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Article
Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists
Journal of Moral Philosophy
  • Toby Svoboda, Fairfield University
Document Type
Article
Article Version
Post-print
Publication Date
10-1-2015
Abstract
Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality (Richard Garner), adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality (Richard Joyce), and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged (Jonas Olson). I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge.
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Copyright 2015 Brill. A post print has been archived here with permission from the copyright holder.

Published Citation
Svoboda, Toby. "Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists" , Journal of Moral Philosophy, Oct. 2015. 10.1163/17455243-46810047
DOI
10.1163/17455243-46810047
None
Peer Reviewed
Citation Information
Toby Svoboda. "Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists" Journal of Moral Philosophy (2015)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/toby-svoboda/5/