Ecological Explanation between Manipulation and Mechanism DescriptionPhilosophy of Science
AbstractJames Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Based on a case from ecology, I show that ecologists’ approach to that case satisfiesWoodward’s conditions for explanation and mechanism, but his conception does not fully capture what ecologists view as explanatory. The new mechanistic philosophy likewise aims to describe central aspects of mechanisms, but I show that it is not sufficient to account for ecological mechanisms. I argue that in ecology explanation involves identification of invariant and insensitive causal relationships and descriptions of the mechanistic characteristics that make these relations possible.
Document VersionPublished Version
CopyrightCopyright © 2009, Philosophy of Science Association
PublisherPhilosophy of Science Association
Citation InformationViorel Pâslaru. "Ecological Explanation between Manipulation and Mechanism Description" Philosophy of Science Vol. 76 Iss. 5 (2009)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/viorel_paslaru/1/