China’s Tax Policy Response to the Global Financial Crisis

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On August 4, 2008, two unusually trenchant pieces of commentary on China’s tax policy appeared in Caijing magazine. Both took aim at China’s production-type VAT (value added tax), which differed from the consumption-type VAT that is the international standard in that it did not allow the VAT that producers had paid on purchases of equipment and other fixed assets to be credited against VAT due on output. This resulted in the non-consumed portion of GDP being subject to the VAT, which distorted both production and consumption decisions. The first piece was by Xu Shanda, a former deputy minister of the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). Xu chastised the government’s longstanding hesitation in reforming the VAT. According to him, the conversion to a consumption-type VAT should have happened during the deflationary aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, but the government had been too worried that such conversion would result in reduced revenue to do anything. What would have been wrong with a little bit of deficit to finance tax reform, Xu asked, especially if the reform (by removing a tax on business investment) would have had the effect of stimulating investment, which the government was trying to do in 1998 anyway? After 2003, once inflation became the primary concern instead of deflation, VAT reform was delayed for the opposite reason: the government was afraid that it would stimulate the economy too much, and, in any case, policymakers might have felt that reform was unnecessary, despite the inefficiencies of the production-type VAT, given how well the economy was going. The result, Xu pointed out, was that there is no backing for tax reform during either boom times or downturns. Fortunately, he claimed, the State Council might occasionally rise above such political quagmire, and once a decision was made, VAT reform could be implemented without a glitch.

The second essay by Liu Shangxi, from the Fiscal Science Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), began with the statement: “The most important issue is not always the most urgent; the most urgent issue is not always the most important. But VAT reform is both most important and most urgent.” The reasons he gave for the importance of VAT reform were many (e.g. the VAT was too narrow in scope and left the service sector to the cascading Business Tax), but the urgency he felt was clearly traceable to one item: the rapid growth in tax revenue China witnessed in 2007 and the first half of 2008. Liu’s argument appeared to be: finally, we can afford VAT reform.

The actual turns of events during the rest of 2008 simultaneously belied and fulfilled Xu and Liu’s prophesies. As the spreading global recession slowed China’s export growth in the latter half of 2008, year-on-year tax revenue growth went into an even faster decline, and became negative in October, November and December. Before boom-time indifference to tax reform could be overcome, it seemed, fiscal conservatism during downturns might rapidly return. This highly

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2 Hence the label “production-type” (as opposed to “consumption-type”) VAT.
4 2008 Revenue Analysis.
unusual circumstance, however, also produced response that was a quite unusual in terms of the ordinary politics of Chinese tax policy: in early November, in the same week that the State Council announced the “4 trillion yuan” stimulus package, it also announced the decision to complete the conversion of China’s VAT into the consumption type, effective on January 1, 2009.\(^5\) A tax reform measure that had been advocated for over 10 years was finally brought into fruition by the global financial crisis (GFC).

We will see below that VAT reform constituted the most important tax policy action China took during 2008-9. Of course, if China had had a more typical tax structure, this specific policy instrument (as well as certain others) would not have been available. Conversely, because of the idiosyncrasies of China’s current tax structure, some of the policy measures commonly deployed in other countries also cannot be used. In comparing China and Europe in the tax policies adopted since 2008, therefore, major differences in prior tax structures must be taken into account. But there are also two other potential determinants of China’s tax policy, both alluded to in Xu Shanda’s essay. One is the Chinese government’s general propensity (or lack thereof) to use taxation as an instrument of economic policy. The other is the fate of fundamental tax reforms, in the absence of which tax policy options that have macro-economic significance are limited. This essay makes a preliminary attempt at analyzing these two additional factors, after first chronicling the significant tax policy measures that China adopted since 2008 and comparing them to what happened in Europe.

I. China’s Tax Policy Responses to Consequences of GFC

During 2007, before the GFC could have been widely anticipated, China adopted several important tax reduction measures, foremost among which was the passage of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law). The new EIT Law, which took effect at the beginning of 2008, accomplished the long-overdue, widely-supported integration of the previously separate corporate income tax regimes for domestically- and foreign-invested enterprises, and reduced the nominal income tax rate for domestically-owned enterprises from 33% to 25%. The effective tax rate for these enterprises was further lowered thanks to the removal of a host of unjustifiable limitations on deductions of expenses.\(^6\) This reduction in the corporate income tax is consistent with trends in EU countries and indeed in OECD countries in general,\(^7\) and was part of the long-term strategy of “structural tax reduction” (jiegouxing jianshui) pursued by the Chinese government, aimed at broadening the tax base and lowering tax rates at the same time.

A reduction of the personal income tax (PIT) rate on deposit interest from 20% to 5%, as well as a popular policy that raised the monthly deduction amount under the PIT for wage income to 2000 yuan a month (roughly the median monthly income per person of China’s urban population),

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\(^5\) However, the limited scope of the VAT was unchanged; only upon further integration of the VAT and the Business Tax would China’s VAT become the consumption-type VAT adopted in most other countries. All references to the 2009 conversion to a consumption-type VAT below should be understood in light of this caveat.

\(^6\) The effective tax rate for foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) increased due to the repeal/phase out of previous tax preferences. In 2008, FIE EIT revenue grew year-on-year by 39%, outpacing the growth rate for domestically-owned enterprises by 16.2%. FIE EIT revenue as a proportion of total EIT revenue rose from 27.57% to 30.11%. See 2007 Revenue Analysis.

also came to pass by the end of 2007. The former policy should have been controversial because
the administrative cost of collecting PIT on interest was very low, and it is widely believed that
Chinese individual saving behavior is relatively inelastic and would not be easily distorted by
taxes. In other words, the tax on deposit interest was economically efficient. It was believed by
some to be unfair, however, because the poorer segments of the population kept more of their
savings in the form of bank deposits, whereas richer people invested in assets the returns on
which were not always subject to effective tax collection. Even so, given that PIT collected on
interest income represented a healthy 16% of total PIT collection (and 1% of total tax revenue) in
2007, it seems that one could have chosen to cut other taxes that were both inefficient and
regressive, such as the production-type VAT. In 2007, however, there was still not enough
momentum for such other reform.

The increase in wage deductions was also significant. The monthly deduction for wages had been increased as recently as in 2005. By the estimate of the MOF, after taking into account other deductions, even a person earning 10,000 yuan of wages a month (i.e. someone well into the top 5% of income in the entire Chinese population) was only subject to an average PIT rate of 8.3%. Indeed, PIT revenue as a proportion of total tax revenue went into steady decline after 2007. The narrowness of the PIT tax base directly implies that, during 2008-9, PIT could not have been an area of meaningful policy action.

Tax policies specifically responding to the global economic recession did not appear until summer 2008. In August, China began a series of increases in the rates at which VAT borne by various categories of exported products are refunded to exporters. Globally, countries with VATs generally tax the import of goods and completely refund any VAT borne by exported goods. In a relatively unique arrangement, China offers export refunds only selectively and at a quite varied set of rates, thus essentially imposing a set of excise taxes on exports. Increasing VAT refund rates amounts to reducing these excise taxes. The size of these tax cuts in 2008-99 was significant: export refund grew 10.6% in 2009 over 2008 despite the decline of the total value of exports by 13.9%, implying well over 100 billion yuan of foregone revenue.

The reform of the VAT announced in November 2008 involved not only allowing taxpayers to claim input tax credit for fixed asset purchases, but also reducing by half the tax rate applicable to small taxpayers, and increasing the minimal thresholds under which businesses would be exempt from the VAT (and the Business Tax). Although there are no published official estimates, the

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8 The monthly deduction for wages had been increased as recently as in 2005.
10 The percentages in 2007, 2008, 2009 and the first 3 quarters of 2010 were 7%, 6.87%, 6.64%, and 6.6%, respectively. See revenue analyses available at http://szs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai.
11 Indeed, up until 2007, the government had been reducing export refunds for goods that either consume a high amount of energy to produce, generate high pollution, or use nonrenewable resources.
13 Like abandoning the production-type VAT, the increase in export refunds is a policy option that one would not expect to find elsewhere in the world.
change for small taxpayers itself could have implied a tax cut between 30 and 40 billion yuan in 2009. The next tax cut targeted at small businesses, however, did not come until the end of 2009, and its magnitude was small: the EIT rate applicable to small businesses would be reduced from 20% to 10% for taxpayers earning less than 30,000 yuan of taxable income in 2010. Since taxpayers operating at this scale are usually taxed on the basis of deemed instead of actual profits, it is unclear that how effective this item of policy will turn out to be.

In any case, between 2008 and 2009, the Chinese press’ reports on tax cuts focused instead on two other areas. One is reductions in transaction taxes, especially ones directed at more speculative parts of the Chinese economy. For example, the stamp duty on securities transactions was cut twice, likely in order to signal the government’s willingness to support the stability of the stock market, just as stamp duty increases had been used before to express concern about over-speculation. Similarly, changing Business Tax (BT), Deed Tax, Land Appreciation Tax, and stamp duty policies for the secondary housing market merely continued a history of cyclical adjustments. The preferential BT policy on residential property adopted in December 2008, for example, was strict by historical standards, and in any case it was reversed in 2009, after it had become clear that the GFC would not stop real estate speculation in China. The one excise tax cut aimed at real consumption was a vehicle purchase tax rate reduction (from 10% to 5%) for small vehicle purchases in 2009 and 2010, which may have contributed to the healthy revival of consumer automobile sales in the second half of 2009.

The other area of potential tax cuts subject to intense media focus was possible PIT reductions. The already preferential 5% rate on interest income from bank deposits was reduced to zero in October 2008, but the real heat was on increasing the monthly deduction for wage income. Rumors of increases circulated through different press outlets despite multiple debunkings. There was little evidence that such a tax cut (with strongly regressive effects) would stimulate domestic consumption, however, and much to its credit, the government did not budge.

In early 2009, the MOF estimated that tax reductions adopted since late 2008 would result in RMB 500 billion of lost revenue in 2009. The conversion to the consumption-type VAT (within the VAT’s current scope) itself was predicted to cost the government RMB 123 billion.

In increases in export tax rebate, and the cuts in securities stamp tax and transactional taxes

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14 Author’s computation based on domestic VAT collected in 2009 and the proportion of total VAT collected from small taxpayers as of 2007, as shown in China Tax Statistic Annals (2008).
15 Stamp tax rates on securities transactions have been adjusted 9 times between 1990 and 2010.
16 For a detailed examination of the history of transactional taxes in the Chinese real estate market, see Wei Cui, “What China Might Learn from the Australian GST,” forthcoming in Christine Peacock et al (Eds.) THE AUSTRALIAN GST: LOOKING FORWARD FROM THE FIRST DECADE (Reuters, 2011)
18 See “MOF Claims Tax and Fee Reduction of 500 Billion Yuan, with VAT Contributing Most;” China Business News, January 12, 2009. Data from the first half of 2009 suggested that the amount of input tax credits (equivalent to less revenue collected) resulting from VAT reform would slightly exceed the projection. See “Overall Transformation of VAT May Bring about Tax Abatement in Excess of RMB120Bln,” China Taxation News, November 11, 2009 (English version at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n6669073/n6669118/9397383.html)
applicable to real estate transfers were also included in the estimate. In addition, over 100 items of miscellaneous government fees were also canceled, with the expected cost of 36 billion yuan for the government in 2009.

Like other countries, of course, the Chinese government also enacted revenue raisers to counter the budgetary impact of tax cuts. The privilege of group consolidation reporting (which allowed members of a corporate group to use losses of one to offset profit of another), previously granted to 106 state-owned enterprises and estimated to cost the government 40 billion yuan per year, was ended at the beginning of 2009. Stricter enforcement led EIT collection from foreigners to grow rapidly. But as the economic downturn threatened the fisc of both national and local governments, something less benign began to emerge. Despite projected economic slowdown and tax cuts, the government set a nationwide target for revenue growth of 8.2% over 2008. Throughout 2009, evidence emerged of local tax bureaus attempting to meet this target through illegal means. More importantly, after tax revenue experienced 6% negative growth (year-on-year) during the first half of 2009, the SAT, under a mandate said to come directly from the State Council, ordered a nation-wide tax audit campaign in order to enhance tax collection. Audit departments of local tax bureaus were given targets of additional revenue generation set at twice the revenue collected from audits for 2008. The result was spectacular: revenue collected as a result of special audits in 2009 was 119.2 billion yuan, which exceeded the sum of audit-generated revenue from 2006 to 2008. This dramatic increase in collection, however, must be understood in light of the fact that Chinese local tax agencies’ capacity for carrying out effective audits is quite limited. “Enhanced audits” often simply mean setting higher expectations in negotiations for tax payment with all taxpayers, instead of any targeted action against non-compliance by specific persons. The audit campaign thus effectively amounted to an across-the-board tax increase, and was widely perceived to run

21 Id. Annual revenue collected as a result of tax audits hovered between 30 and 40 billion yuan between 2002 and 2007. Id.
counter to the policy of tax reduction.\textsuperscript{28} Interestingly, news reports suggest that the last time that such an audit mobilization occurred was during 1998, after the Asian financial crisis.\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Chronology of Significant Chinese Tax Policy Measures, 2008-9}
\begin{tabular}{|l|p{15cm}|}
\hline
Year & Description of Tax Policy Measures \\
\hline
2008.4 & Security transfer stamp tax reduced from 0.3% to 0.1% \\
2008.8-2009.6 & Rates of rebate of export VAT on selective products raised seven times. \\
2008.9 & Security transfer stamp tax halved by requiring only buyer to pay \\
2008.10 & Elimination of personal income tax on deposit interest \\
2008.10 & Exemption from stamp tax on individual sale or purchase of real property; exemption from land appreciation tax of individual sale of real property \\
2008.11 & Reduction of deed tax rate for certain purchases of first apartments \\
2008.11 & Comprehensive VAT reform, effective Jan. 1, 2009: input credit allowed for purchase of fixed asset; lower rates for small taxpayers. \\
2008.12 & Easing of BT policy on individual sales of residential housing (to be effective for one year in 2009) \\
2008.12 & Imposition of excise tax on finished oil, to replace six types of fees (intended to be revenue neutral.) \\
2009.1 & Reduction of vehicle taxes on purchases of small vehicles (effective for one year, subsequently extended for 2010); RMB 5 billion subsidy program for retirement of inefficient vehicles \\
2009.4 & Limited BT exemptions for exported services adopted \\
2009.12 & EIT rate reduction from 20\% to 10\% for 2010 for enterprises with less than RMB 30,000 of annual taxable income. \\
2009.12 & Tightening of BT policy on sale of residential property again \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Table 1 lays out the chronology of significant tax policy measures during 2008-9, whereas Table 2 displays the actual revenue outcome for 2009. Both as a result of tax cuts and slower economic growth, 2009 tax revenue growth over 2008 was only 5.7\% (after discounting tax revenue increase from the absorption of transportation and road fees into the Excise Tax (\textit{xiaofeishui})),\textsuperscript{30} in sharp contrast to the high growth rates of the preceding 5 years.\textsuperscript{31} The growth patterns of revenue from specific taxes are also interesting. As can be expected, total VAT revenue (net of export refunds) experienced significantly below-average growth. Rate cuts also resulted in a big drop in stamp duty revenue, despite a doubling of trade volume on the stock market. Some of the other transaction taxes nominally subject to rate cuts, however, generated significantly above-average revenue growth: this is true of the real-estate component of the

\textsuperscript{29} The SAT Initiates the Second Wave of Tax Audits, New Revenue Targets Set after Ten Years,” Economic Observer, March 15, 2010. According to this report, audit teams nationwide were mobilized in the 4\textsuperscript{th} quarter of 1998, and, disturbingly, increasing penalties over which tax officials have discretion also became a device for increasing revenue intake. 
\textsuperscript{30} Computation based on 2009 Revenue Analysis. The fee-to-tax conversion was expected to generate over 200 billion yuan of additional tax revenue, including increased VAT collection resulting from the fact that the sales amount to which VAT applies includes the Excise Tax. 
\textsuperscript{31} Tax revenue grew 20.7\%, 19.1\%, 18.6\%, 33.7\% and 18.8\% during 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively.
Business Tax, the Deed Tax, and the Vehicle Purchase Tax. Other real-estate-related taxes also witnessed significant revenue growth. Given that the income taxes experienced below-average growth, the overall tax mix shifted towards excise/transaction taxes and property taxes in 2009.

### Table 2: 2009 Tax Revenue Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Tax</th>
<th>% of total tax revenue</th>
<th>Growth rate over 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total tax revenue</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9.8% (5.7%-6.7% after discounting fee-to-tax conversion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic VAT (net of export refund)</td>
<td>20.15%</td>
<td>2.3% in gross revenue, 10.6% in refund, -1.14% net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise income tax</td>
<td>19.38%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Tax</td>
<td>15.15%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAT and Excise on Import</td>
<td>12.99%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Excise</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>85.3% (20.93% after discounting fee-to-tax conversion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income tax</td>
<td>6.64%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deed tax</td>
<td>2.92%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariff</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td>-16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle and vessels purchase tax</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban land use tax</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate tax</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Appreciation Tax</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax on use of agricultural land</td>
<td>1.06%</td>
<td>101.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamp tax on securities transactions</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
<td>-47.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource tax</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other misc taxes</td>
<td>3.74%</td>
<td>-14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Comparison with EU Countries

According to a recent report by the European Commission, “tax policies have played an important role in countering the financial and economic crisis” in EU member countries. A preliminary comparison of activist tax policy responses to the financial crisis in Europe and in China yields the following observations:

1. China's ratio of fiscal expenditure to GDP increased from 19.26% in 2007 to 20.82% in 2008 and 22.63% in 2009, which was smaller than, but comparable to, the 4 percentage point increase in expenditure ratio in the EU as a whole from 2008 to 2010.  

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32 Based on 2009 Revenue Analysis.
34 Tax Policy after the Crisis, p 16. The Chinese figures in this and the next two bullet points are computed based
2. China’s ratio of total tax and nontax revenue to GDP experienced slight increases (19.95%, 20.40%, and 20.42% for 2007, 2008 and 2009), in contrast to the slight fall in aggregate revenue ratios in Europe.\(^{35}\) In other words, tax cuts did not reduce total revenue intake as a percentage of GDP in China.

3. Once the effect of the one-time conversion of six types of fees into taxes is factored out, China’s ratio of total tax revenue to GDP did decline as a result of tax cuts. The 500 billion yuan in projected tax cuts represented 1.49% of 2009 GDP, implying a much greater tax policy response than the EU average.\(^{36}\) In both Europe and China, however, the absolute amount of tax cuts paled against increased government spending.\(^{37}\) In China, the cost of tax cuts represented only 40% of increased spending.

4. In EU countries, cuts dominated in corporate and personal income taxation, while increases were clearly prevalent in excise duties and VAT. In fact, “one of the effects of the crisis on tax systems seems to be a reinforcement of the trend of the last few years towards higher consumption taxes.”\(^{38}\) This is the opposite from the choice of policy instruments in China, where the dominant portion of tax cuts comprised in VAT reductions (including both increases in export refund and in the conversion to a VAT of the consumption type) and reductions in excise taxes (e.g. for vehicle and housing purchases).

5. “[O]ne of the most common types of measure [in Europe] was the direct support of household spending power by reductions in the PIT.”\(^{39}\) However, because of the structural limitations of the Chinese PIT, only a reduction in the tax on bank deposit interest was adopted in China. Assistance to low-income households otherwise took the form of cash or in-kind subsidies instead of tax expenditures.\(^{40}\)

6. Social security contributions (SSC) and similar taxes increased as a total percentage of government revenue in Europe, as a result both of the relative stability of wages and government measures to support wage levels.\(^{41}\) In China, social security fees do not count as tax revenue and indeed do not even appear in the general budget. Nonetheless, social security fee collection did grow 17% in 2009,\(^{42}\) faster than tax revenue growth. This may be considered a parallel development to the European shift towards higher SSC proportion of revenue after the crisis.\(^{43}\)

\(^{35}\) Id.

\(^{36}\) The majority of the measures adopted in EU countries has had an estimated budgetary impact of well below a half point of GDP. Id, p 30.

\(^{37}\) Id, p 16.

\(^{38}\) Id, p 31. One prominent exception was the temporary VAT reduction to boost consumer spending in the UK. Id.

\(^{39}\) Id. “This happened more often through increases in allowances than cuts in rates, presumably also because an increase in allowances can be expected to more directly boost private consumption given its proportionally higher impact on lower-income households.” Id.

\(^{40}\) For example, government-set purchase prices for agricultural products were raised; payments under the urban minimum income (dibao) program were increased; and subsidies given for sales of home appliances and vehicles in rural areas. See 2008 Budget.

\(^{41}\) Tax Policy after the Crisis, p 18.


While observations 1-3 and 6 identify similarities between China’s tax policy response to the GFC and those found in the EU, observations 4 and 5 point to divergences that are symptomatic of larger background differences. In exploring these differences, at least two broad questions may be raised. One is whether the Chinese government could have done more by way of tax cuts, or at least could have eschewed the nationwide audit campaign in 2009 (and the extraordinary revenue it generated), which in all likelihood did not permanently improve compliance but only amounted to a one-time extraction from the economy during a difficult time. This question is particularly pointed given that the central government is believed to have been hoarding cash in the treasury, and much of the central expenditure budget has been drawn down very slowly in the last two years. There are, however, likely to be important political forces in China that favor the use of expenditure policy over tax policy. Most fundamentally, the control of expenditure may be a powerful way of building factions and patronages within the state apparatus, whereas granting relief to taxpayers may generate little political benefits within a non-democratic system. And when mechanisms for transmitting budgetary revenue to actual expenditures are inefficient, higher spending goals—as were set during 2008-9, especially for local governments—also may imply greater incentives to secure revenue.

A second, related question is the following. The European Commission’s report found that “tax reforms enacted [by EU member countries during 2008-9] have been broadly in line with recent trends in tax policy,” especially in terms of reduction of taxes on labor. In the Chinese context, while the conversion to the consumption-type VAT clearly moved the tax system in the right direction for the long term, many other measures did not necessarily reflect views about permanent reform. For example, the tax cuts on real estate, vehicle, and securities transactions either have already been reversed or may be reversed in the future, and in July 2010 VAT export refunds were revoked for six categories of products (406 items). Whether the tax mix should be moving towards the current miscellany of excise taxes, as it did in 2009, is also subject to debate. Finally, since, unlike Europe, the PIT base is very narrow in China, the long-term trend should be a rise in the share of PIT in total revenue. The below-average PIT growth in 2009, therefore, ought not to be regarded as a part of long-term tax policy. Where, then, have the policy measures since 2008 positioned China in terms of the trajectory for future tax reform?

III. Options and Prospects for Future Reform

As a result of the decision to pursue VAT reform at the end of 2008, further changes to China’s indirect taxes have gained surprising momentum. The integration of the VAT and the Business Tax (BT), in particular, is being discussed much more frequently than could have been

44 There are, of course, substantial variations among EU member countries in the specific tax policies adopted in 2008-9 as well. Tax Policy after the Crisis, p 19-20.
46 Given observation 3 above, however, whether such explanations that refer to political factors unique to China are needed to explain the dominance of expenditure over tax in the policy response to the GFC is open to debate.
47 Tax Policy after the Crisis, p 7.
predicted two years ago.\(^{49}\) The BT, which generally applies to services and the transfer of real and intangible properties, covers a tax base that is normally covered by the VAT in other countries, but is a cascading tax imposed at rates (typically 5%) lower than regular VAT rates. Its eventual unification with the VAT had been anticipated ever since the two taxes were given their current shape in 1993.\(^{50}\) Integrating the two taxes will give VAT taxpayers the ability to credit taxes paid on input purchases of services, intellectual property and other intangibles, and real property against VAT on output, which should have a pervasive disinflationary effect on both domestically consumed and exported goods. Moreover, the elimination of cascading could remove many behavioral distortions and result in large efficiency gains, while being revenue-neutral. In short, from the perspective of tax design, VAT/BT integration is a very attractive reform option. However, unlike the VAT, which is split 75/25 between central and local governments, the BT is almost 100% a local tax, is the largest source of tax revenue for most local governments, and is administered by local tax bureau systems that do not collect the VAT. Anyone proposing to integrate the two taxes in favor of a comprehensive VAT therefore must explain how to compensate local governments for lost revenue, address the implications of the elimination of a major part of tax bureaucracy, as well as deal with a host of technical problems.\(^{51}\) Like all fundamental tax reform proposals, therefore, it still possesses something of the character of a political orphan. According to the mentality Xu Shanda ascribes to policymakers, if China has gotten by with the separation of the VAT and BT for so long, does it have to be fixed today?

The imposition of a broad-based property tax on real estate ownership has also been a purported but elusive goal for a number of years. In the last few years, whether a property tax will dampen real estate speculation has been heatedly discussed, without any convincing conclusion.\(^{52}\) Well-intentioned arguments in favor of the property tax as a welcome supplement to local governments’ revenue source have also been advanced, but it is clear that the tax in itself cannot plug the vertical fiscal gap that characterizes Chinese public finance.\(^{53}\) Finally, while the nature of the property tax as a progressive tax should have been a strong argument in its favor, prevailing opinion seems to be that only owners of a third apartment (or apartments over 200m\(^2\)) should be subject to it. At least in the public light, there are few advocates of the property tax giving convincing accounts of its true nature and arguing against its distortion and compromise.

Major tax reform proposals have a way of taking on a faceless character in China: at best,
they are associated with vague statements in certain official documents (“the State Council’s 2009 Opinion on Deepening Economic Reform”, the “2010 Legislative Agenda”, etc) and with ministries, but never with persons. Indeed, since the beginning of China’s economic reform, virtually no tax bureaucrat ever rose to political prominence, and no politicians ever claimed tax reform as their credentials. There are no counterparts to Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown, or Oskar Lafontaine (or Brian Mulroney, John Howard, or Ronald Reagan). This highlights a fundamental character of Chinese tax policy, namely that it seems remarkably insulated from the political process. There appears to be a lack of connection between the incentives of politicians and the wide array of tax reform options actually open to the country, resulting in most of these reform options laying dormant for long periods of times and perpetuating an inefficient tax system. The quick succession of tax measures since 2007 suggests that this is clearly an important area of policy to watch, but any logic that could assist prediction has yet to emerge.