COLLECTIVE SECURITY OR HEGEMONIC SECURITY? A NEO-GRAMSCIAN (RE) EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN ROLE IN THE TWO GULF WARS

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INTRODUCTION

Following the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003, the question of who gets “what” “how” and “why” in the invasion had become a subject of crucial thought among Political Scientists and scholars of Middles East Studies. This paper takes a crucial step at the subject, by linking the collective security mechanism in the international system as an effective hegemony sustenance mechanism, which although hijacked by the United States, nonetheless, remains a *sui generis* intergovernmental platform for securing the sovereignty of member states of the United Nations.

We argued that the cases of the two gulf pointed clearly the future of global security mechanism that reflects the self interest of a single preponderant: so long that the American quasi-monopolistic influence on the security mechanism in the international system remains constant, the concept of collective security and the way in which it is evoked will reflect the value, preferences and standards set by the United States as a hegemon in our Uni-polar world. Although most scholars noted a decline in the United States status as a hegemon due to her lost of control over distinctive Gramscian elements of coercive structural power. We argued that on the contrary, the use of direct force in place of diplomacy as a key strategy in the United States policy do not only compliment these “leakages” in her coercive structural power as a hegemon, rather, it prompts a fiduciary support from allies through what we refer to as deferential coercion. This type of hegemonic element of coercion was evident in the support the United States got from Britain, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Poland and few other countries during the second gulf war, even when she failed to get a consensus in the security
council of the United nations and support from core E.U powers-
Germany and France to back her unilateral auspices for a collective
security evoked against Iraq.
HYPOTHETICAL OVERVIEW

No doubt, the issue of collective security at the international level has become synonymous with the maintenance of global peace and security aimed at securing the territorial integrity of the member states of the United Nations and the settlement of inter-state disputes. In this vein, the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1991 saw the deployment of troops from concerned countries into the Middle East, with the primary objective of securing Kuwait’s territorial integrity a move largely supported and sponsored by the United States, in what was referred to as the first Gulf War. Following the September 11 attacks on the United States, the American government declared a total war on global terrorism and wooed support from world leaders to the agenda, culminating to a second Gulf War – the invasion of Iraq, the overthrowing of the Saddam Hussein’s government, his ultimate execution, and the control of the Iraqi oil economy by the United States.

Studying the underpinning politics behind the two Gulf Wars, this paper views the American call for collective security as a function which serves her purpose in the Middle East. The concept of collective security is used to legalize policies and actions which are aimed at securing the United States hegemony in the region, and so long as the region serves the West economic needs, this hegemony remains important. This hegemony is vastly sustained through the creation of artificial “colliding” forces in the region, through propaganda, the sponsorship of warring parties and direct aggression which are evident in American role in the creation of an Israeli state in the Middle East, arming Iraq against Iran, the destabilization of the United Arab Republic, the Arab league etc.

Articulating from the above problems, our argument are based on two assumptions.

Lemma 1: The United States hijacked the global collective security
mechanism, which she institutionalize as a tool for securing her hegemony in the Middle East.

**Lemma 2:** While a hegemon looses her key gramscian elements of coercion, she could sustains her position relatively through direct aggression and “deference”.

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS**

To achieve the objectives of the paper we adopted the neo-gramscian theoretical framework of analysis which is the product of Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of the domestic politics of Italy in the 1930’s and adopted in international relation by Robert Cox, Rupert, Van der Pije, and Gill. In his work, Gramsci (1971), went beyond the “economic determinism” of orthodox Marxist analysis by attributing to the political “superstructure” a capacity to change the “economic base” through the “hegemony” of certain social forces and ideas by broadening the definition of state. He attributes to the concept of hegemony a practical role in the prevailing dominancy of ruling class over the ruled, through the ascendancy of a set of ideas and gaining the “consent” of the ruled. For him, hegemony would be possible after some sort of “alliance” among fragments within different social classes, which is similar in structure and application to the collective security mechanism. In this vein, Gramsci specifies a “successful alliance” achieving a high level of hegemony as a “historic bloc”. His concept of “historic bloc” grants a coherent bridge between ostensibly distinct social relatives of economics, politics and culture.

The neo-Gramscian hegemony requires a coherent fits between power (material capabilities), ideas, and institutions in the international realm (Cox 1981, 104), which interacts reciprocally, and requires an historic bloc of a hegemonic social class (Cox 1983, 132). The historic
bloc, in coxian terms, is built by a “transnational managerial class” which has “its own ideology, strategy and institutions of collective action” (Cox 1981, 111). The idea of a transnational class is developed by a number of scholars in the same tradition and seems valuable for the analysis used in this paper. In tandem with the internationalization of state and production in the 1990’s (Cox, 1981), internationalization of an “Atlantic ruling class” was taking form, (Van der Pijl, 1984). The formation of the transnational class, which replaced the previous Fordist-based American hegemony (Rupert, 1995), has expanded since the end of the cold war (Van der Pijl, 1998) and transnational enterprises, international policy and development strategies have all been shaped to reflect the interest of this class (Sklair, 1979). For Gill (1993), neo-liberal hegemony within the new structure of global governance reflects ideas of this class, but also necessitates a concrete historical study of emerging world order in terms of economic, political and socio-cultured dimensions. While Cox (1981, 113) perceived such hegemony from the contact of ‘the global structure of social power rendered by the internationalization of production”, Rupert (2000) considers it more as a “system of global governance” in the form of “hyper-liberalism” (Cox, 1989), this reflects liberal economic policies of Reagan and Thatcher (Overbeek, 1990), which expanded to include ex-communist economies as “global perestroika” (Cox, 1999). From a neo-Gramscian perspective this hegemony is ideologically based on a “consensus” of the idea of “There is no alternative” (TINA), and a “war of position” pursed by the above-mentioned capitalist class, and of likeminded “epistomic communities” (Haas 1992) such as think-tanks, “organic intellectuals” and it uses international institutions like the IMF, World Bank, OECD and inter-governmental peer-mechanism like collective security as the playground of hegemonic ideas and conflicting material capabilities.
This provides substantially a base to examine American role in the Middle East crises as a hegemon.

**CONCEPTUAL ISSUE: AN OVERVIEW**

This paper analyzes the role of the United States and the application of the concept of collective security in the first and second Gulf War. In achieving this we adopted the Neo-Gramscian theoretical framework of analysis. This approach serves as a useful guide to the changing dynamics of international relations with respect to the United States hegemonic role in international politics, the Gulf case inclusive (Cox, 2004, Stephen Gill, 1993). In this vein, Emre (2007) observed that “a hegemon exercises power internationally by linking leadership to methods of coercion that are both intellectual and moral in character. However, a hegemon can maintain power only so long as it can sustain these links”. The tools of securing these links can be through diplomacy or the use of apparent coercive mechanism existing in the international system itself. We argued that the tool through which the United States maintains her hegemony as evident in the Gulf crisis is that of collective security, which she hijacked to serve her aims rather than the guiding principles in which it was established.

The concept of collective security is predicated on the notion of a common interest of states in security issues that have far reaching global consequences. Such collective interest rest on the protection of territorial integrity of follow states and the settlement of inter-state disputes through an international governing body, in which all member states are directly represented (Laski, 1924; Ekpe, 2004). The concept of collective security is encapsulated in three guiding principles: Firstly, coercive occupation and disrespect of a state’s sovereignty and territory by other state(s) must be condemned, and in that situation, all states
with naïve are to assist the victimized state against the aggressing state(s) (after a resolution on such act, have been passed by the international body). Secondly, states should adopt diplomatic solution(s) as a means of settling inter-state dispute rather than armed conflicts (American Political Quarterly, Sept.1964; Ufomba, 2006). Lastly, in principle, states should accept the ruling of the international body on matters that have cross-border consequences. Elaborating on these principles, Appadorai (1974) noted that “if every state realizes the truth of these three principles and acts upon them, collective security is assured, the knowledge that an act of war against all is sufficient inhibition to any possible aggression in violation of international law. There will be the rule of law, not of might; there will be collective security which will include national security”. In sum, collective security is a sacred principle of international law which sees unprovoked aggression of one state against another as barbaric and hostility against the international community as whole. The essence of the existence of this principle is to prevent conflict and thus ensure world peace (Ekpe, 2004).

Although the above stated principles are theoretically the guiding rules enshrined in the United Nations, but the use of this mechanism as a means of achieving its own interest and to secure her hegemony by the United States vis-à-vis the Gulf crisis, makes the entire system a mere extension of the American offensive apparatus, making it fall well below the principle. As noted by Agi (2001) the control of the international security mechanism by the United States for her interest in the Gulf, was evident in the declaration of war against Iraq by the United States president instead of the Secretary General of the United Nations; the United States sent troops into the Gulf even before tabling the Kuwait case for deliberation by the Security Council. By this act, the United
States made clear her position in the crisis, thus, the Security Council’s Resolution 660, 661, 664 and 665 of 1991 acted the function of legalizing American moves and giving it a global backing. 

The case of the second Gulf Wars is not too different from the first. Although, the influence of the United States as a hegemonic force in international politics have greatly reduced in the period between 1991 and the second invasion of Iraq in 2003 chiefly due to the emergency of the Euro as an alternative to the Dollar as a major currency reserve and transaction currency, and the resurrections of the European, Japanese, Indian and Chinese economies as alternative centers of economic power (Emre, 2007) the United States adopted the policy of direct coercion to make up for these deficiencies.

**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY: BACKGROUND TO THE GULF CRISES.**

The casualties and devastation inflicted on Europe by World War I and World War II brought into sharper focus the need for collective security made up of state actors, as a major security mechanism in international relations. What specifically heightened the interest among states on this project was not only the fear of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but, the emergency of volatile leaders, whose nationalistic zeal may well lead to an inescapable global cataclysm as evident in Adolf Hitler’s Germany in the period between 1938 till 1943- a move which was in vein with Omaha’s predictions that “within another generation (prior to the second world war) there will be another world war, if nations do not concert the method by which to prevent it” (Omaha, 1919). In the period following World War II, the check-and-balance mechanism existed spontaneously on the impetus of the cold war between the co-existing but contradicting power blocs (United States-led NATO and
the Soviet Union-led Warsaw Pact) which neutralizes each other, despite their various arms races. Although there was mistrust between the two power blocs due to the aggressive stance of the United States- Soviet Union relationship, they collectively secured the globe through neutralizing each other excesses, and to a large extent kept a World War or peripheral conflict between the two blocs at the border of academic curiosity. But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the cold war, the United States hijacked the global collective security mechanism through her economic influence and military prowess as the world’s watch dog. Apart from face-off with other major key players in the United Nations on security matters that affects their interest, the United States faces one major challenge: a strong Arab league, which controls the major supply of crude oil to her and other industrialized countries and its threat to the existence of an Israeli state in the Middle East. With her face-off with Israel, an Arab league would severe ties with the United States, with its impact on her economic interest in the region. With this fact at hand, the United States shifted her international security focus from Europe to Asia with an eye on the Middle East, a move to secure her hegemony in the region, through the strengthening of Israel, creation of security tension in the Gulf (through identifying nationalistic Arab nations as a security threat to the world, and in possession of both weapons of mass destruction and a well organized and efficient terrorist machinery), and the deployment of her forces into the region under the auspices of the United Nation’s collective security.

The end of the cold war, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989, was followed by the establishment of a uni-polar power bloc in the international system, which is led by the United States with her allies in NATO. The center stage of the United States security policy shifted
from Europe to the Middle East, this shift is attributed to the following reasons:

1 Firstly, the Middle East is the nerve center of one of the world’s largest religion—Islam, and considering Israel’s territorial position and relation with the Islamic majority in the region. Except the United States secure her hegemony in the region and protect Israel, the country may be “wiped out” by Islamic fundamentalists as attempted in the Israeli-Arab war in 1967. Such threat, no doubt, still exists in the region.

2 Secondly, the Middle East provides a very important naval route which links the Indian Ocean to the North and South of America, and also the Mediterranean.

3 Thirdly, its proximity to Russia is of strategic importance to the U.S-NATO alliance, and lastly, the Middle East possesses the largest oil deposit in the world, which is of great economic importance to the industrialized world, especially the United States.

The above factors made the Middle East and activities within the region of paramount interest to the United States. The logic lays on the fact that the United States is acutely aware that any problem that adversely affects any part of the region is likely to affect her economic lifeline (Ekpe, 2004). It is against this background that the United States manipulated the United Nations during the Persian Gulf crisis into action in other to save her economic interest and hegemony.

Having played an important role in the protection of Israel and in the two gulf wars, the American policy in the region is strategically aimed at securing her interest. Although the new world order under the United States hegemony has witnessed unprecedented co-operation from the permanent members of the Security Council, the methods and politics
through which she interferes with the activities of the Middle East proves her efforts to use the concept of collective security to secure her hegemony in the region. As noted by Holsti (1995) S.P Agi (2001) and A. Ekpe (2004), the American race to secure her hegemony in the Middle East in the events that culminated to the first gulf war, was buttressed by the change in her policy of sensitivity to the plight of both parties during a dispute. By sending troops into the region even before the issue was presented formally to the Security Council (see, Blyden and van Kristen, 2006), the United States made it clear that her military activity in the region is to secure her own interest first, this makes it evident that the United Nations forces in Iraq, under the auspices of concerned world leaders to protect the territorial integrity of Kuwait did so for the seek of collective security, while at the same time, helping the United States militarily to secure her hegemony in the gulf.

ARMING IRAQ TO ENGAGE, DISARMING IRAQ TO SECURE: THE POLITICS OF THE FIRST GULF WAR.

The Israeli-Arab war proved a point; given their religious and cultural background, a strong alliance of Arab nations into a power bloc in the Middle East is not only possible, it also stands as a potential threat to the security of Israel and, the American hegemony in the region. To secure her hegemony in the region and Israel, the United States pursued a “loosing the knot” policy, which is aimed at ensuring the collapse or destabilization of a strong alliance of Arab nations under the Arab league, by severing diplomatic ties among the major actors of this alliance- Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Notably, through the sponsorship of distrust and security tension among them, and increasing aid to Israel which is strategically aimed at empowering her economically and giving her
access to strategic military data and hardware, which is followed by diplomatic backup. As noted by Rouke (1997) American diplomatic backup to Israel was evident in her refusal to sponsor a motion to force Israel to comply with numerous United Nations resolutions asking her to withdraw from the Arab territories she occupied during the Israeli-Arab war.

American thrust to weaken regional integration in the Gulf following Iran’s claim on Bahrain (1970-1971), and the Saudi Arabia’s claim on Burami Oasis in 1974, and dispute with Kuwait over an oil rich “National Zone” to the West, took a major step in the role she played in the ten years Iraqi-Iran boundary conflict (Etim, 1997), during which she aided the establishment of an Iraqi war machine- a move that cost her well over $50 million, both in aid and supply of military hardware (Stiglitz and Harbison, 2003). This served the United States two purposes: it weakened Iran militarily thus limiting her potential as a possible threat to Israel, and, arming and positioning Iraq as an aggressor who with time will be disarmed through a US-led coalition force on the auspices of the United Nations, thus, destabilizing any possible Arab common front and securing her hegemony in the Gulf.

The climax of the American diplomatic stratagem in the gulf was the motivation of an Iraqi offensive against Kuwait in 1991, with Saddam Hussein assured of American support as a compensation for her sacrifices in the war against Iran (S.P Agi, 2001). The underlying motive behind this promise is to justify the destruction of the Iraqi war machine through collective security on the disguise of securing Kuwait’s territorial integrity. This point was observed by Holsti (1995) he argued that “the real plot of the story (the first gulf war) was not Saddam Hussein’s action (his occupation of Kuwait) but the desire by the United States to secure hegemony in the Middle East and to protect her client Israel against the
demands of the Palestinian people”. As noted by Ekpe (2004) the way and manner the United States conducted her diplomacy during the Gulf crisis left much to be desired. Unlike America’s usual sensitivity to the position of the adversary, during the Gulf polemics, America displayed military virtuosity and did not exhaust all possibilities for the peaceful resolution of the conflict (Holsti, 1995; Ekpe, 2004). The explanation for such an aggressive diplomatic posturing is rooted in American economic interest in the Gulf region. In tracing the origin of American policy in the Gulf crisis, Rouke (1997) pointed out that an American aggressive policy in the Middle East was not peculiar to the Bush’s administration that went to war, rather, the position of American diplomacy in the Gulf dates as far back as the 1950’s, when President Harry S. Truman pledged to protect the West’s primary petroleum source in the region. This position was reaffirmed by even the reconciliatory Jimmy Carter who in his State of the Union message in 1980 stated clearly that ‘to gain control of the Persian Gulf (by a contradicting power, as against American hegemonic interest in the region) will be regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States of America’. It will interest us to note categorically, that, the diplomatic mechanization that characterized American politics during the Gulf crisis is not a product of a protective stance on the security of Kuwait; rather, it is a reflection of more than forty years of adopted policy focus. It is imperative to note that if the Kuwait- Iraq case occurred twenty years earlier, the United State’s stand would possibly been the same, since it have always been in the interest of the United States to secure her value, preferences and interest in the Gulf.

THE UNITED STATES AND GULF WAR TWO

With the September 11 attacks on the United States, the tension needed to secure support for an offensive against Iraq was established.
Although the invasion of Afghanistan was attributed to the sponsorship of the Osama Bin Laden–led Al Qaeda alleged to have masterminded the attacks; by the Taliban government– the invasion of Iraq was simply unjustifiable. The American excuse for invading Iraq fell between the borders of “suspected” possession of weapons of mass destruction, the Kurdish massacre and the need for regime change. To examine the American-Iraqi case critically, we present the following question(s): The much publicized reason for the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 was the allegation that the latter under its president, Saddam Hussein, is developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). If the possession of WMD’s by Iraq is a potential global threat, is it more a threat than Musharaff’s Pakistan, or India, Russia and North Korea? If no, then why did the United States unilaterally declare collective security against Iraq- a function reserved by the United Nations, despite the declaration of its opposition to the move by core EU powers-Germany and France, together with Russia and China? Is it the function of the United State’s president to call for collective security or the Secretary General of the United Nations? The unjustified aggression against Iraq, points clearly that Iraq was not invaded in 2003 for her ‘sins’ against the United Nations, rather she punished because of her geo-physical possessions- crude oil and presence in the Gulf, which is very important to the United States as far as the region and Israel’s security is concerned.

The United States unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a product of the foreign policy principles outlined in the Bush Doctrine, which was formerly outlined in 2002 in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

This made provision for the maintenance of American supremacy in international affairs through a post-soviet form of imperialism (Emre,
2007) and the Iraqi case may well be referred to as a mere test of this policy and its workability in our globalizing world. In this same line of argument, Robert Jevis (2005) observed that ‘the invasion of Iraq, although important in itself, is even more noteworthy as a manifestation of the Bush Doctrine. In a sharp break from the President’s pre-September 11 view that saw America’s leadership, and especially its use of force, restricted to defending narrow and traditional vital interests, he enunciated a far-reaching program that calls for something very much like an empire’, such an empire may well stretch from Hawaii to Baghdad and be maintained administratively through regime changes and setting of ‘democratic’ institutions in the affected state which can be easily controlled and run from the White House.

The American use of naked power against Iraq showed conclusively that while her influence as a hegemon declined due to her increasing inability to create and maintain a consensus on various international issues, due to leakages in her character and possession of soft power with which to sustain her hegemony. The United States have shown the ability of a hegemon to sustain its position despite leakages in key elements of structural coercion: she can still muster support for her own interest through a means which is substantially different in its methodological application in international politics and at the same time as traditional as gramscian elements of coercion; deferential power. In the second Gulf War, despite the fact that the United States did not get the consensus she wanted from the United Nation’s Security Council, she launched her planned offensive against Iraq with the awareness that the deference accorded to her by past allies will prompt their support. This support came from Britain, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Japan, Turkey and some few other countries. An allegiance which paid off in the post-war reconstruction bids for oil blocs and economic participation in the new
Iraq.

Economic hegemony in the Gulf as the key motivator in the American participation in the region’s security from the Kuwait’s case in 1991 to the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein in 2003 after her invasion of Iraq was shown in her unilateral control of the Iraqi economy, in what we refer to as the war spoils. Two months after the conclusion of the initial military assault, the United States transformed the United Nation’s Oil-for-Food program from one that operated through an Iraqi Euro Accounts into one that operated through a Dollar Accounts. This effectively ended Iraq’s brief experience in trading oil in Euros and, coupled with the United States insistence that only members of the ‘coalition’ would be eligible for reconstruction contracts, it also meant that effective control over Iraq’s economy is once again in the hands of the United States. This position is reaffirmed by the placing of Anglo-American oil companies at the top of the list of companies eligible for high-return oil extraction contracts, even while the United States is lobbying for more military support from her allies and those opposing the invasion (Emre, 2007; De Livingston, 2006).

The direct consequences of the American invasion of Iraq are in the future. These problems may spore up either from the constitutional lacuna that exist in the American forced democratic setting in Iraq which contradicts the prevailing political values and norms existing in the Iraq political terrain, or the very existence of American presence in the country: which may be a stepping stone for the invasion of Iran- the way and manner with which the United States conducted her diplomacy to justify her invasion of Iraq is similar to the face down between her and Iran with the United Nations acting as the older man’s shield bearer. With the hope of a verisimilitude in a post-war reconstruction policy of an anticipated US victory over Iran with that obtainable in present day Iraq,
most core powers that condemned the war against Iraq may choose to support the United States if she ventures to invade Iran to become eligible in the profitable post-war oil extraction rights. This no doubt blanks the future of collective security in principles since it adumbrates American economic interest, which if not checked may develop into global catastrophe, starting from the Middle East. If Iran is invaded then we are rest assured that Syria, Yemen and Oman may follow suit. If such assumption is limited within the boundary of academic curiosity, then one thing that we have proved so far is that the concept of collective security, with the Middle East as a case study, have failed its test and fallen well below its principles- its methods of application only serve the purpose of the United States hegemony not only in the Gulf, but reflect its position in our post-soviet Uni-Polar international system.

CONCLUSION

Using the two Gulf Wars as a case study, this paper examined the concept of collective security, the policies of the United States in the Middle East and the role she played in the underlying show-downs that led to such high level of disintegration in the Gulf: this theoretically showed that in the efforts of a hegemon to protect its influence in international politics, it can use direct coercion which involves the direct use of force and the destabilization of perceived opposing alliance. As made known in this paper, from the vantage point of hindsight, if the principle of collective security is juxtaposed vis-à-vis the Gulf crisis, it no doubt fell below the principles guiding its establishment, it is conceptualized in the context of an apparatus used to secure American hegemony in a Uni-polar international system.

Our argument is in two dimensions: firstly, we argued that the United States hijacked the global collective security mechanism, which she uses to pursue her interest as a hegemon in the Middle East, as
evident in the cases of the two Gulf Wars. Secondly, the case of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed clearly that while a hegemon looses her key elements of coercion, she can sustain her position through ‘deference’.

This paper applied the neo-gramscian theoretical framework in its analysis of the concept of collective security and the American policy in the Middle East, using the first and second Gulf Wars as case studies. In our analysis, we clarified the concept of collective security and the background to the first Gulf War. We argued that collective security was evoked against Iraq with the auspices of the United Nations, a move which secured American hegemony in the region, by first arguing that the crisis in the Middle East are not without the sponsorship of the United States- to justifies her war efforts and weaken a joint opposition against her from Arab nations.

Since American influence in the international community declined before the second Gulf War, she found it difficult to get consensus in the Security Council of the United Nations, such loss of influence is no doubt related to the rise of the Euro as an alternative foreign reserve currency, the consolidation of the Chinese and Indian economies as alternative economic poles and her lose of direct control over NATO allies, a luxury she enjoyed till the end of the cold war. While this conclusion is held as valid, we insist that, as evident in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the lost of such gramscian elements of coercive structural power did not displace the United State’s from her position as a hegemon, rather, we identified deferential force as a conceptual factor that augments such lost: by deferential force we refers to the ability of a hegemon that have lost its major gramscian elements of coercion, to sustain her influence through the respect accorded to her by allies due to her former exploits. This factor played a substantial role in giving the United States the support she wanted in her war against Iraq from Britain, Turkey, Spain, Japan, Portugal, Poland and few other countries.

Conclusively, we pointed out that the American economic interest,
which is the driving force of her invasion of Iraq was reflected in her post-war reconstruction policy. This saw the procurement of high-return oil extraction contracts by Anglo-American firms, with restrictions placed to favor only members of the invading coalition, and the transformation of the United Nations oil-for-food program from one operated through Iraqi Euro accounts into one that operated through Dollar accounts. With an eye on these huge spoils the United States enjoys from her invasion of Iraq, and with a similar heat gathering against Iran, the chances are greater that she may get more support from core powers if she ventures to invade Iran- so what the United States lose in gramscian elements, she gains through deference. With this in mind, we maintain that except the global collective security mechanism on the auspices of the United Nations is divorced of the values, preferences, norms and reflections of the interest of the United States, its function as an effective peace keeping apparatus will remain below its principles, biased and an apparatus for imperialism in our ever expanding Uni-Polar international system established after the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the cold war.
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