On the Game of GoogolInternational Journal of Game Theory
AbstractIn the classical secretary problem the decision maker can only observe the relative ranks of the items presented. Recently, Ferguson — building on ideas of Stewart — showed that, in a game theoretic sense, there is no advantage if the actual values of the random variables underlying the relative ranks can be observed (game of googol). We extend this to the case where the number of items is unknown with a known upper bound. Corollary 3 extends one of the main results in [HK] to all randomized stopping times. We also include a modified, somewhat more formal argument for Ferguson's result.
Citation InformationTheodore P. Hill and Ulrich Krengel. "On the Game of Googol" International Journal of Game Theory Vol. 21 Iss. 2 (1992) p. 151 - 160
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/tphill/29/