Skip to main content
Article
Analyst Behavior and Underwriter Choice
Articles and Chapters
  • Walter I. Boudry, Cornell University
  • Jarl G. Kallberg, Arizona State University
  • Crocker H. Liu, Cornell University
Publication Date
1-1-2011
Abstract

We examine the role that analysts play in a firm's choice of underwriter using a sample of major U.S. investment banks. In order to best capture the competitive environment, which is critical to the potential role that analysts play, we limit our sample of firms to 161 real estate investment trusts (REITs) issuing debt or equity between 1996 and 2004. Using the estimation technique of Ljungqvist et al. (Journal of Finance 61:301–340 2006), which accounts for the endogeneity of analyst behavior and the coverage self-selection decision, we find that target prices that are optimistic relative to competitors' target prices, significantly increase an underwriter's probability of attracting underwriting business. This result holds for both equity and debt issues with fees greater than one million dollars. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that increased regulatory scrutiny of conflicts of interest between analysts and investment banks has decreased the impact of analyst behavior on underwriter choice.

Comments

Required Publisher Statement
© Springer. Final version published as: Boudry, W. I., Kallberg, J. G., & Liu, C. H. (2011). Analyst behavior and underwriter choice. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 43(1), 5-38. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

Citation Information

Boudry, W. I., Kallberg, J. G., & Liu, C. H. (2011). Analyst behavior and underwriter choice [Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Hospitality Administration site:http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/272