Article
Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
(2019)
Abstract
In a series of recent papers, Ben Bramble defends a version of hedonism which holds that purely repetitious pleasures add no value to one’s life (i.e. Non-Repeatable Hedonism). In this paper, we pose a dilemma for Non-Repeatable Hedonism. We argue that it is either committed both to a deeply implausible asymmetry between how pleasures and pains affect a person’s well-being and to deeply implausible claims about how to maximize well-being, or is committed to the claim that a life of eternal pleasure for a person can be just as good for them as a life of eternal suffering. The only way out of this dilemma is for Bramble to reject the Non-Repetition Requirement. Yet, rejecting this requirement both forces Bramble to reject the wholly unique, core component, of his view and undermines his view’s ability to handle one of the most powerful objections to hedonism, viz., that a life with a larger quantity of so-called “base” (or lower) pleasures is better for a person than a life with a slightly smaller quantity of so-called higher pleasures. We conclude that Non-Repeatable Hedonism must be rejected in favor of standard forms of hedonism or some non-hedonic view of well-being.
Keywords
- hedonism,
- non-repeatable hedonism,
- well-being,
- eternal recurrence,
- pleasure,
- pain,
- J. S. Mill,
- Fred Feldman,
- Ben Bramble,
- experience requirement
Disciplines
Publication Date
2019
DOI
10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.025
Citation Information
Travis Timmerman and Felipe Pereira. "Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False" Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Vol. 6 Iss. 25 (2019) ISSN: 2330-4014 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/travis-timmerman/22/