Skip to main content
Article
Institutional Outsiders and Insiders: The Response of Foreign and Domestic Inventors to the Quality of Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Global Strategy Journal (2014)
  • Theodore A. Khoury, Portland State University
  • Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Northeastern University
  • Luis Alfonso Dau, Northeastern University
Abstract
We analyze how the quality of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in developing countries impacts patent applications. We extend institutional economics to propose that firms vary in their interpretation of institutions, specifically arguing that foreign and domestic inventors respond to different institutional signals because of their different positions as institutional outsiders and insiders. Thus, we propose that foreign inventors, as institutional outsiders, respond more positively to the quality of IPR protection in countries with more democratic political systems, whereas domestic inventors, as institutional insiders, respond more positively to the quality of IPR protection in countries with higher quality legal systems.
Publication Date
July, 2014
DOI
10.1002/gsj.1079
Citation Information
Theodore A. Khoury, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra and Luis Alfonso Dau. "Institutional Outsiders and Insiders: The Response of Foreign and Domestic Inventors to the Quality of Intellectual Property Rights Protection" Global Strategy Journal Vol. 4 Iss. 3 (2014) p. 200 - 220
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/theodore_khoury/10/