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Article
Take the Money and Run: Political Turnover, Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
  • Tony Caporale, University of Dayton
  • Jonathan Leirer, Center for College Affordability and Productivity
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-1-2010
Abstract
We find a negative and significant relationship between gubernatorial turnover and U.S. state economic growth. Although our finding of an inverse relationship between growth and political instability may seem to contradict Olson's (1982a) famous hypothesis regarding the growth retarding nature of political stability, such constitutional political changes were not primarily what Olson had in mind. We argue that enhanced political turnover is associated with more rent-seeking since payoffs to focusing on special interest (redistributive) policies vs. general (growth enhancing) ones are greater for less durable regimes. Therefore, we interpret our evidence as supportive of Olson's broader argument concerning the negative affect of rent-seeking behavior on growth.
Inclusive pages
406–412
ISBN/ISSN
0167-2681
Comments

Permission documentation is on file.

Publisher
Elsevier
Peer Reviewed
Yes
Citation Information
Tony Caporale and Jonathan Leirer. "Take the Money and Run: Political Turnover, Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol. 76 Iss. 2 (2010)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/tony_caporale/47/