Skip to main content
Unpublished Paper
Committee Design with Endogenous Participation
mimeo (2016)
  • Volker Hahn, University of Konstanz
We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts’ decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages lead to lower quality experts. Second, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Third, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency. Fourth, we derive the properties of optimal committees. They involve low wages and can be transparent or opaque.
  • committee decision-making,
  • information aggregation,
  • adverse selection,
  • efficiency wages,
  • transparency,
  • career concerns
Publication Date
January, 2016
Citation Information
Volker Hahn. "Committee Design with Endogenous Participation" mimeo (2016)
Available at: