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Article
Undocumented immigration and host-country welfare: Competition across segmented labor markets.
Faculty Publications
  • Thomas J. Carter, University of South Florida St. Petersburg
SelectedWorks Author Profiles:

Thomas J. Carter

Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2005
Disciplines
Abstract
In this paper’s model, undocumented workers are endogenously sorted into secondary labor markets. When further illegal immigration occurs, some new migrants follow their fellows into already migrant-dominated jobs, lowering migrant wages and raising real incomes of host-country labor and capital. Some submarkets switch from employing legal workers to employing migrants, lowering demand for and wages of legal workers. Undocumented immigration is Pareto-improving when enforcement reserves primary-sector jobs for legal workers. Pareto-dominant policies target the number of migrant-dominated submarkets, not the number of migrants. This appears consistent with U.S. enforcement practices. The effects of deportations, employer sanctions, and amnesties are explored.
Comments

Citation only. Full-text article is available through licensed access provided by the publisher. Members of the USF System may access the full-text of the article through the authenticated link provided.

Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Creative Commons License
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
Citation Information
Carter, T. J. (2005). Undocumented immigration and host-country welfare: Competition across segmented labor markets. Journal of Regional Science, 45(4), 777-795. doi: 10.1111/j.0022-4146.2005.00392.x