Productivity Effects of Organizational Change: Microeconometric Evidence

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This paper analyzes the relationship between investment in information and communication technologies (ICT), non-ICT investment, labor productivity, and workplace reorganization. Firms are assumed to reorganize workplaces if the productivity gains arising from workplace reorganization exceed the associated reorganization costs. Two different types of organizational change are considered: enhancement group work and flattening of hierarchies. Empirical evidence is provided for a sample of 411 firms from the German business-related services sector.

We develop and estimate a model for labor productivity and firms' decision to reorganize workplaces that allows workplace reorganization to affect any parameter of the labor productivity equation. Our general and flexible methodology allows us to properly take account of strategic complementarities between the input factors and workplace reorganization. The estimation results show that changes in human resources practices do not significantly affect firms' output elasticities with respect to ICT, non-ICT capital, and labor, although most of the point estimates of the individual output elasticities and of the control variables for observable firm heterogeneity are larger if workplace reorganization is realized. We therefore apply the Kernel density-estimation technique and demonstrate that for firms with organizational change, the entire labor productivity distribution shifts significantly out to the right if workplace reorganization takes place, indicating that workplace reorganization induces an increase in labor productivity that is attributable to complementarities between the various input factors and workplace reorganization. By contrast, firms without organizational change would not have realized significant productivity gains if they had reorganized workplaces.

Key words: workplace reorganization; ICT investment; labor productivity; endogenous switching regression model; Kernel density estimation

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1. Introduction
The swift development of information and communication technologies (ICT), as well as the declining prices for its use, have considerably enhanced the diffusion of ICT during the last few years. As a consequence, the impact of ICT on productivity has become a broadly discussed topic in management sciences and economics. Several studies find empirical evidence for positive productivity effects of ICT at the firm level (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996, Lichtenberg 1995, Greenan and Mairesse 2000, Licht and Moch 1999). Although it seems reasonable that ICT also has an indirect effect on labor productivity by enabling firms' reorganization of workplaces, researchers have only recently become interested in the joint effects of workplace organization and ICT on labor productivity. Studies like that of Black and Lynch (2001), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), and Bresnahan et al. (2002) find empirical evidence that ICT and workplace reorganization do, in fact, have positive and significant effects on labor productivity.

A flaw of these studies is that they assume a unidirectional relationship between labor productivity and workplace reorganization. They take the view that workplace reorganization affects labor productivity, but ignore a potential reverse causality, because a main reason for firms to reorganize workplaces is to increase labor productivity. Such a simultaneity renders the economic interpretation of the results presented in earlier studies questionable and casts doubt on any recommendations for management practices based on them.¹

¹ In econometric terms, the parameter estimates of existing studies are likely to suffer from a simultaneity bias, which leads to inconsistent parameter estimates.
The merits of this paper are twofold. First, it takes the potential simultaneity between labor productivity and firms’ decisions to reorganize workplaces into account by estimating an endogenous switching regression model for a sample of 411 firms from the German business-related services sector. Second, it allows for complementarities in firms’ organizational design; e.g., it allows workplace reorganization to change any parameter of the production function. Hence, we apply a general and flexible econometric methodology.

In our model, firms are assumed to reorganize workplaces if the productivity gains arising from the reorganization exceed the associated reorganization costs. The reorganization decision defines two labor productivity equations—or “regimes”—one which involves firms with workplace reorganization, and another regime including firms without such a change in human resources management. Besides taking a potential simultaneity into account, the switching regression model also allows workplace reorganization to change the entire set of partial productivity elasticities instead of a priori restricting workplace reorganization to act as a productivity shift parameter in the productivity equations, as earlier studies do. Our estimation results indeed indicate that it is worthwhile to allow for a more flexible effect of workplace reorganization on labor productivity.

Moreover, this paper provides evidence for two distinct types of workplace reorganization: enhancement of group work or the flattening of hierarchies, introduced by 39% of the firms in our sample, and flattening of hierarchy levels, introduced by 28% of the analyzed firms.

Our estimation results clearly indicate that labor productivity and workplace reorganization are simultaneously determined. We find that the individual output elasticities of ICT investment, non-ICT investment, and labor do not significantly differ between firms with and without workplace reorganization and that there are insignificant differences in the returns to scale between the two regimes. The point estimates of the partial output elasticities of labor and non-ICT investment are, however, larger for the set of firms that conducted a workplace reorganization, but the coefficients do not differ significantly from each other.

We conduct a counterfactual analysis related to the questions: (i) what would have been the effect of workplace reorganization on productivity for a firm without changes in human resources practises if it had changed the organization of workplaces, and (ii) what would have happened to the productivity of a firm that changed the organization of workplaces if it had not changed it? We visualize the joint differences in the point estimates by plotting the entire labor productivity distributions of firms with workplace reorganization and of firms without workplace reorganization, using Kernel density estimation. Our results indicate that the firms in our sample, on average, reached the right decision: Only those firms that reorganized workplaces actually gained from the reinforcement of group work or the flattening of hierarchies, while firms that did not introduce changes in workplace organization would not have realized gains in productivity.

This paper is organized as follows: §2 briefly reviews the existing literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework as well as the empirical model. Section 4 introduces the data set; §5 presents and interprets estimation results, and §6 concludes.

2. Earlier Research

Until recently, two main strands of literature have dealt with the relation between ICT investment, organizational change, and productivity. One branch concentrates on the impact of ICT investment on organizational change. For instance, Leavitt and Whisler, as cited by Crowston and Malone (1988, p. 1051), already predicted in 1958 that “the use of information and communication technology would lead to the demise of middle management” and that the number of hierarchy levels in organizations will decrease if, for example, computers are used increasingly often to perform the functions of middle management. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a broad discussion about the effects of ICT on workplace organization, with ICT being loosely defined as something in-between a new payroll system and a new personal computer. Due to binding data restrictions, few empirical analyses of the relationship between workplace organization and ICT exist for that time period.


Studies on the effects of ICT and organizational change on firms’ productivity emerged only recently. It seems plausible that the implementation of a new information and communication system alone is not sufficient to cause positive productivity effects. The implementation of a new software system such as SAP often requires a restructuring of the firm to use the new system efficiently. Thus, it appears likely that workplace reorganization has to be changed accordingly to make workflow more efficient or, to put it differently, that ICT is enabling organizational change, as pointed out recently by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000). Related evidence is provided by Black and Lynch (2001), who analyze the productivity effects of several workplace practices, ICT, and human capital, using cross-sectional and panel data estimation on a sample of about 600 firms of the U.S. manufacturing sector.
industry. Their results indicate that workplace reorganization has positive and significant effects on labor productivity. Bresnahan et al. (2002) also find empirical evidence that ICT and workplace reorganization as well as new products and services positively affects the demand for skilled labor and firms’ labor productivity. Their analysis is based on a data set of 300 large U.S. firms from manufacturing industries and services.

3. Theoretical Background

3.1. Complementarities in Firm Strategies

It is likely that firms with organizational changes not only differ from other firms with respect to their organizational form, but also in various other respects such as skill mix or investment strategies. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) demonstrate that firms need to implement computer technology as part of a system or cluster of organizational change. This argument of strategic complementarity has been further advanced in studies by Brynjolfsson and Mendelson (1993), as well as by Radner (1993). It might thus be too restrictive to assume that firms produce according to the same production function independent of the way workplaces are organized. Considering the effect of workplace reorganization to simply change the constant term in a production function neglects that workplace reorganization is also very likely to change firms’ strategies with respect to skill mix and investment and that these changes may have impacts on the labor productivity of firms—i.e., that an organizational change might enable a more efficient use of the input factors labor, ICT capital, and non-ICT capital. This constitutes the main hypothesis of this paper:

**Main Hypothesis.** Workplace reorganization not only acts as a shift parameter in the production function, but changes—due to strategic complementarities between workplace reorganization and the input factors—the partial productivities of labor, ICT capital, and non-ICT capital as well.

We test our main hypothesis by simultaneously estimating two labor productivity equations—one for firms with workplace reorganization and one for firms without workplace reorganization. In a second step, we compare the labor productivity distributions by applying the Kernel density-estimation technique. Changes in the entire shape of the labor productivity distribution due to workplace reorganization point at complementarities between workplace reorganization and the production factors.

Empirical evidence on the relationship between ICT investment and organizational change is provided, for instance, by Bresnahan (1999) and Bresnahan et al. (2002). Both papers suggest that investment in ICT enables changes in work organization. In a case study context, Brynjolfsson et al. (1997) demonstrate that even productivity losses might occur if investment in ICT does not go along with changes in firms’ organizational structure.

Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) also stress the complementarity between human capital and workplace organization that, in turn, jointly improve productivity and cost efficiency. Indeed, it is fairly well documented that workplace reorganization goes along with an upskilling of the labor force in the sense that highly skilled labor and workplace reorganization are strategic complements (Black and Lynch 2001, Bresnahan et al. 2002).

3.2. Forms of Organizational Change

In this paper, we consider two forms of organizational change: (i) enhancement of group work, and (ii) flattening of hierarchies. Both the enhancement of group work and the flattening of hierarchies are closely related to what Bresnahan et al. (2002, p. 350) term “decentralized workplace organization,” meaning that the authority of individuals and teams is enhanced. The authors, indeed, find that higher ICT levels go along with higher degrees of decentralization of workplace organization.

By motivating employees and by increasing their identification with their companies (Ichniowski et al. 1997), firms intend to increase productivity. More specifically, organizational changes are feasible means to reduce production cost and to improve product quality (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000, Davenport 1994, Davenport and Short 1990, Hammer 1990). In our context, both organizational changes—enforcement of group work and flattening of hierarchies—are likely to have an effect on costs as well as on quality, because by improving information flows in the production of services, customers are served more efficiently (reducing cost) and more quickly (improving service quality).

Traditionally, hierarchical organizational structures are said to reduce communication costs compared to flat hierarchies (Malone et al. 1987, Radner 1993). In the Milgrom and Roberts (1990) model, communication costs are driven towards zero by ICT, so that more direct interaction between employees is enhanced without causing higher cost. Flattening of hierarchies might affect the motivation of workers, with the total effect being unclear: On the one hand, a removal of hierarchical structures might motivate workers on the low end of the hierarchy ladder while having an inverse effect on those who lose power due to the abolishment of hierarchy levels. The total effect of hierarchy flattening, hence, hinges upon the ratio of “winners” and “losers” as well as on the relative productivity of both types of workers. Empirical evidence provided by Bresnahan et al. (2002) suggests
that firms with a decentralized organizational structure exhibit a higher partial productivity of ICT than firms with a centralized structure, thus underscoring the initial Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argument of complementarities between organizational structure and ICT.

While the flattening of hierarchies affects the general flow of information within a firm, the reinforcement of teamwork mainly affects the flow of information concerning specific projects or targets. The latter also involves employees of different hierarchy levels, at least in the knowledge-intensive business-related services sector with which this paper is concerned. This in turn implies an improved feedback and a higher identification with the work to be completed. These positive effects might be counteracted by inefficient organization of the team and by upper management’s difficulties in transmitting information to the team members—a problem that might be solved by using communication and organization software, as pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000, p. 24): “a significant component of the value software, as pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt be solved by using communication and organization information to the team members—a problem that might act by inefficient organization of the team and by upper management’s difficulties in transmitting information to the team members—a problem that might be solved by using communication and organization software, as pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000, p. 24): “a significant component of the value software, as pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt be solved by using communication and organization information to the team members—a problem that might be solved by using communication and organization software, as pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000, p. 24): “a significant component of the value software, as pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt be solved by using communication and organization information to the team members—a problem that might be solved by using communication and organization software, as pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000, p. 24): “a significant component of the value software, as pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt be solved by using communication and organization information to the team members—a problem that might

3.3. Empirical Model

To formalize the considerations of §§3.1 and 3.2, the following model is used: We assume that firm i produces according to a Cobb-Douglas production technology. Output $y_i$ is a function of ICT capital, ICT; non-ICT capital, $K_i$; labor, $L_i$; and a set of variables capturing observable firm heterogeneity, often termed “observable differences in production efficiency,” which are summarized in variable $A_i$:

$$y_i = A_i ICT_i^\alpha K_i^\beta L_i^\gamma.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

The exponents $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$ denote the elasticities of output with respect to ICT capital, non-ICT capital, and labor, respectively. Taking logs and adding an i.i.d. normally distributed error term, denoted by $u_i$, leads to

$$\ln(y_i) = \ln(A_i) + \alpha \ln(\text{ICT}_i) + \beta \ln(K_i) + \gamma \ln(L_i) + u_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Labor productivity, i.e., output per worker, is then given by

$$\ln \left( \frac{y_i}{L_i} \right) = \ln(A_i) + \alpha \ln(\text{ICT}_i) + \beta \ln(K_i) + (\gamma - 1) \ln(L_i) + u_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

If a firm changes its organizational structure, its labor productivity is

$$\ln \left( \frac{y_i}{L_i} \right)_{oc} = \ln(A_i) + \alpha_{oc} \ln(\text{ICT}_i) + \beta_{oc} \ln(K_i) + (\gamma_{oc} - 1) \ln(L_i) + u_{oc} = X_i \delta_{oc} + u_{oc}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

For firms not conducting an organizational change, labor productivity is

$$\ln \left( \frac{y_i}{L_i} \right)_{noc} = \ln(A_i) + \alpha_{noc} \ln(\text{ICT}_i) + \beta_{noc} \ln(K_i) + (\gamma_{noc} - 1) \ln(L_i) + u_{noc} = X_i \delta_{noc} + u_{noc}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where the subscripts $oc$ and $noc$ denote the two productivity regimes with and without organizational change, respectively. Firms decide to reorganize workplaces if the productivity gain from workplace reorganization is larger than the costs per worker involved in an organizational change, $C_i$. Thus, the latent variable

$$I_i^* = a \left[ \ln \left( \frac{y_i}{L_i} \right)_{oc} - \ln \left( \frac{y_i}{L_i} \right)_{noc} \right] - C_i + v_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

represents the difference between the productivity gains and the costs arising from an organizational change, where $v_i$ is an i.i.d. normally distributed optimization error and $a$ represents the effect of the productivity gains from workplace reorganization on the reorganization decision. If $a = 0$, the reorganization decision is unaffected by the productivity differences.

The selection mechanism for observing a workplace reorganization is

$$\text{ORG}_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } I_i^* > 0, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

Substituting Equations (4) and (5) into Equation (6) leads to

$$I_i^* = a X_i (\delta_{oc} - \delta_{noc}) - C_i + v_i = Z_i \Pi_i + \varepsilon_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

where $\varepsilon_i = a (u_{ioc} - u_{inoc}) + v_i$ follows a normal distribution with $N(0, \sigma^2_{\varepsilon_i})$. We jointly estimate Equations (4), (5), and (7) using a full information maximum-likelihood estimator. Please refer to Appendix A on the Internet, where we also provide computational details.\footnote{Note that all appendices are available at mansci.pub.informs.org/e companion.html.}
4. Data

We use data taken from the “Service Sector Business Survey (SSBS),” a quarterly survey in the business-related services sector which has been collected by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) in cooperation with Germany’s largest credit rating agency, Creditreform, since June 1994. The ZEW sends out a one-page questionnaire every three months to about 3,500 firms belonging to the business-related services sector. The survey is constructed as a panel. It is a random sample, stratified with respect to 10 sectors, regional affiliation (East/West Germany), and five size classes (two for East, three for West Germany). Details on the survey design are presented in Kaiser et al. (2000). The response rate of the survey amounts to about 30% per wave. The questionnaire is divided into two parts. In the first part, firms assess their current business development by answering questions concerning the past development of sales, profits, demand, prices, and employment on a three-point ordinal scale. The second part of the survey is concerned with present-day economic issues and changes quarterly, with selected questions being repeated annually. This paper uses data taken from the 26th wave (third quarter of 2000), which contains information on workplace reorganization. The 26th wave currently is the only wave of the SSBS which contains information on workplace reorganization, so that panel data estimations cannot presently be provided.

In particular, the relevant question in the survey is: “Did one of the following changes or reforms take place within your firm during the past three years?” The list of possible answers consists of (i) enhancement of group work, and (ii) flattening of hierarchies. Firms have three answering possibilities: (i) yes, (ii) no, and (iii) do not know. Although the question appeared to have been well understood by the survey participants, we clearly do not know anything about the degree of radicalness of the organizational change. It is unclear, for example, whether firms have changed the organization of only one department or of the entire firm. This is a caveat of our study.

We supplement the information contained in the 26th wave of the SSBS with data on ICT investment, non-ICT investment, and total employment, which is taken from the 24th wave (first quarter of 2000) of the SSBS. Because 408 firms that took part in the 26th wave of the SSBS did not respond to the 24th wave, these firms cannot be considered in the analysis. A check for systematic differences in the anatomy of firms (with respect to firm size, sector affiliation, regional affiliation, ICT investment, and non-ICT investment) that have to be left out due to unit nonresponse indicates that these firms are missing at random.

Our analysis starts with some descriptive evidence on workplace reorganization. Table 1 displays the share of firms that conducted one of the two types of workplace reorganization. Group-work reinforcement is the more important type of workplace reorganization, with a share of 39% of the firms in the sample, compared to a share of 28% for the flattening of hierarchies. The order of importance replicates the degree of radicalness of the two forms of workplace reorganization: While group work is relatively simple to establish, flattening of hierarchies requires a substantial change in human resource management because some of the employees will lose their ranks and titles.

Table 1 Percentage Share of Firms with Workplace Reorganization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of workplace reorganization</th>
<th>Firm share (in %)</th>
<th>No. of firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enhancement of group work</td>
<td>38.93</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flattening of hierarchies</td>
<td>27.98</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table 1 displays the share and the absolute number of firms that enhanced group work and/or flattened hierarchies. The total number of firms considered here is 411.

5 Moreover, the SSBS is a very versatile data set where firms take part on an irregular basis (a point to which we shall return to at the beginning of §5), so that even if panel data were available, unobserved heterogeneity could not be taken into account because we ended up with a very tiny fraction of firms for which data are available for more than two periods. The problem is even more severe because we combine data from adjacent survey waves.

5. Empirical Results

5.1. Specification

The implementation of our empirical model is straightforward. Labor productivity is calculated as the ratio of total sales to the total number of employees. Non-ICT capital is measured as investment in non-ICT equipment (including machinery, ICT investment) that have to be left out due to unit nonresponse. Appendix B gives some further information on the most important continuous variables used in the estimation of labor productivity.

A “pretest” (a test survey that involved 19 firms) revealed that all participants had the same notion of the two types of organizational change. We also interviewed 15 of the firms that eventually took part in the SSBS survey wave and found the same result.
physical capital; ICT capital is proxied by ICT investment. Proxying ICT capital by ICT investment does not appear to be a severe shortcoming because ICT depreciates extremely quickly (Dewan and Min 1997). With regard to the empirical proxy for non-ICT capital, it is important to note that a capital stock could be calculated using information from past SSBS waves using the perpetual inventory method. The SSBS, however, is a very volatile panel data set. Firms usually take part in the survey on an irregular basis, so that a calculation of capital stock appears to work, due to unit nonresponse, with a sample of between 10 and 20 firms only (Kaiser 2001).

Observed productivity differences across firms, as represented by the term $A_i$ in Equations (1) to (5), are considered by the inclusion of a set of nine sector dummy variables and a dummy variable that is coded one if the respective firm is from East Germany and zero otherwise.

Workplace reorganization costs, $C_i$, cannot be directly observed. We therefore assume that these costs are (i) lower for exporting firms because these firms are used to adjusting quickly to changes in the international market environment, (ii) lower for firms facing foreign competition on the domestic market because increased competitive pressure induces firms to optimize their work flow, and (iii) higher for firms that report that they have encountered difficulties in recruiting qualified apprentices as well as the sales development variables, are the identifying restrictions of Equation (8).

Table 2 displays estimation results for the labor productivity equations and the two types of workplace reorganization. In addition, it presents the results of tests for identical coefficients in the two different

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Switching Regression Estimation Results: Level Equations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group-work reinforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Std. err.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(\text{ICT})$</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(\text{K})$</td>
<td>0.1909***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(L)$</td>
<td>-0.3480***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>-0.0042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.8231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_1$</td>
<td>-0.1276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_1$</td>
<td>0.7618***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(\text{ICT})$</td>
<td>0.1788***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(\text{K})$</td>
<td>0.1287***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(L)$</td>
<td>-0.4273***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>-0.1641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.7324***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_2$</td>
<td>-0.6840***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_2$</td>
<td>0.8403***</td>
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</table>

Wald tests for identity of the coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test stat.</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Test stat.</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(\text{ICT})$</td>
<td>0.0900</td>
<td>0.7640</td>
<td>0.1610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(\text{K})$</td>
<td>0.6978</td>
<td>0.4037</td>
<td>0.1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(L)$</td>
<td>0.5223</td>
<td>0.4700</td>
<td>0.9914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to scale</td>
<td>2.0419</td>
<td>0.1530</td>
<td>1.6459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set of input factors</td>
<td>2.5682</td>
<td>0.4631</td>
<td>1.9054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>0.6745</td>
<td>0.4115</td>
<td>0.0545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector dummies</td>
<td>13.0698</td>
<td>0.1596</td>
<td>10.1295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.7102</td>
<td>0.1910</td>
<td>0.9838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire specification</td>
<td>18.4274</td>
<td>0.1718</td>
<td>18.4337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wald tests for joint significance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime with organizational change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor inputs</td>
<td>25.2564</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>17.4946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector dummies</td>
<td>9.8110</td>
<td>0.0360</td>
<td>18.9154</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entire specification</td>
<td>56.1845</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>55.4516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime without organizational change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor inputs</td>
<td>40.2032</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>61.0463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector dummies</td>
<td>30.4624</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>19.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire specification</td>
<td>95.1554</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>100.8017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table 2 displays estimation results for the level equations of the endogenous switching regression model. A total of 411 observations was involved in the estimations. The asterisks *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% significance level, respectively.
regimes. For example, we test whether the coefficients of \( \ln(\text{ICT}) \), \( \ln(\text{K}) \), and \( \ln(\text{L}) \) are the same in the regime with organizational change and in the regime without organizational change. Estimation results for the separation equations are displayed in Appendix C, Table C.

### 5.2. Productivity Estimations

Positive and highly significant effects of ICT investment, non-ICT investment, and labor on labor productivity are found in all productivity estimations, as shown in Table 2.\(^7\)

The “partial productivity” parameters, the coefficients of \( \ln(\text{ICT}) \), \( \ln(\text{K}) \), and \( \ln(\text{L}) \), capture the percentage change in labor productivity induced by a 1% change in the corresponding production factor. For example, in the case of group work enhancement, a 1% increase in ICT investment induces a 0.1515% increase in labor productivity, a 1% increase in non-ICT investment leads to a productivity increase of 0.1909%, and a 1% increase in employment leads to an increase in labor productivity of 0.652%. We obtain quite similar estimates for the corresponding specifications with respect to hierarchy flattening. This means that the “payback” of investments is higher for labor than for capital. Labor, however, is more expensive than ICT equipment, such that the “real” net payback of these investments could only be calculated reliably if data on costs and profits were available. However, this information is, unfortunately, not at our disposal.\(^8\)

The point estimates of the partial productivity estimates of investment and labor are generally larger in the regime with organizational change than in the regime without the change in human resources management, whereas the estimated elasticity with respect to ICT investment turns out to be smaller in the regime with organizational change. Identity of these parameters, however, cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels, as shown in Table 2. Indeed, identical returns to scale for the two productivity regimes cannot be rejected either. Hence, workplace reorganization has an insignificant effect on the partial output elasticities of ICT investment, non-ICT investment, and labor input.

Also, even though the point estimates of the constant term, the dummy variable for East German firms, and the sector dummy variables tend to be larger in the regime with workplace reorganization than in the regime without workplace reorganization, identity of these parameters between the two workplace reorganization regimes cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels. Consequently, identity of the entire parameter vectors of the two regimes cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels.

Interestingly, the point estimates of the partial output elasticities are of almost the same magnitude for both types of workplace reorganization, group-work enhancement and hierarchy flattening. This means that the two forms of workplace reorganization do not have strikingly different effects on the partial productivities of ICT investment, non-ICT investment, and labor. The factor inputs and the set of sector dummies, as well as the entire set of explanatory variables, are clearly jointly significant for both regimes, with and without organizational change, and for both types of workplace reorganization. There is only one exception, referring to the set of sector dummies in the case of group-work reinforcement and the regime with organizational change.

To visualize the joint effects of the differences in the partial output elasticities and the firm heterogeneity parameters, we compare Kernel density estimates of the conditional labor productivity distributions in the two regimes. These joint effects are displayed in Figures 1 and 2 for group work and in Figures 3 and 4 for the flattening of hierarchies.

Instead of considering only the point estimates related to the input factors, these figures show the joint productivity effects of workplace organization arising from changes in the output elasticities of the

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\(^7\) Note that for labor input, the estimated coefficients displayed in Table 2 correspond to \( \gamma - 1 \), so that adding one to the estimated coefficients yields the partial output elasticity of labor.

\(^8\) Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996, p. 550), for example, calculate the net marginal product of computer capital to lie between 48% and 67%, depending on the assumptions about the depreciation rate of computer capital. Moreover, they mention the problem of taking account of costs such as taxes, adjustment costs, etc. Because we have no information about profits and costs, but observe only sales, and because we do not observe ICT capital but ICT investment, we prefer to refrain from calculating “real” payback to ICT.
input factors and from the changes in the observable firm heterogeneity parameters. In addition, the selectivity effect resulting from the firms’ decision of whether or not to reorganize workplaces is taken into account.

The idea behind the figures is to consider the same firms—those with workplace reorganization (Figures 1 and 3) and those without workplace reorganization (Figures 2 and 4)—under the two different workplace reorganization regimes. To control for the fact that firms with organizational change, might be systematically different from those without organizational change, and thus might differ in their decision to engage in workplace organization, the productivity distributions are estimated conditional on the choice of firms concerning workplace reorganization. Details on the econometrics are displayed in Appendix D.

The triangled curve in Figure 1 represents Kernel density estimates for log-labor productivity related to the parameter vector with reinforcement of group work and firms which actually conduct this form of workplace reorganization, while the circled curve corresponds to the parameter vector without workplace reorganization and firms which enhanced group work. Mathematically, the triangled curve in Figure 1 is calculated from the fitted values $X_i \gamma_{oc}$, while the circled curve is calculated from the fitted values $X_i \gamma_{noc}$, where $X_i$ includes only those firms with enhancement of group work, plus the selectivity parameter resulting from the choice of the firms whether or not to engage in workplace reorganization, respectively.

In all figures, the log-labor productivity distribution with organizational change is situated to the right of the regime without workplace reorganization. However, the productivity differentials in the log-labor productivity between the two regimes are much larger for firms with organizational change. This means that the firms with group-work enhancement or hierarchy flattening are clearly better-off compared to the hypothetical case without workplace reorganization. By contrast, those firms without organizational change would not have gained much if they had reorganized their workplaces. Thus, it seems that, on average, the firms make “the right decision” with respect to organizational change because reorganization only pays off if the associated productivity gains are larger than the reorganization cost.

The results of the Kernel density estimations might explain, to some extent, the insignificance of the difference of the estimated coefficients in the two regimes according to Table 2 because those do not consider hypothetical productivity differentials.

The labor productivity effects for hierarchy flattening are, on average, larger than those for group-work reinforcement. For both types of organizational change, a $t$-test indicates a significant shift in the
mean log-labor productivity between the regimes with and without workplace reorganization. Table 3 displays the corresponding test results.

Interestingly, if workplace reorganization is considered as a simple productivity-shift dummy variable, comparable to existing studies (e.g., Black and Lynch 2001, Bresnahan et al. 2002, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000), we do not find significant effects of workplace reorganization on labor productivity. Indeed, when a simple linear regression of labor productivity on a dummy variable for the different types of workplace reorganization and the same explanatory variables as in our model is run, the effects of workplace reorganization on labor productivity are insignificant.\(^9\) This indicates that workplace reorganization induces a change in the entire set of output elasticity coefficients and in the set of variables capturing observable firm heterogeneity, so that inserting a dummy variable for organizational change in a productivity equation may not have fully revealed the effects of organizational change on productivity.

A potential alternative to our approach would be to include interaction terms between the input factors and the dummy for organizational change into the estimation to take account of potential complementarities. Proceeding this way, however, would neglect the simultaneity between organizational change and labor productivity revealed by applying the endogenous switching regression model. Hence, we consider the endogenous switching regression model and the counterfactual analysis of productivity differentials as the appropriate and econometrically correct method of estimation for this issue.

According to Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), ICT can be interpreted as a “general purpose technology” that facilitates complementary innovations. Thus, one might suppose that the contributions of ICT capital to productivity are significantly larger than those of non-ICT capital. However, as results of Wald tests for identity of the partial output elasticities of ICT investment and non-ICT investment for the four productivity estimations show (see Table 4), identity of the coefficients \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels. One reason for this finding might be that not all benefits of ICT use are captured by the production elasticity of ICT. Because ICT enables complementary organizational investments such as those proxied by the workplace organization variables in our study, some fraction of the productivity contribution of ICT investment might be absorbed by other transmission mechanisms. A second reason might be the use of ICT investment as a measure of the ICT capital stock. Although in part justifiable by the fast depreciation rate of ICT, it may capture the capital stock only insufficiently (the same is true, of course, for the capital variable as well). Finally, due to the cross-sectional character of our data, we are not able to account for the lagged effects of ICT on productivity, an issue that is highlighted for example by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), who state on page 33 of their paper that “the effects of information technology are substantially larger when measured over longer time periods” and if productivity growth is considered rather than productivity levels.

### Table 3

**Tests for Significant Differences in Conditional Log-Labor Productivity Distributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firms considered</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>(p)-value</th>
<th>mean difference &gt; 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enhancement of group work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1 with change</td>
<td>0.9569</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2 without change</td>
<td>0.1540</td>
<td>0.3264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flattening of hierarchies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3 with change</td>
<td>0.9171</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4 without change</td>
<td>-0.1374</td>
<td>0.3305</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table 3 displays results of tests for positive differences in the means of Kernel estimations of conditional log-labor productivity between the productivity regimes.

### Table 4

**Wald Tests for the Identity of the Partial Elasticities of ICT and Non-ICT Investment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Test stat.</th>
<th>(p)-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With organizational change</td>
<td>0.1682</td>
<td>0.6817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without organizational change</td>
<td>0.2796</td>
<td>0.5970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flattening of hierarchies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With organizational change</td>
<td>0.0154</td>
<td>0.9012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without organizational change</td>
<td>0.3826</td>
<td>0.5362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table 4 presents the results of the Wald test for identity of the partial elasticities of ICT and non-ICT investment.

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\(^9\) The point estimate (standard errors in parentheses) corresponding to the dummy variable for the reinforcement of group work is 0.0862 (0.0818). For the flattening of hierarchies, the coefficient of the dummy variables is 0.0364 (0.0910).
5.4. Organizational Implications

There are two substantive findings that directly relate to the organization of firms. The first finding relates to the complementarity between organizational change and production factors; the second one concerns the small differences in the productivity effects of hierarchy flattening and the enhancement of group work.

The organizational implication of our complementarities finding is trivial, but a truism that directly follows from the definition of complementarities: It is more profitable to invest in a multitude of complementary activities instead of focussing on just one activity. Translated to our application, this means that firms should not only invest in labor and capital, but should attempt to accompany these investments by appropriate organizational changes.

Our second finding with respect to organizational implications is the small difference between the labor productivity effects of hierarchy flattening and group-work enhancement. As pointed out in §3.2, both types of organizational changes affect information flows and worker motivation so that these two effects actually induce the positive labor productivity effects. That means that other types of organizational change that come with improved information flows and improved worker motivation could lead to equally large gains in productivity.

5.5. Caveats

Our paper has four main caveats that are primarily related to data restrictions: (i) Measurement of workplace reorganization: We only observe whether a firm has conducted a workplace reorganization and do not know anything about the degree of radicalness of the reorganization; (ii) Generalizability: Our analysis is concerned with the German business-related services sector which differs markedly from other sectors; (iii) Cost variables: We do not directly observe reorganization cost and use proxy variables instead; and (iv) Unobserved heterogeneity: We cannot take unobserved heterogeneity into account, although this could have marked effects on our results. We cannot address any of these issues with the data we have at hand. As we argue in greater detail in Appendix E, we also do not believe that these caveats strongly influence our results.

Another caveat is that we use a Cobb-Douglas production function, which is quite restrictive. Alternative specifications, however, led to implausible results and we believe that this is again mainly a data issue. We provide further comments in Appendix E.

6. Conclusions

This paper studies the effects of workplace organization on labor productivity by using simultaneous equations techniques. We apply a general and flexible framework to analyze the productivity effects of organizational change. A firm’s decision whether or not to reorganize workplaces is assumed to depend upon the productivity differential with and without workplace reorganization, net the associated reorganization costs. An endogenous switching regression model is applied to a sample of 411 firms from the German business-related services sector. It turns out that workplace reorganization and labor productivity are in fact simultaneously determined.

Our estimates show that workplace reorganization in the form of enhanced group work and flattening of hierarchies neither leads to significant changes in the partial output elasticities of ICT investment, non-ICT investment, and labor, or in the returns to scale. The point estimates with respect to non-ICT investment and labor, however, tend to be larger if workplace reorganization takes place. We do not find significant differences between the partial productivity of ICT capital and non-ICT capital.

Kernel density estimates of the log-labor productivity distribution, conditional on the choice whether or not to reorganize workplaces, show that workplace organizational change induces a positive and significant shift in the distribution of labor productivity for firms that reorganize workplaces. This points at strategic complementarities between the various input factors and workplace reorganization. The Kernel density estimates also do not show gains in labor productivity for those firms without organizational change compared to the hypothetical case that they reorganized workplaces, indicating that firms on average take the “right decision” regarding workplace reorganization.

We derive two organizational implications from our results. First, our finding that strategic complementarities exist between the input factors and organizational change indicates that firms can gain even more from investments in input factors if they also change their workplace organization. Second, the small differences between the productivity effects of hierarchy flattening and group-work reinforcement indicate that the driving force behind the productivity gains are those features that are common to the two forms of organizational changes: improvements in the flow of information and worker motivation. This in turn implies that other forms of organizational change that improve information flow and worker motivation might lead to similarly sized productivity effects—at least in the knowledge-intensive and social-skill-intensive business-related services sector.

A straightforward extension of the present analysis is the use of panel data to study the effects of workplace reorganization on labor productivity and on labor productivity growth. The latter aspect is analyzed by Bresnahan et al. (2002), using firm-level
data and showing that workplace reorganization fully reveals its effects on labor productivity with a time lag. Because panel data is currently not available, this issue has to be left for future research. Moreover, more flexible production functions may be used to assess the effects of organizational change on productivity.

An online appendix to this paper is available at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/eecompanion.html.

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