Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruptionPublic management review
Date of this Version1-1-2009
Document TypeJournal Article
AbstractDemocratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies - particularly the illiberal democracies - this study identifies a key to corruption control.
Citation InformationXiaowen Tian and Vai Io Lo. "Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption" Public management review Vol. 11 Iss. 2 (2009) p. 155 - 172
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/vai_lo/18/