Article
Dissolving Death’s Time-of-Harm Problem
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
(2022)
Abstract
Most philosophers in the death literature believe that death can be bad for the person who dies. The most popular view of death’s badness—namely, deprivationism—holds that death is bad for the person who dies because, and to the extent that, it deprives them of the net good that they would have accrued, had their actual death not occurred. Deprivationists thus face the challenge of locating the time that death is bad for a person. This is known as the Timing Problem, which is thought to be one of the biggest challenges facing views holding that death can be bad for the person who dies. Every possible answer to this question has been defended in the literature, yet each answer can seemingly be shown to be subject to compelling objections. In this paper, I argue that the force of the Timing Problem is illusory. Specifically, I argue that the problem, as formulated in the literature, is underspecified. Any adequately precise form of the question ‘When is death bad for the person who dies?’ is one to which there is a clear, decisive, and unproblematic answer.
Keywords
- death,
- Epicureanism,
- deprivationism,
- harm,
- Timing Question,
- Timing Problem,
- No Subject Problem
Disciplines
Publication Date
2022
DOI
10.1080/00048402.2021.1891108
Citation Information
Travis Timmerman. "Dissolving Death’s Time-of-Harm Problem" Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 100 Iss. 2 (2022) p. 1 - 14 ISSN: 0004-8402 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/travis-timmerman/29/