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Article
Incentives, Information, and Winner's Curse in Construction Industry Bidding
Management of Engineering and Technology. Technology and Innovation Management. PICMET '97. Portland International Conference on
  • Gerald H. Williams, Portland State University
  • Timothy R. Anderson, Portland State University
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-1997
Subjects
  • Monte Carlo method,
  • Construction industry -- Management,
  • Engineering -- Management
Disciplines
Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between incentives, information and winner's curse in the bidding for construction industry contracts. The approach uses both simple Monte Carlo simulations and bidding experiments to show the effects of changing levels of information (in terms of variance) and incentive (in terms of risk share) on the winner's curse.

Description

This is the publisher's final pdf. Copyright © 1997 by PICMET. Paper delivered at Portland International Conference on Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), 1997.

Persistent Identifier
http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/9273
Citation Information
Williams, G.H., Jr.; Anderson, T.R., "Incentives, information, and winner's curse in construction industry bidding," Innovation in Technology Management - The Key to Global Leadership. PICMET '97: Portland International Conference on Management and Technology, pp. 27-31.