclude non-owners. This stands in contrast to an open-access commons”

7: “Demsetz made no mention of such a commons, apparently not noticing that his example of a tribal system of family allotments amounted to such. For him there was communal property belonging to all, private property belonging to a single individual, and state property belonging to the government. This is clumsy not only because it overlooks the limited-access commons but because it implies that private property is conterminous with individual ownership, but obviously it is not. As Carol Rose has nicely put it, a limited-access commons is common on the inside, but private on the outside20 – the former because co-owners may not be excluded, the latter because non-owners may be excluded. Private property is inclusive of individual property, but the converse does not hold.”

9: “Usually, however, government plays some role in these accounts, whereas I want to focus on the genesis of property, its emergence many millennia before the state and other governmental institutions themselves emerged (thus belying Bentham’s assertion that the existence of a legal system is essential to the existence of a property system).26 Because property began in prehistoric times, no one can really prove what actually happened, as a matter of historical truth. The objective is a plausible explanation, logically intact and consistent with what we know about human development.”
Hume thought that animals (humans aside) "are incapable of... property." Biologists say otherwise. They observe that members of many species – various spiders, insects, birds, and mammals, for example – commonly resolve territorial disputes by a simple rule: "the resident always wins." The rule, deference to possession, is a product of biological evolution, and the core explanation of why and how it developed is usually credited to the biologist John Maynard Smith, who summarized and extended his views in Evolution and the Theory of Games.

53 Hume, supra note 24, at 487 (§ 2).
57 Id. at 326 (Book 2, Part 1, § 12).


**Kuper: Chosen primate**

Kuper, Adam 1994 *The chosen primate: human nature and cultural diversity.*
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1: “Darwin was right about human beings, but is there a Darwinian account of human nature?”

55: “African hunter-gatherer communities, which have been studied by ethnographers for a century, are now quite well understood. Some generalizations can be made about the foraging way of life, at least as it persists in the twentieth century. Perhaps this understanding can be drawn on to reconstruct the ways of the early human foragers, who lived for millions of years in the African plains before the evolution of modern humans.

This was the program that Sherwood Washburn … proposed for American anthropologic in the 1960s and 1970s. ‘The Pleistocene way of life can only be known be inference and speculation,’” Sherwood Washburn and C. S. Lancaster told the famous ‘Man the Hunter’ Conference in Chicago in 1966. ‘Obviously speculations are based on much surer ground when the last few thousand years are under consideration. Ethnographic information is then directly relevant and the culture bearers are of our own species. As we go farther back in time, there is less evidence and the biological and cultural difference becomes progressively greater.’

That was undeniably correct. But Washburn was not averse to risk-taking. And risks had to be taken, he urged, since ‘it was in those remote times that the human way took shape, and it is only through speculation that we may gain some insights into what the life of our ancestors may have been.” And, indeed, that was also undeniable.”

69: “Washburn and Lancaster asked what ‘general characteristics of man’ could be ‘attributed to the hunting way of life.’ …
Hunting … implied various social arrangements. “It involves divisions of labour between male and female, sharing according to custom, cooperation among males, planning, knowledge of many species and large areas, and technical skill.” A home base had to be maintained, where food could be shared. This would serve also for cooking, and cooking allowed the exploitation of seeds. Take together, these considerations suggested a daring conclusion: ‘When males hunt and females gather, the results are shared and given to the young, and the habitual sharing between a male, a female, and their offspring becomes the basis for the human family.’”

79: “The most ancient specimens of Homo Sapiens (broadly defined) have been dated to some half a million years ago.”

81: “Europe’s Middle Paleolithic cultures were not a Neanderthal monopoly: some fully modern humans also plied Mousterian trades. However, virtually all Upper Paleolithic cultures (the Aurignacian cultures) are associated uniquely with fully modern humans, the Cor-Magnon people. [one Neanderthal exception noted.]”

85: “A second line of argument has development as the fossils have been more securely and precisely dated. Modern humans may have evolved only between 200,000 and 100,000 years ago. Some of the oldest fossils, dating from 115,000 and 74,000 years ago, have been discovered in caves of the Klasies River Mouth in South Africa. The skeletons found in the Skhul and Qafzeh caves in Israel have now been firmly dated to the later Mousterian, some 40,000 years ago, and are identified as modern humans, though they retained some archaic features. They may have been the direct ancestors of the first anatomically fully modern humans in Europe, the Cro-Magnons, who date from about 35,000 to 10,000 years ago.

The Neanderthals survived—sometimes in close proximity to these modern populations—up to a little over 30,000 years ago. Most fossils for this period in Europe and the Near East are unambiguously either modern or Neanderthal: the identification of a few specimens are intermediate in type is disputed. The fact that the distinction between the two populations persisted so clearly for several thousand years points to a gradual displacement rather than a long-term merging of the populations.”

89: “the rapid displacement thesis … does not imply that a full-fledged human culture was brought to Europe by the first immigrant populations of modern Homo sapiens. … Modern humans lived without this distinctive culture for perhaps two-thirds of their history, or even longer. …

The most plausible current view is that modern humans lived alongside Neanderthals for approximately 10,000 years in some places in Europe and the Near East. For a long time they lived in a similar style. Then the Aurignacian culture appeared, but it spread only among modern human populations. Not only that: its appearance in Europe coincided with the extinction of the Neanderthals.”

90: “In any case, the flowering of human culture in the Upper Paleolithic was not associated with major biological changes in the human population. The Neanderthals and their African and Asian contemporaries had a cranial capacity equivalent to that of modern humans, although there is some speculation that the brain of archaic Homo sapiens may have been structured differently from our
Fully modern humans indistinguishable from ourselves appear in the fossil record at least 60,000 years before the development of a full-blown human culture. The physical basis for modern human speech may have evolved only with the first Homo sapiens, but 2,000 further generations were to pass before the first unambiguous evidence that attests to the existence of symbolic communication, the subtle and varied art of the Upper Paleolithic.”

97: “Today no serious evolutionist would dream of constructing a series of ‘stages’ though which all societies pass in the course of their history. Human history until a few centuries ago is best told as a story of diversification and local adaptation.”

208-9: Discusses state of nature theory; perhaps some confusion of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau

209: “The state of nature, the rationalist alternative to Eden, was a fantasy, a thought experiment. Nevertheless, writers in the Enlightenment tradition more or less seriously imagined that in the course of their voyages European explorers might stumble upon some people still living in that aboriginal condition.” Quotes Locke’s all the world was America.

209-210: “For a Darwinian, it was simply absurd to think that some early humans had engineered a historic break with an aboriginal state of [210] nature. Early human society was not the product of reason. On the contrary, the earliest human societies must have resembled the societies of other apes. Therefore, some natural social bond must have provided the initial basis of a broader sociability. And this primordial bond, the early anthropologists agreed, could only have been blood relationship.” [However, he discredited this idea in his other book, and discusses the problems with this view below.]

210: “The alternative to blood loyalties was local patriotism, but this, they thought, had evolved much later. It was taken for granted that early humans were nomadic. Territoriality bases associations had become significant only at a late stage in human history. According to Maine, a great revolution occurred … when territorial loyalties became more important than kinship ties. …

However, as reliable studies began to be made of simple, small-scale human societies, it became evident that these principles could be combined. Ethnographers reported that territory, local rootedness, was by no means unimportant even among foragers and pastoralists. Even nomadic groups had a local identity. According to the ethologists, moreover, ‘territoriality,’ was based on an instinct shared with other species. Nevertheless, it was greatly agreed that in small-scale, technologically simple communities, descent—Maine’s blood relationships—was ideologically more important than local loyalty.”

213-4: “Further research, however, tended to undermine the view that simple political systems were based on patrilineal blood ties. Although members of small-scale hunter-gatherer communities were as a rule related in some way to one another, it was not necessary to trace unilineal descent back to a founding ancestor in order to be accepted as a band member. Relatives did enjoy privileged access to band membership, and people generally felt a moral duty to help even quite distant kin, but the band was not just a patriarchal family writ large. There were various routes to becoming a band member. A claim though a mother or
father, a husband or wife, a brother or sister would serve. Even an unrelated exchange partner of a band member could usually be accommodated.

Often a person would be a member of several bands during a lifetime. Some individuals lived in a peripatetic existence. And while crucial resources—a fountain, a grove of trees—might be claimed by the band, the band members did not have a monopoly on the resources of a clearly defined territory. In sum, it was not the case that the small-scale communities of hunter-gatherers were generally organized into patrilineal bands.

The lineage model also provided an inadequate guide to the operation of larger headless political systems. … The patrilineal principle apparently operated as an ideology, rather than as a law governing everyday choices.”

219: “[Marcel] Mauss argued that reciprocity was not to be confused with the operations of entrepreneurs in a market. Indeed, with money and markets the ancient principle of reciprocity had been fatally diluted. It was, in origin, a moral idea, not simply an accounting principle [as in Adam Smith]; at it could be seen most clearly in operation in societies that were not dependent on market exchanges.

Mauss challenged Malinowski’s image of the Trobriander as a sort of antipodean businessman. … To Mauss … the *Kula* was an instance of the ancient form of gift exchange. … Mauss argued that traditional societies were based on relationships of give-and-take from which the profit motive was absent. … Nor were exchanges truly voluntary; there was no escape from the twin obligations to give and to receive. The sanctions against those who did not play the game could culminate in [220] the last resort in exclusion from society, or, between communities, in warfare.

Mauss also emphasized that the exchanges that shaped social relations were not exclusively or even predominantly exchanges of goods and wealth. ‘In the systems of the past,’ Mauss wrote, “they exchanged rather courtesies, entertainments, ritual, military assistance, women, children, dances and feasts.”’


221: The !Kung bands, containing anywhere from ten to thirty members, were open and fluid groupings. Larger gatherings might form in the winter, when surface water was available, allowing a more expansive social life. …

Although there were occasional violent eruptions of jealousy or anger within the band, cooperation was the norm. The band had no permanent leaders, and even skilled hunters might take a rest rather than appear to dominate others by virtue of their talents. The key resources were available to anyone accepted into the band. The conditions of band membership were flexible, and virtually any connection through a kinsman or affine would serve as an entry ticket. Equally a quarrel could be settled by migration of one party to join another community, an easy enough operation in this very mobile society.”


223: “Richard Lee corrected this slightly idealized picture, recording that fights were in fact not uncommon. On some measures, the !Kung homicide rate compares unfavorably with that in the worst American urban areas (though for
such tiny communities these comparisons are not necessarily significant, since the homicide rate must be extrapolated from a very small number of cases). Lee noted that a high proportion of homicides were crimes of passion, and remarked that !Kung fighting seems to be ‘a kind of temporary insanity or running amok rather than … an instrumental act in a means-end framework.’

… social peace is achieved among the !Kung through sharing and giving. Meat is always shared, with everyone in camp, if possible, getting a share. Other possessions are claimed and passed on in a continuous cycle, from weapons to items of clothing and decoration.”

225-6: [Summing up his discussion of reciprocity] “It is a chilling thought, perhaps, but the same logic governs the friendly, ceremonial exchange of the Kula and the relentless exchanges of the feud. Both are driven by the principle of reciprocity, [226] which is the nearest thing to a universally recognized canon of justice. One has a right to even the score, to get even.”

226: “Adam Smith began with the individual, and explained what bound him to society. … But according to another tradition of social thought, it makes little sense to argue about why individuals live in groups. There are no pre-social individuals who have to be tempted into the group. Human beings are essentially social, and each society creates the individuals it requires. Individual consciousness is a product of social forces.”

228-9: “There are no pre-societal individuals, but equally there are no— or mercifully few—totalitarian communities that consume all individual choice. The most ancient societies were perhaps not much more, or less, individualistic than our own. They seem to have been open, transient, fragile associations. Yet they may well have constituted powerful moral communities, shaping individual goals, constraining choices, imbuing actions with particular meanings. The best guess [229] is that early societies, like all we know today, had somehow to accommodate the divergent pressures generated by common interests and individual goals, communal institutions and entrepreneurial strategies.

There is not simple, natural, universal primal constitution of human society, no single motive for sociality. The family was probably the universal basis of domestic organization, and the principle of reciprocity always had a greater or lesser role in regulating relationships; but ancient forms of social life were surely very various. A great many mechanisms have been developed that persuade individuals, generally speaking, to behave as good citizens. We are unlikely ever to discover through empirical research the first—or fundamental—form of citizenship.

Nor has it proved possible to identify a principle of legitimate authority that is accepted across the spectrum of cultural traditions. We cannot specify a universally accepted human right. In any case, even if all hitherto known societies recognized a particular law, we might nevertheless decide not to abide by it any longer. What laws should prevail will not be settled by empirical research: it is a matter for political debate. Nor is there any inevitable progression in the forms of government. The future is a different story.”

3: “the study of primitive society…was treated initially as a branch of legal studies. … The issues they investigated—the development of marriage, the family, private property and the state—were conceived of as legal questions. The initial source—the common case-study—was provided by Roman law.”

5: “The anthropologists took this primitive society was their special subject, but in practice primitive society proved to be their own society (as they understood it) seen in a distorting mirror. For them modern society was defined above all by the territorial state, the monogamous family and private property. Primitive society therefore must have been nomadic, ordered by blood ties, sexually promiscuous and communist. There had also been a progression in mentality. Primitive man was illogical and given to magic. In time he had developed more sophisticated religious ideas. Modern man, however, had invented science. … They looked back in order to understand the nature of the present on the assumption that modern society had evolved from its antithesis.”

5: “[Darwin’s] contribution was not the level of theory. Rather, he re-established and embellished a classical notion of the original human condition, and he made it seem directly relevant to the intellectual concerns of his contemporaries. Maine’s history … assumed that man was originally a member of a corporate family group ruled by a despotic patriarch. Later, patriarchal power provided the basis for larger association. The principle of patriarchal authority was diluted. Local association became increasingly important. Ultimately, societies based on kinship were replaced by societies based upon the state. This transition from blood to soil, from status to contract, was the greatest revolution in human history.”

6: “Johannes Bachofen, had appealed to…particularly Greek myth and Roman law…concluded that man’s original family structure was matriarchal.”

6-7: “By the end of the nineteenth century, almost all the new specialists would have agreed with the following propositions.

1. The most primitive societies were ordered on the basis of kinship relations.
2. Their kinship organization was based on descent groups.
3. These descent groups were exogamous and were related by a series of marriage exchanges.
4. Like extinct species, these primitive institutions were preserved in fossil form, ceremonies and kinship terminologies bearing witness to long-dead practices.
5. Finally, with the development of private property, the descent groups withered away and a territorial state emerged. This was the most revolutionary change in the history of humanity. It marked the transition from ancient to modern society.

These ideas were also linked to the theory of primitive religion. The original religion was ‘animism,’ a belief that natural species and objects had souls
and should be worshipped. In the most primitive societies each descent group believed that it was descended from an animal or vegetable god, which it revered.”

7: “The rapid establishment and the endurance of a theory is not particularly remarkable if the theory is substantially correct. But hardly any anthropologist today would accept that this classic account of primitive society can be sustained. On the contrary, the orthodox modern view is that there never was such a thing as ‘primitive society’. Certainly, no such thing can be reconstructed now. There is not even a sensible way in which one can specify what a ‘primitive society’ is. The term implies some historical point of reference. It presumably defines a type of society ancestral to more advanced forms, on the analogy of an evolutionary history of some natural species. But human societies cannot be traced back to a single point of origin, and there is no way of reconstituting prehistoric social forms, classifying them, and aligning them in a time series. There are no fossils of social organization.”

8: “the history of primitive society is the history of an illusion. … If there is a current orthodoxy in the humanities and social sciences, then it is perhaps relativism. … The aim is to avoid culture-bound misapprehensions, to achieve phenomenological validity. It may even be suggested that to understand all is to forgive all. However, it is one thing to set an argument in its context; it is quite another to pretend that it cannot be rejected. … The theory of primitive society is about something which does not and never existed. One of my reasons for writing this book is to remove the constitution of primitive society from the agenda of anthropology and political theory once and for all.”

13-14: “three defences. First of all, the ideas I deal with have not by any means been universally discredited. … they still flourish in the backwaters. … [14] Secondly, the idea of primitive society was never the exclusive preserve of social anthropology. It infused the political and historical consciousness of several generations. Its history must be of consequence, even for many who are otherwise content to remain quite ignorant of anthropology. Finally, although the history I shall trace is rather deplorable, similar accounts could be given of many other intellectual traditions. We need to consider ways in which we delude ourselves. If this book helps to explain the persistence of an illusion, then perhaps it may even hold out the promise of an escape from illusion.”

24: [Henry] Maine regarded this kind of thing [state of nature theory] with scorn, and traced it right back to the ancient theory of Natural Law. … Trusting the Greek assumption that certain legal principles were universal, the Romans had developed rules based upon abstract principles of justice.”

25: “The foolish belief in the state of nature could only be countered by applying the historical method [according to Maine]. The origin of social forms must be reconstructed scientifically. This imperative should be evident to all

26: “[Maine’s] was a world not of free individuals but of solidary family corporations, ruled by totalitarian patriarchs.” So don’t believe this quote from Maine, but here’s what Maine says, “ ‘Men are first seen distributed in perfectly insulated groups held together by obedience to the parent. … It [either the law or
the state] was an aggregation of families. The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient society was the Family, of a modern society an Individual.’”

53: Muller referred to “models of technical and social progress constructed by writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, borrowing their famous four-stage model (‘the four stages of society are hunting, pasturing, farming and commerce’ to quote Adam Smith’s classic formulation.) These economic stages had from the first been associated with a model of political development from anarchic communism to private property and the state.28”


65: Quotes Henry Lewis Morgan’s book Ancient Society (1877)’s endorsement of uniform human progress, “It can now be asserted upon convincing evidence that savagery preceded barbarism in all tribes of mankind as barbarism is known to have preceded civilization. The history of the human race is one in course, one in experience, and in progress.”

66: Table 3.2 outlines Morgan’s division of savagery and barbarism into lower, middle, and upper statuses

67: Quoting Morgan again, “While movement from one phase to another might be triggered by a technical advance, the lines of social development are predetermined and inevitable.”

72: Morgan was adapted by Marx and Engels and became part of Soviet orthodox theory. Marx defined a primitive ‘Asiatic mode of production.’ “It was concerned only with war, taxation, and public works, and was superimposed upon a series of otherwise independent village communities. These village communities held land in common and redistributed their agricultural surplus internally”.


73: Engels’ book (1884), The Origin of the Family, Private Property and State, partly from notes left by Marx, “is essentially a popularization and development of Morgan’s theories. … it was the Morgan as defined by Engels who became crucial to Marist tradition.”

75: “[Morgan’s] model could be used by Engels as an argument for communism, and by Morgan himself in defence of American capitalism and democracy. I think that the fundamental consistency of Morgan’s thinking has to do with religious rather than political beliefs. His ultimate aim was to demonstrate that human history made moral sense, that it was a history of progress, and that it united all branches of the species. If he could borrow ideas so promiscuously from Muller and McLennan and Taylor, it was because they all shared his faith.”

76: After Morgan’s book: “Most authors now converged on a single model of primitive society. The conflict between the advocates of primitive ‘matriarchy’ and ‘patriarchy’ was resolved. ‘Matriarchy’ was generally held to characterize the most primitive societies; ‘Patriarchy’ typified a higher level of social development. Both forms of organization were based upon group exogamy. Primitive societies had all been organized on these principles of descent and
exogamy for many millennia, until at last the revolutionary transition occurred from the original kinship-based polity, in which property was held in common, to a territorially-based state and a system of private property.”
77: “a unilinear evolution was an unquestioned component of the new consensus.”
231: “The idea of primitive social structure which crystallized in the late nineteenth century was remarkably simple. Primitive society was originally an organic whole. … There were no families in the accepted sense. Women and goods were held communally by the men of each group. … The groups worshiped ancestor spirits. … After countless generations this system gave way to a form of society based on territorial units, the family and private property and, eventually, the state.”
235: “Theories of the origin of the state changed least of all over the century. From Maine and Morgan to Engels and Childe, the basic assumptions were that kin-based communities gave way to territorially-based associations, which developed into states. The Marxist version of this thesis was particularly influential. It linked technological development and the evolution of private property and the family to the political revolution of private property and the family to the political revolution which the state represented.”
236: “[Boas] and his students at Columbia attacked the Smithsonian people with a barrage of counter-examples. … [summary of the Boas school’s criticism]: the family was universal; early societies were based in part on territory; totemism was a fantasy.”
243-4: “Anthropologists developed the theory of primitive society, [244] but we may make amends if we render it obsolete at last, in all its protean forms.”

Leacock: The Montagnais ‘Hunting Territory’ and the Fur Trade

American Anthropologist Vol. 56, No. 5, Part 2, Memoir No. 78.

2: “My hypothesis is, first, that such private ownership of specific resources as exists has developed in response to the introduction of sale and exchange into Indian economy which accompanied the fur trade and, second, that it was these private rights—specifically to fur-bearing animals—which laid the basis for individually inherited rights to land. … The concept of trespass as simple physical encroachment on another’s land does not exist, nor do berrying, fishing, bark-gathering, or hunting game animals constitute trespass. These products of the land are communally owned in that they can be hunter or gathered anywhere. … Any Indian from the Mistassini or another band could enter the territory and take what he needed without payment or permission, although it was agreed that he could not take an additional amount to sell.”
41: “Under these conditions, hunting grounds, fishing places, and maple groves were jointly owned by the entire band. With the coming of the whites, colonization and it consequent restriction of territory, trading posts, and the fresh emphasis on small fur-bearing animals, along with the necessity for maintaining their numbers, place new importance on landownership. Within the recent past the family territory has developed. Interestingly enough, the maple groves, which are in no way connected with trade, are still communally owned.”

Leacock and Lee, Politics and history in band societies


7: “In our view there is a core of features common to band-living foraging societies around the world. Extraordinary correspondences have emerged in details of culture between, for example, the Cree and the San, or the Inuit and the Mbuti.”

7-8: Similarities among foragers include: egalitarian patterns of sharing; strong anti-authoritarianism; an emphasis on the importance of cooperation [8] in conjunction with great respect for individuality; marked flexibility in band membership and in living arrangements generally; extremely permissive child-rearing practices; and common techniques for handling problems of conflict and reinforcing group cohesion, such as often-merciless teasing and joking, endless talking, and the ritualization of potential antagonisms. Some of these features are shared with horticultural peoples who are at the egalitarian end of the spectrum, but what differentiates foragers from egalitarian farmers is the greater informality of their arrangements. Foragers do not ‘keep accounts’ in a strict sense. In Salins’ (1972) terms, there is a greater emphasis among foragers on ‘generalized’ than on ‘balanced’ reciprocity.”

p. 8: “A preliminary list of core features that characterize relations of production among foragers include the following: 1. Collective ownership of the means of production—the land and its resources—by a band, ‘horde’, or camp. … 2. The right of reciprocal access to resources of others through marriage ties, visiting, and co-production. … 3. Little emphasis on accumulation. … 4. ‘Total sharing’ or ‘generalized reciprocity’ within the camp as well as with others who come to visit or seek help …. This does not mean that each item of food is dividend …. However, it does mean that no one goes hungry if there is food in camp.”

p. 9: “5. Access of all to the ‘forces of production’. Virtually everyone possesses the skills for making essential tools. … 6. ‘Individual ‘ownership’ of tools. However tools are easily lent and borrowed, and the fact that people generally possess the resources and
skills necessary for replacing them means that such ownership does not divide haves from have-nots as it does in class societies. Yet tools and utensils do embody the time and skill put into making them, and in addition may be made from special materials more readily available in one area than another. Hence individual ownership forms the basis for individual gift-giving and for inter-band exchange systems that make possible farflung networks of reciprocity.”

p. 8: “The foregoing does not mean that foraging societies are societies without problems or contradictions. … Contradictions arise when individuals desire to hoard rather than share, to marry in, to be lazy and freeload, to try and lord it over others, to be sullen and isolate themselves, or be quick to argue and fight.”

Silberbauer: Political process in G/wi bands


24: “The social and political community is the band. There are no exclusive formal qualifications for membership, but such attributes as marriage or close kinship to existing members, or birth into the band, are the basis of strong to absolute claims to membership.”

24: “There is marked stability of the band in its conceptualized identity as a group of people living in a geographically specific territory and controlling the use of the resources of that territory. Membership of the band is somewhat less stable than its identity.”

25: “Decisions affecting the band as a whole are arrived at through discussion in which all adult, and near-adult, members may participate.”

29: “Leadership in the band is apparent at all phases of decision-making. … Leadership may be measured as the extent to which an individual’s suggestions or opinion attracts public support”.

Lee: Politics…


51: “Central to the foraging mode of production is a lack of wealth accumulation and the social differentiation that accompanies it.”

53: “On the political level these characteristics of foraging life lead to a strong emphasis on egalitarian social relations. It is not simply the question of the absence of a headman and other authority figures but also a positive insistence on the essential equality of all people and the refusal to bow to the authority of others, a sentiment expressed in the statement: ‘Of course we have headmen … each one of us is headman over himself.’ Men and women whom we would call leaders do exist, but their influence is subtle and indirect. They never order or make demands of others and their accumulation of material
goods is never more, and is often much less, than the average accumulation of the other households in their camp.”

54: “an arrogant person is actually dangerous, since according to the !Kung ‘his pride will make him kill someone.’ … the one area in which they are openly competitive is in recounting suffering. They try to outdo each other in tales of misfortune.”

55: “In the case of the !Kung, food is shared in a generalized familistic way, while durable goods are changed according to the principle of balanced reciprocity. … Egalitarian relations are a kind of balanced political reciprocity where giving orders and receiving them balances out. … sharing of food and sharing of power seem to go hand in hand.

The fact that communal sharing of food resources and of power is a phenomenon that has been directly observed in recent years among the !Kung and dozens of other foraging groups is a finding that should not be glossed over lightly.”

56: “So it is clear that the demands of the collective existence are not achieved effortlessly, but rather they require a continuing struggle with one’s own selfish, arrogant and antisocial impulses. The fact that they !Kung and other foragers succeed as well as they do in communal living, in spite of (or because of?) their material simplicity, offers us an important insight. A truly communal life is often dismissed as an utopian ideal … But the evidence for foraging peoples tells us otherwise. A sharing way of life is not only possible but has actually existed in many parts of the world and over long periods of time.”

**Wiessner: Kung San economics**


Argues the much of the reciprocal sharing behavior is a strategy to protect them from risk.

90: “‘the tribe’ exercised economic rights over the land it occupied, while rights within it were held communally by the tribespeople and access to its products was held in common by all of its members. … Yet the fact remains that some notion of ‘ownership’ or exclusive possession over certain segments of tribal land by specific persons must be acknowledged, even if this cannot be considered by us to be ‘economic’ in character. For example, rights of sacred sites are owned by certain specific men”.

**Hamilton: rights to land**

Leakey, origin of humankind


p. v (page after the publisher’s info): 10-5 million bp Origin of bipedalism
3-2bp: Origin of brain expansion; earliest known stone tools, in Africa
Less than 2bp: *Homo erectus* expands out of Africa
2-1bp: Evidence of meat eating becomes strong
About 1.5bp: Major advance in tool manufacture
700,000bp: First use of fire
200,000bp: Major advance in tool manufacture, Mousterian; Origin of Modern humans, in Africa
30,000bp: First evidence of art in Africa and Europe
10,000bp: Agricultural Revolution

60: Talking about known hunter-gatherers: “despite the differences in diet and ecological environment, there were many commonalities in the hunter-gatherers, “despite the differences in diet and ecological environment, there were many commonalities in the hunter-gatherer way of life. People lived in small, mobile bands of about twenty-five individuals—a core of adult males and females and their offspring. These bands interacted with others, forming a social and political network linked by custom and language. Numbering typically about five hundred individuals, this network of bands is known as a dialectical tribe. The bands occupied temporary camps from which they pursued their daily food quest.”

63-4: Quotes Glynn Isaac saying at a conference in 1982 saying that the development of food sharing was more important than the development of hunting in human evolution, “‘The adoption of food-sharing would have favored the development of language, social reciprocity and the intellect.’”

Five patterns of behavior separate humans from our ape relatives, he wrote in his 1978 paper [in *Scientific American*]: (1) a bipedal mode of locomotion, (2) a spoken language, (3) regular systematic sharing of food in a social context, (4) living in home bases, (5) the hunting of large prey. These describe modern human behavior, of course. But Isaac suggested, by 2 million years ago, ‘various fundamental shifts had begun to take place in hominid social and economical arrangements.’ They were already hunter-gatherers in embryo, living in small, mobile bands, and occupying temporary camps from which the males went out to hunt prey and the females to gather plant foods. The camp provided the social focus, at which food was shared. ‘Although meat was an important component of the diet, it might have been acquired by hunting or by scavenging’”

66-67: Quotes Binford (in a review in 1985) as saying “I became convinced that the organization of the hunting and gathering way of life among these relatively recent ancestors was quite different than that among fully modern *Homo Sapiens.*” Shows evidence indicating the hominids were primarily scavengers (rather than hunters) and that they might not have lived in home bases both before 35 to 45,000 years ago.

70: “hominids close to 2 million years ago were using stone flakes to dismember carcasses and deflesh bones”.

72: more evidence of scavenging.
73: “I would be very surprised if early Homo Erectus did not engage in this form of hunting. The humalike physique that emerged with the evolution of the genus Homo is consistent with a hunting adaptation.”

74-77: Tells a story (based on “the rich archeological evidence”) of what he believes life was like in Homo Erectus society 1.5 million years ago. It is very much like a primitive version of the hunter-gatherer band.

77: “Many will believe that my reconstruction makes Homo erectus too human. I do not think so. I create a picture of a hunter-gatherer lifestyle, and I impute language to these people. Both, I believe, are justifiable, although each must have been a primitive version of what we know in modern humans. In any case, it is very clear from the archeological evidence that these creatures were living lives beyond the reach of other large primates, not least in using technology to gain access to foods such as meat and underground tubers. By this stage in our prehistory, our ancestors were becoming human in a way we would instantly recognize.”

101-118: He shows that there was very little art before 35,000-45,000 years ago, and then a big explosion of it.

119-138: Language was certainly in place by 35,000 BCE, but whether it had developed rapidly beginning 20 or 30,000 years before or whether it had developed extremely gradually for the previous 2 million years is not completely certain.

134: “From about 250,000 years ago, archaic sapiens individuals, including Neanderthals, made tools from prepared flates, and these assemblages, including Mousterian, comprised perhaps sixty identifiable tool types. But the types remained unchanged for more than 200,000 years—a technological statis that seems to deny the workings of the fully human mind.

Only when the Upper Paleolithic cultures burst onto the scene 35,000 years ago did innovation and arbitrary order become pervasive.”

Lee: Crisis in H-G studies

Richard B. Lee
Art, Science, or Politics? The Crisis in Hunter-Gatherer Studies
ABSTRACT: In the complex history of hunter-gatherer studies, several overlapping and at times antagonistic discourses can be discerned. However, one critique has emerged that would render all hunter-gatherer discourses irrelevant and do away with the concept altogether. The paper explores the poststructuralist roots of this "revisionism" and then argues why the concept of hunter-gatherer continues to be politically relevant and empirically valid. However, if they are to fulfill their promise of illuminating an increasingly fragmented and alienating modernity, hunter-gatherer studies will have to become more attuned to issues of politics, history, context, and reflexivity.

COPIED TO ARTICLES FOLDER, but haven’t read beyond this abstract
Lee: Primitive Communism…


Very useful: SEE HARDCOPY NOTES

Lee—The !Kung San


204: “considering the great importance of the mongongo and the long distances walked by the Kung each year to reach the groves, one would imagine the some attempt would have been made to grow mongongo trees in the sandy soils near the permanent water holes, thereby making possible a more sedentary life. I asked Xashe, ‘Why don’t you try growing the mongongo tree at Mahopa?’

‘You could do that if you wanted to,’ he replied, ‘but by the time the trees bore fruit you would be long dead.’

‘And besides,’ he continued, ‘why should we plant when there are so many mongongos in the world?’”

Chapter 9: Men, women, and work

250: “There is no evidence for exploitation on the basis of sex or age.”

251-2: Opinions about how much hunter-gatherers work have varied. “My common sense tended to favor [the less work view]: If hunters and gatherers had been in business for so many thousands of years, surely they had worked out some sort of stable adaptation.” But he needed his own investigation.

256: “The number of days of work per adult per week varied from a low of 1.2 to a high of 3.2, a range of figures that represents only 24 to 64 percent of the 5-day weekly work load of an industrial worker. However, these figures cannot be accepted without further adjustment.” Adjusting brings the average from 2.2 to 2.4 days of work per adult.

256-8: “This low input of work required to feed a camp of hunting and gathering people challenges the notion that the life of hunter-gatherers is a constant struggle for existence, with subsistence work dominating their lives. The Kung San, at least during the month of this study, appeared to spend less than half of their days in subsistence and appeared to enjoy more leisure time than the members of many agricultural and industrial societies. This point gains added significance when we not that these observations were made during the dry season of a year of serious drought”.

276-7: Tool making: “women do much more of the work, with only 3 minutes a day for men and 18 for women. Overall the man’s daily work load is estimated at 64 minutes compared with 45 minutes for the woman, and these times should be added to the weekly subsistence work loads.”
278: **Table 9/12: Work hours per week: men and women**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subsistence work</th>
<th>Tool making and fixing</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Housework</th>
<th>Total work week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

280: “A major category of work still to be mentioned is child care, and to the child’s own mother falls 60 to 80 percent of the work with young children”.

Chapter 10: The allocation of nutritional stress

281: “The !Kung San of the Dobe camp in a single month appeared to meet their nutritional needs with a modest amount of work effort.”

287-8: De Almeida (1965:5), after observing the Kung in Angola, argued that the San stature is a product of chronic semistarvation—a view that contrasts sharply with the evidence for their adequate diet and abundant leisure time (Chapters 6 through 9).” Others have argued that it’s genetics.

289: “Clearly, the Kung fall far below the Western standards for height, weight, and fatness; but the existence of this shortfall in spite of an adequate diet leads me to question, not their way of life but the validity and applicability of Western standards! It has become increasingly clear over the last 10 years that the body size we have come to accept as normal in the West is a product of overfeeding, underexercising, and declining standards of nutrition and health.”

290-1: “In spite of the apparent evidence for their slow growth and late maturation as children, their smallness and thinness as adults, the Kung are a hardy and vigorous people. Truswell and Hansen found almost no clinical signs of malnutrition among the Kung. They also noted that the Kung had an adequate intake of proteins, vitamins and minerals …. It may well be true, as Truswell and Hansen suggest, that under traditional hunting and gathering conditions Kung do not reach their maximum genetic potential …, but implicit in this statement is the assumption that bigger is somehow better. For hunting, precisely the opposite may be the case. Tobias … has reported …that among the central San groups ‘the taller members are almost invariably poor hunters’;” Lee confirmed this result with his own study.

291-2: “At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the Kung are small by world standards and that this smallness probably indicates some degree of undernutrition during childhood and adolescence … But even though cattle post Kung may consume more calories [and grow much taller], there is no evidence that their diet is as well rounded or that their health is any better than the health of their bush-living relatives.”

302: “at any given season the Kung have two subsistence strategies available to them: to walk farther to reach the more desirable foods or to remain closer to home and accept foods of lower quality. It is likely that the low January weights are one of the consequences of choosing the latter subsistence strategy”.
369: “The informal leadership, vague boundaries, and reciprocal access to resources worked well for the Kung when the land was vast and the people were few. But with the transition to village life the old mechanisms have proved quite inadequate.”

433-4: “Modern foragers are different from each other and from ancient foragers. … if we can discern the principles underlying foraging behavior in all its variability, we can apply these principles to more dynamic models of foraging societies past and present.”

437-8: “Food supply [among the !Kung] is sufficient to their needs, and they achieve this state of affairs with only the simplest of tools. This finding challenges the widespread popular and scientific notion that the way of life of hunter-gatherers is precarious and full of hardship and that the life of man in the ‘state of nature’ was ‘nasty, brutish, and short.’”

438: “Perhaps the most telling evidence of the security of life as hunter-gatherers is its extraordinary persistence. Foraging people have been operating in the Dobe area for thousands of years without any evidence for major discontinuities. Personnel have changed, but the way of life has remained the same.”

440: “Studies of other hunter-gatherers … show a similarly low level of work effort—a level that has led one observer to suggest that foragers probably enjoy more leisure time than does any other level of society …. All these studies of work and leisure are short-term; the workers at one or two camps are monitored over a period of days or weeks. We do not know how representative these studies are of the level of work effort required over the long run.”

440: The study of seasonal fluctuations in weights … provides this broader perspective. … These adult weight losses are small by the standards of African societies, for whom weights may vary by as much as 6 percent between the harvest season and the hungry season …, and the overall picture tends to strengthen the argument for the relative ease of subsistence and for the security of foraging life.”

455: “Because they know what to expect from the environment, they see little point in bringing the food and raw materials to camp before they are actually needed. The food collected by members of a camp is distributed and consumed without delay within the boundaries of the camp or by the camp’s immediate neighbors. No portion of the production is set aside for consumption at a later date or for distribution to more distant points. This lack of surplus requires that a constant level of work be maintained throughout the year. This uniformity of effort stands in sharp contrast to the management of subsistence in agricultural societies …. The actual amount of time devoted by the San to the food quest is modest, amounting to about 17 hours of subsistence effort per adult per week, or about 900 hours a year, a lower level of work than has been observed in many agricultural and most industrial societies”.

456: Land ownership is collective.

457: “An individual may utilize the food resources of several water holes as long as he observes the elementary good manners of sharing fully with the members of the local camp.”

457-8: Describes the egalitarian aspects of Kung organization.
458-60: “[Westerners] are alternately moved to pity by their tales of hardship and repelled by their nagging demands for gifts, demand that grow more insistent the more we give. These contradiction—generosity-stinginess, arrogance-humility, equality-hierarchy, sociability-withdrawal—are central themes in Kung culture. …. The essence of this way of life is sharing, a practice that is extended more widely in the foraging mode of production than in any other.”

460-1: “Having declared that the foraging mode of production is a form of primitive communism, it would be a mistake to idealize the foraging peoples as noble savages who have solved all the basic problems of living. Like individuals in any society, the foragers have to struggle with their own internal contradictions [i.e. conflicts], and living up to the demands of this strongly collective existence presents some particularly challenging problems. … Among the foragers, society demands a high level of sharing and tolerates a low level of personal accumulation compared with Western capitalist norms. And living up to these demands, while it has its rewards, also takes its toll.”

461: (The end of the book): “A truly communal life is often dismissed as a utopian ideal, to be endorsed in theory but unattainable in practice. But the evidence for foraging peoples tells us otherwise. A sharing way of life is not only possible but has actually existed in many parts of the world and over long periods of time.”

**Lee & DeVore—Man the Hunter**

RB Lee, I DeVore - *Man the Hunter*, 1977


Cited for various background stuff

8-9: “the reports in this volume make it clear that the hunter-gatherer band is not a corporation of persons who are bound together by the necessity of maintaining property. …. Among the Mbuti Pygmies the territories are well-defined but the membership in the resource-using group is open and changes frequently (Turnbull in chapter 15).”

9: Heading: “Flexibity and the Resolution of Conflict by Fission” “Turnbull … has defined an important means of social control among the Mbuti Pygmies. When disputes arise within the band, the principals simple part company rather than allow the argument to cross the threshold of violence. By this seemingly simple device harmony is maintained within the cooperating group without recourse to fighting or to formal modes of litigation. The essential condition seems to be the lack of exclusive rights to resources; thus it is a relatively simple matter for individuals and groups to separate when harmony is threatened. The
effect of this practice is to keep the population circulating between band territories. Such a form of conflict resolution would not be possible in situations where social units are strictly defined and firmly attached to parcels of real estate. Woodburn and Lee reported a similar mode of conflict resolution among the Hadza and !Kung Bushmen; judging from their generally flexible group structure, resolution of conflict by fission may well be a common property of nomadic hunting societies.”

Turnbull—The Importance of Flux in Two Hunting Societies

Chapter 15

132: “Because neither [of two Pygmy societies] is under the rigid control a truly marginal economy might impose, each is able to maintain a fluid band composition, a loose form of social structure, and to utilize flux as a highly effective social mechanism.

By flux I mean the constant changeover of personnel between local groups and the frequent shifts of campsites through the season. This apparent instability is, in fact, the very mechanism that gives these societies their cohesion. Both the Mbuti and the Ik are composed of many constantly shifting elements forming established patterns. Flux is expressed as recurrent fission and fusion which affects the composition of local bands. A similar state of flux is found in a number of hunting and gathering societies, such as the Hadza and Bushmen, and may be characteristic of the majority of peoples described at the symposium.”

135: Some of the fissioning is seasonal, but it always separates antagonists. “When hostilities come into the open, the solution is for one or the other disputants to pack up and leave. … The problem for the archers is how to maintain any semblance of band unity under such conditions, and band unity must be expressed, for territory is defined by bands, just as bands are defined by territory. It is essential that territorial boundaries should be known so as to avoid any conflicts that might arise due to allegations of trespass or poaching. The need, then, is for each band to draw together all its scattered segments and to act as a band, within its territory, for at least some part of the annual cycle.”

136: “There is no form of central authority in either society …. It is difficult to see what are the threads that hold each society together as such, for despite the apparent lack of cohesion, both the Ik and the Mbuti are strongly united, as peoples, in opposition to their neighbors.

On the contrary, in each case there is a strong hostility felt towards any individual who aspires to a position of authority or leadership. Hostility is even shown towards those who, without any such aspirations, are plainly better fitted to lead than others by virtue of sheer ability. …

… [the environment] leaves a large margin of latitude and always allows the certainty of, at the very least, a sufficiency of food, if not a surplus. The assurance of food is clearly seen in the unpredictability of the daily hunt. … a band … may well at the last moment decide not to go hunting after all. … The result may even be hunger on that day. … Sometimes rain will making hunting
impractical, and again hunger might ensue since their society ... will [not?] store or keep anything for the morrow. After two or three consecutive rainy days ..., a fine day may dawn and find the band still determined to stay in camp and attend to unimportant chores.”

136-7: “They are unencumbered by the rigid imperatives that would be imposed by a truly harsh environment. Thus they are able to maintain a fluid band composition and a loose social structure; and are able to utilize this flux as a highly effective social mechanism, providing scope for action in all aspects of social life.”

137: “the major function of flux is not ecological adaptation but what could be called political adaptation ... The predictability of food supplies allows for neighboring bands to plan their movements so as to avoid conflict ... in each case the process of fission and fusion follows lines of dissent rather than those of descent, and that the major function is conflict-resolving ... The band can only be defined as that group of individuals living and hunting within recognized territorial boundaries at a given time.”


Lee, RB—What Hunters Do for a Living

39: “The !Kung Bushmen have available to them some relatively abundant high-quality foods, and they do not have to walk very far or work very hard to get them. Furthermore, this modest work effort provides sufficient calories to support not only the active adults, but also a large number of middle-aged and elderly people. The Bushmen do not have to press their youngsters into the service of the food quest, nor do they have to dispose of the oldsters after they have ceased to be productive.

The evidence presented assumes an added significance because this security of life was observed during the third year of one of the most severe droughts in South Africa’s history.”

41: “The Bushmen of the Dobe area eat as much vegetable food as they need, and as much meat as they can. It seems reasonable that a similar kind of subsistence strategy would be characteristic of hunters and gatherers in general.”

43: “life in the state of nature is not necessarily nasty, brutish, and short. The Dobe-area Bushmen live well today on wild plants and meat, in spite of the fact that they are confined to the least productive portion of the range in which Bushman peoples were formerly found. It is likely that an even more substantial subsistence base would have been characteristic of these hunters and gatherers in the past, when they had the pick of African habitats to choose from.”
43: Ethnologists have tended to focus on the more dramatic cases. “unfortunately [this emphasis] has led to the assumption that a precarious hunting subsistence base was characteristic of all cultures in the Pleistocene. This view of both modern and ancient hunters ought to be reconsidered. Specifically I am suggesting a shift in focus away from the dramatic and unusual cases, and toward a consideration of hunting and gathering as a persistent and well-adapted way of life.”

Woodburn: Introduction 2 Hadza...

50: “The Eastern Hadza assert no rights over land and its ungarnered resources. Any individual may live wherever he likes and may hunt animals, collect roots, berries, and honey and draw water anywhere in Hadza country without any sort of restriction. Not only do the Hadza not parcel out their land and its resources amount themselves, they do not even seek to restrict the use of the land they occupy to members of their own tribe.”

52: “Hunting and gathering tribes are often described as living on the verge of starvation. It is easy to gain such an impression after living for a short while with the Hadza; often by nightfall every scrap of food in the camp has been eaten unless a large animal happens to have been killed recently. Moreover the Hadza place such emphasis on meat as proper food and treat vegetable foods as so thoroughly unsatisfactory in comparison that they are apt to describe themselves as suffering from hunger when they have less meat than they would like. In fact, there is never any general shortage of food even in time of drought. The range of foods in the bush is so great, if one knows what these are and how to obtain them, that if weather conditions should cause the failure of some type of root or berry, or the migration of some of the game, some other type of food is always available. For a Hadza to die of hunger, or even to fail to satisfy his hunger for more than a day or two, is almost inconceivable.”

52: “With food of some sort always available, the Hadza give little attention to the conservation of their food resources.”

52: “Hunting is not a coordinated activity. Men hunt individually and decide for themselves where and when they will go hunting. When a man goes off into the bush with his bow and arrows, his main interest is usually to satisfy his hunger. … Men often return from the bush empty-handed but with their hunger satisfied.”

54: “We have good evidence that the food they eat is adequate nutritionally. … My impression is that, over the year as a whole, the Hadza spend less energy (and probably less time) obtaining their subsistence than do neighboring agricultural tribes, but until detailed comparative research is done, the matter must remain in doubt. From a nutritional point of view the Hadza again appear to be better off than their agricultural neighbors although to establish this, too, more research is needed. It is clear that agriculturalists are liable to suffer from recurrent famine in this area while hunters and gatherers are not.”

55: “Perhaps largely because of the temporal priority of hunting and gathering, there has been a widespread tendency to see it as a hard and demanding way of life in which the necessities of the food quest dominate people’s lives. With the
Hadza this is clearly not the case and judging from some of the other papers in this volume, they may not be exceptional. I have sought to show that the Hadza meet their nutritional needs easily without much effort, much forethought, much equipment, or much organization.”

*Sahlins—Notes on the Original Affluent Society*

89: Reviews some observations of hunter-gatherers that show their affluence: “Harassment is not implied in the descriptions of their nonchalant movements from camp to camp, nor indeed is the familiar condemnations of their laziness. A certain issue is posed by exasperated comments on the prodigality of hunters, their inclination to make a feast of everything on hand; as if, one Jesuit said of the Montagnais, ‘the game they were to hunt was shut up in a stable’ (Le Jeune’s *Relation* of 1634, in Kenton, 1927 I, p. 182). Not the slightest thought of, or care for, what the morrow may bring forth,’ wrote Spencer and Gillen (1899, p. 53). Two interpretations of this supposed lack of foresight are possible: either they are fools, or they are not worried—that is, as far as they are concerned, the morrow will bring more of the same. Rather than anxiety, it would seem hunters have a confidence born of affluence, of a condition in which all people’s wants (such as they are) are generally easily satisfied.” Quotes Needham on the philosophy of the Penan of Borneo “‘If there is no food today there will be tomorrow’ … expressing … ‘a confidence in the capacity of the environment to support them, and in their own ability to extract their livelihood from it.’”

*Woodburn—Stability and Flexibility in Hadza Residential Groupings*

103: “Hadza residential groupings are open, flexible, and highly variable in composition. They have no institutional leadership and, indeed, no corporate identity. They do not own territory and clear-cut jurally defined modes of affiliation of individuals to residential groupings do not exist. The use of the term ‘band,’ with its connotations of territorial ownership, leadership, corporateness, and fixed membership is inappropriate for Hadza residential entities and I prefer to use the term ‘camp,’ meaning simply the set of persons who happen to live together at one time”.

*Clark—Studies of Hunter-Gatherers*

Quote for piecing together three kinds of evidence.
One important point for me: The genus Homo has existed for about 600,000 years, but the hunting and gathering style and social arrangements that are characteristic of human foragers and make them distinct from other primates might have existed since homo erectus (other sources put that at 2 million years).

301: “To see how radically hunting changed the economic situation, it is necessary to remember that in monkeys and apes an individual simply eats what it needs. After an infant is weaned, it is on its own economically and is not dependent on adults. This means that adult males never have economic responsibility for any other animal, and adult females do only when they are nursing. In such a system, there is no economic gain in delaying any kind of social relationship. But when hunting makes females and young dependent on the success of male skills, there is a great gain to the family members in establishing behaviors which prevent addition of infants, unless these can be supported.”

302: “In monkeys, because the economic unit is the individual (not a pair), a surplus of females causes no problem.”

303: “While stressing the success of the hunting and gathering way of life with its great diversity of local forms and while emphasizing the way it influenced human evolution, we must also take into account its limitations. There is no indication that this way of life could support large communities of more than a few million people in the whole world. To call the hunters ‘affluent’... is to give a very special definition to the word.” Monkeys and baboons also have a lot of free time, but their populations are limited by food availability. “After agriculture, human populations increased dramatically in spite of disease, war, and slowly changing customs. Even with fully human (Homo sapiens) biology, language, technical sophistication, cooperation, art, the support of kinship, the control of custom and political power, and the solace of religion—in spite of this whole web of culture and biology—the local group in the Mesolithic was no larger than that of baboons. Regardless of statements made at the symposium on the ease with which hunters obtain food some of the time, it is still true that food was the primary factor in limiting early human populations, as is shown by the events subsequent to agriculture.”

303: “The biology, psychology, and customs that separate us from the apes—all these we owe to the hunters of time past.”

Lévi-Strauss—the Concept of Primitiveness

350: Recalling Lathrap’s comment, “hunter-gatherers were not representative of an earlier condition of mankind, but were regressive rather than primitive.”
Lee—The Cambridge encyclopedia of hunters and gatherers


Lee and Daly—Foragers and others

1: “hunters may hold the key to some of the central questions about the human condition—about social life, politics, and gender, about diet and nutrition and living in nature; how people can live and have lived without the state; how to live without accumulated technology; the possibility of living in Nature without destroying it. … They have lived in relatively small groups, without centralized authority, standing armies, or bureaucratic systems. Yet the evidence indicates that they have lived together surprisingly well, solving their problems among themselves largely without recourse to authority figures and without a particular propensity for violence. It was not the situation that Thomas Hobbes, the great seventeenth-century philosopher, described in a famous phrase as ‘the war of all against all.’ By all accounts life was not ‘nasty, brutish and short.’”

3: “Foraging refers to subsistence based on hunting of wild animals, gathering of wild plants foods, and fishing, with no domestication of plants, and no domesticated animals except the dog.”

3: Farming replaced HG in most of Amazonia millennia ago, but they readapted to foraging to make them less vulnerable to colonial expansion.

3: “In defining foragers we must recognize that contemporary foragers practice a mixed subsistence: gardening in tropical South America, reindeer herding in northern Asia, trading in South/Southeast Asia and parts of Africa. Given this diversity, what constitutes the category ‘hunter-gatherer’? The answer is that subsistence is one part of a multi-faceted definition of hunter-gatherers: social organization forms a second major area of convergence, and cosmology and world-view a third. All three sets of criteria have to be taken into account in understanding hunting and gathering peoples today.

The basic unit of social organization of most (but not all) hunting and gathering peoples is the band, a small-scale nomadic group of fifteen to fifty people related by kinship.”

4: economic life of small-scale hunter-gatherers shares the following features: First they are relative egalitarian … This important aspect of their way of life allowed for a degree of freedom unheard of in more hierarchical societies but it has put them at a distinct disadvantage in their encounters with centrally organized colonial authorities.

Mobility is another characteristic of band societies. People tend to move their settlements frequently, several times a year or more, in search of food, and this mobility is an important element of their politics. People in band societies tend to ‘vote with their feet,’ moving away rather than submitting to the will of an unpopular leader. Mobility is also a means of resolving conflicts that would be more difficult for settled people.
… concentration and dispersion. Rather than living in uniformly sized groupings throughout the year, band societies tend to spend part of the year dispersed into small foraging units and another part of the year aggregated into much larger units. …

A fourth characteristic common to almost all band societies (and hundreds of village-based societies as well) is a land tenure system based on a common property regime (CPR). These regimes were, until recently, far more common world-wide than regimes based on private property. In traditional CPRs, while movable property is held by individuals, land is held by a kinship-based collective. Rules of reciprocal access make it possible for each individual to draw on the resources of several territories. Rarer is the situation where the whole society has unrestricted access to all the land controlled by the group. …

Sharing is the central rule of social interaction among hunters and gatherers. … the giving of something without an immediate expectation of return, is the dominant form within fact-to-face groups. … This, combined with an absence of private ownership of land, has led many observers from Lewis Henry Morgan forward to attribute to hunter-gatherers a way of life based on ‘primitive communism’ ….

Found among many but not all hunter-gatherers is the notion of the giving environment, the idea that the land around them is their spiritual home and the source of all good things. [See –Bird-]

Women in hunter-gatherer societies do have higher status than women in most of the world’s societies, including industrial and post-industrial modernity. This status is expressed in greater freedom of movement and involvement in decision-making and a lower incidence of domestic violence against them … nowhere can it be said that women and men live in a state of perfect equality. …

Many prehistoric peoples, lived in large semi-sedentary settlements with chiefs, commoners, and slaves, yet were entirely dependent on wild foods.”

Foragers as a group are not particularly peaceful. …

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challenges this thesis at a fundamental level, the ‘revisionists’ do raise serious questions. For too long students of hunter-gatherers and other pre-state societies tended to treat in isolation the peoples they researched, regarding them as unmediated visions of the past. Today history looms much larger in these studies. Hunter-gatherers arrive at their present condition by a variety of pathways.”

15: “One of the recurring themes in hunter-gatherer research is the surprisingly good nutritional status of foraging peoples. As S. Boyd Eaton and Stanley Eaton [in this volume] point out, there are many lessons to be learned from the study of foragers’ diet and exercise regime. In the precolonial period foragers led healthy outdoor lives with a diet consisting entirely of ‘natural’ foods. Salt intake and refined carbohydrate consumption were low and obesity rare, as were many of the diseases associated with high-stress sedentary urban living such as diabetes, heart disease, and stroke.”

**Tim Ingold—On the Social Relations of the Hunter-gatherer Band**

403-4: “One of the key debates of Western political philosophy has surrounded the possibility of a truly egalitarian society. It has been argued, for example by Ralph Dahrendorf (1968), that society cannot be without rules for regulating conduct; that such rules would be meaningless without sanctions to back them up; and that the existence of sanctions requires that there be persons in positions to impose them, to exercise power over those who are sanctioned. In any society, therefore, ‘there has to be inequality of rank among men’ (1968:172). The notion of an original band society from which all distinctions of rank are absent, Darendorf claims, is a figment of the imagination.”

427: “the person in a hunter-gatherer band, she writes, is like a drop of oil floating on the surface of a pool of water. When these drops come together, they coalesce into a larger drop. But drops can also split up into small ones that may then coalesce with others. Likewise persons, ‘throughout their lives perpetually coalesce with and depart from, each other’

**Alan Barnard—this volume**

Lee says p. 7, “As described … by Alan Barnard … philosophers from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau onward have been drawn upon contemporary accounts of ‘savages’ as a starting point for speculations about life in the state of nature and what constitutes the good society.”
This article admits that HGs are overall less healthy than occidentals, but mostly catalogues the ways in which their healthier, and there are many.

449: They consume less fat and less saturated fat
450: The amount of carbohydrates in their diet is about the same, but most of it is from fruits and vegetables rather than grains and refined sugars. They consume more fiber and more animal protein. They exercise much more. Most no alcohol and little or no tobacco.
451: Much lower percentage of body fat. Blood pressure does not increase with age.
452: “Cholesterol level of hunter-gatherers is much below that of urban industrial people. … At any given age foragers tend to be about one-third more fit than Westerners.”
452: “Despite the foregoing, the health of people in affluent countries surpasses that of typical hunter-gatherers by most epidemiological measures. Life expectancy in sedentary, industrialized nations is over twice as long and infant mortality is far lower than among foragers. The main reason here is that infectious diseases can be prevented in affluent nations (through sanitation and immunization) or treated (by antibiotics and supportive therapy). In the nineteenth century, life expectancy for hunter-gatherers and occidentals was nearly equal.”
452: Less (if any) obesity & diabetes
453: High blood pressure is essentially unknown, because of lack of salt intake.
453: Heart diseases are almost unknown.
453: “Four cancer killers common in industrialized nations illustrate different mechanisms by which the affluent life-style promotes malignancies from which hunter-gatherers are relatively immune.” HGs low-fat high fiber diet makes them relatively immune from colon cancer. Lack of access to tobacco and lack of exposure to radon gas makes them relatively immune from lung cancer. No excessive salt in their diet makes them relatively free from stomach cancer.
454: “One forager woman in 800 develops breast cancer, while in the United States it is more like one in eight”.
454: “In many foraging societies, the intake of fruits and vegetables, for which the statistical correlation with cancer prevention is very strong, exceeds that of almost all Westerners.”
455: “In 1754, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote that in a ‘state of nature’ men were strong of limb, fleet of food, and clear of eye. … [more details of Rousseau’s statements] … For generations this view was considered naively romantic and it was unquestionably exaggerated, but anthropological investigations of hunter-gatherer life during the past half century have confirmed its basic postulate: individuals who continue the lifeways of our remote ancestors are largely immune to the chronic degenerative diseases which produce ‘the greater part’ of all mortality in affluent nations. Rousseau did not anticipate the obvious advantages
of modern life …. He could not have predicted a life expectancy twice that of eighteenth-century Europe (and of his ‘savages’). But he did hit upon a fundamental truth: our biology is designed for a different era.”

John Gowdy—Hunter-gatherers and the mythology of the market

Unfortunately, this one didn’t turn out to be that valuable for me. It doesn’t tell me anything I don’t already know; it focuses on economics rather than political philosophy; it doesn’t have original research on HGs; and it doesn’t address the more pessimistic views of HG life.

Leroi-Gourhan: Gesture and speech


318: “According to a deep-rooted scientific tradition, prehistoric humans lived in caves. If this were true, it would suggest interesting comparisons with the bear and the badger, omnivorous and plantigrade like ourselves, but it would be more correct to suppose that although humans sometimes took advantage of caves when these were habitable, they lived in the open in the statically overwhelming majority of cases and, from the time when records become available, in built shelters.”

Lozano et al, Global and regional mortality


Lozano, Rafael “Global and regional mortality from 235 causes of death for 20 age groups in 1990 and 2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010”.

From the Table on pages 2105-2109, there were 456,300 deaths from interpersonal violence out of 52,769,700 total deaths worldwide. Dividing one by the other gives me a figure of 0.86% deaths from interpersonal violence. If you add the 1,340,000 deaths from self harm you get 2.54% of all deaths.

From the table p. 2109:

<table>
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<th>All ages deaths (thousands)</th>
<th>Age-standardised death rates (per 100 000)</th>
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From the pie chart on p. 2112: in 2010 interpersonal violence constituted 1.6% of deaths among female individuals ages 15-49 worldwide and 5.2% of deaths among male individuals 15-49. Suicide deaths were 4.8% and 5.7% respectively.

**Lotz, Is Community Development Necessary?**


Mentions older anthropologists endorsing the phrase (n, b, & s), but doesn't endorse it.

**Macintosh et al— Prehistoric women’s manual labor exceeded that of athletes through the first 5500 years of farming in Central Europe**

Alison A. Macintosh1, Ron Pinhasi, and Jay T. Stock, “Prehistoric women’s manual labor exceeded that of athletes through the first 5500 years of farming in Central Europe. *Science Advances* 29 Nov 2017: Vol. 3, no. 11

NOT YET DOWNLOADED OR READ

Abstract:
The intensification of agriculture is often associated with declining mobility and bone strength through time, although women often exhibit less pronounced trends than men. For example, previous studies of prehistoric Central European agriculturalists (~5300 calibrated years BC to 850 AD) demonstrated a significant reduction in tibial rigidity among men, whereas women were characterized by low tibial rigidity, little temporal change, and high variability. Because of the potential for sex-specific skeletal responses to mechanical loading and a lack of modern comparative data, women’s activity in prehistory remains difficult to interpret. This study compares humeral and tibial cross-sectional rigidity, shape, and interlimb loading among prehistoric Central European women agriculturalists and living European women of known behavior (athletes and
controls). Prehistoric female tibial rigidity at all time periods was highly variable, but differed little from living sedentary women on average, and was significantly lower than that of living runners and football players. However, humeral rigidity exceeded that of living athletes for the first ~5500 years of farming, with loading intensity biased heavily toward the upper limb. Interlimb strength proportions among Neolithic, Bronze Age, and Iron Age women were most similar to those of living semi-elite rowers. These results suggest that, in contrast to men, rigorous manual labor was a more important component of prehistoric women’s behavior than was terrestrial mobility through thousands of years of European agriculture, at levels far exceeding those of modern women.

Maisels—The Emergence of Civilization


16: “It is a central theme of this work that population growth, technological, and social change are, where present, systematically related and that far from there being a single ‘prime mover’, one element which drives the whole system, those factors move together in pulses.”

35: Why farm at all when foraging is reasonably productive?

36: “When the Yir Yoront of the Cape York Peninsula underwent a leap from Paleolithic to Iron Age technology with the introduction of the steel axe supplanting the traditional polished stone axes, the heightened productivity was used to provide more sleeping time. … When steel axes were introduced to the Siane of the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea, again the indigenous social structure accommodated the improved means of production, and the Siane had become more leisured”.

199: “chiefs rule in chiefdoms, and kings reign over states, while meritocratic entrepreneurs such as big-men, famed hunters, or shamans have merely influence in more acephalous societies. States possess a unique power centre manifesting sovereignty, characterized by *ultimate control* of the populations which are their subjects. In chieftaincies only hegemony obtains; autonomous foci of power exist over which the centre is merely preponderant (perhaps only for reasons of tradition or prestige) and any of which might secede to form the nucleus of another chiefdom. Yet most theories of state formation fall at the first hurdle through their authors’ failure, or their formulation’s inability, to distinguish chiefdom from true state. There is governance in the former, only in the latter is there government: overall social regulation by specialized apparatuses of control emanating from a unique power centre.”

200-203: Goes over a theory of stages slightly different from the one I’m using. Primarily relies on Service. Makes chiefdoms out to be weaker than the Earle version I’m focusing on.
200: “It is to Elman Services work *Primitive Social Organization* … that we owe the full and rigorous distinctions between band, tribe, chiefdom, and the state forms of what he calls ‘levels of sociocultural integration’.”

201: “Sedentariness, as I have argued, has a lot to do with it, but as for local specialization and overall re-integration by the chief, Earle (1977a:223) shows quite plainly that territories within the Hawaiian proto-state were specifically organized to ensure local autarky, and that what was ‘centralized’ and ‘redistributed’ (only to the elite) were sumptuary items marking their status …. For Service, ‘a fully developed chiefdom is likely to have both regional specialisation and individual division of labour tied to the redistribution’”.

203: “Modern ethnoarchaeological models of state formation fall under two broad categories: (1) the Managerial and (B) the Stress, whose rational may respectively be rendered as ‘benefits’ versus ‘conflicts’.”

203-218: Goes over several models of state formation, including Carneiro’s circumscription theory. They fall into two categories, managerial and stress.

205-207: Critical of Service’s managerial theory of the state.

213: Critical of Wittfogel’s hydraulic thesis.

214-216: Critical of circumscription. Shows evidence that cities attracted people rather than hemmed them in.

215: “Even after millennia of city-states in Mesopotamia there were always significant numbers ‘voting with their feet’ as they alternate between and around cities and fluxed from agrarian villages to nomadic niches and back again. Very often indeed, such fluid elements posed problems to the stability of states. Stability neither of watercourses nor of population or politics could be taken for granted.”

216: “States arose not in the original Neolithic upland hearths where demographic pressure would have been greatest. On the contrary, they emerged on the alluvium precisely under those environmental constraints in the contrast to which favoured focal areas *are supposed to make cultivators stay put and accept domination*. It was the breaching of any ‘circumscription’ that took settlers down from the fertile piedmont on the plain, and it is there in a semi-desert punctuated by marshes that we find ‘The Heartland of Cities’ … whose advent demands explanation less schematic.”

216-218: Also rejects a stratification model in which the elite create the state to protect their interests. 218: Perhaps he’s critical of any “monocausal explanations for the rise of the state.” [REPOONSE: I wish he’d be more clear about what he’s for.]

218: “Inter-regional exchange did not increase markedly until … after the advent of the world’s first states. … neither from ethnography nor archaeology is there any support for the prime role of trade in Sumerian state origins, whatever its role may have been later”.

219: “Having dispensed with the presently encountered types of models as either too general, too partial, or just contradicted by the evidence, it is possible to outline my own working model of state formation … we are dealing … with landholding, of which there are two basic forms in pre- and early-historic Mesopotamia. Temple land, the agrarian property of the community as a whole,
but run by temple personnel for cultic purposes and as community reserve. Second, but originally of greater extent, land help corporatively by ‘patriarchal clans’. Over the this twofold landholding tended to produce a tripartite division of arable land, resulting in temple lands, community land, and a private sector of lands held by eminent individuals from land alienated by the ‘kinship’ sector.” He gives a long explanation which seems to amount to: someone from one of those centres of power takes full power.

219: “the supreme temple functionaries had gained control of the ‘public’ land and its reserves, due in large measure to the fact that they never came to ‘own’ temple resources as their own property, since the city god ‘owned’ the temple as his household. Such ‘corporate control’, however, served to crystallize state appurtenances from temple personnel at the highest level.”

219: “With continual inter-community conflict a warrior elite led by a lugal (literally ‘big-man’) like Gilgamesh emerged from the ranks of the citizenry of good family. When this office, originally transient became revisionary ..., supplanted and dominated the emergent temple hierarchy, it became permanent and the locus of all the levers of power—ideological and economic, as well as military .... In this fusion it is particularly important to not ‘the Mesopotamian conception according to which royal piety is the warrant for national well-being and fertility’ .... The stabilization of such concentrated (but far from absolute) power characterizes the Early Dynastic period”.

302: “Causes of the advent of the state are various and highly contingent. They all presuppose, however, as a necessary but not yet sufficient condition, a certain threshold population density produced by settled agriculture.”

302: “While there can be chiefdoms without towns and cities (for a large village will do), there cannot be a state in their absence, since the state depends upon the concentration and specialization of power which means the disconnection of ultimate control from the populace as a whole. In short the formation of the state depends upon the replacement of horizontal political relationship by vertical ones of super- and subordination.”

**Malinowski: 5 books**

**Coral Gardens**


This quote from Hann “intro” apparently refers to Coral Gardens: 25-6: “Malinowski stressed the need to move beyond ‘the legal point of view’ and to transcend the ‘false antithesis’ of the individual versus communal dichotomy.
(1935: 318-19). His discussion of Trobriand land tenure pays careful attention to webs of ideas, [26] ‘mythological foundations’ and kin relations”.

318: “We could lay down at once the rule that any attempt to study land tenure merely from the legal point of view must lead to unsatisfactory results. Land tenure cannot be defined or described without an exhaustive knowledge of the economic life of the natives. … enquires, especially the official ones, have been based on the fallacy that land tenure can be ascertained by a rapid fusillade of questions concentrated upon the legal aspects alone.”

319: “when in one Oceanic colony after another the officials are advised to report on land tenure and do this by stating that land is owned communally here and individually there: that is ‘clan property’ in one tribe, the ‘chief’s domain’ in another, and ‘apportioned among the family’ in a third—the results at best can give only a very rough approximation to the reality. But actually a typical enquiry does worse that this: it proceeds on the basis of a questionnaire inspired either by set and specialized European notions or else by some distinctions conceived a priori, such as e.g. the undying fallacy of anthropological work—the opposition between communism and individualism. Any observations thus obtained are then immediately mutilated or placed in a wrong perspective, and the result this obtained, by giving a fictitious solution, veils from us the real problem.”

319-320: “Land tenure enters very deeply into every aspect of human life, and it is the integral expression of all the ways in which man uses his land and surrounds it with the values of avarice, sentiment, mysticism, and tradition.”

320: “The subject is complex and elusive, in spite of its fundamental relevance to the theorist and practitioner alike. And this makes it a suitable example on which to establish some point of principle in the functional method.

The maxim that you cannot understand the rules of the game without knowledge of the game itself describes the essence of this method. You must know first how man uses his soil, how he weaves rout it his traditional legends, his beliefs and mystical values, how he fights for it and defends it; then and then only will you be able to grasp the system of legal and customary rights which define the relationship between man and soil.”

Crime and Custom in Savage Society

Bronislaw Malinowski: Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926)

18: “within each canoe … there is one man who is its rightful owners, while the rest act as a crew. All these men, who as a rule belong to the same sub-clan, are bound to each other and to their fellow-villagers by mutual obligations; when the whole community go out fishing, the owner cannot refuse his canoe. He must go out himself or let some one else do it instead. The crew are equally under an obligation to him. For reasons which will presently become clear, each man must fill his place and stand by his task. Each man also receives his fair share in the distribution of the catch as an equivalent of his service. Thus the ownership and use of the canoe consist of a series of definite obligations and duties uniting a group of people into a working team.
What makes the conditions even more complex is that the owners and the members of the crew are entitled to surrender their privileges to anyone of their relatives and friends … for a repayment. To an observer who does not grasp all the details, and does not follow all the intricacies of each transaction, such a state of affairs looks very much like communism: the canoe appears to be owned jointly be a group and used indiscriminately by the whole community.”

19: “Any description of a savage institution in terms such as ‘communism’, capitalism’ or ‘joint-stock company’, borrowed from present-day economic conditions or political controversy, cannot but be misleading.”

20: “Thus on close inquiry we discover in this pursuit a definite system of division of functions and a rigid system of mutual obligations, into which a sense of duty and the recognition of the need of co-operation enter side by side with a realization of self-interest, privileges and benefits. Ownership, therefore, can be defined neither by such words as ‘communism’ nor ‘individualism’, nor be reference to ‘joint-stock company’ system or ‘personal enterprise’.

46-7: Describes a hereditary chief who can declare war, organize an expedition, and receive tribute, services and assistance, but who has to follow norms and laws when he does so.

91: “All these standard symptoms show us how much resented is any prominence, any excess of qualities or possessions not warranted by social position, and outstanding personal achievement or virtue not associated with rank or power. These things are punishable and the one who watches over the mediocrity of others is the chief, whose essential privilege and duty to tradition is to enforce the golden mean upon others.”

**Freedom and Civilization**


Hayek (p. 140) writes; “Modern anthropology confirms the fact that ‘private property appears very definitely on primitive levels’ and that ‘the roots of property as a legal principle which determines the physical relationships between man and his environmental setting, natural and artificial, are the very prerequisite of any ordered action in the cultural sense.’” CITING: B. Malinowsk, Freedom and Civilization (London, 1944), pp. 132-133.


It doesn’t not refer specifically to these books or to any other actual evidence in the three chapters that discuss property in primitive societies: Part IV: Chapters 1, 2, and 3, pp. 99-137.

127-8: Earliest man discovered that a long, then piece of wood, a stick …,[128] provided it be well selected… and pointed at one end, is very serviceable.”

128: “The stick acquires value. Economically, value is the translation into terms of personal possession of an object collected, shaped, and constantly used, and the application of it of the laws of ownership. … Ownership means that man will not surrender such an object except in exchange for other goods or for services. … Value constitutes therefore a new driving force which makes human beings produce, maintain, and hold in physical possession those objects which enter instrumentally into the exploitation of the environment.”

132-133: The full quote on the pages Hayek cites is: “As mentioned already, private property appears very definitely on primitive levels. When it is surrendered it always implies a repayment, either in kind, or in terms of some other obligations of kinship, cooperation or social dependence. Economically, man depends upon his shaped sticks and stones, upon his knowledge how to [133] produce them, and upon his right to use them exclusively and permanently. This dependence finds its economic expression in the rules of ownership. The individual does not surrender the object which he has acquired or produced expect in exchange for goods and services.” There are no citations of evidence other than the phrase “As mentioned already”, which doesn’t refer to any specific page above.

133: The next paragraph uses logical argument rather than empirical evidence to show that people must have had property very early: “Imagine a community where the principles of personal property were not in force. This would mean in terms of physical performance that no one would be certain to find his digging stick, axe, spear, shield or piece of clothing when the need arises. This would also mean that in a complex, concerted action such as communal hunting, fishing or the manning of a canoe, there would occur an initial and perhaps a chronic disorder, incompatible with any efficiency in performance.”

133: The second part of Hayek’s quote is the next paragraph: “The roots of property as a legal principle which determine the physical relationship between man and his environmental setting, natural or artificial, are the very prerequisite of any ordered action in the cultural sense.”

Malinowski’s main thesis here is that all of this is determined by cultural rules, and freedom relies on obeying cultural rules.

137: “We find thus that value is the prime mover in human existence. It pervades all forms of activity and is the driving force throughout culture. Man is moved to effort, not under an immediate physiological drive, but instructed by traditional rules, moved by learned motive and controlled by value. Man works to obtain the thing that he values, whether things be an object, a way of life or a belief. The way by which the values—freedom of conscience, of dogma, of devotion to ideals—are established is one of the main installments in freedom or bondage.”
“The study of any culture must therefore be carried out in terms of institutions. This means in other words that an object or artifact, a custom, an idea or an artistic product, is significant only when placed within the institution to which it belongs.”

Argonauts of the Western Pacific

Bronislaw Malinowski: Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922)

63: “Not only does the chief … possess a high degree of authority within his own village, but his sphere of influence extends far beyond it. A number of villages are tributary to him, and in several respects subject to his authority. In case of war, they are his allies, and have to foregather in his village. When he needs men to perform some task, he can send to his subject villages, and they will supply him with workers.”

64: “Wealth, in the Trobriands, is the outward sign and the substance of power, and the means also of exercising it.”

65: “Side by side with this rather complex mechanism of authority, the prestige of rank, the direct recognition of his personal superiority, give the chief an immense power, even outside his district. Except for the few of his own rank, no native in the Trobriands will remain erect when the great chief of Omarakana approaches, even in this days of tribal disintegration. Wherever he goes, he is considered as the most important person, is seated on a high platform, and treated with consideration. Of course the fact that he is accorded marks of great deference, does not mean that perfect good fellowship and sociability do not reign in his personal relations with his companions and vassals.”

94: “in the whole of the Trobriands there are perhaps only one or two specially fine armshells and shell-necklaces permanently owned as heirlooms, and these are set apart as a special class, and are once for all out of the Kula. ‘Ownership,’ therefore, in Kula is quite a special economic relation. A man who is in the Kula never keeps any article for longer than, say, a year or two. Even this exposes him to the reproach of being niggardly, and certain districts have the bad reputation of being ‘slow’ and ‘hard’ in the Kula. On the other hand, each man has an enormous number of articles passing through his hands during his life time, of which he enjoys a temporary possession, and which he keeps in trust for a time.”

116-117: “It is especially a grave [117] error to use the word ownership with the very definite connotation given to it in our own society. For it is obvious that this connotation presupposes the existence of very highly developed economic and legal conditions, such as they are amongst ourselves, and therefore the term “own” as we use it is meaningless, when applied to native society.”

117: “Ownership has naturally in every type of native society, a different specific meaning, as in each type, custom and tradition attach a different set of functions, rites and privileges to the word. Moreover, the social range of those who enjoy these privileges varies. Between pure individual ownership and collectivism, there is a whole scale of intermediate blendings and combinations.”

118: “the village community is always subject to the authority of one chief or headman. Each of these, whether his authority extends over a small sectional village, or over a whole district, has the means of accumulating a certain amount of garden produce … always sufficient to defray the extra expenses incidental to all communal enterprise.”
Thus in all types of tribal enterprises, the chief or headman is able to bear the burden of expense, and he also derives the main benefit from the affair. In the case of the canoe, the chief, as we saw, acts as the main organizer in the construction, and he also enjoys the title of toli. This strong economic position runs side by side with his direct power, due to high rank, or traditional authority. .... Both combined allow him to command labour and to reward for it.”

See also his introduction to Hogbin

The Sexual life of savages.

DON’T NEED

McCall: Review of The World Until Yesterday


Indeed, without wading in the deeper water of how violent some of the "classic" cases are, it is logically sufficient for us to show that there are at least some undisputed cases of small-scale societies with VERY low rates of violence and that virtually no one of them would be considered "intolerable" in Hobbesian/Lockian sense.

From a related email, “As far the !Kung go, my reaction is that murder rates have indeed been moderately high but that this has been largely the result of their displacement from traditional territories and broader economic marginalization, in combination with the introduction of alcohol. My dad's work, for example, has shown that virtually ALL interpersonal violence occurred in situations in which either one party or both was drunk. In short, it's hard to blame the murder rate exclusively on the !Kung themselves and I feel like it has more to do with negative colonial and post-colonial dynamics in the region.”

134: “Once again, we anthropologists are confronted by the mixed bag that is Jared Diamond’s scholarship. … this book boils down to a list of generalizations about “traditional” societies based on a superficial reading of outdated ethnography and conversations between Diamond and New Guinea porters. …

135: “After concluding that traditional societies are fundamentally violent and warlike in nature, Diamond argues that indigenous peoples that have been incorporated into states are better off than those in societies that were not. Intended or not, this comes across as very much the same rhetoric used by colonial powers in subjugating indigenous peoples
across the globe in recent centuries. … there is no evidence that small-scale societies are more violent than modern ones and the process of colonization didn’t do conquered peoples any favors. …

… Why do we keep reading these books and, better yet, assigning them to our classes? … It appears that we are involved in a bad codependent relationship with Diamond because he is doing work that we should be but that we are not. Specifically, Diamond’s broad “big picture” thinking about the structural nature of social phenomena in ecological terms is appealing, both within the field of anthropology and without.

**McCall: Origins o’ Warfare**


**161: ABSTRACT**

This paper presents a cross-cultural study of inter-group warfare among modern foragers focusing on the following set of variables: environmental context, population density, economic/subsistence strategy, food storage, social inequality, territoriality, and group mobility. The paper uses the results of this study as a frame of reference for approaching the emergence of warfare within past forager societies. This study demonstrates that the prevalence of warfare among foragers correlates strongly with sedentism, the storage of food, high population densities, perimeter defense territorial systems, social inequality, and relatively rich foraging environments. These results suggest that warfare is a post-Pleistocene phenomenon, beginning within the last 13,000 years, since such conditions are not seen archaeologically among Pleistocene forager groups. The paper closes by reviewing the archaeological record and demonstrates that the earliest evidence for true warfare does, in fact, emerge among terminal Pleistocene and early Holocene complex forager groups. The main implication of this finding is that true warfare is not a universal feature of human groups, but is actually a relatively recent phenomenon, contingent on the emergence of certain social and economic structures within past human societies.

162: “In order to address questions concerning an evolutionary basis for violence among modern humans, in an earlier paper we reviewed the hominin fossil record for evidence of interpersonal violence (McCall and Shields 2008). We found that there was substantial evidence for interpersonal violence extending deep into the human evolutionary fossil record; however, this violence was relatively dispersed in comparison with results of modern warfare and/or genocide. This led us to conclude that there is an evolutionary psychological basis for aggressive behavior, but that the manifestations of this have transformed radically over time. In short, while small-scale interpersonal aggression may be evolutionarily innate to some extent, modern patterns of violence are not a part of the human evolutionary record.
This paper begins by demonstrating that the earliest human warfare occurred among complex forager groups around the Pleistocene/Holocene transition (around 13,000 years b.p.) as a characteristic of what Binford (1968) calls —post-Pleistocene adaptation.

162-3: “This study focuses on a limited set of interrelated variables within the sample of modern forager groups: (1) The environments in which forager groups live, (2) their subsistence strategies, (3) their territorial system, (4) their mobility patterns, (5) their system of social ranking and degree of inequality, (6) their patterns of food storage, and (7) their population density. This study finds that forager groups that have the highest prevalence of warfare are permanently sedentary, have perimeter defense territory systems, have relatively high degrees of material inequality and social rank, and live in high population densities. These are all conditions that are characteristic of post-Pleistocene adaptation and they all occur very late in human prehistory. This implies that warfare is not an innate human condition, but rather a consequence of relatively recent developments in terms of cultural evolution.”

163: “What distinguishes warfare as a special kind of violence is the relationship between attackers; warfare involves the attack of one person by another based on membership within some kind of social group. … Feuding is a phenomenon closely related to warfare in which contestants oppose one another based on family, clan, or sodality membership.”

164: “The earliest evidence for warfare in the archaeological record comes from the terminal Paleolithic site of Jebel Sahaba in Sudan, dating to around 13,000 years b.p (Wendorf 1968). This site contains a cemetery with 59 individuals, 24 of whom have projectile points embedded in their bones, and most of whom have other unhealed trauma. The evidence from Jebel Sahaba suggests that the village was suddenly attacked, with a large number of its inhabitants killed simultaneously. While this case is striking in its severity and its early date, it is perhaps more important to note that this occurred long after the emergence of strictly anatomically modern humans around 200,000 years b.p., and the origins of human-like hominins 1.9 million years b.p. (Klein 1999).”

164: “the most striking examples of supposed chimp warfare are known from locations and habitats, in places like Rwanda, most stressed by human actions and (ironically) the results of recent African wars.”

167: Table and following discussion are very useful.

“Table 1
Forager Cases Used in this Study and Their Variable States”
Territorial system. These categories of territoriality are taken from the seminal paper of Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978). (A) Passive territoriality refers to systems in which social groups do not defend their boundaries at all. Such systems are prevalent mainly in Arctic or sub-Arctic environments where plant productivity is very low, and forager territory sizes are very large. (B) Social-boundary defense characterizes territorial systems where a group may allow access to their land by their neighbors within a system of reciprocity, such that they may have access to their neighbors’ land in the future in exchange. Such systems generally require neighboring groups to ask permission before using their neighbors’ resources. In addition, while boundaries are not actively enforced, conflict may result if a group is encountered while using a territory without securing permission. Such territorial systems are prevalent in tropical or semi-tropical arid zones where territory sizes remain relatively large and water access is an important issue. (C) Perimeter defense territorial systems are those where groups actively patrol their borders and prevent (with hostility) neighboring groups from gaining access. In such systems, borders are frequently marked with either symbolic or actual defensive architecture. Perimeter defense systems generally occur in areas containing concentrated and/or highly seasonal resources, such as rich maritime resources or rich plant communities (e.g. Suttles 1968).”

Social inequality. These categories are common to the ethnographic study of foragers, and are taken most directly from Woodburn (1982). (A) Egalitarianism (called —immediate-return‖ systems by Woodburn [1982]) refers to social systems in which no individual is allowed increased status by virtue of the accumulation of material possessions or boasting about personal deeds. In fact, in such systems, the accumulation of status or prestige is actively resisted; this phenomenon is typified by Lee’s (1978) account of —insulting the meat‖ and —leveling the hunter‖ for individuals who are particularly successful at hunting. (B) Ranked systems (called —delayed-return‖ systems by Woodburn [1982]) are those in which individuals may gain status, prestige, or political power through the accumulation of material wealth or commission of important deeds. While probably absent for most of prehistory (Binford 1968), most social systems in the world today are of this kind.”
169: Population “densities of 5 persons per sq. km and smaller are considered —very low,|| between 5 and 15 are considered —low,|| between 15 and 40 are considered —moderate,|| between 40 and 65 are considered —high,|| and greater than 60 are considered —very high.”

169-170: “Prevalence of warfare. This is the most important but difficult variable to define for this study. For one thing, modern nation-states tend not to tolerate ethnic or tribal warfare within their borders, so much of this information is gleaned from historical sources included within Kelly (1995) and Binford (2001). Many of the cases have no inter-group warfare at all, and these are categorized as —very low.|| Some of the cases are characterized by feuding, and the occasional inter-group conflict often resulting from territorial disputes or retaliation. These are characterized by the term —low.|| Many of the cases are characterized by high levels of feuding and relatively frequent raiding of neighbors, often resulting from disputes over access to resources or in retaliation. These cases are characterized as having —moderate|| levels of violence. Some of these cases are characterized by periodic inter-group attacks, defense of permanent territorial borders, and relatively specialized weaponry designed for inter-personal violence. These cases are categorized as —high.|| Finally, there are some cases where inter-group attacks are constant and conflicts are institutionalized within family, clan, sodality, or tribal structures. Frequently, the motivations for warfare in these cases stem from discourses rooted in religious/ mythological, clan- or sodality-based, or ancestral tensions. In such cases, the taking of slaves is common. These cases are categorized as —very high.”

170: “raw environmental characteristics do not very strongly influence the prevalence of warfare, while all of the human social and economic variables are fairly powerful considering the small sample size involved.”

174: “Food storage. This characteristic requires sedentism and is almost always associated with boundary defense territorial systems”.

175: “Beyond being attractive targets, food stores are an aspect of inequality that acts as a source of antagonism and hostility”.

175: “high population densities are an important source of warfare.

177: “This cross-cultural study of modern forager societies has demonstrated the association of warfare with a suite of variables including (1) high population densities, (2) intensive foraging of food resources clustered in space and time, (3) food storage, (4) sedentary mobility systems, (5) perimeter defense territoriality, and (6) social inequality. In addressing the question of the antiquity of warfare in human prehistory, these variables provide a valuable inferential framework with which to approach the archaeological record. Put most concisely, none of these characteristics of forager societies appears until the Holocene—very late in prehistory and far too late for warfare to be an evolutionarily innate phenomenon. These characteristics are, in fact, definitional characteristics of a watershed set of archaeological cultural transitions, around 13,000 years b.p., collectively referred to as —post-Pleistocene adaptation|| (Binford 1968); this term includes the origins of complex forager societies, plant and animal domestication, the rise of social inequality, and (as this paper argues) the first true warfare.

Modern humans originated in Africa around 200,000 years b.p. (Klein 1999)—long before the period of post-Pleistocene adaptation in which the necessary cultural preconditions for warfare appeared. During the vast majority of the Pleistocene, human foragers lived in extremely low population densities (Binford 2001). In fact, even the
lower range of modern forager population densities is greater than any reconstructed Pleistocene values. The first sedentary villages appear in the archaeological record in the Near East with the Natufian culture shortly after 15,000 years b.p. (Bar-Yosef 1998). The first food storage facilities are associated with these early permanent villages in the Near East. Perimeter defense territoriality is difficult to see directly through the archaeological record, however, there is a recognizable reduction in territory sizes among early Holocene forager groups across the Old World and in the later part of the Holocene in the New World (Binford 1968). Finally, the earliest social inequality is likely marked by the appearance of luxury or prestige goods (jewelry, ground stone axes, etc.), especially in mortuary contexts, among early complex foraging societies such as the Mesolithic of Northwest Europe (Bailey 2008) and the Jomon culture of Japan (Habu 2004) after 13,000 years b.p. The co-occurrence of these various cultural characteristics within a short time span around the Pleistocene-Holocene transition underscores their close inter-relationship, and implies that warfare probably arose around the same time.”

177-8: “The rise of agricultural societies is also clearly a prime mover in terms of the explosion of Holocene warfare. It is not the case that agricultural societies witnessed the major expansion of warfare because they are at some more advanced unilinear stage of evolution, as was supposed by early social scientists (Morgan (1985) [1877]; Marx 1955[1867]). [178] Instead, the rise of agricultural societies brings about a structure of resources, economic lifeways, and social practices that mirror those identified in this paper for complex forager societies. Specifically, agricultural societies are sedentary, depend upon food resources that are tightly clustered in space and time, store food, and live in much higher population densities than do even the most packed forager societies. Because of its focus on a very narrow range of plants, agriculture is far more susceptible to catastrophic failure (drought, pests, etc.) than the resources generally exploited by foragers. In addition, early agricultural societies see the formation of striking hierarchies, differences in social status, and wealth. Within a few thousand years of the origins of agriculture, major states with highly structured hierarchies had formed in places like Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Indus Valley, and China. In short, agriculture was essentially a recipe for an increasing prevalence of warfare over the course of the Holocene.”

178: “In terms of building evolutionary theory, the major implication of warfare as an element of post-Pleistocene adaptation is that it can in no way be considered innate, but rather a highly contingent property resulting from the unique circumstances in which modern human populations live. It is undeniable that aggression and some forms of violent behavior have very deep antiquity within human ancestry and a substantial biological basis (McCall and Shields 2008). The more relevant question is how innate aggressive tendencies can be motivated into the unique patterns of warfare that are so prevalent during the Holocene. …

In terms of seeking to eliminate modern warfare, a few possibilities warrant further discussion. Inequality—at both individual and group levels—is a powerful motivator for mass violence.”

179: “If we really wish to bring an end to these patterns of mass violence that have been such a major part recent history, then it would seem that reducing global inequalities and building in better safeguards against economic catastrophe would be good places to start.”
179: “This also suggests that warfare and genocide do not have to be invariant historical trajectories for modern human societies, and that the structural relationship on which they depend may be acted upon in positive ways.”

**McCall: Other articles**

Look around for notes on other McCall articles

**McCall: Research Report: Ju/’hoansi Adaptations to a Cash Economy**


**Mellars, Why did modern human populations disperse…**

Paul Mellars. Why did modern human populations disperse from Africa ca. 60,000 years ago? A new model. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America vol. 103 no. 25, 9381–9386

Abstract

Recent research has provided increasing support for the origins of anatomically and genetically “modern” human populations in Africa between 150,000 and 200,000 years ago, followed by a major dispersal of these populations to both Asia and Europe sometime after ca. 65,000 before present (B.P.). However, the central question of why it took these populations ≈100,000 years to disperse from Africa to other regions of the world has never been clearly resolved. It is suggested here that the answer may lie partly in the results of recent DNA studies of present-day African populations, combined with a spate of new archaeological discoveries in Africa. Studies of both the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) mismatch patterns in modern African populations and related mtDNA lineage-analysis patterns point to a major demographic expansion centered broadly within the time range from 80,000 to 60,000 B.P., probably deriving from a small geographical
Recent archaeological discoveries in southern and eastern Africa suggest that, at approximately the same time, there was a major increase in the complexity of the technological, economic, social, and cognitive behavior of certain African groups, which could have led to a major demographic expansion of these groups in competition with other, adjacent groups. It is suggested that this complex of behavioral changes (possibly triggered by the rapid environmental changes around the transition from oxygen isotope stage 5 to stage 4) could have led not only to the expansion of the L2 and L3 mitochondrial lineages over the whole of Africa but also to the ensuing dispersal of these modern populations over most regions of Asia, Australasia, and Europe, and their replacement (with or without interbreeding) of the preceding “archaic” populations in these regions.

Merrill: The Evolution of Property Rights (Special Issue)

The Evolution of Property Rights: A Conference Sponsored by the Searle Fund and Northwestern University School of Law
Journal of Legal Studies
June 2002 Supplement Volume 31, Number S2

Merrill Introduction


“In his original paper, Demsetz suggested that some societies would tend to evolve toward state ownership, whereas others would tend to prefer private ownership, and he attributed this to cultural differences (“community tastes”). In his contribution to this volume, Demsetz seeks to fill this gap in his prior study, offering a thoughtful and panoramic account of the factors that he believes have militated over time in favor of private property rather than state ownership. Other commentators also touch on the question of what determines the particular form that emergent property takes, with a number of contributors, including Epstein, Levmore, and Henry Smith, giving consideration to when some type of communal property regime is likely to emerge rather than a full-blown private-exclusion regime.”

“Anderson and Hill suggest that property rights emerge because of the entrepreneurial efforts of individuals who have superior ability (based on either human or natural resource endowments or both) to capture economic rents from the creation of property rights. Stuart Banner offers a similar idea but couched in less flattering terms: he suggests that property rights emerge when powerful oligarchs control both the largest share of resources whose value would be maximized by the creation of property and the political system through which
such a transition is effectuated. Other contributors, including Epstein and Levmore, draw on interest-group theory as either a supplement or replacement of the social efficiency explanation offered by Demsetz. Of those who stress distributional issues, Levmore stakes out the most pessimistic position in terms of the explanatory potential of the Demsetz thesis, arguing that “for every transaction-cost story about changed access or other property rights there is a suspicious—or even pessimistic—interest-group explanation.”

“Levmore considers the phenomenon of reversibility at length from a theoretical perspective. Haddock and Kiesling, adopting a more empirical approach, review the evidence about the impact of the Black Death, which caused a large relative shift in the values of labor, capital, and land, on property rights. The articles by Banner and Henry Smith also touch on the possibility of reversibility. A possible generalization from these papers is that property rights are sticky in the sense that large upfront costs make it hard to create them, but once created, there is often little reason to get rid of them even if the benefits decline to the point where they would not be created de novo.”

“the contributions to this volume suggest that there are two principal candidates for the causal mechanism that translates changes in resource values into changes in property institutions: distributional or interest group theories and consensual social norm theories. It might be possible to test the relative plausibility of these theories using econometric techniques.”

**Allen The Rhino’s Horn**


**Abstract**

Under certain conditions, it is possible for the costs of enforcing property rights to exceed their benefit for assets with high first-best values. Under these conditions, previously privately held assets may revert to the public domain. This paper analyzes this prospect and considers attempts to lower the gross value of the asset as a possible method of maintaining the private property right. The paper examines several examples including built-in obsolescence and penal colonies to demonstrate the general idea.

**Banner: Transitions between Property Regimes**

Stuart Banner “Transitions between Property Regimes” *Journal of Legal Studies* June 2002 Supplement Volume 31, Number S2

**Abstract:** What causes a society to reallocate property rights? The canonical explanation is the one offered by Harold Demsetz in “Toward a Theory of
Property Rights”—that societies adopt new property regimes when some external shock alters the costs and benefits of an existing regime such that it becomes less efficient than the one that replaces it. As others have noted, however, the Demsetz account fails to specify any mechanism by which the transition can actually occur, and the existence of such a mechanism is not obvious, because the transition is likely to be costly. This paper examines the empirical operation of one such mechanism, used in the massive reallocation of property rights that took place throughout Europe and many of its colonies roughly between 1500 and 1900, in which functionally organized property systems were converted into spatially organized systems.

GREAT ARTICLE; VERY VALUABLE FOR STONE AGE APPROPRIATION; SEE ELECTRONIC HIGHLIGHTS. Transferred here:

S359: “What causes a society to reallocate property rights? …

The canonical explanation is the one offered by Harold Demsetz in “Toward a Theory of Property Rights”—that societies adopt new property regimes when some external shock alters the costs and benefits of an existing regime such that it becomes less efficient than the one that replaces it.”

S360: “The Demsetz story is a happy one, because it implies that over the long run, property rights will be reallocated in the direction of efficiency. The difficulty with this account, as others have noted, is that it fails to specify the mechanism by which the transition actually occurs. Property rights cannot simply be assumed, like other goods, to be produced in a pattern that responds to the changing costs and benefits of producing them. They can be produced formally by a government or informally by the cooperation of individuals in the creation of a social norm, but either way, the production of a property right is necessarily a collective endeavor. No individual entrepreneur can cause a transition from less efficient property regime A to more efficient regime B. A society will move from A to B only if there is some mechanism for translating the collective cost/benefit balance into a sufficiently large aggregate of individual cost/benefit balances.”

S360: “Noticing this difficulty leads to an alternative way of thinking about transitions between property regimes—that societies reallocate property rights when some exogenous political realignment enables a powerful group to grab a larger share of the pie.”

S360-1: “This is a darker story than the one offered by Demsetz, because it has no efficiency implications one way or the other. It suggests that over the long run, transitions between property regimes should occur in both directions, toward efficiency and toward inefficiency, in no predictable pattern. This account has the virtue of specifying a mechanism by which transitions occur. But it has the defect of appearing much less consistent with experience [s361] than the Demsetz story. Over the long run, transitions between property
regimes do generally seem to have run in the direction of efficiency.”

S361: “If transitions between property regimes occurred for reasons unrelated to efficiency, we would expect to see more inefficient transitions. The Demsetz story is thus more consistent with the empirical evidence than its competitor, but it is missing two crucial pieces. First, it needs an account of how a society can overcome the obstacles that might block a transition to a more efficient property regime. How do participants in a transition overcome the problem of collective action? How do they handle the costs of valuing old rights and assigning new ones? And second, it needs an account of the mechanism by which efficiency gets translated into political action.”

S363: “Finally, contrary to what is usually assumed, a system of property rights need not be a public good in the relevant sense. The organizers of a property system can deny the system’s benefits to certain people simply by refusing to enforce those people’s claims. …

… Frederick Maning, one of the judges of New Zealand’s nineteenth-century Native Land Court, was certain that the Maori would greatly prefer to own land in fee simple and that their failure to abandon their traditional usufructuary system before the British arrived was attributable to the fact that land ownership was so fractionated that collective action was impossible.”

S365: “In most places today, land is divided spatially, and with certain exceptions the owner of a parcel of land is understood to command all the resources within the bounds of the parcel. But that was not always so. In most of the non-European world, European colonizers found property systems in which resources were allocated on a functional, not a spatial, basis. A person or a family would not own a zone of space but rather the right to use particular resources scattered in a variety of different spaces.”

S366: “Nor did the right to use a resource in one place preclude the right to use other resources in other places. A family might own the right to one spot for sleeping, another for cultivating, and a third for catching eels.16 The Maori, like most of the indigenous people over whom Europeans assumed sovereignty, had a well-developed property system, but it was a system in which property rights were not bundled into a single geographic space. Similar nonspatial property systems also existed throughout much of Europe before enclosure. Participants in common fields did not control all the resources within defined boundaries but rather possessed rights to use different kinds of resources in different places. An individual might possess the right to cultivate several strips of land scattered over several fields during the farming season, the right to graze a certain number of animals of a certain kind in certain pastures at certain times of the year, the right to gather twigs in one place and nuts in another, and so on.”

S367: “Why did property owners not shirk the administrative work? How did enough property owners cooperate
to credibly threaten to exclude property owners who refused to participate?"

S368: “The answer resides in yet another pair of common features. These programs all had significant distributional consequences. There were clear winners and losers in the change from functional to spatial property rights. The expected payoffs to the winners were large enough to provide them with an incentive to bear a disproportionate share of the administrative costs of reorganization. And the distributional consequences were not random. These schemes all occurred within hierarchical political structures primarily divided into two classes. In broad outline, Britain had big landowners and everyone else; the colonies had settlers and indigenous people. The winners in each transition were the rich and powerful. The political economy of the transition thus tended to pit an oligarchy against a larger number of relatively powerless farmers. The big winners from reorganization were the same people who ran the governments that decided whether reorganization would take place. By skewing the payoffs in favor of the powerful, these programs facilitated the reallocation of property rights.

In a world without administrative costs, the efficiency gains from these transitions need not have been distributed so unevenly. Everyone could have been a winner. But the presence of high administrative costs meant that the managers of the transitions had to cut some corners. They had to adopt some rules of thumb that would drive the costs of valuation and assignment low enough to make the transition feasible.

But which rules of thumb? Different rules would have helped different kinds of people. Here is where political hierarchy became important, because the people running the switch had the power to choose the rules of thumb, and unsurprisingly, they chose the ones that would help themselves and their friends while hurting only powerless strangers. In Britain, for example, the poorest commoners often had their use rights valued at zero.24 This represented a considerable savings in administrative expense. When the property right in question was as meager as that of picking up leftover bits of grain after the harvest, it might have cost more to price the right than the right itself was worth. Enclosure might have been too expensive to be worth the effort if every penny had been properly accounted for. But of course that was not much consolation to the commoners affected, who saw enclosure as the confiscation of their primary means of subsistence. In New Zealand, Native Land Court judges fell into the habit of registering blocks of land to a maximum of 10 Maori, regardless of the true number of people with rights to resources within the block.”

S369: “As a result, despite the overall gains associated with these transitions, all were bitterly opposed at the time, in terms so despairing as to make even the most rigorous utilitarian pause a moment to think about the losers. In their distributional effects, enclosure and the parallel colonial schemes were a bit like free trade today, with diffuse gains for most and concentrated gains for some coming at the expense of concentrated losses for others.”
When an oligarchy skews the payoffs in this way, it also takes a big step toward overcoming the problem of collective action. A relatively small number of people who anticipate disproportionately large gains from a transition will have a greater incentive to cooperate in organizing the transition than would a larger number of people anticipating gains more equally distributed. The oligarchs do not need the participation of everyone. They just need enough people to be able to credibly threaten to exclude nonparticipants from property rights under the new system. The more concentrated political power is, and the more unevenly the gains from the transition will be distributed, the smaller the number of people that will be necessary to make that credible threat.

Here, then, is empirical evidence of a mechanism that permits a transition between property regimes to overcome the obstacles of collective action and administrative cost. It may not be the only conceivable mechanism, but it is the one that facilitated some of the major transitions of modern times. This account suggests the general (and testable) proposition that transitions between property regimes are more likely in less egalitarian societies. Further evidence in support of this proposition may be found in the fact that so many indigenous societies, with political structures more egalitarian than the pattern of settler-native relations that replaced them, did not reorganize their traditional property systems themselves, even after large-scale European settlement and trade seem to have given them every incentive to do so. This retention of traditional, nonspatial property systems is today conventionally explained by the invocation of mystical concepts—a sacred link between indigenous people and the land, a sense of belonging to the land rather than owning it, and so on—joined with the allegation that Europeans treated land as a mere commodity to be bought and sold. The contrast is surely overdrawn on both sides. For all their love of the land, many indigenous people in many places proved quite eager to sell it, to obtain all the useful manufactured goods that would have been otherwise unattainable. Europeans and their descendants, meanwhile, were hardly slow to develop romantic attachments to their land. The imbalance in political power between colonizers and colonized may have been the necessary ingredient for colonial and postcolonial transitions between property systems. Without that imbalance, the costs of transition may have been too high.

In this paper, I have tried to supply the first missing piece of the Demsetz account—a mechanism by which transitions to more efficient property regimes can actually take place, despite the obstacles posed by the costs associated with the transitions themselves. … Why does this kind of political decision seem to have a bias in the direction of efficiency?” He only speculates about the answer to that one.
Levmore Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights

Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights
Saul Levmore
June 2002 Supplement Volume 31, Number S2, pp. S421-S451

Abstract “This article shows that for virtually every move toward privatization or, moving in reverse, toward the reopening of access to property, there are conflicting explanations. One is transaction-cost based and optimistic, while the other implicates interest groups and arouses suspicions rather than celebrations. It will normally be difficult to know which explanation is more fitting. Examples range from highways, to intellectual property rights, to tennis courts, and then to licensing regimes. These examples draw attention to the possibility of an evolutionary path that runs from a commons to private property and then back to a commons. The normative ambiguity inherent in the dual stories about change infects most property right transformations, including the simplest cases of newly emerged property rights. The presence of competing stories creates problems for normative judgments about secure private property and about government intervention that opens or restricts access.”

S421: “My starting point is the conventional story about the evolution or maturation of property rights. This maturation story emphasizes that, with increases in value and economic activity, property rights become secure, strong, well defined though malleable and divisible, and increasingly private. In turn, these secure property rights elicit further investment that then adds yet more value.”

S422: “If we search for variations in access, we might recognize diverse ownership arrangements that can be ordered as including (a) “commons” with open access; (b) common-pool resources that are managed by a group or its agents, with restricted access—or, as we will see, with open access and restricted use—in what we might think of as a “semicommons” arrangement; (c) single private property owners with virtually full control, who normally close access or charge for it; and perhaps most fashionably (d) multiple owners who overexclude in a way that generates an “anticommons.” The conventional story explains the move from a to c, more or less.”

S423: “for purposes of exposition, the discussion proceeds as if the move from a to c, from open access to private property with closed access, is universally regarded as normal, so that devolution or reversal, from c back to a—or at least back to something falling in between a and c—is remarkable. Section II sketches two stories about this normal evolution and its reversal. One is about transaction costs and is normally optimistic; the other is about interest groups and is potentially pessimistic or at least suspicious. Section III engages concrete examples on its way to suggesting that, absent local evidence, it is difficult to choose between these two tales. The difficulty has consequences inasmuch as legal rules and government intervention are normally brought to bear on these property rights rearrangements.”
We do not know that interest groups do more harm than good. Still, the optimism associated with the transactions-cost explanation is not easily transferred to the interest-group story. It is for this reason that I describe the interest-group explanation as one that raises suspicions. The conflicting stories sketched here suggest that it is a wonder that we have come to think of the emergence of private property in such rosy terms. Secure property rights may bring about investment and economic development, but it is difficult to know whether the gains to the private owners and their government sponsors exceed the losses suffered by those who enjoyed the commons. It is perhaps ironic that commentators who champion private property at every turn are often also quick to express disdain for government interventions, on the grounds that these are likely to be inefficient and the product of rent seeking. The irony is that the emergence of private property may itself be the inefficient product of interest-group activity. Purely spontaneous privatization is unusual. But even where the evolution to private property is managed without active government participation, it is possible that the change is inefficient and that it simply reflects the advantage of one interest group over another.

The central authority will prefer property rights regimes that make tax collection easy, and in turn these regimes will tend to be those that make interest-group formation easier. The very transaction costs or other characteristics that make some interest groups succeed will also make revenue raising easier. The enthusiasm displayed here for the idea that private property rights may emerge not because they are more efficient but rather because they are attractive to a self-serving, forceful ruler, or because they serve the interests of some well-organized group at the expense of others, need not obscure the fact that these property rights may in many circumstances and historical settings be something to celebrate. I am not to make a claim against private property but rather to suggest that there is a pessimistic, or at least suspicious, story as well as an optimistic story to associate with the emergence of private property.

My claim is not that private property rights are suspect but rather that their emergence, as well as rearrangement, is as suspicious as their devolution. The content of private property is itself a function of government, and virtually all legal moves need to be analyzed in terms of both transaction costs and interest groups.

Smith: Exclusion versus Governance

Henry E. Smith “Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights” June 2002 Supplement Volume 31, Number S2, Abstract: The delineation of property rights can follow two strategies that form the poles of a spectrum. In the exclusion strategy, rough proxies for use allow
further individuation of use to be delegated to an owner. In the governance strategy, resource use is measured in terms of individual activities. Each strategy has its own characteristic cost structure. This theory, which is based on proxy measurement, refines the Demsetz thesis to allow for increased use of governance as well as exclusion. The theory also provides testable implications about the direction of expected change in exclusion and governance regimes and shifts among them. The proxy-measurement theory is contrasted with an account that is based on rising resource values inducing more incursion and hence lower exclusion. A primary illustrative application is the rise of the open-field system in England and the Demsetzian puzzle of the open fields both arising from and giving way to more exclusive ownership of parcels.

Others in this issue:

Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman

Cowboys and Contracts
Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill

The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads
Richard A. Epstein

The Black Death and Property Rights
David D. Haddock and Lynne Kiesling

The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States
Gary D. Libecap and James L. Smith

The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison
Dean Lueck

Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition between Private and Collective Ownership
Harold Demsetz

Abstract: “This essay broadens the theory of property rights, extending it beyond one based on changes in the importance of externality problems to one that is focused on quite different aspects of exchange. It argues that these aspects have been changing in ways that generally, but not always, have increased capitalism’s productivity relative to collectivism’s. The nature of transactions emphasized here has no necessary connection to, but does not exclude, externality problems. The focus here is on aspects of the relationship between parties who are engaged in exchange activities. Observations on historical happenings supplement the otherwise mainly conceptual and theoretical discussion.”
Murdoch: Ethnographic Atlas

This is a book of tables with data about just about every conceivable group that had been studied by ethnographers up to 1967. But it seems to be useful if you want to look up some basic facts about some group.


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286: “Has transition from preindustrial food production to postindustrial wage labor led to an increase in labor time per worker, as certain anthropologists have hypothesized, or to a secular decline in the work week, as some economists contend? We do not have enough quantified labor studies employing a common definition of labor and a standardized methodology … to determine this.” See the article for tables comparing studies.

Morris, Martha Binford, a Popular Stereotype

The Role of Anthropology in Maintaining a Popular Stereotype Author(s): Martha Binford Morris
Reviewed work(s): Source: Anthropology & Education Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug., 1977), pp. 189-191

Abstract (189): Professional anthropologists should be concerned with, and willing to combat, popular oof humannaturederivedfromtheworks of and others. Student Ardrey, Morris, econcepts responses to a questionnaire indicate that students have a hypothesis of human nature which leads them to expect the worst from their fellows. A continued lack of concern about this belief may have disastroussocial, political, and economic consequences. The introductory classroom can provide a forum for correcting these imbalanced perceptions.
“My interpretation of recent field studies on nonhuman primates supports my view that man is not basically aggressive, nasty, brutish, and selfish. I am aware that other anthropologists view the same data differently.”

Neeson: Commoners


Banner mentions this as a general source for how non-spatial private property rights were before enclosure.

11: “the stubborn memory of roast beef and milk and the swift disappearance of both from labourers’ diets after enclosure.”

12: “It is the argument of this book that common right proposed in the eighteenth century where forest, fed, hill and vale villages had generous common pastures, or where they house many small occupiers of land and cottages. Here, commoners ensured the value of common right with an effective local system of by-laws, and common right offered some independence of wages and markets.”

13-14: “commoners’ relative independence of wages and the cash economy helps to illuminate the nature of the eighteenth-century agricultural labour market. Their tendency not to work for wages on every occasion goes some way to explain the late eighteenth-century complaint of labour shortage. Their independence also helps to explain the equally common complaint about the poor quality of labour. … the late-eighteenth century labour market worked like one staffed by peasants, not one supplied by wage-labourers.

A consequence is that the rise in labour productivity in agriculture, which seems to have been accomplished over the century with proportionally enlarging the labour four, may have been accomplished in part by turning peasant labourers into agricultural [14] labourers at enclosure. … commoners became utterly dependent on miserable wages. And that to earn them they worked harder.”

297: “Commoners were not labourers. Their defenders and critics agreed on this. Some laboured. Some earned wages, but even they were independent of the wage. Their lands and common rights gave them a way of life quite unlike that of the agricultural labourers, outwokers, or smallholders they might become at enclosure.”

299: “In the early modern period common-field peasants appear to have had at least three characteristics. First, the owned or occupied land and got their living from it.”

319: “Before enclosure, but not after it, Midland peasant agriculture required cooperation and the protection of common interests. Sharing common pasture and working plots scattered over the length and breadth of a parish each called for collective regulation. Every spring and autumn occupiers made by-laws”.

320: “Common-field villages did not house serenely self-regulating democratic communities. Economic and political changes affected the behaviour of open-field farmers, divided their interests, and led them to act independently in all
kinds of ways. In some parishes the workings of the land market, or the ability of landlords to consolidate holdings reduced the number of small peasants to nothing long before enclosure. … landlords did not deny common pasture to small occupiers and cottagers. Landlords did not annul leases and raise rents two or three times over in the space of a year; nor did they drive land sales up to record levels. It took a parliamentary enclosure to do all this,”
321: “That commoners recognized their mutual dependence on this shared economy is evident in their reaction to enclosure.”
329: “Long after enclosure had created compact farms, and renting more than an allotment had become almost impossible, labourers still felt a longing for land. Well into the second half of the nineteenth century, in E. P. Thompson’s words, “the ground-swell of rural grievance came back almost to access to the land.”
329-330: “enclosure was an institutional or political intervention. No other attack in common right succeeded as well as enclosure. No other means could be found to raise rents as far or as fast. Enclosure, sanctioned by law, propagandized by the Board of Agriculture, and [330] profited in by Members of Parliament, was the final blow to peasants in common-field England. The result was a memory of expropriation that informed, legitimized, and sharpened the class politics of nineteenth-century villages.”

Otway-Ruthven, A History of Medieval Ireland

This is not a libertarian book. It’s a history book that Rothbard refers to.
5: “Even the base client might terminate his contract with his lord under certain conditions and seek another lord. … a commoner who became wealthy could rent out his stock to clients of his own, so that after three generations his grandson would be reckoned as a member of the noble grades. The structure of early Irish society … provided opportunity for a considerable proportion of the population to reach a state of moderate plenty”.
6: “a man’s status was measured chiefly by the amount of protection he could provide. In a society which had very little centralized authority and where law was privately executed, each class of society in effect controlled and protected its inferiors.”

Panter-Brick et al: Hunter-Gatherers

CHECKED OUT @ GUQ

2: “Hunters and gatherers rely upon a mode of subsistence characterized by the *absence of direct human control* over other aspects of population ecology such as the behavior and distribution of food resources. In essence, hunter-gatherers exercise no deliberate alteration of the *gene pool* of exploited resources, in contrast to people who rely in the main upon an agricultural or pastoral subsistence base.”

4-5: “European scholars traditionally stressed the homogeneity of the category for reasons that were often overtly political. In the seventeenth century, hunter-gatherers were typecast by Hobbes (1651) as [5] the primeval state of humanity, living lives he famously described as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’. By contrast, his contemporary John Dryden (1670) depicted them as living in a state of grace from which the rest of humanity had fallen, coining the equally famous phrase ‘the noble savage’ to describe them. … both depicted them as a unitary type, timeless and ahistorical.”

[According to Wikipedia, Dryden coined the phrase in a play in 1672.]

5: “The concept of a hunter-gatherer mode of production is however a political rather than an ecological one; while clearly more sophisticated than its predecessors, it still presents a single ahistorical category whose coherence is explained through a single theoretical framework. Echoes of the same notion appear in Sahlin’s ‘original affluent society’ … and Woodburn’s ‘immediate return’ systems …. Even if two hunter-gatherer modes of production are recognized (such as immediate return/egalitarian and delayed return/inegalitarian), the diversity of hunter-gatherer social formations is poorly represented by such categories.”

6: “it is the *range of behaviors* and the *flexibility* of human groups, not uniformity, which deserves emphasis. We see this range of behaviors as arising both through responses to different environments and through the trajectory of different cultural traditions.”


CITED BY MAYOR

This turns out to be a very useful chapter. Although he doesn’t make that much of it, he has the best argument I’ve recognized for why we can take modern HGs as giving us significant insights about pat HGs.
“In behavioral terms, hunter-gatherers are defined to a large extent by their economy. Forager subsistence (food, fuel, fibre, etc.) is derived from non-domesticated resources, species not actively managed by themselves or by other human beings. **Foragers are those peoples who gain their livelihood fully or predominantly by some combination of gathering, collecting, hunting, fishing, trapping, or scavenging** the resources available in the plant and animal communities around them. By this definition, key properties of this form of economy are ecological in nature. While there are different and sometimes more precise definitions of hunter-gatherers, this one has the advantage of simplicity. It does not confuse primary with derivate and more variable features of this lifeway, such as ‘band-level’ social organization or an egalitarian social ethic.

… nearly everyone looks to hunter-gatherers for foundational insights into the origins of human capacities and inclinations. Foragers are a primary testing ground for broader anthropological theory.”

“They [HGs] vary along every imaginable dimension of socio-economic comparison …: in the diversity and types of food and other resources consumed, in degrees of task group and residential mobility, in forms of intra-and inter-group exchange and land tenure, in group size and structure, in male and female role differentiation, and along a spectrum of egalitarian to more stratified social organization. …

Despite considerable variety, the comparative ethnographic study of hunter-gatherers provides four generalizations that require explanation. Despite exceptions, these features stand out as common patterns. They are: (1) apparent under-production, and a general lack of material accumulation; (2) routine food sharing; (3) egalitarianism; and (4) despite number 3, routine division of labour between the foraging activities of males and females: **men more commonly hunt while women more commonly gather**. Behavioural ecology analyses offer insights on all of these patterns.”

“Kummer (1991) has examined the evolutionary origins of respect for possession and the distribution of this trait among the primates.” [Not at GUQ, TU, or ND]

All behavioral ecology models of distribution begin with two assumptions. (1) The individuals forage as a group, or, if they forage separately, they come together as a group to consume at least part of the catch, perhaps at a central place. This condition, **social foraging**, is very likely to be true of hominids and certainly is true of ethnographically known foragers. (2) They harvest one or more resources in the form of a packet, a natural unit larger than can be immediately consumed by the individual that acquires it. … Encounter with such packets is likely to be fairly rare and unpredictable. Day by day, some individuals succeed and others fail to locate packets. Due to stochastic factors, they are unequally successful in the food quest.

Certain selective pressures come into play when some individuals in the group find themselves holding more than their fill and others find themselves with less. Among the most basic of these is **tolerated theft** (Blurton-Jones 1987), better described as **scrounging** (Vickery et al 1991). … Scrounging is probably a dominant mechanism generating food transfers among those primate species occasionally observed to hunt other vertebrates. Examples include chimpanzees … and capuchin monkeys …. It probably is one element among several in the food transfers occurring in human societies.

**Reciprocity** is a second route for food transfers. In reciprocity, an individual with surplus food transfers portions to an individual who has less, in the expectation that the
favour later will be returned when their circumstances are reversed. Because reciprocity is subject to cheating …, the conditions for it to evolve are more restricted than those for [27] scrounging.”

27: “Food transfers within a group may also be analysed as exchange, in which edible resources move against other goods and services …. Kaplan and Hill (1985a) propose that Ache [successful hunting] men … are benefiting indirectly through receipt of sexual access to females or alliance support from community members.

Hawkes (1993) has proposed a fourth mechanism for food transfers, the show-off model. … Men benefit from the enhanced social prestige and perhaps the mating opportunities that follow from providing occasional subsistence bonanzas.”

28: “Given social foraging and the unsynchronised acquisition of foodstuffs in packets, intra-group food transfers are likely to result from some combination of scrounging, reciprocity, risk minimization, exchange, showing off, and costly signaling. This is an embarrassment of difficult-to-separate causal possibilities. Although there have been many fine ethnographic studies of food sharing, most did not record the detailed, quantitative information needed to assess the relative importance of these overlapping hypotheses.”

30: “It is known that in the right socio-environmental circumstances, a wide variety of species engages in intra-group food transfers …. Sharing occurs opportunistically across a wide variety of taxa, and it cannot be invoked as a late-coming feature in a progressivist treatment of hominid evolution.

30-31: “No fewer than six models address the intra-group resource transfers known generally as ‘sharing.’ Transfers arise in response to a mix of ecological (intermediate resources, subsistence risk) and social (showing off, costly signaling) factors. Because of unique socio- [31] ecological circumstances, the causal effectiveness of these mechanisms will vary among populations. As a result, transfer behaviors are likely to be ubiquitous, but their form and extent will be diverse. Behavioral ecology shows that sharing may be much more heterogeneous than it has seemed from standard ethnographic accounts.

Social anthropologists have argued that egalitarianism is a consequence of two features of hunter-gatherer life: (1) the very limited degree to which individual hunter-gatherers sequester resources with concepts of private property, and (2) the very high degree to which they value reciprocity and, with it, a general disdain for material routes to status. Evolutionary models focused on territoriality and respect for possession help us to understand the former feature. With respect to the latter, models of transfer behavior suggest that reciprocity may be only a minor element among the mechanisms equalizing material wealth in hunter-gatherer societies. Those models that do envision ambitious producers have them dispersing goods as widely as possible in exchange for social prestige (showing off) or as a means of validating prowess (costly signaling). Both tend to forestall differential material accumulation.

Anthropology generally has lacked compelling explanations for the routine male-female division of labor found in foraging societies.”

33: “Behavioral ecology provides us an understanding of the micro-ecological foundations … for those basic features, as they manifest themselves in the variety of foraging societies. It offers a unitary approach that takes diversity seriously by moving from categorical statements such as ‘Hunter-gatherers under produce’, to analytical
claims of the form, ‘We can predict that the level of hunter-gatherer production will vary as a function of soci-ecological variables x, y, and z.’

34-5: “Foragers also are virtually unique in having evolved [35] very limited forms of property with respect to essential resources and foraging range. And they are unusual in the variety of mechanisms that produce widespread and generally equitable distribution of food and other resources within social groups. All of these features arise to significant degree from properties of the ecological setting of forager subsistence.

Behavioral ecology analysis accommodates our intuition that foraging economies are profoundly different while it simultaneously insists that forager behavior can be understood by the same analytical tools applied to other societies. In effect, we need not despair of clear definition, robust generalities or coherent, encompassing theoretical explanation of hunter-gatherers despite their variety and their difference from our own economic experience.”

Rowley-Conwy “‘Time, Change and the Archeology of Hunter-Gatherers: how original is the ‘Original Affluent Society.’”


42: “These two typologies produced similar but not identical classifications. Inuit store food and are logistically organized, although most are not territorial or hierarchical. Australian Aborigines do not store food, but are to an extent territorial. Layton (1986) resolved these anomalies: Inuit are obliged to store food due to seasonal variation in resources, but unpredictable inter-annual and spatial variations make territoriality unviable. Aborigines are territorial mainly with regard to water: ritual knowledge about water sources is jealously guarded while in other respects they practice an immediate return strategy. This allows us to construct a four-fold typology of hunter-gatherers …:

1. the OAS [original affluent society]: groups with little or no logistic movement of resources or food storage. These are mostly found in tropical regions (e.g. the Aborigines), although some occur in higher latitude areas where resources are available throughout the year; people can move from one resource to the next, exploiting them in sequence without the need for much storage.
2. Logistic groups that do not defend territories, such as most Inuit.
3. Logistic groups that do defend territories—many of Woodburn’s delayed return groups.
4. Sedentary groups who invariably defend territories and store resources, forming a continuation from type 3.”

45: “This chapter argues in favour of local responses and local historical trajectories, and against any progressive trend, by challenging the one aspect of the OAS that is usually accepted without question: its originality.”

51: “Most cemeteries are … near coasts … Because earlier costs are now under the sea, any earlier Mesolithic cemeteries would remain inaccessible. [earlier than the end of the last ice age] … in southeastern Australia cemeteries are known as early as 13,000BP.”
52-53: “Such hugely diverse time-lags argue strongly against the demographic steamroller. … There is no archaeological evidence that hunter-gatherers display an inherent trend from simple to complex.”

63: “There was … nothing about the Natufian that made agriculture inevitable. Agriculture appears to have resulted form the meshing of a series of unrelated factors of which the Natufian delayed-return economy was only one; climactic change and plant genetics were just as crucial …. Had these factors not come together, the Natufian might have continued hunting and gathering indefinitely.”

64: “There is no directional trend among hunter-gatherer societies. Numerous examples reveal complexity coming and going frequently as a result of adaptive necessities. The adaptationist view cannot be reconciled with progressivist theories, whether demographically or socially based, but is in stark opposition to them. Most hunter-gatherers who became farmers have done so as the result of stimuli from agricultural neighbors—empirical evidence for the low likelihood of such an event occurring. Most hunter-gatherer historical trajectories would never have resulted in agriculture had that way of life not impinged on them from the outside.”

65: “If the Original Affluent Society is not ‘original’, what is it? Archaeologists have often regarded territoriality, rigid group membership and social hierarchy as stepping stones from the OAS towards ourselves, but these features are all found among chimpanzees. From this perspective the flexibility, mobility and social equality of the Original Affluent Society may be the most remarkable and specialized social form that humans have ever evolved. It has not claim to be the original human condition.”

Khun & Stiner, the antiquity of hunter-gatherers


99: “This chapter examines resemblances and differences between modern hunter-gatherers and earlier Pleistocene humans in Europe and Western Eurasia, and explores some general explanations for observable variation.

In comparing modern and ancient foragers, it is not sufficient to use one or two modern hunter-gatherer groups as ‘model foragers’. The strategy adopted here is to characterize the limits of variation in the economies, technologies, and social arrangements of recent hunter-gatherers, and to use these observations as a baseline for assessing behavioural variation in the remote past. If ancient human groups showed similar ranges of variation to modern foragers, then the basic structure of modern human hunter-gatherer adaptations was probably in place long ago. If the expected patterns of variation are not manifest archeologically, we are dealing with a very different sort of hunting and gathering hominid.”

100: “Surviving hunter-gatherers have been part of ‘world systems’ for as long as Western scholars have known about them (e.g. Bird-David 1991, Woodburn 1991).

This has led some scholars to question the relevance of ethnographic accounts to understanding human life in the remote past (Spielman and Eder 1994). However, we are
better served by seeking to understand the factors that moulded the diversity of recent foraging adaptations.”

106: “No aspect of human behavior are so consistently documented in the archeological literature as diet and technology …. One strategy of risk reduction typical of many recent foragers has distinct archeological consequences: residential mobility is a common solution to local fluctuations in food availability, as it allows hunter-gatherer groups to ‘map on’ to fluctuating resource distributions …. Uninhibited residential mobility is only feasible in a relatively empty environment, however. If many foraging groups have an interest in the same set of resources, access must be co-ordinated or selectively restricted in order to avoid conflict. Virtually all documented foraging groups thus possess norms of land tenure or preferential access to resources.”

107: “variation among recent foragers provides a number of general expectations for Pleistocene foragers. Most obviously, the degree of dependence on hunting and/or marine resources should increase to the north, and also within a given area as conditions become colder during glacial/interglacial cycles. Conversely, dependence on vegetable resources should be higher nearest to the Equator, or as conditions became warmer and drier over time. … the ethnographic record indicates that any substantial dependence on vegetable foods normally entails a focus on seeds and nuts and requires non-perishable processing equipment. We should also expect to find a greater variety of complex technologies in northern parts of the human range, or during colder climatic intervals. Finally, evidence for the exchange of exotic goods in connection with territorial organization and strategies for managing resource risk should be manifest widely.”

123-4: “The records of the LUP [Late Upper Palaeolithic] an the Middle Palaeolithic both reveal considerable variability across time and space. However, neither the range of variation nor the trends across environmental gradients is the same for the two periods. The differences can highlight the question of the antiquity of the hunter-gatherer lifeways as we know them from ethnographic and historical accounts.

LUP and Epipalaeolithic peoples were distributed from the tropics to the subarctic. Variation across environmental gradients in subsistence and technology is much like that observed among ethnographically documented hunter-gatherers, with good evidence for greater dependence on hunted and/or fished foods in northern Eurasia, and earlier, intensive use of plant foods in southern areas such as the Levant. Low-volume, long-distance exchange, taken as evidence for broad networks of alliances, is ubiquitous. Of course it is impossible to find complete recent analogues for LUP groups, so Pleistocene evidence thus actually expands the range of known hunter-gatherer adaptations. None the less, the picture of broad-scale variability in the LUP is not unfamiliar to anthropologists who study modern hunter-gatherers.

In contrast, the Middle Paleolithic world [300,000 to 30,000 years ago] seems to have been populated by very different sorts of foragers. Human behavior of this period certainly varied from one context to the next, but global variation in the archaeological evidence does not fit the expectations based on recent or LUP hunter-gatherers. At least three major differences can be identified. First, technological and faunal evidence for the Middle Palaeolithic suggests rather limited variation in subsistence with latitude, beyond that governed by pre distribu- [124] tions. Second, the amount invested in subsistence technology shows no relation to climatic gradients. Wherever they lived, Mousterian foragers employed a fairly similar tool-kit, at least from stone, and seldom elaborated the
production of artefacts. Interestingly, the way in which tools were made and raw materials obtained show considerable flexibility—it is only the end-products that are so similar. Third, it appears that Mousterian groups had little need for durable symbols of group membership and individual identity, and they seldom exchanged distinctive, durable goods to maintain relationships across territorial boundaries.

The particular features or the Middle Palaeolithic record are not in themselves unexpected. Even in the recent past some foragers might have subsisted almost exclusively on high-ranked foods, used relatively unelaborated technologies, or practiced little exchange with their neighbours. What is surprising is that such a pattern persisted for so long over such a broad area for the Mousterian from full glacial to prolonged interglacial periods and from central Russian steppes to the deserts of North Africa. Clearly, one can not explain the shared characteristics of Middle Palaeolithic artifact and faunal assemblages by reference to a particular set of ecological conditions.

Since the Middle Palaeolithic archaeological evidence does not fit with expectations based on modern hunter-gatherers, what sort of adaptations does it represent? Middle Palaeolithic (and earlier) foraging groups seem to have been very ‘light on the landscape. … we can further infer that group sizes were small or that larger aggregations were uncommon.’

127-8: “Modern hunter-gatherer adaptations in diet and technology were globally established by the LUP (20,000 BP), perhaps even by the EUP [Early Upper Palaeolithic] (ca. 45,000 BP). While the lifeways of particular Upper [128] Palaeolithic groups were unlike those of recent foragers, LUP hunter-gatherers responded to ecological and demographic factors in ways similar to modern foraging societies. By contrast, the archaeological record of the Middle Palaeolithic represents a different—albeit quite successful—range of behaviours. Mousterian foragers dealt with environmental variation in some unexpected ways, and their potential for population growth may have been lower as a consequence. While Middle Palaeolithic hominids hunted and gathered, they were a different kind of hunter-gatherer from any presently known.”

129: “There is … a clear association in time between increases in human diet breadth and rapid radiations in the formal elements of Upper Palaeolithic technology in the late Pleistocene. A variety of new artifact forms, ranging from harpoons to traps and nets—were probably necessary to make the collection of many kinds of small animals worthwhile”.

Pennington—Hunter-Gatherer Demography


173: “Given what we know about our reproductive capacity and survival under the worst conditions, it is puzzling that there were so few of us for so much of our history.”
P. 192-3: From Table 7.5, E0 is
Hadza 33
!Kung 30
The best single summary of lifetime survival is $e_0$, the average number of years newborns live given the survival schedule. It is of course very sensitive to rates of death during infancy and early childhood but provides a feel for conditions in these groups. Among groups still foraging, the worst death rates occur among the Agta ($e_0=24$) and the bst among the Ache ($e_0=37$). Proportions surviving to reproductive age—$L_{15}$—is a proxy for measuring parenting success. Approximately 55% of foraging !Kung, Hadza, Agta, and Cuiva children survive to age 15. About 65% of Ache and Kutchin survive to this age.”

Discussing table of life expectancies from pages 192-3, says, “The expectation of life at Birth in hunter-gatherers ranges between 24 and 37 years. At worst, half of all newborns die by age 15, and 4 out of 10 that survive to age 15 reach 50. These are people living in the harshest of conditions.”

“To achieve the near-zero growth rate experienced by our species in the last 100,000 years or more, these life tables indicate that survival must have been much worse than anything we have observed among modern hunter-gatherers if TFRs [total fertility rates] of 8 percent prevailed.”

“If the demographic rates evident in these data characterize hunter-gatherers past and present, the idea that we have been a slowly growing species throughout the millennium is not plausible. It seems more likely that periods of rapid growth and decline are characteristic of our species’ history. The growth rate implied by the demographic rates of the forest Ache is nearly 3% per annum. A population growing at this rate doubles in size about every 25 years. The simulations confirm that the observed ranges of hunter-gatherer fertility and survival rates often produce rapidly growing populations and indicate that either we had death rates much higher than any observed or we continually experienced episodes of fertility-impairing disease evident in the data. Since most modern hunter-gatherers live on the fringes of land-development plots or in the territory of economically more successful agricultural people, it is easy to imagine that the hunter-gatherers who once occupied these territories experienced better survival than we observe today and perhaps were capable of even higher growth rates.

These boom times were probably balanced by periods of epidemics and famine that periodically reduced survival to the worst levels (e.g. $e_0$ was 22 in the ‘Peasant Agta’). Groups with this level of survival will begin declining as the TFR declines from 8. Since birth rates in today’s hunter-gatherers are typically well below this, such poor survival is probably not typical of our species.”

Many authors believe the diseases affecting fertility are too new to have greatly affected reproduction in our species history. But even using the lowest hunter-gatherer survival rates, we cannot account for low growth rates without them.”

Jenike, Mark R. “Nutritional Ecology: Diet, Physical Activity, and Body Size.” In Hunter-Gatherers: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, edited by Catherine Pater-Brick,
222-5: “The extinct hunter-gatherer populations from temperate habitats reported in Cohen and Armelagos [225] (1984) are taller still [than the tallest modern hunter-gatherers] and approach the mean height of 30-year-old Americans in the early 1980s—176cm for males, 163cm for females …. Genetic differences account for some of the variation in height between populations of hunter-gatherers …. However, stature is also known to respond strongly to diet and disease exposure …. suggesting that the archaeological populations of hunter-gatherers represented in Cohen and Armelagos (1984) were more advantaged in either or both of these respects than were present-day hunter-gatherers; moreover, the Ache appear more advantaged than other contemporary tropical forest hunter-gatherers.”

225: “Skinfold thickness of hunter-gatherer populations suggest that they are as a group very lean”.

229: “The variability and flexibility in nutritional ecologies described here suggest a view of hunter-gatherers not as original affluents or as Hobbesian destitutes, but rather as nutritional strategists who balance the extrinsic constraints of variable food availability against the demands on energy for somatic maintenance, growth, reproduction, and physical activity.”

Conkey, Hunting for Images


267-9: My summary. In the late 1800s leading researchers in prehistory were reluctant to accept the belief that ancient peoples and/or hunter-gatherers could produce ‘art.’ This prejudice was so strong that the cave paintings discovered in the cave of Altamira in Spain in 1879 were originally attributed to an artists living on the estate that encompassed the cave. By 1902, after ethnographers had uncovered Australian aborigine hunter-gatherers making rock art, prehistorians finally accepted the cave paintings as the products of ancient hunter-gatherers, but not yet as art. They thought they were trying to practice some kind of magic to aid the hunt by capturing the animals on the wall. It took many decades of research before prehistorians accepted that people living 15 and 30,000 years ago had the same cognitive (and artistic) abilities as we do.

Layton, Hunter-gatherers, neighbors, & states

196, 3: “Tacitus (1955: 14) wrote: the Fenni ‘eat wild herb, dress in skins and sleep on the ground. Their only hope of getting better fare lies in their arrows, which, for want of iron they tip with bone … Yet they count their lot happier than that of others who groan over field labor’.”


297: quote about Samis, also reference that I didn’t copy: “intensive reindeer pastoralism did not replace hunting until the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries …. The Sami were probably pushed into intensive reindeer husbandry by Swedish settlers, who depleted wildlife in traditional Sami hunting areas and extracted pelts from the Sami in tax as they colonized their land ….”

306: “Foraging !Kung rely on strategies similar to those of Aboriginal hunter-gatherers in the Western Desert of Australia (Layton 1986b).


306: “The Western impact on hunter-gatherers had been uneven by the time they were first studied by anthropologists, but all had been affected to some degree”.

309: “In California the Franciscan mission system based on the coerced labor of native Americans dominated livestock production at the time of the region’s incorporation into the world market …. Ironically, therefore, the first cowboys … were in fact Indians.”

314-5: “There are three possible histories for recent hunter-gatherers. They may possess a continuous cultural and genetic history inherited from pre-farming ancestors, albeit influenced by interaction with non-foraging peoples. They may possess a continuous cultural history, but have become genetically diverse as they are joined by former farmers or pastoralists and left by others. They may possess neither cultural nor genetic continuity with pre-farming ancestors, being refugees from farming or pastoral communities who have been forced to reinvent hunting and gathering. I consider the tendency for hunter-gatherers with very different histories to converge on particular solutions to living in certain environments more [insightful, in understanding the role of hunting and gathering in human evolution, than the hypothetical conservation of an ancestral condition. It remains essential to establish whether hunters and gatherers are living independently of farmers or herders, symbiotically or under duress, in order to assess the significance of their behaviors.”

**Peterson: Demand Sharing**

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Abstract, p. 860: “Despite the prevalence of an ethic of generosity among foragers, much sharing is by demand rather than by unsolicited giving. Although a behavioristic model of demand sharing can be seen as matching sociobiological expectations, the emphasis here is on the social and symbolic significance of the practice. It is argued that demand sharing involves testing, assertive, and/or
substantiating behavior and is important in the constitution of social relations in
egalitarian societies.”

860: “The extent to which the idiom of giving and sharing among Aboriginal
Australians is one of demands and claims is surprising. It contrasts sharply with
the common ethno- graphic emphasis on a dynamic of unsolicited generosity and
sharing among hunter- gatherers (see, e.g., Sahlins 1972: appendix A). Of the
Australians, Les Hiatt has written:

> Probably everywhere in Aboriginal Australia the highest secular value is
generosity. Readiness to share with others is the main measure of a man's
goodness, and hospitality an essential source of his self-esteem. As
 Aboriginal children seem as demanding and self-centred as children
 anywhere, the altruism of adults is most plausibly explained, not as a
 natural propensity, but as the outcome of a programme of moral education
 in which greed is condemned and magnanimity extolled. It is likely that
 this pervasive and highly-developed ethic of generosity emerged as a
 cultural adaptation to the exigencies of hunting and gathering, and
 conceivably conferred improved fitness on those who adopted it. [Hiatt
 1982:14-15]

Hiatt goes on to comment, however, that below the melody line in praise of
generosity among the Anbara people of Arnhem Land, a grumbling about their
stinginess, neglect, and ingratitude also was evident. Public pressure on individual
Anbara to share was virtually irresistible, so various counterstrategies were adopted by the diligent to
prevent exploitation by the lazy or manipulative. The most effective of these, in
Hiatt's view, was eating during food collection so that the greater part of a
person's produce was in an advanced state of digestion by the time he or she
returned to camp (1982:24).

... Why do recipients often have to demand generosity?”

861: “Using mainly Australian evidence, I argue that demand sharing is
characteristic of small-scale societies for good reason, and that it has been
neglected because of the particular ethical construction that Westerners place on
generosity—that of outwardly unsolicited and altruistic giving. Such giving is not
only inappropriate to the construction of generosity in such societies but also
suggests that more emphasis should be placed on the constitution of social
relations through social action than has tended to be the case in the past.”

862: “Among the Yolngu (Murngin) people of Arnhem Land with whom I lived
in the
mid-1960s largely off the bush, demands for food or other items were common,
although
they did not always take spoken form. Simply presenting oneself when food was
being prepared and eaten meant one had to be included. This was rarely done by
adults, unless large quantities of food had been brought into camp by one
household; but for children it was common practice. …

Among adult men, demands for spears and other items of material culture
were frequent, and two interesting strategies were used to avoid having to meet
them.”
Demand sharing makes sense when there is scarcity, as Helm suggests is the case among the Dogrib (1972:67), but today it is almost received wisdom that hunter-gatherers are normally free from market obsessions with scarcity. Sahlins (1972), following Polanyi, has persuasively developed the substantivist case that scarcity is not necessarily present in all societies and has suggested that hunter-gatherers enjoy unparalleled plenty because they are satisfied with a low standard of living. The widely reported optimism about tomorrow (see Lee and DeVore 1968) has, however, to be distinguished from the concerns of today.

An alternative strategy to this bookkeeping approach is simply to respond to demands as they are made. This has at least four advantages: difficult decisions are avoided; the onus is placed on others; discrepancies in the evaluation of relationships are not laid bare; and an excellent excuse is provided for not meeting some obligations within the context of behaving generously. Further, it fully recognizes the inherent difficulty in delayed reciprocity: time alters the value of objects and the perception of relationships, compounding the difficulties of calculating the correct return.

Such an inertial strategy also provides an additional possibility: demands can be refused. This can usually be done only by hiding, secretive behavior, and lying. …

It is not only potential givers who hide resources, but also potential receivers, who hide what they have so that they may ask others because they are seen to have a need.

By its nature, the hunting and gathering life involves risk and uncertainty, particularly where there is no storage and where provisioning is on a day-by-day basis. Under such conditions, sharing appears to make good economic sense (e.g., Cashdan 1985). As Ingold puts it:

Were each hunter to produce only for his own domestic needs, everyone would eventually perish from hunger. . . . Thus, through its contribution to the survival and reproduction of potential producers, sharing ensures the perpetuation of society as a whole. [1980:145]

Eric Smith (1988:234) calls this the "received view." From the perspective of evolutionary biology, it is problematic because it depends on the suggestion that the survival of the social group is the function of sharing practices. Setting this phrasing aside, Kaplan and Hill (1985) have shown that among the Ache, where large animals are shared, such sharing does indeed increase the nutritional well-being of most band members, although not equally (see also White 1985).

Smith argues, however, that a simple risk-reduction model of sharing fails to consider the costs of sharing, such as transporting food for others and ensuring that others share. Using a game-theoretical model, he shows that from the point of view of evolutionary biology, truly altruistic or indiscriminate sharing is evolutionarily unstable and will be undermined by freeloaders: a system of generalized reciprocity is dependent on a way of monitoring reciprocity and a means of invoking sanctions against freeloaders (E. Smith 1988).

The virtue of an individualistic and rationalistic risk model, Smith argues, is that it provides a general framework for predicting the degree of variation in sharing
from time to time and place to place. This means that it predicts the existence of demand sharing under certain conditions in a way that the received view does not.

869: “Demand sharing is clearly not confined, however, to immediate-return societies: it is also prevalent in delayed-return societies such as those of the Australians and, for example, the Inuit (Spencer 1969:164) and Siriono (Holmberg 1969:98), which renders this suggested association between demanding and the absence of load-bearing relationships problematic. The failure of kin to offer support before it is requested may not be, as Woodburn suggests, a moral indifference to their plight so much as, in part, a heightened sensitivity to the meaning of giving, which often constrains people to act only when faced with a demand. Thus, giving can be construed as both rude and dominating—even as an aggressive act—where large gifts are concerned. So, compassion may be present, but evoked only when people present themselves as lacking something (Myers 1986).”

870-1: “Conclusion

It seems, then, that there are ample ethnographic and intellectual grounds for assuming demand sharing to be an important and intrinsic feature of Aboriginal Australian social life and indeed of hunting and gathering societies more generally. This raises the question of why it has not received more attention and why it usually suffers the fate accorded to it in Hiatt's account: gaining a limited descriptive reference before being passed over. One possibility is that it is a consequence of interviewing informants about their practices, which tends to put them on their best behavior and leads them to present a normative account. Such accounts are often neat and tidy and can mesh with romanticized views of other ways of life, thus reinforcing them, as in the case of game-sharing rules and the collective appropriation of nature.

More significantly, however, it reflects a paucity of information on the vernacular formulation of the ethic of sharing and its day-to-day practice, so that our own deeply held understandings and evaluations slip into the vacuum. These lead to a situation where, because the unsolicited giving associated with generosity by Westerners is seen as positive, the practice of demand sharing is seen as negative, since it is a damper on that generosity. But should the practice be construed negatively? Free giving in our own society is often informed by self-conscious strategy and assessment of what is appropriate, so there are no necessary grounds for negatively evaluating a different construction of the ethic of generosity simply because it may involve self-conscious strategy. Indeed, focusing an account of demand sharing on strategy is part of the problem, because it is really a deeply sedimented social practice often well removed from self-conscious calculation. From this perspective, if moral obligation and commitment to others is construed not in terms of giving freely, but in terms of responding positively to their demands, the morality of demand sharing is as positive as that of generosity.8

Another reason for the neglect of demand sharing could be that rather than being a behavior of long standing, it is a transitional phenomenon resulting from a breakdown in social obligations and surges in wealth differentials that the orthodox ethic of generosity cannot handle. However, demand sharing seems too
deeply embedded in the daily practice of Aboriginal life and too integral to the
tensions between autonomy and relatedness to be accounted for either by wealth
differentials, disruption, poverty, or the entrenching of social inequality, although
these things may have intensified the practice.

Demand sharing is a complex behavior that is not predicated simply on need. Depending on the particular social context, it may incorporate one, some, or all of the following elements. It may in part be a testing behavior to establish the state of a relationship in social systems where relationships have to be constantly produced and maintained by social action and cannot be taken for granted. It may in part be assertive behavior, coercing a person into making a response. It may in part be a substantiating behavior to make people recognize the demander's rights. And, paradoxically, a demand in the context of an egalitarian society can also be a gift: it freely creates a status asymmetry, albeit of varying duration and significance. While demand sharing is prevalent in foraging societies, it is not apparently confined to them, as it has been reported among some Bantu-speaking pastoralists and Melanesian horticulturists (e.g., Schieffelin 1990). Whether it is as fundamental to the constitution of social relations in these less egalitarian societies as it is among many foragers, where it reflects the tensions between autonomy and relatedness, is a matter for further inquiry.”

**Pinker, the Better Angles of Our Nature**

GOT IT ON AUDIO: Only a small part of it was about non-state societies.

He argues in chapter two that nonstate societies were extremely violent and that the establishment of states reduced violence. But he also admits that larger nonstate societies like those of the pacific Northwest were more exploitive (and maybe more violent) than many band societies.

Chapter 3c, within the last two minutes of the track. Pages 81-82: “The economist, Gregory Clark examined records of death of English aristocrats from late Medieval times to the industrial revolution. … in the 14th and 15th Centuries, an astonishing 26% of male aristocrats died from violence—about the same rate … as the average for preliterate tribes. The rate fell into the single digits by the turn of the 18th Century, and of course, today it is essentially zero.”

Chapter 10c: “Marxism, as Daniel Chirot observed (see page 330), helped itself to the worst idea in the Christian Bible, a millennial cataclysm that will bring about a utopia and restore prelapsarian innocence.” Pinker’s summary here is better than the Chirot quote on p. 330.
Platter: Economic Anthropology


Cashdan: H&G


21: “Hunters and Gatherers—people who live primarily on wild plant and animal foods—are found today as small politically marginal remnant populations in only a few parts of the world.”

24: Taking into account “Maintenance work” and “housework” “the !Kung workweeks averages 42.3 hours. This is still somewhat less than our own, if we consider the time we spend on housework and maintenance tasks in addition to the time we spent ‘at work’ away from home.”

24: “How typical are the !Kung? … Among the G/wi, a San group living in a somewhat more arid region of the Kalahari, men and women spend an average of 32.5 hours per week in subsistence work (Tanaka 1980), compared with the 17.1 hours spent by the Dobe !Kung.”

25: “Ache men spend an average of 43.5 hours per week procuring food … which means they are working about twice as hard as the Dob !Kung men. Other work (food processing, maintenance work) occupied the men for an additional 1.5 hours per day.”

26: “there is no simple answer to the question of how hard foragers work. The data suggest considerable variation, …. We can, however, demolish with confidence the old stereotype that hunter-gatherers had to work all the time simply to get enough food to eat. A corollary of this mistaken view was that agriculture, being more productive, freed hunger-gatherers from their burdensome life and gave them the leisure time to ‘build culture’.”

38: “plant foods and small game may be shared with only the individual family and close relatives. This is probably a consequence both of differences in ‘food package’ size and of differences in predictability, since the returns from hunting are more variable than those from gathering.”

40: “virtually all foragers have systems of land tenure (usually communal) that control access to the land and its resources.”

40-41: “The diversity of systems [41] is great. Among the Vedda of Ceylon … the band territory was subdivided for individual band members, who could pass their property on to their children.” He then mentions the Hadza as an opposite example.

41: “A far more common patter is that of the !Kung San. Each !Kung territory (‘n!ore) is associated with a core group of long-standing residents who are spoken of as the ‘owners’ of the n!ore, and whom outsiders approach when seeking permission to visit. They act as spokespersons for the wishes of the band in this regard and should not be thought of as
‘owners’ in the Western sense. … Permission to use the resources of another n!ore is always asked but is rarely refused. Bands who do not want visitors to remain do not usually refuse permission outright but rather make them feel unwelcome so that they will leave on their own accord”.

42: The Shoshone lacked any form of ownership of land or resources on it. “The Owens Valley Paiute lived in permanent villages and had clearly demarcated and defended territories. The territories were owned by bands (villages or groups of villages), and plots of pine nut trees within band territories were owned by individual families.”

Johnson: Horticulturalists


50: lists “common features” including “5. Control of land by multifamily corporate kin groups” and “Political leaders of either the headman or Big Man varieties, with important roles in production, exchange, and resource allocation.”

51: “This distinction becomes difficult to apply in unusual cases where domesticated plants provide only a small portion of a diet that is still largely obtained by foraging. For example, the Sinriono Indians of the Blivian rain forest (Homberg 1969) forage for wild foods in an extensive territory but also scatter tiny horticultural plots throughout the region.”

53: “we will treat horticulturalists as a continuum along which cases vary according to levels of population pressure on resources and the consequent intensification of production. At one end are tropical horticulturalists living at low population densities, with a relative abundance of land for horticulture and an extent of forest in which they may forage for fish, game, insects, and wild nuts, fruits, roots, and other vegetable foods. Such people are only mildly territorial and are comparatively free to move their settlements; leadership is minimal and, apart from the need for defensive alliances where warfare is common, households are autonomous and self-sufficient. At the other end are horticulturalists living under high population densities, where wild foods are virtually nonexistent, and even good agricultural land is scarce. Domesticated supplements to wild foods, to provide protein, fats, and other essential or highly desirable nutrients, are necessary and time-consuming aspects of the economy. Access to land is tightly controlled through kin groups, and relations between landholding groups are coordinated through a system of debt, credit, and exchange in which all families participate, but some hold more power than others.”

Berdan: Precapitalist States

By 3000 B.C. the stage was set for the advent of full-blown states in the Old World; by 2200 B.C. several states and even empires were in full sway.

The earliest states, and those that followed them in succession, were extensive political entities characterized by large populations, a centralized government enjoying a monopoly of force and supported by a system of legal codes, and a social hierarchy dividing the populace into classes or castes. The population tended to be concentrated in dense (often urban) settlements.

**Posner: A Theory of Primitive Society**

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This article has limited value. I listened to the whole thing, but it’s mostly about showing that primitive institutions can be explained as having a rational function. It does not show that people consciously agreed to them because they have that rational function. It doesn’t make any claims about property rights in the societies in question. The author also groups very different societies—bands, autonomous villages, and chiefdoms—together as all being “primitive.” But here are the tidbits:

p.5, n14: “14 Like most generalizations about primitive society, this one is not universally valid. Some primitive societies developed ingenious systems of record-keeping not involving writing. See A. S. Diamond, Primitive Law, Past and Present 203 (1971)”

30: “we find high information costs reflected in the reliance on oaths, or-deals, and other dubious or irrational methods of factual determination that are sometimes used in primitive adjudication. Yet the superstitious element in primitive fact finding is easily exaggerated. There is less reliance in African tribal society than there was in medieval European adjudication on the ordeal, the wager of battle, and similarly bizarre methods of finding facts.98”

30n: “98 See Diamond, supra note 14 [above], at ch. 21. Even the bizarre methods can perhaps be understood in a setting of transaction costs so high that people are unwilling to attempt factual determinations on their own, that is, without divine assistance.”

47: “The widespread "social insurance" of primitive society reduces the gains from acquisitive crimes and so presumably their incidence. If I am free to take the food I need from my kinsmen and forbidden to "hoard" more than I need, there is no purpose in stealing food unless none of my kinsmen, or anyone I might beg from, has any food to spare. Theft seems in fact an unimportant crime in many primitive societies.158”
47 n158, “See Diamond, supra note 14, at 222. Of course, this appearance may be an artifact of the communal nature of much of the property in primitive societies: the loss to any one co-owner is too slight to move him to vigorous efforts to apprehend and punish the thief.”

Pospisil, Anthropology of Law

CITED BY BENSON
ALSO CITED, BUT THIS SEEMS TO BE THE SAME AS ONE CHAPTER OF THE BOOK
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58: The page cited by Benson wasn’t very relevant to me.
65: “the Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea” … two basic values of these Papuans … : the emphasis upon individualism and upon the physical freedom of an individual. These two values affect profoundly the manner of passing and the execution of the authority’s decisions and the types of punishment at his disposal. There is no such thing in Kapauku society as imprisonment, bodily restraint, or enforcement of prescribed behavior by torture or physical harm or by threat of these. Moreover, there is no institution of war prisoners, slaves or anything that would even approximate the old domination of the European peasantry by the landlords. A heinous criminal or a captured enemy would be killed but never tortured or deprived of his liberty. A culprit might be beaten or even wounded with an arrow, but he would always have a chance to run away or fight back. If he did not do so, it would indicate that he preferred to accept punishment and resume a normal life with his people.”

66: “A house, boat, bow and arrows, field, crops, patches of second-growth forest, or even a meal shared by a family or household is always owned by one person. Individual ownership, contrary to the findings in the Paniai region (De Bruijn 1953), is so extensive in the Kamu Valley that we find the virgin forests divided into tracts which belong to single individuals. Relatives and husbands and wives do not own anything in common. Even an eleven-year-old boy can own his field…. There is no communal territory or corporations. This type of economy thus reflects the basic cultural value placed upon personal independence in thinking and action.”

67: Describes people becoming leaders (tonowi) through economic competition. The wealth become tonowi.

68: “the highest status in the culture is achievable through the well-known Kapauku practice of lending money and the hording of wealth for its own sake is considered unethical and is punishable by reprimands, ostracism, and gossip.”
68: “The tonowi who is generous and ‘moral’ in the above-mentioned sense is sometimes called a maagodo tonowi—a really rich man. Only such a man becomes an authority with followers, most of whom are his debtors. Thus the economic institution of credit plays a basic role here in the political as well as legal structure.”
70: “One would assume that a given group would have a single authority. Although this is usual, it is by no means the only possibility. Some villages are lead by two tonowi who share power.”
72: “The informality of the Kapauku headmanship, as well as the nature of the social control which relies primarily upon inducement rather than enforcement led Dutch friends of mine … to conclude that Kapauku society lacked leadership and, consequently, also law. The Western cultural bias upon which this conclusion rests is too obvious”.
96: Has great disrespect for Fried, “Fried introduces a ‘strong’ argument against my conceptualization of law by pointing out how Austin would have dealt with some of my Kapauku cases; ‘He would probably have reject them for their spontaneity and formlessness’ (Fried 1967: p. 152). To this argument I reply that I care little for the opinion of those who condemn contemporary theories as heresies committed against outdated dogmas of the past.”
127-192: “Chapter Five: Change of Legal Systems”
This chapter discusses various theories of changes in legal systems given by Montesquieu, Maine, Marx, Durkheim, Hoebel, and others.
189-190: Even though Pospisil is extremely critical of evolutionary theory he discusses most of the major forms of social organization in his discussion of Hoebel. For example, “On the band and tribal levels a more formalized chieftainship develops, with a tendency toward hereditary succession … [190] With the level of gardening-based tribes Hoebel exhausts the scope of primitive societies. The next level of development is reached by societies who become urbanized and consequently ceased to be primitive.” Pospisil clearly endorses Hoebel’s analysis: “With the exception of early writers such as Montesquieu and Maine, Hoebel’s conceptualization of the trend of the development of law, by being broad enough and based on empiricism, is not be the most adequate and certainly more acceptable than the more speculative and often oversimplified theories described and analyzed in this chapter.”
191: Another example of his view of Fried: “I regard anthropology as a scientific discipline and therefore empirical. Speculative theories with little support from the available ethnographic evidence that often flout empiricism by dogmatically constructing ‘stages of evolution’ for which no shred of empirical evidence can be found, no matter how popular or ‘exciting’ they may be, have been rigorously excluded from my selection (e.g., Morton Fried 1967: esp pp. 185 ff.).”
274-5: “It must be emphasized that this analysis pertains only to Kapauku ideal land tenure, the abstract rules of which are the mental property of most adult males. A few general remarks concerning these rules follow.
First, the actual behavior of the Kapauku is generally consonant with their ideal abstract rules …
Second, Kapauku rules of land tenure contradict Herskovits’ generalization about Melanesian communities that they ‘admit the ownership of produce rather than the garden where it is grown’ (1960, p. 358). Kapauku rules clearly refer to land which is
owned individually and may be [275] sold, leased for shell money, or loaned by the
owner. … the title to Kapauku land does not rest on its use.”
296-7: “Right of Ownership … As has been pointed out so often in anthropological
literature, the term ownership in itself is unsatisfactory and misleading. It is actually a
bundle of specific rights which an individual holds with respect to land, water, or an
object. Since these rights differ from society to society it is mandatory that the
ethnographer enumerate precisely the specific [297] rights that the owner enjoys. Among
the Kapauku the owner’s rights to land and water differ from one terrain to another.
However, there is a bundle of specific rights that any owner … possesses with respect to
his (their) property that may pertain to any of these fourteen terrain classes. This type of
Kapauku ownership consists of the following rights: exclusive right to trap, right to cut
maone trees …, right to hunt by means of fire …, and right to collect indemnity for
damage done to the terrain by others. The dimension of ‘right of ownership’ applies to all
fourteen terrain types and distinguishes among them on the basis of ‘individual’
ownership (garden, yard, fallow grassland, fallow bush, exploited virgin forest, virgin
forest), sublineage ownership (path, mountain summit, crag, swamp, brook), lineage
ownership (small lake), and everyone’s ownership (large lake, river).”

Possehl et al—Harappan Civilization and Rojdi

The Harappan or Indus Civilization has proved to be one of the most enigmatic of
the world’s ancient urban systems. This can be attributed for the most part to the
total absence of true historical records that document the Harappan peoples.
Given this fact, and the current state of research on the Indus Civilization, new
excavation is almost certainly going to produce major insights into our
understanding of ancient India’s first cities.

Redfield: Primitive Law

Robert Redfield, "Primitive Law," in Paul Bohanan, ed., Law and Warfare (Garden City,
N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1967)
Cited by Benson to support the following, “If law exists only where there are
state-backed courts and codes, then every primitive society was lawless.” But
does not show that private property exists in primitive society, and in fact argues
against it.
6: “the Andaman Islanders … provide an instance of a society without even the
most rudimentary elements of law …. These natives have no means of composing
disputes, and no specific sanctions which may be brought to bear on one who
commits generally condemned acts.”
21: “The most obvious general conclusion about primitive law is that there is not
much of it. Systematic and explicitly formulated rules of conduct and formal
procedures for the enforcement of these rules by impersonal authority play a
relatively small part in the maintenance of social control, and in some societies they are entirely lacking. On the whole, people do what they are expected to do because that is what they want to do and what (in the light of those inducements and customary advantages and disadvantages which Malinowski sometimes calls ‘law’ and sometimes ‘effective custom’) they find it expedient to do.”

21: “Nevertheless … rudimentary legal institutions are abundantly represented in many of the preliterate societies.”

23: “The other special characterization of primitive law is the importance of bodies of kindred as parties to controversy and to legal action. The materials cited here have included many instances where the wrongs righted are wrongs against kinship groups, the claims are pressed by kinship groups, and the liability of the individual is to his kinship group. I have said that murder and theft are usually regarded as torts rather than as crimes, but the delict is not so much a wrong done to an individual as a wrong done to a familial group.”

24: “Maine was right, when, in considering the early forms of the classic societies, he proposed that primitive society was to be regarded as an aggregation of families rather than of individuals.”

Renfrew—Prehistory


84-85: Introduces “the sapient paradox:” If human cognitive capacity is what is so decisive in making the modern world, why did it take so long between the development of that capacity and the appearance of the agricultural revolution?

85-86: Anatomically modern humans are found in African fossils from as long as 150,000 years ago. The human species might have emerged their as early as 200,000 years ago. Modern human remains are found from 40,000 years ago in Europe, 45,000 in Australia, 90,000 in Israel (the last with some archaic features).

87-88: Many of the cognitive traits of modern humans appeared in Africa 150,000 years ago.

90: “On the basis of mtDNA analysis it can be asserted that all living humans are closely related and descended from ancestors living in Africa some 200,000 years ago. … The first and principal dispersal of human ancestral to the living humans of today took place about 60,000 years ago.”

91: “the humans who dispersed out of Africa (as well as those who remained) were all very closely related. The physical (or ‘racial’) distinctions between different human groups in the world today must presumably have begun to develop from the time following the initial ‘out-of-Africa’ dispersal of 60,000 years ago.”

92: “The population of all these areas today [Asia, Australia, Europe, the Americas], and indeed of other areas of the world, share this specifically human language capacity. It is difficult to see how this could be so were that capacity not present in the initial dispersal.

There is, moreover, a more significant underlying point. The genetic composition of living humans at birth … is closely similar from individual to
individual today. … Moreover a child born today … would be very little different in its DNA—i.e. in the genotype, and hence in innate capacities—from one born 60,000 years ago.”

93: “The implication here must be that the changes in human behavior and life that have taken place since that time, and all the behavioral diversity that has emerged—sedentism, cities, writing, warfare—are not in any way determined by the very limited genetic changes which, as we understand the matter, distinguish us from our ancestors of 60,000 years ago.

94: Restatement of the sapient paradox: “If the genetic characteristics of our species, the human genome, emerged as much as 150,000 years ago in Africa, and if the humans who dispersed out of Africa some 60,000 year ago were closely similar to each other, and also to ourselves in their genotype, why did it take such a long time before the emergence of those distinctly more modern behaviors that become apparent at the time of the agricultural revolution?”

At some point around here, he defines the “speciation phase” as up to 60,000 years ago and the “tectonic phase” as since then.

139: “There is presumptive evidence that boats were being built by Homo erectus some 500,000 years ago. Finds of the Middle Paleolithic stone tools on the island of Flores in Indonesia, which even with the low sea levels of a very cold climatic phase would have remained an island, suggests that their makers must have travelled by sea. This must have involved a number of people in a cooperative activity that was directed at other activities that were to follow at some point in the future …. The proposed voyages would evidentially have had a purpose—whether the provision of food from the sea, or travel to obtain raw materials or meet other humans.”

141: “we should not in any way assume that aspects of the life of hunter-gatherers that might be inferred from Paleolithic times would necessarily apply to hunter-gatherer communities today. … modern hunter-gatherers have had as long as any other contemporary communities to develop from our common Paleolithic predecessors, and their culture is as distant in time from the life and times of the Paleolithic as ours.”

142: Agriculture began at least as early as 9,000 BCE in the Levant. “What has now become much clearer, however, is that the appearance of settled village life did not follow upon the establishment of a secure agricultural regime, as had earlier been thought; it preceded it. The evidence is clear that sedentism preceded farming, although it was dependent upon the availability of abundant wild food resources.”

145: “in a sedentary society, ‘property’ emerges as a substantive reality whose recognition establishes it as an institutional fact. All of this presumably happens before the notion of ‘property’ becomes a legal concept, generally in more complex societies, since the notion of law in itself implies the emergence of other institutional facts. Not the least of these is some authority to which appeal can be made when disputes arise concerning the application of the legal principles involved.”
“while food production is a concomitant of much sedentary life, it is not so much food production as the experience of sedentism on a stable and enduring basis that is the prime revolutionary concept in the ‘Neolithic revolution.’”

Figurines appeared in western Asia with sedentism but before agriculture.

Permanent ritual sites predate agriculture in Turkey.

“the association between people in mobile societies can be transitory. If group members disagree, they can disaffiliate. They can leave the band and, if appropriate, take up membership in another group. This is more difficult in an agricultural society with a permanent village settlement and with rights of access to cultivable land.”

“Most early societies appear to assign very little personal importance to prominent individuals. There is no evidence for what the anthropologist calls salient rankings. On the contrary, they might at first sight be described by anthropologists as ‘egalitarian’ societies, with the kit and personal possessions of one person very much like another.”

“one does not see any evidence in the archaeological record associated with these monuments for the presence of the chief in person. But the group achievement is evident. For that reason the term ‘group-oriented’ is appropriate for such societies [early settled villages].” Societies with collective action but no evidence of chiefs include the makers of Stonehenge and the cliff dwellers of Chaco Canyon. “The recognition of the capacity of ‘group-oriented’ societies to produce such impressive collective works is essential if a clear account is to be given of prehistory.”

“Hunter gatherers of the Paleolithic did not apparently ascribe high value to durable materials … this propensity to assign value to goods seems … to have developed at about the same time as the emergence of sedentism.” Money appears first during the first millennium BCE in Anatolia. “the adoption of a money economy marked the end of prehistory in so many parts of the world that we could take it as the best indicator of the dawn of history.”

“Most anthropologists agree that many small-scale societies are broadly egalitarian. Their members are more or less equal in status, and they operate without hereditary distinctions of rank or prestige.”

Long quote from Peter Wilson *The Domestication of the Human Species.*

By the time you get early states you get social stratification, law, and sometimes literacy.

“The Sumerians, like the early Egyptians, surrounded their rulers with all manner of fine things. The cities of the Indus … are notably lacking in the choice materials.”

“It is possible to trace the development of chiefdom societies through the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few and, in some cases, through the conspicuous burial of children clearly already of high status, demonstrating that the prestige and distinction of the chief was inherited.”

“The term ‘chiefdom’ has been called into question by critics of evolutionary approaches to social development, where the seemingly natural progression from tribal society to chiefdom to state society can too easily be assumed. But it remains true that, before the emergence of an early state society
… in many parts of the world, we see burials indicative of persons of high rank”. Examples include” China, Peru, Mesoamerica, Western Asia and Anatolia.

176: The continuing path towards state society seems to have involved a very similar process. The power of the chief or leader was augmented by the conspicuous display of his increasing wealth, and sometimes by his control of the mechanisms of trade. In particular, if the chief could control the important of exotic valuables, he could both ensure his own preeminent status in their conspicuous use and consumption and arrange that his followers could also, in a more limited way, display and enhance their prestige by a similar, if more modest, display. … It seems that the emergence of the state often requires conquest of territory as well as centralization of power. In many parts of the world the emergence of state society was accompanied by notable military achievements by the ruler. The earliest iconography of several early states … involves the conquest and humiliation of captives.”

178-179: The Indus valley is an exception.

228: The approach in this book is similar to the ‘holistic’ approach of Kent Flannery, Joyce Marcus, Peter Wilson, and Paul Boyer.

**Robson: Econ o’H-G & evolution**

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I listened to most of it. An application of economic optimization models to anthropological-evolutionary questions like why are humans so smart and why do they live so long. Mostly mathematical theorizing. Nothing much useful I can find about social organization, property rights, etc.

**Roscoe. The Hunters and Gatherers of New Guinea**


P. 153: Talks about the difficulty of defining hunter-gatherers.

153: “According to common definition, hunters and gatherers are those who subsist by gathering wild plants and hunting wild animals, these activities usually being extended to include fishing.”

153: If hunter-gatherers are people who subsist from more than 50% or more than 75% foraging, there were many bands in New Guinea at contact.

158: “Burch (1998:201) has noted as a pressing practical issue that there are ‘few if any societies of foragers left in the world that have not been profoundly affected by, and to some extent integrated into, much larger-scale systems.’ As a result, ‘hunter-gatherer
research may soon become historically oriented rather than field oriented.” (reference copied to articles folder; notes in anthro notes folder)

158: “In sum, it would be unfortunate if hunter-gatherer scholars prematurely resigned themselves to the archives when New Guinea continues to provide an array of viable field opportunities.”

**Rose: Property & Persuasion**


Chapter 1: “Possession as the origin of property” 11-24

12: “For the common law, possession or “occupancy” is the origin of property.”

14: “Adverse possession is a common law interpretation of statutes of limitation for actions to recover real property.”

15: “The doctrine of adverse possession thus transfers property from the title owner to another who is essentially a trespasser, if the trespasser’s presence is open to everyone and lasts continuously for a given period of time, and so long as the title owner takes no action to get rid of him during that time.”

16: “Possession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested. … the importance of communication”.

18: “There is a second and perhaps even more important subtext to the ‘text’ of first possession: the tacit supposition that there is such a thing as a ‘clear act’ unequivocally proclaiming to the world at large that the one is appropriating this or that—the is, the supposition that there are in fact unequivocal acts of possession that any relevant audience will naturally and easily interpret as property claims.”

19: “It is doubtful whether the claims of any nomadic population could ever meet the common law requirements for establishing property in land. Thus the audience presupposed by the common law of first possession is an agrarian or a commercial people”.

20: “we may admire nature and enjoy wilderness. But those sentiments find little resonance in the doctrine of first possession. Its texts are those of cultivation, manufacture, and development. … The common law of possession gives preference to those who convince the world that they can catch a fish and hold it fast. This may be a reward to useful labor, but it is more precisely the articulation of a specific vocabulary within a structure of symbols understood by a commercial people.”
Chapter 2: “Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory,” chapter 2, pp. 25-45

27: “Finally the essay returns to the narrativity of classical property theory and links the storytelling of classical property theory to a kind of moral discourse; it treats narrative as an exhortation to the listener to overcome a game-theoretic, self-interested ‘nature’ and to follow instead the cooperative preference orderings that a property regime requires.”

39: “So, why is cooperation the preference ordering that seems to need the story? There is, of course, the point that is made so tellingly by critical theory and even more so by feminist theory: the dominant storyteller can make this position seem to be the natural one.”

41-42: “if their tales could just get us John Does over the hump of our conservative, unimaginative, play-it-safe self-interest, they might get us to establish property regimes; they might get us to recognize that if we all respect each other’s claims, we can encourage everyone to expend labor on the resources of the world, and we all will be better off in the end.

And maybe that is the real story about why they told these stories and why their successors continue to tell them. They might have been right or wrong in their argument that property improves the lot of humankind; and their smooth tales of property’s cooperative origins may well have [42] slighted the emotional context in which cooperation takes place. But those tales are moral ones all the same, just as much as Aesop’s fables, speaking to and constituting a kind of moral community and urging that community to change its ways.”

Chapter 5: “The Comedy of the Commons”

[This chapter wasn’t as useful as I’d hoped.] It’s mostly about specifically public places like roads, riverbeds, and lakeshores.

145-6: “The ‘public’ in question was the ‘public at large’; sometimes it acted through orga-[146]nized governments, but it was also capable of acting without those governments, through the medium of the customs and habits presumed of a civilized citizenry. … the public’s claim had to be superior to that of the private owner because the property itself was most valuable when used by indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons”

150: “the scale returns of sociability, taken together with the possibility of private holdout, will underlie any arguments for the inherent publicness of property. Perhaps the chief conclusion we can draw from the nineteenth-century public property doctrines, then, is that while we may change our minds about which activities are socializing, we do thing that the public requires access to some physical locations for at least some socializing activities. Our law consistently allocates that access to the public, because
public access to those properties is as important as the general privatization of property in other spheres of our law.”

**Rowland: Return of the 'noble savage': misrepresenting the past, present and future**

Return of the 'noble savage': misrepresenting the past, present and future
M. J. Rowland Australian Aboriginal Studies 2004 no. 2, pp. 2-14.

ABSTRACT: The view that a ‘noble savage’/‘ecologically noble savage’ existed in peaceful harmony with nature is a concept that has permeated writings in anthropology, cultural studies, philosophy, political science, literary and art criticism, and in the popular media over many years. The idea of the ‘noble savage’/‘ecologically noble savage’ has resurfaced in recent publications and this article questions the reasons for this and discusses the negative implications of such views. A critique of these concepts may be interpreted as an attack on indigenous peoples or is at least considered insensitive, if not politically dangerous. But to continue to accept the ‘noble savage’/‘ecologically noble savage’ requires a substantial suspension of disbelief. When indigenous peoples are stereotyped as ‘noble savages’ they are once again frozen in the past and therefore can have little to contribute to human history. There is a continuing need to search for a view that focuses on a much more positive engagement with indigenous peoples on environmental issues.

I HAVEN’T SEEN THE ARTICLE, BUT THIS MIGHT BE ALL I NEED TO KNOW.

**Rummel. Death By Government**


Beatrice suggested this to me. I looked at it, but didn’t take notes. I remember two things (but I don’t have page numbers):

- He coined the term democide in an earlier work, and uses it extensively here.
- You can cite him for governments cause the threat of the complete disruption that comes from modern warfare such as genocide, democide, terrorism, and aerial bombardment.

1-2: “democide …. The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and [2] murder its foreigners and domestic subjects.”
83: Soviet Democide
Collectivization 1929 1.04%
Great Terror 1936 .89%
Pre-WWII 1939 1.02%
World War II 1941 1.21%

100: PRC Democide
Totalitarianization 0.35%

113: Nazi Democide rates
Germany .08%
Occupied Europe 1.08 odds of dying during the period 1 in 15
Overall 0.91, odds of dying 1 in 18

135: China civil war 0.33%

194: Pol Pot 1975-79 31.25% Overall, 8.16% annual
USSR 1917-87: 29.64% overall 0.45 annual
China PRC 1949-87 4.49% overall, 0.12% annual
Nazi Germany 1933-1945: 5.46% overall 0.91% annual

346: Croatia 1941-1945: 10.48% overall, 2.50% annually

Sahlins. “Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief

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288: “Embedded within the grand differences in political scale, structure and performance is a more personal contrast, one in quality of leadership. An historically particular type of leader-figure, the "big-man" as he is often locally styled, appears in the underdeveloped settings of Melanesia. Another type, a chief properly so-called, is associated with the Polynesian advance.7 Now these are distinct sociological types, that is to say, differences in the powers, privileges, rights, duties, and obligations of Melanesian big-men and Polynesian chiefs are given by the divergent societal contexts in which they operate.”
289: “The Melanesian big-man seems so thoroughly bourgeois, so reminiscent of the free enterprising rugged individual of our own heritage. He combines with an ostensible interest in the general welfare a more profound measure of self-interested cunning and economic calculation. His gaze, as Veblen might have put it, is fixed unswervingly to the main
chance. His every public action is designed to make a competitive and invidious comparison with others, to show a standing above the masses that is product of his own personal manufacture. The historical caricature of the Polynesian chief, however, is feudal rather than capitalist”

289: “the indicative quality of big-man authority is everywhere the same: it is personal power. Big-men do not come to office; they do not succeed to, nor are they installed in, existing positions of leadership over political groups. The attainment of big-man status is rather the outcome of a series of acts which elevate a person above the common herd and attract about him a coterie of loyal, lesser men. It is not accurate to speak of "bigman" as a political title, for it is but an acknowledged standing in interpersonal relations - a "prince among men" so to speak as opposed to "The Prince of Danes". In particular Melanesian tribes the phrase might be "man of importance" or "man of renown", "generous rich-man", or "center-man", as well as "big-man".

291: “The making of the faction, however, is the true making of the Melanesian big-man. It is essential to establish relations of loyalty and obligation on the part of a number of people such that their production can be mobilized for renown building external distribution. The bigger the faction the greater the renown; once momentum in external distribution has been generated the opposite can also be true”

292: “The great Malinowski used a phrase in analyzing primitive political economy that felicitously describes just what the big-man is doing: amassing a "fund of power". A big-man is one who can create and use social relations which give him leverage on others' production and the ability to siphon off an excess product- or sometimes he can cut down their consumption in the interest of the siphon”

294: “The pivotal paramount chief as well as the chieftains controlling parts of a chiefdom were true office holders and title holders. They were not, like Melanesian big-men, fishers of men: they held positions of authority over permanent groups. The honorifics of Polynesian chiefs likewise did not refer to a standing in interpersonal relations, but to their leadership of political divisions - here "The Prince of Danes" not "the prince among men".”

295: “In the Polynesian view, a chiefly personage was in the nature of things powerful. But this merely implies the objective observation that his power was of the group rather than of himself. His authority came from the organization, from an organized acquiescence in his privileges and organized means of sustaining them.”

295: “Masters of their people and "owners" in a titular sense of group resources, Polynesian chiefs had rights of call upon the labor and agricultural produce of households within their domains”

Sahlins--Stone Age Economics
Stone Age Economics by Marshall David Sahlins (Routlege) $130.00

There seems to be a newer, 2004, edition, but I haven’t been able to find it anywhere. Reading had the 1972 edition, and so my notes are from there.

Chp 1: He calls hunter-gatherers “the original affluent society” because they spent so much time at leisure and had such little worry about gathering enough food. They ate whatever they had, but had no worry about finding more when they needed it. They slept far more than modern humans, and napped a lot during the day. In groups as small as 10 adults, they worked intermittently, when they felt like it, rather than out of any sense of necessity. Even when moving because of depleted resources in a given area, they were unhurried and confident they would find food in the next location. The evidence of hunter-gatherer lifestyle presented here, he says, is at odds with the then common view that hunter-gatherers were in constant want and fear and always struggling for their most basic existence.

1/2: “By common understanding, an affluent society is one which all the people’s material wants are easily satisfied.” The trick of hunter-gatherers (HG) was that they had very few wants, but the wants they had were very easily satisfied.

1-2: “there are two possible courses to affluence. Wants may be ‘easily satisfied’ either by producing much or desiring little.”

13/3: “it seems wrong to say that wants are ‘restricted,’ desires ‘restrained,’ … The words imply the renunciation of an acquisitiveness that in reality was never developed, a suppression of desires that were never broached.”

14/3: “A good case can be made that hunters and gatherers work less than we do; and, rather than a continuous travail, the food quest is intermittent, leisure abundant, and there is a greater amount of sleep in the daytime per capita per year than in any other condition of society.”

15-16: Graphs showing studies of HG groups in Australia in the mid-20th Century working on average 3:50 per day in one group or 5 hours 10 minutes per day in the other group.

17/2: “The most obvious, immediate conclusion is that the people do not work hard. The average length of time per person per day put into the appropriation and preparation of food was four or five hours. Moreover, they do not work continuously. The subsistence quest was highly intermittent.”

17/3: “rather than straining to the limits of available labor and disposable resources, the Australians seem to underuse their objective economic possibilities.”

18/2: They didn’t seem to find the work physically demanding or in any way onerous.
“the dietary intake of the Arnhem Land hunters was adequate.”

Bushmen (in an apparently harsher environment) worked similarly lightly to the Australians.

“The Bushman figures imply that one man’s labor in hunting and gathering will support four or five people. Taken at face value, Bushman food collecting is more efficient than French farming in the period up to World War II, when more than 20 percent of the population were engaged in feeding the rest. Confessedly the comparison is misleading, but not as misleading as it is astonishing.”

Quoting Gusinde 1961 on South American hunters: “Their work is more a matter of fits and starts, and in these occasional efforts they can develop considerable energy for a certain time. After that, however, they show a desire for an incalculably long rest period during which they lie about doing nothing, without showing great fatigue. … It is obvious that repeated irregularities of this kind make the European employer despair, but the Indian cannot hold it. It is his natural disposition.”

“What are the real handicaps of the hunting-gathering praxis? Not ‘low productivity of labor,’ if existing examples mean anything. But the economy is seriously afflicted by the imminence of diminish returns. Beginning in subsistence and spreading from there to every sector, an initial success seems only to develop the probability that further efforts will yield smaller benefits.”

“Reports on hunters and gatherers of the ethnographical present—specifically on those in marginal environments—suggest a mean of three to five hours per adult worker per day in food production. Hunters keep banker’s hours, notably less than modern industrial workers (unionized). … “hunters and gatherers need not work longer getting food than do primitive cultivators. … The Neolithic saw no particular improvement for the production of subsistence; probably, with the advent of agriculture, people had to work harder.”

[In the world today] “One-third to one-half of humanity are said to go to bed hungry every night. In the Old Stone Age the fraction must have been much smaller. This is the ear of hunger unprecedented. Now, in the time of the greatest technical power, starvation is an institution! Reverse another venerable formula; the amount of hunger increases relatively and absolutely with the evolution of culture.”

“The evolution of economy has known, then, two contradictory movements: enriching but at the same time impoverishing, appropriating in relation to nature but expropriating in relation to man.”
“The world’s most primitive people have few possessions, but they are not poor. Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is it just a relation between means and ends; above all it is a relation between people. Poverty is a social status. As such it is the invention of civilization. It has grown with civilization, at once as an invidious distinction between classes and more importantly as a tributary relation—that can render agrarian peasants more susceptible to natural catastrophes than any winter camp of Eskimo.”

Chp. 2: Primitive agrarian people also work less than modern people. Chronically under-exploited their available resources, and retained the ability to split off and start their own communities. Community cohesiveness, not technology was the limit to the size of villages.

61: “Men engaged in little or no work for approximately 45 percent of the time; only half their days could be classed as productive or working days, of an average duration of 4.72 hours of labor.”

87/1: “the greater the relative working capacity of the household the less its members work.”

92-93: Property rights among Neolithic agriculturalists are overlapping, complex, and hard to understand; “higher ‘owners’ in the primitive societies—chiefs, lineages, clans—stand in a relation of the second degree to production, as mediated by the entrenched domestic groups. Chiefly ownership—‘of the land, the sea and the people,’ as the Fijians say—is a particularly revealing case. It is an ‘ownership’ more inclusive than exclusive, and more political than economic: a derived claim on the product and productive means in virtue of an inscribed superiority over the producers. In this it differs from a bourgeois ownership that confers control over producers by a claim upon productive means. Whatever resemblances in ideology of ‘ownership,’ the two systems of property work differently, the one (chieftainship) a right to things realized through a hold on persons, the other (bourgeois) a hold on persons realized through a right to things.”

93: “The household in the tribal societies is usually not the exclusive owner of its resources: farmlands, pastures, hunting or fishing territories. But across the ownership of greater groups or higher authorities, even by means of such ownership, the household retains the primary relation to productive resources. Where these resources are undivided, the domestic group has unimpeded access; where the land is allotted, it has claim to an appropriate share. The family enjoys the usufruct, it is said, the use-right, but all the privileges entailed are not obvious from the term. The producers determine on a day-to-day basis how the land shall be used. And to them falls the priority of appropriation and disposition of the product; no claim of any supervening group or authority legitimately goes so far as to deprive the household of its livelihood. All this is undeniable and irreducible: the right of the family as a member of the
proprietary group or community to directly and independently exploit for its own support a due share of the social resources.”

93-94: “As an *economic* rule, there is no class of landless paupers in primitive society. … Primitive peoples have invented many ways to elevate a man above his fellows. But the producers’ hold on their own economic means rules out the most compelling history has known: exclusive control of such means by some few, rendering dependent the many others.”

94/3: “Lewis Henry Morgan called the program of the domestic economy, ‘communism in living.’ The name seems appropriate, for householding is the highest form of economic sociability: ‘from each according to his abilities and to each according to his needs’—from the adults that with which they are charged by the division of labor; to them, but also to the elders, the children, the incapacitated, regardless of their contributions, that which they require.”

97: “Left to its own devises DMP [the domestic mode of production] is inclined toward a maximum dispersion of homesteads, because maximum dispersion is the absence of interdependence and a common authority, and these are by and large the way production is organized. If within the domestic circle the decisive motions are centripetal, between households they are centrifugal, spinning off into the thinnest probably distribution”.

98: Refers to Carneiro who shows that Amazon villages that had the technical capacity to support 1000 or 2000 inhabitants, seldom had more than 600 because people kept breaking off to start their own groups. Quoting Carneiro, “a factor of greater importance has been the ease and frequency of village fissioning for reasons not related to subsistence … villages may seldom get a chance to increase in population to the point at which they begin to press hard on the carrying capacity of the land. … Many things may give rise to factional disputes within a society, and that the larger the community the more frequent these disputes are likely to be. By the time a village in the Tropical Forest attains a population of 500 or 600 the stresses and strains within it are probably such that an open schism, leading to the hiving off of a dissident faction, may easily occur.”

Chp 3

101: “Kinship, chieftainship, even the ritual order, whatever else they may be, appear in the primitive societies as economic forces.”

134-5: “The ideological ambiguity is functional. On the one hand, the ethic of chiefly generosity blesses the inequality; on the other, the ideal of reciprocity denies that it makes any difference.”
Salzman, Is Inequality Universal?

Is Inequality Universal? quick view
Philip Carl Salzman
Current Anthropology, Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 31-61

COPIES TO ARTICLES FOLDER. Might be an early version of stuff that’s in the Pastoralists book, but see for inequality chapter.

Salzman, Pastoralists


11-12: “Tribal pastoralists live as members of a political unit that provides protection through collective responsibility, with each individual obliged to [12] support the others.”
12: “tribes usually control a territory or claim rights over a territory.”
14: “Internally, independent pastoral tribes tend to be politically egalitarian … because mobile tribal warriors are not prone to accept oppression. The position of peasant pastoralists is more variable …, depending upon the larger agrarian regime.”
40: even where people control territories, land tenure is almost always collective and relatively open. Natural pasture and water sources are thought of as given by God for everyone.”
43: Notes a lot of anthropologists today who argue that all societies are inegalitarian and who have “harshly criticized major ethnographic accounts of egalitarianism”. “The assumption that inequality is universal has gained wide support.” He doesn’t mention here, but this chapter attempts to rebut the inequality view and revive the view that many societies are egalitarian. (See references 1.)
47: “The significance of the Nuer and similar egalitarian, acephalous societies for political philosophy is not hard to determine. British philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes had for centuries argued that collective sovereignty could exist only when vested in hierarchical offices and that order could obtain only when authority was granted to officeholders. According to the arguments of these British philosophers, the only alternative to a hierarchical sovereign was the war of all against all, a circumstance in which human life would be nasty, brutish, and short. In this view, an egalitarian, acephalous society could not exist, and ‘ordered anarchy,’ as Evans-Pritchard characterized the Nuer political system, was an oxymoron, a self-refuting contradiction (which is probably why Evans-Pritchard liked the phrase so much). The fact that anthropological research had given the lie to such arguments was not lost on Meyer Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940: 4).”
48: “How can this order and security be guaranteed without specialized institutions—government, police courts—devoted to ensuring them? The Nuer provided Evans-Pritchard (1940a: chapter 4) with one answer: Order and security could be provided in a decentralized fashion, wherein the instruments and skills of coercion were distributed universally, through the contingent, oppositional balancing of cohesive political groups or segments at all levels of population and territorial size. This system worked internally among the Nuer in much the same way that it works, imperfectly, in international relations: Nuer knew that attacks on the interests, property, or persons of other Nuer would bring swift retaliations upon themselves and that large alliances formed against more distant Nuer would be balanced by equally fierce alliances seeking retribution. The system of segmentary, balanced opposition was thus a deterrent to predatory adventures among the Nuer, who found alternative opportunity for predation with less risk against outsiders, primarily the Dinka.”

53: “If this review of pastoral polities is correct, what are we to make of the assertion that ‘the egalitarian nature of African pastoralists’ is a ‘pastoral myth’ (Fratkin, Roth, and Galvin 1994: 9)? It does not appear form our cursory review of the literature that anyone suggested that all indigenous African pastoral polities were egalitarian or even equally egalitarian. However, some indigenous African and other pastoral polities, as illustrated above, were indeed, according to the ethnographic accounts, truly egalitarian in any reasonable use of that term. This observation makes it difficult, I believe, to accept the assessment that the egalitarian nature of (certain) pastoral polities was a ‘myth.’ In fact such a blanket denial of the existence of egalitarian polities seems implicitly to assert the universal presence of hierarchical political structures and deny that there was a wide range of variation among indigenous polities. Apparently, as Leslie Sponsel (1997: 621) has argued, ‘revisionists tend to ignore the tremendous diversity in regions, environments, cultures, and economies, polities and histories.’

Thus, I am obliged to assert what I had though was an incontrovertible understanding of anthropology—that human societies and cultures vary in important ways—together with its corollary, that pastoral societies vary in important ways, including their degree of egalitarianism.”

See ref 3.

69: It was the conjunction of these three factors—the fluidity of livestock, the holding of ‘natural’ resources in common, and the mobility of herders—that led pastoralists, left on their own, to form egalitarian polities or, if encapsulated, to constrain their chiefs to respect public opinion and seek to work within the bounds of consent”.

70: Discusses literature saying that inequality in the size of herds owned by individuals did not translate into political equality, and so was consistent with egalitarianism.

73: “Another critical distinction that revisionists in pastoral studies seem to ignore is between economic differences and economic differentiation. As we have already shown, economic differences, such as in livestock holdings, did not affect the egalitarian nature of independent, segmentary tribes. The reason is that in segmentary tribes, differences in wealth did not lead to economic differentiation such as (1) stratification, a social
differentiation of status between rich and poor, or (2) class systems, in which the poor work for the rich and the rich reap part of the benefits of the work of the poor. … livestock, easily mobile and divisible, was, for social and political reasons including marriage and political alliance, distributed and allocated to other tribesmen rather than accumulated.”

126: “Tribal peoples such as the Bedouin are famous for these very characteristics. For example, Lancaster … characterizes Rwala society as ‘one where every man is equally free to follow his own bent’ and ‘every man is an island and is responsible for his own affairs.’ … Among the Rwala, there were no rulers and no subjects. … Similarly, among the treat tribal confederacies of the Zargos Mountains in western Iran, the sheep-herding tribesmen are highly autonomous in spite of appearances to the contrary.”

127: “African tribal pastoralists exhibit similar characteristics. Among the Somali, that ‘fierce and turbulent race of Republicans,’ as Richard Burton … described them, both individual liberty and equality are presumptions and operating principles. … Similarly, among the Nuer, as Evans-Pritchard (1940a: 296) famously tells us, equality is no inhibition to autonomy and freedom”.

128: “The extent of equality among pastoralists has been reviewed in some detail …. The general thrust of that review was that among segmentary, tribal pastoralists, equality as an ideal, equality of status, and economic equality were all quite strong. … It seems apparent that both equality and freedom are present in great degree among these tribal pastoralists. No conflict between equality and freedom is apparent; no incompatibility is discernible. The reason for this is the impact of segmentary security on freedom and equality.”

130: “there is a major opportunity cost in segmentary, tribal societies, where men must devote themselves to military skills and combat at the expense of productive creativity.”

130: “This pattern—the conjunction of equality and freedom among segmentary, tribal pastoralists—does not obtain among nontribal pastoralists, just as it does not obtain among nontribal peoples generally”.

131: “it is only in segmentary, tribal societies that pastoralists can enjoy both freedom and equality. However, they do so at the price of security secured through self-help.”

132: Addresses the popular argument that people from the Middle East and Africa have so many failed states because they have no cultural experience with or value of democracy.

136: “The first conclusion is that although most societies emphasize equality at the expense of freedom or freedom at the expense of equality …, pastoralists are among the few to build into their societies both freedom and equality. But there are major opportunity costs associated with this pattern, namely, the absence of civil peace and the associated economic development.

The second conclusion is that the political process in pastoral societies tends to be strongly democratic, with decisions based on consent. Thus, the absence of democracy in states that encompass pastoral peoples cannot be attributed to an absence of democratic impulse in regional culture.”

There are more references. I could come back to this later when I’m doing the inequality paper.

Ref 2
References:

References:

Sandom, Faurby, Sandel, & Svenning: Megafauna.

Winter, “Humans, Not Climate Change

Lisa Winter, “Humans, Not Climate Change, To Blame For Ice Age Animal Extinction” IFL Science, June 5, 2014

Entire article:
Our last glacial period lasted from about 115,000-12,500 years ago. By the end, 177 large mammal species had gone extinct. There has been considerable debate over the last half century regarding what caused the loss of these animals, including saber-tooth cats, mastadons, and giant sloths. While many have argued that these animals simply weren’t able to adapt to the warmer climate, others blame human activity. A new study led by Jens-Christian Svenning of Aarhus University has strongly suggested that humans are squarely responsible for the disappearance of megafauna during the last 100,000 years. The results have been published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society B.

For this study, the researchers focused on megafauna, which is categorized as animals weighing at least 10 kg (22 lbs) that lived in the last 132,000 years. They also identified the regions where these animals lived, comparing the data with climate and human activity. While there are invariably going to be animals lost after a great climate change such as the ending of an ice age, the loss of megafauna that followed the most recent glacial event is an anomaly when compared to the ending of other ice ages.

“Our results strongly underline the fact that human expansion throughout the world has meant an enormous loss of large animals,” co-author Søren Faurby said in a press release.

The team had identified that out of the 177 large mammals that went extinct, 62 species were native to South America, 43 from North America, 38 from Asia, 26 from Australia and the surrounding region, 19 from Europe, and 18 of the extinct species were from Africa. Surprisingly, the areas where the animals went extinct spanned all climate regions, even the warmer regions that hadn’t been particularly affected by the ice age. While there is a slight correlation between the changing climate and the animals dying out, the researchers feel it isn’t nearly strong enough to explain such a drastic series of events across the globe. If anything, it would only explain the extinctions in Eurasia.

"The significant loss of megafauna all over the world can therefore not be explained by climate change, even though it has definitely played a role as a driving force in changing the distribution of some species of animals,” lead author Christopher Sandom explained. “Reindeer and polar foxes were found in Central Europe during the Ice Age, for example, but they withdrew northwards as the climate became warmer.”

Unfortunately, the correlation between extinctions and human activity was quite strong. Hunting activity is believed to be the root cause of the animals’ extinction, through both direct and indirect methods. Humans either hunted the animals themselves, or competed with them for smaller prey. With the animals’ food source gone, they wouldn’t be able to sustain their populations.
"We consistently find very large rates of extinction in areas where there had been no contact between wildlife and primitive human races, and which were suddenly confronted by fully developed modern humans (Homo sapiens). In general, at least 30% of the large species of animals disappeared from all such areas," stated Svenning.

The extinction of these ice age animals is not completely unlike the overhunting that has threatened the lives of modern megafauna, including sharks, rhinoceroses, elephants, and big cats, such as the tiger. These results also support a paper published in March in which genetic analyses revealed that humans drove Moas to extinction so quickly, it didn’t even have time to affect the birds’ biodiversity. An unrelated study a week later suggested that woolly mammoths suffered inbreeding depression, likely due to a declining population from human hunting, making severe birth defects common before the species went extinct.

Read more at http://www.iflscience.com/plants-and-animals/humans-not-climate-change-blame-ice-age-animal-extinction#AOusZkSKYEQk3ZE8.99

**Sandom, Faurby, Sandel, & Svenning, “Global late Quaternary megafauna extinctions linked to humans, not climate change,”**


**DOWNLOADED TO ARTICLES FOLDER**

Abstract: “The late Quaternary megafauna extinction was a severe global-scale event. Two factors, climate change and modern humans, have received broad support as the primary drivers, but their absolute and relative importance remains controversial. To date, focus has been on the extinction chronology of individual or small groups of species, specific geographical regions or macroscale studies at very coarse geographical and taxonomic resolution, limiting the possibility of adequately testing the proposed hypotheses. We present, to our knowledge, the first global analysis of this extinction based on comprehensive country-level data on the geographical distribution of all large mammal species (more than or equal to 10 kg) that have gone globally or continentally extinct between the beginning of the Last Interglacial at 132 000 years BP and the late Holocene 10 000 years BP, testing the relative roles played by glacial–interglacial climate change and humans. We show that the severity of extinction is strongly tied to hominin palaeobiogeography, with at most a weak, Eurasia-specific link to climate change. This first species-level macroscale analysis at relatively high geographical resolution provides strong support for modern humans as the primary driver of the worldwide megafauna losses during the late Quaternary.”
Schneider: Livestock and Equality in East Africa


P. 210: “All men seek to rule, but if they cannot rule, they prefer to be equal. Those who have wealth are unable to institutionalize it and legitimize their attempts to control others, any attempts to do so resulting in scornful and sometimes violent reaction by others against whom the wealthy are unable to retaliate sufficiently to establish authority.”

239: “egalitarianism, wherever it exists on this planet … rests upon an economic base which is such that by its nature (and sometimes perhaps by legal arrangement) it cannot be monopolized.”

Scott, review of the World Until Yesterday


Very insightful review of the World Until Yesterday. But also critical of any judgments about prehistory. “Contemporary hunter-gatherer life can tell us a great deal about the world of states and empires but it can tell us nothing at all about our prehistory. We have virtually no credible evidence about the world until yesterday and, until we do, the only defensible intellectual position is to shut up.” But yet he also writes, “It’s hard to imagine Diamond’s primitives giving up their physical freedom, their varied diet, their egalitarian social structure, their relative freedom from famine, large-scale state wars, taxes and systematic subordination in exchange for what Diamond imagines to be ‘the king’s peace’.”

He catches Diamond being even more Hobbesian than I remember from listening to him, Diamond: “First and foremost, a fundamental problem of virtually all small-scale societies is that, because they lack a central political authority exerting a monopoly of retaliatory force, they are unable to prevent recalcitrant members from injuring other members, and also unable to prevent aggrieved members from taking matters into their own hands and seeking to achieve their goals by violence. But violence invites counter-violence.’ Diamond: “Maintenance of peace within a society is one of the most important services that a state can provide. That service goes a long way towards explaining the apparent paradox that, since the rise of the first state governments in the Fertile Crescent about 5400 years ago, people have more or less willingly (not just under duress) surrendered some of their individual freedoms, accepted the authority of state governments, paid taxes and supported a comfortable individual lifestyle for the state’s leaders and officials.”
Scott, Art of not being governed


ix: My thesis is simple, suggestive, and controversial. Zomia is the largest remaining region of the world whose peoples have not yet been fully incorporated into nation-states. Its days are numbered. Not so very long ago, however, such self-governing peoples were the great majority of humankind. Today, they are seen from the valley kingdoms as ‘our living ancestors,’ ‘what we were like before we discovered wet-rice cultivation, Buddhism, and civilization.’ On the contrary, I argue that hill peoples are best understood as runaway, fugitive, maroon communities who have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects in the valleys.”

x: “The huge literature on state-making, contemporary and historic, pays virtually no attention to its obverse: the history of deliberate and reactive statelessness. This is the history of those who got away, and state-making cannot be understood apart from it. … Pastoralism, foraging, shifting cultivation, and segmentary lineage systems are often a ‘secondary adaptation,’ a kind of ‘self-barbarization’ adopted by peoples who location, subsistence, and social structure are adapted to state evasion.”

7: At a time when the state seems pervasive and inescapable, it is easy to forget that for much of history, living within or outside the state—or in an intermediate zone—was a choice … A wealthy and peaceful state center might attract a growing population that found its advantages rewarding. This, of course, fits the standard civilizational rational narrative of rude barbarians mesmerized by the prosperity made possible by the king’s peace and justice—a narrative shared by most of the world’s salvation religions, not to mention Thomas Hobbes.

This narrative ignores two capital facts. First, … it appears that much, if not most, of the population of the early states was unfree; they were subjects under duress. … second… it was common for state subjects to run away. … 

… Much of the periphery of states became a zone of refuge or ‘shatter zone,’ where the human shards of state formation and rivalry accumulated”.

8: “The diagnostic characteristics of shatter zones are their relative geographical inaccessibility and the enormous diversity of tongues and cultures.

… Many, perhaps most, inhabitants of the uncovered margins are not remnants of an earlier social formation … The situation of populations that have deliberately place themselves at the state’s periphery has occasionally been termed, infelicitously, secondary primitivism. … State evasion and state prevention permeate their practices
and, often their ideology as well. They are, in other words, a ‘state effect.’ They are ‘barbarians by design.’”

9: “Most, if not all, the characteristics that appear to stigmatize hill peoples … far from being the mark of primitives left behind by civilization, are better seen in a long view as adaptations designed to evade both state capture and state formation …

Avoiding the state was, until the past few centuries, a real option. A thousand years ago most people lived outside state structures, under loose-knit empires or in situations of fragmented sovereignty.”

11: “This truly imperial project, made possible only by distance-demolishing technologies … is so novel and its dynamics so different that my analysis here makes no further sense in Southeast Asia for the period after, say, 1950. Modern conceptions of national sovereignty and the resource needs of mature capitalism have brought that final enclosure into view.

… State power … is the state’s monopoly of coercive force that must, in principle, be fully projected to the very edge of its territory, where it meets, again in principle, another sovereign … Gone, in principle, are the large areas of no sovereignty or mutually canceling weak sovereigns. Gone too, of course, are peoples under no particular sovereignty.”

19: “The signal, distinguishing trait of Zomia … is that it is relatively stateless. … While state-making projects have abounded in the hills … Those would-be kingdoms that did manage to defy the odds did so only for a relatively brief, crisis-strewn period.”

20: “hill populations do not generally resemble the valley centers culturally, religiously, or linguistically.”

24: “The argument, in short, is that the history of hill peoples is best understood as a history not of archaic remnants but of ‘runaways’ from state-making process in the lowlands: a largely ‘maroon’ society, providing that we take a very long historical view.

… The concentration of people and production at a single location required some form of unfree labor when population was sparse, as it was in Southeast Asia. All Southeast Asian states were slaving states, without exception, some of them until well into the twentieth century. …

The effect of all state-making projects of this kind was to create a shatter zone or flight zone to which those wishing to evade or to escape bondage fled. These regions of refuge constituted a direct ‘state effect.’”

25: “The process was repeated in the Spanish Philippines, where, it is claimed, the cordillera of northern Luzon was populated almost entirely by lowland Filipinos fleeing Malay slave raids. … highland Filipinos were later misrepresented as the descendants of separate, prehistoric migrations to the island.”

28: “they are considered to be the historical remnants of an earlier stage of human history …. While this ‘just-so’ story treats valley cultures as later, and higher, achievements of civilization, raised from the much of tribalism, as it were, it grossly distorts the historical record.”

101: “A similar stigma has been applied in the West as in Southeast Asia to subjects, even if it ethnically and religiously part of the dominant society, who have no permanent residence: variously termed vagrants, homeless, vagabonds, tramps. Aristotle thought
famously that man was by nature a citizen of a city …; people who chose consciously to not belong to such a community … were, by definition, of no worth.”

102: “Hill peoples are … whole societies of vagrants, at once pitiable, dangerous, and uncivilized. The state-sponsored ‘Campaign to Senentarize the Nomads’ or the ‘Campaign for Fixed Cultivation and Fixed Residence’ … had a deep resonance among the Vietnamese …

Burmans … have comparable fear of and contempt for wanderers with no fixed abode. Such people are called … ‘a person blown about by the wind,’ which could variously be rendered as vagrant, tramp, or wanderer, with the connotation of one going to waste.”

103-4: “Those who chose to leave the realm of inequalities and taxes for the hills placed themselves, by definition, beyond the pale. Altitude could then be coded ‘primitive.’ In addition, to the degree that irrigated padi cultivation massively alters the landscape, while hill agriculture appears less visually obtrusive, hill peoples came to be associated with nature as against culture. This [104] fact enables the following false but common comparison: the civilized change the world; the barbarians live in the world without changing it.”

110: “What Lattimore calls the Chinese matrix of concentrated agriculture and state-making created, as a condition of its existence, an ecological and demographic frontier. In time this frontier became both a civilized and an ethnic border where before there had been no sharp demarcation. The early Chinese state had ample strategic reasons to mark this new boundary with a sharply etched civilizational discourse and, in some cases, with physical barriers such as the Great Wall(s) and the Miao walls of the southwest. It is easy to forget that until roughly 1700, and later in frontier areas, the Chinese state itself faced the classical problem of Southeast Asian statecraft: sequestering a population in state space. Thus the walls and the rhetoric were calculated as much to keep a tax-shy Chinese peasantry from ‘going over to the barbarians’ as to keep the barbarians at bay.”

111-2: “The earliest court centers in Cambodia and Java, and later in Burma and Siam, were, ritually and cosmologically speaking, luxury imports from the Indian subcontinent. Using the ritual technology afforded them by Indian merchants and the court Bramins who came in their wake, small lowland courts ratcheted up their ritual stats vis-à-vis potential rivals. In a process Oliver Wolters has called ‘self-Hinduization,’ local rulers introduced Brahminical protocol and ritual. Sanskritized personal and place names were substituted for the vernacular. Monarchs were consecrated by magical Braminical rites and given mythical genealogies tracing a divine origin. Indian iconography and epics were introduced, along with the complex ceremonies of South Indian court life. … it was a ‘veer,’ ‘an aristocratic religion which was not designed for the masses.’”

112: “Sanskritization thus engendered the invention of barbarians by those who had, not long before, been, well … ‘barbarians’ themselves.”

113: “The idea of the Indic or Chinese state has long had great currency in the hills. It floats up, as it were in strange fragments from the lowlands in the form of regalia, mythical charters, kingly dress, titles, ceremony, genealogical claims, and sacred architecture.”

114: “Valley authorities, including colonizers, have had something of a ‘hill-chief fetish.’ They have seen such chiefs where they did not exist, have exaggerated their power when
they did exist, and have striven to create both tribes and chiefs, in their own image, as units of territorial rule.”

116: “The terms civilized and barbarian are, as we have seen, inseparable, mutually defining, traveling companions.”

119: “All these ladders, however, had at least two rungs in common, despite their cultural particularities. They stipulated, as a condition of civilization, sedentary agriculture and residence with state space.”

121: “Barbarism … is in Ming and Qing practices a political location vis-à-vis stateness—a positionality. Nonbarbarians are fully incorporated into the taxpaying population and have, presumably, adopted Han customs, dress, and language. Barbarians come in two varieties, the cooked and the raw, and these categories are also positional. The cooked are culturally distinct but now registered and governed by Han administrative norms … the raw barbarians … are wholly outside the state population, a necessary ‘other,’ and heavily ethnicized.”

122: “Historically speaking, the process of becoming a barbarian is quite common. At certain historical moments, it has been more common than becoming civilized. … the people who later became known as the Shan Yue ethnic group and thereby barbarians (sheng) were, it appears, merely ordinary min who had fled to avoid taxes. … All those who had reason to flee state power—to escape taxes, conscription, disease, poverty, or prison, or to trade or raid—were, in a sense, tribalizing themselves. Ethnicity once again, began where sovereignty and taxes ended.”

122-3: “What passes, in the eyes of valley officials, as deplorable backwardness may, for those so stigmatized, represent a political space of self-governance, mobility, and freedom from taxes.”

123: “Barbarians are, then, a state effect; they are inconceivable except as a ‘position’ vis-à-vis the state. There is much to recommend Bennet Bronson’s minimalist definition of a barbarian as ‘simply a member of a political until that is in direct contract with a state but that is not itself a state.’ Thus, understood, barbarians can be, and often have been quite ‘civilized’ in the sense of literacy, technological skills, and familiarity with nearby ‘great traditions’—say of the Romans or the Han-Chinese.”

124: “Like their Han and mainland Southeast Asian counterparts, the Romans had a barbarian chiefdom fetish. Wherever possible they created territories, promulgated more or less arbitrary ethnic distinctions, and appointed, or recognized, a single chief who was, willy nilly, the local vector of Roman authority and answerable for the good conduct of his ‘people.’”

125: “A civilized narrative that assumes its own cultural and social magnetism and that depicts acculturation to its norms as much desired ascent could hardly be expected to chronicle, let alone explain, large-scale defection. And yet it is historically common.”

126: “William Rove claimed, perhaps for dramatic effect, that ‘going over to the barbarians’ was more the norm than the exception: ‘The historical reality for centuries has been … that far more Chinese had acculturated to aboriginal life than aborigines to Chinese civilization.’ Whatever a complete demographic account book would show, what matters in this particular context is that backsliding was common, even banal, and that it could have not legitimate place in the official narrative.”

127-8: “the vast mountainous region of mainland Southeast Asia we have called Zomia provided an historical sanctuary for state-evading peoples. Providing that we take a long
view—and by ‘long’ I mean fifteen hundred to two thousand years—it makes best sense to see contemporary hill peoples as the descendants of a long process of marronnage, as runaways from state-making projects in the valleys. Their agricultural practices, their social organization, their governance structure, their [128] legends, and their cultural organization in general bear strong traces of state-evading or state-distancing practices.

This view of the hills as peopled, until very recently, by a process of state-evading migration is in sharp contrast to an older view that this is still part of the fold beliefs of valley people. This older view saw hill people as an aboriginal population that had failed, for one reason or another, to make the transition to a more civilized way of life: specifically, to settled, wet-rice agriculture, lowland religion, and membership (as subject or civilization) in a larger political community. Hill peoples, in the most stringent version of this perspective, were an unalterably alien population living in a kind of highland cultural sump, and hence unsuitable prospects for cultural advancement. On the more charitable view that currently prevails, such populations are thought to have been ‘left behind’ culturally and materially (perhaps even ‘our living ancestors’), and ought, therefore, to be made the object of development efforts to integrate them into the cultural and economic life of the nation.

If, on the contrary, the population of Zomia is more accurately seen as a complex of populations that have, at one time or another, elected to move outside the easy reach of state power, then the evolutionary sequence implied by the older view is untenable. … As we shall see, such a view of hill peoples as state-repelling societies—or even antistate societies—makes far more sense of agricultural practices, cultural values, and social structure in the hills.

… The zones of refuge to which they repaired were not by any means empty, over the long haul, the demographic weight of the state-evading migrants and their descendants tended to prevail”

129: “conflict, amalgamation, and reformulation of identities in this little-governed space accounts in large measure for the ethnic complexity of Zomia. Because it found no legitimate place in the self-representations of valley-state texts, this process was rarely chronicled. Until the twentieth century, however, it was very common. Even today, as we shall see, it continues on a smaller scale.”

130: “The perspective we propose for understanding Zomia is not novel. A similar case has been made for many regions of the world, large and small, where expanding kingdoms have forced threatened populations to choose between absorption and resistance.”

132: “Both the Inca and the Spanish states gave rise to a state-resisting, ‘barbarian’ periphery. In the Spanish case, what is more striking and instructive is that much of that barbarian periphery was composed of defectors from more complex, settled societies deliberately placing themselves at a distance from the dangers and oppressions of state space. To do this often meant forsaking their permanent fields, simplifying their social structure, and splitting into smaller, more mobile bands. Ironically, they even succeeded admirably in fooling an earlier generation of ethnographers into believing that scattered peoples such as the Yanomamo, the Siriono, and the Tupo-Guarani were the surviving remnants of ur-primitive populations.

Those populations that had managed to fight free of European control for a time came to represent zones of insubordination. Such shatter zones, attracting individuals,
small groups, and whole communities seeking sanctuary outside the reach of colonial power. Schwartz and Salomon show how the Jivaro and the neighboring Zaparo, who had fought off the Europeans and come to control several tributaries of the upper Amazon, became such a magnet. The inevitable consequence of the demographic influx gave rise to a characteristic feature of most regions of refuge: a patchwork of identities, ethnicities, and cultural amalgams that are bewilderingly complex.

In North America in the late seventeenth and much of the eighteenth century, the Great Lakes region became a zone of refuge.

133: “As slaves … fled servitude, they found themselves in zones of refuge already occupied by native peoples. In places such as Florida, Brazil, Colombia, and many parts of the Caribbean, this encounter gave rise to hybrid populations that defied simple description.”

134: “The Tengger highlands are distinctive for being the major redoubt on Java of an explicitly non-Islamic, Hindu-Shaivite priesthood, the only such priesthood to have escaped the wave of Islamicization that followed the collapse of the last major Hindu-Buddhist kingdom … in the early sixteenth century.”

135: “Their distinct tradition, despite its Hindu content, is culturally encoded in a strong tradition of household autonomy, self-reliance, and an antihierarchical impulse. The contrast with lowland patterns forcibly struck a forestry officer on his first visit: ‘You couldn’t tell rich from poor. Everyone spoke in the same way, to everyone else too, no matter what their position. Children talked to their parents and even to the village chief using ordinary ngoko. No one bent down and bowed before others.’ As Hefner observes, the overriding goal of the Tengger uplands is to avoid ‘being ordered about’; an aspiration that is deliberately at odds with the elaborate hierarchies and status-coded behavior of the Javanese lowlands. …

… Together with the Tengger highlands, northern Luzon can be understood as a smaller-scale Zomia, peopled largely by refugees from lowland subordination.

In his carefully documented …, Felix Keesing sets himself the task of accounting for the cultural and ethnic differences between upland and lowland peoples. He rejects accounts that begin from the premise of an essential, primordial difference between the two populations, a premise that would require us to construct separate migration histories to account for their presence on Luzon. Instead, he claims that the differences can be traced to the long Spanish period and to the ‘ecological and cultural dynamics operating upon an originally common population.’ The overall picture once again is of flight going back more than five hundred years.”

136: “The uplanders had, for the most part, once been lowlanders whose flight to higher altitudes had begun an elaborate and complex process of differentiation. In their new economical settings, the various groups of refugees adopted new subsistence routines. For the Ifugao, this meant elaborating a sophisticated system of terracing at higher altitudes, allowing them to continue to plant irrigated rice. For most other groups it meant moving from fixed-field agriculture to swiddening and/or foraging. Encountered much later by outsiders, such groups were held to be fundamentally different peoples who had never advanced beyond ‘primitive’ subsistence techniques. But as Keesing warns, it makes no sense to simply assume that a people who are foragers today were, necessarily, foragers a hundred years ago; they might just as easily have been cultivators. The varied timing of the many wages of migration, their location by altitude, and their mode of
subsistence account, Keesing believes, for the luxuriant diversity of the mountain
ethnoscape in contrast to the valley uniformity.”
140: “One result of the Miao’s headlong flight was their wide dispersal throughout
Zomia. Although generally at higher altitudes growing opium and maize, the
Miao/Hmong can be found planting wet rice, foraging, and swiddening at intermediate
altitudes. Weins explains this diversity by the timing of the Hmong appearance in a
particular locality and their relative strength vis-à-vis competing groups. Latecomers, if
they are militarily superior, will typically seize the valley lands and force existing groups
to move upward, often in a ratcheting effect. If the latecomers are less powerful, they
must occupy whatever niches are left, often higher up the slopes.”
144: “Just how decisive flight over the centuries was demographically for the peopling of
the hills is difficult to judge. To gauge that would require more data than we have about
hill populations a millennium or more ago. What sparse archeological evidence we do
have, however, suggests that the hills were thinly populated. Paul Wheatley claimed that
in insular Southeast Asia—perhaps like Keesing’s mountainous Northern Luzon—the
mountains were essentially unoccupied until very recently, making them ‘of no human
significance prior to the late 19th century. …

The key to statecraft in precolonial Southeast Asia, one honored as often in the
breach as in its observance, was the press the kingdom’s subjects only so far as not to
provoke their wholesale departure. In areas where relatively weak kingdoms competed
for manpower, the population was not generally, hard-pressed. Indeed, under such
circumstances settlers might be enticed by grain, plow animals, and implements to settle
in under populated districts of a kingdom.

A large state lording it over a substantial wet-rice core was, as a monopolist, more
inclined to press its advantage to the limit.”
145: “Pushed to the breaking point, the subject had several choices. … becoming a
‘subject’ of an individual notable … movement to another adjacent lowland kingdom …
move outside the state’s reach altogether—to the hinterland and/or the hills. All these
options were generally preferred to the risks of open rebellion, an option confined largely
to elites contending for the throne.”
146: “How common this was is impossible to tell for sure, but to judge by the number of
oral histories in which hill people recount a past as padi growers in the lowlands, is not
negligible.”
151: “again and again, hill people in such zones raided valley settlements to the point
where they ‘killed the goose that laid the golden egg,’ leaving a devastated and
uninhabited plain. …
151-2: “what looks … as generalized raiding by hill ‘tribes’ is, in fact, a fairly finely
articulated expression of hill politics. … the primary objective of these raids was the
taking of slaves, many of whom would be kept by the [152] Kachin or sold to other hill
peoples or slave-traders. … It was yet another process by which the hills were made more
cosmopolitan culturally.”
154: “Defeated rebellions, like war in general, drove the vanquished to the margins.”
156: “Centralized power helps explain a certain level of religious orthodoxy at the core,
but it doesn’t fully account for the enormous religious diversity in the hills. The
heterodoxy of the hills was itself a kind of state effect. … the hill populations were more
scattered, diverse, and more often isolated. … If that population was heterodox, as it
often was, so too was its clergy. Schismatic sects were therefore quite likely to spring up in the hills. ... The second decisive factor is that heterodox sects, proscribed in the valleys, typically moved out of danger and into the hills. Hill demography and geography not only facilitated religious heterodoxy, they also served as a zone of refuge for persecuted sects in the valleys.”

157: “As Zomia became a place of refuge for lowland rebels and defeated armies, so also it became an asylum for banned religious sects. Projecting this process back over many centuries, one can see how Zomia came to resemble something of a shadow society, a mirror image of the great padi states—albeit using much of the same cosmological raw material. …

The frequency with which peripheries—mountains, deserts, dense forests—have been strongly associated with religious dissent is too common to be overlooked.”

158: “Sedentary grain cultivation and the rearing of domestic livestock … constituted … a great leap forward for infectious diseases.”

159: “Perhaps reflecting the effects of crowing and the proximity to trade routes, the coastal population seemed less fit than ‘the populations of the upland areas,’ who ‘made a healthier and stronger impression.’

It appears that virtually everyone understood that in the case of epidemics the safest course was to leave the city immediately and disperse to the countryside or the hills. While people were not generally aware of the actual disease vector, they implicitly knew that dispersal and isolation retarded the spread of the disease. For hill peoples in general, the lowlands are thought to be unhealthy.”

160-161: “They dynastic self-portraits of precolonial padi states in Southeast Asia and the Ming and Qing dynasties are, in the official sources, represented [161] in rosy colors as a rather benign ingathering of peoples. Wise administrators shepherd rude peoples toward a literate, Buddhist or Confucian court center in which sedentary wet-rice cultivation and becoming a full subject of the realm stand as the marks of civilizational achievement. Like all ideological self-representations, the Hegelian ideal they depict seems, like the use of the term pacification in the Vietnam War, a cruel parody of live experience, especially at the frontier.

Ignoring for the moment the larger question of what ‘civilization’ might be understood to represent, the self-portrait is radically wrong in at least two respects. First, the process of ingathering was, typically, anything but a benign, voluntary journey toward civilization.”

161-2: “The second and more egregious omission of this self-portrait is the overwhelming evidence for flight from the state core. To recognize it, of course, would be to manifestly contradict the civilizational discourse … For well more than a millennium before that, [161] however, it is abundantly clear that it was at least common for people to flee the state as to approach it.”

167: “It is easy to see how one might get, in these circumstances, something like the Tengger Highlands described earlier: a kind of vertical sedimentation of cultural pulses from afar—the oldest (deepest) how highest in elevation and the newest (most shallow) in the lowland plains. In practice, of course, the patterns of migration are far more complex, and in the twentieth century Christian missionaries in mainland Southeast Asia have ‘skiipped,’ as it were, directly to the highlands. …
Our focus has been on the vast, contiguous hilly area we have chosen to call Zomia. But the principles of the friction of distance, regions of refuge, and state-resistant topographies work elsewhere on a smaller scale.”

169: “A complete accounting of state-resistant places would have as many pages devoted to low, wet places—marshes, swamps, fens, bogs, moors, deltas, mangrove coasts, and complex waterways and archipelagoes—as to high mountain redoubts. Because such difficult-to-govern places were more likely to be located near rich padi-growing areas, at low elevation, they posed an equal or greater threat to lowland political order.”

170: “A great marsh with an even longer (three millennia or more) stories history is the Mesopotamian Marsh between the Tigris and Euphrates (today on the Iraq-Iran border). This fifteen thousand-square-kilometer marsh that shifts shape season by season was, until recently, home to a sizable population living on floating islands well away from any state presence. … The draconian remedy, in this as in other cases of a marshy resistant zone, was to drain the marsh and destroy the habitat once and for all. This great project in extending state space was finally accomplished by Saddam Hussein …

In white-settler-rulled North America, swamps, quite as much as mountains and the frontier, were sanctuaries of rebellion and escape. The Seminoles, under Chief Osceola, together with their runaway slaves allies, fought a seven-year rear-guard action against federal troops bent on enforcing Andrew Jackson’s policy of Indian removal. The Great Dismal Swamp on the east Virginia-North Carolina border was home to thousands of escaped slaves for several generations”

171: “there were repeated calls to have the Great Dismal drained because it allowed the ‘lowest sort’ of people to find freedom and independence.

Coastal environments, particularly in Southeast Asia, have also provided cover for rebels and those who would evade the state.”

172: “Like the hills, the swamps, marshes, and mangroves are places to repair to and potentially places from which to raid. But above all, they are places of low-stateness, where populations that would for whatever reason evade the writ of the state can find refuge.

…

Older narratives and lowland folk versions of who the minorities are and how they got there typically treat them as an original, indigenous people from whom valley populations descended. Current narratives by historians and ethnographers of the minorities now living in Zomia often portray them as migrants trailing a saga of defeat, persecution, marginalization. The tale is generally one of unjust victimization. Two implicit assumptions help sustain this narrative. The first is that all hill peoples would prefer to be valley cultivators, that many of them were once lowland people, and that they were driven into the hills, reluctantly, by virtue of force majeure. The second assumption is that they would naturally want to avoid the stigma of ‘barbarity’ and backwardness that attaches to them—that barbarity is the logical outcome of their flight. …

To leave the story here is to miss the important intentionality—the agency—of these migrants. Where there is an open-land frontier and trade with lowland settlements, ill dwellers can enjoy a relatively prosperous life with less labor, not to mention taxes and corvée.”

173: “so has the move to upland swiddening and foraging often been voluntary move in terms of narrow economic self-interest.”
Because the shift to hill livelihoods was, in valley terms, always associated with a decline in status, it was inconceivable that it could have occurred voluntarily. Hill populations, by valley accounts, were either an aboriginal population that had never been civilized or, more sympathetically, a population driven from the lowlands by force.

If, in fact, groups choose not to be assimilated to the culture and routines of the valley state, if they choose instead, deliberately, to place themselves at a physical and cultural distance from that civilization, then we need a way to describe this process that treats it as more than a loss or a fall from grace. … Dissimilation … refers to the more purposeful creation of cultural distance between societies.

A comparable story might apply to a great many (but not all) hill peoples of Zomia. … [These groups] seem to share a history in which, often after rebellion, some remained behind while others fled out of range while absorbing along the way, other migrants.

I wish to emphasize the element of historical and strategic choice. … Patterns that may appear static, even timeless, at first sight, display a remarkable plasticity if one steps back and widens the historical lens to a span of a few generations, let alone a few hundred years or a millennium. The evidence, I think, requires that we interpret hill societies— their location, their residence pattern, their agricultural techniques, their kinship practices, and their political organization—largely as social and historical choices designed to position themselves vis-à-vis the valley states and other hills peoples among whom they live.

“nonstate” peoples as the so-called orang asli (‘original people’) of Malasia. They were previously understood to be the descendants of earlier waves of migration, less technically developed than the Austronesian populations which succeeded and dominated them on the peninsula. Genetic evidence, however, does not support the theory of separate waves of migrating peoples. The orang asli … on the one hand and the Malays on the other are best viewed not as an evolutionary series but as political series.

Highland Southeast Asia has, for ecological reasons, no substantial groups of herding peoples. The nearest equivalent, in terms of ease of movement, are nomadic foragers. Most hill people pursue livelihoods that incorporate a certain amount of foraging and hunting and can, when pressed, rely heavily upon it. But those groups specialized to foraging both are located in areas far from state power and have a mode of subsistence that requires physical mobility …. Such people have been typically understood by historians and lowland populations alike as remnants of distinct and, in evolutionary terms, more primitive ‘tribes’ Contemporary scholarship has overturned this judgment. Far from a response to having been left behind, foraging in the modern era is seen as a largely political choice or adaptation to evade capture by the state … the new consensus.

Pooling the risks of illness, accident, death, and food shortages also argues for a minimum group size. … Even for fugitive peoples, then, long-run self-protection requires groups of at least several families.

there is ample reason to assume that they are where they are and do what they do intentionally. This is, in effect, the historic choice made by many former plains-dwellers who fled to the hills when oppressed by ruinous taxation or threatened with servitude by a more powerful people. … Nor should we overlook the attraction of the autonomy and the relatively egalitarian social relations prevailing in the hills, as important a goal as evading corvée and taxes.
Neither does the desire for autonomy exhaust the positive reasons why hill peoples might prefer the situation to the alternatives. We know from both contemporary and archeological data that foragers, in all but the most severe environments, are more robust, healthier, and freer from illnesses, particularly epidemic zoonotic diseases, than the population of more concentrated sedentary communities. All in all, it seems that the appearance of agriculture initially did more to depress standards of human welfare than to raise them.”

Any effort to examine the history of social structure and subsistence routines as part of a deliberate political choice runs smack against a powerful civilizational narrative. That narrative consists of a historical series arranged as an account of economic, social, and cultural progress. With respect to livelihood strategies, the series, from most primitive to most advanced, might be: foraging/hunting-gathering, pastoral nomadism, horticulture/sifting cultivation, sedentary fix-field agriculture, irrigated plow agriculture, industrial agriculture. With respect to social structure, again from the most primitive to most advanced, the series might read: small bands in the forest or savannah, hamlets, villages, towns, cities, metropolises. These two series are, of course, essentially the same; they chart a growing concentration of agricultural production (yield per unit of land) and a growing concentration of population in larger agglomerations. First elaborated by Giovanni Battista Vico at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the narrative derives its hegemonic status not only from its affinity with social Darwinism but from the fact that it maps nicely on the stories most states and civilizations tell about themselves. The schema assumes movement in a single direction toward concentrated populations and intensive production; no backsliding is envisioned; each step is irreversible progress.”

As an empirical description of premodern Europe or of most poor nations until the twentieth century, and as an empirical description of the hilly areas of mainland Southeast Asia (Zomia), however, this narrative is profoundly misleading. What the schema portrays is not simply a self-satisfied normative account of progress but a gradient of successive stages of incorporation into state structures. Its stages of civilization are, at the same time, an index of diminishing autonomy and freedom. Until quite recently, many societies and groups have abandoned fixed cultivation to take up shifting agriculture and foraging. They have, by the same token, altered their kinship systems and social structure and dispersed into smaller settlements. The actual archeological record in peninsular Southeast Asia reveals a long-term oscillation between foraging and farming depending, it would seem, on the conditions. What to Vico would have seemed to be lamentable backsliding and decay was for them a strategic option to circumvent the many inconveniences of state power.

… The French anthropologists Pierre Clastres was the first to argue that many of the hunting-and-gathering ‘tribes’ of South America, far from being left behind, had previously lived in state formations and practiced fixed-field agriculture. They had purposely given it up to evade subordination. …

The precise reasons why such groups would have taken to foraging in small bands is a matter of some dispute. Several factors, however, played a role.”

A paradigmatic case is that of the Siriono, of Eastern Bolivia, described initially by Allan Holmberg in his anthropological classic Nomads of the Longbow. Apparently lacking the ability to make fire or cloth, living in rude shelters, innumerate, having no domestic animals or developed cosmology, they were, Holmberg wrote, Paleolithic
survivors living in a veritable state of nature. We now know beyond all reasonable doubt that the Siriono had been crop-growing villagers until roughly 1920, when influenza and smallpox swept through their villages, killing many of them. Attacked by numerically superior peoples and fleeing potential slavery, the Siriono apparently abandoned their crops, which, in any event, they did not have the numbers to defend. Their independence and survival in this case required then to divide into smaller bands, foraging and moving whenever threatened. They would occasionally raid a settlement to take axes, hatchets, and machetes, but at the same time they dreaded the illness that the raiders often brought back with them. They had become nonsedentary by choice—to avoid both disease and capture."

190: “we may simply note the overall pattern of the agricultural strategies employed in maroon communities. We shall, in the context of describing upland peoples in Southeast Asia, encounter practices that bear a strong family resemblance to those of the maroons.”

191: “movement from swiddening to wet rice was seen as unidirectional and evolutionary.

Contrary to this view, my claim is that the choice of shifting cultivation is preeminently a political choice”

196-7: “Once we have shed the erroneous idea that shifting cultivation is necessarily historically prior to, more primitive than, and less efficient than fixed- [197] field cultivation, there remains one further illusion to shed. That illusion is that it is a relatively static technique that has not changed much in the past millennium. On the contrary, one could argue that swiddening and, for that matter, foraging have undergone far more transformation in that period than has wet-rice cultivation. Some scholars claim that the shifting cultivation with which we are familiar was essentially a product of iron and, later, steel blades, which massively reduced the labor required to clear swiddens. …

At least two other historical factors worked to transform swiddening. The first was international trade in high-value goods that had, at least since the eighth century, linked both swiddeners and foragers to international markets. … The final factor transforming shifting cultivation was the arrival of an entire suite of New World plants from the sixteenth century on that vastly extended the scope and ease of swiddening.”

208: “The issue of tribe and states, however, is still very much alive in the Middle East. Thus it is from the ethnographers and historians of tribal-state relations there that we can begin to take our bearings.

Tribes and states, they agree, are mutually constituting entities. There is no evolutionary sequence; tribes are not prior to states. Tribes are, rather, a social formation defined by its relation to the state. ‘If rulers of the Middle East have been preoccupied by a ‘tribal problem,’ tribes could be said to have had a perennial ‘state-problem.’”

212: “Another turn-of-the-century British official warned observers not to take the apparent subordination of petty Kachin chiefs seriously. ‘Beyond this nominal subordination, each village claims to be independent and only acknowledges its own chief.’ This independence, he emphasizes, anticipating Leach, characterizes even the smallest social units; it ‘extends down even to the household and each house owner, if he disagrees with his chief, can leave the village and set up is own house elsewhere as his own sawbwa.’”

218: “Flight, not rebellion, has been the basis of freedom in the hills; far more egalitarian settlements were founded by runaways than by revolutionaries. …
The hill Karen provide a case in point. Part or all of their small settlements would move to a new location, not simply to clear a new swidden but for many nonagricultural reasons as well. An inauspicious sign, a series of illnesses or death, a factional split, pressure for tribute, an overreaching headman, a dream, the call of a respected religious figure—any of these might be enough to prompt a move.”

219: “The utter plasticity of social structure among the more democratic, stateless, hill peoples can hardly be exaggerated. Shape-shifting, fissioning, disaggregation, physical mobility, reconstitution, sifting in subsistence routines are often so dizzying that the very existence of the units beloved of anthropologists—the village, the lineage, the tribe, the hamlet—are called into question. …

… this polymorphism is admirably suited to the purpose of evading incorporation in state structures.”

220: “But what if many peoples, on a long view, are not preliterate, but, to use Leo Alting von Geusau’s term, postliterate. … And what if, to raise the most radical possibility, there was an active or strategic dimension to this abandonment of the world of texts and literacy? The evidence for this last possibility is almost entirely circumstantial. For this reason, and perhaps due to a failure of nerve on my part, I have bracketed this discussion from the foregoing account of escape agriculture and escape social structure. The case for the ‘strategic’ maintenance (if not creation) of nonliteracy, however, is cut from the same cloth.”

223: “What are we to make of these legends of lost literacy? It is conceivable, providing once again that we take a very long historical view, that these legends embody a germ of historical truth. Tai, Hmong/Miao, and Yao/Mien, form what we can reconstruct of their migration histories, came from lowland settings and may well have once been padi-state peoples”.

224: “Something very much like this institutional collapse seems to lie behind the four-century-long ‘Greek Dark Age,’ lasting roughly from 100 BCE (the time of the Trojan War) until 700.”

225: “The epoch is termed the Dark Age precisely because no written records survive, apparently because the knowledge of Linear B script was abandoned in the chaos and dispersal of the time.”

253: “Most hill people in mainland Southeast Asia, before the colonial state insisted on classifying them, did not have what we might consider ‘proper’ ethnic identities. They often identified themselves by a place name—the people of X valley, the people of & watershed—or by kin group or lineage. And to be sure, their identity would vary depending on whom they were addressing. Many names were implicitly relational—the ‘uphill’ people, the people of the ‘west ridge’—and their designation made sense only as one element in a relational set. Still other names were exonymous used by outsiders—as was often the case for the Miao—have no further meaning except in that context. Identities were, to complicate matters further, plural; most hill people had a repertoire of identities they could deploy in different contexts. And such identities as there were, were subject to change … Before the advent of modern statecraft, with its practices of territorial administration and mutually exclusive sovereignties and ethnicities, such ambiguities were common.”
Flexible identities also characterized systems of social stratification in which those of lower status sought to emulate, or at least to defer to, powerful others of higher status.

Quite apart from the confusion of colonial officials and census takers, later ethnographers and historians of Burma have only confirmed Leache’s earlier judgment that ethnic boundaries are labile, porous, and largely artificial. Thus, for example, different observers could classify the same group of people as ‘Karen,’ Lawa,’ or ‘Thai’ depending on the criteria used and the purposes of the classification. Where different peoples had long lived in close proximity, they often merged seamlessly into one another so that demarcating a boundary between them seemed both arbitrary and futile.”

“Through much of the region ethnicity, far from being an ascriptive ‘given,’ was a choice.”

“‘Tribes’ in the strong sense of the word have never existed. By ‘strong sense,’ I mean tribes as conceived as distinct, bounded, total social units. If the test of ‘tribeness’ is that the group in question be a genealogically and genetically coherent breeding population, a distinct linguistic community, a unified and bounded political unit, and a culturally distinct and coherent [257] entity, then virtually all tribes’ fail the test.”

“In this secondary sense, named tribes with self-consciousness of their identities do most certainly exist. Rather than existing in nature, they are a creative human construction—a political project—in dialogue and competition with other ‘tribes’ and states. The lines of demarcation are essentially arbitrary and the outset, given the great variety of ethnographic difference. The political entrepreneurs—officials or not—who endeavor to mark out and identity based on supposed cultural differences are not so much discovering a social boundary as selecting one of innumerable cultural differences on which to base group distinctions. Whichever of these differences is emphasized (dialect, dress, diet, mode of subsistence, presumed descent) leads to the stipulation of a different cultural and ethnographic boundary distinguishing an ‘us’ from a ‘them.’ This is why the invention of the tribe is best understood as a political project. The chosen boundary is a strategic choice because it organizes differences in one way rather than another, and because it is a political device for group formation. The only defensible point of departure for deciding who is an X and who is a Y is to accept the self-designations of the actors themselves.

The creation of the Cossacks as a self-conscious ethnicity … [260] The people who became the Cossacks were runaway serfs and fugitives from all over European Russia. Most of them fled in the sixteenth century to the Don River steppelands ‘to escape or avoid the social and political ills of Muscovite Russia.’ They had nothing in common but servitude and flight. On the vast Russian hinterland, they were geographically fragmented in as many as twenty-two Cossack ‘hosts’ all the way from Siberia and the Amur River to the Don River basin and the Azov Sea.

They became a ‘people’ at the frontier for reasons having largely to do with their new ecological setting and subsistence routines. Depending on their location, they settled among the Tatars, Circassians (whose dress they adopted), and Kalmyks, whose horseback habits and settlement patterns the copied. The abundant land available for both pasture and agriculture meant that these pioneer settlers lived in a common property land regime where each family had its own independent access to the means of subsistence and complete freedom of movement and residence. An ethos of independence and
egalitarianism, desired by a people who had known servitude, was underwritten by the political economy of frontier ecology.

…

Not by any stretch of the imagination a coherent ‘people’ at the outset, the Cossacks are today perhaps the most solidaristic ‘ethic’ minority in Russia.”

266: “All hill peoples, without exception, as nearly as I can tell, have had long experience in reworking their genealogies to absorb strangers; … Hill societies … attached newcomers to descent groups or kindreds, often the most powerful ones.”

268: “One of the most famous tribes in history—that of Osman, founder of the Ottoman Empire—was in fact a motley collection of different peoples and religions collaborating for public purposes. This was not an exception. Surveying the evidence, Rudi Paul Lindner claims that ‘Modern anthropologists’ field studies [in the Middle East] show that tribal, clan, and even camp membership are more open than the tribal idiom or ideology might indicate.’ The tribe was, in Osman’s case, a useful vehicle to bring together Turkish pastoralists and Byzantine settlers. … The segmentary lineage model is, without doubt, a common tribal ideology, but it is not common tribal practices except insofar as it is necessary to keep up appearances.

The hegemony of blood ties and rules of genealogical descent, as the only legitimate foundation for social cohesion, though at variance with the facts was so powerful as to dominate self-representations.”

276: “one ‘tradition’ to which most Lisu proudly point: namely, the tradition of murdering headmen who become too autocratic. As Paul Durrenberger puts it, ‘The Lisu loathe … assertive and autocratic headmen,’ and the ‘stories Lisu tell of murdered headmen are legion.’ Such traditions can also be found among a good many egalitarian hill peoples.”

278-: “We should distinguish here between state-repelling characteristics and state-preventing ones. They are related but not identical. State-repelling traits are those that make it difficult for a state to capture or incorporate a group and rule it, or to systematically appropriate its material production. State-preventing traits, on the other hand, are those that make it unlikely that a group will develop internally durable, hierarchical, statelike structures.

[279] The state-repelling features we have repeatedly encountered in the foregoing analysis can be summarized in general terms. First, a society that is physically mobile, widely dispersed, and likely to fission into new and smaller units is relatively impervious to state capture for obvious reasons.”

279: “A third state-repelling feature is a highly egalitarian social structure that makes it difficult for a state to extend its rule through local chiefs and headmen. …

A final state-thwarting strategy is distance from state centers or, in our terms, friction-of terrain remoteness.”

281-2: “For the past half-century, however, the gradient of available identities has, as it were, been radically tilted in favor of various degrees of state control … At least three factors account for this. First, the modern idea of full sovereignty within a nation-state and the administrative and military wherewithal to effect it means [281] that little effort is spared to project the nation-state’s writ to the borders of adjacent states. Zones of overlapping, ambiguous, or no sovereignty—once virtually all of Zomia are increasingly rare. Second, the material basis of egalitarian, acephalous societies—common property in
land—is increasingly replaced by state allocation of land rights or individual freehold tenure. And finally, the massive growth of lowland populations has prompted a massive, growing, state-sponsored or abetted colonization of the hills. The colonists bring with them their crops, their social organization, and, this time, their state. The result is the world’s last great enclosure.”

293: “In a world with the odds stacked so massively against them, surely the astounding fact about marginal hill peoples and many of the world’s dispossessed is that they should so often believe and act as though their deliverance were at hand.”

324: “Savagery has become their character and nature. They enjoy it, because it means freedom from authority and no subservience to leadership. Such a natural disposition is the negation and antithesis of civilization.”

--Ibn Khaldun on nomads

... we might identify four eras: 1) a stateless era (by far the longest), 2) an era of small-scale states encircled by vast and easily reached stateless peripheries, 3) a period in which such peripheries are shrunken and beleaguered by the expansion of state power, and finally, 4) an era in which virtually the entire globe is ‘administered space’ and the periphery is not much more than a folkloric remnant.”

326: “The findings are consistent with what some archeologists have called ‘heterarchy’: social and economic complexity without unified, hierarchical ranking.”

326-7: “Zomia was, in all these senses, a ‘state effect,’ or, more precisely, an effect of state-making and state expansion. Shatter zones and regions of refuge are, then, the inescapable dark twin’ of state-making projects in the valleys. The state and its resulting shatter zone are mutually constituted in the full sense of that much-abused term; each stands in the other’s shadow and takes its cultural bearings from the other. The valley state’s elites define their status as a civilization by reference to those outside their grasp, while at the same time depending on them for trade and to replenish (by capture [327] or inducements) their subject population. The hill peoples, in turn, are dependent on the valley state for vital trade goods and may position themselves cheek by jowl with valley kingdoms to take full advantage of the opportunities for profit and plunder, while generally remaining outside direct political control. Other hill peoples, more remote and/or egalitarian, appear to have structured themselves as something of an antithesis of valley hierarchy and authority. Valley and hill peoples represent two contrasting political spheres, one rather concentrated and homogenous, the other dispersed and heterogeneous, but each unstable and each constituted of human material pulled, at one time or another, from the other.

Upland societies, far from being the original, primal ‘stuff’ from which states and ‘civilizations’ were crafted, are, rather, largely a reflexive product of state-making designed to be as unappealing as possible as a site of appropriation. Just as nomadic pastoralism is now generally recognized as a secondary adaptation by populations wishing both to leave the sedentary agrarian state and yet take advantage of the trading and raiding opportunities it afforded, so is swiddening largely a secondary adaptation. Like pastoralism, it disperses population and lacks the ‘nerve centers’ that a state might seize. The fugitive nature of its production frustrates appropriation. Hill societies with their deliberate out-of-the-way locations, with their mixed portfolio of linguistic and cultural identities, with the variety of subsistence routines at their disposal, with their capacity to fission and disperse like the ‘jellyfish’ tribes of the Middle East, and with
their capacity, thanks in part to valley cosmologies, to form new resistant identities at the drop of a hat, are constituted as if they were intended to be a state-maker’s or colonial official’s worst nightmare. And indeed, they are largely so.”

328: “much of the flux and apparent disorder is resolved once we examine hill social order and reformulations of identity as strategic repositionings of various villages, groups, and networks vis-à-vis the gravitational force—political, economic, and symbolic—of the nearest valley state.”

329: “It is perhaps one of the features of shatter zones located at the interstices of unstable state systems that there is a premium on the adaptability of identities. Most hill cultures have, as it were, their bags already packed for travel across space, across identities, or across both. Their broad repertoires of languages and ethnic affiliations, their capacity for prophetic reinvention, their short and/or oral genealogies, and their talent for fragmentation all form elements in their formidable travel it.”

330: “What hill peoples on the periphery of states have been evading is the hard power of the fiscal state, its capacity to extract direct taxes and labor from a subject population. They have, however, actually sought, sometimes quite eagerly, relationships with valley states that are compatible with a large degree of political autonomy.”

331: “Virtually all hill societies exhibit a range of state-avoiding behavior. For some, such characteristics are compatible with a degree of internal hierarchy and, from time to time, imitative state-making. For other groups, however, state evasion is coupled with practices that might be termed the prevention of internal state-making. Relatively acephalous groups with strong traditions of equality and sanctions against permanent hierarchy, such as the Akha, Lahu, Lisu, and Wa, seem to belong to his category. State preventing societies share some common characteristics. They are likely to prevent the emergence of any permanent ranking of lineages through marriage alliances; they are more likely to have cautionary legends about the assassination or expulsion of overreaching headmen; and, finally, their villages and lineages are likely to divide into smaller and more egalitarian fragments when inequalities do threaten to become permanent.”

333: “Hjorleifur Jonsson, in this context, contrasts thee subsistence strategies: 1) foraging-hunting and gathering, 2) swiddening, and 3) fixed field agriculture. Foraging is virtually appropriation-proof and permits little in the way of social inequality. Swiddening is appropriation resistant, though it may generate a surplus, usually temporary, internal hierarchy.”

334: “Foraging and swiddening were both understood by those who practiced them as forms of political secession from the lowland state, with foraging the more radical, distancing choice.

… a large bandwidth of possible locations … taking up padi cultivation on the plains and inviting incorporation as peasants into the valley state to the other extreme of foraging and swiddening in remote, fortified, ridge-top settlements while cultivating a reputation for killing intruders.”

334-5: “Here it is worth recalling that most foragers and nomadic peoples—and perhaps swiddeners as well—were not aboriginal survivals but were rather adaptations created in the shadow of states. Just as Pierre Clastres supposed, the societies of many acephalous foragers and swiddeners are admirably designed to take advantage of agro-ecological niches in grading with nearby states yet manage to avoid subordination as subjects. If one were a social Darwinian, one might well see the mobility of hill peoples, their spare
dispersed [335] communities, their noninherited rankings, their oral culture, their large portfolio of subsistence and identity strategies, and perhaps even their prophetic inclinations as brilliantly suited to a tumultuous environment. They are better adapted to survival as nonsubjects in a political environment of states than to making states themselves."

335: “colonial administrators … often explained that taxes were the inevitable price one paid for living in a ‘civilized society.’ By this discursive legerdemain they neatly managed three tricks: they described their subjects as effectively ‘precivilized,’ they substituted imperial ideals for colonial reality, and above all, they confounded ‘civilization’ with what was, in fact, state-making.

The ‘just-so’ story of civilization always requires a wild untamed antagonist, usually just out of reach”.

337: “In the valley imagination, all these characteristics are earlier stages in a process of social evolution at the apex of which elites perch. Hill peoples are an earlier stage: they are ‘pre-’ just about everything: pre-padi cultivation, pre-towns, prereligion, preliterate, pre-valley subject. As we have seen at some length, however, the characteristics for which hill peoples are stigmatized are precisely those characteristics that a state-evading people would encourage and perfect in order to avoid surrendering autonomy. The valley imagination has its history wrong. Hill peoples are not pre-anything. In fact, they are better understood as post-irrigated rice, postsedentary, postsubject, and perhaps even postliterate. They present, in the longue durée, a reactive and purposeful statelessness of peoples who have adapted to a world of states while remaining outside their firm grasp.”

378 (n. 18): “David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 186. The archeological record is clear. ‘John Coatesworth writes, “Bioarcheologists have linked the agricultural transition to a significant decline in nutrition and to increase in disease, overwork and violence in areas where skeletal remains make it possible to compare human welfare before and after the change.” Why would one prefer a lifeway based on the painful cultivation, collection and preparation of a small variety of grass seeds, when it was so much easier to gather plants or animals that were more varied, larger, and easier to prepare’ (223). This analysis lends further support to Ester Boserup’s thesis, in The conditions of Agricultural Growth (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), that sedentary grain agriculture was a painful adaptation to crowing and land shortage. …

[n. 22] “The evidence suggests that the New World was far more densely populated before the Conquest than previously imagined. We now know, in large part through archeological evidence, that agriculture was practiced in most areas where it was technically feasible and that the population of the New World may actually have been more numerous than that of Western Europe. … see Charles C. Mann, 1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus (New York: Knopf, 2005).”


**Sen, Poverty & Famines**

1: “Starvation is the characteristic of some people not *having* enough food to eat. It is not a characteristic of there *being* not enough food to eat. White the latter can be a cause for the former, it is but one of many *possible* cause. Whether and how starvation relates to food supplies is a matter for factual investigation.”

45: “The entitlement approach to starvation and famines concentrates the ability of people to command food through the legal means available in the society”.

p. 52-85: “Chapter 6: the Great Bengal Famine”

53: “The official Famine Inquiry Commission reporting on the Bengal famine of 1943 put its death toll at ‘about 1.5 million’. W. R. Aykroyd … has said recently: ‘I now think it was an under-estimate…’ … it can be shown that the Commission’s own method of calculation does lead to a figure of around three million deaths”.

**Silberbauer, Hunter and habitat in the central Kalahari Desert**


GRANT’S RECOMMENDATION: Evidence of low violence: I THINK THIS QUOTE IS FROM GRANT: “In any case, there are other clear cases in which rates of violence are very low. Elsewhere in the Kalahari, the G/wi would seem to be a good case of this. Here, real violence would seem to be almost virtually absent. See Silberbauer …”

Silberbauer himself:
“Abhorrence of any violence that goes farther than the domestic ex- [175] change of blows effectively prevents assaults. The latitude permitted among joking partners leaves no real possibility that mutual insults could lead to any more than retaliation in the same coin. … the restricted nature of interaction between avoidance relatives effectively prevents direct conflict between them.

Conflict is expressed mostly in the form of accusations of laziness, stinginess, deceitfulness, excessively bad temper, and the damaging of property.”

Smith, Semicommon Property

ABSTRACT:
A semicommons exists where property fights are not only a mix of common and private fights, but both are significant and can interact. The major example of a semicommons is the medieval open-field system in which peasants owned scattered strips of land for grain growing but used the land collectively for grazing. The ownership structure allowed operation on a large scale for grazing and harnessed private incentives for grain growing. But a semicommons potentially leads to problems of strategic behavior that go beyond the familiar incentives to overuse a commons. In order to raise the costs of such behavior devices such as the scattering of strips may be used to mix up entitlements. Generally, boundary placement and norms are substitute methods of addressing strategic behavior in a semicommons. Among these solutions, scattering functions as a sanction for activities associated with strategic behavior.

131: “ONE commonly encounters the observation that actual property regimes mix elements of public, common, and private ownership. And so they do. Even with respect to individual assets, ownership is often divided, as in future interests, trusts, co-ownership, and easements.

But one form of mixed ownership has not received due attention-what I will call "semicommon" ownership. In a semicommons, a resource is owned and used in common for one major purpose, but, with respect to some other major purpose, individual economic units-individuals, fami-
lies, or firms--have property fights to separate pieces of the commons.”

132: “The archetypal example of a semicommons is the open-field system of
medieval and early modern northern Europe. In the open-fields system, peasants
had private property rights to the grain they grew on their individual strips of under 1 acre, which were scattered in two or three large fields
around the central village. However, during certain seasons, peasants would
be obligated to throw the land open to all the landowners for grazing their
animals (especially sheep) in common, under a common herdsmen. His enabled
them to take advantage of economies of scale in grazing and private
incentives in grain growing (with no important scale economies). The
semicommons allowed operation on two scales simultaneously. To address
incentives to overuse the common-pool resource (the potential "tragedy of
the commons"), many aspects of the operation such as the numbers of animals
and times for grazing were strictly regulated on a communal basis.”

132: “A semicommons need not be tragic
where the benefits from operating on multiple scales outweigh the costs of
strategy behavior and its prevention. In the case of the open fields, a special
device, scattering of peasant plots, discouraged such strategic behavior by
raising the costs of engaging in it: for example, singling out parcels for excessive
trampling by sheep would be prohibitively difficult where the herd
is standing on many plots at once or moving around and it is difficult for
the herdsmen to tell which parcel is which.”

134-5: “The paradigm case of what I am calling a semicommons is the medieval
open-field system. The open-field system combined significant aspects of
common and private ownership. Details of the open-field system varied
from location to location, but it presents striking similarities. In the typical
open-field village, several hundred peasants would live together in a nucleated
village surrounded by two or three large fields of arable farmland and,
probably farther out, waste or woods. Neither the fields nor the waste was
an open-access resource; only villagers-or, in the case of the open fields
themselves, landowing peasants-had access to the commons. The village
might or might not be under the supervision of a lord and a manor
court, and the peasants took many decisions in group meetings. Individual
peasants would own long and narrow strips of well under an acre, in the
sense that the individual peasant would be entitled to all the grain produced
on those strips and could lease, alienate (subject to minimal restrictions dis-
cussed below), and pass them by inheritance. Even in medieval times, both
freeholders and copyholders enjoyed these rights of ownership in the strips. These strips would be not be adjacent but would be widely scattered
through the two or three fields. One field would be kept fallow in any season.
The peasants enjoyed a right to graze livestock (sheep, sometimes cattle
or horses) on the fields when they lay fallow and in certain other circumstances
such as immediately after harvest. This was important in the later
pre-enclosure era, when pasture land was scarce in the open-field reas in
England.
required much pastureland given the techniques of the day. Animals, especially sheep, were grazed as a collective herd composed of individually owned animals; at various times, the herd would graze on the open field in its role as commons or on the common "waste" area. Either the peasants would hire a herdsman or each peasant would take turns herding in proportion to the number of sheep he owned. During the grain-growing season (or in some instances during the hay-growing period), however, peasants' private rights in their strips controlled: peasants withdrew all produce (grain, or sometimes hay) from their respective strips. The open-field system allowed operation on two scales, large (common) scale for grazing and small (private) scale for grain growing. Mixing common and private ownership allowed each operation to use the combination of scale and ownership structure most suited to it."

137: "Various fights to the commons, both waste and arable, were quite well defined. Supervision of these limitations did not originate with an overlord. Many common-field villages were not under the direction of a lord of the manor. Instead, it seems that much of the regulation was customary and that some of the customs made their way into increasingly formal legislation. The customs (and later laws) were administered by local town gatherings and the courts leet and, later, the equity courts."

Smith, Ten Thousand Years of Inequality

Michael E. Smith and Timothy Kohler (editors), Ten Thousand Years of Inequality: The Archaeology of Wealth Differences (Amerind Studies in Archaeology)
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/archaeology-wealth-inequality-180968072/

Haven’t read the book, but here’s an article from the Smithsonian Magazine about the book:

The Archaeology of Wealth Inequality
Researchers trace the income gap back more than 11,000 years
By Matthew Shaer
Smithsonian Magazine, March 2018

When the last of the volcanic ash from Mount Vesuvius settled over Pompeii in A.D. 79, it preserved a detailed portrait of life in the grand Roman city, from bristling military outposts to ingenious aqueducts. Now researchers say the eruption nearly 2,000 years ago also captured clues to one of today’s most pressing social problems.

Analyzing dwellings in Pompeii and 62 other archaeological sites dating back 11,200 years, a team of experts has ranked the distribution of wealth in those communities. Bottom line: economic disparities increased over the centuries and technology played a role. The findings add to our knowledge of history’s haves
and have-nots, an urgent concern as the gulf between the 1 percent of ultra-rich and the rest of us continues to grow.

“We wanted to be able to look at the ancient world as a whole and draw connections to today,” says Michael E. Smith, an archaeologist at Arizona State University, who took part in the study. The research is being published this month in Ten Thousand Years of Inequality, a book edited by Smith and Timothy Kohler of Washington State University.

For the first time, archaeology allows humanity’s deep past to provide an account of the early manifestations of wealth inequality around the world.

The idea of using house size as a proxy for economic status may not be revolutionary—a palace is bigger than a hovel, after all—but the researchers found a new way to gauge the economy of ancient settlements from structural measurements. For each site they calculated a value known to economists and policy wonks as the Gini coefficient, which quantifies how evenly wealth is distributed. In a population with a Gini coefficient of 0, everyone has the same economic resources; 1 represents maximum disparity. The Gini score of the United States, one of the most unequal countries, is about 0.81, while that of Slovakia is about 0.48.

How do past societies stack up? Hunter-gatherers, as scholars long hypothesized, tended to be the most equitable. But around 10,200 B.C., societies began to farm the land. Economic disparity edged up: farming enabled families to collect wealth and pass it on. In Europe and Asia, domestication of draft animals beginning around 10,000 years ago let some landowners cultivate ever larger areas, further concentrating wealth. That didn’t happen in the Americas until after Europeans exported that agricultural innovation in the 16th century.

*The more technologically advanced a society was, the researchers say, the less equal it tended to be*—a cautionary tale for our increasingly high-tech future.

*Comparing the size of dwellings at archaeological ruins, researchers found increasing wealth inequality over thousands of years.* Technology accelerates the trend, first in the Old World and then in the New. For each site the experts calculated the Gini coefficient, a standard measure of wealth distribution. The gap between rich and poor in the United States is shown for reference.

Abstract This review addresses methods and theories for the archaeological study of ancient state economies, from the earliest states through the Classical period and beyond. Research on this topic within anthropological archaeology has been held back by reliance on simple concepts and an impoverished notion of the extent of variation in ancient state economies. First I review a long-standing debate between scholars who see similarities with modern capitalist economies (modernists and formalists) and those who see ancient economies as radically different from their modern counterparts (primitivists and substantivists). I suggest that the concept of the level of commercialization provides an avenue for transcending this debate and moving research in more productive directions. Next I review work on the traditional archaeological topics of production and exchange. A discussion of the scale of the economy (households, temple and palace institutions, state finance, cities and regional systems, and international economies) reveals considerable variation between and within ancient states. I review key topics in current archaeological political economy, including commercial exchange, money, property, labor, and the nature of economic change, and close with suggestions for future research.

73: “for most economists, Rome (or perhaps Greece) is as “ancient” as they are willing to study. Economic anthropologists ignore ancient states.”

74: “most anthropological archaeologists today have an impoverished view of economic variation in ancient states.”

75: “Early “modernists” argued that the Greek and Roman economies did not differ greatly from the modern economy, whereas the “primitivists” emphasized the small-scale, agrarian orientation, and stagnant nature of the ancient economy compared to modern capitalism … The leading substantivist was Karl Polanyi, many of whose concepts—e.g., the notion that the economy is embedded in society—have been extremely fruitful. One of his central tenets, however—the view that capitalism is fundamentally different from other economic systems—proved quite harmful to the study of ancient state economies. … According to Polanyi (1957), noncapitalist economies are organized around the exchange mechanisms of reciprocity and redistribution, whereas capitalism is based on market exchange. The problem with this classification—which has been enormously influential in archaeology—is that it leaves no room for noncapitalist commercial exchange. To Polanyi, early state economies were not capitalist, so therefore they must have been based on reciprocity and redistribution. Polanyi did not understand the operation of ancient commercial economies.”
75-6: “He claimed that there were no [76] true markets or ‘prices’ .... These ideas have now been thoroughly refuted ... only a few scholars still accept Polanyi’s ideas about ancient Old World economies”.

76: “Most textbooks in economic anthropology are written by ethnologists who ignore archaeology and early states (e.g., Wilk 1996). Archaeologists therefore have assumed the task of theorizing ancient state economies largely independently of mainstream economic anthropology.”

76: “Adaptationist theories that the rise of states was caused by population pressure (Cohen 1977) were easy to debunk (Cowgill 1975)”

77: “Just as to talk of commercial development in a state-controlled economy like the Inka or Egyptians would be misleading, to reject commercial development as an active economic force in the Roman or Greek economies also would be absurd. The level of commercialization is, in fact, one of the key dimensions of variation in ancient state economies, a topic explored more fully below.

Clearly Brumfiel & Earle (1987b) favor the political model. Local elites assume control of the economy, but unlike in the adaptationist approach, elites take a more self-centered stance by strategically controlling aspects of the economy for their own economic and political ends.”

78: “Most applications of this model [new institutional economics], including those by anthropologists (Acheson 1994), simply assume a high level of commercialization (Ankarloo 2002), and the work of adapting the new institutional economics approach to uncommercialized or partially commercialized economies barely has begun”

78: “Most anthropological archaeologists avoid the Classical world, and most Classicists ignore other early state economies, but these biases have little theoretical or comparative justification. One way that Greece and Rome stand out in relation to many early states is their high level of commercialization. These were not, however, the only early states with money, entrepreneurial merchants, and other commercial institutions.”

79: See table on p. 79

79: “Uncommercialized state economies lack marketplaces, independent entrepreneurial merchants, general-purpose money, and other institutions associated with commercial exchange. Full-time craft specialists work for the state or state-connected temple institutions, and agents of the state carry out long-distance transfers and exchanges. Historical descriptions of Egyptian and Inka society, supported by archaeological data, make clear the strong state control of most sectors of these economies and the accompanying proliferation of bureaucratic institutions and practices for management of the economy.

Economies with low commercialization have limited marketplace distribution of goods and services, but land and labor are not commodities.”

79-80: “Economies with intermediate commercialization correspond approximately to Smith’s “fully commercialized” type (1976a). These economies are characterized by interlocking central place market systems for goods and services, and they have commercial institutions such as money and
professional entrepreneurial merchants. Land and labor, in contrast, are typically [80] under state or elite control, with only limited occurrence of private property in land.”

81: “Large territorial states fall at the low end of the commercialization scale, whereas city-states fall at the high end. Empires, in contrast, cover the entire range of commercialization, from the uncommercialized Inka to the heavily commercialized Roman economy.”

87: “Apart from some discussions of staple finance and wealth finance (D’Altroy 1992, D’Altroy & Hastorf 2001), there is little systematic research on the archaeological expressions of different forms of state finance. One active area is the use of archaeological data to evaluate documentary accounts of Roman imperial taxation (Greene 1986). For many economies, however, archaeologists cannot even distinguish trade from taxes, much less analyze the type of state finance system; clearly this topic needs greater conceptual sophistication and considerable methodological attention.”

91: “The findings of economic anthropology support the chartalist view because barter economies (required in the metaller account) probably never existed (Dalton 1982). The chartalist account fits the origins of coinage quite well; the earliest coins (from Lydia, sixth century BC) were of large denominations and were issued by states to pay public debts (Hudson 2004).”

91-92: “Property and labor, as major economic relations, are fundamentally important in any state economy. But because they largely consist of jural relations, they are extremely difficult to analyze with archaeological data. Studies of property systems in ancient states rely almost exclusively on textual data (Haring & de Maijer 1998, Hudson & Levine 1999). Property is the subject of several recent methodological papers by archaeologists (Earle 2000, Gilman 1998), but these writings serve mainly to confirm that the ability of archaeologists to reconstruct property relations or systems of property is quite limited without written information. The archaeology of labor organization is similar to property relations.”

93: “The relationship between state power and commercial level is generally inverse (Blanton et al. 1993, Hansen 2000, Trigger 2003, pp. 342–55). Archaeologists apply this generalization dynamically in cases where powerful states with low levels of commercialization give rise over time to smaller states with more commercialized economies. This change has been marked in several cases by the spatial expansion of the economy into an international system, a growing regional economic diversification, and the conversion of former luxury goods into commodities (Blanton et al. 1993, pp. 212–19, Hudson & Levine 1996, Sherratt & Sherratt 1991, Smith & Berdan 2003). In an important series of collections, Hudson and colleagues (in the International Scholars Conference on Ancient Near Eastern Economies) show that commercial institutions and practices in the Near East developed initially within the context of temple and palace institutions and only later took on an independent existence outside the state and other institutions (Hudson & Levine 1996, Hudson & Van de Mieroop 2002). The chartalist view that money originated with states fits well with this notion.”

Important references:
Smith and Schreiber. New World States and Empires

Second Installment


ABSTRACT: The past decade has seen a veritable explosion in archaeological research on complex societies in Latin America. In 1993, Smith published an overview of research to that date; this article is one of two bringing that summary up to the present. Our first article, New World states and empires: Economic and social organization (Smith and Schreiber, 2005), dealt with issues regarding economic and social organization. The present article tackles political organization and dynamics, religion, urbanism, and settlement patterns. We also review recent research in the context of various theoretical perspectives, some traditional, some more contemporary, including approaches to history and process, cultural evolution, agency-based models, linguistic prehistory, migration theory, and the relationship between environmental change and cultural events. Our discussion blends empirical findings, methodological advances, and theoretical perspectives.

Second of a two-part article.

In spite of criticism from Marxists (McGuire, 2002), postprocessualists (Johnson, 1999), and other social theorists (Mann, 1986), cultural evolutionism continues to be the dominant paradigm for understanding change in ancient Latin America. Drawing on a wide range of theoretical sources (Carneiro, 2003; Earle, [23] 2002; Trigger, 1998), cultural evolutionism has “evolved” considerably from the simplistic unilinear models of the 1960s and 1970s.

This one didn’t turn out to be that useful.
Stavrianos, Lifelines from Our Past


24: “anthropologists in recent years have found it necessary to abandon the traditional Hobbesian view of food-gathering life as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

Steenhoven, Eskimos of the Keewatin


Steenhoven, Geert van den. *Leadership and Law among the Eskimos of the Keewatin District.*

**THIS IS THE ONE FRIED CITES ABOUT ESKIMOS NOT MAKING LAND CLAIMS**

Fried refers to him for this passage: “a description of Eskimo west of Hudson Bay warns: ‘At the outset it should be stressed that the very notion of exclusive rights in land or hunting and fishing territory—whether private, familial or communal—is nonexistent and outside the conception of these Eskimos. … these grounds are open to everybody, also non-Eskimos, and any game or fish is … all and no one’s property, as long as it has not been touched. The same view is taken of other resources’”.

Actual notes:

47: “With regard to the relations between the owner of something and a person outside the circle of the owner’s family … the reader might perhaps expect the recognition of at least a few rules … But I believe that no meaningful contribution to understanding can thus be given. Anyone who has lived among these Eskimos will soon realize that they are acting from a few guiding principles or, perhaps, rather tendencies, the outward application of which may be completely flexible, depending on the unpredictable variables in the given situations. Especially the jurist unaccustomed to look beyond his own restricted conceptual horizon, eager to find numerous nicely formulated and strictly applied rules but unable to resign himself to the different realities of Eskimo life, is bound to have a fairly frustrating field period in this part of the world. I believe, therefore, that the Eskimo notions of ownership should be presented by suggesting the principles or tendencies rather than by attempting to formulate more or less detailed rules which—though they might impress the ignorant outsider—are in reality arbitrary and misleading.”
Mine and thine are distinguished among these Eskimo and ownership is conceptualized, though it lacks the connotation of absolute rights to which we are accustomed.

48: “A man who made something is owner of it as long as he needs and uses it. But at a given moment someone else will need it and the owner will lend it to the former. This relation, however, should not be regarded as a kind of contract with a priori well-defined consequences; these are fully academic questions to the Eskimo. …

The payment of ‘rent’ for normal use of another’s property during any length of time is unknown, with the significant exception of manufactured goods, especially hunting implements, that have been dearly bought at a trading post or other white establishment.”

57: “Insofar as the community comprises families which are not all related to each other—and this is a quite normal camp condition among these Eskimos—it is a more inclusive entity than the (extended) family …

Rights in land. At the outset it should be stressed that the very notion of exclusive rights in land or hunting and fishing territory—whether private, familial or communal—is non-existent and outside the conception of these Eskimos. It is true that each band has a more or less traditional, yet vaguely definable, hunting and fishing area where its hunters feel most ‘at home’, but these grounds are open to everybody, also non-Eskimos, and any game or fish is res nullius, all and no one’s property, as long as it has not been touched. The same view is taken of other resources like soapstone, wood, etc. Like many other Eskimos, the Keewatin Eskimos are very positive when talking about this subject; and there are, perhaps, no societies in the world—even those living under comparable physical conditions—that are so emphatic in their denial of any claim to exclusiveness of hunting and fishing grounds. The idea of a war of conquest is therefore quite foreign to these Eskimos”.

58: “Political Organization. … Eskimo society, with its complete and conspicuous lack of supra-family organization, cannot be meaningfully described as having political organization; even in the broadest sense, there are no formal councils, there is no central power, there is no question of political authority or government—let alone a state. Jenness (1922:23) observation that ‘one of the most noticeable features in Eskimo society almost everywhere is the absence of chiefs’ is indeed applicable also to the Eskimo of Keewatin District.

‘Tribes’. In respect to social organization, we cannot speak of Caribou or Netsilik Eskimo ‘tribe’ in its proper sense, since they lack any social superstructure, have no common meetings or rites, and lack that feeling of unity, which exceeds kinship, that is characteristic of a tribe … the collective name ‘Netsilingiut’ … [or] ‘Caribou Eskimos’ does not even have an equivalent in the Eskimo language, since it is only used by white people to denote the several bands west of Hudson Bay leading a typical inland life, centered in the caribou. The geographical boundaries of both groups are best determined by the vaguely definable adjoining hunting and fishing ranges of those bands whose members are tied by links of blood, marriage and, consequently, of adoption and incidental friendships.

Bands. Neither is each band internally more than an aggregate of families, lacking every formal organization but held together by kinship ties, individual friendship, relative physical nearness and common direct interests.
“In wonderful savageness live the nation of the Fennians, and in beastly poverty, destitute of arms, of horses, and of homes; their food, the common herbs; their apparel, skins; their bed, the earth; their only hope in their arrows, which for want of iron they point with bones. Their common support they have from the chase, women as well as men; for with these the former wander up and down, and crave a portion of the prey. Nor other shelter have they even for their babes, against the violence of tempests and ravening beasts, than to cover them with the branches of trees twisted together; this a reception for the old men, and hither resort the young. Such a condition they judge more happy than the painful occupation of cultivating the ground, than the labour of rearing houses, than the agitations of hope and fear attending the defence of their own property or the seizing that of others. Secure against the designs of men, secure against the malignity of the Gods, they have accomplished a thing of infinite difficulty; that to them nothing remains even to be wished.”

Testart, Food Storage among Hunter-Gatherers


526: “Such a development is intimately connected with a tradition of food sharing common among nonstoring hunter-gatherers: the food brought back to the camp by the hunter is totally or partially shared out, thus bringing prestige to the successful hunter. This custom, however, acquires a different meaning when food is stored. Among nonstoring people, the only way excess food can be used is to give it away. Among storing people, on the contrary, it can be individually appropriated by the producer insofar as it can be converted into a lasting product: in this context the prestige tied to a gift of food has an utterly different quality. It is the quest for prestige which is the primary motivation of this act, since the goods given could be profitably kept by their owner. Because of the part played by prestige, the custom of food giving takes on a very different meaning among food-storing people. There is another basic difference. Perishable foodstuffs that have not been processed for preservation can be given only to those who have an immediate need for it and who do not live too far away or can be reached in a reasonable time. The transformation of foodstuffs into lasting goods stretches to an unprecedented extent the possibilities of exchange and gift and thus enhances the advantages of accumulating food. Great quantities of goods can then be accumulated for redistribution in the remote future or for long-
distance trade: the volume, area, and duration of the circulation of the goods take on different dimensions. No wonder, then, that the old custom of food giving manifests itself most strongly in a society practicing large-scale storage.

We have seen that the accumulation of wealth is made possible by sedentarism, realized by the transformation of food into lasting goods, and rendered potentially unlimited by the exchangeable nature of stored food. This last point is especially important, since only those who have at their disposal an excess can be classified as "rich." This brings us to economic inequalities. These can only develop with the existence of material goods, but such goods cannot engender a differentiation between rich and poor if they are appropriated by the community as a whole. This is generally the case among nomadic hunter-gatherers as far as food is concerned: indeed, there is a universal rule which stipulates that the products of hunting and, to a lesser extent, those of gathering must be shared by all members of the community. The social relations prevailing among people who store food must therefore be radically different if their food reserves are to be privately appropriated. In order to account for this difference, we will investigate the connection between social relations and the practice of storage.”

527: “storage is often, though not always, connected with a tendency towards the development of individual ownership. Where there is individual property, the emergence of economic inequalities… Sedentarism also means an exclusive or privileged exploitation of the territory in which the group has settled. Disparities in resources between areas and the abandonment of a flexible social structure, which implies high population pressure for some groups, bring about differences in wealth from one group to another (Smith 1976:49-50). Sedentarism also limits the possibility of resolving conflicts through splitting of local groups, hence the emergence of mediation, a new opportunity for leaders to strengthen their social position (Bender 1978: 213).”

527: “In some nomadic societies, for instance, in Australia, the elders enjoy special privileges with regard to food, men have similar privileges in opposition to women, or individuals are obligated to make gifts of food to kin or affines: from these facts it can be argued that some forms of exploitation may exist among nomadic hunter-gatherers. These forms of exploitation will, however, be very limited”

527: “the existence of collective stores provides an opportunity for the emergence of this exploitation. People who are important because of their religious status or their kinship ties will assume the management of the stores, control their utilization by members of the community, preside over their redistribution, orient their use in accordance with their own interests or those of their own group, and justify both the share they appropriate of the communal stores and their poor contribution to it in terms of the importance of their function.”

528: “Thus all the material, social, ideological, or political pre-requisites for the emergence of social inequalities seem to be present in societies with a storing economy”
530: “CONCLUSIONS What are the theoretical implications of a category of storing hunter-gatherers? The adoption of an agricultural way of life is currently considered a turning point in history comparable in importance to the Industrial Revolution: hence, the notion of "Neolithic Revolution" associated with Childe's works. This conception has its roots in the idea that there is a neat opposition between hunter-gatherers and agriculturalist-pastoralists, the basis of this opposition being the presence or absence of the domestication of plants and animals. Now, storing hunter-gatherer societies exhibit three characteristics--sedentarism, a high population density, and the development of socioeconomic inequalities--which have been considered typical of agricultural societies and possible only with an agricultural way of life. Furthermore, their economic cycle--massive harvest and intensive storage of a seasonal resource--is the same as that of societies based on the cultivation of cereals. The difference between storing hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists lies in whether the staple food species are wild or domesticated: this proves to be only a minor difference, since it does not affect the main aspects of society. Agriculturalists and storing hunter-gatherers together are neatly in opposition to nonstoring hunter-gatherers. The conclusion to be drawn is that it is certainly not the presence of agriculture or its absence which is the relevant factor when dealing with such societies, but rather the presence or absence of an economy with intensive storage as its cornerstone.”

Thomas: Understanding the Neolithic

Understanding the Neolithic – J Thomas – 1999

His main thesis seems to be that the Neolithic was not a monolithic period, but one of gradual change in with lots of transitional mixed economies, especially chapter 2, pp. 7-66.

229: “If earlier Neolithic life involved a series of synchronised and interlinked temporal cycles, there are suggestions that this pattern began to break down after 3000 BC. While many communities maintained a degree of mobility, the character of their yearly cycles may have been less repetitive and more opportunistic. The growing diversity of material culture suggests that more effort was being spent on differentiating people from one another. However, the use of distinct assemblages for different activities in separate locations indicates that, rather than reflecting the development of ‘ranking’ or ‘social stratification’, new statuses or prerogatives were emerging which could be exercised in specific and limited social circumstances”.
Trigger: Maintaining Economic Equality in Opposition to Complexity: An Iroquoian Case Study


121: “Both [the Huron and the Five Nations Iroquois groups if Iroquoian-speaking peoples] were confederacies composed of four or five tribes and embracing 20,000 to 30,000 people.”

143: “There are clearly many possibilities for differing interpretations of Iroquoian social organization in late prehistoric times …, especially with regard to how egalitarian or hierarchical it was. Roles were differentiated according to sex, age, and individual prestige. … Major political offices were hereditary …. In spite of this, Iroquoian societies had powerful built-in mechanisms of resistance that prevented the domination and exploitation of one individual or group by another. Chiefs functioned as mediators and coordinators, but did not have the right or power to impose their will on others. Their effectiveness depended on their prestige, which was determined by their reputations for wisdom, fairness, and generosity and their ability to avoid the appearance of being dictatorial.”

144: “the sharing ethic remained strong throughout the seventeenth century, while consensual leadership and factionalism lasted even longer despite the massive dislocation of Iroquoian life”.

Trigger: Sociocultural Evolution

Tulane: HM 106 .T75 1998

Defends sociocultural evolution. Evaluates the neoevluationary perspective, finds problems with it.

Trigger—Understanding Early Civilizations

Understanding Early Civilizations: A Comparative Study
By Bruce G. Trigger
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003
This book studies 7 diverse early civilizations from different times and places: The Aztecs, the Maya, the Inca, Yoruba-Benin (sub-Saharan Africa), Egypt, Southern Mesopotamia, and Shang China.

29: These are all pristine or primary states, although he doesn’t use the strictest possible definition.

38-39: “each of these civilizations evolved separately and largely independently in its own region.”

40: “‘Early Civilization’ is undeniably an evolutionary concept.”

40-41: “The idea of social evolution has been violently attacked in recent decades as a myth created by Western European scholars, beginning in the eighteenth century, to justify colonial expansion in many parts of the world (Diamond 1974; Patterson 1997; Rowlands 1989). Although there is much truth to this charge, I reject the suggestion that the idea of evolution, as an approach to the study of human history is inherently and inescapably colonialist and racist.”

41-42: “It has been demonstrated archeologically that all modern societies are descended from Upper Paleolithic hunter-gatherer bands and these in turn from still earlier scavenging societies. … many concepts formerly associated with evolutionary theory have been … abandoned. … Today it is recognized that change is neither more nor less normal than stasis, that most innovation tends to promote random or multilinear rather than orthogenetic cultural change, that cultural change occurs for many different reasons and in highly contingent ways … the concept of progress is a purely subjective one that has no place in scientific discourse;”

42: “In spite of this, a strong tendency has been noted for sociocultural change to move in the general direction of greater complexity. This results from the greater capacity of more complex societies to compete successfully with less complex ones for control of territory and other resources. As a result of such competition, in all but the poorest and most marginal environments … smaller-scale societies must either acquire the key attributes of more complex societies or be displaced or absorbed by them.”

42: “This does not mean that all societies evolve along a single trajectory to a common future or that cross-cultural differences are less important than similarities.”

44-45: “Anthropologists apply the term ‘early civilization’ to the earliest and simplest forms of societies in which the basic principle governing social relations was not kinship but a hierarchy of social divisions that cut horizontally across societies and were unequal in power, wealth, and social prestige. In these societies a tiny ruling group that used coercive powers to augment its authority was sustained by agricultural surpluses and labour systematically appropriated from a much larger number of agricultural producers. Full-time specialists (artisans, bureaucrats, soldiers, retainers) also supported and served the ruling group and the government apparatus it controlled.”

46: “it appears that in all complex societies there is a strong correlation between wealth, power, and prestige.”

46: “‘Early civilization’ can thus be summarily defined as the earliest and simplest form of class-based society.”

47: Recognizes complex chiefdoms like Hawaii. “In early civilization, in contrast, class displaced kinship and ethnicity as the main organizing principle of society.”
“no early civilization appears ever to have had an egalitarian village base, all such communities having been hierarchized to varying degrees as a consequence of having existed in the context of class societies.”

“All the early civilizations compared in this study had kings.”

“Kingship was hereditary in practice in all seven early civilizations and hereditary in theory in all except perhaps the Sumerian parts of Mesopotamia.”

“The king, standing at the apex of society, constituted the most important link between human beings and the supernatural forces on which the welfare of both society and the universe depended.” Sometimes they were ascribed divine attributes.

“it is we, not the people who lived in early civilizations, who differentiate between political and sacred power.”

“A state is a politically organized society that is regarded by those who live in it as sovereign or politically independent and has leaders who control its social, political, legal, economic, and cultural activities. Two sorts of states appear to have been associated with early civilizations: city-states and territorial states.”

“In early civilizations and other complex preindustrial societies, inequality was regarded as a normal condition .... The general pervasiveness of inequality ensured that its legitimacy went unquestioned. If egalitarian social organization was known to people in early civilizations, it was a feature of small-scale and usually despised societies beyond the pale.”

“In each of these civilizations the upper classes ... claimed a special supernatural origin.”

“While symbolically the king stood above and represented all of society, he was also the leader of the upper classes. One of his most important functions was to unite that group and protect and promote its social and political interests. The upper classes in all early civilizations were small, amounting to no more than a few percent of the total population, but they controlled much of the surplus wealth of their societies and played key roles in decisions about policy and administration.”

“The luxurious lifestyle of the upper classes was supported by family or private ownership of land, by state salaries, which sometimes involved revocable assignment of land instead of actual payments, and by the opportunity to become the beneficiaries of bribes, fees, military booty, and economic control. Some members of the upper classes enjoyed these privileges simply as a result of belonging to upper-class families. They did little work, but their status put inherited land and other forms of wealth at their disposal. Other members played an active role in administering the state. The highest state officials belonged to the upper classes, and together with the king they made all the most important decisions. Members of this group also commanded the army and managed the major religious institutions. Less prestigious members of the nobility were minor officials, engineers, and sometimes high-ranking artists.”

“The upper classes in early civilizations had many features in common. They controlled a disproportionate amount of wealth in their societies, avoided physical labour, enjoyed an opulent lifestyle, and indulged in conspicuous consumption. They occupied the top administrative, military, and religious posts and constituted the highest levels of decision making and administration, either sharing power with the monarch or being the people most able to influence him.”
154: “Commoners made up the vast bulk of the population in early civilizations, often constituting 90 percent or more. They rarely owned land individually and, if they did, only in small amounts. They developed for subsistence on the sale of goods they produced, worked for the state or other patrons or formed collective landholding groups. Their political power was also severely limited. The lowest-ranking and by far the most numerous of them were engaged in agriculture. At the top of the commoner class were full-time specialists, more numerous than the upper classes but also amounting to no more than a few percent of the population. … Some may have owned small properties, but others either subsisted by selling their produce or received rations or grants of land in exchange for their services.

Many members of this group depended on the state or on members of the upper class for their positions and salaries. …

The most prestigious group of specialists was the lesser officials, who are often labeled ‘administrators’, ‘bureaucrats’, or ‘scribes’”.

155: “The next rank of commoners consisted of full-time soldiers and police who were not members of the upper classes. In general, they and their families were well fed, housed, and rewarded for their services by the state.”

155: “The third and lowest rank of specialists was full-time craft workers. … Long-distance traders were part of this grouping. Some were self-employed, others worked primarily for upper-class patrons, and still others were permanently attached to institutions such as palaces and temples. The state and the upper classes were the major consumers of the work produced by the most skillful artisans.”

155: “The bulk of commoners, probably amounting to 80 percent or more of the total population, were farmers. Some farmers had legal rights to land, either as owners or renters; others were tied to land owned by others, while still others were landless labourers.”

157: “The conceptualization and practices of slavery different significantly among early civilizations …. Slaves in early civilizations tended to be few compared with those of Classical Greece or Rome.”

160: “Social mobility was limited in early civilizations by the slowness of technological and social change and by a general lack of opportunity to gain access to knowledge from outside the social group into which a person was born. … In addition, in most early civilizations upward mobility either was regulated by the state or required recognition by the upper classes.”

239: “In most early civilizations law was described as a powerful force maintaining order in an equitable, if unequal, fashion in the social realm. Yet, … the legal system was a potent instrument for intimidating individuals of lower status. Chinese law appears to have differed from that of other early civilizations only in that in theory as well as in practice, litigation was possible only between equals. No efforts were made to idealize the legal system as a means by which justice was provided for all. Early Chinese realism with respect to law appears to have had long-term consequences for the development of Chinese civilization, which never evolved a strong sense of either private property or individual legal rights. Elsewhere, in due course, some people were inspired to try to realize the ideals embedded in representations of their legal system as an instrument of social justice as well as social order.”
264: “All early civilizations were based on the idea of social and economic inequality, which not only informed the understanding of society as a whole but also pervaded the family. As a consequence, ideas of inequality and obedience to authority were inculcated in everyone from earliest childhood. As children grew older, the concept of obedience was reinforced in schools, social life, and relations with government officials. In each early civilization a small number of privileged people were supported by a large number of taxpaying farmers. This upper class governed society and controlled much of its wealth and surplus labor.”
265: “In all early civilizations for which we have adequate documentation, the privileges of the upper classes were protected by armed forces and the legal system. While lower-class conscripts were generally used to fight foreign wars, professional soldiers served as a police force to protect the upper classes, government property, and officials.”
272-273: “There was considerable cross-cultural uniformity in the sociopolitical institutions of early civilizations. The similar general conceptualizations of kingship, similar class and legal systems, and the use of full-time police and soldiers to support the upper classes recurred in every early civilization for which there is adequate documentation. … These findings do not accord with the basic tenet of cultural relativism—that human behavior is shaped primarily by cultural traditions that are not constrained to any significant degree by non-cultural factors. They certainly do not confirm the argument that universals, if any, are insignificant”.
279: “primary civilizations evolved in many different kinds of environments …. [They] are associated with vast differences in temperature, rainfall, elevation, topography, soil fertility, and microenvironmental diversity. … [they tended to be in areas with] easily worked soils and without dense, deeply rooted grasses. Yet not all regions with these characteristics produced early civilizations. There is no basis for theories that attribute the rise of civilization to the influence of a single type of environment or climatic event.”
281: “There is therefore no basis for viewing the rise of early civilizations as being closely linked to improved agricultural implements.”
283: Addresses the argument from population pressure and circumscription. “Agricultural land was naturally circumscribed in the Valley of Mexico, Peru, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. … The Classic Maya, Yoruba, and Shang Chinese civilizations had no such natural boundaries. … People in these civilizations had large areas of less densely inhabited arable land into which to escape from authority.”
284: “Theories of circumscription thus assume that coercion depended either on increasing population density without any outlet for excess population or on the growing appeal of staying in one place.”
313-314: “It appears that, regardless of the agricultural regime followed, between 70 and 90 percent of the labor input in early civilizations was, of necessity, devoted to food production. This means that all early civilizations had to remain predominantly agricultural. It also means that the surplus resources available to the upper classes were never large in relation to total population and had to be used carefully. Because of this strategies for increasing revenue had to be mainly political … increasing the number of farmers controlled, creating situations in which ruling groups shared available resources more disproportionately among themselves according to rank, or persuading farmers to surrender marginally greater amounts of surplus production without increasing the cost of the mechanisms need to ensure social control.”
314: “I propose to differentiate three broad categories of land ownership in early civilizations: (1) collective ownership by kinship groups or communities, (2) ownership by institutions such as temples or the state, including landholding by individuals or groups as beneficiaries from such institutions, and (3) private ownership.”

314-315: “One of the most persistent myths about early civilizations, which can be traced back to Montesquieu, is that of ‘eminent domain’ (Isaac 1993: 432). This is the notion that in early civilizations rules owned all the land in their kingdoms and prohibited alternative forms of ownership, making everyone a tenant or slave of the ruler. The evidence that has been interpreted as supporting this claim appears to be metaphorical and political in nature. … This claim appears to reflect the ideology of the ruling class rather than what members of the calpolis believed. In practical terms, the concept of eminent domain seems to have been no more than an assertion of sovereignty equivalent to that made by all modern states. Its primary significance was that individuals or groups could not sell or give land to foreigners in ways that extinguished or diminished the ruler’s authority to treat that land as part of his kingdom.”

316: “While many anthropologists are inclined to regard collective ownership of land as evolutionarily ‘primitive’, its main feature is that it is relatively resistant to economic exploitation by people who do not produce food, whether acting together or individually. Producers who are constituted as corporate landowning groups have more freedom to define their relations with the state and the upper classes than producers acting individually, especially those who lack the most important means of supporting themselves: land.

Collectively owned land was common in some early civilizations. In the Valley of Mexico, the most extensive category of land was *calpollalli*, which belong jointly to members of calpollis. Calpollis were, first and foremost, landholding groups.”

317: “The highland Peruvian ayllu was also an endogamous landholding group. … A local ayllu leader oversaw the annual reallocation of land as part of the process of crop rotation and falling. This reallocation ensured that, despite its changing membership, each family continued to have an equitable share. Ayllu members assisted one another in cultivating their land and also cultivated land assigned to members of the ayllu who were sick, crippled, orphaned, or called away for long periods of corvée labour. Land that was set aside to support ayllu leaders and religious cults was also cultivated collectively by ayllu members. …

Yoruba land belong collectively to extended families.”

318: “In Mesopotamia during the late fourth and early third millennia, partilineal extended families appear to have collectively owned extensive tracts of farm land. By the time the oldest readable texts provide detailed information about economic transactions, all or part of such holdings could be sold to non-kin, subject to the agreement of all the male members of an extended family. In the third millennium BC, a rapid increase in institutional land appears to have greatly reduced the amount of collectively owned land. Poor harvests and other economic ecological crises may have forced less affluent extended families to pledge their communal lands, as well as the personal freedom of family members, in return for loans.”

318: “This left a long period during which collectively owned land may have passed into the permanent possession of creditors while its former owners became tenant farmers or
landless labourers, perhaps often after having been temporarily enslaved. The alienation of land possibly began through the fiction of adopting a potential buyer into a family”. 319: As a result of these processes, collectively owned land was transformed into institutionally and privately owned estates. Land ownership became concentrated in the hands of an ever-smaller number of institutions and individuals.” 319: China: “Regional rulers sent to occupy new territory assigned the land around their headquarters to their officials, household retainers, and soldiers …. This suggests that land ownership may have mattered less to descent groups than access to agricultural land through lineage-mediated political relations, which could be interpreted as evidence that in Shang and Western Zhou China all land was in some sense regarded as institutional. 320: “In most early civilizations collectively owned land could not be bought or sold; it was the common and inalienable possession of kinship group or an endogamous community. … Larger landowning groups tended to be more hierarchical. They were managed by councils on which various extended families were represented by hereditary officers. The leaders of such groups were often co-opted by the upper classes.” 320-321: “In larger units, the land and labour of the group tended to be treated more as a resource belonging to the group’s leaders. … Maintaining membership in collective landholding group remained essential for having inalienable access to land. … These situations created circumstances that eventually might permit all collective land to be transformed into institutional or private land. An alternative to collective land, when its co-proprieters were not powerful, was expropriation by politically dominate leaders.” 321: “Institutionally owned land in early civilizations was not public property …. Rather than being established for the enjoyment or benefit of the community as a whole it was set aside to provide revenue for the state, religious cults, office-holders, and socially privileged individuals. … Institutional land was not individually owned and therefore could not be bought or sold. Individual use of a plot of institutional land may or may not have been hereditary, but inheritance of benefits from it was accompanied by the transmission of related duties or roles from one generation to the next. Institutional land assigned to individuals in return for service is often referred to as prebendary land. … I will call such land ‘office land’.” 323: “Office land constituted a major source of revenue for the nobility, all of whose active male members were involved in some sort of state service. Individual office-holders in hegemonic city-states were often allocated specific fields in tributary states.” 323: “Nobles may have tried, where possible, to convert their office land into patrimonial land in order to benefit their families. This appears to have been done on a massive scale after the Spanish conquest”. 327: “By the time of the earliest readable documents appear, about 2500 BC, much land that formerly had been owned collectively by patrilineal kin groups appears to have fallen under the control of kings, temples, and wealthy estate owners”. 332: “Both unilineal evolutionists and substantivist economists believe that private property is a recent innovation (Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957), but since the right of individuals to possess goods is recognized in much simpler societies the existence of private land in early civilizations should not be ruled out. There is, however, no evidence that such land existed in most early civilizations.” Rules out private
ownership in 5 of the 7. “That leaves Mesopotamia and Egypt as early civilizations in which some land might have been privately owned.”

It is believed that in Mesopotamia prior to the third millennium BC, most land was owned collectively. In the course of the third millennium, as communal land rights were pledged for debts, increasing amounts of land fell under the control of temples or palaces, but some of it appears to have become the property of individual creditors.”

333-334: “It is less certain that private land existed in the Old Kingdom of Egypt.”
335: “in many early civilizations the upper classes derived revenues from lands set aside to provision rulers, temples, leading families, and officials.”
336: “A final question is whether there was a developmental sequence from collective to institutional to private ownership of land. There is some evidence that might be interpreted as supporting this claim. In Mesopotamia it appears that collective land gradually was transformed into institutional and privately owned land, and in Egypt a similar development may have occurred. In China, over a much longer period than we are considering, collective and most institutional land was transformed into privately owned land although rights to private property were never guaranteed in China to the same extent that they were in countries that adopted Roman law (Ke 1989; Shen 1994).”
375: “A defining feature of all early civilizations was the institutionalized appropriation by a small ruling group of most of the wealth produced by the lower classes. … Farmers and artisans did not accumulate large amounts of wealth, although they created virtually all the wealth that existed in these societies.”
388-389: “That it was less important who owned land than who had a right to appropriate agricultural production and control surplus agricultural labour explains why a variety of landowning and landholding practices and many different techniques for taxing goods were able to support systems characterized by generally similar levels of sociopolitical inequality. The material asymmetry of these transfers justifies the suggestion that all these societies shared a ‘tributary’ mode of production … so long as it is understood that the term ‘tributary’ refers to the payment of all forms of taxes. The key features of this mode of production were the ability of the upper classes to extract substantial surpluses from commoners and the significance of the control of surplus wealth as opposed to the ownership of property.”
394: “In early civilizations the upper classes appropriated wealth from commoners in many different ways. Invariably these appropriations involved some form of corvée labour. The transfer of wealth was also accomplished by assigning prime agricultural land to upper-class individuals and institutions. … The differing impacts that these transfers had on social organization were determined by the extent to which wealth was controlled by the king or passed directly to a broader spectrum of the upper classes. In delagational polities much wealth fell directly under the control of regional officials, forcing the king to rely on them for support.”
399: “Collective ownership of land by farming families predominated in the Valley of Mexico, highland Peru, and among the Yoruba, but governments were able to appropriate substantial surpluses from these groups. … In Egypt, Inka Peru, and the Valley of Mexico all such land [institutional land] was managed by state officials”.
400: “No unileaner evolutionary sequence in which collectively owned land was gradually replaced by institutional and then by private holdings can be identified. It is
impossible to demonstrate that all land in early civilizations was originally owned collectively.”

400: “Taxes were not the only, or the most effective, way to extract agricultural surpluses from farmers. Rents and sharecropping substantially increased the amount of food surpluses that individual landowners or the state could collect from landless farmers.”

667: “Whether the upper classes in specific early civilizations viewed themselves as self-disciplined bureaucrats, audacious warriors, or comfortable landowners, they agreed about the need to protect their privileges and possessions by keeping the lower classes subservient. They also agreed about the means, including, both physical and legal coercion .... Kin groups and communities were allowed to regulate their internal affairs so long as their doing so did not interfere with the privileges of the powerful. The frequent delegation of political and legal power demonstrated a preference for less expensive government, even if it increased the risk of disintegration. The state focused its administrative skills and resources on key concerns of the upper classes, such as collecting taxes.”

668: “The most potent source of power for the upper classes was probably the pervasiveness and hence the seeming normality of inequality. Hierarchical relations pervaded almost every aspect of life.”

668: “These relations contrasted dramatically with what was found in small-scale societies, where social control was enforced by public opinion .... Smaller-scale societies often lacked even the concept of obedience, in the sense of one person’s being thought to have the moral right to tell another person what to do. ... only by making hierarchical relations pervasive in everyday life could unequal relations be made to appear sufficiently natural that they operated effectively at the societal and hence the political level.”

Vowell, Unfamiliar Fishes


59: “As the Hawaiian Constitution of 1840 defined the situation under Kamehameha I: ‘To him belonged all the land from one end of the islands to the other, though it was not his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and had the management of the landed property.’ Unlike Feudal European peasants, Hawaiian commoners were not bound to particular traces of land, and so it behooved the chiefs and king to treat the commoners well so the land in a chief’s domain remained productive.”

Walker PL, Johnson JR, Lambert PM. Age and sex biases in the preservation of human skeletal remains.

Walker PL, Johnson JR, Lambert PM.

Abstract

Inaccuracies introduced through biases in preservation are a major source of error in paleodemographic reconstructions. Although it is generally assumed that such biases exist, little is known about their magnitude. To investigate this problem, we studied age and sex differences in the preservation of skeletal remains from Mission La Purisima and a prehistoric cemetery (Ca-Ven-110). Comparison of mortality profiles obtained through analysis of skeletal remains and burial records from the mission indicates that biases in preservation can be very significant in poorly preserved skeletal collections. The Purisima burial records show that most of the people interred in the cemetery were either infants or elderly adults. The skeletal remains, in contrast, are predominantly those of young adults. The burial records and skeletal collection produced comparable sex ratios. These results show that age biases in preservation are much more important than sex biases. This conclusion is supported by data on the completeness of the skeletons from La Purisima and Ca-Ven-110. At both sites, the remains of young adults were better preserved than those of children or elderly adults, and the completeness of male and female skeletons was comparable.

DIDN'T READ BEYOND THE ABSTRACT. Many people have cited this as evidence that estimates of how young people died in the Pleistocene are exaggerated.

Walter et al: Sedentism, subsistence and socio-political organization in prehistoric New Zealand

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Abstract:
Much archaeological thinking about the interrelationships between subsistence, sedentism and socio-political organization has been carried out within an evolutionary framework. The classic model sees the development of complex social organization linked to a rise in the importance of agriculture and of a sedentary way of life. The New Zealand record offers challenges to this model. New Zealand is an unusual case involving a society moving from an agricultural to a predominantly hunting and gathering base and then, following large-scale faunal depletions, back towards agriculture. Despite these marked changes in subsistence practices there is little evidence in the archaeological or ethnographic record for any substantial alterations in patterns of mobility, sedentism or socio-political organization over the full duration of the New Zealand sequence. In the
New Zealand case, cultural traditions inherited from tropical East Polynesia are shown to have been more influential than economics in determining the nature of Maori settlement and social organization.

**Wengrow & Graeber: Farewell to the ‘childhood of man’**


Wengrow & Graeber: Farewell to the ‘childhood of man’.

Abstract: Evidence of grand burials and monumental construction is a striking feature in the archaeological record of the Upper Palaeolithic period, between 40 and 10 kya (thousand years ago). Archaeologists often interpret such finds as indicators of rank and hierarchy among Pleistocene hunter-gatherers. Interpretations of this kind are difficult to reconcile with the view, still common in sociobiology, that pre-agricultural societies were typically egalitarian in orientation. Here we develop an alternative model of ‘Palaeolithic politics’, which emphasizes the ability of hunter-gatherers to alternate – consciously and deliberately – between contrasting modes of political organization, including a variety of hierarchical and egalitarian possibilities. We propose that alternations of this sort were an emergent property of human societies in the highly seasonal environments of the last Ice Age. We further consider some implications of the model for received concepts of social evolution, with particular attention to the distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ hunter-gatherers.

2: “To summarize briefly, the genetic and anatomical foundations of our species were established between 200 and 160 kya (thousand years ago); but evidence for complex modes of symbolic communication – in other words, for typically modern human behaviour – becomes widespread in the archaeological record only tens of thousands of years later. First glimmerings appear at Blombos Cave, on the southern tip of Africa, where evidence for the use of ochre-based pigments (at 100 kya) and shell ornaments (at 70 kya) is found across a series of deposits dating to the Middle Stone Age (Henshilwood 2007; Henshilwood et al. 2011). But it is only after around 45 kya, when our species was busily colonizing Eurasia, that evidence for cultural complexity becomes more widely attested: an efflorescence that has sometimes – and contentiously – been termed the ‘Upper Palaeolithic Revolution’ … what are generally taken as the earliest proofs of social inequality, in the form of grand burials and – after the Last Glacial Maximum (c. 20 kya) – monumental dwellings as well. It is this apparent lack of synchrony between the ticking of our genetic and cultural clocks that Colin Renfrew (2007) provocatively calls the ‘sapient paradox’.

In seeking to resolve the paradox, prehistorians have so far offered two explanations. The first – which remains more of a supposition – is that a late but significant mutation took place in the human brain between c.70 and 50 kya, generating
new cognitive resources that made possible the heightened cultural creativity of the Upper Palaeolithic (Mithen 1996; cf. Klein 2001). The second concerns demography. It predicts that, where critical population thresholds were reached, the transmission of complex cultural traits became incremental in an unprecedented way owing to the greater density of human interactions (Powell, Shennan & Thomas 2009).”

3: “Yet, following Bruce Knauft (1991), Boehm is also willing to make ‘the major assumption that humans were egalitarian for thousands of generations before hierarchical societies began to appear’, a development that he places around 5 kya …

… Our model posits that Pleistocene hunter-gatherers alternated – consciously and deliberately – between contrasting modes of political organization. Dual structures of this kind are found across a range of historically documented societies. They were widely reported in early twentieth-century ethnographies of hunting and foraging groups”.

4: “‘rich’ hunter-gatherer burials. Such burials are sporadically attested from Upper Palaeolithic rock shelters and open-air settlements across much of western Eurasia, from the Dordogne to the Don. Some of the earliest instances come from the eastern end of this distribution, at sites such as Sungir (in northern Russia) and Doln’ı Ve´stonice (in Moravia), where they date to between 26 and 30 kya, before the Last Glacial Maximum. … Some of the most lavish ornamentation at this site was associated with the conjoined burials of two children”.

5: “Spectacular burials of this kind have been taken as evidence that – many thousands of years before the origins of farming – highly developed systems of ranking existed among at least some Upper Palaeolithic societies. Attention has focused on the extraordinary outlays of labour involved in making the grave goods (some 10,000 work hours are estimated for the Sungir beads alone); the highly advanced and standardized methods of craft production; the inclusion of exotic (and therefore prestigious) raw materials; and the association of wealth with young individuals, taken to imply ascribed rather than achieved status. On such grounds we are asked to abandon the idea that Palaeolithic hunter-gatherers were uniformly simple or egalitarian in their social arrangements, and to accept the fundamentally complex and hierarchical nature of their social systems (e.g. Vanhaeren & d’Errico 2003; 2005; White 1999).

A second category of evidence, from which similar conclusions have been drawn, is monumental architecture. … in southeast Turkey. … a group of twenty megalithic enclosures, raised there at a time – around 9000 BC – … within the ‘Pre-Pottery Neolithic A’ period but, on current evidence, the groups responsible for their creation lived by hunting and foraging alone”.

6: “Evidence for monumental construction among early hunter-gatherers – implying sophisticated design and the large-scale recruitment and co-ordination of labour – is not confined to the Middle East, or to the onset of the Holocene. Between 18 and 12 kya, along a transect of the glacial fringe reaching from Krakow to Kiev, people lived in impressive circular houses that Olga Soffer (1985b) describes as the Pleistocene’s version of ‘public works or monumental architecture’. …

Based on evidence of this kind, archaeologists can now claim to have pushed back the record of institutionalized inequality to a very early phase of human prehistory (cf. Flannery & Marcus 2012).

10: “what remains consistent – whether we are talking about Inuit, Nambikwara, or Kwakiutl – is the oscillation of social life between two clearly distinct systems, which
accompanied seasonal changes in the material form and composition of groups. The 'complexity' of their moral, religious, and political systems cannot be measured on a single scale …

… The different seasonal modes of existence typically involved different forms of political organization and different ways of exercising authority. What’s more – and this, for us, is the really crucial point – everyone was quite self-conscious about these differences. … social structures not only became more visible as subjects of reflection; they were regularly assembled and disassembled, created and destroyed.”

11: “In Great Plains societies. There, during the late summer months, small and highly mobile bands of Cheyenne and Lakota congregated in large settlements to make logistical preparations for the buffalo hunt, and for subsequent collective rituals, …

The ‘unequivocal authoritarianism’ that prevailed before a bison drive, and during the later Sun Dance rituals, was kept in check by the dispersal of sovereignty among tribal chiefs and police squads (‘soldiers’), and also by the ‘seasonal rhythm’ of social life on the Great Plains. ‘During a large part of the year’, as Lowie (1948: 19) noted, ‘the tribe simply did not exist as such; and the families or minor unions of familiars that jointly sought a living required no special disciplinary organisation.”

12: “Their sovereignty was no less real for its periodicity; and we must therefore accept that the Plains Indians knew something of state power (in Weber’s sense of Gewaltmonopol; see Gerth & Mills 1946: 78), without ever having developed a state. In more recent evolutionary parlance, they were a kind of band/state amalgam.

Even more critically, Lowie observed that the Plains nations – like almost all societies of the Americas – were quite self-conscious about the dangers of authoritarian power. They created explicit mechanisms to limit its abuse, rotating the clan or warrior societies that held office so that anyone holding coercive powers one year would be subject to them the next, …

… Pierre Clastres … His argument – that stateless societies do not represent an evolutionary stage, innocent of higher organization, but are based on self-conscious rejection of the principle of coercive authority…

It is simply not possible to have an evolutionary progression such as ‘band’-‘tribe’-‘chiefdom’-‘state’ if your starting-point is a society that moves effortlessly between institutions deemed exclusive to one category or another; or that experiences – as aspects of contemporary reality – what are supposed to be discrete stages of evolution, moving back and forth from bands to tribes or even organizations with elements of the state (such as a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence within a given territory).”

17: “To conclude, we do not have to choose between an egalitarian or hierarchical start to the human story. We just have to bid farewell to the ‘childhood of man’ and acknowledge – as Levi-Strauss insisted – that our early ancestors were not just our cognitive equals, but our intellectual and philosophical peers too. Likely as not, our Palaeolithic forebears were aware, at least in a very broad sense, of many later social possibilities. Likely as not, they grappled with the paradoxes of social creativity just as much as modern theorists, and understood them – at least the most reflexive among them – just as much, which means also just as little. Perhaps this is what being ‘intellectually modern’ actually means. If there is a riddle here it is why, after millennia of constructing and disassembling forms of hierarchy, Homo sapiens – supposedly the wisest of apes – allowed permanent and intractable systems of inequality to first take root.”
Whelan: Myth of the Noble Eco-Savage

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I haven’t seen the book. Here are some excerpts from a review:
In his book, Wild in Woods: The Myth of the Noble Eco-Savage, Robert Whelan analyzes a significant myth that plays a large role in the mythology of the environmental movement. You can see the myth in action in stories such as Disney’s Pocahontas, where the tree-hugging Indians are contrasted with environmentally insensitive and rapacious English settlers. For hundreds of years, poets and artists have rhapsodized about a fictional time before "the base laws of servitude began, when wild in woods the noble savage ran." This kind of environmental propaganda can be refuted with the facts, and Whelan’s short, highly readable book provides the facts about the mythical eco-savage. Not surprisingly, the eco-savage never existed.
As for the tragic story of the buffalo, research shows that bison hunting by American Indian hunters was often their own version of the market hunting practiced by the white man in the late 1800s. Sites where Indians drove buffalo over precipices to their deaths were found to contain the remains of as many as 300,000 animals. In fact, there was such a high concentration of animal bones at these sites that they were mined later for phosphorous for fertilizer. As Whelan documents, "large amounts of meat were left to rot and herds of animals were decimated, and sometimes driven to local extinction," or breeding stock would be so destroyed that the local herd would become insignificant to its ecosystem. Other aboriginal peoples have been found to prefer killing a female of the hunted species, especially the pregnant ones. The females have higher fat content, their skins were softer and unblemished from fighting, and fetuses were delicacies. Pregnancy also makes the females slower, and easier to harvest.

Wilson, D: Multi-level selection

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Theoretical model of individual selection vs. group-based selection, looking for reasons for sharing and tolerated theft. The model shows that group-based selection is possible, and the author believes it should be used alongside individual selection. Also, there is an equilibrium in the data w/significant tolerated theft.
Wilson: Domestication of the Human Species


Don’t need most of this, but I can cite his date for the beginning of sedentism. 3: “the adoption of the practice of living in permanent homes and settlements, a practice that probably began in southwest Asia about fifteen thousand years ago and either spread throughout the world or was taken up at different times or independently hit upon.”

Woodburn—Egalitarian Societies

Egalitarian Societies
James Woodburn
*Man*, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1982), pp. 431-451

Abstract

Greater equality of wealth, of power and of prestige has been achieved in certain hunting and gathering societies than in any other human societies. These societies, which have economies based on immediate rather than delayed return, are assertively egalitarian. Equality is achieved through direct, individual access to resources; through direct, individual access to means of coercion and means of mobility which limit the imposition of control; through procedures which prevent saving and accumulation and impose sharing; through mechanisms which allow goods to circulate without making people dependent upon one another. People are systematically disengaged from property and therefore from the potentiality in property for creating dependency. A comparison is made between these societies and certain other egalitarian societies in which there is profound intergenerational inequality and in which the equality between people of senior generation is only a starting point for strenuous competition resulting in inequality. The value systems of non-competitive, egalitarian hunter-gatherers limit the development of agriculture because rules of sharing restrict the investment and savings necessary for agriculture; they may limit the care provided for the incapacitated because of the controls on dependency; they may in principle, extend equality to all mankind.

Article: He says not all hunter-gatherer societies are immediate-return egalitarian societies

433: “Societies which fall into this category include the Mbuti Pygmies of Zaire (Turnball 1965; 1966); the !Kung Bushmen (San) of Botswana and Namibia …; the Pandaram and Paliyan of south India…; the Batek Negritos of Malasia … and the Hadza of Tanzania”

434: “The characteristics of these immediate-return systems I have spelt out in some detail elsewhere. Here all I intend is an outline sufficient to provide a
background for my discussion of how these societies promote equality. The social organization of these societies has the following basic characteristics:

1. Social groupings are flexible and constantly changing in composition.
2. Individuals have a choice of whom they associate with in residence, in the food question, in trade and exchange in ritual contexts.
3. People are not dependent on specific other people for access to basic requirements.
4. Relationships between people, whether relationships of kinship or other relationships, stress sharing and mutuality but do not involve long-term binding commitments and dependencies of the sort that are so familiar in delayed-return systems.”

445: “In these societies the ability of individuals to attach and to detach themselves at will from groupings and from relationships, to resist the imposition of authority by force, to use resources freely without reference to other people, to share as equals in game meat brought into camp, to obtain personal possessions without entering into dependent relationships—all these bring about one central aspect of this specific form of egalitarianism. What it above all does is not disengage people from property, from the potentiality in property rights for creating dependency. I think it is probable that this specialized development can only be realized without impoverishment in societies with a simple hunting and gathering economy because elsewhere this degree of disengagement from property would damage the operation of the economy. Indeed the indications are that this development is intrinsic, a necessary component of immediate-return economies which occurs only in such economies.”

446: “Anthropologists … have more commonly used the term [egalitarian societies] as a simple synonym for acephalous societies, societies without rulers, societies without formal political offices.”

Wrangham et al. “Comparative rates of violence in chimpanzees and humans”


19: “Data on human mortality rates from intergroup aggression (war) came principally from a compilation by Keeley (1996), supplemented by other data that we found with the help of Doug Jones. We focused on independent subsistence societies, coding separately for hunter–gatherers and farmers. Results are shown in Table 6. For hunter–gatherers median annual mortality from intergroup aggression was 164 deaths per 100,000 (mean 249, SD 273, n=12). For farmers, median annual mortality from intergroup aggression was 595 deaths per 100,000, (mean 580, SD 313, n=20). This sample conforms to the conclusion that subsistence farmers have higher rates of mortality from warfare (Mann–Whitney U=43.5, n=12, 20, P <0.01).”
Table 6 [abridged by Karl]: “Annual mortality rates in human subsistence societies from intergroup aggression”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Deaths/100K/year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andamanese 30</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dobe !Kung</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>148</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tiwi 1893-1903</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yaghan</td>
<td>Tierra del Fuego</td>
<td>169</td>
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<tr>
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<td>240</td>
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<td>Casiguran Agta</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>Oregon</td>
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<td>Piegan</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Yelling, Common field and enclosure in England, 1450-1850

CHECKED OUT FROM GEORGETOWN
Banner mentions it as a general source on enclosure.

2: “parliamentary enclosure is not seen as a single event, but as a process that took more than a century to complete.”

232: “Whatever the statistical conclusions that will eventually emerge from the study of parliamentary enclosures, many contemporary agriculturalists came to believe, like the poor themselves, that the rewards and costs had been very unequally distributed. … Young remarks that ‘instead of giving property to the poor, or preserving it, or enabling them to acquire it, the very contrary effect has taken place; and as this evil was by no means necessarily connected with the measure of enclosing, it was a mischief that might easily have been avoided (Young, 1801, 515). These views were in the main opposed by farmers and landlords who wished to have a labour force dependent on their wages, and Malthus too entered the argument on their side.”
1: “Although I criticize “neo-evolutionary” theory—that is, the attempt to create categories of human progress … I do not reject the term evolution or social evolution.

Economically stratified and socially differentiated societies developed all over the world from societies that were little stratified and relatively undifferentiated; large and densely populated cities developed from habitations and villages; social classes developed from societies that were structure by kin-relations which functioned as frameworks for production and so forth. These changes must be explained, and archaeologists have been doing the job with remarkable success for more than a century … it doesn’t matter what we call things, as long as we explain clearly what we mean, and as long as our categories further research, rather than force data into analytical blocks that are self-fulfilling prophecies.”

2: “The central myth of this book is not that there was no social evolution …, but the claim that the earliest states were basically the same sort of thing: large territorial systems ruled by totalitarian despot who controlled the flow of goods, services, and information and imposed true law and order on their subjects. If a myth can be defined … as ‘a thing spoken of as though existing,’ we find that much of what has been said of the earliest states, both in the professorial literature as well as in popular writings, is not only factually wrong, but also is implausible in the logic of social evolutionary theory. … No one should conclude, however, from my discussions of the limitations on the power of rulers, and because I am interested in ‘bottom up’ aspects of the power of rulers, that I regard the nature of rule in the earliest states as anything other than repressive and exploitive.”

4-5: “Although I criticize the neo-evolutionary theory as it has been used in archaeology and anthropology, that is, the attempt to create categories of human progress and to fit prehistoric and modern ‘traditional’ societies into them … [5] … I find ‘evolution’ an appropriate term for investigating the kinds of social change depicted in this book. Class-stratified societies with many different social orientations and occupations and with internally specialized political systems developed from societies in which kin-relations functions to allocate labor and access to resources; large and densely populated urban systems emerged over time from small habitation sites and villages; ideologies that espoused egalitarian principles gave way to belief systems in which the accumulation of wealth and high status was regarded as normal and natural, as were economic subordination and slavery. These changes occurred across the globe, mostly independently and about the same time (especially if time is calculated in each region from the onset of the first agricultural communities). Archaeologists have the resources to
explain these and many other kinds of change, and the term evolution is the only one I know that can enfold the various theories needed for the job.”

5-6: “I contest a variety of myths of the evolution and nature of the earliest states, or ‘archaic states,’ as some have curiously called them. These include: (1) the earliest states were basically all the same kind of thing (whereas bands, tribes, and chiefdoms all varied within their types considerably); (2) ancient states were totalitarian regimes, ruled by despotists who monopolized the flow of goods, services, and information and imposed ‘true’ law and over on their powerless citizens; (3) the earliest states enclosed large regions and were territorially integrated; (4) typologies should and can be devised in order to measure societies in a ladder of progressiveness; (5) prehistoric representatives of these social types can be correlated, by analogy, with modern societies reported by ethnographers; and (6) structural changes in political and economic systems were the engines for, and are hence necessary and sufficient conditions that explain, the evolution of the earliest states.”

6: “It has taken archaeologists many decades to reject the neo-evolutionist proposition that modern ethnographic examples represent prehistoric stages in the development of ancient states. Defining ‘types’ of societies (e.g. bands, tribes, chiefdoms, states), establishing putative commonalities within a type, and postulating simple lines (or even a single line) of evolutionary development had led archaeologists to strip away most of what is interesting (such as belief systems) and important (such as the multifaceted struggle for power) in ancient societies”.

7-8: “In the introduction to his photo-biography of Marilyn Monroe, Normal Mailer … coined the term ‘factoid.’ A factoid is a speculation or guess that has been repeated so often it is eventually taken for hard fact. Factoids have a particularly insidious quality—one that is spectacularly unbiological—is that they tend [8] to get stronger the longer they live. Unlike ‘facts,’ factoids are difficult to evaluate because, although they often begin as well intended hypotheses and tentative clarifications, they become received wisdom by dint of repetition by authorities. The history of neo-evolutionary theory in archaeology is the evolution of a factoid. … Once the factoidal nature of neo-evolutionism has been exposed, we can see that its deployment by archaeologists resulted in circular reasoning about the nature of ancient societies and the process of social change.”

OED: “factoid, n. and adj. … Something that becomes accepted as a fact, although it is not (or may not be) true; spec. an assumption or speculation reported and repeated so often that it is popularly considered true; a simulated or imagined fact.

1973 N. Mailer Marilyn i. 18/2 Factoids…that is, facts which have no existence before appearing in a magazine or newspaper, creations which are not so much lies as a product to manipulate emotion in the Silent Majority.”

8-15: Section, “neo-evolutionism evolving” looks critically at social and/or cultural evolutionary theories.

17: “Most neo-evolutionists, attempting to ascertain the essential qualities of evolutionist states (bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states), ignored the conception of civilization”.

18-19: “The neo-evolutionist model of stages and levels … leading to states was characterized in the 1960s as the generalizing, basic cross-cultural tool of anthropology. … Archaeologists embraced the model of ‘our contemporary ancestors’ … because it provided archaeologists with a series of ready ethnographic analogies that could be
introduced into the past. Such neo-evolutionary trees could be constructed without any reservation that the ethnographic societies placed in a line of development did not themselves lead to the next ‘higher’ state. The social evolutionists who had constructed the model, after all, had advocated precisely that cultures should be plucked from any context of time and history. One can see now, of course, that the whole metaphysical arrangement of cultures was riddled with logical contradictions, and it channeled archaeological research into dangerous waters: modern [19] not having achieved ‘statehood’ were ‘fossils,’ the relics of prehistoric underachievement, and the past itself was condemned to resemble some form of the present. I repeat: little wonder that many archaeologists today have rejected the term evolution.”

20: “The very act of categorization turned researchers towards the goal of finding an ideal type in the material record—is it or is it not a chiefdom?—and to construct a shortcut for identifying an entire set of differences (as well as similarities) among prehistoric societies. Archeological accounts of the rise of ancient states and civilizations thus retrojected ethnographic types … into the prehistoric record and reconstructed social evolution as a series of holistic leaps from one stage to the next. The unavoidable conclusion was that archaeologists, in becoming true believers of neo-evolutionary theory, produce confirmations of revealed truth”.

21: “As anthropologists and historians we owe the neo-evolutionists of the mid-twentieth century and their archaeological acolytes great respect for having advanced the study of social change as a central goal in archaeology. Having acknowledged our debt, we now realize that the model of neo-evolutionism in its very comprehensiveness had buried the complexities of development under the single-minded aim of establishing an all-encompassing regularity, a teleology without a god. That model did little to advance our knowledge of social change and only offered an untestable dogma that fossilized, but once harmoniously adapted social systems are out there and only await identification and seriation.”

Chapter 2: Dimensions of Power in the Earliest States

23: “There is no real secret … why the chiefdom was (and sometimes still is) so ubiquitous in the archaeological literature. First, something must precede states that is not even crypto-egalitarian, yet is not exactly state-like, and it requires a name. Second, anthropological archeologists need a frame for cross-cultural comparison. ‘Primary’ states arose independently in various parts of the world, and so similar pre-state entities must be identified in order to measure their distances from statehood. And third … the received anthropological wisdom (created by social anthropologists in the 1960s) directed archaeologists to flesh out the fragmentary material record of an extinct social organization by means of an appropriate ethnographic analogy. …

Archaeologists continued to search the past for chiefdoms into the 1990s (Earle 1991, 1997), although the task was becoming increasingly difficult, as the essential qualities of chiefdoms were themselves changing considerably.”

24-5: “In influential articles written by … scholars … associated … [with the] University of Michigan, the basic point of the chiefdom was that it was [25] a political unit …. That is, the chiefdom represented a breakthrough in social evolution in which … according to Robert Carneiro … gave way to a form of authority in which a paramount leader
controlled a number of villages. Chiefs thus organized regional populations in the thousands or tens of thousands and controlled the production of stables and/or the acquisition of preciosities; the chiefdom was thus the stage preceding the rise of the state. For Carneiro, states were only quantitatively different from chiefdoms—larger, and with more powerful leaders.”

26-7: “Although the archaeological neo-evolutionists had received their inspiration [27] from sociocultural anthropologists, it is clear by the 1980s (at the latest) that determining the essence of chiefdoms and their possible location in the great chain of becoming states was light-years from anything that sociocultural anthropologists were (and are) worried about.”

28: “Gary Feinman and Jill Neitzel (1984) observed that since prehistoric change was continuous …, it was wholly arbitrary to break the sequence into discrete and distinct blocks. In reviewing books on Andean prehistory, Garth Bawden noted that even later pre-ceramic societies have been called ‘states’ and that one finds ‘mixtures of characteristics that have been used to identify chiefdoms and states, ranked and stratified societies’.

29: “There are two groups of archaeologists who often use the term chiefdom, and they must be kept distinct. First are the archeologists studying the rise of ancient states. They use ‘chiefdom’ in order to describe those prehistoric societies that directly precede the societies they call states … but that are a lot more complicated than seems appropriate for ‘bands’ or ‘tribes.’ They use the term ‘chiefdom’ without implying anything about a kind of social organization and its ranking system, form of economic stratification, or amount of territory controlled by a simple or complex chief.

The second group of archaeologists includes those who study societies that were (arguably) not part of a trajectory to statehood at all, for example in the American Southeast or in Polynesia. These prehistoric societies were characterized by leadership structures that were calculated within the kinship system. Monumental structures were the scenes of ceremonies, which required goods to be submitted to the leaders and their ancestors, and leaders amassed not inconsiderable amounts of wealth. As I have already noted, some archaeologists studying these chiefdoms think that the contradictions of limited power along with duties of labor for the construction of ceremonial centers and the enactment of rituals resulted in a phenomenon of ‘cycling’ in which more complex chiefdoms collapsed into simpler ones.”

31: “no formative stage of a state-level society can be simply modeled according to any whole ethnographic example or any prehistoric chiefdom, because the trajectories of development are (or might be) completely different. Ethnographic and prehistoric chiefdoms may not precede the development of the earliest states buytt represent alternative trajectories to it. In social evolutionary terms, the basis for cross-cultural comparison is trajectories of social change in societies that did become states …, not the projection into the archaeological record of (questionable) ethnographic analogies that have been snatched out of time, place, and developmental sequence.”

31: “What neo-evolutionism never was was a theory of social change. Rather, it was a theory of classification, or identification of ideal types in the material record.”

32: “neo-evolutionists could not explain change other than in holistic terms and were content to identify as evolutionary mechanisms … climate change or/and population
growth. They offered little explanation of differences within types except by appealing to different environmental circumstances”.

34: “Control over the sources and distribution of subsistence and wealth, the segregation and maintenance of the symbols of social integration and incorporation, and the ability to impose obedience by force, both on the governmental level and also within local groups, together constitute the main dimensions of power in the earliest states”.

35: “All trajectories towards states began in processes of agricultural production, and all states were largely dependent on the surplus produced in the countryside.

The second major source of economic power is through mercantile activity. Long-distance, regular networks of exchange are generally found to accompany the first inequalities in access to production in early agricultural societies. …

Archaeologists measure trends towards economic inequality in production and exchange by looking at the differing size of residences, activity areas, the distribution of artifacts, features, and mortuary furnishings. No prehistoric trajectory to any state fails to contain indications of significant economic inequality or the potential of such inequality well before the appearance of anything that might be called a state.”

38: “all three main dimensions of power and the different means of achieving power—the struggle for control of economic resources, control of knowledge, ceremonies, and symbols, and control of armed forces—need to be co-evolving for states to emerge, since these three sources of power all reinforce one another.”

41: “Neo-evolutionists spent much time attempting to decide whether a complex society was a state or a chieftain. In this chapter I have tried to show the futility of those arguments and the emptiness of their categories. However, for those who persist in this quixotic venture, I submit ‘Yoffee’s Rule’ about how to identify the ineffable presence (or absence) of the earliest states: ‘If you can argue whether a society is a state or isn’t, then it isn’t.’”

Chapter 3: the Meaning of Cities in the Earliest States and Civilizations

42: “the evolution of the earliest states and civilizations … was marked by the development of semi-autonomous social groups, in each of which there were patrons and clients organized in hierarchies, and that there were struggles for power within groups and among leaders of groups. States emerged as part of the process in which these differentiated and stratified social groups were recombined under new kinds of centralized leadership. New ideologies were created that insisted that such leadership was not only possible, but the only possibility. The earliest states were made natural, that is, legitimized, though central symbols, expensively supported and maintained by inner elites who constituted the cultural and administrative core of the state. Ideologies of statecraft also set the rules for how leaders and would-be leaders must guard these symbols and perpetuate the knowledge of how to maintain, display, and reproduce them.”

44: “in contrast to the neo-evolutionist myth that the earliest states emerged and were territorially extensive—most of the first states were not large, but evolved as ‘peer-polities’ … and were part of larger cultural associations. For example, in early Mesopotamia or among the Maya, there were many relatively small states—city-states or micro-states—that were hardly ever politically unified but whose central symbols of statecraft were shared. This common ideology that stretched over politically independent
states was marked in material culture and literature and played out in economic and political interactions among the independent city-states. It is for these reasons that one needs to distinguish between Maya civilization (or Mesopotamian civilization) and Maya (or Mesopotamian) states.

… the evolution of ancient states was unlikely to have passed through a stage like chiefdoms. … The meaning of cities in the evolution of states and civilizations requires that archaeologists build new social theory.

… Some of these terms become ‘factoidal,’ being repeated so often they seem like facts. In the face of arguments against them, one often encounters claims that a term is ‘heuristic,’ which seems to mean that archaeologists have used the term so often that they are unwilling to give it up.”

45: “The Greeks were not the only ones who invented the term city-state”. He mentions several other examples including Mesopotamian city-states, Harrapan/Indus Valley city-states, early north China city-state, Maya city-states, and Teotihuacan. “Whereas neo-evolutionists seem to have regarded cities as place-holders at the top of settlement hierarchies they called states, I argue that cities were the transformative social environments in which states were themselves created.

… there are early states that are not city-states. The most obvious of these is ancient Egypt, but cases have been made for ‘valley states’ in the north coast of Peru as well.”

48: On Egypt: “Symbols of kingship are unification, including royal names, are found all over the country in the latest prehistoric period, and these motifs supply the principal evidence of a developing territorial ideology within which cities also existed.

…

Teotihuacan … is also an exception …

Although Teotihuacan was a very large city that did not exist in a network of similar cities, and so is not really a city-state that is part of a ‘city-state culture,’ there is a difficulty in terming the a ‘capital’ of a territorial state.”

50: “Geertz elegantly criticized European definitions of the modern state that emphasize the monopolization of violence (1980:122) …. In the case of most of the earliest states, however, there is a conspicuous lack of governance of large territory by a capital, a single seat of state administration.”

56: “If there was no political center in early Mesopotamia before the time of Sargon of Akkade (ca. 2350 BC), who first brought together Mesopotamian city-states into a regional state and then empire …, city-seals and other evidence show that a native conception of Mesopotamian cultural Unity preceded this unification and lasted after its dissolution.”

161: archaeologists are only beginning to consider the evolutionary distinctiveness of prehistoric societies that few would label a state. These societies have their own histories and cannot be relegated as stages in overall global trajectories toward states. For example, Susan McIntosh and colleagues (McIntosh 1999) have discarded the old neo-evolutionist band-tribe-chiefdom-state taxonomy in order to characterize ‘alternative’ forms of leadership in prehistoric African societies. In his Society Against the State, the anthropologist Pierre Clastres (1989) argued that some societies not only were not on a putative, normative pathway to statehood but also resisted such a social trajectory.
To the extent that archeologists have sought to explain different evolutionary pathways, they have, not unnaturally focused on environmental conditions.”

168: “Chacoan ‘complexity’ cannot be reduced to one or another of canonical neo-evolutionist stages, and also that political economic explanations cannot account for major aspects of Chaco society.”

173: “The Choago rituality may not be exactly like the past anywhere else. Many archaeologists now are properly skeptical of a comparative method that simple ‘drops a deductive scheme from above down on the evidence’ …. Although it seems to many that the interpretation of Chaco as a ceremonial realm is clear enough … We [Western folk] have lost the capacity, by and large, to estimate the power and reality of ceremony, and it is hard even to find the property language to appreciate the purpose of ritual.”

174: “Calling the Mississippian societies ‘chiefdoms’ means for Mississippianists only that the polities were not quite states and very far from bands or tribes. Although I do not object to the term in this usage, it obviously doesn’t tell us much about how such societies developed, how they worked, and how and why they collapsed.

Mississippian societies … cycled from more to less complex forms because of structural contradictions in their social organization. They did not develop economically stratified societies, cities and urban offices, and (as far as can be ascertained) an ideology of ‘statecraft.’ Major sites like Cahokia collapsed and were abandoned sooner after the apogee of their construction, which was also the case at Chaco.”

176: “Although some archaeologists have classified both Chaco and Cahokia as ‘chiefdoms,’ their histories were remarkably different. What is most comparable in them is that few archaeologists call Chaco and Cahokia states.

Many archaeologists, however, call Chaco and Cahokia ‘complex societies.’ That is, although neo-evolutionists denied that there were major similarities between chiefdoms and states, because stages had to be holistically separate, one finds in the Mississippian local councils, elite networks, and overarching ideology—institutions that are also characteristic in the earliest states. …

In Chaco and Cahokia political leadership was apparently embedded in ritual networks that discouraged forms of economic inequality other than between ritual leaders and followers, and the social roles of individuals in Chaco and Cahokia were strongly ascribed in social and ritual units. Trends towards urbanism, which are evident at Cahokia and seem quite similar in their rapidity to those that lead to the earliest cities, were short-circuited as new forms of governance did not accompany the substantial demographic and economic changes”.

177: “Instead of developing new principles of leadership, new ideologies of domination and new offices to be contested in cities, along with new social identities of citizens, who were also members of various social and economic groups, Cahokia—as rapidly as it emerged—collapsed.”

Start now: p. 177 “Towards a history of social evolutionary trajectories”

**ZUK: Perfect Past**

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/health/views/20essa.html?_r=1
The Evolutionary Search for Our Perfect Past
By MARLENE ZUK
Published: January 19, 2009
New York Times
Zuzanna recommended it. It introduced me to the term paleofantasy, but didn’t lead me to any academic references for it.