Combatting Non-State Actors

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Methodologies for Countering the Future Growth of Violent Non-State Actors

Abstract

As noted in the 2006 Israeli response in Lebanon, understanding the enemy and their organizational design is merely one piece of the larger puzzle. Indeed, fully comprehending one's own organizational limitations and biases is critical in the development of sound strategies to counter the growing influence of non-state actors. In doing so, new flexible and unstructured techniques are developed that help reformulate the fundamental tools used by nations in identifying and solving issues in emerging hotspots. These new solutions, in turn, facilitate relevant actions in each unique context that enable governments to effectively counter violent non-state organizations by isolating and delinking their activity from the population. Once the activities of these groups are effectively isolated and the organization collapses, an environment ensues that is suitable for future peaceful development in the region. More importantly, understanding this evolving process and the mechanisms that lead to the existence of these groups is critical in formulating adequate responses and effectively countering the influential growth of these organizations.

Introduction

“One of the great intellectual failures of the American intelligence community, and especially the counterterrorism community, is to assume if someone hasn't attacked us, it's because he can't or because we've defeated him.”

-- Michael Scheuer (Former CIA Officer)

(Comments during a February 11, 2009 60 Minutes Interview)

The November 24, 2009 federal indictment of suspected Hezbollah financier and United States citizen, Moussa Ali Hamdan, highlights one of many growing concerns experienced by counterterrorism officers in their efforts to identify, disrupt, and collapse known terrorist groups around the world.¹ These concerns include the geographic dispersion of violent non-state organizations and their abilities in the last twenty years to successfully establish new organizational networks despite efforts to counter their systematic growth. Indeed, Mr. Hamdan’s 2010 arrest in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay following his indictment depicts the degree of these group’s influential reach both regionally, as well as in the United States itself.² In fact, the exposed activities of these networks give pause to many experts, and ultimately leads to the question of how does the United States effectively counter the influence of a violent non-state organizations’ deep reach in order to stabilize and promote peaceful governments in the future.


This research suggests that the answer lies in understanding the unique contextual factors associated with the rise of violent non-state actors and how these factors contribute to their long-term influential expansion. More importantly, success in countering these groups is driven by fully integrating known counterterrorism techniques into a synchronized method of dismantling and preventing diversification of their networks. Recognizing and adopting the best approach within this fluid environment, in turn, further prevents nation states from utilizing these organizations to promote regional hegemonies within another country’s sovereign borders. Hence, to achieve operational and strategic success in such milieus, western governments must integrate and synchronize well-defined political objectives for counterterrorism tactics at all levels of the operational spectrum. By doing so, disruption success rates climb as planners effectively define the environment and then merge established techniques with proposed unstructured methods derived to meet the complexities of the specific contextual problem.

The challenge of this topic arguably centers on how to effectively implement any type of a model against an adversary that is both fluid and amorphous in its approach to establishing new cells and controlling new populations. Bernard B. Fall states in his introduction to the translated version of Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare, “the allegiance of the civilian population becomes one of the most vital objectives of the whole struggle.” Accordingly, any proposed approach must acknowledge the political will, and incorporate the basic needs, perceived wants, and overall desires, of the people – commonly viewed by counterinsurgency experts as the center of gravity – in order to achieve success. Without this direct link to military and political end states, any approach is doomed to failure. In fact, Chinese Revolutionary, Mao Tse-Tung, acknowledged the significance of winning conflicts when he stated that, “the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people requisite connection to winning.”

In an effort to develop a new operational approach for disrupting a violent non-state actor’s organizational growth, a series of case studies is subsequently put forth that reflects upon a number of disparate sources, theories, and historical facts. The intent is to produce a synthetic and yet original theory that sheds light on the developmental processes of terrorist organizations, as well as how these processes can be interrupted making the group vulnerable to disruptions and possible destruction. These distinctive studies include analysis of the Lebanese-based Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), as well as a focus on the Sri Lankan Government’s methods used to defeat the LTTE in 2009. This research, in turn, lays the foundation where a new theoretical approach emerges including several originally designed models representing key concepts that link identified cultural tensions to potential threats within an affected society. These models are further integrated with a visual representation of modern military doctrine as a means to illustrate how current counterterrorism tactics are synchronized at the national and operational levels. The hope is that these graphical representations will illustrate techniques to operationalize the proposed theory into national level planning in order to deter a non-state organizations’ deep reach. By doing so, innovative solutions are proposed that facilitate relevant actions in each unique context.

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3 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1985), ix.

that enable governments to effectively counter these organizations by isolating and delinking their activity from the population. From these proposed solutions, environments will emerge that are suitable for the peaceful development of economic and political organizations that both facilitate regional stabilization and mitigate threatening overtures toward the West.

The significance of this research is in the simple fact that violent non-state organizations’ expanding influence poses a serious and timely threat to both the United States and its regional partners. Indeed, current efforts by both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to fully integrate counterterrorism operations and standing laws into a full-scale national strategy have fallen short in recent years enabling these networks to continue to grow. From an economic perspective, the criminal activities aligned with non-state organizations also represent a springboard for regional and global financial operations, as well as a primary funding source for their continued activities. For instance, nearly one-tenth of Hezbollah’s annual $100 million network-based income originates from its affiliated groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America. In fact, a 2008 Department of State Country Report on Terrorism indicated that, before September 11, 2001, Hezbollah was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization. Notwithstanding Hezbollah’s desire to target the United States, these facts clearly illustrate an immediate threat to the United States and present a need to address the issue from both an integrated operational and strategic viewpoint.

The theoretical framework grounding this study is derived from several political researchers and thinkers. The first of these individuals is French historian, Alexis de Tocqueville, and his study of social movements. The next is Israeli researcher, Dr. Zvi Lanir, who discussed a unique modeling process that analyzed the human decision-making process. These pioneers, together with past philosophical writings from revolutionary leaders like Mao Tse-Tung provide an excellent basis for understanding the root causes behind social movements and their influences on a violent group’s development. Additional inspiration is also drawn from Thomas Sowell’s A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles that effectively outlines societal motivations and actions behind a community’s support for the emergence of a non-state actor. Together these theorists essentially lay a foundation for understanding why violent non-state organizations evolved and how their leaders subsequently identify methods of societal infiltration and ideological expansion. In doing so, a broader realization emerges of how groups like Hezbollah, the LTTE, and the FLN were able to effectively ground their organizational structure into the fabric of their targeted population and expand their networks over time to other regional areas of the globe. Hence, it is profoundly important to establish in the proposed solution a mechanism that accounts for this philosophical approach as a basis for both defining and solving the crisis.

One important assumption in this research is that all the basic tactics, concepts, and legal frameworks are currently in place to develop an acceptable path toward countering these violent

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non-state actors’ deep reach. Nevertheless, the “key ingredients” posited in this paper are not
adequately integrated or synchronized at any level of command in order to currently achieve
success. Thus, the following discussion will focus on two distinctive areas as a means to put
forth plausible solutions concerning this disconnect. The first area will focus on deconstructing
the methods and approaches used by the Hezbollah, LTTE, and the FLN in order to create a
usable template for developing a proposed solution to counter any non-specific violent
organization in the future. This deconstruction process will also include an analysis of recent
operational methods used by the Sri Lankan Government against the LTTE as a means to
demonstrate a successful modern day use of the proposed models illustrated within this
discussion. In doing so, the hope is that a suitable template for countering violent non-state
organizations, like the Hezbollah, LTTE, and FLN will emerge.

The second area will subsequently focus on recommending plausible methods to bridge the
intelligence and communication gaps that currently exist between the strategic and operational
levels of command, in reference to long-term planning, to counter emerging violent
organizational threats. The intent of this discussion, as stated earlier, is to put forth new theories
and solutions that will enable analysts and planners at these respective levels to, not only
integrate the proposed models put forth in this paper, but, to also synchronize their planning
process as a means to focus their efforts toward achieving their end state – countering these
threats. The approach of this research, however, is not to analyze and debate the validity of the
United States legal system or current tactics used to counter these types of networks. Rather, the
conclusions drawn are merely an attempt to coalesce existing methods with known operational
and strategic approaches in order to put forth a synchronized and integrated method for
identifying and defeating violent non-state actors in the future.

Defining the Violent Non-State Organization
Over the course of the last fifty years, an increasing importance of social factors to include
economic disparity, religious beliefs, a desire for equality, and the rise of interdependent
communication advancements have led to a dramatic decline in the significance of the nation-
state construct. This decline, more importantly, has also led to a substantial increase in the
appearance of non-state entities around the world. These new regional and transnationally
networked groups have subsequently challenged the established norms of the traditional realists
paradigm that defines a state as a sovereign, internationally recognized actor that controls both
its territory and its population. The concept of a non-state actor, however, is not categorically
limited to governmentally funded groups designed to help influence the masses. Instead, these
entities also include nefarious organizations known more commonly as violent non-state actors
that often achieve political goals through aggression or illegal activities designed to influence the
masses. Unfortunately, little research has appeared over the last decade defining these types of
violent groups, how they develop, or how to effectively isolate and collapse their organizations
before they pose a serious threat to stable governments.

As noted by Craig Calhoun’s Dictionary of Social Sciences, a non-state actor is defined as a,
“broad category of actors in global politics who represent interests and exert influence on issues
but who do not exhibit the distinguishing state characteristics of legal sovereignty and control of territory and people.”

Although Calhoun’s definition lays out the representative criteria for how these organizations interact in the international arena, it does not adequately depict the “forceful and illegal” linkage applied to violent organizations within the same framework. For instance, a proper defining behavior of a violent non-state actor is that its organization centers on illicit activities to include the use of violence or force, aggressively coercive tactics, or criminal activity to achieve its political aims. These techniques, in turn, are not always directly linked to a sovereign state or an internationally accepted political actor. In fact, many of these violent groups use forceful tactics to co-opt the existing political structure in order to expand their organizational influence and control of the population.

Interestingly, not all violent non-state organizations initially adopt a violent path as a means to operationalize the group’s strategic objectives. Rather, the organization tries to establish its presence within the community through social programs or politically related activities. As illustrated in Figure 1 (Non-State Organization Evolution), this violent tendency tends to emerge over time and through a phased evolutionary process as a means to consolidate the group’s power base and organizational influence over the population they claim to represent.

Understanding the dynamics of this phased development process is important in isolating key points in time where the actions of a violent organization lead to vulnerabilities that are susceptible to counter attacks. The evolutionary model visually illustrates this theoretical concept by outlining three main points where disruption of the organization’s operations may occur. The first is that all non-state actors, whether violent or not, emerge from a corresponding social

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9 Azani, 2011. The five-phased model depicted in Figure 1 is an original design intended to expand on the basic principles put forth by Eitan Azani. This enhanced phased concept forms the basis for later theoretical discussions involving the synthetic and original organizational formulation connectivity model and ensuing planning models using identified “weak points” in the evolutionary process.
dilemma connected to contextually related social factors and existing support links. Second, that the decision to link violent activities to the group’s strategic objectives occurs after the formulation stage in order to establish a clear identity for the organization. Third, that ensuing transition phases in the evolutionary process usually present optimal disruption points for isolating the group from the population. These developmental junctures also represent potential periods of time when contextually appropriate countermeasures become both feasible and plausible against evolving violent groups. For instance, as depicted by the chart, the emergence of a violent non-state actor is the evolutionary product of social disparities that facilitate the rise of a specific dilemma. This dilemma, in turn, feeds the humanistic need within communities to correct a perceived issue in order to bring balance back to the political process.

In many instances, these social dilemmas are driven by ideological differences between the population and the ruling elite, while other cases are driven specifically out of a need to create chaos in society in order to control the population. Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville noted in his book, Democracy in America, that it is, “legitimate passion for equality that spurs all men to wish to be strong and esteemed.”\textsuperscript{10} This desire for social fairness, Tocqueville argues, “impels the weak to want to bring the strong down to their level.”\textsuperscript{11} Despite the wide-ranging factors leading to the emergence of these dilemmas, however, the developmental process of a violent organization in this contextual framework is somewhat similar. Thus, understanding how to identify these factors, as well as when transitions occur during the process, is crucial to formulating options for the effective employment of counter tactics in order to isolate and collapse the overall organization.

Another distinctive gesture about violent non-state organizations is that they are incapable of initially developing and sustaining their existence in any type of social or political vacuum. Instead, the group’s capacity to emerge, as well as their ability to survive depends upon a multitude of contextual social factors or inputs. For instance, many experts over the years have eluded to these vacuums as a perceived factor contributing to the rise of violent non-state organizations, as well as to the identifiable traits contributing to these group’s “tipping point” toward violence. In many instances, these vacuums – or more commonly referred to as ungoverned spaces – are seen as one of the main criteria for the emergence of these types of extremist groups. Indeed, during his 2007 presidential campaign, President Obama, stated that, “the impoverished, weak and ungoverned states have become the most fertile breeding grounds for transnational threats.”\textsuperscript{12} Fundamentally, however, this perception is oversimplified, as many ungoverned spaces actually possess loosely defined control structures formed through either tribal rule or military alliances established between local warlords. Hence, the concept of true anarchy or ungoverned spaces rarely exists in the international community, as some form of political or military style control is always present – whether well established or not. Interestingly, if anarchy did exist in a specific region it would be of little utility to a developing violent non-state actor, as these groups would experience difficulty establishing influential

\textsuperscript{10} Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Library of America, 2004), 60.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.

control over the population in such an extreme chaotic environment. More importantly, the idea that a political or military vacuum is the only precursor to the establishment of an extremist organization misses the basic premise of how and why these groups emerge in the first place.

The evolution of a violent non-state actor, in essence, is a two-part process involving the initial formulation stage of the group and an ensuing four-stage progressionary growth timeline of the organization. The formulation stage generally includes contextual inputs leading to its emergence in the affected population while the later four stages utilize a myriad of support links to expand the influential control of the group – or deep reach. Fully understanding, however, the various types of social factors facilitating the initial formation of a violent non-state actor is crucial to comprehending how to effectively counter them before it becomes uncontrollable in later stages. For instance, a violent organization’s emergence and subsequent evolution is not attributed to a singular point of reference or input within a specific society. Rather, the dynamics leading to the appearance of a new extremist organization are the direct results of a multitude of contributing factors that coexist and depend on one another over time. From a contextual aspect, the same factors (inputs) that initially contribute to the emergence of a social dilemma are also relationally connected to the development of the violent group itself. Without this direct connectivity to the population, the overall support network enabling the organization to emerge in the first place would collapse. From a visual aspect, Figure 2 (Formulation Stage Connectivity Model) illustrates this linkage throughout the formulation development process. The illustration also

Figure 2: Formulation Stage Connectivity Model

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13 An example of this concept is noted in al-Qaeda’s attempts in the 1990s to establish their presence in the “ungoverned spaces” of Somalia. Despite attempts by Usama bin-Laden and his cohorts to expand their influential control on the population, their organizational goals were not met as they failed to understand the dynamics of the local culture, the economic-tribal interdependencies, and the ill-defined political framework between the existing warlords. This organizational mishap led to localized extortion of al-Qaeda operatives and a structural breakdown of their initial networks. Furthermore, the mere lack of physical infrastructure created logistical problems for al-Qaeda in the 1990s until later sponsorship and alliances with al-Shabaab led to the development of an ideological foothold in the country.

14 The Formulation Stage Connectivity Model represents a unique synthesis of different sources, theories, and historical trends designed to illustrate a universal method for identifying emerging violent organizations. This model is further designed to highlight potential inputs and support links that enable planners to isolate key disruption points in order to operationalize future countermeasure tactics.
depicts the relationship of the original social factors (inputs) to the formation of the violent non-
state actor itself. In reality, the actual number and types of factors preceding both the social
dilemma and the support link development phases varies. Hence, a wide variety of input factors
are usually present and are directly correlated to the contextual environment in which the violent
organization is attempting to thrive in. Still, the overall evolutionary connectivity process as
found within the formulation model, regardless of input factor and support link variances, does
not change over time and space.

This interrelated and embedded concept, more importantly, illustrates that a non-state actor’s
evolution is potentially vulnerable to specific countermeasures during the development process,
as well as during the later expansion stages. For instance, coordinated and sustained operations
on various aspects of the group’s development process (contextual inputs) helps identify
potential hot spots enabling planners to isolate the organization during its early formulation
stages. Although other distinctive timeframes along the violent group’s evolutionary process
elicit possible counterattack points, the formulation stage represents the initial opportunity to
derail a violent organization’s deep reach preventing them from embedding within the target
population at all. More importantly, to both validate this proposed formulation model, as well as
to understand the relational dependency between social factors and a violent non-state actor’s
evolution, the following historical case studies involving the Lebanese Hezbollah, the LTTE, and
the Algerian FLN are put forth.

The Lebanese Hezbollah
To date, Hezbollah’s founding and subsequent development stands as one of the most explicit
examples of how a violent organization evolves and expands its influential reach within a
specific population. Factors leading to this group’s development, more importantly, date back to
the early 1960’s when Lebanese politics – originally unified by the National Pact of 1943 –
began entering into a crisis phase as leaders walked a delicate line between appeasing Christian
populations and addressing the desires of the expanding Muslim community. By 1975,
Lebanon’s geographic location to the epicenter of the Arab-Israeli conflict contributed further to
a political breakdown among a variety of domestic players with differing ideological viewpoints.
Of these competing factions, several violent groups including the Afwaj al Muqawana al
Lubnaniya (Amal) and the Harakat al-Jihad al-Islam (Islamic Jihad) were predominately
influenced by Syrian and Iranian actions inside of Lebanon. Iran, more specifically, harnessed
the ideologies of the 1979 Islamic Revolution as a means of exporting their particular brand of
Islamic beliefs to the broader Shia community in order to unite them under one ideological
system. Syrian leaders, conversely, elected to establish a chaotic environment in Lebanon as a

15 Lebanon: Constitutional Law and the Political Rights of Religious Communities, in the Law Library of
Law Library of Congress, the National Pact was essentially a political compromise between the two major religious
communities in order to obtain independence. This pact also continued to govern the state on the basis of the
religious representation provided in the previous Constitution. Following Lebanon’s independence, however, the
custodial practices expanded the religious representation to include assigning certain offices to certain communities
both in administrative and political positions, including the top constitutional offices of President, Prime Minister,
and Speaker of the House.

16 Experts commonly agree that Hezbollah officially emerged in 1982 as a direct response to the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon. The group’s leadership, however, were Lebanese Shiite clerics who were partially inspired by
the teachings of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini who led the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Khomeini
means to maintain control over the region by pitting ideological communities against one another. As a result of this tumultuous environment, Shia radicals – with the help of Iranian surrogates – successfully argued the need for an established armed force designed to protect the population as a means to address local security concerns. Hence, after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the result of this security linkage and accompanying social dilemma would provide the requisite building blocks for the founding of the Hezbollah organization.

Interestingly, Hezbollah originally emerged in the Bekaa Valley as a localized social movement that acted as a parent organization for several Shiite terrorist groups. Furthermore, some of the initial members of this movement included a number of disenfranchised radical members of Amal who felt that the current secular approach to solving security needs in Shia communities did not take a hard enough stance. From the radical Shiite perspective, the predominately poor and politically weak Shia communities were extremely vulnerable to the effects of the ongoing civil war, as well as to an Israeli invasion. For this reason, the advent of the Hezbollah organization effectively represented the dawn of a new era in Lebanon where Shiite communities began taking control of their own political future and security needs in an attempt to level the playing field throughout the region. As noted, this “formulation stage” included a myriad of economic, social-political, and military factors (inputs) that established the foundation for solving an emerging “social dilemma.” That initial dilemma for Hezbollah founders was how to create a socially non-bias and safe environment for Shiites in a region where previous religious beliefs and political viewpoints had led to continued insecurity. In fact, Hezbollah’s emergence in the region represented a culmination of several security and politically related issues stemming from years of external nation-state interference in the region. Hence, the initial contextual inputs providing the basis for Hezbollah’s birth were not only interrelated, but also dependent upon one another as an integrated means to establishing widespread societal changes for the Shiite masses.

As noted earlier, Tocqueville’s concept of individual and societal equality provides an excellent foundational construct for the emergence of the Shiite social dilemma in Lebanon. In fact, this same theoretical premise also affords intelligence analysts a key principle from which to draw information that may lead to identifying the emergence of a violent non-state organization. For instance, a significant number of non-state actors throughout the last fifty years, to include Hezbollah, have derived their initial support from the population by championing an identified social dilemma. Indeed, these dilemmas include some form of widespread political, religious, economic or social discrimination that provided the initial incentive for the masses to take action.

would later assist the emerging Hezbollah organization with the direct help from Iran’s newly established Republican Guards (IRGC).


18 Azani, 131. The Amal movement was a Shia-based political organization that was seen as the more secular Shiite group in Lebanese. The organization would eventually decline significantly after the newly formed Hezbollah chose a more violent approach to establishing their influence in the region. This dynamic would lead to the political and military growth of Hezbollah over the next decades as more radical Shiite members aligned themselves with the aggressive nature of the organization.

From Hezbollah’s perspective, this incentive was represented by the religious and social discrimination of the Shiite population that, in turn, led the people to support the radical platform put forth by the group’s founders. Once the framework of the organization was established, the metaphorical spark enabling the group to officially emerge would come in the form of a response to the 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon. In fact, Israeli Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, once noted in a 2006 Newsweek interview that Hezbollah did not officially exist in Lebanon prior to the Israeli invasion and that his country’s presence is essentially to blame.20

Once Hezbollah leaders successfully linked their ideological agenda to the identified Shiite social dilemma, the group’s next step was to consolidate their military and political power within the local communities in order to achieve their desired endstate. This power grab was necessary as other non-state organizations, like Amal, were competing for the same public support using a relatively identical ideological agenda. The difference, however, is that Hezbollah’s move into the identity stage of their evolutionary growth was preceded with a decision to also move toward a more violent path in order to assert its presence in the region. Fortunately for the group’s leaders, the Israeli invasion into Lebanon provided the desired pretext for these actions. Despite this opportunity, however, Hezbollah faced the internal problem of how to expand its population-based social infrastructure in order to firmly establish itself as a legitimate popular movement rooted within the Shiite communities. In order to accomplish this transition, group leaders followed a Clausewitzian method of linking their political end states to a three-tiered strategic plan.

The first aspect of Hezbollah’s initial strategy was a Maoist-style ideological and religious approach aimed at mobilizing the Shiite population in order to refocus their cultural norms toward a desire for self-sacrifice as a means to support the good of the whole.21 The intent of this push was to create a social environment that accepted a connection with violence in order to expand organizational political and military power in the region. This violent approach, in turn, promoted community ownership of the Hezbollah’s tactical operations in the region, as well as the possibilities of sending their youth into battle for the cause. Interestingly, this same methodology is also used by other non-state organizations around the world as a tactic to develop cultural tolerance for the recruitment and exploitation of fighters capable of conducting overseas terrorist operations or suicide attacks.

The second aspect of Hezbollah’s plan centered on a social rehabilitation concept designed to improve living conditions within Shiite towns, as well as to abolish open discrimination against its support base. This tactic – similar to the counterinsurgency practice of winning the hearts and minds – is still one of the core methods used by Hezbollah today. In fact, this strategy experienced great success in attracting new members to the organization after the 2006 Israeli invasion as group leadership directed millions of dollars of direct Iranian funding into the

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20 Yediot Ahronot [Hebrew], May 7, 2010. Barak told Newsweek on July 18, 2006: “When we entered Lebanon...there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.” Quoted by Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 33.

21 Azani, 2011, 63-64.
immediate rebuilding and medical care of the affected population.\textsuperscript{22} This rehabilitation tactic, in turn, established an efficient grass roots social network capable of replacing a lack of Lebanese government services in the area. Furthermore, community rebuilders directed their efforts to all races (except Israelis), religions, and genders creating an atmosphere of non-bias acceptance by the group.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, this approach established Hezbollah as a more formidable organization in the region and directly countered Israel’s desire to weaken the group overall.

The third and final aspect of Hezbollah’s initial strategy involves the formalized development of a military force designed to exert both physical control over the area and to expel any identified foreigners (Israelis) from Shiite controlled portions of Lebanon. As noted by Eitan Azani, this strategic line of effort was aimed at expanding the group’s influence to all levels of the Shiite population.\textsuperscript{24} In order to accomplish this feat, the organization initiated a violent effort combined with a community wide religious and propaganda-based information campaign designed to increase potential support for future group activities. This community support, in turn, successfully integrated the recruitment activities with the future growth of the organization well into its \textit{expansion} and \textit{integration} stages. In fact, Scottish social philosopher, Adam Smith, identified this popular support concept in the 1700s by correctly stating that, “people on many occasions sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others.”\textsuperscript{25}

When well-defined social grievances are present within communities that lead to social dilemmas, the people will ultimately band together as a means to counter these issues at the expense of their own individual interests. In order to illustrate this integrated concept, Figure 3 (Hezbollah’s Formulation Stage Connectivity Model) is posited with Hezbollah related factors overlaid onto the original formulation stage connectivity model. As noted by this Hezbollah

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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure3.png}
\caption{Hezbollah’s Formulation Stage Connectivity Model}
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\textsuperscript{24} Azani, 2011, 65.

\textsuperscript{25} Adam Smith, \textit{The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Great Books in Philosophy)} (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2000), 193.
specific overlay, developmental links within Shiite communities led to an emerging social dilemma that acted as the initial foundation for the birth of Hezbollah in the Lebanese region. This connection to the social dilemma essentially demonstrates how initial social factors connect directly to popular support for a violent non-state organization by depicting a linkage between societal problems (factors) and their influences on the population’s needs. In this case, these needs related directly to the acceptance of an armed militia designed to counter external threats to the Shiite communities in the region.

Once the formulation stage of a violent organization is complete, the next step in the evolutionary cycle is for the group to align its social dilemma with a political path. In the case of Hezbollah, this choice was ideological and subsequently pushed the organization in a violent direction in order to accomplish its goals. Not surprisingly, this course of action also meant that group leaders needed to expand their funding networks outside of the Lebanese region in order to sustain long-term growth of their operations. Hence, as illustrated by the non-state organization evolution graph (Figure 1), control of resource inputs to the group becomes critical in its long-term expansion and integration into the population and the political system. Simply stated, violent non-state groups tend to position themselves within a targeted population as a means to exert power and control over the flow of money and other requisite resources into the organization.

Denial of these resources, in contrast, also presents opportunities for weakening these organizations, as well as separating their activities from the population. In doing so, a critical weak point – similar to ones established in other stages – is identified and can be used as a means to ultimately stunt the group’s growth and long-term influence over the people. Control of resource inputs is not the only identifiable weak point in this situation it also represents one of the key areas from which to attack and isolate a violent group’s activities. Another example of this resource denial process is illustrated in the 2009 Sri Lankan Government campaign against the Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). In this situation, the government effectively integrated and synchronized various lines of efforts as a means to methodically tighten control over external resources enabling the violent group to exist. As noted in the following case study, this systematic process demonstrates how the proposed theoretical models in this discussion can lead to the development of an effective and integrated theory for countering violent non-state organizations.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – a successor to the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) – were officially formed under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran on May 5, 1976 with the objective of creating a separatist homeland for the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Sri Lankan provinces.\[26\] Although the informal origins of the LTTE date back to the early 1970s militant student body uprisings formally known as the Tamil Student Movement, the modern day influences of the organization are far reaching in the international arena. For instance, a 2008 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) news report stated that the Tamil Tigers were one of the most dangerous extremist organizations in the world and represented a growing concern to the international community as they had “inspired” other terrorist networks to include al-Qaeda in

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26 Swamy, 2003, 36-37.
Iraq.\textsuperscript{27} In fact, the LTTE to date represents the only known extremist organization that successfully developed and maintained organized infantry units, an operational navy (Sea Tigers), and a small but effective air force (Air Tigers).\textsuperscript{28} The LTTE, however, did not evolve out of thin air. Rather historical political and religious tensions (contextual inputs) forged the organizational framework for a group originally formed to protect the Tamil minority.

The historical origins of the Sri Lankan social dilemma that led to the development of the LTTE dates back over a century to the beginnings of Tamil nationalism in the region. This social push essentially surfaced from a political fissure that arose from the friction between the Sinhalese kingdom and the Tamil rulers. Over time, this power struggle would lead the Tamil leaders to establish their own fiefdom in the north along the Jaffna peninsula. Eventually, British Imperialism would reach the shores of Sri Lanka subsequently introducing a new form of communal rule into the region. By 1921, the initial introduction of communal representation would fail leading reformist to back the introduction of the Donoughmore Commission.\textsuperscript{29} This commission essentially laid the framework for proportioning parliamentary representation through population percentages. Once instituted, the initial stages of the Tamilian social dilemma surfaced as the population quickly realized that they – by percentage – were the minority political class of the region. Several attempts were made to counter this new “class system” to include proportioning parliamentary seats equally, however, all attempts failed as the Sinhalese maintained their political discriminatory grip on the country. This power sharing issue over time would become the basis for social and ethnic tensions in the country and eventually lead to the first Sinhala-Tamil riot in 1939.\textsuperscript{30}

After the end of World War II, the British Empire began to constrict under the increasing financial and political pressures related to centuries of global dominance.\textsuperscript{31} This decline, in turn, led to the inevitable transfer of power to the Sri Lankans in 1948 and the departure of British colonial rulers from country. Unfortunately, this newly found independence also included the contextual input of ethnic tensions previously suppressed by third party rule. In the end, these social tensions – further exacerbated by Sinhalese political dominance and economic discrimination – fueled an internal upheaval that led many Tamils to view secession from Sri Lanka as the only remaining option. In July 1983, the tensions would further increase as thousands of Tamils were killed in riots stemming from the retaliation for the slaying of 13


\textsuperscript{30} Murugar Gunasingam, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins (Sydney: MV Publications, 1999), 76.

\textsuperscript{31} The decline of British power in Sri Lanka coincided with the end of World War II and the ensuing years of recovery in the European theater. For instance, Britain’s global dominance began waning as the government focused its efforts on rebuilding its country after the war. The immediate political and financial effects of this “downsizing” were the withdrawal of forces and governors from many previously held colonies.
Sinhalese soldiers by Tamil separatists.\textsuperscript{32} Since this time, ensuing civil and separatist wars have claimed the lives of an estimated 70,000 people and left five major attempts at finding peace stalled including a 2002 Norwegian brokered ceasefire agreement that was later revoked in 2008 by the Colombo Government.\textsuperscript{33}

The Tamilian story is similar to the Shiite experience in Lebanon as it illustrates a fundamental connection between an emerging social dilemma predicated by societal inequities and political discrimination and the appearance of a violent group championing the community’s cause. In a sense, the previously stated Alexis de Tocqueville’s assessment that a social passion for equality eventually spurs all men to wish to be strong and esteemed represents a clear theoretical backdrop for Tamil nationalism. Furthermore, as also noted in the emergence of Hezbollah, the theoretical principles leading to the LTTE development provide intelligence analysts established examples for identifying key factors enabling the creation of a violent non-state actor. For instance, popular support within the Tamil communities during the formulation stage of the LTTE originated from several political, economic, religious, and security-rated factors (contextual inputs). When combined with increasing social tensions throughout the region, these factors established a foundation that provided the framework for an emerging “social dilemma.” For Tamil separatists, this dilemma evolved from the desire to find a suitable solution for creating a socially non-bias and safe environment where nationalistic ideals could take root. In fact, LTTE founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran, stated in his November 27, 1992 Heroes Day speech that, “as long as the Sinhala nation is buried in the mud of racist policies, we cannot expect a fair and reasonable solution from the Sinhalese ruling classes.”\textsuperscript{34} Hence, the contextual political underpinnings (inputs) for the emergence of a new violent non-state actor in Sri Lanka were present. Furthermore, these inputs effectively linked the Tamil social dilemma to the organizational strategy of the LTTE.

From Prabhakaran’s perspective, however, linking the group’s stated strategic aim to the LTTE’s political objectives during the identity stage was more difficult to accomplish than originally perceived. For instance, the assassination of Jaffna’s Mayor, Alfred Duriappah, on July 27, 1975 had taken the organization immediately down a violent ideological path during the group’s formulation stage.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, the LTTE was labeled a terrorist group by the Indian government well before the organization official existed and before any attempt was made to align the group with a political platform. The violent nature of the LTTE, in turn, forced its leaders into a militaristic lane that left little room for political compromise or control of social resources in later years. In fact, Velupillai’s fascination with the second and third order effects of Hezbollah’s 1983 attacks on the United States Marine Barracks in Lebanon would lead him to fully embrace the operational deployment of suicide tactics through out the lifetime of the group.\textsuperscript{36} From an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} CRS Report RL31707, \textit{Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations}, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” \textit{Studies in Conflict and Terrorism} 27, no. 4 (2004): 250.
\end{itemize}
analytical aspect, understanding the LTTE’s initial violent tendencies sheds light on the organization’s operational approach, as well as how its leaders viewed the necessity for political dialogue in future settings. This contextual interpretation subsequently highlights possible weak points in the group’s structural dynamics by emphasizing possible angles for the potential employment of future countermeasures.

Although there is little evidence prior to the formation of the LTTE that Prabhakaran possessed any formalized insurgency or revolutionary training, his actions still enabled the group to establish a clear organizational strategy. His strategic approach, more importantly, was designed to meet the political and security related needs of the Tamil population regardless of the violent actions of its members. To illustrate this integrated strategy, Figure 4 (LTTE’s Formulation Stage Connectivity Model) is put forth depicting the six main contextual inputs leading to the emergence of the social dilemma in the Tamil population. Once established, the social dilemma fostered the push for action with the help of additional support links that led to the formation of the LTTE in 1975. The organization, in turn, transitioned directly toward a violent ideological path in the formulation stage as previous attempts to settle Tamilian political and social disputes failed. Hence, the violence levels surfaced earlier and expanded quicker in the group’s identity and expansion stages. As noted by later attempts to end the insurgency peacefully, this violent aspect created a double-edged sword for the group during negotiations.

Although Prabhakaran often alluded to a desire for a peaceful solution to the Tamil social dilemma, his Maoist-style use of subversive tactics along side the groups armed struggle represented a double-edged sword during “honest” negotiations. For instance, the LTTE’s hybrid operational approach looked more like a well organized terrorist group determined to use fear as a tactical method to control the population rather than a true insurgency or revolution designed to coerce the political process on behalf of the population. This concept, in turn, proved detrimental to the negotiation process as limited trust levels amongst all parties led to a continuation of the violent status quo. Ultimately, the LTTE’s propensity toward violence would be the group’s biggest factor in its 2009 downfall as its brutal ideological path overshadowed the organization’s original intent to create a Tamilian nation. Still, to further validate the theoretical non-state organization evolution model, as well as to confirm the tenets of the formulation stage connectivity model, one final case study involving the Algerian Front de Libération National (FLN) is put forth for analytical discussion.
The Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)

Historically, the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, or more commonly known as the National Liberation Front, represents one of the few violent non-state actors that successfully navigated all phases of the five-stage developmental process despite losing their insurgent battle to French forces. Furthermore, the FLN’s actions established the necessary political environment in France enabling the Algerian Muslim population to eventually win their national independence through a nearly unanimous July 1, 1962 referendum. The organization officially formed on March 30, 1954 when an ex-French army sergeant, Ahmed Ben Bella, joined efforts with eight other Algerian exiles to create the Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action (CRUA). The CRUA characterized the political arm of the FLN, as well as the core nucleus of the overall group. This political arm was ultimately responsible for all final decisions made concerning the ensuing revolution and would eventually grow to thirty-four members. The original nine founders, more importantly, were former disenfranchised members of the Organisation Spéciale (OS) – a secret branch of the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) – that was disbanded earlier by the French in 1950.

Ben Bella along with several other original members of the CRUA would go on to establish a smaller organizational unit within the FLN specifically designed to control planned terrorist (military) operations. This military structure was named the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). The ALN would play a key role in the evolutionary development and phased transition of the FLN as terrorist attacks were establish early on as an operational tactic to initially facilitate and continually support the legitimacy of the group within the Algerian population. For instance, many scholars identified a unified population as a prerequisite for the successful prosecution of the revolution despite the fact that Ben Bella indicated in a 1965 interview that the FLN lacked any centralized ideology that benefited a militaristic approach. Scholars, however, are not entirely incorrect in their assessment, as the organization was guided by a broad-based concept of nationalism that directly fed their internal drive for action despite not initially having an identified ideology or a highly structured network. Thus, the inherent need to acquire and maintain popular support for the independence push was seen as a requisite tenet for the group’s violent activities. Quickly unifying the public behind this nationalistic push for independence, in turn, led FLN leaders to unwittingly identify a violent ideological path in the group’s evolutionary stage as the best operational approach toward achieving the organization’s strategic goal – independence. Hence, a violent nature was as much a part of the FLN’s internal social structure as it was the external solution connecting the group’s political aims to its military actions.

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These connections to the group’s political objectives are more clearly understood when outlining the FLN’s stated goals within the military arm of the organization – the ALN. For instance, the group’s first strategic goal was to deter colonialism in Algeria in order to establish the political conditions necessary for achieving independence. This goal would be achieved through the military operational objective of isolating both French and European citizens living in Algeria, as well as the French army from the broader community. Once isolated, the aim of the ALN was to focus organizational attacks on the French political administrations with the intent of destroying them. Interesting, early FLN operations – unlike those of the Hezbollah and LTTE – would intentionally target French military personnel in an attempt to acquire weapons in order to arm the organization. This initial tactic stemmed from a lack of external support structures in the early stages of the group’s evolution that also caused the leadership to focus their attacks toward high profile targets in lieu of drawn out tactical engagements.

The second strategic goal of the FLN was to gain and subsequently consolidate popular support for their actions. This was accomplished by using violence as both an intimidation tool, as well as means to decisively eliminate all dissenters within the communities. The intent of group leaders was to increase their capacity to recruit new personnel into the organization by instilling fear into the community through a directed campaign of terroristic threats. One method used by FLN members to elicit this communal response was the frequent distribution of pamphlets that listed persons targeted by the group as informers. The intent of this action was to both demonstrate the strength of the FLN and to build loyalty amongst the people. In fact, this same tactic is used today in Afghanistan by the Taliban who frequently deliver Shabnamah (night letters) in an attempt to control the local population by instilling fear into the community.

Strategic and operational goals, however, are difficult to achieve for any violent non-state actor without the foundational support of an affected population. For this reason, isolating the contextual inputs leading to the emergence of the Algerian social dilemma is critical in understanding how the FLN emerged in the first place.

Algeria, like many African countries, emerged as an independent state out of the ashes of European colonization. For the Algerian population, this colonial rule also represented a period in their history where social discrimination and economic hardships were the norm. From the outset of French domination in the region, Algerian society became racially polarized along economic, political, and cultural lines. In fact, French became the official language in the 1830s as a means to further control the social and political aspects of the country by purging the Arabic and Berber historical roots from the region. This polarization, in turn, led many native Algerians to view French rule as the antithesis of civilized governance leading many to quietly build internal social networks designed to counter French dominance. Eventually, these networks coupled with poor living conditions and political alienation regularly experienced by the Muslim population would reach a tipping point as nationalistic aspirations began to emerge.

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This cultural tension would explode in 1945 after a protest in the northern town of Sétif turned violent resulting in a large-scale massacre of approximately 50,000 Algerians by French forces. In time, widespread anger resulting from these abuses along with the relaxation of restrictions by French authorities barring political organizations led to the emergence of three main organizations. The first and most notable group founded by Massali Hadj was the Parti Populaire Algérien (PPA) – renamed later as the MTLD – with its secret branch named the Organisation Spéciale (OS). As noted earlier, some of this organization’s disbanded members are seen as the founding leaders of the Algerian revolution and represent one of the critical support links to the formation of the FLN. The second and lesser-known group founded by local religious leader, Sheikh Ben Badis, was the Ulama. The third and final group was the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA). Although ideological differences existed between these groups, core beliefs and organizational objectives still centered on ending French colonial rule and obtaining Algerian independence. Hence, this common purpose led members of each organization to share internal resources and information to the extent that they would ultimately come together in later years under the FLN banner and direction.

As noted in the brief history outlining the FLN development, there are several important aspects that emerge in this organizational case study. First, the FLN’s formation and subsequent survival was directly tied to its violent activities and terrorist attacks. This is important as many non-state organizations evolve first and then decide to move down a violent ideological path after non-violent approaches fail. In the case of the FLN, the group’s emergence is the direct result of terrorist attacks that essentially announced their formation to the world. The second aspect of the survival of the group – as seen in the other case studies – is tied directly to the population’s support and tolerance of their activities through out the lifespan of the group. Hence, Mao Tse-Tung’s connection that, “the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people” is validated in the terms of the FLN’s survival in Algeria. The third aspect of the organization’s tactical and operational objectives is predominantly tied to their overall strategic

![Figure 5: FLN’s Formulation Stage Connectivity Model](image)

43 Jackson, 1977, 15. This number is estimated from Algerian nationalist’s figures.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
aim of acquiring an independent state. This aspect is critical in that a failure to tie their actions to the nationalistic goal of independence would have led to the loss of popular support over time, as well as to the demise of the group and its cause. To visually understand these connections, Figure 5 (FLN’s Formulation Stage Connectivity Model) is presented in order to illustrate the supporting systems that existed prior to the emergence of this violent organization.

As demonstrated in the previous case studies, the formulation connectivity model for the FLN depicts similar dependency trends throughout the evolutionary process. For instance, several contextual inputs are present within the Algerian population – as seen in both the Shiite and Tamil communities – that forms the basic foundation for the emergence of the social dilemma. In this case, that dilemma was the cultural alienation and racism experienced by many Algerians under continued French colonial rule. This dilemma, in turn, became the basis for the emergence of four unique support links that directly led to the appearance of the FLN in Algeria. Thus, each illustrated level in the connectivity model theoretically formed the requisite support foundation for the subsequent layers regardless of the unique contextual environment or timeframe of the events.

Along with the FLN discussion, all three of the case studies highlight additional connections identified between the societal inputs and the support factors found in later stages that led to each study’s violent group expansion. More importantly, these connections illustrated transition periods where potential weaknesses in each group’s organizational structure surfaced. For instance, the Hezbollah experienced a unique structural weak point in their identity stage expansion period as the group initially fought for resource and information control from the Amal. Additionally, the LTTE’s first weak point appeared during the group’s formulation stage as Prabhakaran vied for both internal and external financial and military support to stabilize the organization in the Tamil territories. For this reason, it becomes important to also focus analytical efforts on fully comprehending the non-state actor’s activities during the evolutionary stages in order to potentially counter future deep reach scenarios. Countering these societal inputs, however, is nearly impossible to achieve without a broad-based approach at all stages of the violent group’s development process. Hence, analyzing the later four stages of the evolutionary model is as important in identifying potential weak points as is understanding the initial conditions leading to the emergence of a violent group in the formulation stage. An analytical discussion is therefore relevant in illustrating possible methods to preempt a violent group’s growth by using its weak points to separate the organization’s activities from the affected population.

**Countering Violent Non-State Organizations**

The founder and president of the PRAXIS Institute, Dr. Zvi Lanir, stated in his 2009 *Fundamental Surprises* paper that the intelligence community’s record illustrates that it gets details right, yet it understands the big issues poorly.49 In other words, the ability of the

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48 The FLN Formulation Stage Connectivity Model illustrates the integration of the original formulation stage connectivity model viewed in Figure 2 with identified contextual factors and support links derived from the case study research.

intelligence and national security communities to predict, or react to short-term actions is far more reliable than their ability to make long-term accurate assessments that also meet strategic goals. Consequently, leaders are commonly caught off guard when unforeseen circumstances lead to extremist actions abroad or when known violent organizations abruptly extend their deep reach capacities into previously untouched regions of the world. Simply stated, possessing a situational awareness of an emerging threat is irrelevant without also achieving a fundamental understanding of a non-state organization’s supporting environment and how that environment contributes to the group’s growth.

Situational Awareness versus Fundamental Understanding
This disconnect between situational awareness and fundamental understanding of the environment, in essence, is one of the primary factors that leads planners to misinterpret the actual intent of the threat, as well as to fall short in presenting effective options for leaders to counter these threats. Identifying potential options for countering these violent groups, more importantly, is professionally meaningless without first establishing an integrated and holistic analytical approach. For instance, a holistic process includes a fundamental understanding of the key environmental inputs commonly found within the affected population and how they drive the decision process within the violent group itself. Understanding this basic connection to the population along with the environmental tensions that accompany this societal process essentially enables planners to design an integrated and synchronized approach to mitigating the emerging threat. Furthermore, this approach will successfully connect strategic goals to operational planning objectives if all national elements of power are implemented against the identified disruption points in order to defeat the violent organization. Hence, holistically driven solutions are established when key weak points within a violent group’s evolutionary cycle are successfully attacked using an integrated and synchronized operational approach.

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50 Intelligence Community (IC) is defined for this paper as all United States agencies and organizations headed by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and used for the intent of collecting intelligence information for the government. Additional IC participants include intelligence assets used by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.
Achieving this operational linkage for the most part requires planners to understand the situational context as outlined by existing environmental conditions (ways). Once identified, these conditions can be translated into various lines of efforts (means) that achieve a desired end state (ends) through synchronized operations. One doctrinal method currently available illustrating this process is Joint Publication 5-0’s operational design that systematically outlines an integrated process of using key inputs to establish desired outputs through an operational approach methodology. This doctrine, more importantly, states that any method should define what constitutes victory or success by allocating adequate forces and resources to achieve strategic objectives – commonly known as ends, ways, and means. These desired outputs, much like a conventional approach, are then used to develop synchronized lines of efforts linking specific operational tactics designed to attack the emerging threat (violent group) from an integrated approach. For instance, the formulation model presented earlier depicts several options for identifying contextual key inputs in both time and space for the emergence of a violent non-state actor. As depicted in Figure 6 (Example Violent Non-State Organizational Planning Process), these specifically identified key inputs and support links for a context-related group are then used to drive the development of various lines of operations / efforts within the proposed operational approach. By synchronizing these lines of efforts over time as means to “attack” the violent group’s weak points, the planning cell is then able to effectively counter the group from multiple angles in order to isolate its activities from the affected population.

This integrated operational approach is similar to the 1970 Italian Government’s response to the growing threat of the Red Brigades. In essence, the government implemented a series of operations along multiple lines of efforts to attack the organization from various angles in order to isolate the group from the population. These different operational lines utilized Italian-based infiltration tactics designed to isolate and break down organizational networks and their

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53 The Violent Non-State Organizational Planning Process is a synthetic illustration of this paper's theory using the formulation stage connectivity model put forth in Figure 2 as the input criteria in the operational design process.
activities. They also included mass media efforts to characterize the group’s leaders as violent terrorist with little concern for public safety. In fact, the Italian’s “rewards for information” program was noted in a 2003 Department of State issue brief as being instrumental in Italy effectively isolating and destroying the organization in the end.

Interestingly, this operational approach is similar to attacking a theoretical “open cellular system” by systematically cutting off all external energy sources to the cell in order to collapse the structure. For instance, if the open cellular system is represented by a violent non-state organization, then the external energy sources supporting the system are depicted by the various environmental inputs and support links within the population. Since a “closed cellular system,” unlike the open structure, possesses a finite amount of energy, the goal for a planner is essentially to turn the open system into a closed system. Similar to the Italian methods, this is achieved by integrating and synchronizing all operational efforts in order to cut off the various energy sources (inputs) to the open system (violent group) as a means to collapse the structure. This concept is best illustrated in Figure 7 (Open to Closed System Concept) where the violent organization is simultaneously attacked along different lines of efforts as a means to isolate the group from all external support in order to collapse the structure.

The significance behind the historical Italian reference – in relation to the depicted model – is that until all lines of efforts were synchronized and integrated into one operational plan, the Red Brigades where able to successfully outmaneuver non-integrated independent efforts to dismantle their organization by the Italian Government. This same concept is valid in today’s planning environment where integration and synchronization are vital to establishing an effective

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56 The Open to Closed System Concept is a unique visualization that integrates doctrinal concepts of operational design into the scientific methodology of creating a closed system environment. The intent is to demonstrate how this methodology can be utilized using this papers stated theory to close off external support to the emerging threat resulting in its collapse.
operational effort to counter a violent group’s deep reach. More importantly, these concepts also rely on accurately recognizing and identifying the requisite conditions leading to the emergence of a violent non-state actor. In fact, isolating the factors that form the basis for a social dilemma enables planners to not only develop long-term strategies that help mitigate emerging turbulent social conditions, but also to define more effective methods for countering the influence of a potential non-state actor after its appearance.

Recognizing the Conditions
As noted throughout the presented case studies, environmental inputs that lead to the emergence of a violent non-state actor are central in defining how and when to act against these organizations. Since trying to defeat a violent group before it has emerged within a population is nearly impossible to achieve, a logical starting point in this search is to first understand the initial conditions or inputs that support their appearance in the first place. The previously analyzed case studies, in turn, provide us with crucial data by isolating three unique contextual inputs within each society that existed in the population before the emergence of each of the three different violent groups. These key inputs centered on, the widespread discrimination of a particular segment of society, the political alienation of a specific social class, and the ruling elite’s inability to provide basic human or security needs to one or more segments of the population. Although each case study additionally identified other critical inputs leading to the formal existence of their respective violent group, the three outlined factors clearly represented a common thread over time and space. The only discernable exception to this commonality is the appearance of religiously based ideological groups, like the Aum Shinrikyo, that generally surface from cult-like or doomsday philosophies rather than concerns arising from governmental failures or societal discrimination. Regardless, these exceptions still warrant effective counter planning operations once the group’s leadership takes a violent ideological approach toward expanding their influence in the affected population.

Although anomalies may exist while identifying these various environmental inputs, successfully isolating three common factors that regularly exist prior to a violent group’s appearance elicits two distinctive planning characteristics. The first is the ability to systematically analyze conditions in a myriad of regional environments in order to quickly isolate potential emerging threats. The second is the introduction of a simplistic screening template from which a more rigorous analysis transpires. For instance, once a particular region is “tagged” as having a high percentage rate of supporting the emergence of a violent non-state actor, the area can then be targeted for further “holistic” analysis. As indicated in Figure 6, this type of in-depth examination is sometimes performed by covert, as well as overt options ranging from the activation of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative to the employment of Special Operations Military Liaison Elements (MLE) in the region of concern. Furthermore, integrated and supporting analysis from other national elements like the Department of State’s Foreign Service Officer (FSO) program are used as analytical tools with viewpoints from diplomatic and political angles.

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57 A high percentage rate is defined as simultaneously possessing all three primary common factors (social discrimination, political alienation, and security needs) along with other discernable supporting factors that may elicit a response from the population. This response may become the foundation for a broad-based revolution rather than the emergence of a violent non-state actor. For this reason, subsequent analysis must occur in order to distinguish between the two possible courses of action once the “hot spot” is discovered.
These various intelligence collection approaches are designed to develop a more intricate and broad-based analysis of the social-political dynamics existing on the ground in order to validate or invalidate earlier planning analysis of the potential threat. In the joint environment, this idea is better understood as, “the intelligence preparation of the environment” where all aspects of the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) criteria are evaluated. \(^{58}\) This process, in essence, elicits the operational dynamic of linking identified supporting elements of network conditions to specified objectives within that network’s environment. Furthermore, this linkage is only achievable through a concerted effort by planners to both integrate and synchronize all aspects of the developed lines of effort into a full spectrum operation. In fact, one of the best-illustrated uses of this planning dynamic is seen in the recent and successful coordinated efforts of the Sri Lankan Government to isolate the LTTE from the Tamilian population in order to destroy the organization.

**The Sri Lankan Approach to the LTTE**

The Sri Lankan Government’s predicament surrounding how to effectively mitigate the societal influence and violent activities of the LTTE continued unabated over the course of several decades. During this period, leaders unsuccessfully implemented various independent political, economic, and military endeavors in order to counter this violent group’s slow expansion through out the region. This chaotic dynamic within the Sri Lankan Government would change in 2005 when Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected President and successfully formed a majority political block within the country’s parliament. The ensuing 30 month long campaign against the LTTE led by Mahinda’s brother, Lieutenant Colonel Gotabhaya “Gota” Rajapaksa, represented the only modern day example of a country successfully defeating a violent non-state actor and reclaiming the support of the affected population. Additionally, the ability of the government to maintain its focus on its desired end state and to fully back military operations despite international perceptions that the LTTE could not be defeated proved crucial to the mission’s success. This success, however, represents more than just the defeat of a violent organization by a sovereign government as the campaign itself illustrates the effectiveness of synchronizing and integrating all lines of effort into one coordinated operation.

Much like conventional military operations, synchronizing and integrating various lines of effort against the LTTE enhanced the combat power of their tactical forces once engaged. For instance, several lines of effort included political and economic maneuvers designed to cut off external support to military operations in order to isolate the group from the population. Other efforts involved the government attempting to gradually persuade the national media to cease negative reporting on military efforts in an attempt to maintain public support for the new campaign. Finally, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) who had previously favored peace talks with the LTTE were subsequently blocked access to political institutions by the new government enabling Rajapaksa to develop a political wedge between Norwegian facilitators and LTTE leaders. \(^{59}\) This integrated approach, in essence, re-established the Sri Lankan Government as the

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final authority on the country’s sovereign issues while delegitimizing the political clout previously established by the LTTE. Once, this external “energy source” was cut off, the government proceeded to launch crippling military operations designed to root out and kill the centralized leadership of the LTTE, thus incorporating the concept of a combat multiplier.

If the LTTE’s leader, Prabhakaran, understood the fundamental difference in Rajapaksa policies, he may have discerned that the military and diplomatic trends were changing in the region causing him to realign his internal objectives to ones more politically and militarily obtainable. As this did not occur, the fate of the violent group was sealed. Interestingly, one important aspect of this integrated campaign involves Gota’s ability to effectively identify the root causes of the revolt allowing him to ascertain an accurate Center of Gravity (CoG) for the LTTE. For instance, once Gota accurately identified the Tamil Tiger’s CoG – the Tamil population – both government and military leaders were able to establish clearly defined and integrated lines of efforts that complimented military operations. In fact, many historians assert that most Western powers never possessed a full theoretical understanding of what the Sri Lankan conflict was about causing the violence to be protracted longer than necessary. As noted earlier, a failure by leaders and planners to accurately interpret the initial contextual inputs supporting a violent group’s emergence ultimately leads to failed attempts to counter the group’s expansion in the future. In Gota’s case, his understanding of the contextual factors and supporting links enabling the LTTE to emerge and survive led him to develop an effective operational approach based from a well-defined Center of Gravity for the group. His operational approach, in turn, created the foundation for a successful campaign that achieved all stated strategic objectives.

In the end, the Sri Lankan example represents the emergence of a singular cause that originated from an entire spectrum of relevant conditions. More importantly, the ability of the Sri Lankan Government to understand these conditions and successfully implement full spectrum counter operations using synchronized and integrated lines of efforts resulted in the total collapse of the Tamil Tigers. Although many reports have alluded to possible human rights violations committed by the government during these military operations, the fact remains that the government’s organized effort to destroy the LTTE proved successful in the end. The actions of the Sri Lankan leadership, more importantly, represent one of the case studies depicted in this discussion that illustrates the effective utilization of the models put forth. In fact, the adaptability of the proposed models also illustrates a certain level of validity over time and space that enables planners to sufficiently isolate emerging threats and design counter operations to mitigate those threats. Successfully employing these proposed models, however, requires some level of coordinated efforts from planning staffs at all levels of the strategic and operational spectrum. Unfortunately, this integration is currently lacking at the strategic level where analytical teams within the existing National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) framework are deficient in their ability to synchronize long-term planning capabilities with their respective counterparts at the operational level. In fact, this framework in its current form does not possess the capability for

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60 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publications 5-0 Operations Planning. (Washington, D.C., August 2011), xxi. The Center of Gravity (COG) is defined as a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. The COG is generally identified as the legitimacy and influence over a population when dealing with irregular warfare.

any lasting analytical and planning approach designed to counter emerging violent non-state actors or to counter their potential growth over time. Instead, many operations are developed from a reaction to unforeseen circumstances arising from a lack of well-defined and integrated intelligence information. For this reason, the possibility exists for planners at these levels to incorporate the proposed models into an enduring process that links strategic analysis and planning to various operational efforts. This continued process, if implemented correctly, also mitigates the intelligence gaps currently existing between the national level analysts and their operational counterparts. In doing so, a seamless environment is created enabling planners to holistically assess a region for emerging threats and then subsequently integrate their efforts using all elements of national power. The effect of this integration, in turn, transitions the national intelligence process from a reactive environment to one that holistically identifies and approaches a specific problem by synchronizing and integrating the proposed models in this discussion into specific operations designed to counter potential threats.

Potential Planning and Operational Approaches

As any commander, leader, or staff officer will attest, the solution for solving future problems is usually unknown at the onset of planning. For this reason, any proposed counter model must be flexible enough to accommodate a multitude of unknown or unforeseen factors in order to adequately adjust to the changing environment. In other words, any model or planning staff must be adaptable to changing contextual inputs and their respective events. Additionally, formulated solutions must also be integrated and synchronized across various planning staffs operating within a variety of environments in order to ensure maximum effort is applied to meeting the stated strategic goals. This methodology is more commonly viewed through the lens of operational art during the military planning process.

Operational art as defined by ADRP 3-0 is the cognitive approach by commanders and their staffs to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. Although this definition applies specifically to military operations, the concept is valid for a multitude of broad-based planning approaches utilizing both civilian and military agencies. For instance, operational art – from the aspect of countering non-state actors – is the synchronized arrangement of all national elements of power in a series of integrated actions in time, space, and purpose as a means to achieve stated strategic objectives. This method, more importantly, includes the utilization of this discussion’s proposed models as a holistic method for isolating contextual inputs in order to plan for and execute the integrated lines of effort. As noted in Figure 6 earlier, this integrated arrangement is best viewed as a holistic planning process where the ends, way, and means are derived through a systematic operational approach. This approach, in turn, incorporates the proposed models into a long-term planning process that utilizes various lines of effort to achieve the desired end state. Over the years, however, this integration and synchronization requirement created the most tension within the intelligence community causing ensuing operations to fall short of their strategic goals.

Political turf fights and structural communication barriers within the analytical world, for instance, prevented many planners from developing pre-emptive methods for isolating and

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countering violent non-state actors. In fact, these same barriers led to several instances where emerging threats were either misidentified by intelligence analysts or missed entirely prior to a violent attack. After September 11, 2001, these barriers along with identified command and control issues previously highlighted within the operational community began to fade as national leaders reacted to the perceived failures of the intelligence environment. Accordingly, these political reactions induced several recommended changes designed to streamline the collection and intelligence distribution process. One official recommendation as noted in *The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Report (9-11 Commission Report)* was that the “lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department.”

The report’s recommendations further state that these activities “should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command (SOCOM).” Simply stated, any proposed combined operational effort between the CIA and SOCOM should rest within the DoD lane for coordination and execution of necessary operations. Unfortunately, the integrated-style model proposed within this discussion is not fully realized in the current framework of this commission report recommendation. One avenue posited for solving this dilemma is the fusion of existing operational efforts within the DoD with those currently existing in the NCTC and the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) in Virginia.

The NCTC was initially implemented as a civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism operations with a mandate for combining strategic intelligence and joint operational planning. This consolidation of intelligence analysis and operational planning, as noted in the 9-11 Commission Report, was originally proposed in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation as a means to “break down stovepipes” within the intelligence community. After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, this initiative was formalized into the current NCTC framework as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The mission of this analytical and coordination center is to lead the nation’s effort in combating terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing the information with its partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure a unity of effort. Above all, the intent of this organization – as put forth in the 9-11 Report – is to provide a warning of pending attacks to both the broader intelligence community, as well as to the national leadership. As noted in this intent, long-term planning and synchronization of various lines of effort with the operational level of command is lacking. Hence, developing an effective coordinating element designed to bridge the gap between the analytical side of the NCTC and the operational aspect of the DoD environment provides a potential avenue for countering a non-state organization’s deep reach

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66 Ibid.


using the proposed models in this discussion. One method of accomplishing this task is the creation of a centralized national intelligence center within the NCTC specifically designed to address the long-term analytical and planning requirements necessary for identifying and isolating emerging violent organizational groups and their networks.

Unlike the current movement in the United States military toward a decentralized mission command environment, analyzing and countering trends involving non-state actors requires a certain aspect of centralization and transparent coordination. Hence, creating a national intelligence center designed to specifically use the proposed models to monitor regional activities while coordinating planning objectives between strategic assets and operational levels of command enables a centralized and continuous effort to emerge in combating violent organizations. More importantly, this integrated process could occur – despite fears of intelligence compromises – within the current working framework outlined in the IRTPA and 9-11 Commission Reports. For instance, given the fact that the NCTC is mandated to act as the nation’s indications and warning apparatus while the DoD is authorized to manage the operational aspects of the process, fundamentally linking the two functions at the national level – using the DSOP framework – enables planners to both monitor emerging non-state actor threats and to operationalize plans to counter these threats when discovered. Command and control of the operational side of the process, however, would remain in the DoD lane as the element linking the two functions stayed at the national level under the NCTC direction. The bottom line for this process, is that specific planning cells established to identify and isolate potential non-state actor threats would also contain broad-based planning staffs with a mandate to develop and present various options to national leaders using the proposed models in this discussion.

Although the current NCTC framework includes several national intelligence centers with various missions, none of these collection centers are used specifically for identifying potential non-state organizational threats or their emerging deep reach capacities. In fact, this capability is often seen at the local Combatant Commander (CCDR) level within the DoD structure with varying degrees of coordination outside of each command. As indicated in Major General Flynn’s 2010 Fixing Intel Report, information concerning the enemy is often overemphasized at the lower levels of command at the expense of political, economic, and culturally related aspects of the broader problem.\(^69\) As a result, more efforts are generally weighed toward reacting to visible attacks rather than preempting and deterring them entirely. In fact, the Marine Corp’s Doctrinal Publication 2 (MCDP 2) on Intelligence states that intelligence is inherently and essentially the responsibility of the command.\(^70\) Although, this concept is accurate at a lower command level, when dealing with international violent organizations that have wide-ranging political, economic, and military influences, transparent integration at a national level is required and expected. In doing so, the nation’s leaders and military commanders are given both adequate warning and options to counter these threats. In essence, this higher-level coordination and synchronization of all national elements of power – similar to the coaching and planning


methods used in football organizations – changes the playing field from a reactionary system to a premeditated process where long-term game plans are executed in an integrated fashion.

Inherently, military and political leaders require planners that understand all levels of the emerging threat, as well as the various contextual inputs and support links leading to the evolution of the problem. They must also possess the ability to subsequently apply their knowledge to developing options that address these issues from multiple angles. These planning options, more importantly, cannot become entirely US-centric as a wide range of host nation variables play into the reality of emerging threats in both time and space. As an example, planners working within these proposed intelligence centers should develop methods in partnership with local host nation governments that effectively attack the non-state actor’s Information Operation (IO) campaigns once the violent organization has stepped outside of the political process. In doing so, host nations are empowered at the national level to accept responsibility for the western led counter operations enabling the solution to be locally owned and not externally mandated. In fact, some of this international partnership should evolve into a formal process of linking the proposed violent group based national intelligence center with regional collection cells comprised of agencies from western and host nation environments. This systemic approach, like the tentacles of an octopus, would essentially utilize a centralized and stable national intelligence center linked to various regional multi-national fusion cells as a means to address potential threats from a full spectrum and holistic viewpoint.

**Conclusion**

At the start of this discussion, integration and synchronization were established as necessary elements in dismantling and preventing diversification of a violent organization’s deep reach. Operational and strategic success was further perceived in this construct by connecting synchronized and well-defined objectives with counterterrorism tactics used at all levels of the operational spectrum in order to achieved stated national goals. In doing so, the premise was put forth that a violent group’s operational deep reach, similar to the Hezbollah’s operations in the Tri-Border Area of South America, could be effectively countered over time and space. As the research unfolded, two key factors emerged highlighting critical aspects of a non-state actor’s appearance and long-term growth within an affected society. The first aspect was that planners must accurately identify and understand the various contextual inputs and support links driving the formation of a violent group within a specific population. In doing so, a holistic viewpoint surfaces that incorporates all aspects of the social-political environment surrounding the actual emergence of the non-state organization. The second aspect was that planners could effectively use this acquired knowledge of environmental support links as a tool for developing counter models designed to attack the violent group at identified weak points along its evolutionary process. In essence, understanding the contextual elements within a population that enables a violent group to emerge also helps planners establish methods to defeat these organizations in the long run.

From this aspect, several illustrated models as part of a broader theory were put forth as a visual representation establishing how a violent organization emerges, how the group evolves over time, and how planners can counter their growth using the same inputs that help the organization evolve in the first place. Accordingly, this initial discussion led to the development of the Non-State Organization Evolution model (Figure 1) that depicted this phased evolution as a five-stage
process characterized by internal decisions leading to a potential violent path. As noted within this model, key weak points appeared along the group’s evolutionary path that highlighted possible routes to mitigate the group’s influence. To understand contextually how to accomplish this feat, the Formulation Stage Connectivity model (Figure 2) was put forth as a means to identify both the contextual factors, as well as the internal support links feeding the appearance and growth of a violent group. This model, in turn, created a simplistic design enabling planners to use a template for isolating and identifying potential regional hotspots where violent organizations or their networks may emerge.

In order to close the theoretical loop and answer the original question of how to counter a non-state organization’s deep reach, the discussion turned to presenting a concept that linked the identified formulation inputs to a desire end state. This was accomplished using an operational approach of synchronized and integrated lines of effort as a holistic method to attack the violent group in order to isolate it from the affected population. The resulting Violent Non-State Organizational Planning Process (Figure 6) essentially outlined a doctrinally based approach for incorporating known elements of national power into a formalized process to counter emerging violent groups. This process, in turn, led the discussion toward a “closed system” concept (Figure 7) where the planner uses the original contextual inputs to isolate and ultimately collapse the targeted organization over time. In the end, the proposed models illustrate an integrated method using identified societal inputs and support links – that originally established the violent group – as planning tools to develop synchronized lines of efforts to ultimately dismantle the targeted organization by systematically isolated it from its “energy sources” within the population.

Thomas Sowell noted in his reference to Adam Smith that, “a society cannot function humanely, if at all, when each person acts as if his little finger is more important than the lives of a hundred million other human beings.” From this aspect, violent organizations are no different as their actions inherently depict a selfish desire to expand their political agenda at the cost of a population they claim to represent. In some instances, like the Algerian FLN, this agenda leads to strategic success despite tactical and operational losses to government forces. In other cases, like the Sri Lankan LTTE, the catastrophic toll on the population leads to the inevitable downfall of the organization itself.

Regardless of the situation, however, the cost to both human lives and national economic treasure, as illustrated in the case studies, is enormous and should be avoided at all cost. To accomplish this, leaders and their staffs must become predictive in nature and not resort to reactive techniques in countering future violent organizations or their networks. Furthermore, any potential action to counter the emergence of a violent organization or the expansion of the group’s deep reach should include a holistic analytical approach that uses a fully integrated and synchronized process at all levels of the government. As noted in this discussion, several possible recommendations are available that elicit suitable frameworks for establishing these integrated links between the strategic and operational levels. The goal of this discussion, however, is to present feasible alternatives to the current status quo that enable both leaders and

planners alike to develop necessary skills and organizational structures in order to prevent future attacks to the United States or its allies. In doing so, planning efforts will become more effective in their desired output, as well as in their integrated and synchronized execution by using this discussion’s proposed models to accurately identify and counter the emergence of a violent non-state organization and its developing international networks.