Stock Broker Standards of Conduct – Principles, Rules and Fiduciary Duties

Thomas Lee Hazen, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
In recent years there has been concern as to the adequacy of broker-dealer regulation. SEC and self regulatory organization rulemaking addresses specific types of broker-dealer conduct but by and large the regulation has been based on principles and standards rather than voluminous detailed rules specifying prohibited conduct. In particular, a good deal of broker-dealer conduct is addressed under the umbrella of regulating according to fair and just principles of trade. Also, much of the SEC’s rulemaking authority is based on the ability to prohibit fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive devices. It also has been suggested that broker-dealers should be subject to fiduciary duties but to a large extent, they already are. This article examines the extent to which principles-based regulation or the setting of general standards should be further supplemented by rulemaking addressing specific types of conduct.

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I. Introduction – The Problem at Hand

* Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. BA 1969, JD 1972 Columbia University.
Broker-dealer regulation under the federal securities laws is administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as the self regulatory organizations including the securities exchanges. The SEC and the applicable self regulatory organizations have developed their regulation in a piecemeal fashion. In recent years there has been concern as to the adequacy of current regulation. There is considerable rulemaking addressing specific types of broker-dealer conduct but by and large the regulation has been based on principles and standards rather than voluminous detailed rules addressing specific conduct under regulation. In particular, a good deal of broker-dealer conduct is addressed under the umbrella of regulating according to fair and just principles of trade.\(^1\) Also, much of the SEC’s rulemaking authority is based on the ability to prohibit fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive devices.\(^2\) One issue that has developed over the last decade is the extent to which principles-based regulation or the setting of general standards should be further supplemented by rulemaking addressing specific types of conduct. Another issue that has been in the forefront since recent financial events has been the extent to which broker-dealers are or should be subject to fiduciary duties. This article analyzes those issues first as a general proposition and then by examining the current state of broker-dealer regulation.

Following the financial crisis and frauds such as the ones perpetrated by Bernard Madoff, there was considerable talk of creating stock broker fiduciary duties. Although this inspired fear within the industry,\(^3\) it is far from clear that such a mandate would significantly change the current law. These calls for heightened duties also arose in the context of the Goldman Sachs investigation. Goldman Sachs was investigated by the SEC and by Congress for its role in the over-the-counter derivatives markets. Specifically there was concern over Goldman’s role as fabricator of the derivative instruments and the ways in which it marketed them to its customers.\(^4\) Goldman maintained that it was merely acting as a market maker and as such had no disclosure duties to its customers regarding Goldman’s allegedly betting against the investments that it was marketing. This led many to suggest that it needed to be clarified that brokers are in fact fiduciaries. The SEC brought charges against Goldman\(^5\) claiming that Goldman breached its obligations as a broker of these privately placed derivatives. Congressional or SEC recognition

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\(^1\) See, e.g., FINRA Conduct Rule 2010 (available on Westlaw) (“A member, in the conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.”).

\(^2\) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in section 10(b) empowers the SEC to promulgate rules to outlaw manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (20---). Section 15(c) of the Act gives the SEC similar rulemaking authority with respect to broker-dealer activities. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (20---).

\(^3\) See, e.g., Joe Rauch, Retail Brokers Fear New Law Could Bring Sea Change, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59T4C120091030 (Oct 30, 2009) (also noting that the proposed fiduciary duty language was suggested by SEC Chair Mary Schapiro).


of broker-dealer fiduciary duties addressed Goldman’s market maker defense and also would clearly address the obligations of those brokers who brought their clients to Bernard Madoff. Nevertheless, it is far from clear that these obligations do not exist under current law. The Goldman Sachs settlement\(^6\) means, among other things, that the extent of Goldman’s obligations to its clients was not clarified by the courts. As discussed below, there is plenty of authority under the existing law that recognizes heightened obligations of securities broker-dealer, at least when they are acting in a capacity beyond a mere order taker.

Many observers identified a perceived need for more explicit recognition of broker-dealer fiduciary duties. It would have been more accurate to describe this as enhancing fiduciary duties since as pointed out in Part IV of this article, it has long been the case that stock brokers owe fiduciary duties when acting in certain capacities. As the financial reform legislation developed, controversy arose as to whether to statutorily impose new fiduciary duties. Investor-protection advocates supported such a move. Not surprisingly, the industry and others opposed the suggestion. To the extent that these duties already exist, the suggestion may have been less meaningful than thought by its advocates.\(^7\) In any event, the final legislation eschewed a statutorily mandated fiduciary duty.\(^8\) Instead, Congress directed the SEC to conduct a study to identify any gaps, shortcomings, or overlapping regulation regarding standards of conduct and supervision requirements applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers.\(^9\) The upshot of the new legislation is that broker-dealer standards of conduct will continue to develop piecemeal through rulemaking and case law developments.

The article concludes that although some additional rulemaking may be warranted, as a conceptual matter, the current approach to broker-dealer obligations is appropriate and provides an adequate basis for vigorous enforcement of broker-dealer obligations notwithstanding some apparent enforcement lapses in a few celebrated cases.\(^10\) The law, regulations, and regulatory

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\(^7\) Even as a tactical matter, this proposal was fraught with danger. Congressional rejection of a fiduciary duty requirement could have a narrowing impact on current case law and rulemaking.

\(^8\) Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).


interpretations to date make clear that broker-dealers have fiduciary or fiduciary-like obligations when they provide services beyond executing customer orders. A legislative or regulatory declaration that brokers can be scrutinized under a fiduciary analysis is not necessary but could provide a cautionary reminder to this effect.

II. The New Congressional Mandate

In the wake of the recent credit and financial crisis, questions were raised as to whether Congress should strengthen broker-dealer regulation. While clearly indicating that regulation should be strengthened, there is no statutory mandate of heightened obligations. Instead, Congress left it to the SEC to decide the appropriate level of regulation. Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires the SEC to complete a study and report within six months of the bill’s passage assessing “the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care” for broker-dealers. The Act directs the SEC to look at issues such as whether there exist any “gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps” in law or regulations in this area. As required by the Act, the SEC solicited public comment following the study and report, the SEC may proceed with rulemaking proceedings to deal with the issue of standard of care owed by brokers and dealers to retail customers. An explicit declaration of a fiduciary duty, without more, would add little other than confusion to the existing law.

Section 913(g) of the Dodd-Frank Act expressly provides the SEC with rulemaking authority to impose a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers. For instance, the Commission may choose to issue a rule which places the same fiduciary duty on broker-dealers dealing with giving investment advice to retail customers as that currently placed on investment advisers under the

\[\text{See infra } ----.\]

\[\text{Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act } \S\ 913(b)(1), \text{ Pub. Law 111-203, H.R. 4173 (111th Cong. 2d sess. 2010)}.\]

\[\text{Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act } \S\ 913(c), \text{ Pub. Law 111-203, H.R. 4173 (111th Cong. 2d sess. 2010)}.\]


\[\text{Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act } \S\ 913(f), \text{ Pub. Law 111-203, H.R. 4173 (111th Cong. 2d sess. 2010)}.\]

\[\text{See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 439 (2010) (“an openended broker fiduciary obligation is so loaded with unanswered questions that baseline predictability would come slowly, if at all.”)}.\]

\[\text{Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act } \S\ 913(g), \text{ Pub. Law 111-203, H.R. 4173 (111th Cong. 2d sess. 2010)}.\]
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.\textsuperscript{18} It is not clear that this would impose significantly greater duties on stock brokers.\textsuperscript{19} Fiduciary duties existed under the Investment Advisers Act without having been expressly incorporated into the statute. In 1963, the Supreme Court held that, under the Investment Advisers Act, investment advisers are \textit{fiduciaries} to their clients, and as such, must comply with the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty even though the word fiduciary did not appear in the Investment Advisers Act.\textsuperscript{20} As applied, this fiduciary duty meant that investment advisers must fully to disclose material facts about prospective investments, learn about the client’s needs and goals, describe all fees that could be associated with an investment, and fully to disclose all conflicts of interest when giving advice. As discussed in Part IV below, these duties have traditionally been applied to broker-dealers as well.

The Dodd-Frank Act does not impose fiduciary duties on broker-dealers but rather leaves that decision to the SEC rather than explicitly by the new legislation. The Act thus did not mandate that broker-dealers have a continuing duty of care or loyalty to the retail customers receiving such investment advice.\textsuperscript{21} In addition to the possibility of imposing fiduciary duties, the SEC may also choose to promulgate rules that would require broker-dealers to make certain disclosures to retail customers, such as if the broker-dealer only sells a limited range of products.\textsuperscript{22} The Act also provides that the SEC may choose to create a rule requiring broker-dealers offering personalized investment advice to retail customers to act in the best interest of the customer, as well requiring broker-dealers to disclose certain conflicts of interest.\textsuperscript{23}

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\textbf{The authority cited for the proposition that Congress recognized a “delicate fiduciary nature” was a securities law treatise 2 Louis Loss, Securities Regulation 1412. (2d ed. 1961). See 375 U.S. at 191 n.38. There was no reference either to the statute or to legislative history. Nonetheless, there and then, the principles of fiduciary law by judicial fiat were imported into the Advisers Act.}
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\textbf{21 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g)(1), Pub. Law 111-203, H.R. 4173 (111$^{\text{th}}$ Cong. 2d sess. 2010).}
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\textbf{22 \textit{Id}.}
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The statutory mandate leaves the SEC with many choices in terms of the appropriate regulatory response. For example, the SEC could retain the status, which is unlikely in light of the pressure that led to the massive reform legislation. The SEC can expressly adopt a fiduciary duty standard. As discussed below, there is plenty of support in existing interpretations recognizing fiduciary obligations. The new Act gives the SEC the opportunity to clarify this and codify the existing duties that are recognized by the SEC and the self regulatory organizations. The SEC could elect to adopt rules with guiding principles or it could opt in favor of more detailed rulemaking. This article examines the alternative avenues the SEC could take and evaluated the current state of broker dealer regulation. This analysis leads to the conclusion that while some fine-tuning may be in order, the SEC and self regulatory organization rules strike a good balance between principled based regulation and rule based regulation. It is to be hoped that the Act will not be taken as a message to move away from a principles-based approach.

III. Rules, Principles, and Standards

It is a relatively uncontroversial statement that the securities laws enhance disclosure and prohibit fraud. Broker-dealer regulation occupies a special place in the securities laws insofar as the regulations go beyond merely outlawing fraud. In considering the appropriate scope of broker-dealer regulation and the nature of the stock broker/customer relationship, it is worth considering some aspects of lawmaking generally and, in particular, distinctions that can be made between rules, standards, and principles. As explained below, rules tend to give more concrete guidance as to prohibited conduct. In contrast, laws based on principles and standards give flexibility to adapt the law to situations not covered by explicit rules.

Even a fraud-based regime raises the rules versus standards dichotomy. Since the nineteenth century, both courts and commentators have suggested that defining fraud

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24 See infra ----.

25 See, e.g., McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439, 452 (1872):

The common law not only gives no definition of fraud, but perhaps wisely asserts as a principle that there shall be no definition of it, for, as it is the very nature and essence of fraud to elude all laws in fact, without appearing to break them in form, a technical definition of fraud, making everything come within the scope of its words before the law could deal with it as such, would be in effect telling to the crafty precisely how to avoid the grasp of the law.

See also, e.g., Syracuse Knitting Co. v. Blanchard, 43 A. 637, 639 (N.H. 1899):

It is difficult to define fraud, except in a very general way. It is variable, depending upon the circumstances of the case. Those who make use of it adopt ways that have the appearance of good faith. Great skill is often shown in the attempt to make that which is false and corrupt appear true and honest. Hard and fast rules of law would be a hindrance to the discovery of fraud.

Accord Arkansas Valley Compress and the Warehouse Company v. Morgan, 229 S.W.2d 133 (Ark. 1950) (“trial courts have always been reluctant to define ‘fraud’ (either actual or constructive) lest man's fertile mind invent a new scheme outside the definition but just as nefarious as previously denounced schemes.”).
provides unscrupulous actors with an invitation to find a way around the law. The law thus recognized that it is sufficient to identify a principle rather than needing to focus on specific detailed definitions of the types of conduct to be prohibited.\textsuperscript{27}

It has long been a jurisprudential debate as to the relative effectiveness of specific rule-based law making versus law making through a system of principles and standards. Thus, for example, the common law, although perhaps inefficient in its evaluation, presents an environment for flexible rules that can adapt to change.\textsuperscript{28}

Likewise, administrative law has for a long time recognized a similar dichotomy with respect to alternative approaches to administrative rulemaking.\textsuperscript{29} Standards (or principles) based rulemaking focus on “the goal toward which conduct should be oriented.”\textsuperscript{30} Specific rules respond more directly to the concern that people deserve to have some reasonable idea of what conduct is prohibited.\textsuperscript{31} There are a number of advantages traditionally associated with a rules based system. It can be assumed that rules may assure even handed enforcement—there is no room, under a specific rule—to apply the rule differently to different parties because prohibited or prescribed conduct is clearly denoted under a rule.\textsuperscript{32} Clear rules are efficient because they

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\item \textsuperscript{26}JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE at 190 (10th ed. 1870) (“lay down as a general proposition, what shall constitute fraud, or any general rule, beyond which they will not go upon the ground of fraud, lest other means of avoiding the equity of the courts should be found out.”), as quoted in Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 410 (1994); see also, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 33 (1986) (“Some lawyers talk as though they thought maximum clarity always desirable even though they wouldn't have to probe very deeply to find that fraud, and fiduciary obligation, and undue influence, have been carefully isolated from exact definition, because such exact definition would simply point out safe ways of immunity, and, to the birds of prey, make the law ‘their perch and not their terror.’”), as quoted in Dan M. Kahan, supra at 410 n. 316.

\item \textsuperscript{27}U.S. v. Bishop, 825 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1987) (“The law does not define fraud; it needs no definition. It is as old as falsehood and as versatile as human ingenuity.”); Weiss v. U.S., 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.1941) (“[t]he law does not define fraud; it needs no definition. It is as old as falsehood and as versatile as human ingenuity.”); Greco v. State, 499 A.2d 209 (Md. App. 1985), aff'd 515 A.2d 220 (Md. 1986) (courts “have been reluctant to define fraud with any degree of preciseness”).

\item \textsuperscript{28}See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1909) (classic text on the development of the common law).

\item \textsuperscript{29}See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989).

\item \textsuperscript{30}Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37 n.1 (2nd ed. 2001). Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principle-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007) (suggesting that is oversimplifies complexity to try to draw a distinct dichotomy between rules and principles).

\item \textsuperscript{31}Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 65 (2nd ed. 2001); see also, e.g., Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 792-93 (1975) (due process and vagueness issues).

\item \textsuperscript{32}Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 66 (2nd ed. 2001). Regulatory agencies may prefer rules to standards because agency officials do not have to apply the specific facts of a situation
eliminate the need for interpretive or adjuratory supplementation. They also make it easier for congress to evaluate the agency. On the other hand, specific and detailed rules can hinder an agency in applying its goals because of their inherent inflexibility. It is problematic to apply strict rules to a situation that does not neatly fit into the rules. Standards, on the other hand, permit agencies to apply principles to the unique facts of each case in furtherance of the overall goal of the agency. Of course, it is necessary to state the standards in such a way as to make it clear what the guiding principles are.

Thus, there is no one size fits all answer to the appropriate balance between specific rules and more generalized standards and principles. There is no easy solution since some areas of regulation are more suited to specific rules while others lend themselves to a more principles-based approach. An optimal balance of rules and standards will “channel the discretion of public officials” without stripping regulators of their ability to use judgment where appropriate. The Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery aptly pointed to the advantages of standards and agency flexibility in achieving goals. An agency cannot foresee every situation that may occur, and thus cannot account for every situation with a rule for that situation.

33 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 497-498 (5th ed. 2010) (“Rulemaking eliminates the need to engage in expensive and time-consuming adjudicatory hearings to address issues of legislative fact; rulemaking eliminates the need to relitigate recurring issues; and rules created through rulemaking are easier and less expensive to enforce and to implement that are ‘rules’ announced in the course of adjudicating specific disputes.”).

34 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 497 (5th ed. 2010) (observing that because an agency must issue a public notice of a proposed rule before enacting the rule, the public has a chance to alert Congress and the President of the proposed rule).

35 Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 67 (2nd ed. 2001); see also, e.g., Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 1 (2008) (suggesting that principles-based securities regulation as a New Governance regime--one that uses innovative, pragmatic, information-based, iterative, and dialogic mechanisms to gather, distill, and leverage industry learning in the service of a still-robust but better designed, that is, more effective and less burdensome, public regulatory mandate).


37 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, --- (1947) (“problems may arise which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee . . . [or] the problems might be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule.”); see also, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 104 (2nd ed. 2001), (“For instance, the Securities Exchange Commission developed its standard restricting the use of inside information by stockbrokers by adjudication rather than by rulemaking. As described by Professor William Cary, a past Chairman of the Commission, that body chose adjudication because it not [sic] wish to deal with inputs and objections from the stock exchanges and brokerage firms as would have been the case with rulemaking.”), citing WILLIAM CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 82-85 (1967).
Professor Diver makes the point that there are three dimensions to regulation by administrative agencies. First, there is transparency: a rule is transparent if it uses well-defined words, unambiguous to the audience.\textsuperscript{38} Second is accessibility: “[t]he rulemaker will want his rule to be ‘accessible’ to its intended audience – that is, applicable to concrete situations without excessive difficulty or effort.”\textsuperscript{39} The third dimension is congruency: a rule is congruent if it achieves the regulatory scheme’s desired objective. The analysis then turns to examination of whether the rules are effective in affecting behavior so that the law’s policy objective is realized.\textsuperscript{40}

A legislative or regulatory declaration of broker-dealer fiduciary duties would constitute a broadly stated principle. The guidance that would be provided by such a statement depends in large part on what it means to say that a fiduciary duty exists. The discussion that follows provides an overview of general fiduciary principles, a description of factors that the law has used to identify fiduciary relationships, and the significance of labeling a relationship as fiduciary.

**IV. Overview of Fiduciary Duty**

Although there is no clear definition of fiduciary relationship,\textsuperscript{41} some important generalizations can provide good guidance. A fiduciary relationship consists of two parties, the fiduciary and the beneficiary. It is generally understood that in such a relationship, the fiduciary has the duty to be loyal and act in the interest of the beneficiary.\textsuperscript{42} The beneficiary has entrusted the fiduciary with the power to oversee his well-being.\textsuperscript{43} The beneficiary is dependent upon the fiduciary due to his reliance upon a specific service the fiduciary provides under the arrangement in question.\textsuperscript{44} The beneficiary ordinarily has very little or no control over the relationship or its subject matter, and thus the beneficiary is forced to rely on the fiduciary’s expertise in the


\textsuperscript{39} Id.

\textsuperscript{40} Id.

\textsuperscript{41} See, \textit{e.g.}, Franklin Supply Co. v. Tolman, 454 F.2d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1972) (“A ‘fiduciary relation’ is an elusive status to define.”); Keenan v. D.H. Blair & Co., 838 F. Supp. 82, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“The precise contours of a fiduciary relationship are incapable of expression.”); Farragut Mortgage Co. v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. 95-6231-B (Massachusetts Superior Court, Nov. 15, 1996) (there is no all-inclusive definition of a fiduciary relationship; the existence of such a relationship is a question of fact).


\textsuperscript{43} See, \textit{e.g.}, Kelli A. Alces, \textit{Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth}, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 240 (2009).

specific area. In other words, a fiduciary relationship often exists when one person places his trust and confidence in another. There is reliance upon the fiduciary that the fiduciary will not abuse this trust which has been entrusted in him. Described yet another way, a fiduciary relationship is said to exist when any person instills a power of some type within another, the fiduciary, with the intention that the fiduciary will act to further the beneficiary’s best interests. Particularly helpful to understanding the nature of the stock broker relationship to his or her customer is the Restatement of Torts’ explanation “[a] fiduciary relation exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”

Under common law, fiduciary duties were imposed in situations where one party’s knowledge or expertise was so vast compared to that of another party who may rely upon this expertise. However, not all relationships of this nature are defined as fiduciary. Instead, some are nothing more than contractual. Thus, the existence of special knowledge or expertise of one party is a factor but is not determinative. However, when a party holds oneself out as having special knowledge, a fiduciary duty is even more likely to exist.

A summary of the cases and the literature leads to the conclusion that fiduciary relationships can be placed within one of four categories:

1. “where one person has control of property which . . . in the view of the court of equity is the property or another,

2. Where one person ‘has undertaken or is under an obligation . . . to act on another’s behalf or for another’s benefit’,

3. Where one person with limited or partial interests in property obtains renewed or additional rights in the property; and


47 See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 260 (2009).


51 See discussion of the “shingle theory” in Part V. D. infra.
4. Where ‘undue influence’ exists.”

However, while there are a number of relationships that are generally considered fiduciary in nature, it is difficult to generalize from one relationship to another. Overall, the nature of the relationship depends on the type of fiduciary relationship. In other words, the “fiduciary obligation is inevitably tied to the particular context in which it arises.” Standards within fiduciary relationships are flexible, and courts can apply them as they see fit in individual circumstances. As a result, it is difficult to make meaningful generalizations describing fiduciary relationships generally, considering the diversity of contexts in which they can arise. The scope of the fiduciary duty depends upon a standard of the duty defined by the type of relationship.

Accordingly, while fiduciary relationships across the board possess some similarities, they are also different, thus generalities are insufficient to explain fiduciary relationships. These differences include: (1) the purpose and nature of the relationship; (2) the amount of power granted to fiduciary by the beneficiary; and (3) protective mechanisms put into place to aid in reducing the abuse of this power. Notwithstanding these differences, all fiduciary relationships share the fact that the fiduciary is the substitute for the beneficiary. The beneficiary is looking to the fiduciary for a benefit. It has been suggested that one way to view a fiduciary relationship based upon trust and confidence is to see it from the perspective of morality, that there is a moral premise for a fiduciary relationship. The various descriptions of a fiduciary


61 See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. Corp. L. 239, 259 (2009).
relationship have one thing in common. The common theme is that fiduciary relationships are more expansive than those established through a contract. Thus, for example, as discussed more fully below, fiduciary obligations not present in arm’s length contract dealings include heightened disclosure duties as well as duties of loyalty.

The foregoing shows that generalizations can be made but they are not always very helpful. The same can be said of defining the consequences that follow once a fiduciary duty is established. Identifying a fiduciary relationship is just the first step in the inquiry. It is then necessary to determine the obligations that flow from the recognition of a relationship as fiduciary. Fiduciary law states some general principles and in some instances specific rules of conduct. Most often the duty is expressed in terms of principles rather than rules. A fiduciary duty is something more than would exist simply as a result of dealing with a party at arms’ length. This duty extends beyond just honesty and fairness. As stated in an oft-quoted passage penned by Justice Cardozo: “a trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”

The fiduciary possesses the obligation to act in a way that furthers the beneficiary’s interests. In a fiduciary relationship, the beneficiary is vulnerable to power of the fiduciary. If the fiduciary were to abuse his power, the beneficiary’s interest is at stake. The needs and interests of the beneficiary are thus the utmost priority. Thus, the most ideal relationships are those in which the beneficiary’s interests do not conflict with those of the fiduciary. Ultimately, the most basic definition of a fiduciary relationship is a relationship in which the fiduciary is held to a “higher standard of trust and an obligation to work in a trustworthy manner for the benefit of another, with the beneficiary’s best interests as its goal in the performance of the task.”

As stated in a famous passage by the United States Supreme Court:

to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?


67. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 244 (2009).

It has been said that fiduciary relationships are relationships which are entered into voluntarily in which the fiduciary possesses a zealous duty of good faith. Fiduciary relationships established by law often are mirrored by relationships established by custom reflecting positive social attributes including “loyalty, civility, self-sacrifice, vocational excellence, and high standards of honesty.” The law thus recognizes that a fiduciary relationship entails a strong duty of the utmost loyalty. This loyalty means that the fiduciary must act solely in the best interests of the beneficiary rather than acting in the fiduciary’s own interests.

Although not definable in bright-line terms, the various descriptions of fiduciary relationships have a common thread. The common thread is the existence of heightened obligations to be contrasted to contractual obligations resulting in non-fiduciary arms’ length transactions. Before discussing the extent to which fiduciary principles are applicable to broker-dealer obligations, the next section explores the background and scope of broker-dealer regulation under the federal securities laws.

V. Broker-Dealer Regulation Under the Current Regime

Federal securities regulation is based on a disclosure rather than merits scrutiny of transactions. This means that rather than focus on the merits of particular investments, the basic thrust of the law is “truth in securities” so that after full disclosure of material facts investors can make their own decisions. A notable exception to this disclosure approach, even before the enactment of the first federal securities law in 1933, was broker-dealer regulation which dates back to the thirteenth century. This early regulation authorized licensing securities brokers in London. Stock exchange dealings, with speculation subject to alternate booms and panics, became a part of the English markets in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Trading in

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72 As I have explained elsewhere, “[t]he reasoning is that full disclosure provides investors with sufficient opportunity to evaluate the merits of an investment and fend for themselves.” 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3][A] at 36 (6th ed. 2009).

73 The Securities Act of 1933 was the first comprehensive federal securities law. Act of May 27, 1933, c. 38, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74, codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq (20--). The 1933 Act focuses on public offerings of securities.


75 Id.
shares of stock led to periods of speculation and wild fluctuations in the market. This was followed by English legislation by the end of the seventeenth century, which was enacted to protect investors against unscrupulous manipulation by stock jobbers and stock brokers. Investment schemes throughout Europe led to many frauds, including the infamous South Sea Bubble. There thus is a long history of viewing the stock broker industry as one in need of special regulation. No doubt this was at least in part due to the recognition that stock brokers often nourish trust by their customers and that such a position of trust warrants heightened conduct rules. As shown in the discussion below, broker-dealer regulation as it developed in the United States embraced heightened standards of conduct for participants in this regulated industry.

A. Overview of Broker-Dealer Regulation in the United States

Section 15(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that broker-dealers register with the SEC. In addition, section 15(b)(8) requires that all broker-dealers be members of a qualifying self regulatory organization (either a national exchange or registered securities association).

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76 Promoters of both incorporated and unincorporated companies foisted doubtful schemes on the investing public. See 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 2.2 (3d ed. 2010).

77 As explained by a report that led up to the legislation:

The pernicious Art of Stock-jobbing hath, of late, so wholly perverted the End and Design of Companies and Corporations, erected for the introducing, or carrying on, of Manufactures, to the private Profit of the first Projectors, that the Privileges granted to them have, commonly, been made no other Use of, by the First Procurers and Subscribers, but to sell again, with Advantage, to ignorant Men, drawn in by the Reputation, falsely raised, and artfully spread concerning the thriving State of their Stock.

As quoted in 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 1–A (3d ed. 1989).

78 8 & 9 Wm. 3, ch. 32 (1697) ("An act to restrain the number and ill practice of brokers and stock jobbers"); see Lane, The Years Before the Stock Exchange, 7 HIST. TODAY 760, 761 (1957); 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 1–A (3d ed. 1989).

79 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 1–A (3d ed. 1989).

80 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) (2 0----).

81 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (20----). Up until 1983, broker-dealers could submit themselves to direct SEC control, but the Act was amended to abolish SECO ("SEC Only") regulation.

The broker-dealer registration requirements apply only to persons who as a firm or as individuals engage in broker-dealer activities.\textsuperscript{82} Associated persons who work for the registered broker-dealer firm are subject to SEC regulation but do not have to register as a broker dealer.\textsuperscript{83} The exemption from the broker-dealer registration requirements does not insulate registered representatives and other associated persons from SEC regulation. Thus, for example, employees of brokerage firms who have regular contact with the public as order takers have to qualify as registered representatives.\textsuperscript{84} Furthermore, associated persons who do not have to register in any capacity are subject nevertheless to SEC and FINRA (formerly NASD) disciplinary authority.\textsuperscript{85}

The three principal capacities in which firms act in that business are as broker, dealer, and investment adviser. The 1934 Act defines a "broker" as a "person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others,"\textsuperscript{86} while a "dealer" is a "person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for such person's own account."\textsuperscript{87} An "investment adviser" is defined in 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as a "person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities,"\textsuperscript{88} but broker-dealers who render such advice as part of their brokerage activities are exempt from the 1940 Act definition because of the assumption that broker-dealer regulation is sufficient to adequately protect investors' interests.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{82} See, e.g., Roth v. SEC, 22 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (associated person had to register as a broker-dealer where she was engaged in the securities business on her own and not through a registered broker-dealer).

\textsuperscript{83} But see Roth v. SEC, 22 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (associated person had to register as a broker-dealer where she was engaged in the securities business on her own and not through a registered broker-dealer).

\textsuperscript{84} See, e.g., Exchange Services, Inc. v. SEC, 797 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1986) (order takers for discount brokers must register as general securities representatives).

\textsuperscript{85} Haberman v. SEC, 205 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding disqualification of associated person).


\textsuperscript{88} 15 U.S.C. § 80b–3(a) (20----).

As noted above, under section 15(a) of the 1934 Act, no person may engage in business as a broker or dealer in securities (unless he or she does exclusively intrastate business or deals only in exempted securities) unless he is registered with the Commission. Under section 15(b), the SEC may revoke or suspend a broker-dealer’s registration, or impose a censure, if the broker-dealer is found to have violated any of the federal securities laws or committed other specified misdeeds.

In spelling out the substantive obligations of these securities "professionals" in dealing with public investors, the SEC proceeded with rulemaking largely under the general anti-fraud provisions of sections 10(b) and 15(c) of the 1934 Act, section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. The SEC's attention has been focused on two broad areas: (a) conflicts between the firm's obligations to its customers and its own financial interests, and (b) trading in or recommending securities in the absence of adequate information about the issuer. Violation of the anti-fraud provisions in these two areas has given rise to lawsuits by aggrieved customers as well as disciplinary actions by the SEC.

There is a wide range of approaches taken by the SEC, FINRA, and the courts in regulating broker-dealers, including (1) excessive prices for NASDAQ and over-the-counter securities; (2) activities of market-makers who deal directly with individual customers in a

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90 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (20----).
93 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (20----). See HAZEN supra note ---- § 12.1..
94 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (20----).
95 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (20----).
96 15 U.S.C. § 80b–6 (20----).
97 See HAZEN supra §§ 14.3, 14.10 (discussing applicable regulations).
99 See HAZEN supra §§ § 14.26 and chapter 15.
100 See HAZEN supra § 14.3 infra. The SEC's enforcement authority generally is discussed in id. chapter 16.
101 See, e.g., Lehl v. S.E.C., 90 F.3d 1483, 1488 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1996) ("To guide its members in determining when a price is 'reasonably related to the current market price,' the NASD surveyed industry pricing practices, concluding that the vast majority of transactions occurred at markups of 5% or less. It then issued guidelines setting 5% as a benchmark of reasonableness, to be considered with other relevant factors. The NASD
retail capacity; (3) excessive trading in customers' accounts designed to generate brokerage commissions; and (4) undisclosed interests of brokers and investment advisers in the stocks they recommend.

Market regulation includes the establishment of fair market practices and minimum capital requirements for broker-dealers in order to minimize the risk of insolvency. A major goal of this regulation is to assure orderly markets. There are also several prohibitions against fraudulent and manipulative broker-dealer conduct. Additionally, the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board work together in regulating the extension of credit for securities transactions.

The SEC thus has broad regulatory authority over securities broker-dealers. The regulation spans a wide range of broker-dealer conduct.

B. Broker-Dealers’ Obligations -- SEC and FINRA Regulation and Common Law

There are various SEC and FINRA (formerly NASD) rules that address particular types of misconduct by broker-dealers. As a general standard, SEC Rule 15c1–2 generally prohibits

cautioned, however, that the 5% policy 'is a guide—not a rule'; that a 'mark-up pattern of 5% or even less may be considered unfair or unreasonable'; and that '[i]n the case of certain low-priced securities, such as those selling below $10.00, a somewhat higher percentage may sometimes be justified' ); HAZEN supra § 14.14.

See, e.g., Eichler v. SEC, 757 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.1985) (market maker's duty to execute customer orders meant that it could not base pricing and order execution on an orderly market without making full disclosure to its customers); HAZEN supra § 14.10. Market makers operate in the over the counter and Nasdaq markets and in essence operate as wholesalers of securities. See id.

This is often referred to as churning. See HAZEN supra § 14.20.

This is sometimes referred to as scalping. Scalping consists of material omissions form the recommendation–namely that the person making the recommendation has a position in the security being recommended. A variation on scalping occurs when the person making the recommendation affirmatively misrepresents that he or she does not own any of the securities recommended. See, e.g., In the Matter of Snyder, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34–46108, 77 S.E.C. Docket 2919, 2002 WL 1364075 (SEC June 25, 2002) (violations or Rule 10b-5 for stating that respondent did not have an ownership position in Internet communications about a particular company); HAZEN supra § 14.17.

See, e.g., SEC Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2010) (the net capital requirements); HAZEN supra § 14.8.


See HAZEN supra §§ 14.3[6], 14.15–14.23.

See HAZEN supra § 14.9.

Much of this discussion is adapted from portions of 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.15 (6th ed. 2009).

17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1–2 (2010).
fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive practices in connection with securities brokerage transactions. The types of specific conduct that are addressed in other rules include market manipulation,\footnote{2} high pressure sales tactics,\footnote{12} deceptive recommendations,\footnote{13} generation of excessive commissions,\footnote{14} unauthorized trading,\footnote{15} improper order executions,\footnote{16} improper extension of credit for securities transactions,\footnote{17} and misuse of customer funds or securities.\footnote{18} In addition, broker-dealers and their employees are subject to a more standards based approach under Rule 10b-5’s general antifraud proscriptions relating to deceptive conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a security.\footnote{19} Beyond these specific activities and the general anti-manipulation and deception rules, the SEC makes it clear that violation of its rules is not limited to violation of any specified SEC or self regulatory organization rules, but rather covers all conduct that operates as a deceptive or manipulative device.\footnote{20} This broad coverage thus is not limited to specific SEC rules. The SEC has taken the position elsewhere that it can regulate conduct that would be manipulative even if the concern is not based on any specified violation of existing rules.\footnote{21} Even beyond SEC rules, the rules of the self regulatory organizations, such as FINRA, impose standards of conduct on broker-dealers.\footnote{122}


\footnote{112}{See 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.18; see also, e.g., Yankee Financial Group Inc., http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_012997&ssSourceNodeId=9 (NASDR 2005) (boiler room operator expelled from NASD membership and ordered to pay more than $38 million in restitution).}

\footnote{113}{See 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 14.15–14.18 (6th ed. 2009).}

\footnote{114}{See 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.20 (6th ed. 2009).}

\footnote{115}{See 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.21 (6th ed. 2009).}

\footnote{116}{See 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.13 (6th ed. 2009).}

\footnote{117}{See 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.9 (6th ed. 2009).}

\footnote{118}{See 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 14.8[2] (6th ed. 2009).}

\footnote{119}{17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).}

\footnote{120}{Rule 15c1–2(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1–2(c) (2010): The scope of this section shall not be limited by any specific definitions of the term “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance” contained in other rules adopted pursuant to section 15(c)(1) of the Act.}

In addition to SEC rules and requirements of the applicable self regulatory organizations,\textsuperscript{123} broker-dealers are, of course, subject to common law duties and, in some contexts, fiduciary obligations.\textsuperscript{124} In addition, on appropriate facts, federal courts have recognized the existence of the fiduciary relationship in federal securities cases.\textsuperscript{125} The cases Act even in the absence of an Sec rule specifically addressing that activity); In the Matter of Hazel Bishop, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 718 (SEC 1961) (wherein the Commission held up a registration statement because of the potential for manipulation in connection with an at market secondary offering); see generally 2 Thomas Lee Hazen, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.28 (6th ed. 2009); see also 2 Thomas Lee Hazen, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 6 (6th ed. 2009).

\textsuperscript{123} See 5 Thomas Lee Hazen, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.3 (6th ed. 2009).


\textsuperscript{125} See, e.g., U.S. v. Santoro, 302 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (broker’s recommendation created "position of trust" pursuant to federal sentencing guidelines); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1977): The registered representative of a broker dealer occupies a unique position in the scheme of securities regulation. Since he as broker is the person who actually trades securities for the investing public, his very employment is “in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.” (Rule 10b-5). Indeed, a broker such as the defendant Stott conducts himself and carries out his daily routine through the instrumentalities of the national security exchanges and the over-the-counter market. (Rule 10b-5; Rule 15c1–2). For these and related reasons, courts have concluded that the broker, by virtue of his position, owes a fiduciary duty to his customer.

make it clear that although there is no across-the-board fiduciary duty that applies to every transaction involving a broker-dealer, some heightened level of obligation will exist depending on the activities that the broker is carrying out on the customer’s behalf. In contrast to the narrow view of securities brokers' fiduciary duties, as noted above, there have been a number of decisions that have taken a broader view. For example, since a brokerage relationship is a principal/agent relationship, some courts have recognized fiduciary duties that accompany agency relationships generally.


We begin with an analysis of the relationship between a broker-dealer and his customer. As a broker he acts as an agent with all of the responsibility to his customer to such status implies. But even when, as a dealer in his own securities, he acts as a principal in relation to his customer he is not free to operate under the principle of caveat venditor. "Inherent in the relationship between a dealer and his customer is the vital representation that the customer will be dealt with fairly, and in accordance with the standards of the profession." Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34–2350, 1939 WL 36426 (SEC Dec. 19, 1939). "The theory is that even a dealer at arm's length impliedly represents when he hangs out his shingle that he will deal fairly with the public." 3 Loss, Securities Regulation (2d Ed. 1961) p. 1483. The "shingle" theory, first recognized by the federal courts in the case of Charles Hughes & Co. v. S.E.C., 139 F.2d 434, 435–36 (2d Cir.1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944), has become a well established doctrine in the securities field. Loss, op. cit., 1487. See S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).

127 E.g., Glisson v. Freeman, 532 S.E.2d 442, 449 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("[a] stockbroker's duty to account to its customer is fiduciary in nature, so that the broker is obligated to exercise the utmost good faith. Requirements of good faith demand that in the principal's interest it is the agent's duty to make known to the principal all material facts which concern the transactions and subject matter of his agency"). As stated by the Delaware Supreme Court:

The relationship between a customer and stock broker is that of principal and agent. The broker, as agent, has a duty to carry out the customer's instructions promptly and accurately. In addition, the broker must act in the customer's best interests and must refrain from self-dealing unless the customer consents, after full disclosure. These obligations at times are described as fiduciary duties of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty. They are comparable to the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, and are limited only by the scope of the agency.

C. Broker-Dealers’ Fiduciary Duties Under Current Securities Law

Many times a broker-dealer acts beyond a mere order taker, and in such cases there are heightened obligations. When a broker acts as a mere order taker, most courts say that the only duty is to find the best and prompt execution for that order. \(^{128}\) Where the broker performs additional functions, fiduciary obligations may exist. \(^{129}\) For example, when a broker has discretion with respect to executing transactions, the broker is a fiduciary. \(^{130}\) Similarly, when a broker recommends securities or transactions, heightened duties apply. \(^{131}\) This parallels the development of fiduciary duties under the Investment Advisers Act that arose from judicial interpretation rather than the language of the Act. \(^{132}\)

What is the practical consequence of applying fiduciary obligations to broker-dealer conduct? When a fiduciary duty exists, a broker will be subject to heightened disclosure requirements. \(^{133}\) Fiduciary duties can also result in implied representations, \(^{134}\) including implied


The duty of best execution, which predates the federal securities laws, has its roots in the common law agency obligations of undivided loyalty and reasonable care that an agent owes to his principal. Since it is understood by all that the client-principal seeks his own economic gain and the purpose of the agency is to help the client-principal achieve that objective, the broker-dealer, absent instructions to the contrary, is expected to use reasonable efforts to maximize the economic benefit to the client in each transaction.


\(^{130}\) See, e.g., SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 499 (D.N.J. 2007) (acknowledging the “the weight of the authority to hold that a broker is in a fiduciary relationship with a client, where that client maintains an account with the broker in which the broker, not the client, retains discretion.”), relying on McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 767 (3d Cir. 1990).

\(^{131}\) Consider for example, the suitability rule, FINRA 2310; see also, e.g., U.S. v. Laurienti, 2010 WL 2266986 (9th Cir. 2010) (broker making recommendations in a pump and dump scheme had fiduciary duties requiring disclosure of bonus commissions).

\(^{132}\) See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (imposing fiduciary duties on investment advisers), as quoted supra in note ----.

\(^{133}\) See, e.g., SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D.N.J. 2008) (when broker is acting as a fiduciary, there may be a duty to disclose a mark-up or other profit which would not ordinarily have to be disclosed as a result of a stock brokerage relationship).

It is to be remembered that accountability for the implied representations that may arise out of a fiduciary duty will not violate the securities laws’ antifraud provisions in the absence of a showing that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter. In the Matter of Flanagan, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3–9784, 71 S.E.C. Docket 1415, Release No. ID–160, 2000 WL 98210 *24 (SEC Initial Decision Jan. 31, 2000) ("[A]fter Hochfelder and
representations of expertise, which may also be referred to as the “shingle theory.” The SEC has referred to the "basic principle" that by holding itself out as a broker-dealer, a firm is representing that it will act in the customer’s best interests. Additionally, when the broker claims to have special skills in handling a customer's account, fiduciary duties will attach. Even in the context of federal claims against a broker-dealer, the federal court may look to state law to determine if a fiduciary duty existed.

Aaron, it is not enough for the Division to show that a fiduciary breached an implied representation. It must also show a specific intent to deceive the customer to prevail under those antifraud provisions requiring proof of scienter.); see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Section 10(b)’s deception requirement thus clearly establishes that mere breaches of fiduciary duty without more will not be actionable under federal securities law. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (Rule 10b-5 prohibits deceptive conduct and thus does apply simply because a transaction is unfair or violates a fiduciary duty).


Two theories, the fiduciary and shingle theory, establish an obligation on the part of a broker-dealer to deal with customers fairly. In cases where a broker-dealer has established a customer relationship based upon trust and confidence, and the customer depends upon and follows the broker-dealer's advice, a fiduciary relationship is established between the broker-dealer and customer. As a fiduciary, the broker-dealer also is obligated to disclose all the material facts of a customer's transaction . . . . Closely related to the fiduciary theory is a duty to the customer established by the "shingle theory." According to the shingle theory, a broker-dealer impliedly represents at the outset of a securities transaction that it will deal with its customers fairly and in accordance with the standards of the industry.

(citations omitted). The Shingle theory is discussed ----- infra.


In contrast, a few courts have spoken in terms of an "inherent" fiduciary duty running from the stock broker to the customer. The reasoning behind the inherent fiduciary duty approach is because the brokerage relationship is an agency relationship which by itself is fiduciary in nature. However, the fact that the relationship is a fiduciary one only takes one so far. The key question is to determine what actual duties arise out of the relationship. The answer to that question depends on the particular broker-customer relationship and the functions performed by the broker. Thus, for example, a clearing broker that does not perform the retail functions normally associated with introducing and full-service brokers has been said not to owe fiduciary duties to the customer. Where a clearing broker has reason to know of wrongdoing by the introducing broker, the clearing broker can be held accountable, as well as the introducing broker. For similar reasons, a prime brokerage operation serving an investment fund does not ordinarily owe duties directly to the fund’s participants.


140 French v. First Union Sec., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 818, 825 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). When applicable, state law fiduciary obligations also heighten the disclosure obligations relating to agreements to arbitrate broker-dealer/customer disputes. It has thus been held that a failure to adequately explain the arbitration clause can result in non-enforcement of the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Willems v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 107 P.3d 465 (Mont. 2005). Broker-dealer arbitration is discussed in 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION ch.15 (6th ed. 2009).

141 E.g., Lesavoy v. Lane, 304 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying New York law)); Rozsa v. May Davis Group, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see, e.g., In re Adler Coleman Clearing Corp., 198 B.R. 70, 73 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“As a general rule, a clearing firm is not liable for losses occasioned by an introducing broker because the clearing firm does not have a fiduciary relationship with the customers of that broker.”).


143 Prime brokerage refers to the services offered by broker-dealer firms to institutional investors, including hedge funds. Prime brokerage services include lending securities and extending credit in order to facilitate the fund’s ability to invest on a leveraged basis. A prime broker typically also provides a clearing facility for its customers.

Although there is authority to the contrary,\textsuperscript{145} the apparent majority view of the cases applying state common law is that there is no blanket fiduciary relationship\textsuperscript{146} between broker-dealer and client as a matter of law,\textsuperscript{147} but that the surrounding circumstances can suffice to create a fiduciary duty.\textsuperscript{148} Chief among these factors which may create a fiduciary relationship is "a reposing of faith, confidence and trust,"\textsuperscript{149} often evidenced by a broker-dealer having either prior authorization to trade for the client's account on a discretionary basis, or de facto control of


\textsuperscript{146} See, e.g., Press v. Chemical Inv. Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999), affirming 988 F. Supp. 375, 386–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("naked allegation" that broker was a fiduciary of customer was insufficient).

\textsuperscript{147} See Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Wisconsin law); Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381–82 (7th Cir. 1992) (investment adviser not \textit{per se} fiduciary, but could be shown to be by clear and convincing evidence; applying Illinois law); Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985) (commodities broker; applying Arkansas law); Ray E. Friedman & Co. v. Jenkins, 738 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1984) (commodities broker; applying North Dakota law); Lesavoy v. Lane, 304 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying New York law) (clearing broker's obligations related only to execution of orders and did not create fiduciary duties; applying New York law); Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank AG, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1061 (D. Minn. 2003) (broker did not owe duty of care to sophisticated investor so as to trigger liability for negligent misrepresentation); Shamsi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989); DeSciose v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 476 N.W.2d 200 (Neb. 1991); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986); In re Dean Witter Managed Futures Ltd. Partnership Litigation, 282 A.D.2d 271, 724 N.Y.S.2d 149, (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Berki v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 560 P.2d 282 (Or. 1977); Rude v. Larson, 207 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1973).


\textsuperscript{149} McCracken v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 445 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa App. 1989) (quoting Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1986)).
Representing oneself to have investment and advisory expertise will give rise to fiduciary obligations. When a broker makes investment recommendations to a customer, the broker is acting in a position of trust vis-a-vis the customer, and as such is acting as a fiduciary. A broker who misrepresents his or her expertise is guilty of a material misrepresentation.

In reviewing the relevant state law decisions, some generalizations can be made about treatment of securities broker-dealers. A broker-dealer is more likely to have a duty to make a

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150 U.S. v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (while there is no inherent fiduciary duty arising out of the brokerage relationship, fiduciary duties do arise out of a discretionary account), relying on U.S. v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[A] relationship of trust and confidence does exist between a broker and a customer with respect to those matters that have been entrusted to the broker."); Tapia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 149 F.3d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[W]here the investor controls a nondiscretionary account and retains the ability to make investment decisions, the scope of any duties owed by the broker will generally be confined to executing the investor's order."); Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Luften & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d 933, 940 (2d Cir. 1998). Cf. Trumball Investments Ltd. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 436 F.3d 443, 447 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he plain meaning of the phrase 'shall in its discretion' allows First Union to use its expert judgment. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 563 (2d ed. 1987) (defining discretion as 'the power or right to decide or act according to one's own judgment; freedom of judgment or choice').") (applying Virginia law).


151 See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992).


153 See FINRA Notice to Members 8-27, Misleading Communications About Expertise, 2008 WL 2583019 (FINRA May 20, 2008); NASD (FINRA) Rule 2210 (prohibiting false, misleading or exaggerated communications with the public and the omission of material facts or qualifications that would cause a communication to be misleading). This can apply to an omission as well as a misrepresentation. Consider, for example, if a broker gives advice and omits that he/she is not knowledgeable in that area, this is a violation.
full disclosure when recommending a security, but is less likely to have an unqualified duty to provide the client with useful market information concerning the client's present portfolio even when the broker-dealer is aware of such information. Some courts have been less vigilant in finding a fiduciary duty in the brokerage relationship. Those courts have questioned whether the common law imposes a special obligation on a broker-dealer. There is considerable authority, however, to the effect that honesty and good faith are basic obligations of broker-dealers. Other courts are more willing to recognize that a broker stands in a fiduciary relationship to his or her customer. Furthermore, it is clear that when a broker exercises discretion over an account, he or she will be subject to fiduciary obligations. In such a case the broker is acting as trustee with regard to the customer's investments. With respect to a nondiscretionary account, the broker's duty may be limited to the proper execution of individual transactions, and that duty


ends when the transaction is complete.\textsuperscript{160} This is almost certain to be the case with respect to unsolicited transactions.\textsuperscript{161} Under New York law, for example, the broker in a non-discretionary account has the duty to notify the customer before trades are made and also to execute trades\textsuperscript{162} requested by the customer.\textsuperscript{163} Upon completion of the trade, a securities broker who acted upon a customer’s order does not have any further duty to call upon his or her own professional skill and prudence concerning the wisdom of any of the customer's trades.\textsuperscript{164}

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\item However, when the transaction is the result of a broker-initiated recommendation, there are duties that attach to the making of the recommendation. See 5 Thomas Lee Hazen, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.16 (6th ed. 2009).

\item See, e.g., Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (duty is limited to the completion of the transaction).


\item Rude v. Larson, 207 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn. 1973) (absent a special agreement, a stock broker or brokerage house owes a customer only the duty to exercise due care in executing the customer's instructions); Davis v. Midwest Discount Sec., Inc., 439 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Puckett v. Rufencacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc. 587 So.2d 273, 279 (Miss. 1991) ("A commodities broker in a non-discretionary account only owes his customer the duty to properly execute trades as directed by him, and has no further duty to call upon his own professional skill and prudence as to the wisdom of any of his customer's trades."); Vogel v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 801 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Perelle, 514 A.2d 552, 561 (Pa. Super. 1986); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Fletcher, 975 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. 1998) ("[A] stockbroker's only duty to a client with a non-discretionary account is to faithfully carry out the client's instructions."); Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 889 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (in a nondiscretionary account the duty of a broker is limited to carrying out the customer's instructions); see also, e.g., Gochauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049 (11th Cir. 1987); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D.Mich. 1978).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
However, the absence of a discretionary account is not conclusive in all cases; what also matters is the degree of trust and confidence that the broker cultivates in the customer. A securities broker has a duty to the customer with respect to the functions that have been entrusted to the broker. For example:

Duties associated with a non-discretionary account include: (1) the duty to recommend a stock only after studying it sufficiently to become informed as to its nature, price and financial prognosis; (2) the duty to carry out the customer's orders promptly in a manner best suited to serve the customer's interests; (3) the duty to inform the customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling a particular security; (4) the duty to refrain from self-dealing or refusing to disclose any personal interest the broker may have in a particular recommended security; (5) the duty not to misrepresent any fact material to the transaction; and (6) the duty to transact business only after receiving prior authorization from the customer.

Some courts have indicated that a stock broker is a fiduciary to the extent that he or she owes the customer the utmost good faith.

D. The Shingle Theory

As discussed below, courts and regulators have often referred to the “shingle theory” in talking about securities broker-dealers when they make recommendations or otherwise hold themselves out as having a degree of expertise. Sometimes discussion of the shingle theory is combined with references to fiduciary obligations. Regardless of whether it is discussed explicitly in fiduciary terms, the shingle theory addresses the same issue: instances in which

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165 See, e.g., Wallace v. Hinkle Northwest, Inc., 717 P.2d 1280 (Or. App. 1986); see also, e.g., Starkweather v. Shafffer, 497 P.2d 358, 361 (Or. 1972) (“A fiduciary relationship exists in all cases where there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence.”).


broker-dealers are held to higher standards of conduct than might otherwise apply in a market or arms-length situation.

Simply put, the "shingle theory" holds that by hanging up a shingle, the broker implicitly represents that he or she will conduct business in an equitable and professional manner. As noted elsewhere in this article, SEC and self regulatory rules require broker-dealers to adhere to standards of fair and equitable principles of trade. A breach of the implied representation that a broker will deal fairly with the customer will be actionable in a private action under the securities laws only if the plaintiff can show a causal relationship between the alleged breach and an injury to the plaintiff. A breach of fiduciary duty will not by itself support a claim under the federal securities laws. Thus, the shingle theory will support a private right of action only to the extent that it amounts to a fraudulent implied misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.

Additionally, it has been explained that the shingle theory is but an extension of the common law doctrine of "holding out." It has long been recognized that a securities broker

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170 See notes ---- supra.


172 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (SEC Rule 10b-5 is a fraud based rule).


The "shingle theory" denotes the proposition that a broker-dealer, by holding itself out as competent to conduct a brokerage business, owes its customer certain duties, including the duty not to sell securities at prices far in excess of market prices . . . . Recent cases have harmonized the older "shingle theory" cases with the Supreme Court's Rule 10b-5 fraud jurisprudence by identifying both a duty to disclose and a material omission . . . . To the extent plaintiff's "shingle theory" claim relies on a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the claim must fail because (1) a breach of fiduciary duty does not give rise to a securities fraud claim merely because it involves a securities transaction . . . .

(citations omitted).

occupies a special position of trust and confidence with regard to his or her customer when making a recommendation and that any recommendation of a security carries with it an implicit representation that the broker has an adequate basis for the recommendation.\textsuperscript{175}

Originally the shingle theory was first applied under the securities laws in the context of a broker's charging excessive mark-ups\textsuperscript{176} but is not limited to mark-up cases.\textsuperscript{177} As previously noted, applying this aspect of shingle theory, a broker who makes a recommendation is viewed as making an implied representation that he or she has adequate information on the security in question for forming the basis of the broker's opinion.\textsuperscript{178} This concept of implied representation

\textsuperscript{175} See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) ("A securities dealer occupies a special relationship to a buyer of securities in that by his position he implicitly represents that he has an adequate basis for the opinions he renders."); see also, e.g., In the Matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1977 WL 187397, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34–14149 (SEC Nov. 9, 1977).

Failure to have such a reasonable basis for a recommendation can result in a violation of the securities laws' antifraud proscriptions. As observed many years ago:

The Commission is relying on the so-called "shingle" theory to establish statutory fraud. The essence of this theory is that in certain circumstances one who sells securities to the public—who hangs out his shingle—implicitly warrants the soundness of statements of stock value, estimates of a firm's earnings potential, and the like. When such a person conceals known information inconsistent with this "implicit warranty of soundness" he has omitted a material fact without which the statements made would be misleading. See 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1490 (2d Ed. 1961). One element of this warranty, the Commission held below, is that all such statements, or at least highly optimistic ones, have an "adequate basis." If the salesman makes statements, knowing they had no adequate basis, or if he is "grossly careless or indifferent to the existence of an adequate basis" for his statements, then he has violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, principally § 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.

Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring). Compare, e.g., In re Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 143 B.R. 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (mortgage broker did not have the heightened duty with respect to recommendations that applies to securities brokers).

\textsuperscript{176} Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).

\textsuperscript{177} See, e.g., 8 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 9-C-1 at p. 3816-18 (3d ed., rev. 2004). ("By now—one may add 'happily'—the shingle theory not only is unchallenged but has been considerably refined . . . Moreover the potentialities of the 'shingle' theory are not exhausted by markup cases."); see also id. § 9–C–2.

has also been expressed in terms of a broker-dealer "implicitly warrant[ing] the soundness of the statements of stock value," but this clearly is too broad a statement of the rule. The concept of implied warranty has not to date been extended to brokers' recommendations, and the appropriate standard of care, whether under the shingle theory or otherwise, is necessarily based upon the broker-dealer's factual basis and reasonable belief in the opinions that form the basis of the recommendation.

Furthermore, the shingle theory is sometimes applied to bring activities of the broker which otherwise might not fall within the literal application of the SEC antifraud rules within the ambit of those rules. In many of these cases brokers have held themselves out as having complied with SEC regulations. These activities that have then given rise to accountability, and in some cases liability, include undisclosed insolvency, egregious failures to comply with SEC bookkeeping requirements, and noncompliance with net capital requirements. Also, the SEC has described the broker's obligations with regards to execution of customer orders as based on the shingle theory.

Therefore, the SEC makes it clear that violation of its rules is not limited to violation of any specified SEC rules, but rather covers all conduct that operates as a deceptive or manipulative device. The shingle theory as a basis for violation of the antifraud rules is

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179 Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark J., concurring).


184 SEC Rule 15c1–2 generally prohibits fraud and misrepresentation by broker-dealers. Subsection (c) of that rule expressly provides that the scope of the rule prohibiting fraudulent conduct "shall not be limited by any
premised on an implied representation that the broker will deal with the customer fairly and in a professional manner. This same obligation to conduct one's business in a fair manner is found in FINRA’s (formerly the NASD) rules.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates how general principles, including general fiduciary principles have played a significant role in broker-dealer regulation. Although not defining each and every potential prohibited practice, this approach to regulation has proven to be satisfactory in addressing improper practices. Regulation will not prevent unscrupulous conduct. The best that can be hoped for is that regulation will provide a sound basis for determining when the line between proper and improper conduct has been crossed.

specific definitions of the term 'manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance' contained in other rules adopted pursuant to section 15(c)(1) of the Act. Rule 15c1–2(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1–2(c) (2010); see also the general antifraud proscriptions of SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).


FINRA Conduct Rule 2010 (available on Westlaw) ("A member, in the conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade."); see also NASD Manual Conduct Rule 2310–2(a)(1) (available on Westlaw) ("Implicit in all member and registered representative relationships with customers and others is the fundamental responsibility for fair dealing. Sales efforts must therefore be undertaken only on a basis that can be judged as being within the ethical standards of the Association's Rules, with particular emphasis on the requirement to deal fairly with the public."); NASD IM–2310–2(b)(5)(d):

The Commission has also recognized that brokers and dealers have an obligation of fair dealing in actions under the general anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The Commission bases this obligation on the principle that when a securities dealer opens his business he is, in effect, representing that he will deal fairly with the public. Certain of the Commission's cases on fair dealing involve practices not covered in the foregoing illustrations. Usually, any breach of the obligation of fair dealing as determined by the Commission under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws could be considered a violation of the Association's Rules.
Although broker-dealer regulation is premised on general principles and standards, there are instances in which the regulators have engaged in more specific rulemaking. Striking examples are the rules that developed in the wake of various public offering abuses that occurred in the 1990s. The section that follows discusses the regulatory responses.

E. Public Offering Sales Practices

An example of broker-dealer rulemaking with specific, detailed rules occurred in the aftermath of problems that occurred in the late 1990s with respect to certain practices in connection with public offerings. During that era there was an upsurge in a number of questionable practices.\(^\text{187}\) For example, there were instances of allocating hot issues – those that were anticipated to trade above the offering price. There had been preexisting principles regarding improper allocation practices;\(^\text{188}\) nevertheless, the NASD saw fit to propose more detailed rules regarding allocation of public offerings.\(^\text{189}\)

A pernicious practice that grew during the 1990s was laddering or pre-selling the aftermarket, which consists of requiring purchasers of registered offerings to commit to purchase shares in the after-market in order to get part of the public offering allocation. Laddering, or pre-selling the aftermarket, is a practice that requires IPO purchasers to commit to purchase additional shares in the after-market. Laddering not only provides improper consideration for the allocation of IPO shares, but also creates additional demand in the aftermarket, designed to insure rising prices once the shares are publicly traded.\(^\text{190}\)

The impact of laddering is to generate buying interest in the securities being offered that otherwise would not exist. This practice violates a number of existing rules and principles. For example, a distribution plan requiring purchasers to commit to after-market purchases would have to be disclosed in the offering registration statement that is filed with the SEC.\(^\text{191}\) Regardless of disclosure, pre-selling the after-market implicates the antifraud and anti-manipulation rules, as those sales are designed to generate an artificial demand for the securities

\(^\text{187}\) See Hazen supra note ---- .

\(^\text{188}\) See NASD Rule 2710 (now FINRA Rule 5110 and 5190) (dealing with filing requirements for underwriters associated with IPOs).


\(^\text{191}\) The 1933 Act disclosure requirements are discussed in Hazen supra note ---- ch. 3.
being offered. Solicitation of commitments to purchase in the aftermarket violates the Securities Act’s anti-gun jumping provisions.\textsuperscript{192}

Also, in the 1990s many IPOs were marketed by "spinning"\textsuperscript{193} IPO shares to favored customers in exchange for a quid pro quo, or to others who planned to "flip"\textsuperscript{194} the shares by reselling them immediately into the public market. Although not clearly fraudulent or otherwise \textit{per se} manipulative, these practices proved problematic and are often attacked as manipulative and deceptive. Even without explicit rules, severe sanctions may be imposed against brokerage firms that engage in these and other improper IPO practices.\textsuperscript{195}

There are several other offering practices that were addressed by proposed NASD and FINRA rulemaking.\textsuperscript{196} While these rules could provide useful safe harbors regarding

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{192 1933 Act section 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (20----) prohibits sales of securities covered by a 1933 Act registration prior to the registration statement’s effective date which is the date that the public offering begins. In securing these commitments prior to the offering date, section 5(a) is violated.}


\footnote{194 ‘‘Flipping’ is the practice of buying a ‘hot issue’ and then selling it within a short period of time into a rising market, earning a quick profit on the transactions.” In the Matter of Account Management Corp., Admin. Proc. File No. 3–885; Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34–36314, 60 S.E.C. Docket 962, 1995 WL 579449, n. 3 (SEC Sept. 29, 1995).

\footnote{195 For example, severe penalties have been imposed against firms charged with improper IPO practices. See, e.g., SEC v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, Civil Action No. 1:05 CV00166 (HHK) (D.D.C.), Litigation Release No. 19050, 2005 WL 156766 (SEC Jan. 25, 2005); SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 05 CV 853 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. 2005), Litigation Release No. 19051, 2005 WL 156767 (SEC Jan. 25, 2005). These were two instances in which the firm agreed to $40 million fines without admitting guilt. The SEC charged the firms with various improper practices, including: pre-selling the after-market by telling certain customers that they could obtain good allocations of "hot" IPOs if they expressed an interest in buying shares in the immediate aftermarket; and encouraging flipping by soliciting aftermarket interest from customers that the firm knew had no interest in owning the shares for the long term, resulting in the customers flipping both their IPO allocations and aftermarket purchases. A number of other manipulative practices were also alleged to have occurred: suggesting to certain customers the aftermarket price limits they should give in order to obtain a good IPO allocation; in certain cases encouraging customers to increase the aftermarket prices they originally said they would be willing to pay; accepting customers’ indications that they would purchase shares in the aftermarket interest equal to or greater than their IPO allocations (such as "1 for 1" or some other ratio); and in one case, soliciting an aftermarket order from a customer before all of the IPO shares had been distributed, which the firm executed once trading began—this customer sold both its IPO and aftermarket shares the same day. \textit{See also}, e.g., Goldman Sachs Sub, Formerly Spear Leeds, Settles Charges of Hiding IPO Sales, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 563 (March 28, 2005). \textit{Cf.} Cordes & Co. Financial Services, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2007) (reversing denial of class certification and remanding for further proceedings claims of illegal pricing in IPOs).

\footnote{196 See Proposed FINRA Rule 5131 (proposing rules regarding issues such as reports of indications of interests, lock-up agreements, underwriter agreements, and market orders); \textit{see generally} http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rule/documents/rulefilings/p120939.pdf.}}
permissible public offering practices, they were not designed as such, and thus should not be viewed as an exclusive list of prohibited practices. The risk in adopting such a detailed taxonomy of prohibited practices is the risk that they will be interpreted to be exclusive. Accordingly, it is imperative that such rules be viewed as supplementing rather than replacing general principles, standards, and the antifraud rules that apply to broker-dealers.

In 2003, the SEC approved the NASD's revamped approach to regulating certain public offering practices. The former rules related to "hot issues." In contrast, the new rules make it clear that they address the offering process with respect to all IPOs. The NASD's IPO requirements were approved by the SEC in October 2003. NASD Rule 2790 (now FINRA Rule 5130) replaced the former hot issue interpretations, making it clear that the new requirements apply to all IPOs, not just those that involve hot issues. The new IPO rule expands and clarifies many of the NASD's policies that were already in place. Subject to some enumerated exceptions, IPO shares may not be allocated to individuals or entities having an interest in the issuer or in the offering—these are known as restricted persons. Under the former hot issue interpretation, brokers could sell IPO shares to a restricted person, provided that, after determining the issue was hot, the broker (1) cancelled the trade before the end of the first business day after secondary market trading begins for that issue, and (2) reallocated the security at the public offering price to a nonrestricted person or account. The NASD's IPO rule is designed to prohibit distribution of IPO shares to restricted persons. Accordingly, before selling IPO shares, the broker must verify that the customer is not a restricted person under the rule.

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199 NASD Rule 2790 (FINRA Rule 5130).
200 See NASD's Free Riding and Withholding Interpretation, IM–2110–1. Hot issues are discussed in Hazen supra § 6.3.
201 For example, the rule does not apply to sales to underwriters under a stand-by underwriting agreement.
202 The former hot issue interpretation treated certain people, such as hedge fund managers and other investment managers, as "conditionally restricted." The IPO Rule eliminates the conditionally restricted status, treating all persons as either restricted or nonrestricted.
203 Under FINRA’s (formerly the NASD) IPO rule, "restricted persons" include: broker-dealers involved with the offering and their associated persons, finders, and fiduciaries of the managing underwriter of a public offering, lawyers, accountants, and consultants working on an offering generally will be considered restricted persons for purposes of that offering. The IPO rule not only covers people occupying those positions, but also includes their immediate family.
204 Brokers must receive from each person or account, within twelve months prior to any allocation of a new issue, a representation that the person or account is eligible as a nonrestricted person to receive new issue securities. As an alternative to a representation from the customer directly, a broker may rely on a representation from a domestic bank, foreign bank, broker-dealer, investment adviser, or other conduit, that all purchases of new issues for its accounts are in compliance with the IPO Rule. The broker must update this information annually but may rely on the customer. Thus, for example, if, within a year of receiving verification from a person that the customer qualifies as a nonrestricted person, the customer's status changes to restricted, the NASD member will not be considered to be in violation of the IPO Rule unless the broker has been notified of this change or otherwise has reason to believe that such a change has occurred.
VI. Assessment of Broker-Dealer Regulation

The foregoing discussion provides a sense of the ways in which SEC and FINRA regulation of securities broker-dealers combines rules addressing specifically defined conduct and principles of fair dealing. This is supplemented by an antifraud regime.

Standards and principles are sometimes criticized as not providing a bright line test. Clearly broker-dealers need good guidelines for determining appropriate conduct. The existing rules supplemented by regulatory interpretations are sufficient. The current rules make it clear that certain types of conduct are not permissible. For example, fraud, and manipulation are outlawed.205 A number of specific practices are addressed by rulemaking. For example, churning (entering into transactions to generate commissions) is expressly prohibited.206 Recommending transactions without a sufficient knowledge of the security is prohibited,207 as is making recommendations that are unsuitable given the customer’s knowledge, experience, and risk-bearing tolerance.208 These are just a few examples of improper broker-dealer activity that is expressly addressed by SEC or FINRA rules.

Concerns about the current approach of supplementing existing specific rules with a "just and equitable principles of trade" requirement are misplaced. The current approach perhaps combined with a more explicit recognition of broker-dealer fiduciary obligations through SEC rulemaking or a direct legislative declaration to that effect provides a good approach to regulation. There can be problems with a regulatory scheme that does not give sufficient notice to the regulated industry regarding the proper standards of conduct. This type of problem occurs only with respect to conduct at the margins that is not clearly in violation or in compliance with more specific rules. Granted, a standard based on just and equitable principles of trade does not translate into a detailed list of do’s and don’ts with respect to conduct that is at the margins. However, under the present regime, the message to broker-dealers is clear – if conduct is being considered, the broker-dealer should be comfortable in its belief that it can establish without a doubt that the conduct is consistent with just and equitable principles of trade. A broker who decides to engage in conduct, recognizing that it is marginal but with the belief that it can marshal arguments to support its conduct is taking the risk that it cannot. The actor in such a case is thus on notice that there is a reasonable likelihood that the conduct transcends applicable principles of just and equitable conduct. Given the fact that stock brokers occupy a position of trust and thus are often placed in fiduciary or fiduciary-like positions, it is not unreasonable to have a legal and regulatory regime that puts a high burden on the broker to establish that conduct is within the realm of what is permissible.

205 See supra ----.
206 See supra ----
207 See supra -----
208 See supra ----
VII. Conclusion

Broker-dealer conduct is under increased scrutiny because of recent events. The problems that led to recent scandals reveal that there have been enforcement failure but do not show that there has been a substantial gap in regulation. Congress has mandated that the SEC study whether there are gaps in broker-dealer regulation and whether there should be more explicit regulatory statements regarding broker-dealer fiduciary obligations. As discussed throughout this article, there are many examples under existing law of broker-dealer fiduciary obligations. In fact, any time a securities broker acts as something more than a mere order taker, heightened obligations attach. There is no doubt that expressly stating that broker-dealers are fiduciaries will provide emphasis on their obligations. However, even in the absence of a legislative or regulatory declaration to that effect, heightened standards for broker-dealers are well established.