Adapting the Army Reserve for the Future

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by

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Abstract

Since the development of the Total Force Policy in 1973, the answer regarding how the Army Reserve effectively integrates its operational capabilities into the active force has remained elusive. Indeed, the strategic question for the Army Reserve in the last decade is how does the organization continue to maintain its "operational" footing in a fiscally constrained environment. Historically, operational-level integration initiatives—to include Bold Shift, Training Support XXI, CAPSTONE, and the “roundout” or “wartrace” concepts—have largely failed to emerge as viable options for solving this dilemma. One reason for this continued failure was an inability by military leaders to change the cultural mindset within the different components toward the integrated use of reserve forces in active duty formations. On the other end of the spectrum, structural and administrative disparities between the component's personnel and pay systems have further complicated this integration process, forcing leaders to revert back to historical frameworks. Finally, the increased demand for military support around the world has stressed the active force, putting added pressure on the Army Reserve to fill the existing operational gaps.
Adapting the Army Reserve for the Future

On January 31, 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) submitted its final report to Congress indicating a need to transform the reserve components from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times, to a more rapidly deployable operational organization.\(^1\) The intent of the Commission’s recommendation was to create an operational reserve that was both feasible and sustainable for long-term rotational commitments, and that could provide the active component with requisite capabilities in an expedited manner when needed.\(^2\)

Unfortunately, the effects of the Budget Control Act of 2011, specifically sequestration, stymied efforts to put the recommendation into practice in the Army Reserve thereby causing the component to revert to its former role, a strategic reserve. In 2015, this earlier recommendation was revisited when the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) mandated the formation of the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA). This commission, also known as the Army Commission, presented various options for better utilizing and integrating the Army reserves to meet the nation's future land power requirements.\(^3\) The Army Commission’s recommendations were intended to provide Army leaders with realistic alternatives for making the Army Reserve more flexible and functionally capable of integrating with the active force in order to meet operational requirements.

The Army Commission’s recommended approach, as noted by the Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General (LTG) Jeffrey W. Talley, also increased the pressure on military leaders to find new ways to mitigate the effects of a shrinking force before many of the reserve's operational capabilities were lost.\(^4\) Although, the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA15) temporarily alleviated some of these issues, future reserve
operational capabilities risk compromise unless cultural and structural changes are made within the force to balance the need for an operational reserve within future limited strategic budgetary frameworks. Some of these recommended changes should include: 1) the expanded use of multicomponent unit integration, 2) the increased use of Title 11 full-time support, 3) the implementation of multicomponent manning billets, and 4) the re-introduction of tiered readiness to maintain rapid operational capabilities.

Historical Framework

Since the development of the Total Force Policy in 1973, the answer regarding how the Army Reserve effectively integrates its operational capabilities into the active force has remained elusive. Indeed, the critical question for the Army Reserve in the last decade is how does the organization continue to maintain its "operational" footing in a fiscally constrained environment. Historically, operational-level integration initiatives, such as Bold Shift, Training Support XXI, CAPSTONE, and the “roundout” or “wartrace” concepts, have largely failed as viable options for solving this dilemma. One reason for this continued failure is an inability by military leaders to change the cultural mindset within the different components toward the integrated use of reserve forces in active duty formations. LTG (US Army, retired) David W. Barno acknowledged this point in 2016, when he stated that, "deep fissures have riven the active and reserve components ever since the end of major wartime commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan."5 On the other end of the spectrum, structural and administrative disparities between the components’ personnel management and pay systems have further complicated this integration process, forcing leaders to revert to historical frameworks. Finally, the increased demand for military support around the world has
produced further stress on the active force, and in doing so; put added pressure on the Army Reserve to fill the existing operational gaps.

The prosecution of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the end of the Cold War exposed these critical issues as the Army Reserve struggled to meet the demands of combat missions while maintaining ongoing humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and homeland defense operations. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, previous assumptions supporting the existing reserve mobilization and deployment models were reassessed when adequate forces were unable to muster in a timely manner. This, in turn, caused cracks to emerge in the Army Reserve’s institutional framework. In fact, the organization’s ability to meet these domestic and international demands, as outlined in 2003 by the Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, reached a critical point when the Army Reserve’s institutional capabilities were outstripped by the rapidly expanding active force requirements needed to wage the Global War on Terror (GWOT).⁶

These institutional stresses led to the 2008 congressionally recommended reorganization of the reserve forces commonly referred to as the reserve transformation.⁷ More importantly, this shift from a strategic force to an operational reserve assumed that the active component forces needed to work hand-in-hand with the Army Reserve as it prepared its forces for wartime rotational commitments. These efforts—similar to past experiences witnessed after the conclusion of other major conflicts—were unfortunately blunted by congressionally mandated fiscal restrictions. In this case, the restrictions came in the form of the BBA15 and resulted in increasing the operational capability disparities between the active and reserve components as
reserve unit combat skill proficiencies began to the slowly erode. This erosion, in turn, forced many Army Reserve organizations to revert to their historical strategic process of limiting cooperative training opportunities with active duty organizations in order to save money and streamline unit planning agendas.

From the active duty side, the BBA15 fiscal restrictions forced Army leaders to reduce troop strength across all commands, exposing various capability gaps as soldiers left the ranks. These smaller active duty formations subsequently placed higher operational demands on the Army Reserve to fill active duty shortfalls for future mobilization, deployment, equipment, and resourcing requirements. The result was a reserve component that struggled to find ways to meet the increased operational demands of the active force while in the mist of simultaneously downsizing its overall organization. In 2016, the congressionally-mandated NCFA (Army Commission) attempted to address these issues through a series of prescribed recommendations that were meant to find a way to "best organize and employ the Total Force in a time of declining resources." These recommendations, as presented by the Commission, assumed that any future change to the reserve component force structure would also be accompanied by committed change in the existing cultural preconceptions within the different components that limited full integration in the past. One of these identified areas of transformation involves the recommended continued use of "multicomponent units and training partnerships" as a means to improve Total Force integration.

Multicomponent Units

As noted by the Army Commission, multicomponent units (MCU) represent one of the best ways to develop the one Army concept. Full-scale MCU implementation
embodies a possible solution for resolving some of the critical issues of emerging capabilities gaps in the different components. Addressing these gaps, as noted by the Army Commission, enables the various Army components to counter long-term fiscal austerity, which limits their respective organization's ability to meet increased domestic and international requirements. Interestingly, the Army has a long history of using multicomponent units both in peacetime and war. These past attempts have been met with limited success despite challenges experienced on several personnel, financial, and operational fronts. For instance, increasing United States military commitments to the Bosnian Theater of Operations in the 1990s eventually led Regular Army leaders to redefine Army force structure in other areas of the world. One such area involved the Multi-national Forces and Observers mission in the Sinai (MFO-SINAI). In this instance, the Army decided to reduce the existing active duty footprint in the region by standing up and deploying the 4th battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (4/505th PIR) in 1995. This new unit, when fully operational, utilized a mix of active duty, Army Reserve, and National Guard soldiers. The composition of this battalion, in fact, was predominately reservists with about eighty percent of the force coming from the Army Reserve or Army National Guard. The 4/505th would assume responsibility of the United States battalion under Task Force-SINAI in January 1995, testing the concept of whether or not reservists could assume command and control of active duty future missions. This first-ever deployment of a multi-component battalion to the Sinai ultimately proved successful, leading the Army to continue the practice of giving command authority to reserve organizations deployed around the globe.
Missions like Task Force-SINAI would eventually lead Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen to release the "Integration of the Reserve and Active Components" memorandum to the broader defense community in 1997. The intent of this memorandum, as stated by the secretary, was to continue historical attempts “to create an environment that eliminate[d] all residual barriers structural and cultural for [the] effective integration within [the] Total Force.”\textsuperscript{12} To achieve this end, the memorandum outlined four basic principles for future implementation. These principles included that 1) senior leaders took responsibility and ownership of the Total Force, 2) clear and mutual understandings of the mission emerged between the components 3) resources were provided to accomplish assigned missions, and 4) senior commanders across the components provided the necessary leadership to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.\textsuperscript{13} The implications of Secretary Cohen’s memo would not only help push the Army toward a more unified footing, it would also help set the requisite conditions for the increased use of reserve component units in peacekeeping missions.

In another example, the multicomponent unit concept was employed in an active combat zone on December 3-5, 2002. In this case, the Army activated and deployed the Army Reserve's 48th Combat Support Hospital (CSH) to Afghanistan to address the growing needs for emergency surgical care. This instance represented the first time in United States military history that a multicomponent hospital was used to treat patients in an active combat zone. At the time of the unit’s deployment, the 48th CSH consisted of 124 personnel. Seventy-three of these individuals came from the Army Reserve with the remaining soldiers coming from the active component.\textsuperscript{14} This blended unit was able to care for more than 10,000 patients in six months despite early issues with integrating
discipline, readiness, and cultural preconceptions between the components. Ultimately, the 48th CSH's success led the Army to continue using the multicomponent model after the war by integrating the unit into Walter Reed Army Medical Center’s organizational structure.

The lessons learned from these different examples are threefold. First, when executed properly, MCUs effectively integrate capabilities from all Army components into one organization that works towards one singular mission. This integrated mission focus, in turn, facilitates the combining of the formal training, equipping, and manning activities of the components into one unified process. Thus, each component learns the other’s functional methods, which facilitates an environment where a ‘best practice’ emerges. The second aspect is that MCUs enable the active component to broaden its ability to meet increased requirements by using reserve organizations to fill existing gaps in their operational capabilities. In doing so, the active component is able to expand its operational and strategic depth by refocusing its mission requirements on time-sensitive and immediate operations.

Finally, integrated units are consistent with a variety of past policies, directives, and initiatives designed to meet the intent of the original Total Force concept. These include the 2008 Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, which states, "RCs [will] provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. requirements," and the Army Directive 2012-08 which indicates that, "military departments [will] organize, man, train and equip their active and reserve components as an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities." Hence, MCU execution not only provides a feasible and economical alternative to counter increased operational
demands under fiscal constraints, it is also consistent with various historical efforts to integrate the force. Despite the benefits of multicomponent units, however, several challenges still exist that limit the Army's ability to use these blended formations as a routine concept in the future.

First and foremost, these challenges involve the existing cultural differences between the components and how each component views the other's capability to achieve the mission. As noted in the Army Commission report, "parochialism" and "tension among [the] components" are a few of the many reasons why past efforts to build unity under the Total Force concept has failed.\textsuperscript{17} These cultural tensions exacerbate the other organizational problems that exist in establishing MCUs, fostering unnecessary barriers between the components. Many active duty leaders view a reservists' limited training time as a defining factor in their lack of operational discipline and competence when compared to Regular Army operational standards. The past Director of the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, Major General John G. Rossi, recently expressed this perception when he openly questioned the viability of the reserve components combat performance after September 11, 2001.\textsuperscript{18} Interestingly, this viewpoint is quickly diminished once integration occurs successfully and standards are applied to the unit regardless of its component lineage. In the case of Major General Rossi's comments, the time required to train reserve units for combat missions would be greatly reduced under an MCU design, eliminating the need to place these units initially in "simpler mission sets." The result is a blended unit in which all soldiers are equally viewed as capable of accomplishing the assigned tasks or missions.
The second and more complicated challenge centers on solving the administrative disparities between the components. These administrative differences include variances in the personnel management, pay, and medical functions of each component. In fact, the Army currently uses forty-five different human resource systems to monitor personnel actions and pay activities. Each unique system, in turn, does not share information adequately with the other, which increases and complicates the administrative duties within each potential multicomponent unit. The same problem exists in the medical arena where reserve personnel are tracked on an ad hoc basis depending on their duty status and location. To remedy these issues and make MCU execution more efficient, efforts should continue in the fielding of the Army's Integrated Personnel and Pay System (IPPS-A), as well as streamlining the methods for tracking reserve personnel in the medical arena. Under this new framework, management of soldiers in an integrated unit would become seamless, enabling personnel staff to efficiently track all unit individuals regardless of their parent component.

Unfortunately, the Army Commission failed to address one critical integration challenge that if executed properly, would provide the Army with a truly blended combat organization. That challenge involves finding a way to integrate the various components effectively into the existing Brigade Combat Team (BCT) structure. As noted by General Barno, "having active Army soldiers work with their Reserve counterparts every day in these operational units would be the most powerful way to unify the three fractious tribes of today's Army." Brigade combat teams represent the premier ground fighting force for the military and subsequently should be the main focus for any future multicomponent unit pilot program. The current Army structure includes thirty-two active
duty, and twenty-eight National Guard BCTs. Integrating these formations would enable the various components to work side-by-side on a daily basis, eliminating the existing cultural and operational gaps. The concept would also align training and schooling activities between the institutions, enabling each to compress the current deployment training timeline when required. Without this approach, the MCU development will simply become another historical attempt at integration as the cultural divides between the components continue to limit their organization's ability to overcome existing capability gaps.

Even with sound solutions to these various challenges, true component integration is still a complicated process and requires the full-time commitment of staff personnel in both the active and reserve organizations. The Army Reserve requires additional staffing to expand the use of MCUs in the reserve framework, as the traditional part-time structure of the organization would not adequately support the personnel tracking requirements of an integrated unit. The solution to this dilemma is the expanded use of Title 11 funding for full-time Regular Army personnel within the Army Reserve ranks.

Title 11 Full-Time Support

Full-time employment of active duty soldiers in reserve formations is another attempt, with historical precedence, at operationalizing the Total Force concept through organizational integration. Like multicomponent units, the full-time support concept has been met with tepid responses over the years as funding commitments have fallen short of initially designed expectations. For instance, the 1992 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established Title 11 funding for 5000 dedicated soldiers to be integrated
into reserve formations as a means to improve Army Reserve readiness after Operation DESSERT SHIELD/DESSERT STORM. In 2005, Congress reduced this initial funding mandate to 3,500 soldiers. By 2015, this manning level had slipped to sixty-four authorized Title 11 full-time positions across the Army Reserve force. Not surprisingly, these drastic reductions in full-time manning positions have occurred as both domestic and international military commitments have increased for the Army Reserve.

Recognizing the significance of this administrative gap and its effects on ensuring the future success of MCU development, the NCFA recommended that the Army pursue a pilot program designed to assign Regular Army personnel to Army Reserve units in an effort to increase the full-time support capabilities to the reserve component. The Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR) further identified in a 2015 memorandum the benefits of increasing Title 11 support to the Army Reserve in order to help sustain the operational force. The concept would not only provide reserve formations with "strategic, operational, and tactical enablers," but it also would create a stable management and administrative environment for the Army Reserve component.

Increased Title 11 funding, more importantly, supports both the Army Total Force Policy and the National Military Strategy by providing a predictable and sustainable framework in high demand reserve units. Imbedding Regular Army soldiers into reserve formations also provides the various active and reserve commands with an integrated capability that links active duty leadership and operational skills to high-demand Army Reserve organizations. Many of these critical reserve requirements include demands for civil affair and theater-setting capabilities (that is, the tasks needed to expand military operations gradually or rapidly), as well as long-term needs for logistical sustainment.
during combat. The intended outcome of these types of integrated units is to enable the Army Reserve to be more responsive to active-duty requirements by linking various critical skills to active-duty planning cycles. This linkage, in turn, helps integrate both of the component's training and equipping activities and produces a collaborative environment of sharing institutional knowledge across units and staff structures.

From an MCU standpoint, increased full-time support under Title 11 authorities helps offset Army Reserve manning disparities and enhances the organization's ability to mitigate cross-component personnel issues. Furthermore, any given Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) maintains its daily training and operational planning continuity through the dedicated and full-time employment of Army Guard/Reserve (AGR) soldiers. Similar to the Title 11 full-time support concept, these AGR soldiers enable day-to-day operations to continue despite the limited attendance of the unit's personnel. The inherent problem in this framework arises when either authorized slots are not filled by qualified individuals or when funding is not available for the dedicated support. In fact, Army Reserve AGR Manning stood at seventy-six percent (16,261 authorized of 21,322 required) as of fiscal year 2016.\(^ {27}\) As accurately pointed out in the Army Commission's report, this gap is best addressed using Title 11 dedicated support in lieu of increasing budgetary support for AGR personnel. In essence, as active duty end strength decreases, requirements for additional reserve component support increases. Hence, the need exists to interconnect the daily activities of the different components through the expanded use of Title 11 Manning support.

Individual Multicomponent Billets
Another novel and somewhat radical approach to integration—identified but not fully discussed by the Army Commission—is the implementation of individual multicomponent manning billets within the various component organizational structures. As noted in the report, Recommendation 27 indicates, "the Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as an integrated position." Although not elaborated on fully in the report, this recommendation represents a potentially ground breaking concept that could transform the way the Army meets its operational and strategic demands in future fiscally-constrained environments. This concept, coincidentally, is one of the many recommendations that the Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces put forth as a method for rebalancing and integrating its own Army. The idea, unlike current manning structures, would utilize newly designated integrated billets to open related jobs in different units across all components on a long-term basis. The intent of this new manning structure would be to fill gaps created by ongoing force reductions without affecting the organizational structure of the unit, integrate operational activities between the active and reserve components, and maintain critical skillsets lost when soldiers leave the ranks. Given the current legal status of funding between the components, this new concept would require direction from the Secretary of the Army, as well as new federal laws mandating the Army integrate occupational positions across existing funding streams.

Although no historical precedent exists for the development and use of individual multicomponent billets outside of the MCU design, the concept of using soldiers from different components to fill various manning shortfalls does. The last fourteen years of
conflict has frequently and consistently forced the Army to utilize individuals from the various reserve components to fill gaps in existing capabilities for the active force. In most cases, these soldiers were integrated into the different commands using a variety of funding streams, to include the commonly used Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) fund. This practice has proven effective in both wartime and peacetime operations, and highlights the fact that integration of the active and reserve components is achievable at the individual level. The effect of this new design also enables organizations to better manage their capability gaps without the cumbersome method of requesting support outside of the formal manning process. Finally, this concept provides the Army the ability to expand its operational reach by increasing the organization’s capacity to field more units, including brigade combat teams, by using reserve soldiers to fill existing gaps in their ranks.

As noted earlier, the current Army structure has thirty-two active duty, and twenty-eight National Guard BCTs. With the implementation of individual multicomponent billets, the possibility exists that each BCT structure could include five to ten percent of reserve soldiers within any given unit’s ranks. The benefit of this blended concept would be twofold. First, the financial costs to maintain existing force structures would be spread across the components as personnel and maintenance costs could be passed to the reserve organizations. This would enable active duty organizations to subsequently reduce operational costs as financial commitments are shifted to the reserve component. Second, the reserve components would increase their operational capability as more soldiers are integrated into existing active duty formations. The result is a blended organization with the capacity to stretch its
resources across commands more effectively, enabling the Army to meet its existing operational and strategic requirements.

Figure 1 illustrates how, in practice, these multicomponent billets would be structured within a notional unit. This structure not only aligns the mobilization and deployment activities of the reserve soldier with active duty operations, it also enables the soldiers to fill these positions on a longer-term rotational timeline. The outcome, similar to the Title 11 full-time support model, is the integration of the active and reserve component's training, equipping, and schooling requirements and the synchronization of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle at the individual level. Thus, the active and reserve commands would enjoy the benefits of soldiers that meet all of the unit's deployment and mission requirements.

Figure 1: Notional Functional Multicomponent Billet Design

NOTE: Multicomponent places account for 5-10% at any given time
Figure 2 illustrates the feasibility of the same concept for staffs at battalion-levels of command and higher; thereby, presenting a potential method for ensuring that an operational linkage exists for the planning and execution of various capabilities in times of crisis. The concept, more importantly, would expand on the emerging Army Reserve "Plan, Prepare, Provide" model introduced by LTG Jeffrey Talley's Rally Point 32.1 framework in 2013. In this framework, Army Reserve Engagement Team/Cells are formally stood up and aligned with regional combatant commands (CCDR) to provide direct staff support to active duty planners. The difference is that the formal integration of multicomponent billets enables soldiers in critical skill jobs to maintain operational knowledge previously lost after the termination of combat operations. A 2015 US Army Center for Military History interview with the 2001 Army G3 Operations CENTCOM Desk Chief, retired Army Major Larry Kendrick, noted this lack of operational knowledge by reserve personnel on the Army Staff and its direct impact on the planning and execution phases of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Multicomponent billet implementation alleviates this lack of operational knowledge by providing an avenue for soldiers to establish a long-term training and working relationship with their counterparts. It also expands on the current methodology of using reserve personnel to fill vacant staff positions on a temporary basis by establishing permanent billets that are continuously filled when required. Additionally, it leads to inter-component consistency in the force generation process, and enables formal relationships to emerge between active and reserve component staff members. In sum, the long-term benefit of this type of staff integration is a seamless planning and execution process when reserve component capabilities are required.
Figure 2: Notional Army Staff (Battalion and Higher)\textsuperscript{34}

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\caption{Notional Army Staff (Battalion and Higher)}
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Despite the effectiveness of the various concepts discussed earlier, with respect to both the active and reserve components, the need still exists for the implementation of a reserve-based tiered readiness structure that enables specific capabilities to be more accessible to active duty demands on short-notice. In fact, in 2015 the Army’s Budget re-introduced the tiered-readiness concept into the active component to ameliorate sequestration reductions to the force.\textsuperscript{35} Accordingly, introducing tiered readiness levels for high demand Army Reserve units, like civil affairs, medical, signal, and other theater-setting capabilities, enabled leaders to prioritize funding for requisite training, equipping, and schooling requirements in those organizations.

When viewed holistically, tiered readiness enables the Army Reserve to address how to be a strategic and operational force at the same time. In fact, the original Total Force concept viewed the Army Reserve as a strategic force in reserve that was designed to systematically operationalize the component in order to mobilize and deploy its capabilities over an extended period of time.\textsuperscript{36} The advent of the ARFORGEN process expanded the Total Force concept by creating a predictable and transparent
method for continuously rotating units in and out of theater. What ARFORGEN did not offer was a system for ensuring that certain high-demand reserve units were continuously trained and properly equipped prior to deploying during crises. Tiered readiness solves this dilemma by designating specific high-demand units for additional continuous funding to maintain higher levels of training, schooling, and equipping. Thus, the Army Reserve maintains an operational force for short-notice deployments in an era of fiscal constraints.

Although not viewed positively in the reserve component, tiered readiness has a precedent in the Army Reserve that is recognized as both effective and logical in times of reduced budgets and expanded operational commitments. In 1992, Forces Command (FORSCOM) established the Contingency Force Pool (CFP) to identify a collection of high priority reserve units for emergency-related support missions. This CFP structure was divided into two distinctive levels (CFP I & II), which were subsequently sliced into separate priority packages. Each identified support package was directly linked to active duty divisions and consequently given higher priority for funding, manning, training, and equipping. Within this CFP structure, the Army Reserve further refined the tiered system by classifying its units into four separate readiness tiers. The first and highest tier level (Level I) included units that were expected to arrive at mobilizations sites within fifteen days after being alerted. Tier level II included units expected to arrive between fourteen and thirty-one days after being alerted. Tier level III included Army Reserve schools, training sites, and maintenance support activities, while tier level IV included inactivated units. By October 1994, this CFP structure enabled the Army to expand its operational reach by giving the service the ability to deploy...
nearly nine active component divisions with the Army Reserve accounting for 540 of the allocated units.\textsuperscript{40}

In recent years, this same CFP structure has emerged in the form of FORSCOM’s Army Contingency Force (ACF) initiative, which prioritizes resources for the highest readiness level units.\textsuperscript{41} As noted in previous iterations of organizational restructuring, this concept is the direct result of financial exigencies and its effect on organizational capabilities. From the Army Reserve standpoint, the ACF once again provides the necessary framework for the implementation of tiered readiness in the reserve formations. Under the ACF initiative the Army is able to maintain twenty-four BCTs at the highest readiness level with the help of the reserve components.\textsuperscript{42} This goal is achieved through sustainable funding to the reserve forces and their ability to conduct annual training at various sites. Although not the optimal approach to ensuring all units are 100 percent trained and ready, the ACF and tiered readiness when used together enable both the active and reserve components to meet both immediate and unforeseen challenges. This “quick reaction” capability, in turn, provides time for the broader force to build combat capability, and, when needed, deploy forward to the area of operations, if required. Thus, the Army can sustain a sizeable operational reserve force while also maintaining a strategic capability for large-scale and long-term commitments.

Conclusion

In a 2010 interview, the Chief of Army Reserve, Lieutenant General (LTG) Jack C. Stultz, noted that in addition to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the Army Reserve was engaged in numerous missions around the world fulfilling requirements for medical,
engineer, logistical, and foreign army training operations. This dramatic increase in mission support was a clear indication at the time that the Army Reserve needed to expand its operational capabilities to ensure it retained the adaptability and flexibility required to meet the nation’s future strategic needs. The changing political climate in the United States, however, soon challenged these assumptions as reserve capabilities were slowly diminished by the introduction of the 2011 Budget Control Act, which inflicted budgetary cuts on the military in the form of sequestration. Fortunately, this fiscal challenge, as stringent as it was to the broader force, provided the necessary framework to address the decades-old integration issue that had been thwarted previously. Subsequently, the ability of the Army Reserve to adapt its force structure appropriately became paramount to the future viability of the organization. Identifying recommended paths to better align the reserves in the future epitomizes the fundamental requirement for sustaining an operational force in an expanding complex environment.

The formation of the National Commission on the Future of the Army represents the foremost effort in identifying these necessary changes, as well as how to best apply them in the future integration of the three Army components. Some of these practical recommendations include the expanded use of multicomponent units and the increased use of Title 11 support to the reserve force. The outlined recommendations put forth in this paper, however, expand on these Army Commission conclusions by providing additional proposals, which illustrate the potential advantages to the active component if implemented. These additional recommendations include the development and implementation of individual multicomponent manning billets in the active and reserve
components, as well as the re-introduction of a tiered readiness posture in the Army Reserve itself. If fully implemented, the potential exists for the Army to finally realize a wide-scale integrated organization that enables the institution to effectively meet its operational and strategic obligations well into the foreseeable future. Furthermore, adopting the recommendations identified in this report will foster better integration in the broader strategic force and help maintain a rapid operational reserve response capability in a fiscally constrained environment.

To achieve full integration, the need still exists for each component to overcome long-held preconceived beliefs and institutional biases that create barriers between the components and subsequently limit their ability to perform in an integrated environment. Integrating personnel, pay, and medical systems across the components would also enable the different organizations to function as a total force. Finally, redefining the existing requirements between the Army Reserve and civilian employers will help to incorporate the changing demands on the force and better align future expectations between military and civilian employers as the operational tempo increases. Without these cultural and structural changes, efforts to address the current fiscal, operational, and strategic challenges facing the Army and its reserve components will become just another footnote in history. If heeded, however, the result will be an integrated and operationally organized reserve force capable of not only implementing the original CNGR report’s recommendations, but also the recommended solutions put forth by both the Army Commission and this research project.
Endnotes


2 Ibid.


7 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, 7.


9 Ibid, 68; See Recommendation #32.

10 NCFA Final Report, 68.

11 Ibid, 65.


13 Ibid.


15 Ibid.


17 NCFA Final Report, 3.


20 Barno and Bensahel, "Beyond the Army Commission: Unifying the Army's Components."


22 Ibid.
Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR), Memorandum, "Total Army Benefits for Increasing Title 11 Support to the Army Reserve (AR)," June 02, 2015.

NCFA Final Report, 69; See Recommendation #36.

OCAR Memorandum, "Total Army Benefits for Increasing Title 11 Support to the Army Reserve (AR)."

Ibid.

NCAR Final Report, 65.


Diagram by the Author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, April 23, 2016.


Diagram by the Author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, April 23, 2016.


Kaplan, L. Martin, Department of the Army Historical Summary DAHSUM: Fiscal Year 1994, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1994), 75, http://www.history.army.mil/books/dahsum/1994/ch05.htm (accessed January 4, 2016); CFP I was broken down into four support packages (1-4) while CFP II was broken down into three support packages (5-7).

Ibid.

Ibid.
