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Article
Popular and Aversive Constitutionalism in Uganda: Limiting American-Style Judicial Review by Design
Regent Journal of International Law (2013)
  • David B Dennison, Uganda Christian University
Abstract

Despite its innocuous and relatively subservient heritage, the Ugandan judiciary is firmly and meticulously circumscribed in Uganda’s 1995 Constitution. This constitution limits the potential of the judiciary to effect policy changes through judicial review. The minimal political impact of judicial review in Uganda is no accident. The Ugandan constitutional framework limits the role of the judicial review by design.

This paper posits that the United States Supreme Court has had an "aversive" effect on the Ugandan Constitution. The paper presents Uganda’s efforts to preempt and curtail the scope of judicial review. The paper also assesses the effectiveness of Uganda’s efforts to preempt and curtail the scope of judicial review both generally and specifically with respect to issues targeted for preemption from judicial review.

Keywords
  • Constitutional,
  • Comparative Constitutionalism,
  • Preemptive Constitutionalism,
  • Aversive Constitutionalism,
  • Judicial Review,
  • Uganda,
  • Constitutional Borrowing,
  • Popular Constitutionalism
Publication Date
2013
Citation Information
David B Dennison. "Popular and Aversive Constitutionalism in Uganda: Limiting American-Style Judicial Review by Design" Regent Journal of International Law Vol. 10 Iss. 1 (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/uculaw/9/