The Communication of Morality: Cooperation and Commitment in a Food Co-op

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THE COMMUNICATION OF MORALITY
COOPERATION AND COMMITMENT IN A FOOD COOPERATIVE

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ABSTRACT
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This study investigates the communication of morality in the verbal behavior of a group. Patterns of interaction among members of a food cooperative are examined to find evidence of their use of moral matters in talk. Structural changes in the organization reduced the extent of cooperation and commitment demanded of participants, yet there was apparently little talk of these moral matters. Closer examination of the talk reveals a number of features that indicate moral matters are present at, or near the surface of talk. A central part of this methodology is the systematic location of individuals within "collections of people." Such collections are considered the basis of obligation and evaluation predicated of the individual, as well as knowledge expected. A "moral premise" is a formulation introduced to link people and predicates with the modal terms of evaluation and obligation:

X as a good person in the collection C ought to be Y.

The notion of a good person defines both the difficulties of displaying a self in talk and the need to construct "depersonalized others" so as to include, but not identify, individuals who may even be present.

A series of four problems in the communication of morality are examined, drawing upon recordings of meetings
where decisions were made; participant observation of the cooperative; and a survey of Co-op participants.

1. How could a major change in the ideology of cooperation be accomplished without discussion of the value of cooperative work?

2. How was an extensive change made in the structure of authority of the Co-op without discussions of the loss of a cooperative managing system?

3. What were the conditions of an effective communication of commitment to the Co-op that could and did lead to starting up again?

4. Since the interests of the Co-op had led to confrontations with black people, how could commitment to the Co-op be reconciled with commitment to an integrated neighborhood?

In each case, talk in the meetings led to changes in the Co-op. Two were structural changes, and two refined the degree of participation expected of Co-op people where competing demands existed.

Solutions to these problems involve the finding that moral matters indeed were present, although they scarcely seemed to be so at first. A number of strategies of indirection were noted which by-passed ideological discussion and these appear to be effective in minimizing possible differences. Indirection and vagueness permit smooth transitions from one organizational state to another without the need to confront moral matters and explain differences.
between earlier versions and the present. The avoidance of ideological statements, suppressing what might be a contrast between what is and what ought to be, leaves the Co-op people freer to concern themselves with the practical details of operating the Co-op.
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PREFACE

It was Paul Lazarsfeld who first made me aware that social reality was a notion that might be studied empirically. His own research reflected the social scientist who never lost sight of the people who produced that reality, whether in Marienthal or in Decatur. Lazarsfeld showed that the social construction of reality by individuals in a group is a consideration which transcends any theoretical stance and must be taken into account by any theorist who would study the communication of values and beliefs about the real world. I profited from direct contact with his approach and practice, and I regret that it is no longer possible to thank him in person.

My intellectual indebtedness to Erving Goffman and Robert K. Merton is evident throughout this work. Within their own analysis of social structure they have evidenced a profound interest in the meaning of the group to the individual and awareness of the problems of studying the communication of morality in a group. I have incurred a special debt to both of them. In reading drafts of this work they demonstrated considerable patience with ideas and modes of expression that were often remote from their own work. I benefited immensely from having had the opportunity to discuss many of the issues that are present in
this work. My thanks to them both for their indispensible suggestions.

I have many other people to thank for helping me in doing this study of the communication of morality in the Co-op. First there are the Co-op people themselves who welcomed me and my taperecorder into the meetings, answered my questions in their homes, and accepted my continual presence at most of the food distribution days during the three years in which I was collecting data. Three Co-op people—Sally Gottshall, Sue Minis and Charles Thrall—read and re-read my descriptions of Co-op activities, offering comments which enlarged what I knew and could say of the Co-op.

A number of people read various versions of different parts of this work, contributing many helpful insights and friendly criticisms, including philosophers Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower, social psychologists John Sabini and Maury Silver, linguists Anthony Kroch and William Labov, and sociologists Allen Grimshaw and Jacqueline Wolf. My thanks to all of them for their help and encouragement.

I have also incurred a large debt to my children, Jessie, Joanna, Simon, Sarah, and Susannah, and it is to them that I would like to dedicate this study. Each of them helped in a variety of ways and I would like to thank each of them not only for helping, but also for their continuing encouragement, from the beginning of this work all the long way through to its end. Finally, an author who is married may be fortunate enough to have a spouse who is willing

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to supply support which extends well beyond the parameters of the work itself. In this respect I have been most fortunate, and I happily thank my husband Bill for his help, without whom this work would not have been possible.
CHAPTER 1
MORALITY AND MORAL MATTERS

Morality has always been a central focus for sociology, both by design and inadvertently. In so far as sociology has taken all of human social behavior as its subject matter an important part of such a study must be the norms and values by which behavior is structured, and social control achieved. Yet, the methods designed to study social behavior may produce data in which the norms and values of the subject and the analyst become inextricably mixed. A continual problem then is to separate people's accounts of activities from their notions of what ought to have happened; to distinguish what they say they would do from what they actually do; and to find out what the situation was as opposed to what people say happened.

Given the importance of morality in understanding the ordinary world, one would expect that studies of morality in ordinary interaction had been pursued and that the use of moral language in the everyday world had been a focus of attention. That does not seem to be the case and no answers are yet available to the question: In what form do moral predicates and moral evaluations enter into the ordinary world? The forms that are most easily recognized as explicit use of moral language appear in sermons and "sermonizing" and it seems that many people avoid talking in a way that would
be characterized in these terms. Yet people, when asked, are able to supply notions of what ought to be, of what constitutes a good person. Furthermore, in daily life, people seem ready to justify what they have done as "the right thing" or to determine, for a sociological inquiry, how things "ought to be," both in actions involving themselves and with regard to others. It has been repeatedly observed that some people in each community freely enter into critical judgments of others' behavior through gossip, story, and rumor.

From another point of view, it would seem that morality must be present in talk, since it can not be in the actions alone. An essential part of the construction of reality would seem to be the assigning to actions the features of morality, of rights and wrongs, of what should have been done, or of why something else ought to have been the case—all this primarily displayed in talk. It would seem in fact that talk is a necessary component of morality and to know another's morality would be do hear what another had had to say.

If morality were then to be studied in everyday interaction, the initial problem is to locate the strategic research site where the phenomenon is best displayed and its input on social action can be studied. One possibility is to study casual conversation. But the analyst usually has little knowledge of the background of the actions being talked about and the import and consequences of any moral
matters remain only possibilities to the analyst who does not know if they are actualized or not. Similar objections apply to interview data with the additional problem that responses may be in part designed to fit the interview situation, adding other norms and values. It therefore seems more promising to examine talk from people in a continuing group. To the extent that the observer participated in the activities of that group, the actions that proceeded and followed any display of moral matters can form part of the analysis. Some degree of continuity of association and observation of the interactants by the analyst is a precondition for the meaningful study of such moral matters as commitment, which involves acceptance of a pattern of behavior over time, or cooperation, which involves a shared orientation to and performance of at least some of the group activities. The study of such moral matters in the interaction of people who belonged to a group would present to the analyst a common set of obligations and evaluations of the group from which a start could be made in charting the use of moral matters in talk. Such are the strategic considerations that have led to the selection of the particular site used for this study of moral matters in talk.

This then is a study of the communication of morality in the interaction of a group. The group is a voluntary organization whose members were committed to cooperative activity, in varying degrees, by explicit and implicit consensus. I shall view morality as a conjoining of obligation
and evaluation, and these dimensions will jointly characterize the social construct of a "good person." The configurations of moral matters that are specific to this study--commitment and cooperation--will be the focus of a number of analytical questions which concern the relations of the individual and the organizational structure. By actually locating moral matters in the talk, it will be possible to go beyond speculation about the relation of morality to behavior and to confront eventually the question of whether changes in moral matters precede or follow structural changes in the organization.

The setting of the study is a food cooperative, an "alternative institution" \(^1\) which existed in Philadelphia in the 70's. An essential feature of the Co-op was that members ordered food in advance, thereby committing themselves to buying what they had ordered. Using this system, the group provided produce to people in one neighborhood of the City for six years. The study is concerned particularly with the central three years, in which a decline in the Co-op was successfully reversed through a series of changes in Co-op operation. These changes included changes in the definition of a "good Co-op person." The study considers changes

\(^1\) According to Rothschild-Witt (1979) "alternative institutions may be defined in terms of their members' resolve to build organizations which are parallel to, but outside established institutions, and which fulfill social needs (for education, food, medical aid, etc.) without recourse to bureaucratic authority." (p. 510)
that appear in discussion by the Co-op people of Co-op problems, during the food distribution sessions, in interviews, and at meetings. Talk at the Co-op not only included discussion of policies and practices, but also the actual decisions that were made.

When I first began to listen to the talk of the Co-op people, they did not appear to concern themselves with the changes in moral matters which occurred as they solved problems, formulated policy, and made decisions. People seldom used terms such as "ought" or "should" or referred to others as "good," although I did hear expressions of indignation occasionally. As changes were made in the operation of the Co-op there were generally no discussions of changes in moral matters, of what Co-op people ought to do, or how the Co-op ought to be. There was no attention given to the ideological implications of what was being discussed, or so it seemed. The importance of cooperation was taken for granted, the need for commitment was generally unexamined. In a word, the Co-op people were apparently unconcerned with the communication of morality in their pursuit of Co-op activities.

Yet the Co-op people made decisions which altered the relationship of the Co-op people to the Co-op, of the Co-op to its neighborhood in the City, of different collections of Co-op people to each other. The morality of the Co-op did change. Since the Co-op people did not examine moral matters as they talked with one another, either when making decisions
or while telling stories of the Co-op, the problem of this study is raised: Can one locate evidence of moral matters in the talk of the Co-op people?

Moral Matters In Talk

In the foregoing discussion, I have used the term "moral matters" to refer generally to those issues and problems of social life that involve obligations and evaluations. Throughout this inquiry I shall continue to use the term in this way, to designate these concerns that are considered "moral" by general agreement, some that are distinctive to the Co-op and some that transcend the Co-op. An initial understanding of the problem of locating such moral matters in talk can be gained in the following lines from a Co-op meeting.

Ben:...We've got a court hearing and everything on uh, the 5th, and a, he's going to be summoned, a', and if he doesn't show up, he'll be, you know, a warrant, you know, there'll be a warrant put out on him.

Mickey: Well, who was it that did this?

Ben: It's this guy across the street named Jason Thorne who lives over at 33 Thorne, 33

Mickey: Jason Thorne?

Ben: what? Sheldon?

Sheldon: 3303. Apparently, well, how

Ben: much was said last week about this guy? Did you tell about Dolly?

Sheldon: I don't think it's necessary, you know, it's this, it's really more personal business...["No Parking" 003-018]1

1 The complete text of the segment "No Parking" is given following Chapter 8. Details of the incident are given in the first part of Chap. 8 which contains an analysis of the whole segment. Background information on the Co-op appears in Chap. 2.
There is no use of "ought" or "good" in these lines. The tone of the interactants is calm and no one appears to be indignant. A variety of information is put forward by speakers in the form of "predication." This information appears as descriptions of people, attributions of qualities to people, or statements about the activities of people. At least three of these predications reflect moral matters that can be found by various means in these lines of talk. Each predication reflects a different problem in the recognition and use of moral matters by the interactants. The first predication concerns court hearings, inherently a moral matter, but in this instance they are not interactionally realized as such on the surface of the talk. The second matter simply concerns someone's name. It does not seem to be a moral matter until later in the segment where the individual's identity becomes an issue, complicated by the fact that the individual is black. The third moral matter concerns what is proper to be talked about and a moral matter is realized in the segment as an area of talk is declared out of bounds, thereby defining what is appropriate to that talk.

(1) Court proceedings against an individual are mentioned.

With the term "court hearing" there is understood not only the codified privileges and obligations attached to a government institution, but also the privileges and obligations of certain collections of people who are less obviously
present. These would include those who do the summoning, put out the warrants, and attend during the hearings. When Ben says, "We've got a court hearing" the term "we" introduces other possible collections of people who may feel obligated to attend, since it is possible to conclude that the Co-op has a court hearing, or that only Ben and some others have a court hearing.

The predication of a court hearing has another implication of moral matters even less explicitly stated. It is apparent that the compulsions of a court hearing and the institutions which support it may not produce automatic compliance from the individual mentioned. There is a further implication that automatic compliance is the behavior expected of a "good" person, leading to a possible conclusion that this individual is not an instance of a good person, for at least some collection of people.

(2) The name of the individual is requested and revealed.

In the first few lines, Ben refers to a situation which will occur on the 5th, and discusses the possible actions of a person referred to as "he." Ben has not identified the person about whom he has talked, nor does he make an effort to see if those who are listening know who "he" is. One person present--Mickey--asks who it was, showing that she, as a person within the collection of people at the meeting is privileged to get a name in reply, or an explanation of why a name was not supplied, or perhaps both.
When Ben does answer, it is not with a name initially, but a description of "this guy," and he continues using the phrase "this guy" rather than the name he supplies. Those who listen then have a basis for hearing Ben as referring to an individual of less importance to the Co-op than someone whose name is used. A fuller description, supplied later, reveals that the person is black and the relation with blacks in the neighborhood is interactionally realized as a moral matter.

(3) Talking about some earlier events is said to be inappropriate.

In asking "How much was said..." Ben can be heard as suggesting that there is something that last week's meeting people could have said, which for some people perhaps ought to have been said. The issue here is what can or should be said at the meeting. So too in asking, "Did you tell about Dolly?" Ben does more than ask for information. He makes available the inference that there is some reason why Dolly ought or ought not to be talked about.

This inference is realized in the next response as Sheldon sets a boundary to the talk by saying, "It's really more personal business." Ben is chairperson at this meeting, and there is an expectation that he would set out what can and can not be talked about. Yet Ben has asked Sheldon for guidance about what had been said at the last meeting, and in doing so, has had a boundary to the talk drawn for him. Sheldon's view of what is inappropriate is accepted as the
talk goes on to other issues.

For each of the three items, an examination of the text has indicated some of the predications containing implications of obligation and evaluation. The court hearing is easily seen as introducing moral matters which transcend the Co-op people, and hold for any collection of U.S. people. They are not considered further in the interaction, but having been mentioned have been made available as a moral matter for each of the interactants present. Use of a name is a predication that is less formally institutionalized, although it can be shown that people are sensitive to practices of name usage which denigrate or elevate themselves or collections of others of the people in the neighborhood. Later in this segment, the identity of this individual becomes a crucial issue. The appropriate area for Co-op people to talk about in a meeting is a moral matter which is distinctive to the Co-op and to that immediate situation, although it too relies on broader considerations of what constitutes privacy or rudeness, and the extent to which codified rules or an agenda is followed. In this instance, an immediate consequence of the moral matter is present, in that what can be said at that meeting is defined by one of the talkers, not the chairperson, to exclude something that talker wishes to preserve as a private concern.

But also in those few lines is another moral matter which is distinctive to the Co-op, and by its predication
has implications with reference to obligation and evaluation for good Co-op people and a good Co-op. This predication is less directly related to the surface text, but is clearly an underlying feature of those lines of the example.

(4) Co-op workers ought not to be "hassled" as they do their work.

In this extract, Ben is giving a report of an incident which occurred as he and Sheldon were carrying out their work assignments in the Co-op. Their commitment to the Co-op included going to the Food Center each week at 4 AM and buying produce, which they would then convey to the Co-op and unload. It was available for the food distribution to take place later that day, where other people would cooperate in setting out the food and seeing to it that people got and paid for the food they had ordered previously. (cf. Chapter 2 for details.) The point of Ben's report is to present the problem to the meeting people, since something happened that interfered with his carrying out his commitment to the Co-op. Some consensus is needed on a plan of action, in order to prevent this happening again as Co-op people cooperatively do their work assignments. Co-op members point out later in this segment that this is only "the latest incident," and that this individual has "hassled a lot of people." ["No Parking" 184].

This example shows how moral matters can emerge on close examination of a text. Factual predications made about people were seen as implying moral matters. Prominent were the
"collections of people" for whom something may be a moral matter, or may be judged by others to be in such a position. In this study it will most often be the case that this is some collection of Co-op people.

There is one additional feature which establishes the importance of these lines of talk to the association. Since they are not part of an unfocused conversation, but occur at a Co-op meeting, a further set of moral matters is relevant. Meeting people are expected to solve problems by formulating policies and making decisions. The discussion quoted above continued for several minutes and then a motion was passed to obtain a sign which would restrict parking outside the Co-op entrance. These four predications of moral matters lead to a defensive action of the organization, a recurrent pattern in the relations of the Co-op and the neighborhood.

In the example it is clear that much of what constitutes moral matters is not present as a series of overt statements of obligation and evaluation. More likely there are hints or inferences from activities which are predicated or from categorizations or attributes of people. At one extreme are instances where society has highly codified institutions, e.g., "court hearings." And perhaps at the other extreme is the case of the seemingly ordinary pursuit of asking for a name. In that case, not only the matter of getting the name utilizes a system of obligations, but its use or non-use, as well as the form it takes, also provides information on
evaluation.

There is a sense perhaps in which just about any predication of people is a possible candidate for moral matters, and in some context might become a focus of what ought to be or what is good. It will be useful to use the notion of always available to formulate the property that just about any predication of people can appear in talk as a moral matter. Choosing unbruised ripe bananas may earn for the chooser the label of "perfect banana seeker," (Meeting of 5/21/73), which for at least some of the Co-op people was not a good person. Dewey and Tufts ([1908] 1929) comment on such a phenomenon in their analysis of a "moral situation":

There is then no fixed line between the morally indifferent and the morally significant. Every act is potential subject matter of moral judgment. (p. 211, italics in original).

The complexity and contingent character of talk is in part due to the fact that people in different perspectives and biographies may find different significance in what is available and in what they use as a moral matter. In addition, the individuals in the interaction are going through changing series of relationships with others, both people present and people talked about. That is, the individuals display themselves as part of shifting collections of people. The resulting temporal flux is captured in talk as both a retrospective reviewing and future forecasting. What was not a moral matter is suddenly one for a period of time, perhaps
as brief as the few lines cited above.

The example has suggested that broadening the notion of morality is a useful measure in beginning to focus on what moral matters appear in talk. The notion of "collections of people" which appeared here will be developed further. However, it would seem reasonable at this point to consider the ways in which the general concept of morality has been explored before proceeding to the data and the mode of analysis.

The Sociological Study Of Morality

My thinking about morality stems from the view of Durkheim ([1906] 1974) that "Morality begins with membership of a group, whatever that group may be" (p. 37). The concept of moral matters that I shall be using is close to that of Durkheim's concept of morality because it springs from the association of an individual with a plurality of people. In order to treat moral matters in verbal interaction it will be necessary to use a broader unit of social organization than the usual concept of a social class, group or collectivity: to consider "collections of people" that include such particular units as "thrifty-people," "reasonable-people," or "Monday-night-meeting-people."

I shall maintain that associated with any such collections of people are sets of obligations and evaluations, both explicit and implicit, which interactants may assign to these collections as they appear in talk. These obligations and evaluations construct what a person ought to do, or be,
or have in order to be defined as a "good person" for a collection of people. In other words, they define a good person for that collection of people. For instance, the good thrifty-person (or people) ought to be cautious about the quality of sale merchandise, and the good meeting-people ought to achieve consensus quickly on a policy with regard to the youth in the neighborhood.

This formulation does not say that a person has to be or wants to be a good person. But the means to be a good person in that collectivity are then theoretically describable, given a collection of people. It is also empirically describable, given data on such a collection of people.

Durkheim's characterization of "moral facts" as having "two partly contradictory aspects"\(^1\) is relevant here as he notes:

> Obligation or duty only expresses one aspect abstracted from morality. A certain degree of desirability is another characteristic no less important than the first. \((p. 36)\)

Both aspects will be important in this study, obligation being considerably broadened, and desirability focused on the notion of being a "good person." The term "moral matters" will be kept as a working term to identify the occurrence of elements of morality which are located in some context in talk.

\(^1\) Kant ([1785] 1935) also separates "duty" from "inclination," but finds "moral content" where actions are done "'from duty' and not from inclination." \((p. 13)\)
The Empirical Study of Morality

Until now there has been no extensive study of morality in which the ongoing verbal interaction has been taken as resource from which morality can be constructed. This is not to say that empirical studies of morality which focus on different social groups have not been made, such as Brandt's (1954) finding that Hopi ethical views were similar to Western ones. Brandt's interviews, however, were conducted in English for the most part, and either the Hopi were asked to list actions they felt were right or wrong, or to give their views about the morality of a list of each of thirty types of behavior. Similarly Ladd (1957) sought to find components of a "moral code" of the Navaho by interviewing a Navaho medicine man, Bidaga, and his two assistants. It is not clear how much of what a medicine man would report would be what he thought ought to be the case and how much of what were the on-going practices.

A secondary study of anthropological data was made by Macbeath (1952) to find the ways of life developed by "primitive peoples in their efforts to conceive and live the good life." (p. 245) Macbeath, who titles his work, "Experiments In Living," focuses on "cooperative efforts at conceiving and realizing the good for man." (p. 16)

Moral rules and ideals are found for four groups: Trobriand Islanders (using Malinowski as a data source); Bantu Tribe (using Junod; Willoughby); Australian aborigines (using Elkin; Spencer and Gillen; Radcliff-Brown; Ashley Montagu);
and Crow Indians (using Lowie).

Edel and Edel ([1959] 1968) considered ways to bridge anthropology and ethics. They survey the kinds of items that enter the content and the structure of different moralities, exploring their variety, meaning and function. (p. 192)

They give data from several cultures, but do not consider verbal interaction as a site for study. There and in Edel (1963) a methodology is described to make it possible to map "moralities" (p. 208), by finding the constituents which make up its content and structure. Emmet (1966) surveys these and other less empirical analyses of morality from a philosopher's point of view.

An extensive review of empirical studies of morality was made by the British sociologist Bransley (1972) where he attempts to create a "sociology of ethics," primarily descriptive, but available for prescriptive use. He proposes to keep logically distinct the two aspects noted by Durkheim:

Prescriptions are concerned with the right, whereas evaluations are concerned with the good. (p. 49, italics in original)

Barnsley notes that the "greater part of research" on moral codes "has been carried out by means of either interviews or questionnaires." (p. 187) He mentions that tape recordings and cameras have been used, but sees such "mechanical means" as useful generally in exploratory work for "broadly interpretive purposes." (p. 237) Many of the studies in the literature attempt to elicit moral principles by sets of
questions administered to isolated individuals, often subject pools of college students.¹

Some of the same empirical studies are also reviewed by the British psychologist Wright (1971), but his focus is on a domain he considers larger than that of "moral rules," finding

...a network of related concepts which together make up what can be called the language of moral obligation. A sample of some of the key concepts in this language might include, good, right, wrong, ought, duty, virtue, guilt, responsibility, sin, blame, and so on. (p. 13)

For the most part, Wright does not take into account a social basis, although he does link the phenomenon of what he calls "moral independence" to "remote conformity to the reference group" (p. 28) and he posits a "morally indignant stance" which

declares our solidarity with particular groups of people who share our values--our membership and reference groups. (p. 196)

Ossowska (1971) also reviews social determinants of "moral ideas," and the problems concerning feelings like the so-called sense of duty, remorse, moral scruple, guilt, repentence, moral indignation and so on. (p.21)

¹ Typical of the studies which Barnsley discusses is that by Rettig and Pasamanick (1962) who use a battery of 50 statements of "morally prohibited behavior" (p. 75) to which respondents were asked to assign a degree of "wrongness." It is not clear what aspect of morality is being tapped here, but the right/wrong dimension usually refers to the obligatory or to rules of conduct. Another study of Turner (1954) used written responses to a projective type of questionnaire to assess individual's conceptions of self role where a friend has violated a norm.
Among the many expressions of morality, indignation appears to have the most usually recognized surface indication of affect. In this study an on-going consideration will be to specify the collections of people relevant in instances where displays of affect suggest this and other moral matters.

The major work in indignation was that of Ranulf (1938, 1962) who studied historically what he termed a disinterested tendency to inflict punishment, which he found to be "distinctive characteristic of the lower middle class." (p. 198) His argument ranges through past societies as he finds evidence of indignation linked to social class. Scheler (1910, 1961) earlier had developed a thesis which Ranulf characterized as "identical" (p. 201) to his own, but which Ranulf rejects since Ranulf feels proof was not supplied.

"Ressentement" is distinguished from "rebellion" by Merton (1957) who notes that the former involves a sour-grapes pattern which asserts merely that desired but unattainable objectives do not actually embody the prized values. (p. 156) According to Merton "ressentement" lacks the notion of "change" which characterizes rebellion as a response to the rejection of both norms and means in his discussion of social structure and anomie.

Moral indignation is located "with disinterested

1 Another treatment by Ranulf (1933) considered moral indignation in Athens.
opposition to nonconformity and deviant behavior" by Merton (1957, p. 362) in his discussion of nonconformity as a type of reference group behavior, vital in the mechanisms of social control,

...for not only the relatively small number of people directly injured by deviance—for example, the parents of the kidnapped child—but also the larger collectivity, adhering to the culturally established norms, are activated to bring the deviant (and, by anticipation, other prospective deviants) back into line....His nonconformity is not a private dereliction, but a thrust toward a new morality (or a restoration of an old and almost forgotten morality). He appeals, in short, to a past or future reference group. (p. 362;363)

In his more recent treatment of the reward system of science, Merton (1973) points to the expression of "moral indignation" (p. 292) by the backers of unsuccessful scientists in priority quarrels, since they feel the institutionalized norm of science, that people be rewarded for their discoveries, is being violated.

Two recent historical analyses of problems of deviance in drug abuse and alcohol consumption relate indignation to the social structure. Duster (1970) used Ranulf's formulation to explain the "passionate moral outrage" (p. 235) that drug addition now generates in the middle class, as compared with the situation before 1920. Gussfield (1969) in his study of "moral righteousness" in the establishment of Prohibition finds

hostility, hatred and anger toward the enemy were the major feelings which nurtured the movement. Armed with the response of indignation at their
declining social position, the adherents of Temperance sought a symbolic victory through legislation which, even if it failed to regulate drinking, did indicate whose morality was publicly dominant. (p. 111)

Other varieties of affect are relevant to morality, such as "self-satisfaction" (including "smugness"), "ridicule," "reproach" and "envy." Sennet (1972) in his reflections on contemporary urban life notes the curious self-satisfaction men derive in explaining what they gave up 'for the sake of the children.' (p. 83)

A similar type of affect is discussed in the analysis to come when ridicule is directed at exemplary Co-op members who might be characterized as over-conforming. Silver (1977) focused on "envy," but treated it philosophically, whereas Sabini (1977) experimentally produced "moral reproach" by deliberately interferring with a task assigned to subjects. "Moral reproach" was defined as

any comment which: a) articulates some standard of behavior against which the action or actor fails, or b) characterizes an actor or his action as low in the local scheme of social types. (p. 77)

In analyzing verbal exchanges between a confederate and a subject, Sabini using these two criteria classified 14 percent of the comments as moral reproaches. This study was not designed to locate the subject within any social base, or to specify the linguistic elements within which the standards or social types were displayed. (see also Sabini and Silver, 1978 and Silver and Sabini, 1978)
Two General Concepts of Morality

The references just discussed are part of the subset of the literature on morality that emphasizes empirical work. Though a variety of methods are used to gather the data, none of them examine talk in ordinary interaction. Two general concepts of morality are central to the work here—obligation and evaluation. Each must be examined further. Obligation is linked here to norms and other facets of the moral order, and evaluation primarily to one particular evaluation, that of being a "good person."

Obligation

By obligation I mean a (felt) sense of constraint such that a person is said to be (or be doing) what he or she ought to be (or be doing) in following it. An instance of an obligation is doing one's duty, as are "moral laws" in the sense of Park and Burgess (1924, 1970) which "tell us not what we can, but what we ought to do." (p. 13) Much of what appears in the sociological literature on "social norms" such as Morris' 1959 typology or the analysis of norms and sanctions by Blake and Davis (1963), focus on the sense of "ought," especially with regard to expected behaviors, or of prohibitions, prescriptions, or permissions.¹

¹ For example, the application of logic to "prescriptive discourse (or 'emotive,' 'normative,' 'expressive,' etc.)" (p. 10) described by Anderson and Moore (1957) uses as its "only primitive deontic concept, 'permission,' the others (i.e., obligatory, indifferent, forbidden) are defined in terms of this primitive concept." (p. 12) In the formal
As was suggested above, I shall be extending the set of what can be obligated to include predications other than behaviors. Some social classifications and attributions of people are already traditionally understood in terms of rights and duties, such as "manager" or "woman," and some, such as "boy" or "kid," are not so directly approached, but rather seen as aspects of age or gender. Other attributions are not usually associated with such rights and duties, such as "charm" or "size." The empirical study of moral matters indicates that collections of people partitioned along such dimensions must be included. It is not rare to find them associated with expressions which indicate envy, reproach, indignation, or self-satisfaction. In fact, it remains doubtful if there are any attributes that are assigned to individuals which are not available as predications to which can be given what will be seen as a "moral response." (cf. Chapter 4) The sense of "always available" is evident.

There is a considerable body of empirical studies on obligation. The two most well known studies of the psychological development of morality in children, Piaget (1966) on "moral judgment" and Kohlberg (1971) on the development of deontic logic which they describe (and attribute to von Wright) one of the two principles which govern the deontic concepts is the principle of permission which states that "any given act is either itself permitted or its negation is permitted." (p. 12) Further use of the concept of "ought" is made in Chapter 4, where additional literature which is more relevant there is cited.
morality distinguishes relations of constraint from relations of cooperation. Younger children live within the view that "Right is to obey the will of the adult," (p. 195) whereas according to Piaget this is later replaced with "good" as a "product of cooperation."

Where the small group has been a focus of study, the emphasis was often on the "general psychological process involved in the formation of any norm" (p. 88) as was the case in Sherif's (1936) early experimental studies of the formation of a norm of perceptual patterning. Asch (1952) got subjects to conform to judgments of the length of a line where confederates' judgments also were patently in error. In the decision-making of the Co-op the process of achieving consensus shows a similar redefinition of what ought to be, although it may not be so much at variance with the physical world.

Unlike Sherif and Asch, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) consider the naturally occurring groups in their work on convergence, the way in which shared norms are created.

If the 'benefits' of conformity and the 'social reality' function of groups begin to answer the question why individual opinions and attitudes are so often anchored in groups, then the observation that norms arise from the interaction of individuals begins to answer the question how.1

(p. 57, italics in original)

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1 Katz and Lazarsfeld attribute this phrase, "social reality", to Lewin (p. 45). The notion of "social reality" as a product of ordinary talk similarly appears in Watson's study of sociability (1958), where she sees its "major function" as acceptable explanations for aspects of the
The research design of Katz and Lazarsfeld captures the effects of social interaction even though the analysts were not present during such discussions. Homans (1950) discusses both "norms" and "orders" as verbal statements arising from continued interaction between the members of a group.

Norms often arise from the diffuse interaction of the members [of a group] who associate together for a while, and then, as if overnight, the group norms crystallize and take shape. One day they were followed, though not consciously held; the next day the group is aware of them. The origin of the norms, if it was ever known, is apt to be forgotten. The group has no memory of a time when the norms were not held, be that memory short or long. Thus no one knew the origin of the output standard in the Bank Wiring Observation Room. (p. 417)

The "output standard" was a behavioral response for the Bank Wiring Room People. This is not to say that there were no verbal responses. Some norms readily entail both verbal and non-verbal responses, ranging from officials enforcing codified laws, to what Merton (1957) formulates as the 'spontaneous' yet socially patterned responses of other members of the group, even though they have not been allocated specific roles for this purpose. (p. 319)

External world which are either puzzling or threatening. When the criterion for accuracy cannot be correspondence with observed facts, it becomes correspondence with social reality, which is to say, the judgments of one's friends. (p. 273)

Another instance appears in Klein's survey of how to work within groups (1963) where she notes that close-knit groups tend to create for themselves a 'social reality' where ideas are expressed not because they have been verified, but because they are confirmed in conversation with other members of the group and one would look peculiar if one questioned them. (p. 175)
Such a response is described earlier in Merton, with data on "brown-nosing" from "The American Soldier."

Excerpts from the diary of an enlisted man illustrate the interplay between dissociation and alienation: the outward-oriented man is too sedulous in abiding by the official mores--'But you're supposed to [work over there]. The lieutenant said you were supposed to.'--this evokes group hostility expressed in epithets and ridicule--'Everybody is making sucking, kissing noises at K and S now'--followed by increasing dissociation within the group--'Ostracism was visible, but mild...few were friendly toward them...'

(p. 270, underlining and ellipsis in original)

Here the use of the norm is located in a small group as it was in Homans and in Katz and Lazarsfeld, and it is also shown in action. This description shows moral matters in use, which is what is meant here by the communication of moral matters in interaction.

In each of the studies of norms in small groups the implicit norms defined what a good person would be for some collection of people. For the Bank Wiring, the "output standard" can be seen as the norm of the good workers in the wiring room. In the enlisted man's diary there was a conflict shown between being a good soldier and a good enlisted man. The "everybody" who made kissing sounds (p. 270) is the collection of enlisted men who were carrying out the "socially patterned responses" (p. 319) "expressed in epithets and ridicule." (p. 270) They were in that way suggesting K and S move from the collection of good soldiers to the collection in which "everyone" else was located, that of good enlisted men.
Clearly the notion of obligation is intimately coupled with that of evaluation and so it is difficult to discuss the Co-op concretely without considering both. The Co-op person can be defined within a series of specific obligations. But these are tied to the notion of what was a good Co-op and what was a good person in it. Co-op operation included obligations of members to pre-order and pick-up what they had ordered in order for the Co-op to supply food in the quantities ordered and in a convenient and pleasant fashion. The structure of obligations of Co-op people can more easily be assembled after evaluation is considered.

**Evaluation** Of the many kinds of evaluation that are possible I shall be considering only one, and that is that someone is a "good" person. But the immediate result is quite general in that the whole field of ethics seems to become relevant once that focus is made. From work on values and evaluations, "moral" sentiment notions and judgment, I shall be drawing on particular discussions that deal with the language of morality. Since ethics generally treats ideas there is less that I can draw directly from the literature than was the case with the many empirical studies of obligation.

Although I have elected to use the word "good," I do not propose to attempt to define it. Here I follow the view of G.E. Moore ([1903] 1971) that any attempt to define the good is to commit the "naturalistic fallacy" (p. 10) since "good" has, Moore argues, no constitutive elements.
I am limiting the notion of "good" to its use in a "good person" (or "good people") and it is along these lines that I shall proceed. In so limiting evaluation, I am not attempting to exclude other dimensions along which values appear, such as patriotism, parenting, or preaching. Rather I am concerned with locating the positive end of such a dimension, presuming there is of course a polarity, in the sense that someone can be, or can have gradations of values which might be found in such predicates as patriotic, parent, or preaching.

By "value" I mean what Kluckhohn (1951) suggests as a conception, explicit, or implicit, distinctive of an individual which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action. (p. 395)

The process of evaluation and the creation of value judgments are the subjects of the general theory of value as developed within a philosophical perspective. In the formulation I shall introduce in the next section (and expand in Chapter 4), evaluation is directly linked to obligation. Neither is taken as derivative of the other nor is there any consideration that one is logically prior to the other. Such a view is consistent with a social approbative theory, where the approval or disapproval of society is determinative, not that of the individual. According to the philosopher Hill (1960), Durkheim and other social approbationists err in wanting to substitute a moral science for a moral philosophy. Hill also notes that they assign what he sees as too small
a share to the experiences of "ideas in individual minds." (p. 94)

The area of ethical concern which is particularly relevant to this work focuses on language. In "The Language of Morals" Hare (1952) treats separately "ought", "good" and the "imperative mood", whereas the formulation later developed here suggests a dynamic in which all three are represented (cf Ch. 4 for discussion of dynamic of moral response). Hare and other philosophers of ethics such as Stevenson (1944) and Taylor (1961) have been concerned with differences between imperatives and indicatives and between the act of description and that of evaluation. In other words they treat words and ideas used in "moral discourse" (Edwards, 1955) as important, but they have a "meta-" relation to the empirical world of the Co-op people. Hare (1952) however also considers the relation of "ought" and "is" which will be useful later in this work as language is more directly confronted (in Chapter 4).

For this work, value will be used in Kluckhohn's sense and attention focused on the notion of a good person. This will not mean neglecting the notion of a "bad" person or having it disappear in the logical category of "non-good person." The data do present such collections as defaulting-people (Chapter 5) and troublemakers (Chapter 8) and these must be considered. So too the notion of "super-good", as is captured with the term "saint" or "hero," usefully distinguished by Urmson (1970) by the fact that the former
requires an enormous effort of self-control, although both pertain to the doing of actions most people would not do (cf. here also Chapter 5).

Two Specific Moral Matters

General considerations of morality, even those of obligation and evaluation, are at too great a remove from the talk of the Co-op people to be of much value in the search for moral matters in talk. Two more specific notions of moral matters--cooperation and commitment--will serve as central concepts which will be used to organize the data more directly. The "co-" prefix is not entirely an alliterative accident, but reflects an underlying focus on being "with" others. These particular notions make possible a synthesis of some of the moral matters which became important in the Co-op as they were communicated in talk and so doing were used by Co-op people to effect changes in the Co-op.

One of the systemic problems of the Co-op, the problem of retaining members, can be used as a basis by which to derive the notions of both commitment and cooperation. The overt collective aim of the Co-op (to provide "cheap food," documented in Chapter 2) could be expected to account for people coming to the Co-op to get food. This was seen as an incentive to belong and to participate. But the systemic problem was to insure continued participation. To the extent that commitment was achieved, this problem was reduced.
Following Merton (1916) a degree of participation can be usefully distinguished from a degree of commitment to an association.

By degree of commitment we mean the extent to which the association is important to members as compared with the many other competing demands on their attention, energies, and allegiance. By degree of participation we mean the amount and character of actual engagement in the association's work. (p. 98)

The minimal degree of participation which was expected of everyone consisted of pre-ordering and picking up food. However, since the ordering and picking up occurred a week apart, an essential act of commitment also occurred: the act of returning to pick up and to pay for what had been ordered. That is, to participate required a degree of commitment.

The notion of commitment is a necessary aspect of any explanation of the behavior of Co-op people. Limiting the analysis to the possibility of low prices by Co-op participation, "purpose-rational conduct (zweckrational)" (Weber, [1922] 1954, p. 18) would have resulted in an explanation which failed to explain much of the social conduct by which the Co-op people can be characterized. The notion of commitment described above recognizes that social conduct of people is determined at least in part by "the conscious faith in the absolute worth of the conduct as such, independent of any aim, and measured by some such standard as ethics, aesthetics or religion." (p. 18). In this instance
the standard proposed for such "value-rational conduct" (wertrational) (p. 19) is from ethics, and considers what defines people as good people. As Weber ([1922] 1947) notes

When action is oriented to absolute values, it always involves 'commands' or 'demands' to the fulfillment of which the actor feels obligated.

(p. 115)

As this work will document, "commands" or "demands" appear in ordinary language in a variety of unlikely forms.

The notion of participation makes possible the integration of cooperation into the same analysis. Participation in the Co-op was not a solo endeavor. Participation was expected to be co-participation. In other words, some degree of "cooperation" was expected. Specific problems of commitment and cooperation will be used to organize the analysis of moral matters in the talk of Co-op people in later chapters.

Cooperation The Co-op, as its name implies, was a cooperative. It was formed by people who supported cooperative ideals. By "cooperation" is meant here an activity (category or attribute) done (or held) with others which is directed to a collective aim. In the case of the Co-op, such a shared goal was to get produce at low prices.

As an analytical construct, cooperation appeared frequently in the earlier sociological literature. For Cooley ([1902] 1967) cooperation was a central concern for the individual.
It is, after all, only common sense, to say we exercise our freedom through co-operation with others. If you join a social group—let us say a dramatic club—you expect that it will increase your freedom, give your individual powers new stimulus and opportunity for expression. And why should not the same principle apply to society at large.

For Mead (1934) cooperation was a central concern for society as a whole.

The social organism is used by individuals whose cooperative activity is essential to the life of the whole.

More recently, L. Coser's (1956) analysis emphasizes that "conflict as well as co-operation has social functions" (p. 31) in the building of group formations. Goodenough (1963) focuses on the place of cooperation in accomplishing "purposive change" (p. 67) in community reform and development. In the last decade, cooperation appears as one aspect of collective life in several studies. For example, in Rigby's (1974) study of communes in Britain, people in the counter culture "counterpose the values of cooperation and brotherhood between people" (p. 2) against the value of "competitive individualism."

Rigby proposes differentiating between groups according "to the degree of sharing adhered to" noting that some analysts reserve the term "community"

for those characterized by a fairly minimal level of co-operation, such as shared living accommodation.

Although cooperation obviously permeates all aspects of collective living, it is more likely to be discussed with
reference to occupation or work. Zablocki (1971) observes an emphasis on "work" as a service in Bruderhof communities and concludes there is a communal need to deny the value of "individual achievement." He suggests that

The limitations of individual achievement are thus emphasized, the virtues of sheer cooperation, regardless of who is doing the cooperating, are proclaimed. (p. 33)

Kanter (1973) also points to the economic sphere as the arena in which issues of cooperation are faced by any group attempting to evolve a collective life. She suggests that

Regardless of the specific type of economy and source of income a commune exhibits, economic decisions generally will be made in the light of the social and egalitarian ideals of the group and in such a way as to enhance cooperation and brotherhood. (p. 223)

The Co-op itself was not attempting to evolve a collective life and there is hence no reference to brotherhood, as Rigby and Kanter found with communal living, nor were individual efforts faulted, as was the case with Bruderhof as found by Zablocki. The actual arena in which Co-op people could be cooperative consisted of the activities needed to get the food and make it available for those who ordered it. Such cooperative work included buying food at the food center, opening crates of food, as well as solving collectively the problems of managing the Co-op (cf. Chapter 2 for further details on the Co-op and its problems.)

... ...

The notion of cooperation which emerges from the litera-
ture cited above is one of activity that occurs with other people. That is, there is in some sense co-involvement, which may not be temporally or spatially effected. Rather a fixed set of activities, jobs and attitudes are expected to be done, or held, or had by a plurality of people. Cooperation requires that others are, in some way, also participants.

Though the notion of cooperation may be clear, it is another matter to recognize it as the focus of a moral matter. A formulation is used throughout this work in which people are shown as related integrally as part of the Co-op. Such a formulation is a means of operationalizing cooperation (and later commitment as will be shown on page 40) as a notion that can be investigated in talk. The formulation states that

Good a, b, c, ...n in C ought to y,

where a, b, c, ...n were individuals, C was the Co-op (consisting of cooperating people) and y was some set of activities, attitudes, and categories which were relevant. Implicit is the notion that the C, here the Co-op, has some collective aim (goal) to which cooperative activity is directed. The formulation (later elaborated as a "moral premise", cf. Ch. 4) also leads to the linking of evaluation and obligation, by the use of the notion of "good" and hence directs the investigation of cooperation to include the "good Co-op people."
Commitment. The concept of commitment occupies a central place in traditional sociology and in a variety of recent works such as Smelser's (1962) theory of collective behavior; Goode's (1960) theory of role strain; and L. Coser's (1974) discussion of "greedy institutions," those that seek "exclusive and undivided loyalties." (p. 4) Recent study of commitment begins with Becker's note (1960) in which he focuses on commitment as "consistency of behavior." (p. 36)

There are three major components to commitment for Becker:

(1) prior actions,
(2) recognition of involvement of originally extraneous interest (what Becker refers to as "side bets"),
(3) resulting consistent lines of activities.

The "side bet" hypothesis, that commitment can be explained in terms of involvement in what was initially extraneous, was rejected by Ritzer and Trice (1969) in their study of organization and occupational commitment of personnel manager, but on the other hand was given some support both by Allutto, Hrebinjak and Alonso (1973) in their study of teachers and nurses, and Shoemaker, Snizek and Bryant (1973) in their study of forest rangers in state and federal forests.

Becker refers to Goffman's use of commitment (1968, p. 22) to explicate a person's sustaining a consistent image of self as "face." A later use by Goffman (1961) of the notion of commitment is with regard to roles, where the term is restricted to "impersonally enforced structural arrangements." (p. 33) A person is seen to be "locked into
a position," much as in the earlier notion of "face."
Johnson (1973) also uses such a notion of behavioral commitment,

> those consequences of the initial pursuit of a line of action which constrain the actor to continue that line of action, (p. 397)

in an analysis of courtship and cohabitation. More recently, Marks (1977) finds commitment as the "decisive" factor in whether some form of "strain or overload will be experienced," (p. 929) given multiple roles and scarcity of time or energy. Marks emphasizes the idea that performances are carried out "over time," which is implicit in Becker's notion of "consistent" (p. 33) and Goffman's notion of "sustain." (p. 44)

Ideological commitments were considered by Kornhauser (1962) who analyzed radical and liberal political commitments as consisting

> in the various relations which are formed in the process of acting in a certain direction; (p. 322)

by Gerson (1976) who uses patterns of commitment organization as a means of assessing quality of life; by Goldner, Ritti, and Ference (1977) for the religious commitment of priests (percentage who "never thought of returning to a lay state" p. 545) with regard to the production of "cynical knowledge" (presumably altruistic knowledge constructed to persevere an organization); by Merton (1963, 1976) with regard to the ambivalence of scientists' "commitment to a discovery" (p. 47) and concern for advancing of knowledge; and by Mitroff (1974) who emphasized subjective components of commitment in
Another line of development of commitment is found in Schelling (1963) who uses it in a sense close to "promise" (p. 43) where he notes "the right to be sued is the power to accept a commitment." Schelling deals with conflict, formulation of strategy, and the use of commitment as a major bargaining tool. Similarly the social psychologist Kiesler (1971) defines commitment as "the pledging or binding of the individual to behavioral acts," (p. 30) and tries experimentally to measure factors affecting a degree of commitment. In this direction is a recent study by Moriarty (1975) who experimentally assigned to specific people on a beach a commitment to watch items left on a beach towel which were subsequently "stolen" by confederates. A prior commitment increased markedly the likelihood that people would try to stop a "theft."

Other studies of commitment concern the social system requirements for commitment in which both "zweckrational" as well as the "wertrational" motivations (cf. page 31) need be considered. Kanter (1972) singles out commitment as the central link of self to others. She views commitment in terms of loyalty to a social system in her study of the organizational problems of 19th century communes. Kanter formulates three types of commitment: continuance (instrumental), cohesion (cathetic) and control (evaluative). For each of these she devises two mechanisms of commitment, those tendencies keeping people in, and ones excluding them.
For Kanter

commitment means the attachment of the self to the requirements of social relations that are seen as self-
self-expressive. Commitment links self-interest to social requirements.

Rothschild-Witt (1979) adds to Kanter's mechanisms of commitment "value-purposive incentives" in the case of "collectivist work organizations" (p. 515) which require a high level of commitment. Antonovsky and Antonovsky (1974) made use of part of Kanter's framework for their analysis of an Israeli kibbutz.

Promising, such as used in the sense of Schelling, Kiesler, and Moriarity, is close to the ideological commitment of Kornhauser and the others cited above, but they do not describe the continuing activity of commitment shown by some of the Co-op people. There is a sense in which the people become "locked" into the Co-op, as in Goffman's view, perhaps a "consequence of the initial pursuit" of Johnson, but not readily explainable in terms of Becker's "side bet" which is after all in the Co-op only a small fee. (cf. Chapter 2) It is Kanter's notion that commitment links people to the association that is more fruitful here, when one adds the idea of commitment occurring over time, which was implicit in many of the studies and overt in that of Marks.

Three general features of commitment emerge which are
relevant to this study from considering commitment in terms of the literature cited above.

(1) There is some desired collective aim of the collection of people which requires investment of the individual(s)'s resources (time and energy particularly).

(2) Commitment is a way to be seen as a good person (or good people) in some collection of people.

(3) Commitment is oriented to a future sequence in which a relationship of individual(s) and collections of people will continue.

I shall mean by "commitment" here the continuing investment of resources (particularly time and energy) by people in some collective aim of a collection of people which returns to the individual(s) (minimally) the possibility of being seen as good people in that collection of people. In this way, the same formulation introduced above (p.35, as a "moral premise") linking obligation and evaluation in the conceptualization of cooperation is shown here to be relevant for the investigation of commitment. The formulation is stated

Good a, b, c, ...n in C ought to be y.

Again C is the Co-op having some collective aim to which cooperative activities of the individuals a, b, c, ...n are directed, but in this case the emphasis is on continuing the activity, rather than its cooperative nature.

In the case of the Co-op, although each self makes a commitment, necessarily more than one individual is needed for there to be a Co-op. One question then is to what extent are these features displayed in the talk of the Co-op people. Three critical aspects of commitment conceptualized notions
of investment in continuing cooperative obligations and evaluations which are oriented to a desired collective end. Commitment is specified here as a property of a collection of people with a collective goal. But at the same time, it is a means to a definition of "good Co-op people."

The Sociological Study of Talk

The fundamental problem of this work was set by the fact that moral matters are seldom discussed in any obvious way in the talk of the Co-op people. Yet the evidence will make it clear that moral matters are being changed and the definition of a good person altered. In the chapters to follow particular problems of cooperation and commitment will be analyzed as they were faced in the Co-op. Yet the Co-op people do not formulate their problems and discuss them in ways that resemble discussions of morality, or of what "ought to be" and "what is the good," or even directly in terms of cooperation and commitment. It is for this reason that a philosophical reader such as "Morality and the Language of Conduct" edited by Castaneda and Nakhnikian (1965) is not of use in the initial question of how to study moral matters in talk. However, individual essays on "ought," or its logic and semantics, are relevant to the discussion of Chapter 4 and are considered there.

Although a variety of techniques was used to acquire data, the core of the analysis of the communication of moral
matters, and in particular cooperation and commitment, is through a microanalysis of talk. In doing this I am considering that talk is a legitimate resource for the analysis of morality within the sociology of knowledge. Further I would want to insist that a scientific study which uses talk as a resource is only possible using transcriptions of recorded talk as data, where it is possible to focus on minute and often seemingly unnoticed features of the talk.\(^1\) As interactants the Co-op people may be responding to nuances or gross features of the talk which are missed or opaque or unknown or not remembered by any observer, however well-acquainted with Co-op situations and problems the individual may be. With continued access to talk from transcriptions it is possible to maximize the possibility of developing an analysis which is "based upon observed interpersonal events." (Whyte [1943] 1970, p. 194)

In focusing on am concerned with the creation in talk of a shared residue which results from the communication of "personal or social knowledge" which for Cooley (1926) is

\(^1\) As the research progressed my own views changed as to which moral matters were of primary concern to the problems of the Co-op which I wanted to understand. Short passages of talk assumed greater importance to the final analysis than when they had been first heard. Further the language used by the interactants at these points contained elements of moral matters which only assumed importance within later frameworks. This was true both where events of major importance were occurring, such as the introduction of the stratification system, or with the more ordinary events--such as people complaining about the high cost of food.
developed from contact with the minds of other men, through communication which sets going a process of thought and sentiment similar to theirs and enables us to understand them by sharing their state of mind. (p. 69)

This intuitive approach suggests the way in which moral matters are understood by a self, but leaves open the sense in which the others are essential to the communication of knowledge.

On the other hand Mead ([1934] 1967) emphasizes this "larger context," and minimizes the subjective as he sets out to approach language not from the standpoint of inner meanings to be expressed, but in its larger context of co-operation in the group taking place by means of signals and gestures. (p. 6)

The fact that someone was seen in the Co-op with an orange in hand did not itself provide a basis for deciding amongst the following possibilities: that this person was "looking at an orange," "taking an orange," "buying an orange," "borrowing an orange," "holding an orange," or "stealing an orange."1 Each involves "verstehen" in the sense developed by Abel (1948) of the Weber idea. Each is a definition of the situation in the sense of Berger and Luckman (1967) who "contend" (p. 3) that any "social construction of reality is the rightful business of the sociology of knowledge."

The formulations made by interactants in talk are the means by which participants have defined a situation, including those aspects by which moral matters will be shown in later

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1 In addition, in this area of Philadelphia, the sense of "to hold an object" and "to borrow an object" were often identical.
chapters to be implicated. Mills (1940a) too has located the sociology of knowledge as concerned

with factual investigation of the verbal components of action, with the 'common sense.' (p. 319)

As a study within the sociology of knowledge which is focused on moral matters, the analysis of talk of the Co-op people will be the major means of finding the notions of morality ("mental productions" Merton (1957, p. 461)) used by the Co-op people as they operated the Co-op. Such talk of moral matters was the means by which the Co-op group structure ("existential basis" Merton (1957, p. 460)) of the Co-op was altered, as interactants refined and changed what participation in the Co-op meant, both under usual operation, and under those conditions where an extra effort was needed, such as starting up after a summer closing.

It will be useful to use the formulation of Co-op people for the "existential basis" in a way that stretches between and includes both the Co-op people considered individually and collectively as the social organization of the Co-op. A distinction between the two notions is not always specified in talk and is especially difficult to make when reference to the Co-op people is made using "we." For another thing there is no way to show generally which of the two possibilities--the distributive or the collective--is being understood by the Co-op people in formulating their response. Caution in any interpreting that the analyst does will be exercised, and especially with elliptical reference. In not
pressing into the data too firmly this distinction at every point, I am also following the lead of Cooley ([1902] 1964):

In other words 'society' and 'individuals' do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing, the relation between them being like that between other expressions one of which denotes a group as a whole, and the other the members of the group, such as the army and the soldiers, the class and the students, and so on. (p. 37)

An additional notion from earlier work in the sociology of knowledge which is used here (cf. Chapter 3) is that of Mannheim's (1936) concept of "relationism" by which assertions are formulated "in terms of the perspective of a given situation" (p. 283) as opposed to what he characterized as a non-productive relativism that offers no basis for saying, for example, what standards were operative. The notion of relationism appears in the changing perspectives afforded by the collections of people, including also the possibility of being within ("insiders") or of being exterior ("outsiders"). Mannheim further noted that there are instances of interactants not agreeing, of appearing to be "talking past one another" (p. 280) where one interactant is from another group, and that it is likely that his mental structure as a whole is often quite different when a concrete thing is being discussed, they speak as if their differences were confined to the specific question at issue around which their present disagreement crystallized. They overlook the fact that their antagonist differs from them in his whole outlook, and not merely in his opinions about the point under discussion. (p. 280)

It will be shown that a "point under discussion" often allows of a variety of ways of getting to what is meant by "his whole
outlook," once collections of people are specified (by the methods shown in Chapter 3).

The Study of Moral Matters in Verbal Interaction

I have argued above that the study of moral matters in talk was a legitimate concern for a sociology of knowledge. My focus is not on persuasion or the problems of influence, but rather how moral matters appear and are recognized in talk. It will not be possible however to stop with a mere logical or propositional analysis, since the evidence that these were actually recognized by participants can only be shown by the behavior of others in responding to the talk. Such responses are not necessarily agreement. In fact, overt agreement or disagreement is rarely the criteria for an interactional effect. The reaction and recognition to a moral matter is often a tacit acceptance of a framework, sometimes an implied negation of that framework and the substitution of another which is related in some less than obvious way.

A vital feature of talk is thus that it occurs during an interaction, and it can not be studied apart from that context. Goffman's work (1959 on) has provided an illuminating series of metaphors and insights useful in approaching the complexities of the structural relations which obtain during co-presence. In this study my emphasis is more on the import of talk on moral matters for the structure and organization of the association, than to the interactants and the
syntactic relations amongst them, although both are relevant.

The framework most widely known for the analysis of verbal interaction is probably that of Bales (1950) and his colleagues who conceive such interaction as a series of problem solving situations. Their Interaction Process Analysis (I.P.A.) system approaches an on-going interaction of a small group with a system designed to classify opinions and agreements as well as various expressive items. The I.P.A. system was not designed to take into account moral matters, and especially the multiple interpretations in which moral matters are often embedded, e.g., that a request for information may also be directing what ought to be talked about, or that an agreement may be evidence that a self or another person is a good person. I.P.A. also lacks any means of registering the changing collections of people which will be needed here.¹

Although I shall not be able to use the Bales system, I shall try to maintain the accountability to the actual verbal interaction that Bales shows, rather than following a piece-meal approach which singles out only occasional lines of talk. Accountability or responsibility to the text has several aspects as used here. Responsibility

(1) to the actual expressions of the talkers:

(2) to the text as a whole, and not to instances drawn to illustrate particular points; and

(3) to the level of generality of categories that talkers actually select as relevant to their concerns.

¹ A related system is Longabough (1963) who codes interpersonal behavior as exchange of resources. Moral matters enter "freedom deprivation." (p.331)
It will prove the case that interactants often select levels of generality at which moral matters tend to cluster. Other investigators have assumed some of these responsibilities without taking on all of them, as will appear from the following discussion.

The goal put forward in maintaining a certain responsibility to the text does not mean confinement to the text. Psathas, for example (1969), designed a system to suit a computer analysis of communication content, in which analysis was limited to words used in the text. As will be shown, moral matters are not always located at the level of the words used, and so much may be missed by such techniques.

On the other hand, content analysis departs from the text too much for my purposes. As defined by Berelson (1952), content analysis is a research technique "for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (p.214). The analyst's understanding is abstracted from the text, but the information on how that understanding was achieved is lost. Such a focus relies on the selection of "themes" or "symbols" and the analyst's ability to recognize their appearance.

More recent work on verbal interaction was initiated by Sacks (1967 on) from the perspective of the social structure of conversation. These studies are based on carefully transcribed tape recordings and focus on sequences selected by the analyst to study the immediate organization of talk at such a point. Although this approach was not initially
formulated as a general methodology by which to analyze talk, the techniques for distinguishing between problematic and contingent features of talk has moved forward under Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (especially 1974) and their students. Goffman's (1976) more recent proposal for the analysis of talk moves away from an emphasis on two-membered units of statement/reply towards consideration of talk as a "sequence" of responses, a view which is more in line with analysis done in this work.

There have been a variety of efforts to formulate new insights into conversational structure along the lines of Sacks by ethnomethodologists, like Speier (1973) who traced elements of conversational development such as topicality, interruption and turn taking; Cicourel (1974) who studied interpretative procedures used by "the speaker-hearer for assigning infinitely possible meanings to unfolding social scenes" (p. 88); Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) who devised a descriptive system of analysis which used what they see as three major discourse acts—elicitative, directive, and informative. None of these efforts focus on moral matters especially, nor do they take into account the complex social worlds the talkers are representing. Papers by them and other ethnomethodologists have been included in collections focusing on social interaction (Sudnow, 1972), sociology of language (Fishman, 1972), and ethnography of communication (Gumperz and Hymes, 1972).
Other approaches to discourse include that of Soskin and John (1963) who set out a classification schema from linguistic functions, rather than sociological (as did Bales), which provided broad categories which relied largely on the analysts' judgment, and Allen and Guy (1974) who designed a framework for a "sociology of talk" which used only two variables for the analysis of talk, the degree of loudness and the extent of vocabulary.

A more linguistic analysis of verbal interaction appears in the investigation of therapeutic discourse by W. Labov and Fanshel (1976). They introduced a number of longitudinal propositions representing the social knowledge and assumptions of the participants which their analysis located. They do not formulate the moral matters present in terms of collections of people relevant to the therapist and the client. They do adhere to the goal, as did Bales, of being responsible to the whole interaction studied.

There is one further line of inquiry into verbal interaction that will be used in Chapter 4. That is a more philosophical focus on language, and on speech activities and acts (Searle, 1969) which has grown out of Austin's ([1955] 1965) analysis of certain words as performatives, i.e., words that do actions as well as describe them, such as "I promise" or "I pronounce you married." Work on conversational implicature and more recent studies of speech activity will be cited more specifically further on.
To a varying degree these studies of talk or speech take into account the fact that the talk is being carried out within the context of a collection of co-present people. Though they all necessarily deal with moral matters, none focus on morality specifically, or suggest ways in which moral matters might be studied systematically.

The Study of People in Talk

There is one particular aspect of verbal interaction that is especially important to this study. That is the way in which people are presented, mentioned, referred to, spoken about, hinted at, as well as praised, blamed, evaluated, or in anyway brought into the talk of the interactants. I shall be concerned with how people are identified, how they are constructed, and how it is that they appear as "good" people or not. (Chapter 3, page 193 on, covers the location of the self and other in collections of people in talk.)

The construction and reconstruction of the world includes importantly the characterization of other people. As Schutz (1967) has noted, any encounter with another includes knowledge of other people's interpretive schemes, their habits, and their language. It includes knowledge of the taken-for-granted, in order-to and because-motives of others as such and of this person in particular. (p. 169)

Characterizations of others in talk give evidence of this "stock of previously constituted knowledge." (p. 169)

Berger and Kellner (1964) observe that as partners share
their lives in marriage, it is through conversation principally that

the images of other people, which before or in the earlier stage of marital conversation may have been rather ambiguous and shifting in the minds of the two partners, now becomes hardened into definite and stable characterizations. (p. 63)

Such a microsociological focus on the construction of reality in marriage suggests a site for analysis, rather than presenting an analysis.

The presence of people in talk is sometimes reported by simply counting the number of pronouns used. For example, Klein (1961) uses a lexical count of pronouns as a means of saying to what extent an interaction is self or group oriented. An "I-we-you" table gives a "rough impression" (p. 45) of where the center of an individual's interest lies with regard to the group. Although such a table may give a first approximation of the orientation shown in a piece of talk, any careful work must take into account in each instance the collection of people to which a pronoun is assigned (such as is developed in the discussion of the use of "we" in Chapter 3, pg. 213) as well as more indirect references to people that do not use pronouns or nouns.

Considerable work has been done on the way in which talkers construct representations of other people. The most relevant here is Klapp (1962) who developed a notion of "social type" and found popular labels for collections of people who are praised (heros), feared (villains), or
ridiculed (fools) and are so captured in the language, e.g., "egg head," "chisler," or freak." Klapp notes that definitions of particular persons are part of a stock of type images which society maintains. In this view, social types comprise a system, more or less stable though ever changing as the typing process acts on particular individuals, audiences, and human relation. We see an invisible network of rules, an informal structure, registered in symbolic residues of language—the way people think and talk about others (gossip, story telling, legend building, and so on). (p. 7)

Goffman too observes interactants' use of labels in his analysis of stigma; people in a given stigma category are said to have a tendency to use "we" or to speak of "our people." (1963b, p. 23) The classification of people is considered further in Chapter 4, page 273.

Observations of social types as they appear in talk will be used in this analysis, but they are not extensive enough. A schema is required which will include any instance of people that can be found in a text. The conventional formulation of "status and role" does not include many explicit categories that will be needed in this work, such as "boys" or "neighborhood kids," or "incident people."

The means of categorizing people to be used here is perhaps closest to Sacks' (1972) "members' categorization devices" by which is mean the ordinary everyday use of categories for people which they themselves use, as "female" or "old." (p. 34) In Sacks' work such "members' judgments" are preferred as they reflect "members' biographies," rather than an analyst's perspective which uses sociological
reasoning. Such membership categorization devices have been used by Sacks to describe the structured ways in which individuals identify themselves or others in conversational materials. These will be used. Sacks was not usually concerned with the properties of the larger categories of which these are instances, or the way these are introduced into conversation. These are concerns here.

A number of sociolinguistic studies of the ways in which pronouns are used for people, address terms, person's names, etc. will be cited in Chapters 3 and 4. Some of these link usage to such notions as solidarity, power, intimacy and provide semantic rules which govern their usages.

A focus on people in talk is a first step toward the analysis of moral matters. Without locating people, there would be no basis by which obligation and evaluation can be located on individuals or on collections of people. Evaluations of people will be shown to be an essential part of the analysis also.

Plan Of The Study And Data To Be Used

Although this is a study of talk of the Co-op people in so far as moral matters are implicated, it can not rest on that alone, nor was it planned to. A variety of data-gathering techniques were used in this study, and it is principally through participant observation (1/22/73 to 10/15/75) that situations and activities of the Co-op people became part of this study. Besides attending over 100 produce
distribution sessions, I attended nearly all of the 36 Co-op meetings during this period, and have complete tape recordings of 32. The data also include interviews with 33 of the more active members, to obtain participants' opinions, feelings and accounts especially of "The Early Days" of the Co-op. I did a census of the users of the Co-op in mid-May 1975 in order to describe the opinions and characteristics of the 86 shoppers buying food at that time. I had access to many Co-op documents which people had saved and these were particularly useful in piecing together the financial history of the Co-op.

I was already active in the Co-op (having joined 6/22/71) when I identified myself as someone desiring to be a participant observer of the group and asked permission at the meeting of 1/22/73 to tape-record the meeting. I explained that I was concerned with problems involved in decision making and in how consensus was achieved in a group. As a participant observer I worked each week at the Co-op, usually cutting cheese during the produce day selling sessions, but I did nearly all of the Co-op jobs at one time or another, such as going to the Food Distribution Center, setting up food, helping with pricing, cleaning up, and filling orders as a seller. I also shopped at the Co-op regularly throughout nearly all of its six years, thus experiencing the Co-op also as a user.

Chapter 2 gives details of the Co-op from this data, first a chronology and then an ethnography describing three
aspects of the Co-op. Then Chapters 3 and 4 present the methods to be used, showing the strategies and techniques by which talk will be penetrated in order to do an analysis of moral matters. Transcription procedures appear on p. 309.

One of the first procedures of the analysis will be to specify the ways in which people are located in talk. Systematic means will be shown for locating collections of people who may be only remotely present. Given the occurrence of collections of people in talk with their associated obligations and evaluations, the question arises as to whether those present are jointly oriented to the same shared definition of a situation or characterization of people. The existence of consensus appears more evident when these various collections of people are developed more explicitly, and means devised for determining when they are the same or different.

Not all the references to people involved in moral matters are for collections of people. People involved in moral matters appear as individuals as well as in collections. It will be necessary to trace the presence and the absence of relevant individuals and the use of singular and plural constructions for people in talk. Some persons who first appear as individuals will be seen to represent a whole collection. Whether an individual can serve in that capacity may be disputed. The entire range of terms for self and for others will be useful in establishing relationships amongst the various selves, others and collections of people.
The elements of social structure so identified must then be attached to the expressions of evaluation which may be present. The general position taken here is that individu­als normally expect others to present a "good self" in terms of the collections of people in which they are put. Defec­tions, real or imputed, from such an image of a "good other" may become the basis of comment. When praise or blame or judgments of good and bad appear in talk they can readily be attached to the individuals or collections involved in moral matter. But less obvious means of evaluation must be traced. In some instances there are predications that are implicitly valued as good once collections of people are specified.

Similarly, there is an obvious set of terms by which obligation is recognized and attached to individuals or collections such as "ought," "should," or sometimes "might" or "can." The task of the analysis will be to recognize less obvious terms that express constraint and shape what is going on, or show how people or the Co-op ought to be. Such predications as "worker," "wife," or "woman" can be seen to have such force.

As this is a sociological analysis, the information that is provided by the language is of interest, but to a large extent it doesn't particularly matter whether that information is foregrounded or focused on, asserted or implied, entailed or presupposed, or whatever other subtleties there are in ways in which it can be supplied. The complexities of language and of conversational analysis will sometimes be
drawn upon. But the important feature for a sociological study of talk is at the level of what people make of what is supplied in terms of the collections of people present and how they are filled, and of the obligations and evaluations attached thereto which become relevant.

Chapters 5 to 8 each are centered about a specific problem, each tied to a short transcription from a meeting. These four problems form the core of this work. They have in common that some policy or problem which the Co-op faced is shown in talk, generally at the time that actions or decisions were achieved as to what was to be done, or how the problem was to be solved. Each case exemplified the general problem of this work: Although systemic and structural changes are being made in the talk, concommitant changes in moral matters are accomplished apparently without comment. The four problems are shown as Figure 1.1.

The problems focused on in Chapters 5 and 6 concern cooperation, while those of 7 and 8 are on commitment. Each analysis emphasizes different parts of the methodology, although all four rely on the location of collections of people and the discovery of moral matters in the talk.

Chapter 9 will return to the problem of communication of moral matters in talk. An additional finding will be a view of what constitutes good Co-op people, assembled from what people did and said as they were being Co-op people during Co-op occasions. Evidence will illuminate the way that Co-op
Figure 1.1 The Four Problems.

1. How could a major change in the ideology of cooperation be accomplished without discussion of the value of cooperative work? (p. 321)

2. How was an extensive change made in the structure of authority of the Co-op without discussions of the loss of a cooperative managing system? (p. 384)

3. What were the conditions of an effective communication of commitment to the Co-op that could and did lead to starting up again? (p. 455)

4. Since the interests of the Co-op had led to confrontations with black people, how could commitment to the Co-op be reconciled with commitment to an integrated neighborhood? (p. 533)
people cooperatively participated in the Co-op and showed commitment, or at times, did neither of these.
CHAPTER 2
THE FOOD COOPERATIVE

This chapter introduces the Carverton Food Cooperative, a buying club which operated from December 1970 to October 1976 in Philadelphia. Participants ordered their food in advance; the food was purchased jointly; and the result was lower prices for the food.

This chapter consists of two major sections. The first describes the origins of the Carverton Co-op, and gives an account of the six years of its operation. It documents three periods of endeavor, each demarcated by major financial changes in the Co-op. The Co-op experienced an immediate growth and prosperity ("The Early Days"), then a long recession with only a fraction of its early activity ("The Middle Period"), and finally a gradual return to a consistent high level of activity for several years ("The Later Years"). The Co-op came to an end fairly soon after the building it had used was razed by the city.

The second section is an ethnography describing three different aspects of the Co-op: (1) the activities which occurred on produced distribution days; (2) the Co-op meetings; and (3) the organization of the Co-op. Each of these aspects will be distinguished by the collections of
people involved as well as the information, terminology, obligations and evaluations of what constituted a good Co-op person. Throughout I have tried to limit the description to those facts and events needed to follow the problems of cooperation and commitment set out in Chapters 5 to 8. I have introduced quotations from interviews with Co-op people to illustrate their views of the history of the Co-op and their concern with moral matters as they expressed them to me directly.

The History Of The Co-op

The Carverton Food Co-op was located in Carverton Village, a racially mixed neighborhood in the western part of Philadelphia, adjoining the campuses of Prester University and the University of Pennsylvania. The area is principally residential, consisting of twin houses, a few single and some 3-4 story apartment houses. There are a few stores--cleaners, drug store, hardware, shoe repair, and laundrette--and two long-established food stores: "Thriftright", an independent, medium-sized supermarket on the street separating Carverton from Lantua, the predominately black area on the North, and "Hiram's," a family-run small grocery store in the center of the Village.

Carverton is noted as a socially heterogeneous community, with people with many diverse life styles, and has been labelled more than once as Philadelphia's Greenwich

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1 U.S. Census Block Statistics (1970) show 38 percent black (HC(3)-204).
Carverton is made up of perhaps five communities of people. [Really?] Really, you just take them. The frat boys, the university students, they're a whole different world. Then you've got the old people and the various nursing homes, they're a separate population. You have the black population, that is non-university connected, they're really, you know, more connected with the ghetto. Blacks, you know, they have an identification. The whole house next door to us here is all black, and they're in another world. [Hmm, really?] That's three. You've got the upper middle class [Unhuh] and then you've got the counter-culture people. There's five groups. You might even have a sixth group because Carverton has also a large number of blind living in Carverton. We've got three blind homes and a good many individual blind people living in apartments. So, all in all, it's a really strange mix, or not-mix, you see, that's the problem, it's not a mix.

[Joel, IV., p. 13, 5/20/74]

Cooperative enterprises are common in the neighborhood.

They include the Natural Foods Store, which emphasizes foods grown without fertilizers or sprays, but also sells produce from other than "organic" sources. Natural Foods began its operations after the Carverton Co-op, eventually becoming a strong competitor. Other cooperatives include a pottery and crafts collective, a cooperative vegetarian restaurant (where members who do a share of the cooking get lower prices on meals) and a cooperative wholesale whole-grain bakery. A
car repair cooperative functioned for a few years, and some

1 In a feature article on Carverton (University City News, Dec. 1977, pp. 4-5), Ruth Biddison also characterizes Carverton as "an 'urbane, humane' village surrounded by poverty and urban development" (p. 4). She sees the area as one of "racial and class integration" (p. 5) with a tradition of open housing.
Carverton residents pooled resources and bought beach property at the Jersey shore which is used communally.

Carverton is also characterized by housing communes, some present since the 1950's, including several "Resistance Houses" in which objectors to the Viet-Nam war lived. Many of the village residents are Quakers, including some who belonged to an Association of Communes, a neighborhood organization of many of the communes. The Carverton Co-op was originally a product of that organization.¹

"The Early Days"

One individual was chiefly responsible for getting the Carverton Food Co-op started.

I went around and talked to people in communes, and organized the Association of Communes, a title I gave it, ah, since I couldn't think of anything else, and it seemed appropriate. And it was about 30 communes. They met at "Jonah Coolfar" house. And I just listed about 20 or 25 things that an association of communes might do, you know, everything from cooperative baby-sitting to buying property together, to having a free school—all the kinds of counter-culture things that you become accustomed to hearing of. And one of the things I listed right at the top of the list was a food co-op. And people took to that idea. And so, from the very first, from the very first meeting of the association of communes there was a nucleus of people interested in doing a food co-op.

[Joel IV, p. 1, 5/20/74]

¹ The Carverton Food Co-op is part of a contemporary food co-op movement which is documented in popular magazine articles throughout the early 70's and in "The Food Co-op Handbook" written by The Co-op Handbook Collective, 1975. The Food Cooperative directory included in the handbook shows Carverton (p. 345).
The first food was bought for the Co-op in December of 1970. By March of 1971, sales volume was $1,000 a week. Figure 2.1 is a record of alternate weekly sales totals from the beginning of the Co-op to the start of the "Later Years", which I constructed from various Co-op records. The graph documents the changes in financial activity by which my division of the Co-op's history into three periods was made. Sales volume during the "Early Days" often exceeded $1,300, never dropping below $500 after the first week. "The Middle Period" begins at the point when volume dropped below $500 a week, and remained close to $200 for 21 months. Once the volume began to rise and maintained that increase or bettered it, a new period can be recognized, "The Later Years," though there is no sharp boundary.

Front money was initially obtained by requiring each participant (individual, family, or commune) to lend an amount equivalent to anticipated weekly purchases. Each participant was also expected to put in a share of labor each month. Membership was drawn from people living in Carverton or Lantua to the North. In January of 1972, 150 households were buying regularly for 400-500 people. A markup of 15 percent was added to the price paid for the food at the Food Distribution Center, the city-wide marketing location where wholesalers and jobbers supplied in the early hours of the morning most of the food sold in the City's stores. As will be shown in detail (p. 32) the price
Figure 2.1 Total Sales And Dates Of Co-op Periods.
(Alternate Weeks)

"EARLY DAYS"

"MIDDLE PERIOD"

"LATER YEARS"
including the markup usually represented savings of about 25% over chain store prices.  

The site for the Co-op food activities on Rice Street was obtained through the action of Carverton residents protesting the threat of expansion of Prester University, a predominately technical university in the area.

Around the same time as this association of communes was formed was when ECCR [East Carverton Concerned Residents] took over the warehouse building, which had been vacated, and the RDA [Redevelopment Authority] had intended to board it up. So ECCR took over the warehouse, and that kind of coincided with forming a food co-op. So it started in the warehouse, and we helped start it.  

[Jim IV, p. 1, 12/5/73]

The residents argued that they should have a say in what happened to their neighborhood, and that much of the space being taken over by Prester University was valuable living space. They mounted a "sit-in" to prevent bulldozing of the combined warehouse and garage which later housed the Carverton Food Co-op. Control (of this and several other places) was already in the hands of the Redevelopment Authority ["RDA"] of Philadelphia. Organized as the East Carverton Concerned Residents ["ECCR"] people in the

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Curhan and Wertheim (1972-73) cite 25% for overall savings for 24 pre-order Co-ops in Boston, which included meat, bakery products, and eggs not at that time carried by Carverton Co-op. They cite reports that members of Sacramento pre-order Co-ops also paid prices on an average 25% lower than those of competing supermarkets.
neighborhood began to use some of the buildings and lands.1

We gave the 33rd and Rice Street Garage its first major use, and also began paying rent too, which enabled the ECCR to have some working money to pay the utilities there and to keep the building available for other groups which eventually came. Now you have a cooperative bakery there, you have the Carverton Food Co-op, you have storage for "Books of Our Own", you have the Central Food with their major operation there, and I think Natural Foods has storage there too. So you have five uses for the building, and it's a pleasure to see a building that was wrested from the RDA being used so richly.

[Joel IV, p. 2, 5/20/74]

ECCR continued negotiations with the City for a lease on the building, paid utility bills, and collected rent from users, such as the Co-op.

The Co-op got food in the "Early Days" by having several members go to the Food Distribution Center at 3:30 AM on each morning of the Co-op operation. Others picked up bulk orders of grains, cheese, nuts, cider, and well-water at various places on the same or the preceding day.

In the "Early Days" people who went to the Food Distribution Center brought back information as well as food, such as the fact that tomatoes were coming in from Mexico or that there weren't any strawberries anywhere in the City that week. Display of such information gained at the Center was one way some Co-op people could locate themselves as being

---

more fully within the Co-op experience than others.\footnote{The "implied notion of being an "insider" was introduced on page 45 and is elaborated in Chapter 3. Curhan and Wertheim (1972-73) also found that interest and concern with the food was characteristic of the Boston cooperatives that they studied.}

In the "Early Days," the produce days represented a gathering place for Carverton residents. Many date friendships from that time.

Once you get involved in the Co-op or activities like the Co-op, you know an awful lot of people, and it really serves a social function. ["That's true too."\footnote{That's true too."}] and I don't know if we thought of that before we joined, but I certainly realized it after we joined,--that it had real social value. [Unhuh] We met a whole lot of people, some of whom we liked and some of whom we didn't like, [Unhuh], but a lot of people, an awful lot of the people who are my friends now, maybe most of them, are people whom I met one way or another through the Co-op, either at the Co-op or through somebody I met at the Co-op.

[Sheldon IV, p. 1, 3/23/74]

The high volume of the "Early Days" was not without its problems. Chief among these was a shortage of labor, particularly people to go to the Food Distribution Center to help with the food buying. It was hard to find enough cars to carry the produce. As a result, sometimes the Co-op would not have the quantity or the varieties of food that had been ordered. Even when the items ordered were obtained Co-op people who did not come early on produce day were often unable to get what they had ordered. Some Co-op people were evidently taking more food than they had ordered, and the
same people, or others, were paying for less than they took so that the money taken in was less than that paid for the produce and so that the markup had to be raised.

The "Early Days" were marked by a continual process of new people joining, enthusiastically participating in the Co-op for a short period and then leaving. Despite a large turnover (perhaps as many as 400 people in the first two years) a high level of activity was maintained until June of 1972, when the abrupt decline in gross sales set in. (Turnover is discussed more fully p. 113)

"The Middle Period"

The Co-op barely survived this intervening period of low activity. In this period changes in the cooperative ideology were made and additional commitment was required of Co-op people. The "Middle Period" is then the best place to anchor a study of these moral matters. All four problems of the communication of morality posed in the analyses of Chapters 5 to 8 are located in segments of meetings during this period.

The low level of weekly sales ($150-3200) in the summer of 1972 persisted for 21 months (except for two periods of closing in August 1972 and in the summer of 1973). The deterioration during this period was characterized by one of the Co-op people in this way (note the underestimation of the sales of the "Early Days"):

We hit a volume when the Co-op started—we hit a volume of about six hundred dollars a week, and that went up to, at one point to almost a thousand
dollars a week of volume that we were doing. Now our volume is only about 230, 250 dollars a week, which is a major decrease, and ah, I feel that this has come about because during the period when there was a lot of enthusiasm for the Co-op, there was no management at all for the Co-op, and ah, instead of building on the enthusiasm that existed and establishing a reputation for steady reliable service and a convenient place to go et cetera, the Co-op began to develop a reputation of being inconvenient and unpleasant and things went wrong and people who worked for the Co-op became demoralized.

[Jim IV, p. 3, 12/5/73]

As volume declined, the Co-op people decided to reduce the hours the Co-op was open from 8 hours to 4 hours—with morning and early afternoon sessions being wholly eliminated. This decision resulted in a loss of most of the older shoppers, who preferred to shop during the middle of the day. Furthermore, in an effort to cut losses through over-generous weighing, undercounting what was taken or outright pilferage, people were no longer allowed to help themselves to food. This however increased the number of workers needed to operate the Co-op. The lower volume also was reflected in the need to increase the markup to 20% which was done in January of 1973.

Although fewer people were using the Co-op in the "Middle Period" and it was less likely to meet new people, it did remain a place in which people would find others they knew. ...

...an opportunity to meet your neighbors, which I really value. It,—ah,—going to the Food Co-op is something I really hate! (Laughs) That is rather incongruous. "I don't understand." (Laughing also) It's a drag, ah, shopping. "Yeah, sure." going out and picking up food and all that. It's sort of like going to church, you know, it's hard to pick
up and go, but once you're there it's not so bad, that's kind of how it is with the Carverton Food Co-op. It's hard to get up and go, but once you're there, the people are pleasant, and you meet the people you've known for years, and you meet new people. It's nice--it's good--we need more institutions like that in our community. I'd like to see an Art and Craft Center.

[Joel IV, p. 6, 5/20/74]

At this time a major change for membership was made when it became possible to be a Co-op member and buy food without putting in time as a worker, but instead paying a higher markup. The voluntary labor system in which all had worked cooperatively was thus abandoned.

There were problems in relations with other neighborhood people who were not members of the Co-op. During the winter of 1972-73 a series of run-ins occurred, climaxing in an incident in which one of the Co-op people was hurt. Co-op people were concerned with finding ways to prevent future problems in the operation of the Co-op in the neighborhood.

Another change in the Co-op at this time was their formal affiliation with Central Foods, a centralized buying agency for several of the Co-ops in the city. As early as 1971 Carverton buyers who had developed expertise in the

1 The change in the labor system is the topic of the segment of a meeting held on 1/22/73. The segment, which I have called "New Labor" is used in Chapter 5 as the data for the analysis. Additional background information on the issue is given in the beginning of that chapter and the text of the transcript follows the chapter.

2 This incident is the topic of the segment "No Parking" from the meeting held on 1/28/73 and is the basis of the analysis given in Chapter 8. Additional background material on the issue is given in the beginning of that chapter and the text of the transcript follows the chapter.
intricacies of buying food and of getting along with the jobbers at the Food Distribution Center had begun to pool orders with buyers from other Co-ops in other parts of the City. The greater volume often resulted in lower prices. Shared buying soon became a regular practice for nearly all items, with each Co-op saving money and getting lower unit prices from the increased volume.

Carverton Food Co-op began with sort of, well with a hang-together bunch of people, and there was more of a gypsy operation. It [Laughing] it just--how it--each week we-, we managed to get the food there I just don't know, ah, I think if it weren't for Central Foods being in existence at this point, our Co-op might have just failed. [Unhuh]. Because getting workers down there at 3 and 4 o'clock in the morning to the Food Distribution Center there was a real worry each week, you know, 'Who are we going to have next week to go? Are we going to have a truck, are we?' Now that's not so much of a question. There will always be a truck. There's the Central Foods truck and workers, and we just get a portion, our portion of the Central order. [Unhuh] In a sense we've been saved by a larger organization, ah, a con-federa-tion of Co-ops.

[Joel IV, p. 5, 5/20/74]

By the spring of 1973, Central Foods was buying for seven cooperative throughout the City with the warehouse in Carverton used as the base for the whole operation. Deliveries were made from the Carverton headquarters after cases were split to fill orders from the other Co-ops in Central Foods. In May of 1973, Carverton Co-op voted to pay 7% a case to Central Foods for the food Carverton ordered.¹

¹ Curhan and Wertheim (1975-76) in their follow-up study of Boston Co-ops (Spring 1974, the original study was Fall 1971) found a similar development had taken place in Boston. A
In the Fall Carverton ratified by-laws by which it became a member of Central Foods, although Central Foods had already been buying for them for over six months. The change from independent buying to city-wide central buying was characterized as follows:

I guess it used to be that every week we would go down to the Food Distribution Center and do our own buying, and then there was talk of a federation that would centralize the buying for several Co-ops. And as I recollect, we had a couple of meetings where it was discussed and there was some reservation that once we committed ourselves to this, it was kind of an irreversible step, and it would be very hard to go back to a system in which we were doing our own buying.

[Jim IV, p. 2, 12/5/73]

One other major change took place in 1973. A motion to hire a person to be responsible for the overall operation of the Co-op was passed in May of 1973. In the summer of 1973 a paid manager was hired, and someone filled this post from that fall on.

The Carverton Co-op closed for a vacation period in the summer of 1973, and there was a real question in September if it would re-open. Although a manager had been hired, he buyer or broker was buying produce for a number of cooperatives for a small fee (generally 10¢ a crate). Changes in New England Food Cooperatives throughout the 70's are also documented in an article by Steve Turner, "'New Wave' Co-ops; Challenging the Food Establishment" in the Boston Sunday Globe: New England magazine 2/19/78.

2 A segment of the meeting on 5/21/73 at which the decision to have a manager was taken forms the topic of the segment "Paid Manager". The segment is used in Chapter 6 for the analysis. Further background on the issue is given in the beginning of the chapter and the text of the transcript follows the chapter.

3 The re-opening of the Co-op was discussed at 9/19/73 and
was unable to start work in September. There was some question as to whether there were enough people to revive the Co-op. Some of the most active people now worked for Central Foods. Others were involved in a nearby storefront cooperative, Natural Foods, which had expanded its operation.\(^1\)

At first, Natural Foods was not a serious competitor, since it concentrated on getting "organic" produce (produce which is grown without chemical fertilizers or insecticides, and is not treated with wax or food coloring or any other means to preserve or enhance its looks.) Prices for organic produce are generally higher than either the Carverton Co-op or supermarket prices. Natural Foods also offered dried fruit and grains, and gradually increased its stock to include herb teas, canned food (grown organically), meats (from animals fed natural food) and fresh eggs (from chickens allowed to run, rather than kept in chicken factories), and raw (un-pasturized, unhomogenized) whole milk. It also joined Central Foods, however, and began to offer in addition some of the same produce as Carverton Co-op. Natural Foods then became a real competitor, although membership fees and working member

the segment of that meeting used for the analysis is called "Starting Up." Further details are given on the issue in the beginning of Chapter 7 and the text of the transcript follows the chapter.

\(^1\) Similarly, Curhan and Wertheim (1975-76) found in their follow up story in 1974 of Boston food cooperatives that a "storefront" cooperative had been successfully established and was selling $16,956 per week by 1974. That storefront operation had grown out of one of the Boston city cooperatives. Thirteen other city cooperatives (classified as "Young")
hourly requirements were at least twice of those at Carverton.

Once the Co-op re-opened, it quickly returned to the sales level of the preceding spring, which was maintained throughout the winter and into the next spring. During this period of lower activity, the Co-op was continually adjusting to changes that would make it possible for it to continue as a food cooperative, even though some of the changes reduced the ways in which it was a cooperative.

"The Later Years"

In the late spring of 1974, the level of financial activity of the Co-op began to accelerate as the Co-op began to grow again. By the mid-May Census of 1975, the Co-op was averaging 75 orders a week, double that during the "Middle Period."

Along with an increase in the number of orders, there was an increase in the number of different products handled. The labor system was working smoothly, as people appeared regularly to do their jobs. A huge chalk board (5 foot by about 8 foot) showed the month's labor schedule, with each person's name listed for the hours they were expected to work. The produce obtained was generally of good quality and the quantity was close to that needed for the day's selling. Each of these efforts at rationizing the Co-op's operation had increased total membership and total amount purchased. Of the 12 "urban" co-ops established by community activists, only 9 survived, on the other hand.
were the results of the efforts of the person who was working as a paid manager at this time.

However, the tenancy of the Carverton Co-op in the building was still insecure. Efforts of the East Carverton Concerned Residents ("ECCR") to negotiate a lease with the Redevelopment Authority ("RDA") succeeded in the Spring of 1975. Yet the Co-op still faced the problem that the land and buildings had been rezoned in 1969 for institutional and educational use in anticipation of Prester University's expansion in that area. The Department of Licenses in the City refused to issue a license for retail operation to the Co-op on the grounds that the land was not zoned for such a use. Carverton Co-op appealed, and the hearings were postponed several times. Co-op users suspected that City officials had no desire to antagonize the community sooner than need be and were trying to delay their announcement of refusal until Prester University was ready to go ahead with its plans for the building and land. Matters could not go to Court until the ruling was announced.

In May of 1976, an out of Court settlement was reached among ECCR, representing the neighborhood, RDA, representing the city, Prester University, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for future development of the area. Modified expansion plans would allow 17 of the 33 buildings originally proposed for clearance to stand. The Co-op building was not one of these. The RDA promised to
find alternative sites for community activity.

Co-op volume was still increasing during the Spring of 1976 when the Co-op closed for the summer. The building was razed during the summer. In September about 20 people tried again to start up the Co-op in another of the recycled buildings, a half a block away on the same street. There was a serious problem in getting food supplies, as Central Foods which had been supplying produce to Carverton, had collapsed. Alternative sources of produce proved to be unreliable.

Even if the building had not been razed, it is not clear that Carverton Co-op could have continued much longer. By the summer of 1976 the Natural Foods Store was a fulltime health food store with extensive hours of operation. Natural Foods had all the products Carverton carried plus milk, meat, eggs, teas, vitamins, and grossed $8,000 a week in 1976. It was less than two blocks from the Carverton Co-op and over the final summer closing most of those who had been active in the Carverton Co-op were attracted to Natural Foods.

There were no signs that any of the other people who had been involved in the Carverton Co-op in the spring were going to return. After a few weeks of trying to operate in the new location, the remaining Co-op people decided to stop, and the Carverton Co-op came to an end in October of 1976.
Three Aspects Of Participation in the Cooperative

I have given above a chronology of the major events in the Co-op's economic history, locating each event in the economic activity of that period. This section focuses on the Co-op people themselves, and what participation in the Co-op meant to them. The formal concept of participation which was introduced in the first chapter can be examined now in the concrete setting of the Carverton Food Co-op. This section is an ethnography of Co-op practices or rather three ethnographies, since three collections of people are described, which relies heavily on my observations of the Co-op. Here I shall summarize the practices of the Co-op people again, giving only enough details of the settings as to help the reader to follow the analyses of the succeeding chapters.

Three aspects of Co-op participation define the "produce day—people," the "meeting—people," and the "organization—people."¹ I have set up these conceptual distinctions amongst the Co-op people to separate different features of Co-op participation.² In so far as any person participated in the food buying activities of the Co-op he or she qualified as a produce day—person. The ideology of the produce day was reflected in cooperative purchasing. Each person showed

¹ The relationship of participation to commitment and cooperation was explored in Chapter 1 (pp. 36—41)
² These three aspects of participation in the Co-op will also be referred to as "guises" of the Co-op.
commitment to this principle by placing an order a week before the food arrived. But for some produce day-people (all in the "Early Days") working for the Co-op was also a cooperative activity, and commitment extended beyond that of being a customer who paid for what he or she had ordered. Some produce day-people also felt a commitment to participate in the weekly meetings where cooperative management was carried out. These were the "meeting-people."

However, produce day-people and meeting-people do not exhaust the ways in which the participation of Co-op people can be considered. Co-op people belonged to the Co-op in the sense of being members of a co-op organization, although as will be shown, being a member was a technical requirement that some Co-op people had managed to avoid. Organization-people is in some sense a residual category, one that might be in effect when people were not present as meeting-people or as produce day-people. Co-op organization-people are those who elect to make it known that they are Co-op people. From an outsider's point of view, it is the Co-op organization-people who are known as representatives of the Co-op organization. It is to this guise of Co-op that requests are directed for permission e.g., to use Co-op facilities by another Co-op. Besides membership, financial matters were organizational concerns, and these were often relevant to the outside, e.g., as when the Co-op owed rent to be paid to ECCR, or a delivery of cheese to the Co-op was to be made. And finally there were moral matters by
which the Co-op organization structure and ideology could be distinguished from that of other organizations, both by those within the Co-op and those outside.

Produce Day-People

By produce day-people I mean all the Co-op people who were in any way associated with activities by which food was procured, made available and picked up as part of the weekly operation of the Carverton Co-op. In many instances sub-collections of produce day-people also include people who are not Co-op people, but who are temporarily involved along with at least one individual who is a Co-op person in some of the activities listed above. This practice of including non-Co-op people within subsets of produce day-people is based on the way in which people construct collections of people in their talk, and will appear often in the analysis which is articulated to talk in Chapters 5 to 8.

Who were the Co-op people who participated in the produce day? In the "Early Days" many Co-op people were from the communes which started the Co-op, and a few were students and old-time residents of the area. By the "Later Years" only about ten percent of the participants had been Co-op people in the "Early Days." In mid-May of 1975, I carried out a census of those who shopped at the Co-op during produce day by means of a questionnaire. Figure 2.2 gives the data which shows that Co-op people of the "Later Years" were generally single, white (about 5 percent were
Table 2.2 Characteristics Of Those Who Shopped At The Co-op In Mid-May 1975. (N=86)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
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<tr>
<td>over 41</td>
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<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $20,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
</tr>
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<td>Graduate School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
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<tr>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Length of Time in the Co-op</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Early Days&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Middle Period&quot;</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Later Years&quot;</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>10</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
blacks) in their twenties and either college students or beginning professionals with incomes under $10,000.¹

At all times Co-op people were nearly all neighborhood people, i.e., they lived within a four-block radius of the Co-op. Figure 2.3 shows 65 in the immediate vicinity and only 5 elsewhere (16 not answering). Also located on Figure 2.3 is the Co-op, Hiram's (the family-run neighborhood grocery store), the Natural Foods Store, and several buildings (mostly dormitories) of Prester University.

The medium-sized supermarket, Thriftright, was between 35th and 34th, two blocks further north. The University of Pennsylvania is two blocks further south. The "x's" indicate Co-op people's residences.

The number of blacks in the Co-op was always small, probably never reaching higher than five percent. One person gave the following opinion of why there were so few blacks in the Co-op:

I think that the bulk of black people—in the cities anyway that I've had experience with—are suspicious of organizations [Umm] of most any kind, particular—

¹ Curhan and Wertheim (1972-73) also found lower income status characteristic of cooperatives in Boston in 1971. They classified cooperatives in the city into "Young" and "Urban" cooperatives, the former having slightly higher occupational status and education, but lower income than "Urban," to whom they assigned lower social class status. They find however the distinguishing feature of "Young" and "Urban" to be "lifestyle." (p. 20) Their description of the lifestyle of "Young" cooperatives seems particularly true of the Carverton people who founded the Co-op and less so for each succeeding year. Curhan and Wertheim write, "Members of cooperatives designated as "Young" were generally attracted to cooperative activity for ideological reasons. Members frequently were critical of society and some professed to be radicals. Some were living communally, although few were cultists to any noticeable degree." (p. 29)
ly organizations that are--being run by white people, and being run on kind of white middle class values. unhuh Counter-culture values, you know, to me are white middle class values, basically they're just, you know, sort of a variant of them and I think that black people see that.

Sheldon IV, p. 2, 6/29/74

Later analysis (in Chapter 8) will suggest that it was not counter-culture values, but rather the perception of the Co-op as being a white Co-op that discouraged greater participation by blacks in the neighborhood.

Economics Initially a markup of 15% was placed on produce sold at the Carverton Co-op. By January of 1972, income was not covering expenses. A financial report appeared occasionally in the minutes of the weekly meeting of the Co-op. (Minutes also appeared occasionally, but only during January to June of 1972.) Each report talked of a loss:

We have reduced our weekly loss from $180 to about $100 in the weeks from Jan. 1 to date. If we all exercise greater care in our ordering, buying, weighing, and paying we will be able to reduce our weekly loss to just a few dollars. We have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Savings</th>
<th>$915.00</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Checking</td>
<td>$253.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food stamps</td>
<td>$235.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>$393.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owed</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$1809.00

(Minutes 2/7/72)

Last week we spend $942.00 on food and had cash receipts from sales of $1020.00. This means that we made up the previous week's loss of $72.00, but 15% markup on $942.00 should have been $141.30 added to $942.00 giving the Co-op $1083.30. So
even though we made up a loss incurred two weeks ago, we still had a loss last week of $63.30.

(Minutes 2/28/72)

Our 15% mark-up should yield us $120.00/wk. or $6,000 a year. It has in reality yielded us $12.03, i.e., we are losing a lot of money, in fact 10% of our sales weekly and unfortunately that ain't nobody's money but ours.

(Minutes 6/5/72)

By the winter of 1972, the markup was increased to 20%.

Prices rose again in the spring of 1973, reflecting the switch at that point from the Co-op buying its own produce to products being bought by Central Foods (to whom an 8% commission was paid). Prices were then set and remained at effective markups of 26% for workers and 40% for non-workers, except for cheese which was 13% and 25% respectively, reflecting the fact that the Co-op bought cheese directly from a cheese jobber.

An average order for a single person was under $5.00 in the "Early Days" (Curhan and Wertheim show $6.20 for their Boston urban cooperatives at that time), although many of the orders for communal or family groups totaled over $20.00. The number of orders varied from lows of 12 in the last sessions of the "Later Years" to highs of 164 in the "Early Days", but were between 30 and 40 for most of the "Middle Period" and 50 to 60 in the "Later Years" (cf. also Figure 2.1 for sales volume of first two periods).

Produce day participants were always concerned about prices. The mid-May Census found the major reason given

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1 My data contradict the suggestion of Rothschild-Shitt (1979)
for joining the Co-op as economy (cited by 75%) followed by convenience and quality of produce (each cited by 25%), while a few also noted the Co-op "vibes" (atmosphere). In talking of reasons for people dropping out, one member said:

I think the reason that's given to me most frequently is that our prices aren't all that low [Unhuh] and that they can do as well at the Italian Market—the Italian [Laughing] Market always comes up.

[Amy IV, p. 2, 4/11/73]

The phrase "all that low" suggests an overall problem of constructing a dollar and cents equivalence of the savings from shopping at the Co-op.\(^1\) The basis of comparison could be the Italian Market, an outdoor, long-established Philadelphia market where produce and other foods of various qualities are available daily at prices sometimes less than the big chain supermarket prices. However the Italian Market is too far away to walk to for people living in Carverton Village, as are the big chain supermarkets. In the neighborhood, prices at Hiram's and Thriftright were higher, and these places more likely used for comparison. In February of

who found that the value of community was "most stressed" at the Food Co-op she studied and warns that for all the talk of community at the Food Co-op many members undoubtedly joined simply because the food was cheaper. Because material gain is not part of the acceptable vocabulary of motives in these organizations, public discussion of such motives is suppressed. (p. 515)

As the next few pages will show, Co-op people did not hesitate to talk of "cheap food" or to use the phrase in their flyers.

\(^1\) A savings is an expected feature of co-op activity according to Ronald W. Cotterill, an agricultural economist at Michigan State. According to Cotterill (1978) "rational consumer
1972, a flyer was distributed by the Co-op which compared prices of 15 products at Thriftright and Powelton Co-op. The flyer concluded:

These percentages figured in with others not listed averaged 40%! If you eat what costs $10 a week at Thriftright, it would cost you about $6 at week at the Co-op: Or Less:
(from flyer "Cheap Food!" distributed 2/14/73)

Such a flyer contributed to the perception of real savings which exceeded actual savings which would have been possible had people consistently used the large food chains.¹ One of those who purchased food for the Co-op at the Distribution Center in the "Early Days" and later for Central Foods, gave this rationale for paying Co-op prices:

Generally speaking it is important to realize almost across the board how much a price is at the Co-op, it's going to be cheaper than at the supermarkets so that if you actually needed it, wanted it, you know, you should assume, and I think rightfully so, that you're getting the cheapest price possible for the item regardless of where ever you bought it...trust in the management or whoever makes the buying decisions to not buy things that are outrageous, you know.

[Ben IV, p. 2, 5/16/73]

A difficulty with accepting the judgment of prices of those who spent early mornings buying at the food distribution center is that they were unlikely to visit supermarkets to do comparison shopping, anymore than people shopping in the

behavior predicts that prices in co-ops which demand labor time as well as monetary payment must be lower than prices of competing retail establishments." (p. 263)

¹ Curhan and Wertheim (1972-73) also found members' perceptions about 40% higher in Boston, but they estimate actual savings at about 25% of total purchases (adjusted to supermarket prices).
Co-op were. A case in point occurred in the spring of 1973, as the price of onions rose from 9¢ a pound in February to 22¢ a pound in March in the Co-op, prompting meeting-people to characterize the prices as "outrageous" and to wonder what they must be in the supermarkets which none of them had visited. One person at the meeting of 3/5/73 contributed the information that his mother said they were 32¢ a pound in the supermarket which produced expressions of amazement on the part of some others present.

The usual way to characterize price, both in Co-op talk and in the Co-op written materials, was with the adjective "cheap."

Although the prevailing incentive for belonging to the Carverton Co-op is to get food cheap...

[Leaflet of fall 1972, quoted more fully on page 120]

...purchasing food collectively at their greatest possible advantage. [Leaflet winter, 1972]

"Cheap Food!" [Headline of leaflet 2/14/73]

The Carverton Food Co-op sells these items as cheaply as possible. [Poster of fall 1974]

We try to sell the produce and other goodies as cheaply as possible. [Leaflet of 11/7/74]

No one could deny that paying less for food ("cheap food") was a reason for Co-op participation. However, it can not have been the sole motivation for those who spent many hours hauling crates around or otherwise put in hours fulfilling
cooperative working requirements, or even for some of those who bought from the Co-op during Co-op hours which were in conflict with other commitments in their lives. Commitment to the Co-op is not fully explained by economics. The amount of money saved by shopping at the Co-op was, on the average order, about one dollar. The last section of this chapter will return to the question of other bases for commitment to the Co-op.

**Produce Day Procedures** Certain procedures emerged on the days on which food was distributed and orders accepted for the next week's session. Knowledge of these practices characterized the good Co-op produce day-person.

In the "Early Days," produce day-people came to the Co-op on Thursdays and helped themselves to the items they had ordered on the preceding Tuesday. Food was arranged on tables made from old doors (salvaged from buildings already demolished in the neighborhood) supported by saw-horses in a U-shaped pattern around the perimeter of the room. Vegetables and fruits were arranged alphabetically in their packing crates along the wall. Produce was weighed or counted out by the individual and the cashier figured prices from the amounts indicated on the individual's order, calculated a total and collected the money.

The variety of products increased as cheese, dried beans and nuts were added. Later molasses, honey and oils (known as "drippies") were added, as were peanut butter, eggs, butter
and other dairy products. Still, shopping at the Co-op did not supply everything, and had to be supplemented by trips to other stores for such things as soap, paper goods, canned or frozen goods, meat or fish, and at times for milk, bread, cheese, eggs or produce which the Co-op did not have that particular time.

In the "Middle Period" a modification in the procedure was instituted in order to provide a more supervised way of distributing food (which had been necessitated by the losses mentioned above). A counter barrier was placed between the person picking up an order and a person working as a seller, as shown in Figure 2.4. The seller and buyer walked together around the horseshoe as the seller filled the buyer's order which had been made out at the preceding week's session. The process took about ten minutes, although a waiting line could double or treble the time needed. The seller weighed the produce or counted out the items needed and put down the amounts on the order form. The total was still figured by the cashier.

Produce unsold by 6:30 PM was available as "extras" and placed on what was known as an "extra table" (cf. Figure 2.4) for sale without the necessity of having been pre-ordered. In addition, the "extra table" also usually contained some products even when the Co-op opened which had not been ordered at all, such as the balance of split crates, items left over from the previous weeks, such as onions or
Figure 2.4 Diagram Of Food Distribution On Produce Day. ("Middle Period" and "Later Years"; "Early Days" lacked barrier between path of person picking up food, X to Y, and food boxes.)

Each area of the diagram represents different food items and their locations.

- **Nuts**
- **Dried Fruit**
- **"Drippies"**
- **Cheese Cutter**
- **"Extra Table"**
- **Bread**
- **Cheese Scale**
- **Cheese**
- **Blank Order Blanks**
- **Record Book**
- **Cashier**
- **Blackboard** (in "Later Years" only)
potatoes. Occasionally there were seasonable bargains bought entirely as "extras." Some people would also put things on the "extra table" which they had ordered, but no longer wanted, or did not want at the price being charged or the quality present. From my usual position as cheese cutter (cf. Figure 2.4) I could observe the "extra table." Most days one or two people would put some item on it. However, the number would increase whenever prices showed seasonal highs. There was a difference of opinion amongst Co-op people as to whether the practice should be encouraged or discouraged. The buyers were clear on the need to have everything that was ordered paid for, as reflected in the following utterance.

As a pre-ordered Co-op, you sort of buy on the assumption that, you know you can get rid of certain things, you know, and the whole thing is contingent on not having anything left over at the end of the day, which is essentially worthless, because you can't get anybody to buy it, but you've spent for it [Unhuh] so you've lost money, you know, so it's very important for people to understand that the Co-op itself is going to lose money unless everyone buys what they ordered, you know, so to an extent there is an obligation to buy what you ordered, regardless of the price.

[Ben IV, p. 2, 5/16/73]

Another practice on which produce day-people did not have a consistent point of view was whether non-members should be allowed to buy from the "extra table." I observed people who appeared not to know the procedures being intercepted by a selling coordinator during the "Middle Period" and directed toward the "extra table." In other instances I heard selling coordinators explain that only members could use the place. A few people who entered the
Co-op did become shoppers, not realizing membership might be a pre-requisite to using the Co-op. In the "Later Years" one selling coordinator decided to put together a list of people shopping at the Co-op and found nearly a dozen of the 75 shopping at that time had not known that a Co-op membership existed.

There were recurrent incidents and problems on produce day with youths coming into the Co-op, especially in the "Early Days." They were alternately encouraged and discouraged from hanging out in the Co-op.

Well, there used to be a problem with kids who would come in and obviously didn't belong, you know, 12 and 14 year-old kids would hang around, and maybe try to get some fruit of something, and again it was the kind of situation where, you know, you would suppose that they make a rule that kids don't come in the Co-op. But then there were different people on duty every week--some people would let the kids in, which made it almost impossible the other weeks to tell the kids they couldn't come in, because last week they were let in. Also, if there were also a couple of maybe young women working there, then they felt very threatened by the kids, because, you know, these are adolescent boys, black kids, who, you know, came on in a threatening way. So that was the main problem with people who didn't belong.

A policy of excluding non-Co-op people was followed more consistently during the "Later Years."

In addition the Co-op was robbed three times:

February 1972 - A zip-gun robbery netted $13.50.

April 1973 - Robbery at gun point by two youths who took an unknown amount (but less than $50)

Spring 1976 - Robbery succeeded in taking several hundred dollars in Food Stamps and $20.00 in cash.
Money was sometimes taken to the treasurer's house during selling sessions and always at the close of the day. Each person's total purchase was recorded in a cashier's book, and the total of purchases in the book represented the day's receipts.

Working Cooperatively In the "Early Days" everyone contributed labor in what was a cooperative enterprise. All the Co-op people were workers, a few serving as coordinators for the food buying or as coordinators for the produce day sessions. Labor obligations were three hours in each three month period for each adult who belonged to the Co-op. Some individuals put in many hours beyond those required. People were expected to sign up for jobs. Labor coordinators were in charge of making lists of jobs to be done, and seeing that jobs were filled. Work was not consistently supervised, nor were systems of recording the hours worked. Some people felt that there were individuals who were not signing up for jobs or who signed up but did not do the work for which they signed up.

Each week workers changed, including those who were coordinating activities, except for a few of the personnel who went to the market at 3:30 AM and dealt with the people at the Food Distribution Center. The food buyers and their helpers loaded the food into cars or vans and drove it to the building being used as the Co-op. Once Central Foods took over the buying in the spring of 1973, produce day-
people no longer went to market to buy (but were required
to supply one individual to Central Foods to help each week
or pay a $10 fine). Other produce day-people also worked
to set-up the Co-op by opening crates and boxes and arranging
the food around the room. Some people took turns as cashiers,
others collated orders or solicited labor for the week's
food runs. Some did the bookkeeping and were in charge of
putting money in the bank and of getting funds to those who
were to do the week's marketing. Once people no longer
helped themselves, three or more sellers were needed each
session to fill the orders. Labor coordinators were still
organizing the working system. A person who volunteered
to serve as a session coordinator would be assigned to each
two-hour selling session to supervise and deal with problems.
The post of coordinator was not always easy to fill since
few of the workers were anxious to serve as coordinators.

In the "Middle Period," once it was possible to
participate in the Co-op without being a worker, labor
requirements were set by the labor coordinators at 2 hours
for each 4-week period for a single person, or four hours
for a family or commune, regardless of size. The team of
labor coordinators now set up "crews," four people who
worked together either setting up or selling every four weeks.
Each crew had a coordinator. There were two shifts each
Thursday (later Wednesday) each with its own crew (4 to 6 PM
and 6 to 7:30 PM). The second crew cleaned up and disposed
of left-over produce, if any existed.¹

In December of 1973, there were 35 working members. Generally working members represented from half to two-thirds of the people who used the Co-op. In the mid-May census (1975), 57 (66%) were working members. The cost benefit of working was a ten percent saving off the price placed on the produce throughout the "Middle Period" and most of the "Later Years."

Most jobs were done during selling sessions, but some dry goods and cheese were pre-packaged by people who could not put in their labor requirements during the hours of the Co-op. Other people collated the orders and telephoned the total order to the buyer (or later to Central Foods). The setting-up coordinator did the pricing and was responsible for checking the order to insure that the required produce was on hand. Little could be done if there were an error found for those who had bought the produce (whether Co-op people in the "Early Days" or Central Foods later one) had already left.

Produc day-workers learned their jobs by doing them, with some advice from co-workers. During the "Middle Period" at least once a session someone would come in the Co-op and announce that he or she was supposed to work and ask what they were supposed to do. The session coordinator, if one were present, would assign the new individual to a job, generally to help another seller. Sometimes sellers

¹ "Paid Manager (Chapter 6 p.105) reports on a time when the means for disposing of left-overs had disappeared."
would mistake unit and pound prices and sell oranges, for instance, at 25¢ a piece instead of 25¢ a pound or vice versa. Those who had bought the food at the market were not on hand at the selling sessions, and the cashiers would often add whatever sellers had marked on the order sheets. Unless the purchaser had some notion of prices, mistakes were not uncommon. Some cashiers were not familiar with the operation of the adding machine, and people would have to wait in line until the cashier got a reasonable total. People's accuracy with the scales varied, as did their concern with the interests of the Co-op.

One week someone was weighing out almonds for me and told me he thought that was about a half a pound, well, at a dollar forty a pound you don't over-weigh almonds by even an ounce, and oh, it wasn't a problem. I just said, 'well, gee, why don't you check it, because they're awfully expensive.' And he did, you know, he took a few out and that was that. Maybe I'm more sensitive to this than most people are, because I've, you know, I've tried to get together a plan, where, you know, we won't lose money by that kind of accident.

[Amy IV, p. 3, 4/11/73]

Occasionally check lists of procedures were written out, such as how to close up after selling was finished, or how to find the spring from which spring-water could be obtained. But such information was not kept at the Co-op, but was stored in a box at the treasurer's house, along with extra order forms and miscellaneous papers connected with the Co-op which no one had wanted to throw out.

In the "Later Years" the paid managers gradually took over the labor coordinators' job and were able to eliminate
some of the inefficiencies in the Co-op operation. Until that
time there was also no regular channel for getting information
about the price or quality of produce during the selling
sessions. It is not that people were insensitive to the
problem of information flow or information transfer.

If more information was in the hands of people that
were more accessible, you know, and the dissimina-
tion of information was more, ah, regulated,
normalized, and frequent, [Unhuh] you know, then,
then the Co-op itself would probably not only
become more efficient, but would also become
more cooperative.

[Ben IV, p. 4, 5/16/73]
The talker did not specify how the Co-op would be more
cooperative.

Despite problems in getting information about the Co-op
circulated until the "Later Years", the Co-op managed a
more or less successful food distribution operation for
most of its six years, as the data in the first part of
this chapter showed. The option of attending Co-op meetings
in order to get more information about the Co-op operation,
about Co-op problems, or to voice complaints, or participate
in discussing policy was always open to produce day people
Although most of the people who participated in produce
day never attended meetings, those who did are the ones who
created the policies of produce day.

The Co-op Meeting-People.

Meeting-people are simply the people who came out to an
evening meeting at which Co-op problems were discussed.

Forty one different people attended the 36 meetings in my data
(plus four non-Co-op people). The largest meeting had 22 people (3/31/75) although four meetings had only three people present. Generally 6 or 7 were on hand. The attendance figures are given in Figure 2.5 for meetings held in the "Middle Period" from 1/73-6/75, as well as dates of meetings and names of the person who chaired (if there was a chairperson). The location of the four segments used in Chapters 5 to 8 is also shown.

In the "Early Days" meetings were held weekly, and all coordinators were expected to attend. In addition a more general meeting was held monthly. Separate coordinators' meetings had been discontinued by the fall of 1972, and meetings were held about every two weeks through 1973 and most of 1974, as shown in Figure 2.5.

People who attended meetings were generally working members, especially the coordinators. Occasionally the meeting-people tried to get more produce day-people to attend, by, for example, putting up a notice on the bulletin board at the Co-op. One meeting, 11/19/73, was announced by giving a slip to each person who shopped the preceding produce day, listing a tentative agenda and calling the meeting "important." There were 13 people at that meeting which ratified Central Foods by-laws as compared with 4 the one before and 7 the one following (cf. Figure 2.4).

Meeting-people expected that meetings would be held on the first Monday of the month, although less than half of the 36 meetings listed on Figure 2.5 occurred on a first
Figure 2.5 Meeting Attendance, Date Held, Chair
People For Meetings 1/22/73 To 6/16/75.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting #</th>
<th>Chair Person</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/22/73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Amy</td>
<td>17 (&quot;New Labor&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/29/73</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>14 (&quot;No Parking&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/5/73</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ronnie</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/19/73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/5/73</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/19/73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jim G.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/23/73</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/7/73</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/21/73</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Amy*</td>
<td>9 (&quot;Paid Manager&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/4/73</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (&quot;Starting Up&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/19/73</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>10/15/73</td>
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<tr>
<td>6/16/75</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Norm</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Became chairperson for the vote only.

Segments shown in parenthesis following meeting from which they are excerpted.

Mean attendance at meetings, 7.5

Number of different individuals attending, 48
Monday. The Co-op had no officers, except for the treasurer. At most meetings (23 of the 36) there was no chair person. If a meeting had a chair person, it was either because someone had volunteered to be a chair person or someone suggested there should be a chair person and then someone volunteered. At a few meetings, someone also volunteered to take minutes, although it was not clear what was to happen to the minutes once they had been read at the following meeting.\(^1\) No minutes were taken after 2/19/73.

Although there were treasurers, there was no regular treasurer's report at a meeting. (Of the 18 meetings in 1973, 5 had a financial report.) Some meetings were called in order to get a financial statement of the Co-op, so that the meeting-people could get a sense of whether the Co-op was making or losing money.

Since transcripts of segments of meetings are used as data in Chapters 5 to 8, I shall give a brief description of the meetings of the "Middle Period." There was no nucleus of specific people required before a meeting would start, nor was an agenda usually prepared beforehand. Meetings began as the people present offered to each other suggestions of what they wanted to talk about, and in this way an agenda was built. Meeting-people spoke without being recognized by the chair (if there was one). The discussion followed the meeting agenda, and continued until the last item on the

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\(^1\) I hesitated to inquire too closely into what happened to the minutes lest Co-op procedures be altered by my concerns. The same is true of the lack of regular treasurer's reports.
agenda had been discussed, with rare exceptions.

Meetings lasted about two hours, starting between 8 and 9 and ending between 10:30 and 11:00 PM. Herbal teas were often available before or during some of the meetings. The times just before and just after meetings were spend talking about community or personal concerns, but rarely about the Co-op.

**Information at meetings** What were the issues that were discussed at the meetings? Any problem of the Co-op might be talked about, but some issues recurred fairly often, such as food prices, the Co-op work schedule, and Central Foods. I made a special study of the meeting agenda topics which occurred during 1973, since all four segments used in Chapters 5 to 8 are from meetings held that year.

A total of 113 agenda items appeared in the 13 meetings of 1973, as shown by Figure 2.6. Topics are classified under the three aspects of participation in the Co-op shown in this chapter: produce day-people, meeting-people, and organization-people. The horizontal rows locate each agenda item in the meeting in which it occurred. The four circles locate the segments of Chapters 5 to 8 in the agenda items and meetings in which they were given.

At 12 of the 18 meetings, agenda items dealt with Central Foods: deliveries by, loans to, and communication with that
Figure 2.6 Agenda Items In 1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting #</th>
<th>JAN 22</th>
<th>FEB 24</th>
<th>MAR 23</th>
<th>APR 27</th>
<th>MAY 9</th>
<th>JUN 07</th>
<th>JUL 12</th>
<th>AUG 16</th>
<th>SEP 16</th>
<th>OCT 15</th>
<th>NOV 13</th>
<th>DEC 19</th>
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<td>PRODUCE DAY</td>
<td>76</td>
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organization. The first issue was whether the Co-op should affiliate with Central Foods, although the question was somewhat after the fact since Central Foods was already supplying the Co-op with produce. Central Foods had developed out of the operation of Carverton buyers at the food distribution center. Formal affiliation meant that a seven percent per case fee would be added to the cost of food ordered by Carverton, and that Carverton would no longer be expected to send a full crew to the Food Distribution Center each week. Other agenda items on Central Foods contained reports to the Carverton meetings on the progress of Central Foods in getting six other Co-ops to join, selection of delegates to the Central Foods Board and approval of a loan of $500 to Central Foods.

Each of the discussions from which the segments are excerpted was an agenda item that came up several times during 1973:

"New Labor" - The worker/nonworker system was discussed at five meetings.

"No Parking" - An incident in connection with deliveries was discussed at four meetings.

"Starting Up" - Problems of opening and closing (including holiday closings and hours of the day to be open) were discussed at six meetings.

"Paid Manager" - A paid manager was discussed at six meetings (mostly after the post was created, concerned with who was going to fill the post).

For the most part the meeting-people were concerned with the problems and issues of produce day (76 items), much as any
management would be concerned with the running of an organization. The decision to have a paid manager was made on 5/7/73, although no paid manager did any work until 10/15/73. After the manager started there was a drop in the number of items discussed, although the 42 items which appear in the first five months of 1974 are on much the same themes as the 85 in Figure 2.6 for the first five months of 1973. The number of meetings also decreased (Figure 2.5 shows 13 for 1973 and there were 13 in the whole of 1974).

Few of the items listed in Figure 2.6 concern the meetings themselves, whereas a third concern the Co-op organization. Recruitment of new members accounted for a few of these (7 items). The lack of financial information has been mentioned above; four of the five finance reports in the year were in the first three months of the year.

The number of agenda items at any one meeting ranged from 3 to 13, and the length of time spent from a few minutes (as in the report on deliveries of 2/5/73) to over an hour (on the worker/non-worker system on 1/22/73). In each instance discussion of an agenda item provided an automatic warrant for the information in that it could then be attributed to that meeting. At the same time generally nothing was done about advising the produce day-people as to what had happened at the meetings.1 During some meetings...

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1 Curhan and Wertheim (1972-73) hypothesize a high degree of information transfer as one of three features of a successful cooperative. The other two are high degree of decision
a committee would be set up and people would volunteer to find out something, such as where to buy cheese at a lower price than was currently done, or to do something such as to get a new lock and keys. In some instances talk on an agenda item resulted in significant changes in the Co-op, as major decisions were made by the meeting people.

Decision making Agenda item discussion sometimes produced changes in procedures and policies of the Co-op. In making decisions the meeting-people were concerned with finding solutions to problems in Co-op operation. In the 36 meetings I studied I can locate 15 policy decisions which were made, shown in Figure 2.7. Ten of these occurred in 1973 and can be also found in Figure 2.6. Four of these decisions are related to the topics of the four segments used subsequently.

Six new decisions were financial ones; four were structural changes in the Co-op; four concerned Central Foods (including two of the financial decisions) and three were on the use of Co-op facilities.

Of the 15 decisions, eight were voted on, and with one exception (3/31/75, change member status to client with Central Foods) agreements were unanimous or close to it, reflecting the situation in the seven other instances in which there was no vote, but a consensus assumed. Whether there making and decision implementation. The concepts are undefined, as are the scales on which the degrees are measured.
Figure 2.7 New Moral Matters From All Meeting Decisions (30 Meetings, 15 Decisions).

The Co-op ought to:

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Item of decision</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>No Vote Taken</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/22/73</td>
<td>Have a worker/nonworker member distinction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/22/73</td>
<td>Have a crew system. (&quot;New Labor&quot;).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/29/73</td>
<td>Have a trial period (for the new system) to last 4 to 6 weeks.</td>
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<td>5/21/73</td>
<td>Hire a &quot;Paid Manager&quot; at $20 a week.</td>
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<td>Finance And Prices</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/29/73</td>
<td>Spend up to $15 for &quot;No Parking&quot; sign</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/29/73</td>
<td>Have new markup system.</td>
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<td>3/19/73</td>
<td>Pay 8% markup to Central Foods on produce they supply.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/17/73</td>
<td>Loan $500 to Central Foods</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/4/74</td>
<td>Put a 25% markup on cheese prices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/5/74</td>
<td>Reclassify loan as fee for Co-op membership.</td>
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<td>11/19/73</td>
<td>Ratify Central Foods by-laws and thereby become a member.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/31/75</td>
<td>Change member status to client status with Central Foods.</td>
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(as well as 3/19 and 12/17 listed above)

Use of Facilities

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<th>Item of decision</th>
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<tr>
<td>1/19/73</td>
<td>Open up for the fall &quot;Starting Up:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/17/74</td>
<td>Let Phil put his truck inside premises.</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/9/74</td>
<td>Allow Rainbow Co-op to use premises.</td>
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8 7
was an audible vote, hand raising, or an assumption of an agreement, people did take action or make changes in policy as a result. Attendance at meetings with votes averaged 14.6 people and at those without, 6.1. Only one of the meetings with votes had less than 11 people present, whereas in those without votes only one had more than 11 people present: taking a vote would seem to be dependant on the number of people present.

In the cases where votes were not taken, issues were often discussed until there was an assumption of agreement by the meeting-people; this is a method resembling that used by the Quakers. One Co-op person, who was also a Quaker, explained the Co-op procedures:

We [the Co-op] were geared to consensus, um, pretty much, but it was never really, really stated. There was no one, there was not a clerk of the meeting who said, 'Well, this is how the decision of this meeting.' Rather you had a whole lot of people voicing opinions, and some of them hung in the air and some of them disappeared, you know, and it just, and you wondered sort of at the end of the meeting if you agreed with certain things or not.

[Joel IV, p. 8, 5/20/74]

These remarks refer particularly to the "Early Days," as the last meeting attended by the talker was the sixth of the 36 under study. The general method of consensus without a clerk of the meeting does however apply to the other meetings.

As no minutes were taken after 3/5/73, minutes can not be consulted to discover the wording of motions which were passed. Only the tape recordings that I made allow this to be retrieved. As with the rest of what happened at meetings, decisions joined the oral tradition of Carverton, being known
mainly by those who were at the particular meeting at which they were made and only haphazardly by those who weren't. But even amongst those who had made a decision, there were problems in remembering. For example at the 9/5/74 meeting it had been decided to reclassify loans as fees. In the spring of 1974 no one could remember for how long a period it had been agreed that the money would be refunded to those who had made loans to the Co-op before such loans would be declared to be fees.

Each of the decisions represents an instance in which the meeting-people acted for the Co-op in efforts to solve problems in policies and procedures. Although any agenda item could be identified in the future as having been discussed at a Co-op meeting, agenda items which resulted in decisions being taken had a further characteristic. Each decision legislated some new obligation and evaluation for the Co-op or the Co-op people. The obligations can be stated by adding the decisions of Fig 2.7 as predicates to the formula, "The Co-op ought to:..." From that point on the Co-op can be evaluated on the basis of how well those predications are accomplished. Here is the contribution from the meeting-people which is most readily seen. In some instances, the meeting-people altered constitutive rules of the Co-op, e.g., the Co-op would allow non-working as well as working members to belong. In other instances policies were set, e.g., the Co-op would allow another Co-op to use the premises on a different day. Some of the Co-op people
showed they were sensitive to the question of how much power a meeting should have to make decisions.

I think the whole question is whether there is enough communication before the meeting, so that people know that certain decisions will be made. So I think that the meeting should be empowered to make any decisions that affect the Co-op, but any important decisions should be—there should be an agenda publicized beforehand, and I think ideally everything that's discussed should be publicized before the meeting so that people could come [Unhuh] if they had any input, you know, that they wanted to make on those decisions.

[Caren IV, p. 2, 5/6/73]

This account of the meeting—people does not tap their ordinary use in talk of moral matters that is the subject of this work. Their informed use of regulative rules of meetings are shown to more intent. The agendas and votes, and some of the moral matters are shown in Figure 2.7. In their talk during meetings there are many other ways in which meeting—people continue to show that they are more than meeting—people but also organization—people and that the organization they are concerned with is the Co-op organization.

The Co-op Organization—People

There are two answers to the question: who are the Co-op organization—people? In one sense they are any of the people who participated in the Co-op, but especially those who would on occasion speak for the Co-op.1 In this distributive sense, each person participating in the Co-op qualifies potentially as a Co-op organization—person, although

1 The notion of "speaking for" a collection of people is developed on page 202 for any collection of people.
few may have wanted to make use of this guise. In a second sense, the Co-op organization—people make up the Co-op considered as an organization with an ideology by which it is recognized from the outside as well as the inside a Co-op. In such a collective sense, the Co-op organization has members and money.¹ Both of these senses are important to this study, and in the final Chapter I shall again separate the two so as to consider what constituted good Co-op people in both a distributive and a collective sense. But for the most part the distinction is not vital to the discussions which follow here and will be blurred. I shall use the phrase (Co-op) "organization—people" to refer to either or both at the same time, reflecting here perhaps Cooley's point ([1902] 1964) quoted more fully in Chapter 1 that:

'society' and 'individual' do not denote separate phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing. (p. 37)

Membership As indicated above under produce day—people it was not the case that all the people who used the Co-op were members. It is also the case that Co-op members did not always use the Co-op each week. Although people were encouraged to join and be members, there were no membership lists or files kept, except at the beginning of the "Early Days" and toward the end of the "Later Days." One estimate

¹ Meeting—people had the same possibility of both a distributive and a collective sense. As the segments will show, a collective sense of meeting is seldom used.
of membership I can make is based on the number of people who paid for orders on produce day, which I obtained by counting the number of payments recorded in the cashier's book: this number varied from 25 to 164 as shown by Figure 2.1 for the first two periods.

An indication of turnover can be obtained by noting that of the 33 most active people I interviewed in 1973 and 1974, eight were no longer in the Co-op by 1975. Another indication of turnover comes from the mid-May census 1975 which showed only ten percent of those surveyed had been original Co-op people. Another indication is found in the large amount of money deposited with the Co-op as loans (to be described in the next section on finance) which suggests as many as 400 people may have been members for some part of the time from the beginning of the Co-op in December 1970 until 1973.

Recruiting new people from the neighborhood into the Co-op was often discussed at meetings, as indicated by Figure 2.6 on agenda items of 1973 which shows two items on publicity and five on flyers. Committees were formed to write and distribute flyers. Sometimes posters were stapled to telephone poles or circulars were distributed door to door. One such leafleting campaign in 1972 included not only the immediate neighborhood of Carverton, but also Lantua the completely black residential area adjoining to the North. Generally a few new people appeared after such campaign. New recruits were rarely black people.
The mid-May Census of 1975 asked people how they had first heard of the Co-op. Forty-one percent said they had heard of the Co-op from a friend and 27% suggested a network of friends (a "grapevine" was the usual phrase). Nearly 20% mentioned they were first attracted by the Co-op building with its brightly painted letters on the outside (ECCR for East Carverton Concerned Residents who had "liberated" the building from Prester University, cf. earlier history p. 67) and the signs of Co-op activity. During the operation of the Co-op, people would leave the building with boxes and bags full of produce. In warm weather, the Co-op became even more visible to people walking or driving by, as the large garage doors were open and the whole operation could be seen from the sidewalk. A few indicated they had noticed posters.

Finance When people first joined the Co-op they gave the Co-op as a loan an amount representing their anticipated weekly purchases of produce. Most put up $5.00 or less, but a few of the communes and families contributed $20 to $30. By 1973 Co-op records showed about $2,000 had been loaned by its members. Bank deposits showed assets of about $1,800 at that time. People who left the area for some reason or did not continue their participation in the Co-op, did not generally ask for their money back. It was decided at a meeting in 1974 to put a moratorium on earlier loans (as shown in Figure 2.7 on decisions) and to change to a non-refundable
fee of $3.00 payable once upon joining. The treasurers made a search through whatever Co-op records they had for names of those who had loaned the Co-op money. No names were found. A notice was put up on the bulletin board at produce day that people could retrieve their loan money. A few asked for their money back and refunds were made to anyone who asked. Less than $30 was refunded.

In addition to the gradual loss of the money lent by members and the robberies mentioned earlier, there were several other money losses which were mentioned in the interviews (and in the third instance at the meeting of 5/7/73 which appears in the segment "Paid Manager"):  

Fall 1971—On the way to the Distribution Center $220 blew out of the window of a car and disappeared into the river.

Spring 1972—Several weeks in a row there was about $50 less cash on hand than receipts from the selling sessions indicated should be on hand.

May 1973—About $125 was missing over several weeks.

During the "Middle Period" the Co-op assets shrank, probably making possible the continuation of the Co-op through the low volume and low receipts of the "Middle Period" (as shown in Figure 2.1) The loan of $500 to Central Foods in December 1973 depleted Co-op funds still further. At the beginning of the "Later Years" the assets were used up. However, by the spring of 1975 the Co-op was regularly covering expenses and sometimes showing a slight profit. At that point too the Paid Manager was keeping a weekly record of the number of orders filled, something that had not been
consistently done before. The paid manager by the middle of the "Later Years" also knew each week whether receipts for produce sold were more or less than the cost of the food. Adequate financial records which were up-to-date were then kept until the end of the Co-op.

**Communication with the Co-op** To what extent was the Carverton Co-op known by those who did not participate? The brightly painted outside wall of the Co-op mentioned above did attract attention and make the Co-op more visible to some of the neighborhood people. A few joined and later mentioned the wall. However, to some expected outside agencies, the Co-op was invisible. Gas, electricity and water were paid by ECOR. There was no telephone in the building until the "Middle Period" when Central Foods put one in, which was also used by Carverton. Mail was occasionally delivered, but communication from the City or the Bank generally went to the treasurer's home directly. In order to transact business with Co-op personnel, an outsider had to find out first when the Co-op was open, assuming they already knew what the address of the Co-op was.

In the "Early Days," the Carverton Co-op buyers had gotten to know some of the jobbers and suppliers at the Food Distribution Center. However, once buying was taken over by Central Foods this area of acquaintance and source of market information disappeared. Carverton people sat on the Board of Central Foods, as did representatives of all the
Co-ops belonging to Central Foods. These board meetings became a source of information about the Co-ops in the City, and in turn Carverton people talked of Carverton's operations.

The Carverton Co-op was listed in the National Food Cooperative Directory (November 1, 1973) and in the "Whole Earth" catalog for the area. Beyond that the Co-op had come to the attention and had been in communication with the following agencies:

U.S., Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition, Authorization for Food Stamp program 2/10/71.

City, Department of Licenses and Inspections, scales inspection, 1971, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Denial of license for food store, hearings, 1975, 6.

City, Department of Police, investigation of three robberies, extra police car patrol on street on Co-op days, complaint of attack on Co-op people with subsequent Court hearing.

City, Department of Sanitation, trash removal weekly.

City, Department of Health, passing of certain sanitary standards, including posting of sign about hand washing.

City, Redevelopment Authority (RDA), possible landlord, as Co-op tried to secure lease via ECCR.

Bicentennial Bank, savings and checking accounts.

ECCR (East Carverton Concerned Residents), Leasee of building, to whom Co-op paid $50 monthly rent (later reduced to $25)

Natural Foods Store, co-tenant of building, some-time co-purchaser of various foods; also competitor for some people's food dollar.

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Other City Co-ops, co-customers of Central Foods.

Carverton Baking Corp., bread supplier, sharer of facilities in warehouse.

Central Foods, member and client, borrower of $500, supplier of produce for part of the Co-op's existence.

As an organization the Co-op was successful in communicating with a variety of outside agencies, even if its visibility to the neighborhood people was limited to those who happened to walk or drive past while it was in operation; to those who noticed a poster stapled to a telephone pole throughout the area, usually in the fall; and to those who knew people who were already participants and happened to mention it. If it also happened as it surely did, that the Co-op was mentioned as a good place to shop or that people ought to shop at the Co-op, moral matters would have entered the situation.

**Moral matters** As stated in the first chapter I am using the term "moral matters" to refer generally to those issues and problems of social life that involve obligations and evaluations (p. 6). The overall view of the moral matters of the Co-op organization—people which emerges from this descriptive material reflects many changes from the somewhat anarchistic and open character of the "Early Days" to the record-keeping and order of the "Later Years." The Co-op of the "Early Days" could not survive the problems of food losses, or people not getting what they ordered, and of
not enough money being collected to cover the cost of food ordered. In the "Early Days" there was a lot of excitement and energy which went along with the initial striking successes. The emphasis then was never solely on an economic motivation, but on moral matters as well.

I think we've got a long way to go just to come back to the level we were at in the very first year, and it's just a shame that while we were there, it wasn't possible to develop the philosophy of building on what we had. But, you know, everyone seemed to hold it as a positive value that the Co-op was very anarchistic and disorganized, and I never held that particularly as a positive value, but a lot of people did and what they saw as worthwhile about the Co-op was that it was unpaid, that you could just come in and join and do something for a while and then leave, and that was considered the worthwhile thing. So as long as that was the feeling of most of the members and most of the coordinators, then we weren't going to be able to establish a more permanent structure.

[Jim IV, p. 4, 12/4/73]

But a "more permanent structure" was established, and lasted for three years after Jim's statement. The Co-op that emerged in the "Later Years" was one in which regular management had been introduced. People ran the operation much as any store would be run, knowing who was going to work and when, and what the volume and costs of food were, as well as anticipated receipts. As a reasonably efficient buying club the Co-op supplied its members with produce and other products until such time as it lost its building and was unable to revive in a new location without the many members who had become Natural Foods' customers.

Although meeting-people and produce day-people did not generally talk of moral matters, but rather of Co-op problems
and predicaments, some of the Co-op philosophy is found in the leaflets and circulars which were written from time to time as part of publicity campaigns to get new members. Earlier I cited five such leaflets to show the emphasis of Co-op people on the notion of "cheap" food. One of these leaflets also contains a statement of goal of the Co-op as providing a place for community activity. It does not stress cooperation or commitment.

Although the prevailing incentive for belonging to the Carverton Co-op is to get food cheap, its actual worth and purpose goes beyond money. The Co-op's real potential lies in its presence in the community as a place for people to meet and talk, exchange ideas and feelings. In this way, the Co-op strengthens the community as a whole. Additionally it makes people aware of themselves as active participants in the process of community.

[from "hello! and Welcome to the Carverton Food Co-op, Fall, 1972]

This statement of ideology was written just as the "Middle Period" was beginning. From that point on the major concern of the Co-op was the survival of the Co-op as a place to get reasonably priced food cooperatively purchased and distributed. Yet the problems of the Co-op were eventually solved, and the Co-op operated efficiently, but only because of the changes which were made in the "Middle Period."

I would argue that during the ordinary operation of the Co-op, values and norms were used by Co-op people which reflected the prevailing Co-op ideology. During meetings, moral matters appeared, especially with regard to cooperation and commitment, as for instance in the question of who ought
to have keys for the new lock, who ought to buy the lock, and who was responsible for the loss of the keys to the old lock. Discussion of a lock for the Co-op building may seem to make it possible for an outsider to identify a meeting as a Co-op meeting, rather than a meeting of ECCR or of the local neighborhood Home Owners Association. But both of these other associations had as participants some of the same neighborhood people who were in the Carverton Co-op. Both of these other associations were also concerned with Carverton buildings and security in the neighborhood. Like the Co-op these other organizations encouraged cooperative rather than competitive activity and had problems resulting from participation of people who had a variety of commitments. Their organizations also had periods of inactivity and had to be revived after such lulls.

However, even in the talk of the Co-op people about the keys and locks, I would maintain that moral matters can be found that reflect a particular Co-op ideology. This talk is a resource that can be exploited more systematically than the descriptive ethnography presented in this chapter. In an effort to make such talk more accessible as data in which to find moral matters I have constructed the methodology of the following two chapters.
CHAPTER 3
THE LOCATION OF PEOPLE IN TALK

This and the next chapter describe the methods that will be used in the succeeding chapters to analyze the ways in which moral matters appear and are used in talk. Following the definition introduced in Chapter 1, I use the term "moral matters" to refer generally to those issues and problems of social life that involve both obligations and evaluations. The level of talk that is of interest in this work is the "utterance," the level at which cognitive agreement and disagreement is possible.

The preceding chapter described the Co-op from the viewpoint of three aspects of participation in the Co-op: the meeting-people, the produce day-people, and the organization-people. Each of these collections of people is basic to a study of the communication of moral matters in the talk.

1 The linguist Harris (1951) defines an utterance as an "expanses of talk, long or short, produced by a single person." (p. 14) The problem is often to tell when there is more than one utterance. There may be gaps, where another talks, and the original speaker appears to "know" what has occurred. In such a case, a second utterance is said to begin. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) use the term "turn" in their analysis of "turn-taking," noting "overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time, though speakers change, and though the size of turns and ordering of turns vary..." (p. 699) but the term is undefined.
of the Co-op. But many other collections of people appear in talk, and they must also be represented in the analysis. Some of them are subsets of Co-op people, some of them are neighborhood people, and some of them portray other aspects of the people's lives.

The initial problem this study confronts is the fact that very few of the traditional markers of morality are to be found in everyday talk, even in the focused gatherings of the meeting-people of the Co-op who confront the issues and problems described in the preceding chapter, many involving moral matters. As the title of this chapter suggests the strategy I shall adopt is to search systematically for the points where moral matters of different collections of people would be logically located, and this is where the collections of people occur in talk. In the course of so doing I shall also be making more evident the collections of people within which the individual(s) and subcollections of people in talk are found. This will then be the basis by which evaluations of people will be rooted within the same schema, since evaluations are made of a person or persons as individuals within collections of people.

Since much importance is being attached here to the appearance in talk of "collections of people," a word of explanation of this term serves to introduce this section. Sociology has often been concerned with locating agencies by which obligation is established or evaluations of morality explicated, as the earlier discussion in Chapter 1 of
empirical studies of obligation and evaluation suggested. Discussions of norms and values have been concerned with both those who are moral and those by whom morality is defined. However, as I have broadened the scope of what is being studied here as moral, I need to broaden each of these concerns and locate all the people who are implicated in this wider view.

In so far as traditional concerns with morality have looked for "bearers of obligation" or "enforcers of obligation" they have found such agencies abstracted from the immediate situation in which they occur. No one has yet considered the way that collections of people provide the bases of obligations and evaluations in and through talk. Some pluralities of people constitute a "collectivity," in some instances what is technically a "group." But other collections of people such as "social categories" will also be shown to be implicated in establishing the relevance of moral matters. Traditionally the group has been the basis by which obligations and evaluations or any aspect of morality has been generated. The close analysis of talk which is made here finds that these other collections of people also locate moral matters in talk. These too are the bases by which information and terminology as well as more immediate moral matters become part of the talk. They are the link by which talkers interactionally realize moral matters on the surface of talk or indicate that certain moral matters are relevant, i.e., that they have been made "always available"
(in the sense introduced in Chapter 1, p. 13).

The focus on the collections of people used in talk is designed to provide for the analysis a continuing basis by which moral matters can be traced. In other words, the collections of people are the means by which warrant and perspectives can be assigned, as well as terminology, information, evaluations and obligations located.

This chapter provides means for locating all relevant "collections of people" as they appear during talk. A variety of techniques are presented for finding those collections evident at the surface of talk as well as those not so evident. A large number of such collections of people can then be found in any sustained piece of talk, so large--potentially without limit--that it will be imperative to reduce them to a smaller number. Also I shall need procedures for classifying particular subsets of people which are most relevant to moral matters. To this end I present principles for selection and classification among subsets of collections of people.

The procedures therefore expand the material to be considered, and then contract them. But the procedure is not circular. The reduced set of categories does not consist of expressions found immediately in the text, but a more abstract representation, closely link to and dependent on them.

Since these collections of people appear in talk in a more or less linear sequence, the analysis must deal with the
problem of the relationship amongst preceding and succeeding collections. The second section of this chapter considers techniques for relating collections of people to each other, so as to show where there is underlying consensus. This is traced through the interactional responses of the participants and by the logical relations among the collections concerned. The issue is an important one for this analysis. When moral matters are located, it will be essential to state how far in the interaction their relevance extends—to what extent talkers are locating their concerns as relevant to this categorization of the world.

The notion of collections of people also provides a means for categorizing any individual, group, or social category constructed in talk, both those co-present, and those that are part of the fabric of the talk. A procedure for locating people within or without the collections of people is covered in the third part of this chapter. It will prove to be a useful means for analyzing the construction in talk of self and others, of operationalizing the notion of perspectives and of schematizing relations between people.

**Locating The Collection Of People**

The term "collection of people" is used to designate any plurality of people which can be referred to in talk or systematically inferred from the talk. The notion of collections of people loses the usual distinction amongst groups, social categories, associations, encounters, families,
or any other plurality of people, but includes all of these under this more general heading. Yet this broad concept of plural association is the most systematic means for the location of moral matters in talk, both by the interactants and by the analyst.

A first observation is that talkers must insert references to collections of people fairly often in the form of common nouns, proper names and pronouns in order to make clear who it is that is being talked about. For example, the text of the first page of the segment "No Parking"\(^1\) contains an explanation of the action of two of the Co-op people in not fighting back when they were attacked.

Extract 3-1:

Ben: Well, anyway, ah{Pause}, I guess we just sort of felt that, you know, that this kind of behavior is nothing we would have to take, and ah, we didn't fight back [Door slams] because of, well two essential-three essential factors, I think, first of all because fighting's pretty distasteful to begin with, second of all because, we didn't want to sort of precipitate any kind of a gang-type fight which probably is, is what would have happened, and ah, third of all, you know, he said he had a gun in his apartment, and also because not only that he had a gun, but sort of like that here was something we would have to deal with on an

Glen: Like ah--

Ben: on-going basis, you know, and any, sort of like ah...

["No Parking"021-035]

Ben's explanation uses no names of persons or other terms to refer to people, other than pronouns, most of which are

\(^1\) The issues of "No Parking" segment are introduced in Chapter 2 and discussed in the first pages of Chapter 8 in more detail. The text of "No Parking" follows Chapter 8.
singular. In the terminology of Scott and Lyman (1968) Ben's explanation is an "account," a "linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to value inquiry." (p. 46) This account explains the speaker's actions in not fighting back; since it is well known that there are people who believe that one ought to fight back, this account can be considered a defense against negative judgment. Here then is a site with moral matters, but where are the collections of people?

In order to examine this account I shall consider the text in which it is embedded, from the beginning of the extract, which is the point at which the individual is first introduced, to line **at which there is an end to the descriptive material directly concerning the individual, shown as Figure 3.1.** Here I have under observation all the text in which "he" and his action in fighting can be inspected for evidence of collections of people. The people mentioned in Figure 3.1 are underlined.

In the text then of the first 50 lines of "No Parking" (of which the account in Extract 3-1 is lines 021 to 035), there are only 15 items which are plural representations of people (including five instances of "you" found in "you know"). In Figure 3.2 is a list of all instances of people referred to in the first 50 lines of the segment.1 The 61 items in

---

1 There are two reasons for giving such a lengthy list. First, so that I can be responsible to whole passages of talk. This may be contrasted with methods (which will also be used where necessary) which select good examples of points being made,
Ben: Um, as far as the uh, the incident went on the 18th, ah, we're, we've got ah, I guess he m', he must be mentioned, we've got a court hearing and everything.

Sheldon: Yeah.

Ben: on un, the fifth and a, he's going to be summoned, ah, and if he doesn't show up, he'll be, you know, a warrant, you know, there'll be a warrant put out on him.

Mickey: Well, who was it that did this?

Ben: It's this guy across the street named Jason Thorne who lives over at 33- what?

Mickey: Jason Thorne?

Ben: 33- what? Sheldon?

Sheldon: 3303. Apparently, well, how much was

Sheldon: said last week about this guy? Did you tell

about Dolly?

Sheldon: I don't think it's necessary, you know, it's, this, it's really more personal business. No.

Gertrude: She got hit too?

Sheldon: she wasn't there then, it was another time.

Ben: Well, anyway, ah, [Pause], well I guess we just sort of felt that, you know, that this kind of behavior is nothing we would have to take, and ah, we didn't

fight back [Door slams] because of, well, two essent-,

three essential factors, I think, first of all because

fighting's pretty distasteful to begin with, second of

all because, we didn't want to sort of precipitate

any kind of a gang-type fight which is, is what would

have happened, and ah, third of all, you know, he said

he had a gun in his apartment, and also because not

only that he had a gun, but just sort of like that

Glen: Like ah--

Ben: here was something we would have to deal with on a on-going basis, you know, and any sort of like ah, brudge warfare, that he, you, you know, undertake him in

Glen: You feel that's--

Ben: and it's going to be sort of like drawn out and, and just exacerbated, so--

Glen: What I'm interested in, outside of the fact that I'm really so-, sorry you got hurt ah, is that if we do have to, what does he

Ben: Unhuh.

Glen: look like, for one thing, so I can avoid him [Laughter, some start talking].

Ben: He's, he's, he's about 5'11", he's black with pretty short hair. Yeah, he's

Glen: He's black?

Ben: got, got a little, little mustache, pretty thin, he's

slim,

(People mentioned are underlined by a single line.)
### Figure 3.2 References To People In "No Parking" [001-050] (n=61)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Talker</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Who is referred to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>002</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>we're, we've</td>
<td>incident-people; meeting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>003</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he, he must be ment'd.</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he's going to be</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>006</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he doesn't show up</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>007</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he'll be</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>you know</td>
<td>co-present people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>009</td>
<td>Mickey</td>
<td>who was</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>it's this guy</td>
<td>guy, Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>Jason Throne</td>
<td>guy, Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>012</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>who lives</td>
<td>guy, Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>013</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>014</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>about this guy</td>
<td>guy, Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>015</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>Did you</td>
<td>Sheldon; last week's meeting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>016</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>tell about Dolly</td>
<td>Dolly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>017</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>I don't think</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>018</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>you know</td>
<td>co-present people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>019</td>
<td>Gertrude</td>
<td>She got hit too</td>
<td>Dolly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>she wasn't there</td>
<td>Dolly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>I guess</td>
<td>Ben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>023</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>we just sort of felt</td>
<td>Ben and Sheldon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>024</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>you know</td>
<td>co-present people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>025</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>we would have</td>
<td>Ben and Sheldon; Co-op people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>026</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>we didn't fight back</td>
<td>Ben and Sheldon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>027</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>I think</td>
<td>Ben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>028</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>we didn't want</td>
<td>Ben and Sheldon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>029</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>you know</td>
<td>co-present people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>030</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he said</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>031</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he had</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>032</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>a gun in his apartment</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>034</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>we would have</td>
<td>Ben and Sheldon; Co-op people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>035</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>you know</td>
<td>co-present people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>036</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>you-you know</td>
<td>co-present people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>037</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>we undertake</td>
<td>Ben and Sheldon; Co-op people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>038</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>him in</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>039</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>you feel that</td>
<td>Ben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>040</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>What I'm interested in</td>
<td>Glen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>041</td>
<td>Glen</td>
<td>I'm really sorry</td>
<td>Glen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>042</td>
<td>Glen</td>
<td>you got hurt</td>
<td>Ben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>043</td>
<td>Glen</td>
<td>if we do have to</td>
<td>Co-op people; co-present people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>044</td>
<td>Glen</td>
<td>he looks like</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>045</td>
<td>Glen</td>
<td>I can avoid</td>
<td>Glen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>046</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he's, he's, he's about</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>047</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he's black</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>048</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he's black</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>049</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>he's got</td>
<td>Thorne</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Plural terms underlined)
the figure include all personal pronouns (including possessive, relative and interrogative pronouns), proper names and animate nouns referring to human beings. In Figure 3.2 the first two columns show the line of text and the talker; the fourth column provides an interpretation as to "who it is," i.e., the person referred to in the third column. In five instances there are two possible interpretations shown in the figure, as in "we" [001], which is seen as "incident-people" and also "meeting-people." Though the expression "you know" is often treated as a meaningless filler without reference, the "you" is given here as "co-present people," an interpretation which is discussed in detail in the second part of this chapter with regard to category consensus.

Nowhere in Figure 3.2 is the range of people who are relevant to the issues being argued, including people working for the Co-op, people having pacifistic views, and people who are black. None of the items in Figure 3.2 designates collections of people for whom fighting is a good thing, or not a good thing. Since the passage includes the account of Co-op people's actions in not fighting back, I would have

but provide no basis by which something can be seen as either usual or unusual. Secondly, the effort to present each item as often as it appears does provide for the possibility of counting things, if each time the context of the item is taken into account, such that the "substitutability of objective for indexical expressions remains programmatic in every particular case..." Garfinkel, 1967, p. 6, (italics original)
expected that a higher proportion of the 51 items in Figure 3.2 would have been for plural arrangements of people.

But if moral matters are present, they must be embedded in such plural arrangements and evidence of such collections of people would be present somehow in the text. In fact, these collections of people are hidden from immediate recognition, but they can be found.

The Hidden People

As a first means of finding "hidden people" (those collections of people not immediately evident in the surface talk, but systematically retrievable, as will be shown) I shall consider terms that contain evidence of social organization. For instance, the terms "incident," "court," "warfare," and "gang" are present in the text of this first section of "No Parking." These are cover terms for people engaged in social activity, and are listed as the first section of Figure 3.3 (which covers the same text as Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). "Fighting" [032] requires that there be fighters, as does the expression "brute warfare" [032]. The expression "more personal business" [018] brings in the collection of people who took part in the business. The label "personal-business-people" is used for those who took part. Altogether there are six such terms for social organization in which it is possible to see that people are implicated.

A second set of "hidden" people can be found in the twenty-seven social characterizations that are made in this
Figure 3.3 "Hidden" People In "No Parking" [001-050] (n=56)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Talker</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Collection of People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>the incident</td>
<td>incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>004</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>a court hearing and everything</td>
<td>court-hearing-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>016</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>more personal business</td>
<td>personal-business-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>024</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>fighting's pretty distasteful</td>
<td>not-fighting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>026</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>precipitating gang-type fight</td>
<td>gang-fighting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>027</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>brute warfare</td>
<td>brute-warfare-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>002</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>be mentioned</td>
<td>mentioning-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>to be summoned</td>
<td>summoned-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>007</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>n(o)t show up</td>
<td>not-showing-up-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>015</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>tell about Dolly</td>
<td>telling-about-Dolly-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>019</td>
<td>Gertrude</td>
<td>got hit</td>
<td>hit-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>023</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>sort of felt</td>
<td>feeling-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>024</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>have to take[nothing]</td>
<td>not-taking-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>026</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>n(o)t fight back</td>
<td>not-fighting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>031</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>had a gun in his apartment</td>
<td>gun-in-apartment-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>032</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>had a gun</td>
<td>gun-having-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>034</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>deal with on an ongoing basis</td>
<td>continued-dealing-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>036</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>undertake him in</td>
<td>undertaking-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>038</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>sort of like long drawn out</td>
<td>drawn-out-incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>039</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>exacerbated</td>
<td>exacerbated-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>040</td>
<td>Glen</td>
<td>interested in</td>
<td>interested-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>041</td>
<td>Glen</td>
<td>really so-, sorry</td>
<td>regretful-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>044</td>
<td>Glen</td>
<td>can avoid him</td>
<td>avoiding-him-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>046</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>about 5'11&quot;</td>
<td>5'11&quot;-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>047</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>black</td>
<td>black-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>048</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>with pretty short hair</td>
<td>short-haired-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>049</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>little-.little mustache</td>
<td>mustached-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>050</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>slim</td>
<td>slim-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>002</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>be mentioned [to ___]</td>
<td>meeting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>be summoned [by ___]</td>
<td>incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>007</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>a warrant put out [by ___]</td>
<td>court-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008</td>
<td>Mickey</td>
<td>did this [thing to ___]</td>
<td>incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>was said [to ___]</td>
<td>last-week's-meeting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>016</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>more personal business [of ___]</td>
<td>personal-business-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>017</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>not necessary [for ___ to tell]</td>
<td>telling-about-Dolly-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>019</td>
<td>Gertrude</td>
<td>got hit [by ___]</td>
<td>incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>on the 18th</td>
<td>incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>on the 5th</td>
<td>court-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>015</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>last week</td>
<td>last-week-meeting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>then</td>
<td>incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>another time</td>
<td>another-incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>across the street</td>
<td>across-the-street-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>lives over at 33-</td>
<td>33-living-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>013</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>3303</td>
<td>3303-living-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>014</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>3303</td>
<td>3303-living-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>015</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>there</td>
<td>incident-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>016</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>in his apartment</td>
<td>apartment-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>034</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>here</td>
<td>fighting-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>guy</td>
<td>guy-people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>015</td>
<td>Ben</td>
<td>guy</td>
<td>guy-people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
part of the segment: e.g., having a gun, a car, a mustache, being slim or thin. In each case, the act of characterizing places a person within a collection of people having that one characteristic in common. It is of course true that every characterization of a person defines such a category. Some characterizations, however, establish "social categories" (Merton, 1957, p. 299) "aggregates of social statuses, the occupants of which are not in social interaction." In nearly all the cases on this page of text, it is one individual who is located in such a collection of people: people having guns, with short hair, who are black, etc.

Extract 3-2

Ben: He's, he's, he's about 5'11", he's black with pretty short hair yeah, he's got a little,

Glen: He's black?

Ben: Little mustache, pretty thin, he's slim, ah, and his car...

["No Parking" 046-050]

As is the case in status-set analysis, I am able to generate a large number of collections of people from a description of one individual. Extract 3-2 provided six different collections each with a different population, shown in the second section of Figure 3.3. Listeners may be presumed to have various sets of expectations of the properties of each collection of people, of who is likely to be in each such collection, and of what constitutes a good

1 The problem of identifying to which collections of people individuals found in the text can be assigned is treated separately in the third part of this chapter.
person in each collection. For instance, one possible set of expectations and evaluations would find stereotypes, e.g., that a person with short hair is probably a police person, that a black teenager is a gang member, and a person with a gun is a revolutionary. The substantive analysis of moral matters will include an examination of such social characterizations.

The range of characterizations considered is much broader than the recognized "social categories," since in interaction such attributes as "being mentioned" can take on a social reference that is not transferred to any general social type. Yet there must be some selection of characterizations even at the outset. There are some characterizations which are not useful for the analysis—guessing, telling, thinking, saying, knowing, wishing. These and similar characterizations are on a different level of generality in that they do not discriminate among persons, since they are features of all people. Unless some contrastive stress of some additional substantive characterization is used with these terms, they do not identity specific collections of people for the analysis. None are included in the characterizations shown among the "hidden" people in Figure 3.3. However, "tell about Dolly" [0151] does appear, since the characterization "tell" contains the additional substantive characterization of "about Dolly."

Pursuing the "hidden" people further, I find certain instances of syntactic ellipsis which provide additional sites once the syntax is expanded. In "he must be mentioned" [003] the only person who appears overtly is "he," but the action suggested by "mention" includes people to whom the information
is addressed as well as the person doing the mentioning.

There is an ellipsis in a response to a question about previous talk:

Extract 3-3

Ben: Did you tell about Dolly?
Sheldon: I don't think it's necessary, you know...

["No Parking" 015-017]

Here an expansion of the elliptical system would disclose the people necessary [for ___ to tell about Dolly]."

Gunter (1963) notes that native speaker informants can make such syntactic expansions with near unanimity. In all there are ten instances of ellipsis on the page of text which are shown in the third section of Figure 3.3.

The least obvious of the "hidden" people are found where there is no grammatical element present or implied that refers to animate objects. The text contains reference to times and places which locate relevant incidents in which people participated. For instance, "on the 18th" [001] is a reference to the main incident discussed in the segment; "then" [020] does the same. There are five such temporals shown in Figure 3.3, in which time references are used to designate activity.

Similar work is accomplished by reference to place, such as "there" [020] or "across the street" [010] where people are being talked about in terms of where they are or live, "303" [013] does the same. There are seven such locatives shown in Figure 3.3.

Finally, collections of people can be hidden in singular
animate forms. The surface from may be a singular term that can be extended to characterize a plurality of people. Thus the term "guy" appears twice as "this guy." Such a general classifier contains within it the possibility of a collection of "guys" (or in the terminology of this section, somewhat awkward here, "guy-people"). The same argument could be used to see that "he" provides for the possibility of extension to males ("male-people"), an extension that is increasingly likely in recent years. In these segments, issues of gender do not generally surface. They are of course potentially moral, but are not interactionally realized in the segments. No one made an issue of whether or not a particular status would be held by a male or female participant. There is generally nothing to be gained in these materials by pursuing such most general classifiers as man or woman, and this will not be done.

Labels For Collections Of People

Mostly labels for collections of people are written to re-

1 In the segment "Starting Up" one person says, "I physically can't be there because I have two little kids. "Starting Up" 240J introducing a status conflict (parent and Co-op worker) as an explanation for absence. However, "parenting" in that household was known to be shared and not regarded as a basis for differentiating male and female adults in the household, all of whom worked full time outside the house. The situation is described by the same talker in that same segment as "when you have couples and families and they have kids and everybody is working full time..." "Starting Up" 130J. The segments contain no further references to gender assignment or to children.
Direct surface indications of their presence. As such some labels are very specific and some quite general, reflecting the level of abstraction of the text. For example, a surface form "agenda-discussing-people" is less abstract than "meeting-people," and "selling-food-people" more abstract than "cucumber-selling-people." Each reflects the place in which it occurred in talk.

The talkers themselves can be labelled by the analyst as meeting-people for some part of the time, or as socializing-people and even at times as gossiping-people, depending on when during the evening they are being considered. At any time the analyst could also label them as encountering-people, for whom constitutive rules for co-presence and for communicative behavior, such as described by Goffman (1963a) especially, can be applied.

At times the interacting Co-op people were actively using rules of meeting-people, such as voting or proposing, making motions, or appointing committees. At these times the label "meeting-people" has a performative force which is in addition to the analytical assignment of a surface or intermediate level collection of people into a category of "meeting-people." Such a "defining" sense of "meeting-people" is recognized by the use of regulative rules in the talk. The label "meeting-people" then represents the intersection of the collection of people in the talk and that contributed by the talker's presence as an interacting individual. By a "defining collection of people" I meant one
which has the property of providing a label which those outside as well as those inside the collection of people could apply. A person inside the Co-op building buying food can be labeled a Co-op person. To label Co-op people as people having a meeting requires evidence of a meeting which outsiders as well as insiders could recognize as a meeting of Co-op people. The label "meeting-people" will be used in these materials, and not the word "meeting" alone, in part so as to include both a distributive and a collective sense (cf. here Chapter 1, p.44 ). But there is another basis which is to provide a label within the same system used for all collections of people in this work, and that is with the form of feature plus people.

At this point it would be appropriate to provide some justification for some of the rather ungraceful combinations encountered in Figure 3.3., e.g., "meeting-people," "apartment-people," "incident-people," and "last-week's-meeting-people," as such combinations will be used for all collections of people whether hidden or overt. In each case the format consists of some qualifying material (a "feature") plus the term "people." The word "people" establishes that there is a plurality of animate objects of a rather special sort. The qualifying material distinguishes some part of the people on the basis of some "feature," depending upon what the text provides, i.e., the feature partitions a part of the social world.

The form feature plus people, however, makes explicit
in a standardized way what features of the people are being considered. The general form emphasizes in the structureless collective term "people" any possible form of society and in the feature any possible sort of individual. The same format of feature-plus-people is used regardless of whether terms directly reflect the surface text, or whether they are applied apart from the text within some classifying system or other.

The terms for describing collections of people in talk form a vocabulary which is fairly well stripped down. A more conventional form for designating "apartment-people" would be "people who live in apartments" which seems at first glance to preserve the specific information indicated in the text, i.e., "in his apartment." This would provide a simple conjunctive definition, but it would exclude "people who used to live in apartments," "people who live in a room," "people who are in the apartment and who don't live there," etc. This would confine the analysis to one logical category, that selected by the analyst, and it is far from certain that interactants would select the same one. In fact, the individual in this instance was later characterized (to me) by one of the Co-op people as "crashing at an RDA (Redevelopment Authority) building across the street, I guess, or paying a very minimal amount of rent."

(cf. p. 531 for complete quotation). Labels such as "apartment-people" are the closest copy of the shadow the talker cast at the time of the interaction.
Selection Of Collections Of People

The search for "hidden" people located the 56 instances (Figure 3.3) of people available to the interactants in addition to those more overtly designated (Figure 3.2). By adding the "hidden" people to the first set, the potential basis for moral matters has been considerably enlarged—in fact it has become too extensive and unwieldy for careful analysis of the segments. Yet even at this stage, some selection has already been made. Collections were eliminated which were at the highest level of abstraction, but which did not discriminate amongst collections of people.

Collections resulting from combinations of features were also avoided. Figure 3.3 listed one collection of people for each item from the text, although it is logically possible to generate collections of people defined by combinations of these as might be done in status-set analysis, such as "thin-short-haired-people" or "thin-black-people."

The approach of Figure 3.3 displays the complete set of simplest collections of people. At this point there is no basis for making any one combination of features more compelling than any other. There is sometimes evidence in the text of the value given by interactants to individual features, as in the following lines:

**Extract 3-4**

Ben: He said he had a gun in his apartment, and also because not only that he had a gun, but—

Glen: ["No Parking" 031-033]
In Extract 3-4, repetition gives the interactants a second exposure to the phrase "had a gun" and the collection of "gun-having-people" [032]. This kind of interactional repetition will be used later as evidence for participants' category consensus (p.161). A parallel case can be seen above in Extract 3-2 where one of the seven features of description--"black"--given there is singled out and repeated by the person who asked for the description initially.

One other type of selection has already been made automatically. Collections of people are avoided that are based on implications interactants may have drawn from evidence not given by the text. Where such an association is entirely private, the issue does not arise: e.g., line "a warrant put out on him" may remind one listener of some warrant earlier in his or her life, or one that might be faced in the future. Some associations become exposed as public information, as in the question, "She got hit too?" which introduces information about the incident (some one was hit) and the collection labelled here as "hit-people."

The analysis relies on the occurrence in talk of some indication of the association made with information not initially given in full.

Even with this preliminary selection, the number of collections that any piece of talk can generate is quite large; it is clearly necessary to have some principles for selection of collections of people from talk for use in any specific analysis. The general technique to be used
consists of segmenting talk into phrasal units and assigning one particular collection of people to represent each phrase. Though the number of collections of people is reduced, the interactional sequencing is preserved. The fluid and continuously changing nature of talk is reflected in the sequential production of the collections of people which the talk generates.

In order to pursue the selection of subsets of collections of people by phrases, the first eighteen lines of the text used in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 is shown as Figure 3.4, with the location of both "hidden" and overt people indicated. Single lines show the location of "hidden people" and the overt people are underlined doubly. The labels for the "hidden people" are those shown in Figure 3.3.

I would not propose that these multiple and rapid occurrences of "hidden" and overt people shown in Figure 3.4 are all of interest to the interactants, and would not rest any analysis upon the possibility of all of them being used directly. Rather they should be considered possible targets for the interactional assignment of moral matters.

There appear to be two reasons not to rest an analysis upon each and every collection of people possible in the text. One is the redundancy of information and the second is the fact that speech appears to be normally processed in units larger than words.

"Normal speech" has been characterized by Cherry (1957) p. 165) in his cybernetic study of communication as forming
Figure 3.4 "Hidden" and Overt People in "No Parking"
[001-020]

001 Ben: Um, as far as the uh, the incident went on the 18th,

002 ah, we're, we've got ah, I guess he m', he must be

003 mentioned, we've got a court hearing and everything

004 Sheldon: Yeah.

005 Ben: on uh, the fifth and a, he's going to be summoned, ah,

006 and if he doesn't show up, he'll be, you know, a warrant,

007 you know, there'll be a warrant put out on him.

008 Mickey: Well, who

009 was it that did this?

010 Ben: It's this guy across the street named

011 Jason Thorne who lives over at 33- what? Thorne.

012 Mickey: Jason Thorne?

013 Ben: 33-what? Sheldon? 3303. Apparently, well, how much was

014 Sheldon: 3303.

015 Ben: said last week about this guy? Did you tell

016 about Dolly? Well--

017 Sheldon: I don't think it's necessary, you know,

018 it's, this, it's really more personal business. No

019 Gertrude: She got hit too?

020 Sheldon: She wasn't there then, it was another time.

Single lines are "hidden" people.
Double underlines are overt people.
"a highly 'redundant' signalling system." The analysis of "hidden" people adds to the redundancy the analyst needs to consider. For instance, in the expansion of the text shown in Figure 3.4 there are several places where collections pile up, most of them closely related to each other, as in the following lines from that figure.

Extract 3-5

Ben: ... Well, how much was said to "last-week-meeting-p."

by "last-week-meeting-p." "last-week-meeting-p." "guy-p."

Did you tell about Dolly?
"telling-about-Dolly-p." ["No Parking" 013-015]

If every means of extracting "hidden" people are used, without regard to redundancy, "last-week-meeting-people" could be found as those to whom something was said, those by whom something was said, or those present at the time (last week). Each could be a focus of a moral matter, as what ought to have been omitted by any of the participants from that talk, or might have been said, so that those who were present, to whom it was said, would know something they ought not to know.

In Extract 3-5 the talker selects one of the individuals to ask about what was said at the last meeting. The first part of the utterance employs a passive construction with no agent specified (ellipsis of people shown in Figure 3.3). However, in the next part of the utterance, the speaker asks if "you" talked "about Dolly," [015] so that "you is put in collection of those who talked at last week's meeting, i.e.,
the "___" in the expansion of said [by ___]. "You" is the usual plural means of referring to those who were at last week's meeting, and at first glance it would seem as if everyone present is included. But the direct address, "Sheldon," used five lines earlier [013] helps the interactants to select the singular, as may paralinguistic features, such as looking at Sheldon. Further, those interacting here all know Dolly lives with Sheldon and Sheldon is presumably more apt than any of the others to be aware, concerned, and interested in any talk about Dolly.

What evidence is available that the participants made use of the people hidden in the elliptical expression of Extract 3-5? The response by Sheldon shows that he arrived at the same conclusion as the lines of inference just sketched, for he continues directly with the phrase "it's really more personal business." The "more personal business" is his own, and he accepts the "you" as a singular directed to himself. In this way, moral matters referred to by "personal business" are also made relevant.

Labelling of phrases is done in such a way as to reduce redundancy without losing possible interpretations of items needed for the analysis. An effort to narrow down the label can lead to such hopelessly over-specific constructions as "discussing-this-guy-and-Dolly-at-last-week's-meeting-people." It seems preferable to represent the whole set of collections by simply "last-week's-meeting-people" to match the simplicity and generality of the question as it appeared, as shown by Extract 3-5.
A similar argument can be addressed to line 0 where "there" and "then" appear next to each other. Both identify "incident-people" and will be represented by one label. The analysis thus leaves open the possibility of either term being focused on. Here it is the temporal slot that is chosen:

Extract 3-6

Gertrude: She got hit too?  
Sheldon: No, she wasn't there then, "incident-p."
  "another-time."
  "another-incident-p."

["No Parking" 019-020]  
The response in Extract 3-6 could have been with reference to "another place," but the implication of "then" is continued, rather than that of "there." The more general label of "incident-people" registers the fact that either possibility is open to participants.

A different and more general argument is made on the basis of the empirical evidence for the use of phrases. From what is known of the way listeners process language, clumps of text larger than individual words are grasped and interpreted. Miller (1949) proposed a delayed decision strategy by suggesting that

...the phrase—usually about two or three words at a time—is probably the natural decision unit for speech. (p. 25)

The term "phrase" is used here to indicate a phonetic breath group, a clump of text which may be handled by a listener as a unit in interaction. The question of concern here is the upper and lower bounds by which a phrase can be
defined. i.e., how to divide a text into such interactional phrases.

At one time, linguists felt that the grammar of a sentence could be deduced from its rhythm and intonation. One system of segmenting the surface structure of language in English is that of Trager and Smith ([1951] 1966), who locate a "phonemic clause" with a terminal juncture at the end as a "minimal complete utterance." (p. 49) The linguistic material in the clause, setting aside pitch, secondary stresses, and the junctures, is labelled a phonemic phrase. Though the importance of such cues may have been exaggerated, there is a current tendency to look again at these surface cues for hints in deciphering meaning, as in the focus on prosodic units in Chomsky and Halle (1968). For the most part phonemic phrases are used here, but since my concern is with social structure and not language structure, small differences in the articulation of the prosodic units are not relevant here.

I shall place primary reliance on pauses, following the tradition initiated by Bloomfield (1933, p. 85). In this text, pauses and restarts usually operated to group content words with whatever relational words are used to specify their function in a sentence. When they do not, when a pause interrupts, it may be filled by such items as "uh."  

Jefferson (1974) finds that evidence of alternative formulations may be leaked by the use of "uh," and illustrates such revisions with terms for self and others.
as in line 001 or 007 of "No Parking."

Pauses, stress, and intonation contribute to interpretation. But it is the serial order of production, including hesitations and restarts, that provides the basis on which things get taken together. In considering the methods of relating words, Sapir notes that order is the "most powerful of all relating methods." ([1921], 1949,p.11), for a language to be a "satisfactory means of communication" (p. 93) the fundamental syntactic relation "must be unambiguously expressed" (p. 94) and devices other than order are also used.

Within the phrases, collections of people were located in particular types of lexical material, what Sapir calls "concrete concepts" (p. 93) rather than in "relational concepts." From a sociological viewpoint it is the concrete concepts which are the ultimate carriers of social information, since they are the units that can be referred to and the units that people use in re-tellings and for ascribing responsibility. (cf. Chapter 3, 570). Many of the relational terms will be used here as indicators of moral response (e.g., "never," cf. Chapter 4, 281). But collections of people are focused about concrete terms since these are the elements that appear to be the carriers of responsibility, that enter into the record and can be reported back. Where a phrase contains only one concrete concept there is no problem in writing a label for it. The word conveying the basic concept is used to write the feature by which the partitioning is done, along with any relational material that connects it to a
proposition.

These phonemic phrases contain as a rule one major informational unit at the center of the stress pattern, and in this can be found the collection of people which is focused on. The phonemic phrase is important not because it is a formal pattern, but it is an informational unit. In speech, new information is usually introduced in the stressed position within the phrase (Kuno, 1973). The arrangement of words gives evidence of focusing by interactants even in the first occurrence of the collection of people, and relation to older references that occur in unstressed positions.

The general policy I shall follow in representing the phrase by a collection of people then is to write a label which reduces and eliminates as much qualifying material as possible without changing the basis for partitioning. As with the labelling of "hidden" people, the phrases are often designated by using participles in "-ing." The material of Figure 3.5 provides one collection of people to each phrase for the first 18 lines of "No Parking." Figure 3.5 contains 20 collections of people altogether, where the earlier figure (Figure 3.4) had 20 "hidden" people and 28 overt people shown for the same 13 lines of text.

The Classification Of Collections Of People.

Not all the analyses of the collections of people remain tied to their serial collections. In some instances it may be useful to classify collections of people without regard to the order in
Figure 3.5 Collections of People for Phrases in "No Parking" [001-020].

001 Ben: Um, as far as the uh, the incident went on the 18th, "incident-p."
002 ah, we're, we've got ah, I guess he m', he must be "incident-p./meeting-p." "mentioning-p."
003 mentioned, we've got a court hearing and everything "court-hearing-p."
004 Sheldon: Yeah.
005 Ben: on uh, the fifth and a, he's going to be summoned, ah, "summoned-p."
006 and if he doesn't show up, he'll be, you know, a warrant, "not-showing-up-p."
007 you know, there'll be a warrant put out on him. "warrant-Placing-p."
008 Mickey: Well, who "incident-p."
009 was it that did this? "incident-p."
010 Ben: It's this guy across the street named "across-the-street-p."
011 Jason Thorne who lives over at 33- what? Thorne, "33-living-p."
012 Mickey: Jason Thorne? "33-living-p."
014 Sheldon: 3303. "3303-living-p."
015 Ben: said last week about this guy? Did you tell meeting-p."guy p. "telling-about."
016 about Dolly? "Dolly-p."
017 Sheldon: I don't think it's necessary, you know, "telling-about-Dolly-p."
018 it's, this, it's really more personal business. No. "personal-business-p." No.
019 Gertrude: She got hit too? "hit-p."
020 Sheldon: She wasn't there then, it was another time. "incident-p."
021 another-incident-p."
which they occurred in talk. If a list of collections of people is reviewed which has been generated in talk, then it will be apparent that such surface collections of people vary in degree of abstraction even before any classification is made. In Figure 3.5, for instance, "across-the-street-people" and "3303-living-people," both occurred, in which the first is clearly a more general collection of people. Similarly, "telling-about-Dolly-people" is at a more specific level of abstraction than "mentioning-(to meeting)-people." Such levels of abstraction are independent of the number of people within the collection, as in the first instance "3303-living-people" obviously contains a fraction of those who could be considered within a collection of people reflecting "across-the-street-people," whereas the second instance includes in this context the same number of individuals in both collections of people.

Some principled way of classifying collections of people is needed which will preserve the fact that surface collections of people are derived not in isolation, but along with a specific list of other collections of people. A means of continuing responsibility over a stretch of text is needed, so that both those classified and those not classified will be represented, and responsibility continued to the whole set of surface collections generated on the analysis.

Surface collections of people that appear in talk are partial characterizations of the social world. In these materials that part of the social world which is of immediate
concern is the "Co-op people," including those who in some way joined with, worked with, participated with, aggerated, supplied, fought, harassed, or robbed the Co-op. Presumably any discussion of moral matters would have a similar need to locate a global collection of people implicated in the talk to be studied. For the work in hand, "Co-op people" is such a category.

The collection of "Co-op people" is, however, not equivalent to that of Co-op members. A closer realization of the term "Co-op people" would be "Co-op participants," but this includes those who participate as part of the Co-op, as well as those who make no claim to being part of the Co-op but rather are interacting with people who do. For example, friendly or hostile visitors at the meetings or during produce day are temporarily "Co-op people," and are, for instance, included in "we." Also, "Co-op people" includes people who participated in the Co-op, but never joined, as well as people who were uncooperative or lacked commitment or even overconformed to Co-op working requirements. (This conceptualization of "Co-op people" as "Co-op participants" extends for the purposes of talk the initial view of participation presented in Chapter 1).

A dichotomy of "Co-op" vs. "non-Co-op people" organizes the collections of people in these materials in a useful way. Such collections as "thin-people" or "black-people" or "pragmatic-people" arose from the stance of non-Co-op people. Although some individuals who were Co-op participants are also thin or black or pragmatic, the terms were not used for Co-op people.
being "Co-op people" in those instances. Such a dichotomy as Co-op and non-Co-op people forms a "category set" (Sellitz et al, 1965, p. 394), mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets of people into which more specific ones can be grouped.¹

Another classification that is nearly always possible in the Co-op materials is to sort collections of Co-op people into the three collections of people based on aspects of participation in the Co-op: "meeting-people," "organization-people," and "produce day-people." In the materials examined it is possible to treat this division as exhaustive and exclusive, and has been used here as another category set. The three aspects or guises of the Co-op are then a possible replacement for "Co-op-people," but at a slightly less general level.

```
Co-op people  vs.  non-Co-op people
   meeting    organization     produce day
    /            /              /  non-Co-op
  /              /                /
meeting forms
```

¹ According to Sellitz (1965) a "category set" must meet certain basic rules:

1. The set of categories should be derived from a single classificatory principle.
2. The set of categories should be exhaustive; that is, it should be possible to place every response in one of the categories of the set.
3. The categories within the set should be mutually exclusive; it should not be possible to place a given response in more than one category within the set.

(p. 392)
A further classification may be fruitful. In Figure 3.6 an initial classification into Co-op people and the three guises is presented for the collections of people in the first 45 lines of text of "No Parking" (which includes the 18 collections of people displayed in Figure 3.5 and all of the hidden collections of Figure 3.3, plus whatever other surface collections appeared past those within Figure 3.5) The 56 different collections of people in Figure 3.6 are arranged with 32 for "other people" and 24 for Co-op people in only two of the three guises. Figure 3.6 also shows further classification of the collections of people at a level intermediate between the surface collections and the specification as Co-op and non-Co-op (or guise of Co-op). It may be the case that classification into Co-op people or its guises is not directly useful for a particular discussion and that respecification at an intermediate level can give categories with greater significance for moral matters in the text. This is particularly true when interactants themselves use an intermediate level of categorization, which is reflected in one or more of the surface labels. For example, in Figure 3.6, "Fighting's pretty distasteful to begin with" [027] is reflected by "fighting-people."

Moral matters are often realized interactionally in language which uses categorical terms at just such an intermediate level of generality. "Fighting" is not modified as "some fighting" or "fist fighting" but appears to include all fighting. A little further the same talker uses a more
Figure 3.6 Collections Of People, Classified, In "No Parking" (n=56)

CO-OP PEOPLE (n=24)

Meeting-people (n=6)
  meeting-people [002]
  mentioning-[to meeting]-people [002]
  last-week's-meeting-people [013], [013]
  telling-about-Dolly-people [014], [015]

Organization-people (n=0)

Produce day-people (n=18)
  fighting-people
  fighting-people [021], [029]
  not-taking-it-people [022]
  not-fighting-back-people [022]
  gang-fighting-people [026]
  brute-warfaring-people [035]
  non-fighting-people
  incident-people [001], [001], [002], [008], [010], [017], [018], [018]
  another-incident-people [018]
  continued-dealing-people [033]
  undertaking-people [036]
  drawn-out-incident-people [036]

NON-CO-OP PEOPLE (Other People) (n=32)

Court-people (n=7)
  court-people [007], [005], [007]
  court-hearing-people [005]
  summoned-people [005]
  not-showing-up-people [005]
  warrant-placing-people [007]

Non-court-people (n=25)
  across-the-street-people [009], [010]
  33-living-people [009], [010]
  3303-living-people [010], [012]
  guy-people [012], [015]
  personal-business-people [016]
  hit-people [019]
  feeling-people [023]
  gun-in-apartment-people [031]
  gun-having-people [032]
  avoiding-him-people [044]
  interested-people [040]
  apartment-people [031]
  regretful-people [041]
  look-like-people [044]
  5'11"-people [046]
  short-haired-people [047]
  black-people [047], [048]
  mustached-people [049]
  thin-people [049]
  slim-people [050]

156.
specific term as "any kind of a gang-type fight"
where "any kind of" is again categorical, an extension to
the whole of such gang fights.

In these matters and other instances, the talk polarizes
categorical, an extension to
moral matters at an intermediate level of generality. The
logical step for the analyst is to locate this level at
which participants themselves locate moral matters relevant
to their concerns and then use such formulations for
organizing the collections of people under study.

Accordingly, Figure 3.6 shows under "produce day-people"
a classification into "fighting-people" in which the following
surface collections of people appear:

- fighting-people
- not-taking-it-people
- not-fighting-back-people
- gang-fighting-people
- brute-warfare-people

Closure is preserved on the surface collections of people
found in the text by the location of the remaining collections
of produce day-people as collections of non-fighting-people.

The collections listed for "fighting-people" above
(and in Figure 3.6) are themselves further polarized into
those who engage in fighting (such as "gang-fighting-people")
and those who take a pacifistic stance ("not-fighting-back-
people"). The moral matters here include the pacifistic
stance of some of the Co-op people as well as their appraisal
of a problem of living in a neighborhood in a city (where
there were gangs).

There are no items listed under "organization-people"
since there are no collections of people in these lines
in which the Co-op organization or Co-op organization membership is a relevant feature of the talk. However, several instances of meeting-people appear, each of some aspect of the meeting-people, including one of hidden people ("mentioned-[to meeting]-people"). None use "meeting" in a defining sense (cf. earlier section in this chapter), although two concern what can be said at meetings. So "talking-at-meeting-people" (to include "telling-about-Dolly" and "mentioning-[to meeting]-people") does form one possible intermediate level classification, useful where issues about what can be said and not said at meetings become important. Such was not the case here however.

The long list of collections of "other people" contains 32 items, each designating people who at that time can not be considered as Co-op people (and hence not within Co-op guises). The list is not completely miscellaneous, and the list of collections of other people can be usefully re-classified at an intermediate level of generality by several means, including "court-people" (shown in Figure 3.6).

    court-people
court-hearing-people
summoned-people
not-showing-up-people
warrant-placing-people

Closure is again preserved by locating the other 25 collections of people as non-court-people. In each case, possible moral matters are not limited to the referential uses which appear in the talk. The intensions of the various terms go beyond the particular referential extension which is made in the talk. The moral matters evoked are controlled by the general
signification of the terms which is broader than the immediate use. The possible extensions are limitless, controlled only through personal associations with "court people."
The notion of "always available" introduced earlier (p.13) points to the fact that just about any predication of people is a possible candidate for moral matters.

In this segment, court-people is not a productive analysis in the sense that no moral matters are interactionally realized in the text. The division of other people into black and non-black is however fruitful, as moral matters are activated by that category set in these materials.

Two collections of people overtly refer to black people in Figure 3.6, and others appear further along in the segment. It is also the case that some of the other items in Figure 3.6 would appear in a collection of "black-people" drawn on broader lines. In this instance, the criterion for "black-people" was direct reference to the black population. Had it been a less immediate criterion, then it would have included "3303-living-people" for example, since one black individual had been identified in the text as living there.

Had it been a more covert criterion, then it might have included "across-the-street-people" (for those who see the street as one of blacks and whites, rather than whites and other people).

Whichever strategy is followed for dividing the list of other people, black and non-black usefully focuses on moral matters relevant to these considerations, as the Co-op is viewed as lacking in "black participation" and of being
"pretty white"

The notion of a "salient" collection of people is suggested by the greater likelihood of recurrence of certain collections of people. As will be shown in Chapter 8, the collection of black people reappears throughout the segment, which is not the case for any of the other collections of people (other than Co-op people) introduced throughout.

It is also the case that the three guises of the Co-op people are an instance of "salient collections of people" for all of the segments. This phenomena has been exploited in the classification of surface collections of people described here. It will also be used in the following section as attention returns to continuous text.

This discussion so far has considered possible classification at intermediate levels of generality with subsequent reduction in the number of categories, where a list of collections of people was the starting point. If classification is carried out in the way described, and residual collections formed at each level, responsibility to the text is preserved, since no collection of people once located in the text can be arbitrarily omitted.

Re-classification is useful where the processual character of talk is not a principle part of the analysis. Where that is a focus of concern, the serial relationship amongst the collections of people remains a matter of concern, and any collapsing of categories then has to take into account the relation which collections of people exhibit to
Locating The Extent Of Category Consensus

As the analysis of talk progresses, I shall sometimes need means of representing a series of collections by which larger units of talk can be characterized, which preserves the order in which the collections of people appeared in talk. If the serial order of the production of collections of people is preserved, then the analyst has a means of showing the successively changing warrant for the talk, and of changing resources for the interaction. The methodological problem is to see how each newly produced collection of people is related to the preceding one, so as to be able to distinguish places in which something "new" appears or the old is retained.

In looking at substantive questions of moral matters in Chapters 5 to 8, I need means of characterizing talk in terms of the collections of people which are relevant, not only at each point, but over passages of time. The continuing nature of talk makes for difficulties in fitting into any static framework where each segment would be assigned to one and only one categorization or moral matter. The analysis used here is flexible enough so that moral matters that extend over any size passage can be connected with overlapping collections of people. Also, more than one layer can be accommodated, for example, meeting-people and another.

A means of characterizing the relationships amongst the collections of people is needed which will indicate where inter-
actional support for potential moral matters occurs, or does not.

I shall use the notion of "category consensus" for a situation where the relevance of a given collection of people is shown interactional support. Specifically, category consensus is a particular sort of consensus which occurs as co-interactants ratify the use of specific collections of people, thus affirming as resources for the interaction such moral matters as individuals may locate within that collection of people. Although this is not an interactional analysis, signs in speech of other's response to a talker's utterance need be taken in account as they provide the basis by which the framework of collections of people is continued or altered. The term "consensus" carries less connotation of a voluntary

1 Unfortunately, consensus is a well-worn term. It is used by some of the Co-op people on occasion to refer to a Quaker style of agreement which was achieved in some discussions (cf. Chapter 2, pg. ). It also has an extensive sociological past as an analytical term, used in a variety of senses, several of which are relevant here.

Consensus was seen by Park and Burgess (1924:1970, p.84) as a concrete description of the unified behavior of a group. This type of consensus is indicated by three aspects: (1) "group feeling called 'esprit de corps';" (2) the concept of "morale" or "collective will"; and (3) the "collective representations" analyzed by Durkheim, which included language and other symbolic devices. At this point in this work, the emphasis is more on shared orientations having to do with cognitive matters, rather than affective concerns.

The usage of Newcomb (1959) is closer to the work at hand, wherein consensus is defined as "the existence on the part of two or more persons of similar orientations toward something." (p. 279). But it is not always easy to establish exactly what similar orientations entail, since they include both location in a shared collection of people and some contribution from each individual's biography.

Watson and Potter (1962) presume an ongoing consensus in the axis between individuals, but do not specify by what means
aspect than "agreement" and is compatible with cognitive disagreement on matters of fact or opinion. Consensus operates to establish the relevance of the collections of people without regard to overt agreement or disagreement.

Consensus takes into account the fact that people share the interaction in a variety of ways which are much less easy to describe than the fact of apparent co-attention or focus on what is being said. Goffman (1963a, p.5) suggests the notion of a "working consensus" which is found as

participants contribute to a single overall definition of the situation which involves not so much a real agreement as to what exists, but rather a real agreement as to whose claims concerning what issues will be temporarily honored. (p. 9)

A "working consensus" is useful for both a situation in which a definition is shared for a long period of time and for one in which a constant shifting and re-adjustment is being made.

Cohesion is an aspect of consensus, and a variety of cohesion-building activities occur at the level of the utterance in talk.¹ Only those which give evidence of

this is to be recognized.

Scheff's definition of consensus (1967) captures the aspect of on-going talk: "an infinite series of reciprocating understandings between members of a group." (p. 44)

¹ Halliday and Hasan (1976) investigated cohesion as a systematic linguistic concept, which for them "refers to relations of meaning that exist within the text and define it as a text." (p. 4) By a text in linguistic analysis they mean any passage that forms a unified whole. Cohesion occurs "where the interpretation of some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another." They find that cohesion occurs through reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction (which are all grammatical) and lexical cohesion.
category consensus will be considered here. This will entail omitting consideration of the processes by which the verbal interaction is put together—the constitutive rules of talk—as well as studies of discourse analysis which focus on how interactants continue on a topic.¹

Category consensus also implies category dissensus; the question of what constitutes category dissensus requires consideration of what are the same or different collections of people in talk. Where different collections of people appear next to one another, interactants may or may not be conscious of a "break" in the talk. The result of the analysis of any stretch of talk is that the analyst can then describe the talk as (1) a progression of collections of people in which the collections are related to each other in varying ways, as well as (2) a series of "breaks" at which different collections of people are introduced. In this manner the analyst can show the changing basis on which moral matters are made accessible to the talk.

"Same" Or Different?

In its simplest form, interactional ratification of a collection of people, and hence its continuance occurs through use of the "same" collection of people as the one used by the previous talker. A crucial issue is to

¹ Constitutive rules, such as those for question/answer or summons/response have been studied by Sacks et al (1967 on). Questions of staying on topic in discourse analysis were investigated by W. Labov and Fanshel (1977).
see whether it is necessary to find the "same" wording in order to be able to say that two collections of people are the same. If not, then what are the criteria for the "same"?

In eight places in the segments the same wording appears in the talk of two consecutive talkers. In these instances, interactants collaboratively show emphasis, either by anticipating or by echoing some part of another's talk. In these instances category consensus is undisputable. Such instances also serve to direct attention to a particular part of an utterance:

Extract 3-7

Amy: ... did the other happen before Jim's or after Jim's. The week before Jim G: Yeah, the week before Jim's.

Jim G: Jim's And uh-- Well...

["Paid Manager"185-188]

Extract 3-7 is an instance of "interactive repetition" where exposure is given to part of an utterance by more than one talker. The phrase "the week before Jim's" is displayed twice, thus giving twice the conversational time to it as would be the case for one instance. The heightened prominence of the double appearance of the same phrase can be shown to trigger further talk relevant to that phrase, indicating that the individuals have been motivated to consider additional implications of the repeated phrase. These I would further
argue are likely to be moral matters.\(^1\)

Since interactive repetition occurs rarely in talk it can be observed that there is a tendency in speech, as much as in written materials to avoid repeating the same words near each other. In the following, "a," "the," and "for" are the only words that are used more than once.

Extract 3-8

Sheldon: Could you just go over\(^1\) again what the agenda is?\(^2\)

Jim: Ok, well, there's three items,\(^3\) one is a proposal\(^4\) to-uh-hire\(^5\) at the beginning of August\(^6\) a manager, managing coordinator\(^7\) for the Co-op\(^8\) for twenty dollars a week.\(^9\)

["Paid Manager" 010-016]

1. "going-over-agenda-people"
2. "agenda-listing-people"
3. "item-listing-people"
4. "proposing-people"
5. "hiring-(as proposed)-people"
6. "August-hiring-people"
7. "manager-hiring-people"
8. "Co-op-hiring-people"
9. "$20-hiring-people"

\(^1\) I am distinguishing such "interactive repetition" from the repairs and revision that a person makes in her or his own talk, which may include instances of repetitions of words or phrases. Such instances of self-editing lack the interactional attention which occurs as two people produce the "same" word or phrase. Sacks (1967) has analyzed an instance of the collaborative production of a response ("we were talking about cars....") where three people each produced part of the sentence. The segments have no instances like that. All of the instances of interactive repetition have a phrase which appears twice, in two different person's talk. The eight instances are the following: NL 150; NL 038; PM 159/162; PM 163/165; PM 170/171; NP 100; 042/054; 130.
The nine collections of people in Extract 3-8 were specified according to the principles set out earlier in this chapter, including locating hidden people, and were reduced to one label per phrase. The labels were chosen to include, as far as possible, surface details of the features by which the partitioning was done, in keeping with the principle of minimizing the intervention of the analyst at this stage.

In Extract 3-8 no two of these collections of people are exactly the same, even with the slightly abbreviated labels, such as "August-hiring-people" rather than "beginning-of-August-hiring-people" or "$20-hiring-people" rather than "$20/week-hiring-people."

But several are obviously quite similar and connected, and can form the basis for the recognition of the same. Two different types of similarity will be distinguished: "overlap" and "inclusion." As used here, these concepts do not depend upon the number of people in the collections, but on the relations of the referring terms in the text.

By overlap is meant a type of similarity of collections of people in which intersecting aspects of some core concept are used in the labels. In the nine items above, the common core of the first three labels is "agenda," and each of them shows some aspect of "agenda"—activities of "agenda-people."

By inclusion is meant a type of similarity of collections of people in which one or more details of the core
concept can be subsumed within the other. For instance, the core concept of "hiring" appears by itself and then is given with the detail of "August-hiring," which can be subsumed under "hiring."^1

With overlap, the scope of the features may change in such a way that two collections of people are only partially included within another. On the other hand inclusion is a nesting of details where one is seen as some part of the other. Thus it may be the case that the transitive chain by which one collection of people overlaps another, which is overlapped with still another, may lead to what can be seen as a different collection of people. In an instance of overlap, the different aspects of agenda in "item-listing-people" and "proposing-people" both share the common core of agenda, but provide for somewhat a different set of people. In the case of inclusion of "hiring-people" and "August-hiring-people," the relationship is hierarchical and the collection of people of "August-hiring" is subsumed within the people "hiring."

The series of collections of people from Extract 3-3 are shown with the successive relations amongst them as follows:

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^1 The earlier discussion (p.151) of classification of collections of people with regard to degree of abstraction amplifies this concept and relates collections of people within the three guises of the Co-op people.
1. "going-over-agenda-people"
2. "agenda-listing-people" is related to 1 by overlap
3. "item-listing-people" is related to 2 by overlap
4. "proposing-people" is related to 3 by inclusion.
5. "hiring-(as proposed)-people" is related to 4 by inclusion.
6. "August-hiring-people" is related to 5 by inclusion.
7. "manager-hiring-people" is related to 6 by overlap.
8. "Co-op-hiring-people" is related to 7 by overlap
9. "$20-hiring-people" is related to 8 by inclusion.

The strategy followed by the talkers in Extract 3-8 which is reflected in the relations listed included category consensus from one utterance to the other, as shown in #1 to #2, #2 to #3, #3 to #4, etc. The transition from one collection of meeting-people who "propose" to a collection of Co-op organization-people who would do the hiring at another time is managed in the utterance by the specification of the first agenda item, that is, the proposal to hire someone. During this transition, a state of category consensus is maintained which continues through the rest of Extract 3-8. The talker does not, however, return to "agenda-listing-people" to list the other two agenda items before proceeding to talk on the first agenda item, the proposal to hire. This would seem a legitimate basis for an objection, especially by the person who asked for the listing in the first place.

However, it is not immediately apparent that the talk will not return to the other two items on the agenda being given. Whereas I, as the analyst, have monitored the meeting as a whole many times, and am conscious of the whole context of the meeting. The interactants are experiencing the talk for the first time. The analyst's hindsight makes it possible
for the analyst to know that in Extract 3-8 the talk that follows immediately is not an elaboration of the first agenda item, but the start of an hour long discussion of that agenda item.

As the talk progresses, collections of people appear which may be mutually related to each other as the "same," by either overlap or inclusion. This may mask somewhat the fact that a change has occurred, and there are slightly different collections of people. But further it may be the case that successive collections of people are different and that the relationship between two adjoining ones is not an instance of overlap or inclusion, but constitutes a "break."

Any study of morality in talk needs to be able to say when the same moral matters are present and when not. It has appeared that one answer to the question of why morality is so hard to trace, consists in unstated consensus to certain moral frameworks. Breaks create important evidence, because after a break any earlier consensus simply doesn't apply, and one must search for new evidence that a different framework is being joined.

In order to examine further the notion of a break, the text which follows is next given. The first few words of Extract 3-9 are the last shown in Extract 3-8.

Extract 3-9

Jim: ...for twenty dollars a week,⁹ and, uh, the uh, actually after we made that suggestion I talked Ben to see if he'd be interested,¹² he said he'd, he'd be at least available.¹³
9. "$20-hiring-people" is related to 8 by inclusion

Break A

10. "suggestion-making-people"

11. "talking-to-Ben-people" is related to 10 by inclusion

12. "interested-(in managing)-people" is related to 11 by overlap.

13. "available-(for-managing)-people" is related to 12 by overlap.

The phrase beginning "actually..." is a transition point. A break (Break A) occurs between #9 "$20-hiring-people" and #10, "suggestion-making-people." Though it is not immediately evident, the talk of Co-op hiring in Extract 3-9 moves to involve collections of "other" people and conversations that took place outside the meetings and the produce day. It becomes apparent in the sequel that Jim was talking to Ben as an individual without the Co-op's backing. The collections of people in Extract 3-8 are thus different from those of Extract 3-9, although at first glance "suggestion-making-people" (#10 of 3-9) appears to be a repeat of "proposing-people" (#4 of 3-8). But the people who put the proposal on the agenda do so under one set of rules, and are not the people who made the suggestion of Extract 3-8. Even if the same individuals are included, they must be characterized differently in terms of moral matters.

Further along in the text, Jim amplifies the basis for labelling the actions of Extract 3-9 as a different collection from Extract 3-8, as he says, "last month I finally decided I wanted to push it" [025]. This would seem to place him in the collection of people present at the last Co-op meeting. But nothing was said at the previous meeting about a paid manager. It may seem to those who were not at that
meeting or to those who don't remember the meeting too well, that those who "propose" (3-8) and those who "suggest" (3-7) are the same collection of people with the same rights and obligations. But close analysis shows that they are not, and that Jim could therefore not be said to be acting as a Co-op person in speaking to Ben. The question remains as to when interactants may become aware of this difference and raise it as an overt moral matter.

What happens if a collection of people is not accepted as "the same" as a preceding one by either of the two criteria given above? For the most part the transitions to different collections of people occur without surface disruption. This was true of Break A. Yet a lack of connectedness may be noticed, and a listener may object to the lack of relevance. There are three instances in the segments. In one instance a talker says, "We really got off here..." (cf. Chapter 5 for details, p. 37b) and in the other two the talkers object to what is being said (cf. Chapter 6, p. 420 and Chapter 8, p. 562). In all other instances, transitions occur without comment.

Underlining Others

Often the segments consist of talkers alternatively making substantive utterances which can be shown by analysis (as was done above) to consist of principally the "same" collections of people. Breaks occurred within one person's talk as a rule. In these instances the initial part of the utterance displayed consensus by "under-
lining" the use of a collection of people. In some instances the other's utterance consisted only of such underlining. By "underlining others" is meant the use of a phrase with little or no substantive content, such as "unhuh" or "yes," to display ratification of a collection of people by another talker.

Utterances with little or no substantive content have been given a variety of names, such as "assent terms" (Schegloff, 1968, p. 1090), "feed-back items" (Dittman and Llewellyn, 1968, p. 80), "back channel cues" (Yngve, 1970, p. 568), "verbal reinforcers" and "recognition responses" (Rosenfield, 1973, p. 67), "short utterances" (Kendon, 1967), and "tying terms" (Sacks, Lecture 2, p. 11, 10/10/67). To some extent all these terms are interchangeable in use and for the most part include the notion that there is assent to some understanding that goes beyond cognitive recognition. Each term covers a distinctly different range, but for the most part they are affirmative, and appear to give assent. "Underlining others" includes negative terms, such as "unhuh" or "no" which show consensus to the collections of people being considered, but may indicate disagreement with some aspect of the predication. Underlining also includes instances where a talker continues to talk after using an underlining term, as in "Yeah, right, as far as the..." (PM 111). What would safely be excluded are non-recognition responses, such as "Huh" or "What?" which do not continue category consensus, but rather result in a temporary suspension while interactants re-negotiate what it is that is being said. These
segments do not contain any such instances.

As defined above, category consensus does not entail the notion of agreement, although that may occur. The last line of text from Extract 3-9 is repeated in the following which illustrates the notion of underlining others.

Extract 3-10

Jim: ... he said he'd, he'd at least be available\textsuperscript{13} for, for such a thing,\textsuperscript{14} so it's not an empty set of people\textsuperscript{15} who might do it,\textsuperscript{16} and a, this

Ben: \underline{[Snickers]}

Jim: 'Is a thing\textsuperscript{17} that's been discussed many many times

\textit{["Paid Manager" 018-022]}

\textsuperscript{13} "be-available-[for managing]-people"
\textsuperscript{14} "managing-people" is related to \textsuperscript{13} by inclusion
\textsuperscript{15} "possibly-managing-people" to \textsuperscript{14} by overlap
Underlining by snicker
\textsuperscript{16} "possibly-managing-people" to \textsuperscript{15} as the same
Break B
\textsuperscript{17} "having-a-manager-people."

There is a break (Break B) between \textsuperscript{16} "possibly-managing-people" and \textsuperscript{17} "having-a-manager-people" since these are different collections of people, the first consisting of candidates for the position, and the second of the Co-op people who would do the hiring and thereafter be managed by the selected candidate.

In Extract 3-10, Ben's snicker is an instance of underlining others. Those present know that Ben has been approached about the job (as was shown in Extract 3-9). The snicker can be heard as a reminder that Ben is a candidate, and indeed prevents the "set of people" (in Extract 3-10) from being empty.

Since notions akin to underlining are so well described
as interaction continuing mechanisms, the discussion of their use will be brief here, and only to illustrate a few differences in their use as category markers. That some do appear to give cognitive assent directs attention beyond the phrase and to the whole utterance. However, the snicker of Extract 3-10 lacks inherent positive or negative information, and can only direct attention to the category immediately preceding. It is just such a lack of substantive content which demonstrates where understanding may be at variance.¹

The snicker of Extract 3-10 is a complicated signal by whatever analysis is pursued. At the minimum it directs attention to what the other is saying, establishes that it has been heard and that it has been responded to. Further the snicker associates in some oblique way its producer with the first talker in ridiculing the idea of an "empty set of people" who might take on the job of paid manager. By "tying" himself to the first speaker, the snickerer has potentially made himself a member of the set of people who might do it, and thus shows consensus to the fact that it is not empty in this unusually explicit description of a collection of people.

The underliner is placed at a grammatical juncture (a

¹ In this connection compare the husband reading a newspaper at breakfast, cited by Sacks (1967) where the man displays attention, but is understood by his wife as not only attending, but also understanding.
tendency noted by Sacks with his typing phrases). In each case the original talker continues to talk. An underliner generally causes no disruption in the talk. In addition to whatever else is going on on other levels of talk, the underliner demonstrates category consensus in that some response is being made to the collection of people of the preceding utterance. Each underliner is "tying" to a collection of people.\footnote{Sacks (Lecture 2, 10/10/67) considers a "tying structure" as one of various techniques whereby a speaker goes about 'tying' some utterance he makes to some prior utterance. (p. 11)} Category consensus concerns one particular basis for such a connection, emphasizing that part of what is felt as "tying" occurs at other than cognitive levels. The text continues:

Extract 3-11

Jim: and a, this is a thing\footnote{17} that's been discussed many many times\footnote{18}, and ah, I've sort of always advocated\footnote{19} but never pushed\footnote{20} and ah, I guess last month I finally decided\footnote{21} I wanted to push it\footnote{22} because I feel that it, uh we're [Ben coughs] never gonna get off the ground as a Co-op\footnote{23} and begin just to consolidate our efforts\footnote{24} and uh, get off the treadmill\footnote{25} of running as hard as we can\footnote{26} to stay in the same place\footnote{27} until we get\footnote{28} to a situation\footnote{29} where at least somebody has a picture of the total operation\footnote{30}.\footnote{17 "having a manager people"\footnote{18} "discussing-hiring-people" is related to 17 by overlap\footnote{19} "advocated-hiring-people" is related to 18 by overlap\footnote{20} "not-pushed-hiring-people" is related to 19 by overlap}
Break C
21. "recently-decided people"
22. "manager-pushing-p" is related to 21 by overlap
Break D
23. "not-getting-ahead-Co-op-people" [Ben coughs]
24. "consolidated-efforts-people" is related to 23 by inclusion
25. "getting-off-treadmill-people" is related to 24 by overlap.
26. "running-hard-people" is related to 25 by overlap
27. "staying-in-place-people" is related to 26 by overlap
28. "getting-to-place-people" is related to 27 by overlap
Underlining by Unhuh
29. "total-picture-people" is related to 28 by inclusion.

In Extract 3-11 there is a cough by the same person (Ben) who snickered in Extract 3-10. Neither has substantive content. The cough is however not marked here as a deliberately interactive signal. It is apparently heard as not produced for the occasion. It occurs during the other's talk, not at a juncture, which the snicker does. Whatever psychological components may be reflected through this cough in terms of its origin, timing, loudness or length, none enters the surface of talk, and the cough is passed without comment.

By contrast, the "unhuh" which appears in Extract 3-11 as Sheldon's utterance is an underliner and also illustrates a case in which cognitive agreement may not be present. In this instance, the underline occurs shortly after the apparent completion of the metaphor of the treadmill which was used to describe the current Co-op operation. In fact, the talker has begun the next part of the metaphoric description, where the Co-op has reached a point "where somebody has a picture of the total operation." The timing of the under-
lining occurs just prior to this phrase, and right during "until we get to a situation." But the person doing the underlining does not agree that the Co-op has to get to a point at which someone has a "picture of the total operation," and as other text in the segment shows, he feels the labor coordinator already has such a picture.

The underlining by "unhuh" ratifies the collection of "getting-to-place-people," and displays category consensus. The metaphor continues and the talker makes his point. Without the underlining, the talk, if it had continued along the same lines, would show the same series of inclusions and overlap, along with the breaks at C and D. The underlining give interactional support to the relation of overlap between #28 "getting-to-place-people" and #29 "total-picture-people" making it apparent to others that the talker is not the only one who may be consulting moral matters from within those collections progressing through the talk.

Breaks in Extract 3-11 occur between #20 and #21 as well as #22 and #23. It is clear that the people who are concerned with hiring, whether they have pushed it or not, are one collection of people ("not-pushed-hiring-people" #20), and the Co-op considered with regard to its relative success or lack of it at that point("not-getting-ahead-Co-op-people" #23) is another collection of people. The talker, however, does not move abruptly from one collection to the other, but he introduces a collection of people into which he himself alone falls--"recently-decided-people"--in between
the talk of the collections of hiring-people and those of the not so successful Co-op-people. Further, the lines between the two collections contain additional material in which the self is displayed, tempered by the need to appear as a good self. Further exposition of the constraints of self display and risks inherent will be continued in the final part of the chapter. The remaining aspect of category consensus also concerns self, but in a way that seems to implicate the other who may not even wish to be implicated.

Underlining Self

Attention to another interactional device is indicated here, since literally interpreted it is an assertion of category consensus: "you know." The phrase is regularly dismissed as an irritating "verbal tic" in writing on usage in the columns of the daily press. The ubiquity of "you know." in the Co-op materials, however, invites serious consideration, and a careful examination seems to be called for. In many of its uses "you know" appears to be a way of underlining self. In Figure 3.2 I showed "co-present people" as an interpretation of the phrase, but its relation to the category consensus framework remains to be explicated.

"You know" has been considered in philosophical, linguistic, and sociolinguistic enterprises. In a discussion of parenthetical verbs, the philosopher Urmson (1966) includes

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1 For example, the syndicated feature writer Ann Landers, who titles one column "Get a, you know, tape recorder and, ah, you know, record it" in Philadelphia Inquirer, p. C-3, February 4, 1980.
"you know," noting that it and the other verbs he includes do not appear as descriptions of psychological states, but appear more as "warning, priming, or orienting signals: we show rather than state." (p. 197) In the Co-op materials "you know" not only shows, it appears to assume consensus. Nunberg (1978), a linguist, emphasizes pragmatics in explaining meaning differences amongst parenthetical and non-parenthetical verbs. Two distinctions which he suggests I find are also useful for "you know": "(1) they are non-thematic, in that there is no assertion bearing on the conversation topic" (p. 1), such as in "you know my name is Terry" and "(2) the talker does not commit the other to the truth of the proposition expressed," (p. 2), and hence the interpretation is attenuated and can not appear as an assertion, "you know that is my name" where the force is on the other's knowing. In both of these views, "you know" is interpreted in a substantive way.

Bernstein (1975) has considered "you know" as one of the elements in "sympathetic circularity" (S.C.) sequences.¹

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¹ Bernstein distinguishes his two linguistic codes by the use of elements in S.C. amongst other things. He also suggests that the S.C. and "I think" sequences are functional equivalents in different codes (p. 113). Without getting involved in the "codes" I have also found there is sometimes an alternation in the use of "I think" or "I mean" and "you know," however, within one person's talk. It should be noted, perhaps, that all my speakers were middle class, as Chapter 2 shows. Bernstein notes that his analysis is wholly consistent with the use of S.C. sequences as an "idiosyncratic speech habit of an individual" (p. 112). My data would confirm that the use by individuals is idiosyncratic, but for any individual, patterned.
He notes:

The S.C. sequences may be transmitted as a response of the speaker to the condensation of his own meanings. The speaker requires assurance that the message has been received and the listener requires an opportunity to indicate the contrary. It is as if the speaker is saying "check--are we together on this?" (p. 113)

Besides inviting "assurance" I think "you know" appears (at least in some of its uses) to claim "I know that you are with me in this." This is a claim to consensus. Rather than "test the range of identifications which the speakers have in common" (p. 111) this use claims that such a range exists. Bernstein relates the use of "you know" and other sympathetic ciruclarity (S.C.) sequences to a particular form of social relations which is relevant to a sense of "we-ness" and to places in interaction where there is a preponderance of "individuated experience" in which the S.C. sequences are "feelers" in establishing a new equilibrium in the balance "in the role relationship of the members." (p. 112)

One way of testing various views of "you know" is to examine its distribution. In the Co-op materials everyone uses "you know" at some point or other. In the four segments there are 93 instances of "you know" used by 15 of the 20 talkers in the segments. (The five without "you know" use "you know" elsewhere in the meeting tapes.) Rates for individuals range from hardly any to at least one per utterance. Whether or not speakers are aware of their use of "you know"

1 "New Labor" has 18; "No Parking" 13; "Paid Manager" 11; and "Starting Up" 51 instances of "you know."
(and I find that they are generally not), it is a regular feature of their talk.

"You know" appears in three distinct locations within the utterance: at ends of clauses, after connectives and after subject. "You know" can appear to be underlining either what was just said (retrospectively) or what is going to appear (anticipatory). It is perhaps reasonable to see "you know" as underlining by the speaker at places where underlining by others might have occurred, but did not, that is, after connectives. It is perhaps less logical for "you know" to appear before there is any possibility that others could have underlined, since others would not yet know what was going to be said.

In order to explore the actual use of "you know" in talk, the extracts which appear in Chapter 2 will be used, where there are 23 instances of "you know." Each of the six people who appear in the excerpts in that chapter are represented. Each is from a tape-recorded interview situation, where there would appear to be minimal need for underlining since in my interviewing, I was supportive or neutral, and not antagonistic or argumentative. The selection of the extracts for Chapter 2 was guided by the issues of Chapter 2 and not by whether "you know" was included or not.

Slightly over half of the instances of "you know" are at the end of a clause:

Joel: was really a worry each week, you know, (73)
Ben: if you actually needed it, wanted it, you know, (87)
Ben: not to buy things that are outrageous, you know. (88)
Ben: you can get rid of certain things, you know, (93)
Ben: so, you've lost money, you know, (93)
Ben: unless everyone buys what they ordered, you know, (93)
Jim: and obvious didn't belong, you know (94)
Amy: And he did, you know, (95)
Ben: that were more accessible, you know, (99)
Ben: was more, ah, regulated, normalized, and frequent
you know, (99)
Joel: and some of them disappeared, you know, (109)
Caren: if they had any input, you know, (111)*

* Number refers to pages in Chapter 2 where more extensive quotations from the interviews can be found.

Each occurrence of "you know" is at a possible end point of an utterance, and in one case [88] is the final element.
Underlining necessarily applies retrospectively to what has just been said.

The opposite appears to occur where the "you know" appears just after a connective. In these seemingly anticipatory instances, a "blanket consensus" is alleged to something that is unspecified. Little information is conveyed by the connective, such as "where" or "but."

Jim: the kind of situation, where, you know, you would suppose...
Jim: by the kids, because, you know, these are..
Amy: a plan where, you know, we won't lose..
Jim: But, you know, everyone seemed to hold...

However, in these instances, "you know" is being used close to the grammatical juncture. In each case the turn to talk has been preserved by the device of beginning the next clause. The talker's interest in continuing the discussion was apparently greater than the talker's interest in asserting consensus with "you know" at the juncture. It seems consensus is being alleged for what follows, trading on what has not been objected to in what has been said. It may
be there is greater sensitivity to what is to come, greater need for sharing in the responsibility for what is to be said.

In the one instance, in the segments an utterance begins with "Well" which is immediately followed by "you know", "Well, you know, I think..." ("Starting Up" 036) Such an instance would seem to use "you know" in a more literal sense, as would be the case if "you know" were the first element in an utterance. One of the uses of "you know" in Chapter 2 introduces an appositive, and that use also seems more literal: "And I just listed about 20 or 25 things that an association of communes might do, you know, everything from cooperative babysitting..." (Joel IV, Chapter 2,p.64).

The third use of "you know" is however, similar to the second, in that it occurs after a new clause has begun, and hence is anticipatory. Instead of coming after a connective, "you know" comes after the subject and generally before the main verb. It would seem to be directed to the collection of people being specified in that clause.

Instances of "you know" after a subject:

Jim: ...these are adolescent boys, black kids, who, you know, came on in a threatening way... (94)
Joel: ...they're really, you know, more connected with the ghetto. (63)
Joel: Blacks, you know, they have an identification (63)
Sheldon: Counter-culture values, you know, to me are white middle class values... (84)
Sheldon: ...basically they're just, you know, sort of a variant of them... (84)
Amy: Because I've, you know, I've tried to get together a plan... (98)

In these cases "you know" occurs after the subject is intro-
duced, but before the partitioning element or predicate is given. In the last two there is a repetition as the sentence subject is re-introduced.¹ In both kinds the possibility of greater sensitivity is wrong. It seems likely that the talker is unsure that there will be agreement to what follows and/or is undecided as exactly how to characterize the subject which has been just introduced.

A more risky area of talk is suggested by this use of "you know" which occurs within the sentence syntax. The mechanism in such an instance seems directed to asserting consensus by underlining the subject before it can be characterized in a way that may be objected to.

The three types are not evenly distributed. "You know" which occurs before the connective accounts for over half of the instances in both the interview data shown here and the 93 instances of "you know" in the four segments. At this point I can draw conclusions concerning the use of "you know" based on the data exhibited here which is consistent with the use of "you know" in the segments. These conclusions reflect the ways in which "you know" appears to underline and to further category consensus.

¹ Schegloff (1968) studied restarts which contain "you know" in instances where the talker was interrupting another speaker (not the case in the examples above or in any of the segments). In such restarts Schegloff found that "you know" was an element in adjusting the length of the line so that the talker would begin substantive talk just as the interrupted talker stopped.
1. When placed before connectives, "you know" represents self underlining of what has appeared, occurring in place of underlining by others, i.e., the listener.

2. When placed after connectives, the turn has been secured before "you know" is introduced. Here "you know" serves to underline what is going to appear by showing the listener shares in what it is that is going to be said.

3. When placed after subjects, "you know" presents a category consensus to the general subject, where there is risk that specification of the predicate may be found objectionable.

4. In each case, "you know" suggests some degree of consensus without there having been any verbal indication by the other such is the case. That is, the talker underlines him or herself.

In general, then the view here of "you know" is of a device by which a talker lets others know that what is being said is being presented as if the others agreed to it, by the device of claiming that the others indeed do. Perhaps part of the reason for massive objections to "you know" is that for some of the people to whom it is addressed, the claim is felt as an encroachment on their personal space. Consensus is the perogative of the other person it would seem, who may or may not care to exhibited it, if indeed it exists at all.

In the material on category consensus considered earlier in this chapter, "you know" occurs in the lines just
preceding Extract 3-8.

Extract 3-12

Amy: But nothing has been added to that\textsuperscript{a} [agenda].
Jim: Well, let's do old business\textsuperscript{b} and then, ah – you know, ask if there's new business,\textsuperscript{c} ah, well the, the–
Amy: Yeah.
Sheldon: Could you just go over again what the agenda is?

\textsuperscript{a}"agenda-adding people"
\textsuperscript{b}"old-business-doing-people" is related to \textsuperscript{a} by inclusion.
\textsuperscript{c}"new-business-doing-people" is related to \textsuperscript{b} by overlap.

The use of "you know" after the connective "and then" underlines the "new-business-doing-people" replacing the "old-business" people by people talking about new business. In Extract 3-12 the collection of "new-business-doing-people" is then underlined by the other talker as well with "Yeah," further ratifying and overtly showing support for overlapping collections of people who will deal with the agenda. "You know" here, as elsewhere, instances category consensus, using underlining by the self rather than by others, although that may and does also appear close by.

The continuation of Extract 3-12 is not that the meeting-people begin old business. A request for listing the agenda is made. But rather than say, "What is the agenda?" or "What's on the agenda?" or "What do we plan to talk about tonight?" Sheldon says, "Could you just go over again what the agenda is?" Extract 3-12 and 3-8. Any of these would have been a means of getting an agenda listed it
would seem. That Sheldon's response contains evidence of moral matters (as Chapter 4 will show) suggests a general underlying dissatisfaction with the course projected by Jim for the "agenda-people" of doing old business first and then new business (which Jim underlines himself as does another person, Amy). Both instances of underlining are means by which category consensus is shown for the surface collection of agenda-people, who will do the old business first. Both underlinings appear to display interactional support, but when looked at closely it is evident that Amy's interactional support is real and in Jim's it is only presumed.

Display of Category Consensus

It is now possible to review the whole series of collections of people used and the breaks in continuity and category consensus through the text being discussed. A further way of condensing collections of people will be illustrated and layers in collections of people found where breaks at one level are not breaks at another.

Figure 3.7 shows all the collections of people in the 20 lines of "Paid Manager" (005-032) used as Extracts 3-7 to 3-12 arranged from top to bottom of the page in their chronological appearance in the text. The text of lines 005-032 (shown as a whole in Figure 3.8) shows the agenda being established and introduces the first item, hiring a paid manager. As has been stated above, these collections of
Figure 3.7 Display Of Category Consensus In "Paid Manager" [005:032]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Talker</th>
<th>Meeting-people</th>
<th>Organization-people</th>
<th>Other-people (Non-Co-op people)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td>Amy**</td>
<td>(a) agenda-adding-p.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>006</td>
<td>Jim G.</td>
<td>(b) old-business-doing-p.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>007</td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) new-business-p.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008</td>
<td>Amy*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>Sheldon</td>
<td>(1) going-over-agenda-p.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>012</td>
<td>Jim G.</td>
<td>(2) agenda-listing-p.</td>
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<td>(3) item-listing-p.</td>
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<td>(4) proposing-p.</td>
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<td>(5) hiring-(as proposed)-p.</td>
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<td>(6) August-hiring-p.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(7) manager-hiring-p.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9) $20-hiring-p.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>021</td>
<td>Ben* [snickers]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022</td>
<td>Jim G.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>025</td>
<td>Ben [coughs]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>030</td>
<td>Sheldon*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A***(10) suggestion-making-p.  
(11) talking-to-Ben-p.  
(13) be-available-for-managing-p.  
(14) possibly-managing-p.  
(15) possible-managing-p.  
(16) managing-p.  
B***(17) having-a-manager-p.  
(18) discussing-hiring-p.  
(19) advocated-hiring-p.  
(20) not-pushed-hiring-p.  
C***(21) recently-decided-p.  
(22) manager-pushing-p.  
D***(23) not-getting-ahead-  
Co-op-p.  
(24) consolidated-efforts-p.  
(26) running-hard-p.  
(27) staying-in-place-p.  
(28) getting-to-place-p.  
(29) total-picture-p.  

*underlining others  
**underlining self  
***Break  
p. people
But nothing has been added to that. Jim G: let's do old business and then, ah, you know, ask if there's new business ah, Yeah. Jim G: well the, the-- Could you just go over again what the agenda is? Ok, well, there's three items, one is a proposal, to, hire, uh, uh after we begin again in August [Caren coughs] a, ah, a manager, managing coordinator for the Co-op to, uh, for the amount of twenty dollars a week, and uh, the uh, actually, after we made that suggestion I talked to Ben to see if he'd be interested, he said he'd, he'd at least be available for, for such a thing, so it's not an empty set of people who might do it, and a, this is a thing [Snickers] that's been discussed many, many, times, and ah, I've sort of always advocated but never pushed, and ah, I guess last month I finally decided I wanted to push it, because I feel that it, uh, we're never gonna get off the ground as a Co-op and begin just to consolidate our efforts and, uh, get off the treadmill of running as hard as we can to stay in the same place until we get to a situation where, at Unhuh. [Snickers] least somebody has an overall picture of the operation and can sort of trouble shoot, back up in
people were labelled as close to surface text as possible. One collection of people is shown for each phrase. The over-arching collections of people in two of the three guises—meeting-people and organization-people—are the column heads, as is a column for the non-Co-op people. Although the surface collections have been classified under these broader categories, the order of appearance in talk is preserved. Underlining is shown with asterisks (two used for the instance of self-underlining with "you know"). The numbers #1–#27 and letters a to c are those assigned in the extracts to refer to the collections of people. The breaks occur where collections shift columns.

Although the chart of Figure 3-7 preserves the sequential ordering, it is a more detailed view than will be necessary in many cases. In this instance it illustrates the convergence between the successions of category consensus and the guises of the Co-op. It also thus illustrates the fact that even within a focused interaction governed by an agenda, the talk cannot reasonably stay on the "same subject." The breaks in category consensus seem to reflect the variety of social relations within this focused gathering.

Collections of people prior to the first break in Figure 3.7 appear in the "meeting-people" column; these involve the

1 A similar display of category consensus is shown in Chapter 8 for the whole segment of "No Parking" where 15 breaks are shown in the 193 lines of text.
agenda activities needed to start the meeting. Both underlining and self-underlining occur in the first few items. Talk of "agenda-people" continues until Break A. "A" represents the point at which talk switches to "other-people." The talk in Figure 3.7 at that point has progressed through contributions by Amy, Jim and Sheldon, where Break A occurred within Jim's talk.

The collections of people appearing between the breaks represent short lists of collections of people internally connected by inclusion and overlap, as well as by underlining. Single labels can be written for these lists of collections of people, necessarily at a greater level of generality. This represents another way of condensing collections of people in talk so as to produce an intermediate level of generality between the surface form and the guises of the Co-op. Such intermediate collections of people here would be:

- up to A "agenda-discussing-people"
- A to B "suggestion-making-people"
- B to C "hiring-manager-people"
- C to D "manager-pushing-people"
- D to end of page "getting-Co-op-ahead-people"

These larger units are collections of people which result from the consensus which was earlier given to the phrase by phrase collections of people, but at a greater level of abstraction. Each of these intermediate level collections of people partition the social world, just as the others do, but
at one step more removed from the surface of the text, as
more details are omitted. They do not necessarily increase
(or decrease) the numbers of possible people within a collec­
tion, as for instance "agenda-discussing-people" in that
context has the same number of people as any of the specific
collections listed up to Break A.

Not all intermediate level collections of people are
equally productive of moral matters. Once such intermediate
level collections of people are identified as ones in which
clusters of moral matters are present, these become available
for closer inspection so as to determine what interactional
support was shown, as well as by whom.

Since the text considered here is intact, interactional
concerns may indicate additional levels of collections of
people, such as "interacting-people" or "meeting-people." As
the earlier discussion of defining collections of people
indicated, (p.138) there are periods in which the use of
the regulative rules by a collection of people give evidence
of that collection being in effect. Here "meeting-people"
can be seen to be in effect during the proposal-stating or
agenda-building, and not operative during the stretches in
which talk on the proposals or agenda is carried out. So,
although the meeting shown processively in Figure 3.7 con­
tinues within the collection of meeting-people for its
entirety, it is only during the time of a to c and 1 to 9
that the talk within meeting-people displays the constitutive
rules by which others readily could define the people as
meeting-people (although they themselves might chose to define themselves as meeting for the whole evening).

The labels for the collections of people written above, since they are derived from the contiguous phrases in the surface, continue to reflect the continuous production of talk. Further they are a means of describing the interactional support which appeared during their use. In that way, as the moral matters are investigated and become a feature of the analysis, participants can be distinguished on whether or not they indicated overt support to the collections of people from which the moral matters appear. People can also be distinguished into those who can be located within a collection of people from those who cannot.

Locating The "Self" And "Other" In Collections Of People

A collection of people is a category created in the process of talk. It is with reference to such a collection of people that moral matters are established. The notion of a good person only has meaning with regard to the collection of people from which it is drawn. Statements of obligation make sense only once the collections of people are known from which they are drawn. The earlier discussion of "hidden people" showed that collections of people are not always obviously present in the surface of talk. It is not usually the case in the Co-op materials that talkers locate individuals in collections of people as directly as in the following:
Extract 3-13

Joel: ...there's a woman who came in the Co-op week in and week out to steal from the Co-op and when we threw her out one day, she said, "I'm going to bring my people in here," and it was a bogus threat...

["No Parking" 153-160]

And even here it is necessary for the hearer to have heard an earlier part to know that "my people" was a reference to "blacks," as the woman Joel was discussing was black.

Moral matters are introduced often with individuals. This is indeed the case with Extract 3-13, where the woman is the center of the story. The logical question which the analyst must consider is how individual people are assigned in talk to collections of people and so are linked with the obligations and evaluations of collections of people. I do not deny that interactants may have a private basis for assigning individuals to additional or supplementary collections of people. But such practices are not generally retrievable in the talk. Where evidence of such private associations is shown, then the information is interactionally present, forming part of the talk, and hence of the analysis. The analyst, like any other listener to the interaction, is limited to what is said plus what others are likely to know in common.

Principles for the Analysis of People in Talk

I am concerned with the ways in which the self and others are constructed in talk. The location of a person within (or

1 References to the literature on representation of people in talk were shown in Chapter 1, page 51.
outside) a collection of people is the vital connection between individuals and particular moral matters. Any analysis of the construction of people in talk rests on four propositions.

1. The attachment of obligations and evaluations to an individual occurs by virtue of her or his location within some collection of people. Whatever feature established the collection of people in the first place (such as having a gun), provides also an initial basis on which obligations and evaluations rest (such as the statement of a moral matter "good people ought not to have guns"). Each collection of people presumes certain propositions by which a good person within that collection is defined. Such propositions concern not only obligations with regard to behavior, but also properties and states of the people which are expected to be (as Chapter 4 will explain). In each and every instance of obligation, the notion of a good person is necessarily an individual within some collection of people.

As Chapter 1 suggested, the notion of morality is being broadened in this work. The grounding of morality in groups is continued, but broadened to the use of collections of people, regardless of the degree of structure or possible ephemeral quality of that collection. Chapters 5 through 8 show the workings out of this property in terms of two items of moral matters, cooperation and commitment.

2. An individual in a collection would be assumed to have access to information and terminology special to that collection. This property which results from being a person
who is in a collection of people will be called here being "inside" the collection. Certain facts, such as "Small caliber rifles are licensed for hunting only," or specific terminology, as "hand guns," "rifles," "bores," are more likely known by those "inside." The converse is of course likely true also: Use of such facts and terminology identify collections of people.

Figure 3.9 presents a list of the terms used in Chapter 2 unique to each of the three collections of people which comprise the three guises of the Co-op. There are 23 terms for meeting-people, 14 for organization-people and 39 for produce day-people. Most of these terms are readily understood in themselves. There are no instances of "misuse" of any of these terms in the Co-op materials. What is distinctive about these terms is that they and not others constitute correct usage. For example, Co-op people talk of "extras," (Chapter 2, p. 91) where "overs" would be just as readily understood and indeed is the term for such products in some other Co-ops. However, the use of "overs" would lead to the definition of a person as an "outsider" whereas the use of "extras" would qualify a person as an "insider."

Extract 3-14

Elmer: I think it's the moral obligation of the people of, of the Co-op to spread the cost of these extras, maybe add it on... ["Starting Up" 188-190]

---

1 "The Food Co-op Handbook" (1975) by The Co-op Handbook Collective of the greater Boston area uses the terms "overs," "unders" and describes an "overs table" (p. 194) whereas Curhan and Wertheim (1972/73) use the term "surplus" (p. 33) with reference to the Boston co-ops in their study.
Figure 3.9 Instances Of Terminology Specific To The Three Collections Of Co-op People.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO-OP MEETINGS</th>
<th>CO-OP ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>PRODUCE DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>meetings</td>
<td>members</td>
<td>Food Distribution Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notices</td>
<td>belonging to</td>
<td>set-up crews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general meeting</td>
<td>joining</td>
<td>crates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agenda items</td>
<td>roster</td>
<td>cashiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agenda point</td>
<td>loan</td>
<td>collated orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chairperson</td>
<td>fee</td>
<td>solicited labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-selected minutes</td>
<td>recruiting</td>
<td>week's food runs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secretary</td>
<td>commitment</td>
<td>labor shortages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treasurer</td>
<td>bookkeeper</td>
<td>organizing labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amendments</td>
<td>working member</td>
<td>distributing the food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decisions</td>
<td>non-working member</td>
<td>counter barrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consensus state</td>
<td>posters</td>
<td>labor obligation worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal vote</td>
<td>member of Central Foods</td>
<td>labor requirements crews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motions</td>
<td>client of Central Foods</td>
<td>selling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gavel</td>
<td></td>
<td>coordinator extras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>called to order</td>
<td></td>
<td>extra table</td>
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<tr>
<td>last agenda item</td>
<td></td>
<td>pre-ordered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attending</td>
<td></td>
<td>split crates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carverton representatives to Central Foods</td>
<td></td>
<td>labor shortages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainbow Co-op</td>
<td></td>
<td>closing-up</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shove</td>
<td></td>
<td>to call [order] in</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unit and pound prices</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pick up orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>working [member]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central Foods</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>to do a run</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mark-up</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>paid manager</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>non-worker</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>customers</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>servers</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>bulletin board</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>chalk board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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However, as Merton (1972) has pointed out, a distinction into "insiders" and "outsiders" does not cleanly parallel a distinction into types of knowledge between "acquaintance with" and "knowledge about." (p. 41) The distinction in access to knowledge can be illustrated in the following:

Extract 3-15

Ben: How much was said last week about this guy? Did you tell about Dolly?

Sheldon: It's necessary, you know...

"No Parking" 013-017

In the meeting from which Extract 3-15 is taken, everyone has an acquaintance with Dolly, with the term "last week" as a way of talking about "last week's meeting people," and with the fact that there was an incident (mentioned 13 lines earlier by Ben). Ben and Sheldon have knowledge about the incident people which goes beyond that of anyone else since they were the people who were the incident people. As they talk in Extract 3-15 they are arranging what it is that they will relate to the others who are outside this collection of people who have immediate and extensive knowledge about what happened, as well as an evaluation of the happenings (as shown by Ben's account of the incident in Extract 3-1, p. 127).

3. Location within a collection provides a perspective which can be expected to color a person's observation of events and people, and hence of moral matters. A response can take

1 That location matters was shown in the classic study of perception of a Princeton-Dartmouth game by Hastorf and Cantril (1954) who found that Princeton students were more likely to see that Dartmouth started rough than Dartmouth
on added sense if the location of the talker in a relevant collection of people is known. For example:

Excerpt 3-16

Jim: ...to be on duty an, at a given point, and check out that the person really shows up, he--
Sheldon: I think that you should just put it in other, in other terms, just that he should be the labor coordinator.

"Paid Manager" 127-131

The interruption by Sheldon displays annoyance. It will be shown by Chapter 4 to be a moral response. Annoyance is occasioned by the fact that Sheldon was most recently a labor coordinator for the Co-op, the fact known of course to everyone present. As a member of the collection of labor coordinators Sheldon could be viewed as "defending" the integrity of the job of labor coordinators against what he has heard as an "attack" (Chapter 6 elaborates the notion of "defending.").

This focus on perspectives provides a way of operationalizing in talk Mannheim's notion of "relationism" mentioned in Chapter 1, page 45, by which assertions are formulated in

It seems clear that the 'game' actually was many different games, and that each version of the events that transpired was just as 'real' to a particular person as other versions were to other people. (p. 132)

1 Merton (1957) links location within the social system to a "moral transmutation" (p. 429) of virtues into vices illustrated with the deploiring by Trobriander chiefs (according to Malinowski) of ordinary people's sexual prowess, a positive value for those in power. "The chiefs are quick to resent any personal achievement not warranted by social position. (ital. in original). The moral virtues remain virtues only so long as they are jealously confined to the proper in-groups. The right activity by the wrong people becomes a thing of contempt, not of honor. For clearly, only in this way, by holding these virtues exclusively to themselves, can the men of power retain their distinction, their prestige, and their power." (p. 329)
"terms of the perspective of a given situation" (1937, p. 283) as opposed to what he characterized as a non-productive relativism that offered no basis for saying, for example, what standards are operative at a given point.

Talk presents a further complication in that people can represent other people's perspectives. In each of the segments other people's views are presented, as for instance:

**Extract 3-17**

Elmer: ...you can say, well, um, "We can get you a cucumber for seven cents and you'd pay fifteen," but unless they actually see the cucumber it doesn't mean anything I agree, that's the problem.

["Starting Up 055-058]

In Extract 3-17 the talker assumes that the presence of the cucumber will have a different meaning than talk about the cucumber to people who are non-Co-op people. The schema proposed by Laing, Philipson and Lee (1966) is useful in separating three different "orders or levels" of perception (p. 72). They distinguish "direct perspective," self's view of X; "metaperspective," "self's view of other's view of X; and "meta-metaperspective," "self's view of other's view of self's view of X. In the Co-op materials only the first two occur. In Extract 3-17, a metaperspective of non-Co-op people shows the presence of the cucumber making a difference in others' view, that would motivate them to become Co-op people.

Advantage can be taken of both Mannheim and Laing in locating others whose views or perspectives are given as within other collections of people. In Extract 3-17, prior text puts the people within a collection of "limited-imagination-people," to whom seeing a cucumber makes a difference.
In each segment there is use made of moral matters presented by Co-op people which are views attributed to others, i.e., they use a metaperspective in which the origin is made explicit (another collection of people) so that the viewpoint is not seen as relative, but rather is one of relationism.

4. A person located within a collection of people may use this knowledge and perspective to speak for the whole collection of people. Implicit in the notion of "speak for" is a claim that the person has some right to speak within that collection. What such a right consists of remains in each instance an empirical question. In the following, the talker is the only representative of his commune present.

Extract 3-18

Sheldon: Well, that's certainly true of any coordinator who doesn't come from a large house, but, you know, Yeah.

Jim S.: people like myself come from large enough houses, I guess our house just scrapes by on labor and we coordinate...

['New Labor' 133-139]

The use of "we" by Sheldon does not include the others present (an instance of an exclusive "we," cf. page 216). In one sense anything might have been said without fear of corrections, since there is only one representative present. However, others present know about the commune and know other people in it (are acquainted with the commune and some or all of the people in it) so to this extent the talker is constrained in what it is that gets said.

1 The terms "spokesman" and "spokeswoman" conventionally recognize a formal representative of an organization. Recent work by Conein locates a replacement of "nous" by "je" by representatives in the French Assembly in 1792 and characterizes such usage as instancing "port-parole."
The notion of "speak for" is useful in characterizing those who control what is said of something. In Extract 3-18, others know of Sheldon's location and see him as the "expert" or the person expected to talk from within that area, or whose talk will be assigned greater importance because of that position.

In "Starting Up" there is also talk from within the collection of commune-people in which participants speak for the communes in describing their practices. But in addition all four segments have passages in which an individual appears to speak for the whole collection of Co-op people.

Extract 3-19

Jim: ... and that, ah, a good time to start would kind of be in the fall, when we'll be starting up again as a Co-op, and uh, that it, also, that's the point where we'll sort of need someone to, to help us get started up as a Co-op, uh, and, to help us get going. ["Paid Manager" 047-051]

This "we" is inclusive, but going beyond those who are co-present. It is a "we" for organization-people (cf. p.111). No one objects to Jim's claim to speak for the Co-op organization. Although this instance of speaking for others also uses "we," others appear in the four segments which do not, and will be cited (cf. lines 129-131 of "Starting Up" p. 525 using "you").

A related notion is that of a "moral minder." A "moral minder" is a person who speaks for a collection of rational-people in noticing delicts and showing displeasure at what he or she considers wrong. By monitoring what is said and by speaking up critically of others' behavior a moral minder reflects what is considered right and wrong at the moment.
A "moral minder" possibly appears to others as a busybody, by both the judgments made of others or by the act of speaking up so as to censor another's behavior.

These four principles form part of the technique of analysis of people in talk. An account of the construction of people in the segments locates individuals structurally within collections of people, showing not only what they are expected to know, but the perspective from which they view moral matters. It also serves to locate the moral matters that they are expected to follow or to make use of in order to be seen as a good person. It also locates people with reference to each other, so that relations between and amongst people are systematized in terms of their location within one or another collection of people.

People's construction of people in talk is then a necessary resource for the study of moral matters in talk. It provides the individuals on whom and with whom moral matters are located. Each and every use of terms for people is a possible point from which obligation or evaluation may be located. Chapter 4 will pursue the way in which evaluation and especially obligation are shown in talk. But I shall argue here that the talker is concerned to show the self (and sometimes the other) as good. Hence the use (or non-use) of terms for self and for others also assumes significance in displaying obligation and especially evaluation as will be shown shortly.

The appearance of people in talk is most fruitfully
considered by separating the construction of self from the
construction of others, recognizing that an important aspect
of such constructions is the location of individuals in col-
lections of people. In fact, showing which collections of
people are relevant at any point may engage talkers in
itself as a primary concern. Talkers may ask "What does he
look like?" even after the question "Who was it?" (P. 547). ...

Distinctions of singular and plural that are important
in linguistic analysis will often be disregarded here, since
for example "we" and "I," "you" (singular) and "you" (plural)
may serve as functional equivalents in the presentation of
moral matters. The analysis rests on the assumption that
more than one way of referring to the same individual exists,
and that selection of a form by a talker illuminates evaluation.

Philosophical discussion of the morality of the good
individual is generally on a level removed from actual
practice in talk. However, both linguistic and philosophical
approaches provide insights which will be useful as the ways
of constructing a self and others in talk are considered.

Constructing The Self

The discussion of self in talk as a social construct
starts with Cooley ([1902], 1967) who focused on "daily speech"
in its social context.

It is well to say at the outset that by the word
'self' in this discussion is meant simply that which
is designated in common speech by the pronouns of the
first person singular, 'I,' 'me,' 'mine,' and 'myself.'
'Self' and 'ego' are used by metaphysicians and moralists
in many other senses, more or less remote from the 'I'
of daily speech and thought and with these I wish to have
as little to do as possible. What is here discussed is what psychologists call the empirical self, the self that can be apprehended or verified by ordinary observation. I qualify it by the word social not as implying the existence of a self that is not social—for I think that the 'I' of common language always has more or less distinct reference to other people as well as the speaker—but because I wish to emphasize and dwell upon the social aspect of it. (p. 169)

Since I am using transcriptions of recorded talk, it is easier for me than it was for Cooley to look at an appearance of self in an interaction with others. I can examine in detail ongoing interaction which could only get one hearing where participant observation was the main method of study.

It is then possible to consider where "self" has been inserted, where not, and suggest why not. Alternatives to using the self in talk can be considered, in particular "we" for instance. That moral matters are relevant at each point in the construction of "self" will be shown.

Discussion of the construction of self necessarily is intertwined with the problems of presenting a "good self." To simplify matters, discussion of the social location of the self and issues to do with distancing of self will be postponed for now. The problems which arise with these notions are shared in construction of others, and they will be discussed there at the same time.

**Self Display** Various uses of self terms locate the self as an "interacting person" in some collection of interacting people. Although an individual is continuously present physically, only at certain places in the talk is the self overtly placed within the interaction. This occurs in a
a variety of ways.

One mode of self display occurs with the use of self in parenthetical phrases\(^1\) such as "I mean," "I think," or "I guess." Such self inserts may have little more than consensus adjusting activities (cf. prior section on "you know," where "I mean" is seen as a possible homologue to "you know," but lacking the full interactional sense). In such parenthetical phrases, a self fleetingly appears in formulas which give little or no characterization of the self. They break the flow of the text briefly, but are independent of the syntax. They have a wide freedom of occurrence. minimally noting for others that some internal activity is going on. They do not require, and generally do not get, any overt recognition from the hearer. However, they do serve to remind others of a "self" in so far as the word "I" appears in the text.

Another type of self-insert which can be used is one which gives a psychological description of the self, as in:

Extract 3-20

Fred: I'm essentially a pragmatist...  
["Starting Up" 194-195]

Here the self is not only mentioned, but also characterized in some way, i.e., put in some collection of people, here

\(^1\) Urmson's work (1966) on the parenthetical verb notes that they place an emphasis on "emotional significance, the logical relevance, the reality of our statements: we show rather than we state." (p. 19) The focus here is on the fleeting appearance of the self, and not on whatever "activity" is used in showing, such as "guessing" or "thinking."
"pragmatic-people." There is little risk in being wrong, for this is information about the self given by the self. Co-op people are presumed expert on their own states of mind. However, there is the risk that others may see evidence of something other than a psychological state, but rather a judgment of "good" or "bad" about the self. On the other hand, omitting such psychological characterizations of the self may result in the individual appearing to have no emotional states, or not wanting to share information about them with those present.

There are other optional self-inserts which are used by the talker to display him or herself as doing something at that point in the interaction, such as "I think the re-organization..." "Starting Up" [007] and "Open the doors and get started, I know" "Starting Up" [005]. For Goffman (1974) such items as "know" and "think" are "connectives" which serve "to locate who is doing what at the moment it is being done." (p. 211) I shall be taking into account only those forms which distinguish a self from something the self is doing. Such self-inserts are instances of what Goffman has called "multiple selfing," such as occurs in:

Extract 3-21

Elmer: Shall we take a vote? It's really against my interests to vote, because if I say we should go ahead and do it...

["Starting Up" 005-007]

1 In applying frame analysis to talk, Goffman (1974) illustrated some issues of "multiple selfing" (p. 52) where embedding may enable there to be several selves at any instance,
In Extract 2-21 the "I" that is hypothetically presented as talking is not the "I" of some future collection of people that will be in some activity, here voting.

An "I" of more direct action occurs where a person shows the self as acting.

Extract 3-22

Jim: Actually after we made that suggestion, I talked to Ben to see if he'd interested... ["Paid Manager" 016-018]

The use of self in Extract 3-22 is one in which the talker directly relates the self to some action, here one done in the past, that of talking to Ben. If the action is one in the future, it is not always the case that a statement is heard as a "real" or serious commitment, as will be discussed in Chapter 7 further.

"Possible self" (or other) In talk there appear a series of slots for the possible inclusion of a self, as well as ways of suppressing the display of self. These devices indicate a "possible self" in a specific way that is tied to the grammar1 with, for instance, differing facets of the biographical entity as well as performing different tasks, such as animator or animate person. Any of these could be a "self," or all could be.

1 It has been argued by some linguists that every utterance has a "possible self" in that "I say to you that..." can be understood as a preface in which the talker displays its presence (Ross, 1970). The notion of a "possible self" will be used in Chapter 7 (p.506 ), but only to locate a self in cases of syntactic ellipses. There it will be tied more closely to the appearance (or lack) of moral matters in the talk.
or the interpretation of the statement made. In some instances, as will be shown, "possible self" may be replaced or joined by "possible other." Direct assignment in talk of others in some instances produces the "hidden people" met above.

The notion of "possible self" is linked to the likelihood that people are out to present a good self. In his analysis of the "relation between self and spoken interaction" with regard to face and line, Goffman notes (1967) that when a person volunteers a statement or message, however trivial or commonplace, he commits himself and those he addresses, and in a sense places everyone present in jeopardy. (p. 37)

One aspect of this jeopardy is that the self may not be shown as a good self and others may judge the self as less than good. Thus any use of self is potentially one that introduces moral matters. Once a self has been inserted in the talk, the talker can be held responsible for what he or she has said, and it may be difficult to disclaim such statements. It follows then that there are ways in which the individual can lessen such risks to self and avoid the use of self terms, or at least minimize their appearance. Those self terms that are retrievable suggest the notion of a "possible self."

An insertion of self can be avoided by proposing a hypothetical self, as in Extract 3-21 above, "if I say [by voting] we should..." By proposing a vote for opening up the Co-op, and then putting in his own vote hypothetically, the talker avoids possible damage to self.

The problem of sustaining an identity (Goffman, 1959) at the same time continues (cf. also Lyman and Scott, 1970, who investigate stage fright) and presence of self.
Another way is to use a construction which makes alternative interpretations available.

Extract 3-23

Elmer: I know there are people on this block that never even heard of Carverton Co-op who would probably join...

"Starting Up" 032-033

There are two possible interpretations: someone else could have told him that there were people on the block who might join, or the talker could know them personally. But the latter is not said explicitly, and the risk to the self of being wrong is hence lessened. As a good Co-op organization-person, the talker would be expected to know about and be concerned about possible recruits.

Another way to suppress display of self occurs with using terms which mask the self, such as "you" in the following:

Extract 3-24

Jim: ... that in my opinion are costing us on the average more than twenty dollars a week, but whenever you name any one thing, it's always something that can be dealt with, but uh-never does get dealt with until after it happens...

"Paid Manager" 034-039

Here, and in instances in the other segments, a talker switches from talk using self terms ("in my opinion" in the first line of Extract 3-24) to what linguists call a "general you," which appears to include everyone. However, "you" for "I" is often the case: in Extract 3-24, the talker first makes it clear whose opinion he is giving ("in my opinion"), and then appears to speak more generally, as if people were in the habit of naming things that were costing the Co-op more than twenty dollars a week. No one at the meeting has named
anything, and no one does, except the talker who later in that segment gives such instances.

Talkers use indefinite pronouns like "someone" or "somebody" to mask the self. There is a hypothetical "somebody" who in the following is not going to be able to work.

Extract 3-25

Ronnie: Well, let's say somebody can't work during the Co-op hours, but volunteers to do the labor coordinating.

Martin: That's working. ["New Labor" 033-036]

Later in that meeting the talker herself volunteers to join with another to do the labor coordinating, making it explicit that it was she who was the hypothetical "somebody," too busy to work "during the Co-op hours."

Extract 3-26

Joel: It seems it would go faster if someone would volunteer to pull this whole thing together.

Sheldon: I would be willing to work with anybody if I didn't have the set-up coordinating.

Ronnie: I was trying to do that [volunteer] because I will no longer, I will no longer be able to coordinate selling, do the selling coordinating, so I could volunteer... [Meeting of 1/22/73, p. 53]

By initially constructing in talk the collection of people who are willing to work with an unidentified person who has a time conflict (Extract 3-25), it is possible for the talker to wait until the specifications of the job are established before she volunteers (Extract 3-26). In this way, the talker avoids the possible embarrassment of applying for a job that she would not want and continues to appear as a cooperating worker for the Co-op.
Another way in which reference to the self can be systematically omitted is to use a syntactic option. For instance, an alternative form of expression, such as a passive without an agent expressed omits reference to self. Instead of the self inserted in a direct description of activity going on, "Caren and I talked on the phone" ("Starting Up"[026]), where the talker is taking responsibility for the action of talking to Caren, it is possible to say, "it was posted at the Co-op" ("Paid Manager[003]) , referring to some person, only possibly the self, who posted the agenda list on the wall of the Co-op. The notion of "possible other" is relevant here. On the other hand the line, "it's usually parked here" ("No Parking"[059]) is true for only one possible person, Thorne, and so is an instance where only "possible other" can appear.

In some instances, such as with verbs of perception or evaluation, a "possible self" or "possible other" can be supplied by the interactants (or the analyst).

Extract 3-27

Jim: 1 mean it seemed [to me] like something that,--that would be good in Ben's situation because he is also working for the Central "Paid Manager" 083-085]

In Extract 3-27, I have supplied "to me" since the talker is not giving another's view, but rather his own.

Lists of "possible self" and "possible other" in cases of syntactic ellipsis will be presented in Chapter 7 as the process of making a commitment is explored. There fifty-five
instances of verbs of perception and judgment or evaluation where only the self could be supplied will be distinguished in Chapter 7 from constructions in which "hidden people" include "possible self" or "possible other."

An additional way of hiding a self is to call forth a whole collection in which the self is constructed, rather than just the self alone. In a few instances in the segments "the meeting" appears in such a way. One important option for such burying of the self is the use of "we," as will be discussed shortly. Each of these ways of avoiding self is used to minimize or avoid use of self in communicating issues of cooperation and commitment, as will be shown.

Use of "we" An individual has for all intents and purposes, a right to use "me" or "I" for the self, although there may be a host of reasons as to why it is done or not done at a particular point, including having the self appear as less than good. The risk of displaying a self as less than good may hold as true for the use of "we." But claims for the use of "we" are even more complex, since in some cases those who are being included within the "we" may be there to object, or others may take it upon themselves to challenge a use of "we." "We" suggests a consensus, and further that someone has a "right to say we." ¹ Although the use of "we"

¹ "On The Right To Say We" serves as a title for Spiegelberg (1973) who adds as a subtitle, "A linguistic and phenomenological analysis." However, his work is different in spirit from the present enterprise, since his work is normative. His paper ends with a caution to the reader to use "we" "where you
may safeguard a self to some extent by diffusing it with others, the self may find attack from another quarter as others object to the characterization that is being made. Such a possibility remains hypothetical in the Co-op materials since the tapes examined show no instances of disputes as to being included within a "we."

Use of "we" by the Co-op people occurs in the four conventional ways "we" can be distinguished: distributively vs. collectively and inclusively vs. exclusively. In the first chapter reference was made to the Co-op-people as being either the Co-op-people taken one at a time (distributively) or as a collection of people (collectively) (cf. Chapter 1, page.44). Both senses occur with the use of "we" also. As used in a collective sense where the Co-op is seen as an organization, "we" applies to the collection as a whole: "we would have two levels of markup" ("New Labor" 0041) In other instances the distributive "we" applies to each person individually, as in "we fill out the same order forms." "Starting Up" 0151. However, the possibility of "we" being ambiguous between these two senses also exists.

Extract 3-28

Fred: Well, that's what we ought to do right now, discover exactly what we're going to need to actually open...

["Starting Up" 066-068]

In Extract 3-28 the phrase "we ought to do" contains two honestly believe that your we-partners want you to speak for them." (p. 154)

I Here the talker is speaking for the Co-op using "we" in the sense developed on page 202.
possible interpretations. Either "we" refers to the individuals at the meeting or it refers to the meeting as a whole. The "we" is possibly ambiguous between the two senses, but the second "we" is not, for the Co-op and not the individuals associated with it can be spoken of as having "needs" when the question of opening up is addressed. (cf. Chapter 7)

An "exclusive we" (Bloomfield, 1933, p. 255) includes the speaker and excludes the hearer, as in "we wanted maybe a couple more heads of lettuce" "Starting Up"[120] where Pam talks of her commune, no members of which are present other than herself. The "inclusive we" includes both speaker and hearer as in "At least, ah, we get a vote on the sign" "No Parking"[180]. The relevant collections of people are generally easily distinguished. However, as Chapter 1 explained (p. 44) in the analysis that follows for the most part the distinction between a distributive and collective sense is not generally a part of the analysis.

The possibilities of interpreting "we" shown above suggest one difficulty of any schema which uses a simple pronoun count of "we" as an objective measure of differences in one text from another. The matter becomes even more complex once the variety of collections of people for which "we"

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1 Hymes (1972) in fact sees these as sufficiently different as to propose replacing first person inclusive by a 4th person, arguing it is logically coordinate to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, and would be a useful addition to the usual framework.

2 Representative of the use of "we" is a study by Weinstein and Deutschberger (1963) who found subjects used greater "we" when confederates supplied supporting feedback, and more "you" otherwise.
might be used are taken into account. Any such global counting of "we" can conceal information particularly as to different location of collections of people which may be understood by the people who are present. The phrase "after we made that suggestion" "Paid Manager" is possibly ambiguous between the sense of people at a meeting and people not at a meeting (cf. Chapter 6, page 457) and the subset who are legitimately included within the "we" of "we've got a court hearing" "No Parking" is shown earlier in this chapter and pointed out to be problematic in Chapter 8. The use of "we" as an initial means of examining a text is shown in "Starting Up" in Chapter 7 where 48 instances of "we" are examined. Although many of the "we's" used there are productive of moral matters, the use of "we" does not lead readily to the strategy by which commitment was made in that segment.

Since "we" or any use of terms in which self is included does risk showing a self that is less than good, the analysis of self (more so than of "others") is likely immediately to concern moral matters. Such concerns may be reflected in possible rather than actual use of self terms, as well as the assignment of self to collections of people which in themselves may lead the self to being found less than good. The analytical problems of constructing self however rarely include the simple question of identity, which is likely to be a major concern in presenting "others."
Constructing The Others

People are introduced and referred to in talk through a combination of proper names, pronouns and classification terms. A basic assumption of the analysis (p. 205) is there exist different forms for referring to an individual which are more or less equivalent in truth value, and hence interchangeable from the point of view of reference. A talker's choice of the term to be used then can be seen to supply information by which the analyst can make systematic statements about identity, social location and social distance. Interactants' competence to complete the same or similar analysis is assumed, since it is the basis on which the ability to make such reference rests.

Talk about other people requires some ways of (1) identifying the "others," which may or may not include a basis by which listeners will know who is being talked about. The talker initially is in control of what information on age, gender, or social status is made available to the interaction. These and other classification terms supply (2) "social location," the collections of people in which the other can be placed. Without such information interactants have no basis to assign (3) "social distance" between themselves and interactants or between sets of interactants. However, the first problem faced by the talker is to refer to the other in a way that differentiates that other from other "others."
Identifying others. As terms of reference or terms of address, proper names would seem to be the most direct and complete way of identifying others. But they are rarely used in the segments either as terms of reference or of address (there are seven instances in the segments of names used for address). The form of proper names used for address provides information about distancing as does the place where they are inserted in sentences.

Last names appear only twice in the segments as terms of reference. They were also seldom heard in the Co-op on produce days. Such a minimal use of proper names does not occur because others were not talked about, or because Co-op people did not talk to each other. If the use or non-use of proper names is problematic, then the Co-op people succeed generally avoiding this problem.

1 Semantic rules for the use of names have been studied for address terms. In the schema of Brown and Ford (1961) the Co-op pattern is "mutual FN," reciprocal use of first names for the Co-op people. Address terms in American English have also been explored by Erwin-Tripp (1972) who concerns herself with descriptive rules for the form of the address terms used, and Lambert and Tucker (1976) with regard to social-psychological dimensions. Fischer (1964) found personal names (in Japan) were reported for address of "others" who younger relatives and were said to be used for the self in the case of young children. Fischer also noted "zero forms," the absence of any term for personal reference for various pairs of family members, especially with the wife. His data, however, is from interviews about what people did, not from observations of their behavior. Philips (1976) noticed that Warm Springs Indians (Oregon) seldom used address terms at Tribal Council meetings.

2 The syntactic position of nouns and noun phrases used vocatively in English has been studied by Zwicky (1974).
The philosophical theory of proper names as developed by Gardner (1940) does not recognize interactional use of proper names as problematic. Gardner explains how naming works, noting that a proper name is a word that is recognized as identifying its object by virtue of the distinctive sound exclusively. (p. 65)

However, Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) point out that recognizability of proper names is not a feature of sound alone, but a feature of their use:

It can not be a 'John Brown' unless somebody uses 'John Brown' to name it. (p. 304)

Schegloff (1972) goes further and points out that a "claim to their recognizability" is made:

It appears to be the case that persons (in this society at least) in using names and in asking for them, claim their recognizability... (p. 90)

The "identifying description," according to Searle (1960, p. 174) is the essential feature of the basis by which proper names perform the speech acts of "identifying reference."

...if both the speaker and the hearer associate some identifying description with the [proper] name, then the utterance of the name is sufficient to satisfy the principle of identification, for both the speaker and the hearer are able to substitute an identifying description. (p. 171)

Searle notes that both interactants need "supply the same identifying description." (p. 171) The Co-op materials suggest identification may consist in supplying more than one "identifying description" as more than one facet of the identity of the individual assumes importance.
In talking of the "No Parking" incident, Ben first identifies the individual by "he," until asked to supply a name.

Extract 3-29

(Mickey: Well, who was it that did this?
Ben: It's this guy across the street named Jason Thorne, who lives at 33-
Ben: Jason Thorne?
Mickey: Jason Thorne?

["No Parking" 008-012]

Ben first locates the person as a "guy" and then describes where the person lives ("across the street") before giving the name, and then a specification of the house number. (These "social locations" will be considered in the next section.) The name alone does not appear to be expected to achieve recognition, although it identifies the person.

When the other is identified (and sometimes even before as was the case in the text that preceded Extract 3-29) the usual practice is to continue reference using pronouns. Some of the difficulties of identity in talk arise in the effort to keep tabs on individuals through a stretch of talk where pronouns are being used for more than one, or where a variety of pronouns and other terms are used to refer to the same individual.

Perhaps the most elusive representative of people is the pronoun "they." There is no clue as to gender (which the

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1 In "No Parking" Ben uses five "he's" for an individual who remains unidentified by any other means until asked by Mickey (cf. Extract 3-29). I shared her ignorance of his identity and suspect that most others who were there did too (cf. Chapter 5)

2 "They" is treated as a "generalized pronoun" by Weiner and W. Labov (1977) in their discussion of the passive, a colloquial
singular "he" or "she" have) and whether any of those co-present are included or not, as can be shown with "you."

With any partitioning of the social world which produces a collection of people, "they" can be used, and perhaps moral matters alongside, as in the following.

Extract 3-30

Jim: ...and twice in a row they're not there that they're supposed to be there they don't show up, well I would say then, 'Don't let them get away with it...'

"New Labor" 052-056.

In Extract 3-30 "they" are characterized as not being present when they are supposed to be, but scarcely identified in any other way. A further factor with the use of "they" is a greater likelihood of the others appearing as depersonalized (as will be discussed further in Chapter 4), a ready indicator of moral matters. Problems of unravelling the "they" are many and identity may be less important than knowing something of the social locations in which they are being shown.

Social location A second problem in constructing people in talk is to show social location of the individuals. The problem here is not that of locating a referent for an "other," as was the case with establishing an identity. In the framework being used here the question can be phrased, in what collections of people is the person being viewed? Although this discussion uses "others" as examples, the same issues equivalent of more formal forms.
apply to the construction of the social location of a self. This process has not been systematically explored in talk, although the importance of the general location of individuals in talk within various reference classes or groups and statuses has been recognized (Schegloff, 1972). Talk does not always make social locations explicit, nor is it possible to say whether a recently used category is at a particular point relevant for the talker or for one or more of the interactants. An analysis can consider what has been made available, and what appears to have been used by the interacting people. Whatever private assignments people know of and do not use have relevance for the analysis only in so far as they appear as part of what occurred.

Some information about social location is generally available from pronoun use (assigning the "other" to a gender class) if singular forms are employed. Along with a name, additional social locations can be shown, as was the case in Extract 3-29 above, where the individual was located as a guy (one of the "guy-people"). Classification with "guy" is an instance of the use of a "peer term,"¹ one of a set of common nouns that designate an indefinite set of unnamed persons, such as "woman," "girl," "boy," "kid," "man," or "guy," but do not uniquely distinguish any individual. Such "peer terms" introduce collections of people that are social

¹ Systematic ambiguity in the use of "peer terms" was explored in T. Labov (1973), including particularly the confusion generated as both distributive and collective senses become relevant. Ryle's (1965) notion of systematically misleading expressions was used as a means of distinguishing who were the Jets (which youth) from when was the Jets (the club).
locations for the individual. Here the use of the singular term "guy" was a means of indicating "hidden people," the collection of "guys"("guy-people"), as discussed earlier in this chapter (p.137). The choice of such peer terms may introduce evaluations or obligations which color the characterizations taking place. The notion of a "questionable classification" is shown a means of signaling moral matters (as discussed with indicators of moral response in Chapter 4, p. 271).

Later in "No Parking" "identifying description"

six further collections of people into which he can be located. These were "hidden people" discovered in the list of adjectives presented in the surface of the talk (cf. Chapter 3, page 134) including:

- thin people
- 5'11" people
- slim people
- mustached people
- black people

But the individual has also been located within the "incident-people" and a dozen other collections of people throughout the first 100 lines of talk. As the talk progresses and further "he's" appear, can analysts (or interactants) assign any of these social locations to each instance of "he"? I do not wish to claim that each and every instance of the use of a pronoun has an assignment made by the listeners, but some no doubt did. The following, where "he" is particularly stressed, both by its repetition and the word "personally" would seem to be a likely one.
Extract 3-31

Ben: ... He, he personally ... is crazy. "No Parking"[096]

Extract 3-31 introduces a new social location, "crazy-people" for him. The argument in the further analysis of this line (found in Chapter 8) is based on the notion that not all collections of people are equally "salient." (cf. p. 161) The further point can be made that if certain collections of people do appear as more salient, then their use may result in individuals being re-assigned retrospectively within such a collection of people. Once a description includes this social location for the individual, then it may not be possible to view what was said earlier apart from the knowledge that the individuals had that particular characteristic.

Interactants seem to make available an excess of social locations as each predication of the individual may show additional ones that are present.

Extract 3-32

Jim: ... a week before there was a similar large loss [Ben clears throat], but the person who coordinated in your position the week before did not

(Caren: Didn't report it.)

Jim: compare the money he brought over with the book, as he was supposed to do, so we didn't know about that large loss until we checked over the books carefully when you reported the loss...

"Paid Manager" 173-181

In Extract 3-32 the social locations for the "person" include:

coordinating-people

1 Emerson (1969) notes "retrospective definition" as a feature of sociable interaction.
last-week-coordinating-people
bringing-over-money-people
checking-records-people

Moral matters appear particularly with the phrase "as he was supposed to do," suggesting that the "person" does not have a social location within the collection of "checking-records-people." Here is a reason for their ignorance ("we didn't know") of the loss of Co-op monies.

For the most part the social location relevant at each particular point is difficult to establish and not an essential part of much of the analysis. With one exception. In some instances a further part of constructing others may involve the relations in terms of distances between and among people in a "structure of social space" (in the terminology of Danziger, 1976, p. 45).

Social distancing  Discussion of the relation of self and others in a social space is simplified by anchoring individuals in collections of people. People within a collection of people are, in terms of that collection, "less remote" than those in different collections of people. For the purposes of this work, a degree of "remoteness" or "nearness" is a dimension along which social distance is being considered. In some instances, "nearness" has a physical correlate, in that collections and sub-collections of "interacting-people" may be visible to each other, perhaps even talk to each other.

People who are "near" are generally seen as individuals
with personalities. People who are "remote" are seen as less personal, that is as depersonal. The notion of "depersonal" as a characteristic of moral response is developed further in Chapter 4 with regard to individuals and to the affect they display. (p. 275)

Social distance is shown by choice of classification term or pronoun, or form of proper name used. It follows that changes in social distance are displayed by changes in these choices, such as the replacement of a third person pronoun or indefinite, such as "person" or "someone" to the use of "you" of the "interacting-people."

**Extract 3-33**

Jim: Why not simply say that a person's entitled to his full points if he calls and gives notice, ah, but you're not entitled to the same point, you got to call and find a substitute if you're not going to be there....

"New Labor" [089-094]

The change from "person" to "you" in Extract 3-33 shortens the social distance by moving from people located somewhere in a remote social space to those who are interacting nearby within the room.¹

A similar change occurs as Glen begins a motion about

¹ A conventional distinction between 2nd and 3rd person is useful where a distinction can easily be made between the present people and those not present, who then become "he," "she," "they," or some indefinite. There are problems with "you," such as not knowing the inclusion scope (one or some or all of those present) or "generic you" from a "you" used for self. In some languages multiple pronoun forms for "you" make possible distinctions of singular and plural as well as others such as intimacy and formality (e.g., French tu and vous) or power and solidarity (Brown and Gilman, 1966).
the action of one individual, and then completes the motion using "you."

Extract 3-34

Glen: ... I have a motion that the meeting allow Sheldon to spend up to 15 dollars to buy the sign, 15 dollars for the, ah, to get, in other words, so that if you do have the opportunity, or get the way that you'd be cleared to do that. ["No Parking" 109-113]

Here the closer social location is shown by the talker talking directly to the individual, Sheldon, giving an explanation of what the money being appropriated is to be used for. Here the possibility of talking to someone who is "near" is actualized.

Another way of showing an individual as "near" is to establish a collection of "remote" individuals and show the individual as not part of it.

Extract 3-35

Caren: I don't want to be pessimistic but I really would like the Co-op to open.... ["Starting Up" 245-247]

In Extract 3-35, the talker sets out a collection of pessimistic-people which she does not place herself within. If she had she would have been as "remote" as the collection. Earlier in the same segment, the talker did locate herself in one collection (which she apologizes for) which is also remote, but then sets out a yet more remote collection of people which she avoids placing herself within.
Extract 3-35

Caren: I don't mean to be so negative, 'cause you know, I really believe in it, I want to be

Pam: Yeah.

Caren: part of something that's alive, you know.

"Starting Up" 146-150

Here the collection of "negative-people" is the initial location of the talker, and the collection of "not-alive-Co-op-people" one that she implies briefly, only long enough to show that she doesn't want to be part of it, but rather "part of something that's alive" ("Starting Up" 150). Both Extract 3-35 and 3-36 have instances of category consensus being shown about different collections of people used by Caren. In Extract 3-36 both underlining by self and other is shown, suggesting more interactional difficulties earlier in the segment than later (as will be shown in Chapter 7) concerning belief in the Co-op.

The collection of "troublemaking-people" is used in the "No Parking" segment as a place to locate individuals whom the talker (and the others present) would prefer to have "remote." The text assigns one person directly to that collection of people and the analysis in Chapter 8 suggests another individual has also been located there, despite no explicit statement of that in the talk. Moral matters cluster about the collection of "troublemaking-people," as will be shown.

Using the dimensions of "near" and "remote" helps to capture a polarizing effect that the showing of social distance
has for moral matters. Once the notion of "near" appears, then the analysis has put the other close to another, which from one point of view is always a self. The issue of whether the person is being shown as a "good person" then is relevant, whereas "remote" social locations are the preferred dumping ground of those seen as not good, as for instance the "not-alive-Co-op-people" of Extract 3-35 or the troublemakers sketched out just above. However, not every "remote" social location is inherently evil, as for instance social locations in temporally different versions of "Co-op people," such as the "Early-Days-Co-op-people."

Extract 3-37

Elmer: Thank God, when we first started our Co-op for people like Martha Martin who would put up three or four times, they put up forty dollars in deposits, because that's the only way we had money to buy, you know, because people didn't give us a deposit....

Caren: B-b-b-b-b-b--

["Starting Up" 172-177]

In Extract 3-37 are a collection of the founding people, seemingly remote from present day Co-op people. The talker is apparently free to characterize the collection as he likes, having established that he is part of it ("when we first started" first line of Extract 3-37). In this instance the talker establishes in talk one individual particularly, "Martha Martin" who kept the Co-op going with her large loans in the Early Days. The "remoteness" of the collection of

\[1\] In this connection cf. the use of anonymity to distance the antagonist in narratives of personal experience in the analysis of W. Labov (forthcoming).
people is not a means of showing it as non-good, but rather a characteristic of its having been operative a long time ago.

The talker in Extract 3-37 is speaking for the collection (cf. p. 202), seemingly controlling what is to be said about the collection. But Caren's "B-b-b-b-b" is interpretable as a likely "but," although her interruption is not completed and it can not be confirmed. Except by those who have the additional information which also locates Caren within the collection of founding people and as part of a commune that could also be credited with keeping the Co-op going by their equally large loan. If the interruption had been completed, then all would have witnessed the shift in the collection of "Early-Days-Co-op-people" (or "founding-people") to include Caren, becoming less remote as Caren also had an input into how that collection of people was to be characterized, and who "deserved" to be within. That Elmer had overlooked Caren's location within the collection of people also suggests his knowledge of the collection of "founding-people" was not as extensive as would first appear.

The assignment then of "near" or "remote" to collections of people in social space remains an empirical issue. However, it is a first step before conclusions can be drawn about the social distance between individuals located in the same or different collections of people. In those instances where one of the individuals turns out to be self

1 Issues concerning obligation, evaluation, rights, claims, deserts are handled in the next chapter. Caren's "B-b-b-b-b" is the closest to an objection to another's speaking for a collection of people as occurs in these materials.
within a perspective, moral matters concerning a "good" self are likely to cluster. Moral matters concerning a non-good other are likely to cluster where some non-Co-op people are being shown, especially where that collection of people is being shown as "remote," and perhaps depersonal too.

This chapter has introduced the notion of "collections of people" as a means of representing people who appear in talk, by which the conventional distinctions amongst degrees of structure within pluralities of people are collapsed. From such collections of people I argue that moral matters are appended and may become interactionally realized in talk. A series of procedures for locating people not initially apparent but systematically retrievable were used to disclose these "hidden people." Since the number of collections of people proved to be so large, means of classifying and categorizing them were devised so as to select levels of generality most likely to be productive of moral matters.

The notion of "category consensus" was developed as a means of showing the extent of ratification of the use of collections of people through a passage of talk. Generally such consensus is shown by the use of similar collections of people in which either intersecting aspects of some core concept (overlap) or similarity of details of core concept (inclusion) show succeeding collections of people to be the same or different. The notion of a "break" was a logical outgrowth by which places
lacking consensus maintaining features could be characterized.

Equally vital for the analysis is the location of individuals in talk, both self and other, for it is with people that evaluations of good or non-good are shown. Principles by which individuals in talk can be analyzed were advanced, beginning from the notion that the individual need be shown within a collection of people, for by this means obligations, evaluations, as well as information and terminology particular to a collection of people are shown as features of the individual. The notion of speaking for a collection of people was suggested by which a person uses knowledge and perspectives of the collection of people to represent the whole collection of people.

From their location in the Co-op and in other collections of people, individuals are shown sometimes as committing themselves to the Co-op or working cooperatively for the Co-op, or sometimes trying to avoid doing these things. The question remains as to how in talk obligations and evaluations relevant to cooperation and commitment are interactionally realized and related to particular individuals and collections of people. To answer this, I shall again consult the language used.
CHAPTER 4

LOCATING EVALUATION AND OBLIGATION IN TALK

The preceding chapter found that the collections of people on which moral matters might depend are quite densely distributed in the text. In this chapter systematic ways will be developed which disclose the moral matters which were in fact interactionally realized. Two major elements need to be added to the analysis developed so far: evaluation and obligation. These elements will be located in the talk and fitted together with the appropriate individuals and collections of people to arrive at a full characterization of moral matters.

Just as passages of talk may differ in clarity and explicitness of ideas presented, they also differ in clarity and explicitness with which moral matters are displayed. Talk also differs in the use that talkers make of moral matters at any one point. A concerted focus on language continues then to be an essential part of the methodology.

The identification of moral matters depends more on the interpretation of interactional events than did the location of collections of people. Not everyone present may have the same basis for seeing that an utterance is a moral response. Affect sometimes shown by interactants may be a helpful guide,
but only affect which is directed at what will be shown to be depersonalized concerns. A battery of speech forms exist that regularly signal attention to moral matters, whether or not others have made overt the moral matter to which they are responding. The more straightforward cases are those in which interactants seize upon moral matters and continue the talk with consensus on the underlying collections of people.

It will be evident that only a small amount of explicit moral response which is produced would be recognizable as ethical or moral in a textbook sense. Few use "ought" or talk of a good person. The analysis of talk continues to require close concern with a wide range of detail, and to implicit as well as explicit expressions of obligation and evaluation. Once expanded means of describing moral matters in talk are provided, it will be possible to consider in Chapters 5 to 8 particular problems of commitment and cooperation and to recognize other instances of moral matters in talk.

To focus on cooperation or commitment, means of representing moral matters in talk is needed. Such representation necessarily requires a means of relating obligation and evaluation to each other within the framework suggested by the emphasis here on collections of people, and especially of Co-op people.
The nature of obligation and evaluation which is of concern here is their appearance in language at much the same time. In Chapter 1 the relevant sociological studies of obligation and evaluation were shown, and the means by which they have been studied made explicit. Those analyses did not tend to consider at the same time questions of obligation and evaluation. Since talk has the need to condense and present all at once not only relations amongst and between people but motivations as to why people behave one way or another, talk necessarily presents both together. It would be a disservice as well as a difficulty to separate them, and so the focus here is to start from the point of view that obligation and evaluation are linked and to find means of representing this fact.

The notion of obligation ranges from an imperative sense which is backed by official arrangements to insure enforcement, to instances in which constraint is barely perceptible. On the one hand good Co-op people are expected to pay for the food they have taken; if they don't they can be excluded from the Co-op as was done (cf. Chapter 8). On the other hand, good Co-op people are expected to be friendly rather than legalistic, have low prices on produce, and accept everything that was on their order, even if they no longer need it or want it (cf. Chapter 2).

The notion of moral premise makes use of an obligatory link between a subject and a predicate. Rights and privileges
may go along with these obligations, such as getting lower prices, or sanctions for not fulfilling them. Generally there are no rights and privileges associated with being a friendly person. Yet in the Co-op, as will be shown, people are expected to be friendly. The moral matters associated with this expectation may not appear as "serious," crucial, or dramatic as those revolving around theft or violence. Yet the mechanisms by which moral matters effect behavior can be revealed similarly in these more subtle matters.

The obligatory link of moral premise between subject and predicate can be contrasted with one that is less constrained, that has more freedom, that is, at the level of an existential ("is") rather than obligatory ("ought"). The empirical problem is to determine in each instance which attributes, classifications or activities are shown by interactants as defining a good person. With such instances, the linkage of "ought" rather than "is" applies and the formulation is expressed as a moral premise.

In the framework used here the pressure to conform in anyway to some expectation is mediated by the display of self (or others) as a good individual(s) within a collection of people. Freedom is restricted, necessity imposed by this superordinate framework resulting from the location of the individual(s) within some collection of people. Such location within a collection of people in talk is the basis by which people can be evaluated by the interactants as good or not.
The "Ought" And The "Good Person"

The notion of "ought" is complex and has been the center of much philosophical speculation. The specific issue of the relation of "ought" to "is" will be discussed later in this chapter, but first more general considerations of "ought" will be given. The Co-op operation often intertwines an instrumental "ought" and an "ought" for which moral reasons can be supplied as in the belief that Co-op people ought to take everything they order. Instrumentally, the Co-op would lose money if people did not take what they ordered, and so efficient operation of the Co-op requires that everything ordered be paid for. On the other hand commitment to take what was ordered gives evidence of moral reasons for doing it, such as being trustworthy.

The logic of "ought" has been explored widely, including analysis by Harman (1977) who proposes four different meanings:

In this theory then, to say the P ought to do D is to say that P has sufficient reasons to do D that are stronger than the reasons he has to do something else. If what you mean is that P morally ought to do D, you mean that P has sufficient moral reasons to do D that are stronger than the reasons he has to do something else. (p. 118)

1 For instance, Sellers (1965) explores the "relation between thinking oneself under an obligation to do something" and "(ceteris paribus) deciding to do it for the reason that one ought to do it." Castaneda (1965) examines "the sense in which statements about obligations or rights, wrongs, or oughts, as well as their denials, are true or false." (p. 220) Foot (1972) distinguishes an "ought" of a hypothetical imperative from that of moral judgments, arguing that they "have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette." (p. 312)
The "good-reasons" analysis for the other senses of "ought" with examples of all four senses can be shown. (The examples have been modified to use Co-op people as the subject, since "ought" that does not concern people is not of interest to this work.)

Ought of rationality (also called simple rationality)

Example: Co-op people ought to use the side door. (There are reasons for Co-op people using the side door.)

Ought of evaluation

Example: Co-op people ought to volunteer. (There are reasons for hoping or wishing Co-op people would volunteer.)

Ought of expectation

Example: Co-op people ought to be at the Co-op by now. (There are reasons for thinking or believing that Co-op workers are at the Co-op now.)

Ought of morality

Example: Co-op people ought to commit themselves to cooperative work. (There are moral reasons for Co-op people doing what they said they would do, such as to be good Co-op people.)

In the materials to follow, no effort is made to distinguish amongst these abstract senses of "ought." Each involves good reasons which some or all of the interactants might consider as being "moral good reasons." The likelihood of ambiguity is large, as the earlier example of taking what

1 Harman (1977) also refers to a distinction introduced by W.D. Ross (1930) between a prima-facie "ought" and an "all-things ought" (p. 119) in which the former refers to a basic sense of "ought" and the later is a derivative of it.
was ordered suggested. Each suggests some constraint on the freedom of the individual to do, be or have anything at all. As will be shown, each provides a way for an individual(s) to appear as a good person.

The notion of what constitutes a "good person" is generally not expressed overtly by talkers. "Good" as used here is opposed to "non-good" rather than "bad" or "evil." What is "good" can be established in some instances if a comparative form has been used. By introducing another state (a "lower markup", ("New Labor"[075]) in order to explain the situation of working regularly, the talker also may provide an evaluation of the original state (getting a markup for occasional work).

The moral matters focused on here involve generally the notion of the good person. For instance the need to display the self as a good person will be related to the

1 "Ought" is sometimes realized by the use of other modals. The discussion of modals (as one of eight indicators of moral response later in this chapter) shows similar complexity and likelihood of ambiguity in the schemes linguists propose for the interpretation of modals and modal-like verbs.

2 The argument of Ayer (1967) that "good" in itself is "symbolically blank" seems reasonable, if it is kept in mind that "good tends to evoke "similar attitudes in other persons":

The addition of 'is red' to 'this' does symbolize an extension of our reference, namely to some other red thing. But 'is good' has no comparable symbolic function; it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to this, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another. (p. 125)

Such a formulation is consistent with the earlier view of Ogden and Richard (1923) and Stevenson (1944) who also saw "good" as mainly an emotive, rather than a referential term or Moore (1903, 1971) who left it undefined. (cf. page 27).
display of commitment to the Co-op (cf. Chapter 7 and 8). Both overconformity and underconformity to cooperative work will be shown to be related to how people are seen as qualifying as good people (cf. Chapter 5 and 6).

The Notion of the Moral Premise. By "moral premise" I mean a statement which sets out an expected relationship between persons and some activity, classification, or attribution assigned to those persons. That is, through some language device obligation is imposed upon a predication involving some evaluations of persons by a talker. The moral premise links obligation and evaluation to people seen in collections of people:

X as a good individual(s) in C ought to Y,

where X is an individual(s), C is a collection of people and Y is a predicate. "Ought" is used as a paradigmatic link of X and Y, and "good" refers to some evaluation of a person along a good/bad continuum. The predicate Y occurs as one of three forms, "does an activity," "is classified," or "has an attribute" (e.g., "works at the Co-op," "is a guy," or "has a gun"). Specification of three predicates insures that the analysis will extend beyond the usual category of

1 The notion of a moral premise is used extensively throughout the following four chapters. 107 were written and appear in the next four chapters. They are summarized in Chapter 9. The notion of moral premises was related to cooperation on 1-31 and commitment, 1-40.

2 Hare (1952) argues for "universal ought principles" (p. 19) as underlying human activity. Others prefer "moral propositions" or "moral predicates," either of which, if they can occur in particular instances, would be similar to what is here meant by a moral premise.
activities to include all possible predicates.

The moral premise resembles a logical proposition which links subject and predicate. However, instead of a copula (a form of "to be") "ought" is used to show that the relationship of interest is one of obligation rather than existence.

The word "premise" can be understood in two senses of its basic meaning. A moral premise is the major premise of a syllogism that assigns evaluation and obligation to an individual: X as a good person in C ought to Y; X does not do something; therefore X is not a good person. The other sense of the moral premise is a proposition that lies behind what is said, what people can understand from utterances that more or less show this. I shall not be concerned with the judgments people make from these premises, but rather with what they display of their understandings and interpretations of these moral matters.

The notion of a moral premise is broader than that of a norm and that which is conventionally considered as expected behavior resulting from conformity to rules and regulations. The expectations are extended to include notions of what "is" and what properties are actually present. The individual is then seen as obligated to be in one or another of a variety of states, and to have a range of characteristics possible, only some of which interactants may choose to view as a basis for evaluating the individual as a good person within that collection of people.
Moral premises are the underlying definitions of relationships amongst people. In order to examine moral matters it will be useful to locate the succession of moral premises which occur as talk progresses, below (and sometimes rising to) the surface of talk. The moral premises are a means of formulating the underlying notions of what constitute good people for the collections of people being presented in talk.

As will be seen, moral premises may be nested, in that the analyst may include more specific ones within more general ones. Thus the collection of good sellers or good coordinators is included within the collection of good working members. Details of what the good person ought to do, be or have for some collection of people can appear in varying degrees of generality, depending on the scope of the collection of people.

The central assumptions implicit in moral premises are that (1) being a good person as defined in moral premises is a desirable state, or at least preferable to some other state, and (2) people have some idea of what constitutes a good person for a given collection of people. Moral premises thus rely doubly on the notion of a good person.

Throughout this work I shall be writing many particular moral premises which appear in talk.

Stating The Moral Premise

The next problem to be considered is how to translate a
surface indication of moral into a formal statement of a moral premise in the form arrived at on the preceding pages. The procedure for stating the moral premise consists of finding evidence in the talk of each of the parts of the underlying moral premise, and then of placing them in that form.

The purpose of stating moral premises is to reveal the underlying formulations which illuminate speaker/hearer concerns with moral matters in a way to minimize the number of inferences that must be made. The moral premises are accordingly written to retain the wording of the surface text as closely as possible.

Some semantic analysis of the words of the text may be required to write moral premises, especially where colloquial phrases need to be translated into more standard form. A syntactic analysis may be used to rewrite a passive so that individual(s) become the subject. None of the inferences at this level is context-free, and it is generally possible to find alternative interpretations of the same words in other contexts. A minimal amount of abstraction from the context will allow sets of moral premises to be compared to investigate their consistencies or conflicts.

It will appear frequently that moral responses will not contain an explicit representation of each of the elements in the moral premise. Earlier text may supply what is not expressed explicitly. However, there are cases, as will be seen, where the text does not, and it may be necessary to refer to participant observations results which are found
in Chapter 2. The critical issue in stating the moral premise is the interpretation by the analyst of the moral response and the preceding text in a responsible manner.

The starting point in formulating moral premises is a collection of people. As Chapter 3 showed, the number of collections of people which are presented in talk far exceeds those from which moral matters are explicitly realized in the talk. In the analysis I shall not attempt to deal with purely internal associations that individuals present may have had as a result of their personal histories. I shall deal only with what became interactionally available to the participants, in the sense that it was realized in the talk. The aim of the analysis is to move from the surface representation to the underlying moral premise in a systematic way.

The following four elements appear in each moral premise:

1. **Collections of people** A moral premise requires a collection of people. The problem is to specify the collection in which the individual(s) are being seen as representatives of good or bad people. The principles for writing collections of people from Chapter 3 can then be used here.

2. **Location of individual(s)** A moral premise requires as subject, some individual or individuals. In most instances the moral response contains a subject, but in some cases an expansion of the syntax is used to locate one. In some instances a subcollection or collection of people serves as subject.
3. **Polarity of evaluation** A moral premise requires an evaluation of the individual negatively or positively. In a few instances, polarity is shown with overt markers, such as "good" or "bad." In some instances evaluations are determined from characterization of people as less than whole, as deficient. In some instances, a comparative statement gives evidence of a lesser state.

4. **State of obligational predication.** A moral premise requires a predicate which is considered obligatory, as prescription or proscription. Where the text does not make this explicit, other material may need to be consulted. The tense or aspect of the verb is lost in substituting an "ought" linkage. All three forms of linkage appear (do, is, have) although the supporting verb may not be syntactically required.

These four elements yield an expanded version of the moral premise, which can be written as follows:

\[
X\text{ who is (not) a good individual(s) in } C\text{ ought (not) to do, be, or have } Y.
\]

The two poles of evaluation might have been shown as good/bad, but the optional "not" notation is used since it avoids a secondary focus on bad or evil and the complications resulting from connotations associated with those terms. The optional "not" in the predicate is quite independent, and simply permits constraints as well as positive predications. The three forms of the predicate \( Y \) (do, be or have) were discussed above.
The process of writing moral premises will be illustrated with six excerpts from the opening lines of "New Labor" (shown in Figure 4.1).\(^1\) The contents of Figure 4.1 seems quite ordinary as the meeting people talk of the motion they will discuss. In the next chapter it will appear that these ordinary moves are in fact the beginning of a process that radically altered the cooperative structure of the Co-op.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Response</th>
<th>*(individual(s))</th>
<th><em>(collection)</em></th>
<th><em>(predicate)</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Can we get a sense of the meeting...</td>
<td>we</td>
<td>meeting p.</td>
<td>get a sense of the meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. It's a two-part proposal...we would have two levels of markup...</td>
<td>we</td>
<td>organization p.</td>
<td>have two levels of markup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. It is proposed that working members are to members have a regular job or commitment to the Co-op</td>
<td>working</td>
<td>organization p.</td>
<td>have a regular job or commitment Co-op</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Does everyone understand everything?</td>
<td>everyone</td>
<td>meeting p.</td>
<td>do understand every-thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. The other possibility working is a working member in default.</td>
<td>working</td>
<td>members</td>
<td>do (not) be in default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Another motion might be made about it... you, some-body</td>
<td>[I, we, you, some-body]</td>
<td>meeting p.</td>
<td>do make another motion about it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the items except D and E contain terms from the recognized vocabulary on what ought to be done at a meeting.

---

1 Later discussion (page 261) will show that each of the excerpts is a moral response, that is, an utterance with a surface indication of moral matters. However, at this point their determination as moral responses is not relevant to the problems of stating moral premises, and so is postponed.
Figure 4.1 Moral Response In Opening Lines Of "New Labor" Segment.

Amy: Can we get a sense of the meeting now on just this as a general proposal?
Joel: Yeah, it's a two part proposal, and there, it's again that we would have two levels of markup, one for working members and one for nonworking members. Ok, vote on that by a show of hands and aye.

Amy: Let's take that much.
Joel: hands and aye.

Amy: show of hands, in favor, and opposed, one abstention? [Laughs] and second part.

Joel: Um again, rather simple, um, it is proposed, it is proposed that working members are to have a regular job or commitment to the Co-op.

Sheldon: That's rather ambiguous.

Jim C.: As opposed to signing up every month on an ad hoc basis for vacant positions.

Joel: Right.
Amy: Does everyone understand everything.

Mickey: Yeah, I can understand that.

Ronnie: It's a discussion point.

Glen: Maybe we should word it a little more clearly.

Ronnie: Are working members only going to be considered people who work during the hours the Co-op is open, and, you know, like I think we're going to have to define it a little, a working members more closely. [Loud footsteps; coughs]

Martin: Why is it a problem, I mean, what possible ambiguities can you run into?

Ronnie: Well, let's say somebody can't work during the Co-op hours, but volunteer to do the labor coordinating.

Martin: That's working.

Jack: [Several start up] What about the further possibility is a working member in default, how long, I think maybe it's not part of this motion, but another motion might be made about it saying something about problems of default, spelling out how long we can go with a default before we say "You can't work," or are a hard ma-ma.

(Moral responses used in the text are underlined.)
B and C are in fact part of the wording of two proposals that are considered at the meeting. D lacks any reference to the meeting and is a more general question showing moral matters concerning what people are expected to know and understand.

In A, B, C, and D, the subject of the moral premise X is the subject of the sentence. In E it is the predicate noun that serves the subject of the moral premise. In F the surface form has no personal agent, and so a conventional syntactic change from passive to active form locates X.

"I, we, you, somebody" are all possible realizations of this unexpressed agent. Where the subject of the utterance is a specific individual (referred to by pronoun or proper name) then the most immediate subcollection of people in which the individual can be placed can be used as subject of the moral premise.

"Meeting-people" is the collection of people listed for A and F, since that is the co-present on-going collection of people to whom "we" is referring. In D "everyone" is expanded to "everyone in the room", i.e., the meeting-people. So too for F, where doing a motion requires meeting-people. In A, it is the meeting-people who go about getting a "sense of the meeting." In the case of B, although the meeting-people are creating the proposal and eventually would be called on to pass it, it is not the meeting-people who would have two levels of markup, but rather the Co-op organization-people. One of the functions of the meeting-
people is to create new policies for the Co-op organization, and this is a case in point. In C, working members are located within organization-people, and in E the singular working member appears in a collection of working members.

The predications Y need only minimal adjustment to the format of the moral premise. In E, the negative obligational predication comes from the sense of "default." In the case of F, the predicate is the active rather than the passive form of the utterance in order to show some agent as subject. In D as the auxiliaries are stripped, tense is lost. Where the predicate is idiomatic or colloquial, some editing may be needed to get a standard English form which captures the sense of that particular application. Similarly, terms in the predicate such as "here" or "now" or other indications of the specifics may require translation into a more context-free form which retains the sense of the original but not the particularity.

The formula for the moral premise supplies "ought" and the person is located as a "good individual(s)" within a collection of people. The phrase "is a good individual(s) in a collection of ____" can be shortened to "as good ____," especially where the subject shows a plurality of individuals, such as "we" or "everyone." The resultant moral premises are as follows:

A. We as good meeting people ought to get a sense of the meeting.

B. We as good Co-op organization people ought to have two levels of markup, one for working members and one for non-working members. (Appears in Chapter 5 as A)
C. Working members as good organization people ought to have a regular job or commitment to the Co-op.  
(Appears in Chapter 5 as B)

D. Everyone as good meeting people ought to understand everything.

E. A working member who is a good person in a collection of working members ought not to be in default.

(F. I, we, you, somebody as good meeting people ought to make another motion about problems of default. 
(Appears in Chapter 5 as C)

In five instances, the surface form has the same polarity as the corresponding moral premise. That is, X is Y appears as X ought Y. In E a "not" has been added, since the surface form reverses the polarity of the corresponding underlying form. Later in the discussion of the dynamic of moral response, this case in which there is a disjunction between surface and underlying forms will be pursued further.

Where the subject is an individual in a whole collection of similarly labelled people, the specification of the individual can be dropped, so that, for instance, E can also be written as E. Good working members ought not to be in default. In F the predication shown earlier was "do make another motion about it," and the "it" has been replaced (as would other particular reference to "here" or "now") by the referent "problems of default." Although the surface text is followed as closely as possible it is freed from what becomes incomprehensible particular reference once the context is no longer present.

The general practice is to state the moral premise as close to the surface text as possible. Problems of finding
collections of people have been treated in Chapter 3. Not all collections of people are equally of interest in the analysis. Several intermediate collections of working and non-working people are emphasized in the discussions of problems of cooperation in Chapters 5 and 6. On the other hand, the location of individuals and subgroups within the collections of starting-up, incident and trouble-making-people are handled in the discussions of problems of commitment in Chapters 7 and 8. Each of these collections of people are used to write many different moral premises for each segment of talk.

Relations Amongst Moral Premises

The list of six moral premises above is typical of lists of moral premises that are used throughout the four following chapters. If such a list of moral premises is to be maximally useful, then means need be found of summarizing, and replacing them by a shorter list. A crucial issue then is to establish what relations there are amongst the moral premises. I had indicated above that moral premises are written to represent moral matters in talk and that they preserve the surface wording of the text as closely as possible. Hence any degree of generality shown by moral premises is initially limited by the form of the talk. Subsequent analysis may increase the generality of moral premises, but not decrease it, as will be shown.

Moral premises can be shown to be related to each other
either in terms of their subject or their predication. The discussion of Chapter 3 which considered ways of classifying collections of people is the means by which relations amongst subjects are shown. Similarities amongst predications are handled first in terms of the three types of linkages illustrated above (do, have, or be) and then with regard to the degree of generality of the predication. Both methods are used throughout the following four chapters, and are summarized further in Chapter 9.

People The subject of a moral premise is uniformly written as an individual(s) in some collection of people. The individual in some instances is represented by a proper name, pronoun or classification terms. In other instances no individual is located and some collection of people is used directly. Or it may be the case that the individual is not of immediate interest to the analysis and so a subcollection of people is used instead.

The last chapter showed that any individual may be located in a variety of collections of people in talk. In writing moral premises, collections of people that are used are those as closely tied to the surface text as possible. The format of "feature plus people" introduced there (p. 139) insures that collections of people have a standard form and can be compared with each other.

Since the focus of this work is on moral matters of the Co-op people, the collection of Co-op people is usually
the most general that is of interest. Co-op people and non-Co-op people is then the most general category set used. Further, as p. 153 suggested, the possibility of locating any collection or subcollection of people as within one or another of these two collections of people also makes available use of the subcollections represented by the three guises of Co-op people: meeting, organization, and produce day-people.

In the six moral premises shown above, the subjects X were listed as: we, working member, everyone, (I), (you), (we), and (somebody). It is only by reference to the collections of people "C" that any relationships amongst the X's can be shown. It is not the case, for instance, that the two instances of "we" apply to the same collection of people: the first is the people who are co-present and the second the organization-people.

In the moral premises written above, the six collections of people are all Co-op-people, as are about 90% of those found in the analyses of the next four chapters. The six collections are distributed in two of the three guises of the Co-op-people:

Co-op people (6) Non-Co-op people (0)

Meeting-people (3)
Organization-people (3)
working-members
non-working members
Produce day-people (0)

The collection of "working members" (appearing in moral premise E) is located here under organization-people since it is a
subcollection of members. The format of the table given above categorizes the collections of people also at the level of Co-op vs non-Co-op people, the most general level of interest in this study.

The nesting illustrated by the above table is based on the relation of "inclusion" explored in the classifications of collections of people in Chapter 3 (p.15). The discussion of the problems of cooperation and commitment in the four succeeding chapters relies particularly on the classification using inclusion and on collections at an intermediate level of generality, such as "working-members" or defaulting-members." The alternative way of classifying, by "overlap" where a common core is preserved and features change in details shown, in particularly suited to show processual change, as in the analysis of category consensus and location of interactional "breaks" in the talk of commitment (cf. the Co-op and neighborhood shown in Chapter 3.)

It is important at this point to distinguish generalizability of collections of people from generalizability of moral premises. Although the possibility exists of locating any collection of people found in the text as either Co-op or non-Co-op people, it is not the case that moral premises written for some intermediate level collection of people are also true for all Co-op people, or even for the Co-op people within one of the three guises. For instance, "E" earlier applies to "working-members" (who ought not to be in default) and does not apply to non-working members who are not expected
to work in the first case. Although the collection of people may be classifiable, predication remains tied to the more specific collection shown in the moral premise.

In the cases where the collections of people shown in the text show a guise of the Co-op, it then becomes possible to consider that a list of such moral premises would constitute a statement of what good Co-op people in that guise ought to do, be, or have. A tentative statement of such a Co-op value system appears in the next chapter, and a fuller discussion appears in Chapter 9.

People who figure as subjects of moral premises are also potentially related to each other in terms of the evaluation shown. Moral premises are generally written using the term "good" or "non-good" although in some cases the surface forms of the terms for people include an evaluation. In the case of "No Parking" "a working member in default" (Chapter 5) appears, and is used by the interactants. Moral premises are written in which such "defaulting people" become the subject of moral premises. In such a case, the following structure is presumed amongst the category set of "organization-people":

"Working-members"    "Non-working-members"
                     Defaulting-members
                     Non-defaulting-members.

Here the notion of "non-defaulting-members" reflects positive polarity, what a good working member ought to be. The argument of "New Labor" is that Co-op people ought to be freed to be good-non-working-members, i.e., people who elect not to work, once the cooperative structure of the Co-op is changed.
The six moral premises found above illustrate the three types of predications which can be linked to people: action, attribution and existence of a state. Two of the six moral premises show activities (ought to do ____).

A. We as good meeting-people ought to get a sense of the meeting.

F. [I, we, you, somebody] as good meeting-people ought to make another motion about problems of default.

Two show an attribute (ought to have ____).

B. We as good Co-op organization-people ought to have two levels of markup, one for working members and one for non-working members.

C. Working members as good organization-people ought to have a regular job or commitment to the Co-op.

Two show a state (ought to be ____).

D. Everyone as good meeting people ought to understand everything.

E. A working member who is a good person in a collection of working members ought not to be in default.

Any list of moral premises can be classified on the basis of the type of linkage, as shown above, although such was not a particularly useful procedure for the problems of cooperation and commitment considered here.

Moral premises can also be classified on the basis of whether the predication is a prohibition or prescription. In the list above, only E (linking working members and default) has a negative state shown for the the obligational predication.

1 "To understand" is assumed to mean to be in a state of understanding, differing from the attribute of being understanding, or the activity of getting an understanding.

2 About a third of the moral premises stated in the four substantive chapters (5-8) appear as prescriptions.
In a few instances negative and positive counterparts appear at the same time, i.e., "ought to" and "ought not to."

For example, divergent viewpoints on whether a particular individual is a good person or not a good person to be a manager interrupt the discussion of projected changes in the Co-op in Chapter 6. However, as a means of analysis of moral premise here, the classification of moral premises on the basis of whether a negation is present or absent is generally a less useful approach than is one directed to similarities.

It is possible to write a series of moral premises which are more or less general than the specifics of the predication shown in the text. Thus, for example, A, "get a sense of the meeting" could appear as A# "get a sense of all meetings" or "get some sense of this meeting." In changing the scope of the predication those of more specific scope are seen as nesting within more general ones. However, such changes are hazardous and can only be made with careful attention to the text. (An # identifies such alternations.)

It is sometimes possible to find moral premises in which specific and general aspects of the same predication are shown. Two which appear in the chapters ahead are related to D above.

D. Everyone as good meeting people ought to understand everything.

7-D. (We as ) good meeting people ought to be knowing about the neighborhood people.

8-B. Good meeting people ought to know about Thorne.
All three moral premises say something of what meeting-people are expected to know and understand. All concern what "insiders" to the collection of meeting-people in the sense developed in Chapter 3 (p.202) ought to know. In these three moral premises the process of having access to information is shown in operation for three of the four segments.

It is also the case that moral premises with similar predications appear within the discussion within a chapter. For instance in talking of changes in the cooperative structure of the Co-op, a recurrent phrase is "deal with" appearing in five moral premises (Ch.6). In this instance it is a change in the subject of the moral premise that finally locates management people as those who "deal with" problems, and it is the basis by which a contemplated change in the cooperative structure of the Co-op is accomplished.

Similarly, in the establishment of commitment to the Co-op, a series of predications about "opening up" appear (Chapter 7) in 12 moral premises, instrumental in establishing the people who will do the opening up. Moral premises which have such similar predications are labelled with the same initial letter (within a chapter) to call attention to the fact that within that discussion other moral premises have similar and probably relevant predications. About a fifth of the moral premises in the four substantive chapters are so designated.

It also happens that moral premises may have apparently unrelated wording, but that the predications are focused on one particular issue. For example, moral premises concerning
black/white issues are considered together (Ch. 8) a step used to see what inconsistencies are presented in what is said on that issue and what consistencies are present in how they are said.

Moral premises are stated throughout the next chapters to show the moral matters which appear to be entering into the interaction. Some concern the basic tenets of the Co-op; others more ephemeral concerns. But the moral premises in themselves often lack information which the existential level presents. In some instances the surface representation may have been hypothetical, or in fact the empirical circumstances might be such that moral premises contradict the surface form, as when people want or expect things to be other than what they are. A discussion of the relation of the surface form to the moral premises will illustrate some of these considerations and others. But before discussing the dynamic of moral response which involves both surface and underlying representations, I shall focus fully on the surface and the overt indications of moral matters in talk.

The Language Of Moral Response

My concern for moral matters as they are interactionally used in talk is served by the introduction of a general term, "moral response" emphasizing that the recognition of reference to moral matters is dependent on the preceding interactional material and on the initiative of the talkers.

By moral response I mean an utterance, or a part of an
utterance, that provides a surface indication that moral matters are present. Such a response is an interactive product of collective belief, as are rumors. Moral response shares with rumors the properties that they are products of the situation, are spontaneously produced, are likely to be accompanied by emotion, and serve to define and characterize (and in doing so, often evaluate) situations and people.

The notion of "moral language" has been limited by philosophers to prescriptive or evaluative judgments for the most part. The scope of moral response is also considerably broader than the recent emphasis in linguistic analysis of discourse on speech actions in which activities are shown as modified, manipulated or prohibited through language. I am

1 Shibutani's (1969) treatment of rumor as "improvised news" is in the spirit of the conceptualization presented here.

2 For instance, Hare (1952) reserves the term "moral language" for a type of prescriptive language, in which words like "ought," "right," and "good" are "moral judgments" (p. 3) as opposed to other instances in which they appear as "non-moral value judgment." In addition, Hare excludes "imperatives" from "moral language" as they are lacking in value judgments.

3 Linguists have given some consideration to a range of ways in which activities can be modified or prohibited. Much of what linguist Green (1975) has termed an "impositive" are speech acts "by which the speaker's desire or opinion is imposed on the addressee as an order, demand, request, plea, warning, or suggestion." (p. 125) There has been considerable discussion of such terms on the basis of intuitive reflections on the use of sentences which contain such items.

A parallel approach to the ways of verbally altering activity is that of linguist Ervin-Tripp (1976) who distinguishes six types of "directives": need statements, imperatives, imbedded imperatives, permission directives, question directives, and hints. For the most part, Ervin-Tripp suggests that simple interpretive rules operate with such activity, although noting that "for such a process to flow smoothly participants must share norms." (p. 63)

Another approach in this area is that of sociologist Grimshaw (unpub.) who is examining a set of verbs used for
equally concerned about the question of what constitutes the notion of a good person for the talk, and how this is shown. Included, therefore, are concerns with what people ought to be, or ought to have as well as what activities or behaviors are relevant. And further still, the focus here is on people as within collections of people, a focus not shown in more linguistic (or philosophical) enterprises.

Moral responses assume a variety of forms which include prohibitions to actions, statements of evaluation, instancing of self-satisfaction, representation of indignation, and the definition of what is being said as wrong. Some are easily recognized, as in the following example:

Extract 4-1

Jim S.:...and twice in a row they're not there that they're supposed to be there they don't show up, well I would say then, don't let them get away with it...[with affect]

"New Labor" 052-055

The talker in Extract 4-1 is objecting to the behavior of other people who don't show up when they have promised to be there in order to work.

As a participant observer my immediate reaction is that Extract 4-1 is an indignant response. I would not expect much problem in a reader agreeing that it is an instance of a moral response. As early as the 1959 edition of Webster's New International Dictionary (W-2), the moral force of "get away with" is specified in the definition "to accomplish (as some-

manipulation, instrumentals, to map "syntactic, illocutionary and sociological constraints which operate on lexical inser-
tion" (p. 3) into a frame work which relates two individuals and some activity.
thing reprehensible) without penalty."

However, there are two questions which are methodologically relevant: One, what are the concrete indicators in Extract 4-1 which locate it as a moral response? Two, what are the features by which other utterances can be located as instances of moral response? Any method that succeeds in locating moral matters in talk will ultimately rest on satisfactory answers to these questions.

Indicators of Moral Response

There are eight indicators which I have so far found to indicate that a moral response is present. These indicators tend to cluster. They represent both cognitive and affective levels and include both linguistic and para-linguistic materials. The first three are recognized signals of moral matters on which one might agree without much argument. The next four are a set of indicators that might at first not appear to signal moral response. Often they appear to do no more than embroider the text, until closer analysis is done. The concept of "depersonalization" will emerge as one characteristic of moral premises which may contribute as much as any other to the problem which was first confronted—that people appear to discuss moral matters without talking about morality. The last indicator points to a generally unstated purpose or goal which is shown to be needed or desired, or conversely a state to be shunned. The indicators are as follows:
The basis for each indicator is summarized below. These indicators will be used extensively to locate moral matters in the analyses of the next four chapters.

1. **Verbs of obligation**  
The use of modal verbs such as "ought" or "should" invokes an obligation of people to have certain properties, do certain actions, or be in certain states. This is perhaps the most explicit form of moral statement and the first search for moral matters in Chapter 1 was directed toward such expressions. The usual set of modal verbs includes "must," "ought," "should," "will," "shall," "would," "may," "can," "might," and "could." In addition to the modal other verbal linkages share some of the semantic properties of the modals, but are not usually grouped with them because they have different syntactic properties. Such "quasi-modals" (Bloomfield, 1933) include "let" (in the sense of permission) and "got to" or "have to" (where a degree of compulsion is indicated). There is a further set of obligatory terms which show constraint or necessity, such as "allow," "supposed to," "are to have," "expected to," and "permit."¹

¹ Joos (1964) in "The English Verb" distinguishes three kinds of meaning among the English modals. Each of the 8 modals he considers is either "adequate" or "contingent," each either "assures" the event or specifies it is "potential." Each
The arrangement of modals given above, beginning with "must" and ending with "could" reflects decreasing intensity from complete necessity to barely existent intensity, using a "root sense" rather than an "epistemic sense." In the epistemic sense the modals indicate the degree of certainty accorded to the predication, whereas in the root sense there modal is causal (will, shall, can and may fall in this category) or stable (must, ought to, dare, and need are included in this category). The stable modals are linked by Joos (p. 150) to "the community mores" and considered as operating where morality is shown.

1 Similar scales appear in the linguistic literature, such as the "Scale of Likelihood" presented by Diver (1964) in which five members of the Modal System are shown in decreasing order of "representing an event as hypothetically rather than actually taking place" (p. 330)

   do (certain)
   must (very likely)
   should (more than likely)
   may (less than likely)
   can (possibly)

"Do" is considered by Diver as a "quasi-indicative" (p. 331) as he notes "'do' stands closest to the Indicative, the latter indicates an unquestioned certainty, 'do' a questioned certainty." In the schema used in this work, "do" along with "be" and "have" indicate an existential predication rather than a modal.

2 The notions of "root" and "epistemic" appear in Jenkins (1972) who attributes it to R. Hofmann. The two semantic classes can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root</th>
<th>Epistemic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>may (permission)</td>
<td>may (possibility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>must (necessity)</td>
<td>must (logical entailment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>will (volition)</td>
<td>will (future prediction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can (ability and permission)</td>
<td>can (possibility)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ney (1978) replaces "logical entailment" by "hypothesis" and finds counter-examples which collapse the above root-epistemic distinction for "must" (and "should") especially with the negative (prohibition) and certain tenses.
is an element of control or permission. A particular surface form may be ambiguous between the two senses, as in the following:

Extract 4-2

Amy: Can* we get a sense of the meeting? ["New Labor 001]

Epistemic - Is it possible to get a sense of the meeting?
Root - Are we allowed to get a sense of the meeting?

The root senses provide access to systems of controls, permission and constraints on the people present. In this way, the root sense conveys obligation directly. On the other hand, the epistemic sense, in introducing an alternative possible state, introduces a basis of evaluation. Therefore modals that appear in their root sense, qualify automatically as features of a moral response, but only those instances of epistemic modals which appear along with another indicator of moral response are so labelled. A possibility of ambiguity in interpretation of modals is relevant to the theoretical model of the relation of "ought" and "is" presented in the next section of this chapter.

1 Asterisk superscripts will be used in the examples (Extract 4-2 to Extract 4-26) to locate the indicators of moral response under discussion in that section.

2 The linguist R. Lakoff (1972) has emphasized in a study of modality the people implicit within an obligatory relationship, making a distinction between an imposer of an obligation and the bearer of it. Fillmore (1973) has demonstrated the need to consult social context, including speaker/hearer relationship as well as paradigmatic conditions in order to interpret the phrase "May we come in?"
There are commands in which the modal is omitted. In the following, an obligational term is omitted in the phrase "BUY 'EM!":

Extract 4-3

Ben: ... we didn't buy them [onion] for two weeks, and all of a sudden people said, 'BUY'EM!' [Shouted], 'cause our people are buying them in supermarkets anyway, you know. and 'You can't* live without onions'... [much stress] [Meeting of 4/23/73 p.3]

In this instance there is an imperative which is a demand, as well as an epistemic sense of "can" accompanying it.

The interpretation of commands as implying "should" is supported also by those developing Searle's theory of the "illocutionary force" of speech acts. (1973) The linguists Boyd and Thorne (1969) propose that "he should go" be interpreted as a demand, and suggest the problem confronting moral philosophers is:

that of deciding the conditions under which sentences containing should (or its alternative surface structure form ought to) are to be taken as moral injunctions...

(p. 66)

As Boyd and Thorne note, though all imperatives may contain an

1 Recent generative analysis (G. Lakoff, 1973) sees an elliptical "will you" as part of an underlying modal linkage, citing evidence from the tag question, e.g., "Buy 'em, won't you?"

2 Boyd and Thorne (among others) have been concerned with applying Searle's notion of a "speech act" to the use of modals in talk in order to explain e.g., that an individual's promise to pay is understood as an obligation to pay. This goes back to an earlier formulation of Austin (1965) of "illocutionary acts" which occur when something is said such as ordering, warning, undertaking, etc., utterances which have a certain (conventional) force." (p. 108) Fraser (1975) also links modals to speech acts, considering the way modals affect a set of performative verbs to be illocutionary, which he terms as "hedged performatives." Fraser introduces a notion of
Implicit "should," not all uses of "should" can be interpreted as demands. For example, the following may best be seen as a criticism of the behavior of an individual who has fought with the Co-op people, rather than a demand that he stop doing so.

Extract 4-4

Gertrude: Well, I know that big guy that lives upstairs, he should know better than that.

Ben: He's the guy that called him off.

Gertrude: better than that. [Fast]

"No Parking" 099-105]

The last line criticizes the behavior of the individual who had fought with the Co-op people. The tendency for this talker to express concern for other peoples' activities may be captured by the label "moral minder", a person occupied with trying to arrange the world the way the talker thinks it "ought to be." (cf.205, where this notion is introduced and where this example is discussed further.).

2. Evaluative qualifiers People are sometimes evaluated in talk as "good") or "evil," as "right" or "wrong," both by

"obligation fulfillment" as a general principle of rational behavior, but does not distinguish to whom obligations are owed, nor the extent to which this principle applies across a whole set of "hedges."

1 C. Wright Mills (1940b)locates the labelling of acts and programs as "good" and "bad," imputing "these qualities to the soul" (p. 913) by religious institutions as part of the process of social control. More generally Mills notes that "adjectives such as 'good,' 'pleasant' and 'bad' promote action or deter it. When they constitute components of a vocabulary of motives, i.e., are typical and relatively unquestioned accompaniments of typal situations, such words often function as directives and incentives by virtue of their being the judgment of others as anticipated by the actor." (p. 908) Here I focus on their place as providing evaluations.
using these terms themselves, or by providing evidence of their being in situations where they were rewarded, sanctioned, or where values were expressed.\(^1\)

Extract 4-5

Sheldon: ...you're losing a working member, when you're, maybe that person would be a good working member, you know... ["New Labor" 159-160]

Some people there are shown as defaulting. Extract 4-5 contains the word "good," one of the few instances of such a direct evaluation in the segments.

There are no instances in the Co-op materials where someone explains that a defective state is bad or evil. These values are assumed to be generally accepted. Where classifications used by Co-op people are not made explicit, any analytical statements that I make shall be based on the ethnographic data presented in Chapter 2.

In some instances there is indirect evidence of evaluation carried out in comparisons that presume an alternative state which is presupposed to be preferable. Typically the alternative state is unstated.

Extract 4-6

Glen: Maybe we should word it a little more clearly. ["New Labor" 024-025]

The analysis of this utterance depends upon the recognition

\(^1\) In this connection see Grafton (1947) who attempted to develop a sociology of right and wrong by consulting the "meanings of right and wrong as they occur in ordinary speech." (p. 87) However, his study of ordinary speech consisted entirely of consulting dictionary entries.
that clearer wording is seen to be preferable to the current wording (called "ambiguous" in an earlier utterance [015]), and that as good persons within the collection of meeting-people, they are expected to produce clear wording. However, not all uses of comparatives are necessarily indicators of moral response.

Extract 4-7

Sybil: Well, I was down there one night, and a bunch of little kids down there, it was last year, I don't know who was working, it was an older woman who was working, and Laura was there...

[Meeting of 2/19/73, page 7]

The phrase "older woman" in extract 4-7 is in this instance descriptive not evaluative, except perhaps for those who (for some reason unconnected with this situation) are particularly sensitive to the evaluative aspects of the label "an older woman."

3. Traditional vocabulary for moral matters Spoken interaction shows a number of terms and phrases which are part of the traditional vocabulary of morality, such as "commitment," "obligation" or "responsible":

Extract 4-8

Jim: I don't think he'd have to be responsible for every man on every crew on every hour, but I do think he'd have to make sure that, ah, that he knew who was showing up.

["Paid Manager" 140-143]

Such traditional terms have the effect of shaping behavior indicating obligations, restrictions or controls on that behavior. Norms and values can appear explicitly in the imple-
mentation of the formal and informal rules governing the meeting, or the things that meeting-people do, such as "vote" or "propose." These terms, when used as part of actions, cluster about sets of rights and responsibilities, as well as sanctions.

In addition to such formal traditional terms, a number of colloquial or slang phrases are generally recognized as containing moral implication, e.g., "bull shit" or "screw somebody" (in non-sexual uses) or "deal with" or "hassle."

Extract 4-9

Ben: ...not only that he had a gun, but just sort of like that here was something we would have to deal (Glen: Like ah--
Ben: with* on an on-going basis, you know...

"No Parking" 031-035]

Proverbial expressions are a more indirect way of evoking moral matters. In talk they are often referred to by a few words.

Extract 4-10

Fred: ...you could always find someone, robbing Peter* who got there at 4 o'clock and could stay, you know, and work...

"Starting Up" 077-080]

The oblique reference to the proverbial expression "robbing Peter to pay Paul" assumes a prominent position in the analysis of the ways in which commitment is shown in Chapter 7.

4. Questionable classification Inappropriate or problematic classification of individuals in talk often points
Peer terms and other classifiers, sets of common nouns that designate an indefinite set of unnamed people may be used. They do not uniquely distinguish individuals. In Chapter 3 (p.195) I argued that obligations and evaluations are attached to an individual within some collection of people. Peer terms (introduced in Chapter 3, p. 221 re social location, cf. T. Labov, 1973) are a usual means by which people are characterized, often appearing in the singular, as in Extract 4-4, "the guy, the big guy." The problem of classifiers arises with their application. In Chapter 1, Klapp's use of "social types" (1962) was mentioned as a means of recognizing popular labels for heroes, villains and fools. (cf. p.52) I shall argue that moral matters are interactionally realized by their inappropriate application, in addition to that which appears with any use.

Extract 4-11

Amy: ... the guy's name is John, he's a really nice kid, he used to be around all the time.

Mickey: That was the boy's* name, John, I think, yeah, that was his name, John.

[Meeting 2/19/73 p. 5]
used for the same individual. "Kid" is informal and inappropriate for legal decisions. "Boy" is inappropriate for older youth, especially where the youth is black. In the text following Extract 4-11, the first talker continues to use "kid" and the second to use "boy" as they compare incidents involving the youth. Peer terms when appropriately applied instance a way of getting moral matters into talk. Their misuses (especially where presumed to be deliberate) show what is preferable, i.e, what ought to be (for some individual).

I am not contending that only one appropriate use of peer terms exists, or that inappropriateness is categorical. But in the context of the Co-op and the people who came to meetings, there appears to be a consensus on appropriateness and inappropriateness which is reflected in usage. Consider the phrase "this guy" which appears throughout "No Parking," and twice in the following extract.

Extract 4-12

Ben: It's this guy* across the street named Jason Thorne who lives over at 33 what? Thorne, 33
Mickey: Jason Thorne
Ben: What? Sheldon? 3303, apparently, well, how
Sheldon: 3303
Ben: much was said last week about this guy?*

Extract 4-12 begins as an answer to the question "who was it?" First the individual is referred to by "this guy" and then his proper name is given. The full name is repeated by one of the Co-op people, and then the last name is repeated by the talker. How is the individual next referred to? Not by name or pronoun, but by what would seem to be, given these options, less appropriate--"this guy." (Other aspects of the
nine usages of "guy" in "No Parking" are found in Chapter 9,

The appropriateness of a self-classification is called into question by the talker in the following:

Extract 4-13

Caren:... he's crazy, and it has nothing to do with his being black... ["No Parking"148-150]

I would argue that moral matters are indicated by the making of both these classifications and especially by the denial that "black" is appropriate, which the talker declares in a categorical way is a misclassification.

A similar logic would seem to apply in the case of name calling, scolding, blaming, cursing, or in anyway putting someone in a collection, which is not, by some standard or another appropriate. There is a sense in which by labelling the person he or she is being shown as belonging in a collection of people, whether that is the case or not. To say that someone is a child is to say that they ought to be considered a child (in one way or another).

There are certain categories which are in general not considered "good" for all individuals. Some are derogatory terms for racial, religious or ethnic groups. Some are deficiencies from a full or complete state. "Child" or "childish" is used in this way, where an adult is the preferred

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1 Palmore (1962) finds a close association between the amount of prejudice against an outgroup and the number of derogatory nicknames used. He adopts the term "ethnophaulism" for such terms, following an earlier usage he cites of Roback.
status for a person who is not a child in age; "crazy" is the deficient state where sane is expected of people outside of institutions; and "stupid" where "smart" is valued.

Excerpt 4-14

Gertrude: Well, if he's gonna go to the court, ah, he's not going to be, ah, stupid I hope and not---

Sheldon: OK, I'd like to say...

["No Parking" 124-127]

In all six instances of questionable classification appear in that segment, all directed to the same individual.

5. Depersonalized others In some uses of animate pronouns, no individual is specifically included. This is depersonalizing since a whole collection of people is referred to, not as individuals, but as a category, by a pronoun or mass noun like "people." Implicit thereby are the properties of the whole collection referred to, including the sets of obligations and evaluations, i.e., the moral matters. These collections of people tend to be sub-collections of Co-op people. "They" and "these people" illustrate:

Extract 4-15

Caren:...where are the people that are going to do all that? [Voice rises]

Fred: Well, I think that they are there, they're just not here.

["Starting Up" 208-211]

In this use of "they" there is no effort to specify or personalize the "people" of the preceding utterance. "People" is itself depersonal referring generally to those "that are going to do all that." However, not every use of such a general "they" is included here. "They" is used in colloquial
language as a general impersonal pronoun equivalent to a passive without an agent expressed, so that "they say" is equivalent to "it is said." Like other expressions that do not refer to a particular collection, these are excluded from consideration as depersonalized others.

I am using the term "depersonalized" to indicate a partial generalization as opposed to the completely general "impersonal" pronouns. The depersonalized terms select a category that goes beyond the individual, but impose some limits on the extent of the generalization. Depersonalized terms retain the sense that individuals are implicated, but lack enough information to make it possible to single out specific individuals. Depersonalized individuals appear as "remote" rather than "near" collections of people with reference to the notion of "social distancing" as developed in Chapter 3 (p. 224) as an aspect of the problems of constructing others in talk. They tend to be subcollections of Co-op people.

In some instances depersonalized others may be actually represented with a singular term:

Extract 4-16

Glen: ... if he* has made an effort and then he* has called the labor coordinator...

"New Labor" 058-060

The preceding talker had referred to those who did not show up to work as "they" several times, and then said, "Don't let them* get away with it." In Extract 4-16, "he" is used for this same collection of people.

Similarly, "someone" or "somebody" can appear as
Depersonalized.

Extract 4-17

Jim: ... also, that's the point where we'll sort of need someone to, to help us get started up as a Co-op...

["Paid Manager" 049-051]

Keeping the position of manager depersonal is an important aspect of the argument by which the cooperative structure of the Co-op is altered and a manager hired.

6. Depersonalized affect The notion of "depersonalized" also captures the type of feeling which appears to be displayed often in talk of moral matters. Such affect\(^1\) appears to be generalized and depersonal in that it is not directed at any immediate or unique property of the individual. Such affect is displayed in terms of the individual acting in a manner typical or stereotypical of some collection of people—one which is "remote" and depersonal rather than "near" and personal.

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\(^1\) Another approach to the display of affect is an emotion-management perspective proposed by Hochschild (1979) by which "conventions of feeling (i.e., what one is supposed to feel)" (p. 572) are posited as factors in social exchange. One question within such a framework then is how various categories and groups of people differ in "the sense of what one 'ought to' or 'has the right to' feel in a situation." (p. 573) "Feeling rules" ("guidelines for the assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation" (p. 466) are introduced by Hochschild. On the other hand Heise (1979) confined his analysis of affect to its appearance in social relationships with regard to event construction. Both of these analyses go well beyond the concerns here, for they include a much broader range of feelings than those of interest in this work. Further both appear to accept affect as genuine. My assumption is that people often display affect (which they may or may not feel) in depersonal situations, by which they show that the situation is one involving moral matters.
At first, it might seem that emotions are stronger when they are directed at a particular person, reflected in the term "getting personal." But one impression that emerges from this analysis is that the affect becomes stronger as it is expressed in less personal terms, that is, particular judgments are replaced by categorical ones.

In the Co-op materials there is ample evidence of emotional concern shown by changes in stress, tempo and dynamics. Tempo changes can be shown by speaking faster or slower or also by including seemingly extraneous laughter, repetitions, and revisions in phrases. Such emotional concern appears to be oriented to people for the characteristics shared by people in a collection, rather than directed to an individual for some unique combination of personal characteristics.

Extract 4-18

Caren: .. if you* could find, like if you* would be willing to say that you would be there every* week ...  

["Starting Up" 250-252]

The asterisks in Extract 4-18 call attention to the words which were stressed (you, you, every) and spoken louder, and the place at which the tempo was altered ("if" begins a repetition and revision of the prior incompletely "if" clause). In Extract 4-18 "you" is an individual, any individual in a collection of people who could possibly be involved in opening the Co-op. The talker is attempting to get a commitment from people who are co-present—the syntax and surrounding text do not make it clear if the "you" is directed to one or more
people. In fact, two of those co-present do commit themselves in the next two utterances.

Places where the tempo is altered by repetitions of phrases (as opposed to stuttering over parts of words) may appear to lack change in stress or dynamics.

Extract 4-19

Glen: ... or somebody who has a connection to uh,* some sort of ah, *I don't know, maybe there's a, is there a black Co-op around town somewhere? ["No Parking" 139-143]

In Extract 4-19 the talker revises and repairs several times, as shown by the asterisks above. The lines, however, contain several other indicators of moral response ("somebody," depersonalized other; "some sort of" to be discussed as intensifier next). The point is that individuals show affect in different ways, and those who know the talker's style may recognize affect where others not as familiar with the other's style do not. It was characteristic of this talker not to vary his style from an unstressed and regular even style, but to produce changes in tempo through such revisions, rather than through talking faster or slower. Since the basic style of speakers may be more agitated or more forceful than others, I shall be relying on changes in more than one of the dimensions (stress, tempo or volume) or changes in one plus some other indication of moral response.¹

Another curious fact about the use of depersonalized

¹ The analysis continues to be concerned with display, and what is available for interpretation, rather than what an utterance meant to an individual who spoke it.
affect or terms, is that they frequently include or are
directed at people who are present, and it is reasonable to
ask if it might have been more forceful to address those
present directly. Yet it seems as if a combination of inhibi-
tion against personal response and the categorical tendency of
moral matters yields these displays of affect coupled with
the efflorescence of "somebody" or "you" (used generally).

In some instances people express their depersonal affect
by talking at one higher level of generality—not about
their feelings, but about the fact that they or others have
feelings.

Extract 4-20

Jim: ... because people might [Caren coughs] feel
we should make the position more widely known...
["Paid Manager" 055-056]

Where other people's feelings are constructed, the speaker
has in fact created a moral response in talk which is a meta-
display of affect.

Depersonalized affect is frequently recognized under
the general heading of moral indignation or self-satisfaction
(as a feeling of "smugness"). It is not the task here of the
analyst to analyze systematically what have been called "moral
feelings," such as were referred to in Chapter 1, p. 19.
But where these feelings surface, their part in the changes
in the moral matters concerning cooperation and commitment
will be made clear.
The Co-op segments show frequent use of hyperbole. Many expressions seem impossible to apply to the real social situation if they were literally interpreted. Quantitative expressions show degrees of activity that are implausible. Other words or phrases are seemingly empty intensifying elements. Some situations are exaggerated with idioms that overstate the actual happenings.

The "quantifiers" include the set of universal or absolute adjectives and adverbs such as "never," "ever," "always" and "all."

Extract 4-21

Jim S.: In other words, the second time you default you're thrown out as a working member, [Laughter] and you will never* work for the Co-op again... [Laughter] ["New Labor" 096-099]

Laughter follows the utterance excerpted in Extract 4-21, suggesting that the utterance has not been taken as wholly serious. The absolute meaning of "never" applied to Co-op policy is implausible, as reference to the ethnographic materials of Chapter 2 will document. "Never" makes no contribution to the literal meaning of Extract 4-21 which a simple "not" would have supplied.

In the case of intensifying adverbs, such as "really," "merely," "actually," basically," "only," or "just," it is often difficult to discover any literal contribution to the meaning.
Sheldon: ... then that can just be recorded, it doesn't have to be correlated...  
["New Labor" 177-178]

There appears to be little difference between "recording" and "just recording," other than that "just" does suggest an activity that is in some way simpler. At first glance "just be recorded" seems to be sensibly contrasted with the more complex operation, that of recording and correlating. The actual mechanics of recording, however, would be the same in either circumstance, so that there is no difference in the literal sense of the expression with or without "just."

Other forms of hyperbole can be observed as a situation is defined, captured, or described by a phrase that—if literally taken—would exaggerate the activity beyond what actually occurred.

There are several examples of the hyperbolic use of "throw out," when only verbal contact is involved. In "New Labor," "you're thrown out as a working member" [097] and

Extract 4-23

Joel: ... there's a woman who came in the Co-op week in and week out to steal from the Co-op, and 
Caren: Yeah, I remember—

["No Parking" 153-159]

1 An attempt to show the meaning supplied by "merely," "not merely," and "not really" was made during an analysis of the notions of "play" and seriousness done by the philosopher Riezler (1941). "Merely play" and "not merely play" are located as residing "in the attitude of man, not in things, matters, actions that we could subsume under play and seriousness." (p. 505)

In a playful attitude we are 'not really' concerned. But it is just this 'not really' that must be explained. Moreover 'not really' is wider than
This non-literal use of "throw out" suggests that the person's behavior violated acceptable standards to the point that the excision was justified. A similar hyperbolic idiom is found in "No Parking," "throw this up into our faces." [152]

Hyperbole sometimes involves more than a simple phrase or adverb.

Extract 4-24

Pam: ...We [the 14 people in the commune] would each week like sort of get together for five minutes and sort of figure, you know, whether last week we didn't have enough bananas or we wanted maybe couple more head of lettuce and it worked.

Caren: Yeah.

Pam: ...out really*, well, we really* saved money, plus plus we thought ahead so we didn't spend, you know, say half an hour, two or three times a week in the supermarket thinking 'No, let's see, eggplant, no I don't know! you know.'

"Starting Up" 117-126

Here the speaker's viewpoint that shopping at the Co-op is preferable to shopping at the supermarket is made with the two descriptions of shopping, contrasting five minutes of planning for the whole Co-op order of the week's food with half an hour two or three times a week to buy an eggplant at the supermarket. Both quantifications substitute greatly exaggerated, categorical statements for realistic descriptions. Both the quantification and the intensification of "really" (which appears twice) focus attention on moral matters. The moral

'merely playfully.' (p. 510)

Riezler introduces an "ultimate horizon" that lets both "our play, and ordinary life be serious." (p. 517) Such playing, he continues, can not be mere playing or "partial" (p. 511), or "simpler" in the above analysis.
response here is more than a description of how one mode of shopping is better than another, but an implementation of a moral matter, that one ought to shop at the Co-op, given as part of an argument to justify starting up the Co-op.

Neither the quantifiers, nor the intensifiers nor the overstated description can be accounted for in terms of the referential meaning or truth value of the situations. All call attention to aspects of the ongoing reality which are more basic, absolute or simpler than some other possible construction of it. I would propose that talkers make reference by these means to a level of moral matters where a simplified categorical relationship of obligation and evaluation is appropriate. That is, they indicate that the level of moral matters is relevant to what it is that they are saying.

8. **Syntactic indication of purpose**¹ There are a set of sentence structures that indicate that a certain state, attribute or activity is a goal of another action or activity or one that is to be avoided. The implication is that this second state of affairs is not only desired, but one that ought or ought not to be. The conjunctions "so," "so that," "in order that," operated to indicate a positive goal; "or," "or else," "so that...not," "so...not," and "in order that... not," the state to be avoided.

¹ This indicator was suggested by W. Labov.
This structure can indicate a purely instrumental relation, but in dealing with human actions the moral dimension is always available and often foregrounded by other indicators of moral response.

Extract 4-25

Amy: It's this half of the proposal that we're talking about, how we're going to organize the labor force so that* the work gets done. [*"New Labor" 190-192]*

The goal here of getting the work done, is clearly positive and it would seem difficult to imagine a Co-op person who did not agree that such ought to be done.

The most usual form of this conjunction which is used by the Co-op people in the extracts in the next four chapters is "so." One of the four instances appears in a negative sense, and illustrates the conjunction "so...not."

Extract 4-26

Caren: Well, yeah, but what's the point of opening it unless we know, we should know enough about the neighborhood to know where we're at, so* we don't* open, you know, and, you know, just collapse, I mean. [*"Starting Up" 071-074]*

In Extract 4-26 the opening up and collapsing is a state to be avoided, as is shown by much of the discussion in the segment from which the lines are extracted.

The term "so," has the sense in Extract 4-26 of "in order that," which is not the case with all uses of this phrase. For instance in "so that's another kind of problem" [*"Paid Manager"* 226], the sense of "so" is "therefore," and it is not an instance of an indicator of moral response.
Distribution of Moral Response Indicators.

The question can be raised, why are particular indicators used at one point and not others? In one way or another the indicators of moral response give evidence of obligation and evaluation in utterances of people, such as have been formulated here by the moral premise. The modals (1) focus on the linkages used, often ambiguously amongst several meanings, in some instances seemingly oscillating from one to another. In one way or another they show exception to the indicative, existential state. The evaluative qualifiers (2) supply information by which individuals are polarized, and appear as good or non-good. The instances of traditional and colloquial vocabulary for moral matters (3) are a resource giving direct access to what has become institutionalized in language of some of the norms and values in use.

The techniques of questionable classification (4) and of depersonalization of others (5) show evaluations of people and collections of people more directly. The important notion of depersonalization seems at the heart of both of these indicators as well as that of affect (6). Moral matters essentially are features of the collection of people and only secondarily of any individual who happens to fit within the collection. Hyperbole (7) also expresses affect, but in addition calls attention to a simpler level of a categorical relationship. The syntactic indicators of purpose (8) point to a desired or needed end state, or one to be shunned.

The following passage illustrates these more general considerations. The example is from a transition where the
talker changes from an utterance which is on the surface an existential representation, lacking in any signs of moral matters, to one with many indicators of moral response.

Extract 4-27

Jim G.: Yeah, but we haven't sat down with the book to work out the details of where the money is missing, we only* know that the amount of money is short uh, the, a*, now, you know,* that's the kind of* thing which could* be prevented, like if we had like* a proper* cash register, right, which is again something which we ought* to do, probably not going to do...

["Paid Manager" 199-206]

The talker displays in Extract 4-27 his feeling that the Co-op ought to have means to prevent money losses, in fact he finally uses the paradigmatic "ought." He begins without any overt display of moral matters in that there are no indicators of moral response. It may be that the talker also feels that he or someone else ought to have sat down and done the work of figuring out "where the money is missing." He does not show that. Others may feel that he ought to have done that work, but there is no evidence in the way that the talker presents the information here.

The eight indicators of moral response just described are not evenly distributed in the talk in the four segments. For example, in the "New Labor" segment, about half the lines have no moral response. On the other hand, one three line utterance [130-132] has ten indicators. Generally indicators cluster so that where there is one indicator in an utterance, there is another, but usually not of the same type.

The four segments used in the succeeding chapters—about
20 minutes of talk--contain 679 indicators of moral response in the excerpts which are used for analysis and appear in this work. Others are present in utterances not subjected to close analysis. In some instances several cues of depersonalized affect, for appear and so the figures reflect each instance. Also all instances of modals are marked. Although an "epistemic" sense may have been intended, the possibility that it was heard as a root sense (and hence showing control or permission, cf. earlier in this section) is taken into account.

Of the 679 instances, 192 (28%) are type 7--hyperbolic use of quantifiers and intensifiers. One segment ("New Labor") which contains the largest number of talkers is the only one of the analyses that does not put this indicator in first place, but rather third (31 of 131, accounting for 17%). Second most frequent use was of the modal linkages, with 144 of 679 (21%). As noted above, this category may be inflated since I have tagged each instance of modals so as not to lose the possibility that a root sense may have been understood. It is perhaps surprising that one of the most straightforward indicators of values--type 8, syntactic indication of purpose--was least used, with 4 of 679 (1%).

Recognition by the analyst of these indicators of moral response is only one aspect of their distribution in talk. There remains always the possibility that one or another of the people present have additional resources to find moral matters in talk. For instance, the mechanics of keeping records of the work done by Co-op members is presented as follows:
Extract 4-28

Sheldon: ... all you have to do is you have to keep track of how much work each household does and you have to do it very well... ["New Labor" 173-175]

If certain households had not done as much work as they were supposed to have done, some of the people present would have known. The talker in Extract 4-28 could then be heard as defining some household's past performance as poorly done. The same argument applies if someone knew, or thought it was the case, that the talker or others felt that some had done exemplary jobs. In either possibility, evaluation will be attributed to the utterance which may or may not have been a feature of the talker's original utterance. Such private interpretation cannot appear in this analysis.

The last chapter suggested that the introduction of the self in talk in itself could be viewed as a moral matter, since the underlying strategy of a talker was to appear as a good self. To what extent are these features of moral response used in presenting a good self? Chapter 3 showed ways by which a "possible self" is avoided in talk or minimized (p. 208). It was noted that the direct use of "I" for the self does not in itself lead to representation as a good self. Further, Co-op adults (as do other adults) appear to avoid the use of terms which directly evaluate the self as good.

The described indicators of moral response are perhaps more directly relevant to evaluation of others and to the appearance of certain activities, features and categories of
others as obligatory. It may be the case that obligation is being displayed in one of the instrumental senses (cf. earlier discussion on "ought" p.264) and the talker has no moral intent in mind. However, the possibility that others are supplying moral matters has been taken into account in the analysis.

Several of the indicators use depersonalized techniques, which uniformly diminish the relevance of any specific individuals (others or the self) and increase the importance of collections or sub-collections of people. The strategies used to portray the self as good may be located at a level of interactional activity that would include such phenomena as irony, flattery, tact, self-aggrandizement, etc.

I have suggested no reason, nor would I want to, that talkers are consciously motivated to talk with or without indicators of moral matters. The perspective used here is distinct from a study of motives, where motives are considered as subjective, inferential bases of action. However, motives in the sense used by Mills (1940b) for "typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in delimited societal situations" (p. 904) may appear as part of moral responses, and hence play a part in what others who are co-present make of what has been said.

The procedure here will be to locate in any continuous stretch of talk a series of moral responses, providing a continuing access to moral matters which were interactionally realized in that talk. Beyond the identification of moral matters, the analysis aims to identify the ways in which the
moral matters are implicated in the social world of the interactants. The moral premises provide a more general way of representing the moral matters, freed from particular context and particular features by which they were located. Varied moral responses can be unified within the analysis by their transformation into moral premises which are more abstract forms representing moral matters. However, moral premises remain related to the moral responses in ways that remain to be explored.

The Dynamic Of Moral Response

In the first section of this chapter, the moral premise was established as a schematic representation of moral matters which links the notions of "good" and "ought." A crucial factor in that formulation was the location of an individual as a good person within some collection of people. Equally vital in the moral premise is the assignment of obligation to that collection. An activity, attribution, or state is predicated with a modal "ought." To make more precise the ways in which moral responses give evidence of these moral premises, it will be useful to consider the relation of "is" and "ought" within an utterance, a relation that is central to this work.¹

¹ Searle's (1969,1973) analysis of the relation of "ought" and "is" relies on his notion of constitutive rules, creating or defining the activity of an institution, as opposed to rules which regulate it.

It is often a matter of fact that one has certain obligations, commitments, rights and responsibilities, but it is a matter of institutional not brutal fact.
In talk, "is" and "ought" often appear to be in equilibrium as the interpretation of a surface form oscillates between two types of predication—existential and moral.\(^1\) This notion of "oscillation" reflects the ease with which interactants sometimes move between the two senses, and may

It is one such institutionalized form of obligation, promising, which I invoked above to derive an ought from an is. (p. 131, 1973)

"Ought" is used throughout this work as including all the various senses introduced earlier.

Hart's notion (1965) of defeasibility also focuses on the relationship of "ought" and "is." Hart recognizes an ascription of rights and responsibilities occurs. For example, "they did it" for Hart is seen as ascribing a responsibility of individuals for some activity, and "this is mine" as ascribing rights of ownership or property to individuals for some object. The crux of the argument which Hart makes is that both are defeasible (i.e., subject to annulment or termination) when there would no longer be such a right or responsibility ascribed. In these instances, they might stop doing it, or I might give it to someone else. In my argument, an oscillation in ascriptive and descriptive senses parallels the "is"/"ought" dynamic developed here.

Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) find an "overlap" in notions of obligation and causality, since "one can talk of one person allowing another to do something in either a causal or a deontic sense." (p. 509) They see "permissibility" as being at the conceptual core of notions of obligation, holding a parallel position to "possibility" in a causal domain.

\(^1\) The fact that an existential may contain a prior sense of being an obligatory is developed in Goffman (1959, p. 13) where he notes

> The others find then, that the individual has informed them of what is and as to what they ought to see as the "is." (Ital. in original)

The notion that all of one's experience teaches what one ought to see (in the sense developed by G.H. Mead, that straw can be "food" for "animals" or/and "building material") is presumed in the dynamic explored here. In the analysis the existence of an underlying existential is also considered, where the surface form contains explicit predication of obligation, as will be shown. Hudson's reader (1969) on "The Is/ought Question" sees the is/ought problem as the "central problem of moral philosophy" (p. 10) and contains 22 papers on it, including an amplification by Searle of his original paper.
choose to avail themselves of the "ought" or to ignore it. The dynamic may clarify the sense in which moral matters are considered to be always available.

The simplest formulation of the dynamic of "is" and "ought" is one in which a moral premise directly reflects what is shown in an existential predication. An alternative relation is one in which the moral premise reflects the opposite of what is found in the existential. In a third situation it is not possible for the analyst to say which of these formulations apply, even with extensive background information on the problems under discussion, such as is supplied here from the participatory observation of the Co-op.

As the examples to follow will show, the surface talk contains either an existential or obligatory form. The dynamic between the two forms can be expressed as a pair of statements, one showing the existential predication (EP) and the other the obligational form as the moral premise (MP). Such an oscillation is most readily seen when modals occur in the surface form. A modal like "will" in the epistemic sense makes an existential reference to the future, while the "root" sense refers to volition ("I will") or compulsion ("You shall"). One polar case of this dynamic—where the surface form is existential and lacks any evidence of moral response—is not of great interest usually. The other

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1 All the examples are from the segments used in the analysis in the next four chapters. There the collections of people are often specified as subcollections or predications generalized as the surrounding text is taken into account.
polar case—where the surface form appears with "ought" and "good"—is rare. The analysis draws most heavily on existential utterances which can be classified as moral responses by the presence of indicators of underlying moral matters. They establish a greater likelihood that the people who are interacting are taking into account moral matters than talk that lacks such surface indication. However, the notion that moral matters are "always available" introduced earlier (p. 13) affirms the possibility that any utterance having to do with people can be heard as a moral matter, even those with little or no indication of moral response in the existential form.

The disengagement of the "ought" and "is" senses is not always straightforward. There are some cases where the existential predication (EP) and the obligational moral premise (MP) predications differ in polarity. In general I can recognize three cases: where the two have the same polarity, where they have the opposite polarity, and when the relationship is indeterminate.

Case I: Polarity of EP = polarity of MP

EP: \[ \begin{cases} \text{has} \\ \text{is} \\ \text{does} \end{cases} \] \{not\} Y

MP: \[ X \text{ as good individual(s) in } C \text{ ought } \{\text{not}\} \text{ to } \begin{cases} \text{have} \\ \text{be} \\ \text{do} \end{cases} Y \]

(Items in square brackets are coupled. When the EP is positive, the MP is positive; when the EP has "not," the MP has "not.")
An instance of case I occurs at the end of "No Parking" as a motion is adopted.¹

Extract 4-29

Ben: Um, at least we get a vote on the sign motion. Opposed? (Glen: Minimum?)

Ben: OK. Fifteen dollars a year it is. Let's see, the next point is... ["No Parking" 187-192]

EP: We get a vote on the sign motion.

MP: We as good Co-op meeting-people ought to vote on the sign motion.

Two terms from the recognized meeting vocabulary ("vote" and "motion") are used here. The voting itself is accomplished in the same utterance. This and other instances of the use of the regulative rules with which the meeting-people operate are easily recognized instances of moral response, affecting what is done in the interaction, and also what is to be done by the Co-op at a future time. The polarity of EP and MP are the same in this prescription.

Another prescriptive instance of case I is indicated in the example below; this shows no reference to the rules and regulations of meeting-people.

Extract 4-30

Sheldon: I think that you should just put it in other, in other terms, just that he should be the labor coordinator. Yes. [Louder]


¹ Asterisks in the examples Extracts 4-29 through 4-41 indicate text to be analyzed.
EP: He should [in the future sense] just be the labor coordinator.

MP: He who is a good person in a collection of managing-people ought to be the labor coordinator.

Here a reformulation is inserted into the talk. Both the insertion and the reformulation itself show a modal "should" in the surface form. The "should" is paradigmatic of the way that the epistemic and root senses reflect an oscillation of moral and existential interpretations. The disagreement may be taken as either a disagreement about what the person to be hired will do, or what he ought to do.

In the following, a regulation that has been proposed is interpreted in a way that clearly shows a moral premise, yet preserves a possible non-moral interpretation as well.

Here the instance is one of prohibition.

Extract 4-31

Jim: In other words, the second time you default, you're thrown out as a working member, and you will never work for the Co-op again...[Laughter] ["New Labor" 096-099]


MP: You who are not a good person in the Co-op ought not to work for the Co-op again.

Three indicators of moral response are present. The utterance is delivered with affect, yet an affect that is not directed at a particular person. The "you" refers to no particular person. The quantifier "never" is a term that overstates the duration of the proposed sanction categorically. These indicators of moral response reinforce the root sense of "will." Yet the existential possibility, a future event, persists and the
dynamic is available. In this situation that means that
the possibility is preserved that Jim is not endorsing the
proposal and condemning the defaulting, but is merely
pointing out the consequences, and may even be opposed to
the proposal.

In the following, the surface form of the linkage is
not a modal, so the oscillation is not as apparent. However,
indicators of moral response make clear it is a location of
moral matters, and that the dynamic is also operating in this
prohibition.

Extract 4-32

Caren: ...know enough about the neighborhood to know
where we're at, so we don't open, you know, and,
   you know, just collapse,* I mean.
   Fred:    Well, you never do...
          ["Starting Up" 072-076]

EP: So we don't open and just collapse.

MP: We as good Co-op people ought not to open and col­
lapse.

The text of the existential predication is kept the same as
the surface. Information about moral response occurs with
the use of the term "just," moral affect as shown by the
slowing of the tempo, the result of a series of parenthetical
elements ("you know's" and "I mean"), and the use of "so" a
syntactic indicator of purpose. The text following "so" is
clearly connected with the instrumental action preceding it
and is exhibited as a state of affairs to be shunned. Though
the EP lacks the surface indication of oscillation found in
the preceding two instances which had modal linkages, the
moral response indicators make an "ought" interpretation per-
haps more likely. The response of an interacting other is directed to what is known about the neighborhood and continues the use of indicators of moral response (categorical "never" and also stress on it, showing affect, again depersonalized).

The following instance presents an undesirable activity and at the same time claims that it did not occur. The substance of what is said then is that such an action was not done, reflecting the moral premise which says that it ought not to have been done.

Extract 4-33

Glen: ... if he has made an effort, and then he has called the labor coordinator, I mean, it isn't as if *you totally screwed the guy* [Louder and faster].

["New Labor" 059-061]

EP: It isn't as if you totally screwed the guy.

MP: You as good people in the Co-op people ought not to screw the guy.

In Extract 4-33 the hyperbolic phrase "you totally screwed the guy" is negated by the pre-posed negative existential. The talker has been proposing an alternative milder system of sanctioning for the case where someone gave notice of an intended absence, rather than simply did not show up. The conjunction "as if" is another way of indicating a possible rather than actual state, which is reinforced with the negative "isn't." In the phrase, affect is shown as an increase in volume and speed. The line also contains the quantifier, "totally," indicating once again an inflation beyond the actual operation of Co-op affairs. The phrase "to screw the guy" is
a traditional, but vernacular moral term, which translates roughly as "to harm the guy." Extract 4-33 is an instance in which the speaker did not need to make clear the basic feeling and attitude of the Co-op people on the question of how to behave in enforcing rules. Both EP and MP senses are available here, and for some people there may be an oscillation between the two.

The formulations so far used for the dynamic of moral response had an existential predication which directly reflected the obligational predication. However, there are instances where this is not the case, and where one negates the other.

Case II: Polarity of EP ≠ polarity of MP

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{EP: } & \quad \{ \begin{array}{c}
\text{has} \\
\text{is} \\
\text{does}
\end{array} \} \quad \text{Y} \\
\text{MP: } & \quad \text{X as good individual(s) in C ought not to} \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\text{have} \\
\text{be} \\
\text{do}
\end{array} \right\} \text{Y}
\end{align*}
\]

Here the linage of EP and MP are opposite: given \( X \text{ is } Y \), then \( X \text{ ought not to be } Y \) (or \( X \text{ is not } Y \), then \( X \text{ ought to be } Y \)).

Again the examples vary in how much of the formulation is explicitly shown on the surface.

In the following instance, the moral premise appears in surface form, and the evidence of the participant observation (as shown in Chapter 2, p. 79) is consulted to supply the corresponding existential predication which negates the moral premise. All the Co-op people at that meeting would know that was the case, since all the people at that meeting had been closely involved with Co-op operation in the past.
Extract 4-34

Elmer:... "it's the moral obligation of the people of the Co-op to spread the cost of these extras," maybe add it on...

"Starting Up" 188-190

EP: The Co-op people do not spread the cost of extras.

MP: The Good Co-op people ought to spread the cost of extras. (It's the moral obligation of the people of the Co-op to spread the cost of these extras.)

In Extract 4-34 the talker is one of the "people of the Co-op," and so assigns the "moral obligation" to himself as well.

As earlier discussion in Chapter 3 on construction of people in talk showed (p. 296) an expectation exists amongst Co-op people that they are "good people." The phrase "moral obligation" is from the recognized traditional vocabulary indicating the sense of "ought." Here the MP is given in the surface and the problem is to extract the EP. A straightforward application of case I would produce Co-op people who spread the cost of extras. But this in fact is not so. In order to complete the formulation of the dynamic, the polarity of the existential was determined by consulting the actual circumstances of what the Co-op policies were with respect to the extras.

The next instance illustrates the use of a general collection of adults, who like all adults are presumed to be peaceable and reasonable. As in the preceding instance, the surface form is that of a statement of moral matters.

Extract 4-35

Gertrude:... "he should know better than that."

"No Parking" 104-105
EP: He does not know better than to fight (since he fought).

MP: He who is a good person in a collection of adults ought to know better than to fight. (He should know better than that.)

The prior text has established that he fought, and that he was an adult ("it's this guy..." [010].) The utterance contains "should" appearing in what seems a root sense and is accompanied with affect, such as could be glossed as sounding "indignant." The underlying existential predication is supported by the text which shows this person doing irrational things which are labelled as "crazy"[148] in another talker's utterance, "there's no reason why he's that way, because--except he's crazy." [148]. Since the EP refers to a past event, the epistemic sense of the modal "should" might seem excluded; yet there always remains the possibility of interpreting Gertrude's utterance as a hopeful expectation of what will happen next time.

The next instance contains an existential in the surface form, which is marked as a moral response.

Extract 4-36

Jim: ...then a problem arises, where like, where State Co-op is not accepting our vegetables anymore, so now* we have a regular loss every week*, ranging from three dollars on good weeks to twelve-fifteen dollars on bad weeks, now somebody's really gotta deal with this problem..."

["Paid Manager" 213-218]

EP: We have a regular loss every week.

MP: We as good Co-op people ought not to have a loss every week.

The statement about the regular loss uses categorical terms
which exceed the facts of the matter—I can report that the loss was not "regular" nor "every week." As a participant, I can also support the view that running the Co-op would not have been successful if there were losses, and therefore from the Co-op's point of view there ought not to be losses. Interactants would also know this. That there were in fact sometimes losses becomes then a measure of how the Co-op did not always succeed as a good Co-op.

Extract 4-36 is an extract from a long utterance, and so other peoples' interactive moral responses do not appear immediately. The talker himself introduces further moral matters ("somebody's really gotta deal..." [217]) showing that he was continuing the dynamic of moral response.

In the next instance, the utterance contains an explicit evaluation, although it is an apparently objective evaluation of the situation, and the self appears only as "possible self" (cf. Chapter 3, p. 210).

Extract 4-37

Joel: ...it's an unfortunate situation, you know, the fact that* we don't have a larger black representation in the Co-op.*

["No Parking" 162-164]

EP: We don't have a larger black representation in the Co-op.

MP: We as good Co-op people ought to have a larger black representation in the Co-op.

The negative phrase ("it's an unfortunate situation") favors the dynamic translation of the existential predication in the positive moral premise, that "we ought to" have a larger black representation. The notion of a dynamic allows that either
option can be selected by interactants since both are available.

There are consequences of the reversal of polarity shown in case II which were not present in case I. Both have been shown as an oscillation in which either EP or MP is present in the surface and the respective other form is somehow beneath the surface, but with varying degrees available to interactants. However, the dynamic of case I is such that the oscillation from EP to MP to EP to MP etc., can be seen as reinforcing of the one phase by the other, since both exhibit the same polarity, the alternating cycle resembling that of a current that switches one way as readily as the other.

Not so with case II, for here there is opposition and no simple relationship of reinforcing can be shown such that a return to a preceding phase is likely, or possible. In all of the examples of case II something new is to happen because of this unbalance. Conceived dialectically, as a thesis and antithesis, the synthesis is to be a new state which did not exist before. But is there evidence of synthesis in those instance?

In Extract 4-33, the MP was that he ought "to know better than to fight." As the segment shows, the individual has been summoned to a court hearing, at which point efforts will be made to discourage him from further fighting, that is, to see that he does "know better." In Extract 4-34, the
Co-op people ought not, according to the MP, have a regular loss, and actions are being taken at that meeting to provide a manager who will oversee Co-op operation. In Extract 4-35, "we," the Co-op people in the MP are shown as having an obligation to have more black people in the Co-op. That segment does not give evidence that anything was being done about the fact that few blacks were in the Co-op. And indeed, as will be shown, it is possible to recognize unresolved attitudes on that issue. However, some individuals in the Co-op, as Chapter 2 showed did conduct a special campaign in the neighboring all-black area to get Co-op members, and other encouraged the neighborhood black youth to use the Co-op as a place to hang-out.

The importance of case II then is that it is a signal that an unresolved state is present, and that changes are likely. The consequences of case II are that the moral matters which differ from the existential may result in the existential changing. As such, instances in which ideological changes occurred before existential have been located, and can be investigated to see when and how a synthesis to a new stage for the existential is accomplished. This structural consequence does not exist for existential statements or moral premises alone, but only by virtue of their structural relation.

Case III - Unresolved polarity

In case III it is not possible from the information presented to say that "ought" or "ought not" is the intent
displayed by the talker or the hearing understood by the others present. In the next examples, the talker does not make polarity explicit. The information needed is not readily available in the text or elsewhere in the segment, and it is likely that some or all of the co-present would have no basis for resolving the ambiguity. Extract 4-38 precedes 4-37 and touches on the same issue of black participation.

Extract 4-38

Ben: ... that generally speaking, *there's practically no black participation in the Co-op,*

Glen: Unhuh.

EP: There's practically no black participation in the Co-op.

MP: Good Co-op organization—people ought/ought not to have more black participation in the Co-op.

Since the talker gives no overt indication as to whether or not he favors the characterization, the moral premise is written to allow for either possibility. It is a fact that Ben generally takes a liberal stance, and the positive reading would therefore seem to me more likely: the Co-op ought to have more black participation. But not everyone in the meeting knows Ben well. A third position, between opposing and favoring is possible (see Chapter 3). The unresolved dynamic makes such a neutral position available for those present. A similar case occurs shortly afterwards. The issue is the same, the talker is the same, and the indirection is the same.

Extract 4-39

Ben: ... he identified *the Co-op as being pretty white.*

["No Parking" 096-083]
EP: The Co-op as being pretty white.

MP: The Co-op (good Co-op people) ought/ought not to be predominately white.

In this instance the existential predication contains no evidence of a moral response. However, the issue is a sensitive one, and other talk on that issue in the segment contains many of these indicators. The underlying moral matters are "always available," (in the sense shown in Chapter 1, p.13) but the polarity of the underlying moral matter is not made clear, and so the moral premise shown here contains both possible interpretations, i.e., ought/ought not.

Another instance of an indeterminate moral premise occurs in a discussion of starting up the Co-op after a summer hiatus. Before people can commit themselves to the Co-op, they need to determine that others are serious also about opening up the Co-op.

Extract 4-40

Caren: Well, it's a joke right now, then what are you talking about? *What do you mean open?*

[Laughs] What's open?

Fred: How about, yeah, what some the thing that...

["Starting Up" 009-013]

EP: What do you mean open (it's a joke right now)?

MP: You as good Co-op people ought/ought not to open the Co-op.

The surface form of Extract 4-40 is highly elliptical and the focus of the joke is not supplied. The interactants have been talking about opening the Co-op. Few indicators of moral response are present, other than the affect shown by laughter and the formulation of the situation as a joke. The
talker's own position on opening the Co-op is not clear here, although later she says "I really would like the Co-op to open"[247]. It is not until the end of the segment that it becomes clear that most of the interactants show that they feel they ought to open the Co-op and display commitment.

In several discussions of cooperation, a similar indeterminancy exists as to whether or not Co-op people feel they ought or ought not to make certain changes in the cooperative labor structure. One particular dilemma is whether a particular person, Ben, ought or ought not to be the person paid to be a manager. One instance differs from the others in the direct way that this question is presented in the text surface form.

Extract 4-41

Jim: ...so the motion I want to make is we, we establish the position, and then we can get into the question of *whether Ben's the best person* or whether we want to advertise it...

"Paid Manager" 068-0733

EP: Whether Ben's the best person (to be paid manager).

MP: Ben as good person in Co-op people ought/ought not to be the person to be manager.

Thus, ambiguity of an MP is not necessarily tied to ambiguity or lack of explicitness in the talk. The logic that is supplied here is not that of the analyst alone. The "popular logic" (Rose, 1954) of ordinary language can be relied on to show the polarity of these propositions or that no polarity may be intended.

Case III, as well as cases I and II start from the notion that there is an oscillation between an existential form and
the corresponding linkage of obligation. Case III differs in that the nature of the obligational linkage is not clearly resolved into either a form which matches the existential (as in case I) or one that opposes it (as in case II). The question as to how far the existential or obligational side is more prominently displayed in the interaction remains in each instance an empirical question.

The Application Of This Methodology

This completes the discussion of the problems of locating evaluation and obligation in talk and particularly of the language of moral matters by which moral responses were found and their use in talk described. This chapter and the preceding one set out the methodological basis for the analysis of moral matters in talk. The techniques that have been described are designed to accomplish three things:

To show individuals as located within collections of people;

To provide a framework that is broader than that used in conventional discussions of morality;

To show how the evocation of moral matters in talk effects a change in behavior.

My empirical orientation is to maintain an analysis open enough to account for multiple interpretations, ambiguities and unspelled out assumptions which are characteristic of talk and perhaps particularly so for talk of moral matters.

In the next four chapters, these techniques are used in discussing specific ideological problems which the Co-op people encountered, to show how the people in their talk con-
fronted these issues (or ignored them) and how from these issues the Co-op became that which it was. Each of the ideological problems is one of the relationship of the Co-op people to the problems and practices of the Co-op. Each illuminates some important issue in the Co-op, providing a glimpse of how the Co-op people worked out problems in actual talk and of how moral matters were part of Co-op concerns even where such was not recognized. Two concern changes in the cooperative structure of the Co-op. Two concern different facets of the problems of commitment to the Co-op. In all four, moral matters define what constitutes good Co-op people.

Each problem is focused on a stretch of talk from a different meeting. The segments provide a site for the different techniques to be exhibited, so that taken together the four illuminate further the techniques introduced in this and the preceding chapter. Each of the segments is self-contained and can be followed without reference to the other substantive chapters. In each chapter a resume of the problem is sketched out and some background given. Additional ethnographic information on the Co-op is found in Chapter 2, as are particulars of the three guises of the Co-op people: meeting-people, organization-people, and produce day-people. Each of the four chapters is followed by a transcription\(^1\) of

\(^1\) As I explained earlier (p.55) tape recording was done with the knowledge and consent of those members who made up the meeting of 1/22/73. I selected the four segments as places in which moral matters might be present since changes were occurring in the Co-op. Transcriptions were done of these segments so as to have a written version of the words which
the segment used as data for that chapter. The final chapter summarizes the notions of cooperation and commitment and what has been discovered about what constitutes the good Co-op people, both from the point of view of the individual and from that of the collectivity.

Particular attention was given to audible reactions, both those which were verbal, but tend to occur below the level of conscious recall, such as "you know," "I mean," Unhuh," and "uh," and those which are non-verbal, such as laughter, snickering, coughing, etc. Such items do clutter up the transcript, and I apologize to the reader for them. I too would prefer to read a transcript that flowed like a novel, but this is not a novel. The transcriber who edited would be false to the data and render a disservice to the analysis. Such seemingly clumsy elements in the stream of talk are part of the data that were used by interactants as they participated in the talk and interpreted both existential and moral predications. A point of analysis has been to try to show how some of these non-verbal items hint at moral affect, or display interactional support for moral matters.

The system of transcription has focused on the utterance as a whole, using commas to show places in which a brief pause occurred, reserving periods for an uninterrupted final clause. In a few instances there are questions and question marks appear within an utterance. Where there are interruptions at the end of the utterance (and this is often the case), "--" is used. Overlapping utterances are shown with the use of brackets to indicate which lines of talk were produced simultaneously. The words which are shown directly on top of each other are the words which overlapped. In some instances three or more people talked at the same time or partially overlapped each other. Brackets and spacing left to right on the line also show text which was interpolated or began after an earlier speaker finished.

My focus is on the words that were used, and the overall audible record that was responded to. No doubt video data would enhance the analysis, but the moral matters which particularly concerned me were ideological concerns, for which language seems a necessary tool. Hence my focus on what was said, what people said they said, and what the analyst can make of it all.
The actual procedures which are used vary somewhat depending on the organizing concepts used and the character of the talk in the segments. However, certain general considerations would seem to apply in all cases. The essential elements of the methodology are:

1. Actual talk is used. The transcriptions make it possible to retain contact with what was said, rather than the analyst being limited by what was remembered of what was said. Further the surface of talk is used in a way that insures responsibility to a continuous stretch of talk. Moral matters are located as occurring within an expanse of talk, and it follows that the absence of other moral matters within an expanse of talk can therefore also be asserted.

2. Each analysis focuses on a particular organizing concept, a moral matter which seemed central to Co-op concerns. Although the basic viewpoint that moral matters are "always available" in talk is accepted, I have opted to limit the analysis in the first place to particular moral matters, using as data talk in which I would expect those concerns to be more evident than in others. In each case I shall also try to show by means of the same data some aspects of what constitutes "good Co-op people."

3. The starting point of each analysis is the same: the systematic retrieval of the relevant people and collections of people present in the talk. This reflects the original orientation of this work, that is, the logical place to find moral matters is in collections of people ("Morality begins
with a membership of group whatever that group may be."
Durkheim, (19061, 1974, p. 37). The formulation of collections of people as "feature plus people" is introduced to avoid distinguishing amongst various types of collections of people. These distinctions of "group" vs "association" vs "organization" etc. are essential for other sociological concerns but are not generally developed sufficiently in talk to make them useful here. It is a characteristic of talk to have many instances of people appearing rapidly without the information needed to specify the kind of internal cohesion or organization that is available for the associations of the talkers themselves.

4. A major problem is then always the same: how to make a principled selection from all possible collections of people to those which are useful to the question being considered. It will usually be helpful to view the Co-op people within the three guises described in Chapter 2 as meeting-people, organization-people, and produce day-people. But further sub-collections are often sought at another level. Generally, the talk itself is polarized about issues at an intermediate level of generality, and this will be used as a basis by which selection could be organized. In the following chapters such diverse collections of people as defaulting, overworking, managing, starting up, troublemaking and fighting-people will prove useful.

5. Attention to the way people are constructed in talk provides means of determining the social location of the self
and others in the continuing series of collections of people which are predicated by a talker. Hesitation to show a self as less than good is reflected in strategies which minimize and omit self. Alternative but referentially equivalent ways of talking of others display social distance between and amongst people as "near" or "remote." Such alternative representations may make difficult establishing the identity of others. Although not a problem in constructing the self, identity of others may prove a major difficulty in constructing others, giving evidence of evaluation as readily as do explicit criticisms or praise.

6. Moral matters have been found to cluster and surface indications of moral matters are more dense in some passages than others. Indicators of moral responses identify stretches of talk when surface indications of moral matters are richer than elsewhere. Clues to the display of moral matters include techniques by which depersonalization or questionable classification is accomplished, as well as evidence of modals and more traditional expressions of morality. It is surprisingly rare to find obligations overtly linked to individuals. Indirect means are often used to represent the self as a good person and others as perhaps not good people.

7. The formulation of moral premises presented brings together all the elements of the conceptual framework. These moral premises provide systematic access to moral matters by locating the elements of which it is composed. The formulaic representation of the moral premise
allows a comparison of moral matters in which evaluation and obligation are linked in one formulation.

8. When moral matters are extracted from a stretch of talk, an effort is made to maintain relations with all the other moral matters that remain. In this way a "domain" is achieved over the set of moral matters in a body of talk. Accountability to that talk is maintained in one of two ways. One is a processual analysis in which the interactional flow is taken into account and the changing collections of people which become relevant are charted as they continue the "same" or "new" collections of people. A process of showing category consensus reflects this underlying basis of the talk. Alternatively, order is disregarded by the concentration on classification of collection of people over a stretch of talk. In either way the different collections of people used over the segment become exposed. Both procedures are used, and a combination of them.

The limitations of the methodology are in part shared by any immediate observation of conversational behavior. Other methods are needed to gain a background understanding of the people, and of the problems and issues with which they are concerned. Here participatory observation, interviews, surveys and access to documents provided necessary data by which to recognize distinctive values and beliefs of the Co-op people, and hence what might be evaluated as good.
A further limitation is an apparent overemphasis on the place of the Co-op in the people's lives. For many of the "Co-op people," the hour or so each week it took to go to the Co-op to pick up their order was all of the time spent in that actual category. Some of the talk during the meetings no doubt had little or no impact on the individuals who uttered them or those who heard them, yet I may spend several pages on a few utterances. I have tried not to inflate the importance of these events. I recognize the Co-op was a small organization in a city of huge ones, a minor concern usually in the complex lives of the people who constructed it.

Important or not in other schemes of things, time spent at the Co-op and at Co-op meetings represented time spent as "Co-op people," whether this ever became an overt designation of the people involved or not. During this time moral matters of the Co-op appeared. Some of these moral matters concerned problems of changes in the cooperative structure of the Co-op. Some concerned the diffusion of commitment of Co-op people and the competition with other commitments which characterized the Co-op people. If people were to be "good" Co-op people by however that was defined, it would seem this could only be during time spent as Co-op people. It was to explore through talk specific ideological questions about the Co-op people qua Co-op people that the methodology was created. The particular strategy selected was to focus on changes in cooperation and commitment, as they were reflected in the talk
of the Co-op people. In this way an empirical study of the 
communication of morality was conducted whose starting point 
was the group.
CHAPTER 5
THE MORALITY OF NOT WORKING

Among the segments of the meetings to be considered in this study of moral matters, "New Labor" stands out in presenting the most radical change in Co-op structure, and in the definition of what constituted a "good Co-op member." At this moment in the history of the Co-op it would seem most likely that the people who effected that change would engage in talk about moral matters. Following the methods outlined in the last two chapters, it will be possible to penetrate the discussion of the meeting and lay out the extent of the fairly intensive concern with moral matters animating the discussion. Continuing the usage introduced in Chapter 1 and amplified in Chapters 3 and 4, I shall use the term "moral matters" to refer generally to those issues and problems of social life that involve both obligations and evaluations.

The transcript called "New Labor" is a segment of the January 22, 1973 meeting which introduced the status of non-working members to the Co-op. A distinction between working members and non-working members represented a major change in the ideology of the Co-op: it made it possible for people to

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1 Complete text of "New Labor" is given at the end of this chapter, page 377. More details of the Co-op are found in Chapter 2.
get the benefits of the Co-op (such as fresh produce at low prices) without working for the organization. In the "Early Days" of the Co-op it was required that every person who bought food also put in some time helping to secure that food. The practice of that period was the same as that found in many other cooperatives in which each person who shared in the privileges exchanged a share of labor (cf. Chapter 2 page 95 ). Although cost-saving was important to the Co-op people, it would be a mistake to view the operation of the Co-op as limited to rational economic practices (Zwecksrationalitate). As will be shown, participation in the Co-op included moral imperatives—both obligations and evaluations (Wertsrationalitate).

By the winter of 1972-3, participation in the Co-op had declined with sales dwindling to less than a third of the previous year (Figure 2.1) Fewer people were available to work, and not everyone who was using the Co-op seemed to be putting in their hours. Also food shortages were occurring each week as the food ordered ran out before everyone had picked up their order. In an effort to supervise the produce day sessions, a system of sellers was instituted to hand out the produce, rather than have buyers help themselves. This even further increased the need for labor. (cf. Chapter 2 for details)

The meeting was the culmination of a movement to make an explicit structural change in the system so it would be possible to be a Co-op member and yet not be a worker. Two classes of membership were created. One was for those who
were going to work; they would get lower prices by taking on a regular assignment. In this way an additional incentive was given to people to be working. A second status, that of non-working member, was established for people who chose not to fulfill the labor requirements. They would pay higher prices. A system of two markups would distinguish the two classes of membership. An economic rationale for creating a non-working status is emphasized in hindsight by Jim G. in an interview eleven months after the meeting.

Carverton as a community has a lot of people who can not afford the time to work for the Co-op, and I think it was very elitist to begin with, to insist that all members of the Co-op be working members. That restricted the Co-op to a narrow base of membership, and also cut the Co-op off from a potential source of funds, because once you're gonna run the Co-op anyway, it doesn't cost anything extra to get some extra crates of food while they're down there. It doesn't require very much extra work to set up another crate of oranges when you're already setting up oranges, and by allowing non-workers to buy at the Co-op it increases the buying volume to where we can survive. I think if it were just working members now we wouldn't have enough volume for it to be economical. I think it would then cost working members more to buy at the Co-op than at the supermarket, which would be completely ridiculous.

[Jim G. IV, p. 4, 12/5/73]

In Jim's statement, both economic and moral matters can be recognized. The term "elitist" retrospectively evaluates the structural change as positive. It will be important to see if this formulation is present in the segment of the meeting as the change was being made.

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1 Excerpt is from Interview (IV) which I taped and transcribed as part of the data on which this study is made. Chapter 1, p.54 gives details of the body of data from which this is an excerpt. Particulars of transcription procedures are given in a footnote at the end of Chapter 4, page 309.
Another retrospective view of the basis for change is provided by Ben, five months after the meeting, who includes a suggestion of moral matters in a commitment to the Co-op, by viewing Co-op participation as an important dimension in itself.

Some people just find themselves to be, you know, working their asses off, and therefore unable to participate in the Co-op, and I know that was one of the big complaints before, a lot of people felt, you know, that they were really cramped to work, and then if they got there late, if they got there at 6 o'clock there wasn't anything left, you know. So both of these problems have been dealt with, but, you know, I think it's important for people that, you know, can't afford to work somehow to be able to participate because, as long as the work itself gets done and the Co-op doesn't suffer for it, I think, the Co-op's interest come first...

Ben also points out the "Co-op's interests come first." By and large all the changes discussed at the meeting were designed to further the Co-op's interests.

A system of crews was agreed upon to keep track of who was a worker. A team of labor coordinators was appointed, their first responsibility being to discuss the new system with each person shopping on the next three produce days. Workers were signed up on those days and assigned to crews. After these organizing weeks, the system was put into operation and continued through the "Later Years." At first about two-thirds elected to work, but this quickly decreased to about one-half during most of the "Middle Period."

The changes in the structure of the Co-op were quite extensive. Yet at the meeting at which the stratification was
accomplished, there was no discussion of changes in a cooperative ideology of the Co-op—the issue of whether good Co-op people ought to be working members. No one spoke of the change in system as a moving away from an ideal communal organization in which everyone participated as a worker. Had practical exigencies eroded completely the ideals of the communes which had started the Co-op (cf. page 64)?

The problem considered in this chapter can be formulated as follows:

**How could a major change in the ideology of cooperation be accomplished without discussion of the value of cooperative work?**

The notion of cooperation was introduced in Chapter 1 as an essential aspect of participation in the Co-op, where to some extent or another cooperation was expected. Cooperation was defined there (p. 32) as an activity (category or attribute) done (or held) with others which is directed to a collective aim. There its development in the literature was shown. In this chapter the shift from cooperative to individualistic ideology will be explored using the methodology of Chapters 3 and 4. The analysis begins by locating the particular set of collections of people most relevant to this problem. Then all moral responses in the segment will be assembled which contain reference to this set of collections. From these, moral premises will be written which link the obligations and evaluations which were interactionally relevant. These and other of the strategies
introduced in the preceding chapters will supply an evidential basis to answer the question I have posed, in which the data consist of what was actually said at the meeting. A by-product of the analysis will be the identification of the Co-op's value system which is communicated by the talk in this segment.

Three Collections Of Co-op People

The Co-op has been shown to consist of many collections of people. The first problem of the analysis is to discover which collections will be most fruitful for an analysis of cooperative work in the Co-op. The segment begins with a formal proposal by which two new collections of people are distinguished.

Extract 5-1

Amy: Can we get a sense of the meeting now on just this as a general proposal?
Joel: Yeah, it's a two part proposal, and there, it's again that we would have two levels of markup, one for working members and one for non-working members.

"New Labor" 001-006

These lines introduce the social status of non-working members. All the talk which follows in the segment starts from the understanding that two collections of people\(^1\) will exist from this point on. Participation in the Co-op will no

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\(^1\) The term "collection of people" will be used rather than status, role, or member (for the most part) in keeping with the practices outlined in Chapter 3 to take into account both the sparseness of differentiating material in talk and the requirements of the overall framework of this study.
longer automatically make an individual a Co-op worker, as
a new role has provided a means for Co-op people to partici-
pate in the Co-op without doing Co-op work. Practical
exigencies have led to this role differentiation. Unwittingly
a structural change in the Co-op has removed cooperative
activity for some of the Co-op people. How is this possible?
The proposal of Extract 5-1 was passed unanimously except for
one abstention at that point. The language of the proposal
in Extract 5-1 uses "we" to refer to the Co-op organization.

Here the talker formally speaks for the Co-op (cf. page 202).

MP-A: We as good organization-people ought to have two levels
of markup, one for working members and one for
non-working members.1 (Extract 5-1)

Very shortly the status of working member is specified
further.

Extract 5-2

Joel: ...it is proposed
that working members are to have a regular job or commit-
ment to the Co-op.

Sheldon: That's rather ambiguous.

Jim G: As opposed to sign-
ing up every month on an ad hoc basis for vacant posi-
tions.

Joel: Right.

["New Labor" 013-019]

This proposal, like the other proposal, when adopted became
part of the set of official policies, regulations and practices
of the Co-op. At this point of the meeting, its actual inclu-
sion as official Co-op policy was problematic. However,

1 Details of the procedures for stating moral premises appear
in Chapter 4 (pp. 243 to 262) where MP-A, MP-B, and MP-C are
derived in a simpler fashion without taking into account
the surrounding context.
the meaning of the proposal—a role definition of working member—does not depend on the adoption of the proposal. As the Co-op meeting people talk, they are considering the consequences of this proposed new policy which is reflected in the moral premise:

MP-B: Good working-members ought to have a regular job or commitment to the Co-op. (Extract 5-2)

There are two points in the segment where a "regular job" is specified. One occurs as Ronnie asks when the job need be done, suggesting it be defined more clearly. (In this connection, cf Extracts 3-20 and 3-21 on Ronnie's use here of "somebody" to mask the person she talks of ("Possible self"), i.e., to avoid risk to herself). The other occurs about half way through the segment.

Extract 5-3

Dottie: I'm confused because I'm not sure what the limits are going to be, what are the qualifications for a working member you know, like a person comes in on one Thursday, and works for two hours, get the same type of markup as the person comes and works for four hours—

Jim G: We haven't decided what should be a minimum commitment, I think we have to say, each working member has to put in a minimum of X, now what that X is we haven't figured out yet.

["New Labor" 100-110]

Why there should be the alternative qualifications of a "regular job" or "commitment" is not spelled out anywhere in the meeting. There is one further elaboration of commitment as "minimum commitment," although a minimum is not set. As shown in Chapter 2 (p. 119) there were Co-op people who preferred a less structured, more nearly anarchistic approach
to organization. The proposed option of "regular job" or "commitment to the Co-op" was apparently designed by Joel to satisfy those who feared over-regimentation. Since almost nothing further appears in the segment concerning this option, the discussion in this chapter will focus on "regular job."

The original model of the Co-op which is being supplanted at this meeting consisted of only working members, some of whom served as coordinators. In the future, working members would be given an extra incentive to do what everyone had been expected to do in the past. A dollar incentive is being used now explicitly to see that enough work is done so that the Co-op operation can proceed more readily. No appeal is made to Co-op people in which the virtues of cooperation are described. As originally established, the Co-op was expected to be a cooperative endeavor in the sense that all members were expected to share in doing the work. In the future, Co-op people will be able not to work and still participate in the economy of cooperative food buying, but with less of a savings. It would seem that the Co-op people become a completely Zwecksrational people and lost any trace of Wertsrationalitate as motivation for Co-op participation.

Besides the official partitioning of the Co-op people into two collections of people shown in Extract 5-1, the segment reflects a more complex set of collections of people which had actually developed over the preceding two years of
the Co-op's existence. It is these collections which are more pertinent to the question of cooperative work than the role differentiation into workers and non-workers. These are the collections of people which are at an intermediate level of generality and at which moral matters cluster, such as was seen in Chapter 3 (p. 151). To locate these intermediate collections of people, all instances of talk on "work" or on the products of work in the segment were used to locate the "hidden" and overt people in the talk who were workers.¹ From these people, the collections of actual working members were inferred, which showed that the working membership of the Co-op at that time was far from homogeneous. The people present at the meeting referred to many different kinds of workers, which can be subsumed under three intermediate level collections of workers.² Taken together, these three collections are a "category set" (Sellitz, 1965, p. 151) mutually exclusive and exhaustive of the collection of working members which were talked about at that time in the Co-op. These are the people on which the analysis will be based, as they are the intermediate level categories which are most productive of moral matters in the segment.

According to what the meeting-people said, there were

¹ Procedures for locating hidden and overt people are found in Chap. 3 (p. 132). In the instance here, an initial selection of people was made by locating all references to people which concerned "work," rather than generating all possible references to people.

² Classification of collections of people was based on procedures introduced in Chapter 3.
working members who didn't appear on produce day to do the work: "a working member in default." [0241] There were others, generally coordinators, who did more than their share of "keeping the Co-op going." [0243] There was also a third collection of "those who work during the hours the Co-op is open." [0271], who neither overwork nor disappoint others by not showing up. The structure of the Co-op which these collections of people reflect is shown by the following diagram:

Throughout the segment the meeting people refer to these different broad collections of working members as they specify what would constitute a "regular job" (Extract 5-3). Each collection of working members mentioned provided the talkers with a perspective from which the moral matters raised in the meeting were explored. In so far as cooperation was a relevant moral matter, it would be located in these collections of people. Each was the locus of moral premises by which a "good person" would be defined. The three collections of people in the diagram then provide bases for the analysis of the next three sections of this chapter to locate
moral matters concerning cooperative work which appear in the talk. Each of these sections concerns one of these three collections of people. In this way, what appeared in the talk concerning the defaulting people, the overworked coordinators and the regular working members will be systematically made accessible for the problem under study.

**Default And Sanction: The Defaulting People**

The collection of defaulting people will be explored here by making explicit the moral matters concerning them which appeared in this segment. The data are those utterances that include both indicators of moral response and mention of default.¹

The notion that there are "problems of default" is first introduced with a suggestion that another motion about this problem is needed.

**Extract 5-4**

Jack: ...the other possibility is a working member in default, how long, I think maybe it's not part of this motion, but another motion might be made about it saying something about problems of default, spelling out how long we can go with a default before we say "You can't work," or are a hard ma-ma.

Jim S: Twice.

Jack: Yeah, I think twice is the maximum we should allow. ["New Labor" 037-044]

¹ There are 60 indicators of moral response which appear in the 7 excerpts in this section. The excerpts contain 26 phrases referring to defaulting people. Each excerpt is used as a source of one or more moral premise. The segment contains no other reference to defaulting people. Some of the indicators of moral response will be described in detail in the text. Similarly not all collections and subcollections of people will be given, but only those which are important to the analysis.
The proposal for a motion comprises a moral premise:

MP-C: [Somebody, we, I or you] as good meeting—people ought to make an additional motion for problems of default. [(Extract 5-4)]

"Defaulting" usually meant that a member signed up to do a particular job and then did not actually do it. Defaulting also included instances where people not only didn't work, but had avoided signing up to do any work in the first place. The basic current meaning of the verb "default" is "to fail to fulfill an obligation." [OED] It is apparent that those whose behavior is characterized by the term "default" are evaluated as non-good, especially when the alternative sense found in [OED] is considered, "default—to be guilty of default." The moral premise follows these considerations:

MP-D: Good working-members ought not to be defaulters. [(Extract 5-4)]

Furthermore, defaulting was a problem that the Co-op needed to solve. It was not a new problem, as Chapter 2 showed, but it seemed to have become more widespread at this time. At the time, no one tried to estimate how extensive defaulting was, but labor shortages occurred each week, despite a participating membership large enough to provide adequate labor.

An immediate inference from Extract 5-4 is the assumption that members will continue as defaulters. It is not only that there was a problem, but the same performance is expected by Extract 5-4 from certain working members even after the option is provided for them to be non-working members who still use the Co-op.
The talk in Extract 5-4 also reflects another moral premise, one that introduces the notion of a sanction. The phrase, "You can't work"\(^1\) indicates that some people will not be allowed to be workers.

**MP-E:** Defaulting-people ought not to be permitted to default without penalty. (Extract 5-4)

There is also in Extract 5-4 a limit proposed on the act of defaulting. It is first presented as involving a problematic length of time, but then specified as "twice." Such interactive repetition shows category consensus (p. 162) in the moral response "twice is the maximum we should allow" which also contains the modal "should" and the term "allow" from the traditional vocabulary of moral response. The moral response is:

**MP-F:** We as good organization-people ought not to allow more than two instances of defaulting. (Extract 5-4)

"Don't Let Them Get Away With It"

Almost immediately indignation\(^2\) is shown in the moral response of Extract 5-5:

**Extract 5-5**

Jim S::: In other words, somebody has to make a commitment to come every Thursday morning to do this selling, to work behind a counter handing out food, and twice in a row they're not there that they're supposed to be there they don't show up, well, I would say then don't let them get away with it no more than twice in a row, ah [Loud, stressed]-- "New Labor" 050-056]

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\(^1\) Or the more obscure notion (of Extract 5-4) of the Co-op people being a "hard mama" which also suggests sanctioning people.

\(^2\) cf. Earlier discussion of indignation in the review of empirical studies of morality in Chapter 1, page 16.
Practical difficulties are uppermost and form the basis for generating this display of a psychological state. Jim S. comments on the situation, and further comments on what he would say, ("Well I would say"). He then goes ahead and makes his comment, "Don't let them get away with it...": where "it" refers back to "not showing up to work," reflects the moral premise (E), defaulters should be penalized which was supplied in Extract 5-4. People in Extract 5-5 are identified as depersonal others (cf. Chapter 3, p. 219 on constructing others), shown by both the use of "somebody" and "they," who could be any Co-op person, as long as he or she was a rule breaker. Since the people are shown as depersonalized, it is easier to consider sanctions than with people who are shown as having personal relations with one another. The meeting people would seem to be in agreement with Durkheim ([1893] 1933), "reality of an obligation is certain only if it is manifested by some sanction." (p. 426). Moral premise E has linked the non-good working members (here termed defaulting-people) with the possibility of escaping punishment.

Extract 5-5 contains one of the few uses in the Co-op materials of the traditionally moral term "commitment," rather than "promise to work" or "says they will work." This also refers to the original wording of the proposal in Extract 5-2

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1 "Commitment" is explored extensively in Chapters 7 and 8 and an analytical discussion of this basic moral matter appears in Chapter 1,
as was captured in moral premise B which gave a role definition of working members as having either a "regular job" or "commitment to the Co-op." The rest of the meeting focuses on the work, not on a promise to work.

At this point, the system of two levels of markup re-appears in the discussion, along with the possibility of using a substitute in case of an absence. In the following, getting a substitute is elliptically referred to with "if he has made an effort [to find a substitute] and then..."

Extract 5-6

Glen: I don't see, I mean if you have a higher markup you might want to say one time, if he has made an effort

Jim S.: Uhhuh

Glen: and then he has called the labor coordinator I mean it isn't as if you totally screwed the guy, [Fast, loud]

Jim S.: Yeah, yeah

["New Labor" 057-062]

The Co-op people who default continue in Extract 5-6 to be treated depersonally, except that "someone" or "they" has now become "he" and then "the guy." (cf. page 275) on depersonalization of others as indication of moral response). The moral premise proposed as F--twice as an acceptable level of default--is hereby re-specified as once. Another new moral premise assigns to the good working members the obligations of providing a substitute and/or reporting thier absence.

MP-G: Good working-members ought to provide a substitute if they can't perform the work themselves, and/or call to report their absence in advance.

(Extract 5-6)

This moral premise is not formulated in regard to the defaulting people, but rather applies to regular members; it is evolved
by the meeting people in the course of talk about defaulting people.

There is yet another moral premise apparent in the concern that the Co-op people had not "totally screwed the guy." Harming others is undesirable for Co-op people and the claim is being made that it did not occur. This is an instance of case I of the dynamic of moral response (p. 294) where the existential predication (EP) and the moral response have the same polarity.

EP: (As if) you totally screwed the guy.
   (Co-op people were not harmful to the guy)

MP-H: Good organization—people ought not to harm other people.

The EP is given in the surface form and then the MP records the sense of "you," which here is a depersonal term for the Co-op people, and also translates the vernacular phrase "to screw the guy." Moral premise H reflects the value generally found in the Co-op of treating people in a friendly way, of not being rigid in putting rules into effect. (cf. Chapter 2 for details of produce day procedures and behavior).

The text continues with the implications of using a higher markup as a means of paying for instances of default. Again the number of times a person may default is questioned and another revision of the acceptable level of default of moral premise F implied.
Excerpt 5-7

Glen: ...you could make it with more than one exception, or something like that, although I don't see why you would make it more than once, because even if the guy is just honestly, just, if there is some problem, well, that's something he accepts, and pays the ten percent, I mean, or whatever it is. [Tempo speeds up]

Jim S.: Yeah, ["New Labor" 063-069]

The system of two markups is interpreted in Extract 5-7 as a means of implementing the system of workers and non-workers. For some Co-op people, the markup was emerging as an exchange, a common way of equalizing social relationships for those who worked and those who did not. For others, as will be shown, the markup would be viewed as something that had to be earned, a reward for time spent as a cooperative working member. Yet for some participation in the Co-op included a moral value of good as an activity in itself.

The moral premise stated from Extract 5-7 specifically assigns the higher markup to the defaulting people, referred to in the utterance by "he." "He" continues to be depersonal here the person who "pays the ten percent" (in addition).

MP-I: Defaulting-people ought to pay an additional ten percent. (Extract 5-7)

By moral premise I those who purportedly were working members would be treated as non-working members (paying an additional ten percent) whenever they defaulted. Here the notion of extenuating circumstances is provided with "if there is some problem." Furthermore, the moral response contains the term "honestly," and thus introduces a display of intent. The collection of defaulting-people can be divided into subsets
according to intentions: those that are trying to avoid putting in the required work and those who are trying to do the work, but have "some problem" (Extract 5-7). But under MP-I, both will be sanctioned in the same way.

One other possible action is considered in the segment: what might be done when there is a default. The earlier moral premise E--setting up a penalty for default--can be understood in terms of a temporary or permanent removal from the working membership, where the penalty would be the loss of markup. The option of temporary removal is seen as potentially dangerous.

Extract 5-8

Martin: ... that destroys, that destroys the continuity, that gives people an option simply to stop doing it once like "I can't do it this Thursday."

Jim S.: Right

Martin: "day," and all of a sudden all the sellers find, "We can't make it this Thursday," they'll pay an additional ten percent. [Loud, stressed]

"New Labor 077-083"

The moral response of Extract 5-8 (shown by indicators of moral affect including changes in dynamics and stress; modal form "can't"; hyperbolic use of "destroys" and "all"; and depersonalized others shown by "people," "all the sellers," "they") extends the capriciousness which might occur to a situation in which no sellers were present at all. Here too a Co-op value is shown in the existential predication:

EP: That destroys the continuity. (Extract 5-8)

The moral premise (an instance of case II, since non-destroying the Co-op is clearly a tenet of those who make up the organization) can be stated as:
MP-J: Good organization—people ought to preserve Co-op continuity. (Extract 5-8)

This moral premise underlies much of Co-op activity, but does not usually surface so clearly. Extract 5-8 also contains the moral premise formulated above as MP-I, that they will pay ten percent more.

"You Will Never Work For The Co-op Again"

Permanent removal is suggested as follows:

Extract 5-9

Jim G.: ...why not simply say that a person's entitled to his full points if he calls and gives notice, ah, but you're not entitled to the same points, you got to call and find a substitute if you're not going to be there, that's it.

Ronnie: Is that in a row? 

Jim S.: In other words, the second time you default, you're thrown out as a working member, and you will never work for the Co-op again, so we lose a working member. [Laughter]

In other words, the second time you default, you're thrown out as a working member, and you will never work for the Co-op again, so we lose a working member. [Laughter]

The moral premise can be written:

MP-K: Defaulting people ought to be removed from the working membership. (Extract 5-9)

However, the moral premise K is apparently not heard as serious for there is laughter in Extract 5-9 following the utterance, suggesting people hear it as responding to and mocking the preceding legalistic amplification by spelling out in somewhat exaggerated detail the consequences of the preceding utterance. Such is depersonal affect.

The first utterance of Extract 5-9 begins with third person forms—"a person" and "he"—to construct the other people being described. Such descriptions are depersonal in
that they apply to any Co-op person who is in that situation regardless of who it is. Further, the first utterance switches from third person forms to "you" by which the social distance is shortened (p.22) and the other is now constructed as near, possibly even co-present. The second Jim's utterance continues the use of "you," providing another basis for the laughter, as the people co-present are most unlikely to be in a situation of defaulting, or so it would seem from their present concern with setting up a Co-op in which people would no longer need to say they would work and then not work.

The phrase "you will never work for the Co-op again" contains a use of "never" (often an indicator of moral response) which applied to Co-op policy is hyperbolic as Chapter 4 demonstrates (p.281). The existential predication contains a modal which can oscillate between a future sense and one showing compulsion for this severe sanction:

\[\text{EP: You will [in future sense] never work for the Co-op again.} \quad (\text{Extract 5-9})\]

In the dynamic of moral response evidenced here, case I is present for the polarity of the existential predication matches that of the moral premise.

\[\text{MP-L: You who are defaulting-people ought not to work for the Co-op again.} \quad (\text{Extract 5-9})\]

In the earlier discussion of this particular dynamic (p.294) the moral premise subject and collection of people were shown as "you who are not a good person in the working members."

In the analysis here which takes into account the continuous
text of the segment, those who are not good working members have been defined as "defaulting workers." In other situations, other bases for being non-good working members would also be found, such as arranging the produce with fruits preceding vegetables or not setting up an "extra table" for produce available without prior order, or selling apples by the pound when the price shown was for the piece or vice versa. (cf. Chapter 2 for other instances).

A basic moral premise concludes the utterance of Extract 5-9, which appears in the surface form as a consequence of "never" working the Co-op again, and that is that the Co-op loses a working member. The Co-op throughout its history, like most organizations, was out to retain membership.

MP-M: Good organization—people ought not to lose working members. (Extract 5-9)

There is, however, a conflict between moral premise M and the moral premise K, that defaulting people ought to be removed and L, that defaulting people ought not to work for the Co-op. No mechanism was proposed for enforcing either moral premise K or L, so to all intents and purposes, moral premise M, that working members be retained, was simply continued.

Further in the segment is another place where moral premise K, a permanent removal from the working membership reappears.
Implicit in the notion of "kicked out" is that there is some procedure or means for legally removing someone from the working membership. This was not the case, however.

Although Extract 5-10 shows a disagreement about the implications of the system being worked out to take care of instances of not working, category consensus is continued to the collection of defaulting people (p. 16). The identity of others--here defaulting people who miss two or so times working--is constructing in two quite different ways. (p.220) Sheldon identifies them as people who were "allowed to get by a couple of times" and Jim G. as a person who "skips out on two of those [trips behind the counter]" in Extract 5-10. Both are moral responses as contrasted with the more neutral existential proposition--someone did not show up to work twice.

The two utterances in Extract 5-10 show many indicators of moral response. Both talkers use "you" to refer depersonally to any of the Co-op people who do not show up to work twice. Both talkers show many disturbances in the tempo of
their talk suggestive of moral affect (indicator discussed on page 27). Jim repeats himself. "one sign up a month," is reformulated as "one time a month." "One set" becomes "one time" to describe working behind the counter, as well as two "that's" in a row and two "you's." Further he uses the perjorative "skips out" to describe the action of defaulting. Sheldon uses an empty intensifier, "really" and "kinda" as well as then replacing "You're kinda kicked out." immediately by the more severe "you're kicked out." His description of the action of defaulting uses the term for traditional morality, "allowed to get by."

It is not immediately apparent why the flow of talk should suddenly show so many indicators of moral response. Closer analysis indicates the talkers have assumed opposite positions on two of the moral premises already introduced. The perceived harshness of the moral premise K, removal from the working membership, no doubt accounts for some of it. But it is the conflict with M, the necessity of not losing working members that is at the center of the difficulty. That may help explain why this passage contains two of the total of seven instances of the use of direct address terms found in all of the segments combined. In this most direct way of identifying each other (page 220), the other people present are clearly excluded from responsibility for knowing the viewpoint of the talker, save for the one individual mentioned who has been perceived as not being aware of the viewpoint and for whatever reasons needing to be told it.
The thirteen moral premises so far derived in this chapter concern four collections of Co-op people, two found more widely (meeting and organization people) and two specific to this analysis (working members and defaulting people). The latter two have already been noted to be intermediate level collections of the subcollections of Co-op people who were actually participating in the Co-op at the time of the segment. Both of these collections of people have been identified earlier (page 323) as the intermediate level collections at which moral matters cluster in this segment.

The moral premises stated can be classified as follows:

**Good meeting-people ought**

(C) to make an additional motion for problems of default. (Extract 5-4)

**Good organization-people ought**

(A) to have two levels of markup, one for working members and one for non-working members; (Extract 5-1)
(F) not to allow more than two instances of defaulting; (Extract 5-4)
(H) not to be harmful to other people; (Extract 5-6)
(J) to preserve Co-op continuity; (Extract 5-8)
(M) not to lose working members. (Extract 5-9)

**Good working-members ought**

(B) to have a regular job or commitment to the Co-op; (Extract 5-2)
(D) not to be defaulters; (Extract 5-4)
(G) to provide a substitute if they can't perform the work themselves and/or call to report their absence in advance. (Extract 5-5)

**Defaulting-people ought**

(E) not to be permitted to default without penalty; (Extract 5-4)
to pay an additional ten percent; (Extract 5-7)
(K) to be removed from the working membership;
(Extract 5-9)
(L) not to work for the Co-op again. (Extract 5-9)

None of these moral premises show concern about others who are jointly doing Co-op work. Although MP (G) specifies a course of action such that others will know of intended absence, there is no other explicit recognition that the enterprise is a cooperative one, and that awareness of other people's work is a prime consideration. In other words, the self-interest of the Co-op people is emphasized with each effort to refine the means of sanctioning defaulting individuals—at the expense of the cooperative aspects of this work. A variety of individualism is being created here in which a cooperative ideology will not be expected even from some of those who say they will be workers. Further implications of these moral premises will be drawn once the other collections of Co-op working people are explored by means of the moral responses in the talk which were relevant to them.

Overconformity: The Overworked Coordinators

In the discussion of "New Labor," problems arose in connection with modes of distributing credits for work.

Extract 5-11

Jim S.: What we should do is, a person who works for two hours should work twice as often as a person who works for four hours. [Several start up]

Jim G.: Yeah, there's a level on which you can't do that, I mean, you know, like some people are coordinating and they're working much more than most people
and there's just no way we're going to be able to equalize that kind of thing.
["New Labor" 111-119]

The question was apparently more complex than whether two periods of two hours work equalled one period of four-hours work. For one thing, some of the working members were coordinators, people who took the responsibility of being in charge of a selling shift or a sector of the shopping or setting up. Some felt that their work was worth more. It is also noted in Extract 5-11 that some of the coordinators were "working much more than most people." As Chapter 2 noted, some individuals had always put in many hours beyond those required. Jim speaks for the Co-op organization people as he asserts that equalization is impossible:
"there's just no way we're going to be able to equalize that kind of thing." (Extract 5-11). The moral premise inherent in that utterance is:

MP-N: We as good organization-people ought to distribute work equitably. (Extract 5-12)

The underlying notion of "equity" implied is not explicated in this segment. Two separate problems are involved. Do coordinators deserve more credit for coordinating than do working members for working? If the answer is yes, then perhaps coordinators ought to work less hours for the same amount of credit. Can a coordinator who works extra hours (presumably beyond those for which the coordinator is scheduled

1 All moral responses in the segment in which there is reference to selling coordinators are used in this section. (Labor coordinator was a different status and is not included) There were 14 items which referred to "coordinating" or its lexical
be compensated in a way consistent with the rewards given to others who work the specified number of hours? To this question, Jim is expressing his view that "there's just no way we're going to be able to equalize" (Extract 5-11) the amount of work. Here he speaks for the Co-op. (cf. p. 202)

The negative statement of Jim G. is equivalent to a prediction that the Co-op will continue to have trouble distributing work equitably, much as it has had in the past. At this point a series of utterances appear in the text which could not have been anticipated in the light of the moral matters that have been considered so far. The concept of a good Co-op organization person is elaborated to include certain kinds of restraint or moderation--and excessive zeal, even in the interests of the Co-op, is denigrated. Some people will not only do the work, but also overwork.

"Just for the Sake of Keeping The Co-op Going"

The reason as to why some people do extra work is considered in the utterance which follows immediately:

Extract 5-12

Jim S.: ...the people who are coordinating, basically the way it works now, at any rate, are people who are willing to work, you know, just for the sake of keeping the Co-op going, and you know, all right, fine, you know, let them score themselves some Brownie points and keep going. [Woman laughs] Well, I'm a little---- [Laughter] ["New Labor"121-127]

equivalents. Text located in this way contained 25 indicators of moral response, from which the moral premises are stated in this section (or earlier ones pointed out.)
How does overconformity—working "much more than most people" (Extract 5-11)—here in Extract 5-12 become a subject for laughter. The overconforming coordinators have violated the "degree of expected conformity to norms of [the] group" (Merton 1957, 317), not by evasions, such as have the defaulting people, but by overwork. These overworking coordinators are not people who shirked earlier and who now are "subject to guilt engendered by previous nonconformity with the rules" (Merton, 1957, p. 152); or who were "renegades" (Merton, p. 296) and must now overconform to show their loyalty to the in-group; nor are any of them a "new convert" (Merton, p. 352), one who "becomes over-zealous in his conformity to the norms of the group because he considers himself on trial and wishes to insure his acceptance." Nor is there evidence of "overidentification with rules" (Blau, 1963). It is not suggested by the interactants that this is a form of ritualism where the overconforming coordinators respond with over-compliance to "allay the status-anxiety and anxiety over the capacity to measure up to institutionalized expectations" (Merton 1957, p. 185). The behavior is not shown as "compulsive acquiescence" of the perfectionistic observance" (p. 259 within the framework of deviant orientations proposed by Parsons (1951)). The structural sources of overconformity suggested by Merton (1957, p. 220) for the bureaucrat are totally lacking in the Co-op, as there are no incentives for disciplined action and conformity
to the official regulations." (p. 200). In the Co-op are hardly any official regulations as Chapter 2 showed. However, there is in Extract 5-12 clear evidence of Wertsrationalitate, of people who are willing to work "just for the sake of keeping the Co-op going," preferring collectivity over self.

At first glance, the moral premise which is present here in "people who are willing to work," appears to be limited to the one found above as MP-J, concerning preserving Co-op continuity. But the phrase continues, "you know, just for the sake of keeping the Co-op going." (Extract 5-12) suggesting that the motivation is being rejected; that others share this point of view is also claimed as the talker underlines his own talk with "you know". "For the sake of" implies that what follows is not the only option. Some other option is also possible, and at least needs to be taken into account. There is something other than the moral premise which can be stated as different from that of J:

MP-O Overworking coordinators ought not to work solely to preserve Co-op continuity. (Extract 5-12)

By MP-O an excess of zeal on the part of some of the coordinators in the cooperative endeavor is being deplored by one of the meeting people, who himself sometimes serves as coordinator, as do at least half of the people in the room, including Sheldon, Amy and Ronnie. There is something somehow embarrassing

1 That one might be "ashamed to admit" (p. 10) that one "acted out of sheer dedication" to an institution is noted in a feature story in the Philadelphia Inquirer of 10/9/78 which tells of those who lived within the Art Museum during a city workers' strike which closed the museum for 9 days. This temporary
about the notion of working solely for a collectivity, except perhaps for those expected to be committed on religious grounds, such as saints or those who do exceptional acts of heroism.\(^1\) It would seem that overconformity indicts those who are fulfilling their roles, but whose performance, while adequate, is motivated less by the needs of the organization and more by the needs of the individual. Though "self-interest" is not overtly mentioned in Extract 5-12, it is apparently being sacrificed by the overworking coordinators to keep the "Co-op going." Once again the meeting people show their realistic concern with individualism and lack of enthusiasm for selfless cooperation. Overconformity is not a virtue for those who feel their own performance may be shown as not matching others' performances.

In Extract 5-12, a mock reward is proposed: "Brownie points" are distributed to the overworking coordinators. Laughter follows. The ridicule is directed at those whose motivation in working for the Co-op has just been defined as "keeping the Co-op going," that is the preservation of the Co-op as a goal in itself. Such affect is depersonal. The moral premise can be stated:

\[
\text{MP-P: Overworking coordinators ought not to be rewarded. (Extract 5-12)}
\]

crew assumed makeshift living arrangements within the museum in order to safeguard it from fire, temperature or humidity change or theft. Their motivation was generally described as looking for adventure, except for one individual who admitted to institutional concern and dedication to the museum itself.

\(^1\) Urmsen (1970, cited earlier on page 29) usefully distinguishes these two categories.
Why is it that zealous work to keep the Co-op going is mocked? "Brownie points" are a trivial reward for work which is furthering Co-op goals. The answer may be found in the motivation of the others present. It would seem that some of those in the room had put in many hours in the Co-op well beyond those required as participants in the Co-op. Some had been founders of the Co-op and could be characterized as dedicated to the Co-op. They too have shown they have worked to keep the Co-op going, and so the same motivation would seem to be true of them. An explanation of the embarrassment that seems present would seem to stem from the fact that these people too were at times similarly motivated, but admission of such motivation is not acceptable, other than from "saints" or "heros." Hence the embarrassment.

Perhaps at hand is an instance of the alleged motivation for others' behavior reflecting on the way some of those who are present view their own motivation. The perspective of "sociological ambivalence" (Merton, 1976, p. 17) would seem to cast light on the fact that what is found in others as something to be denigrated is at the same time a feature of their own motivation. If their role-behavior is seen as alternately governed by a "dynamic organization of norms and counter-norms," then concerns for the Co-op and for the self can be posited as existing together. The sight of others exposed in their overconforming devotion to the Co-op requires they display that such is not a part of their behavior which they do here by mocking those who so subscribe. Concerns
for the self appear dominant then and their response displays hostility over-riding respect which they also may feel but don't show. Another imaginary reward is awarded immediately, another instance of MP-0, that working solely to preserve the Co-op is not a good thing, as another person joins in deriding the overworking coordinators.

Extract 5-13

**Martin:**... Let's give them a little cheer.
**Jim S.:** All right, yeah
**Gertrude:** That's all they have to hear now, that's all they have to hear, that they're scoring Brownie points and they'll refuse to work.

["New Labor" 128-132]

The awards can be seen as a mock-effort by the meeting-people to correct an inaccuracy which occurs if the coordinators are shown as the ones whose motivation is, at least for the most part, to keep the Co-op going. The overconforming coordinators are subverting those engaged in role compliance, and these rewards, mock though they may be, restore a balance by supplying additional rewards, beyond that of keeping the Co-op going. Granted that the coordinators know nothing of this effort, however, it readjusts the light in which those who are present are seen in, since the motivation of those who overworked has been tarnished, and they no longer are shown as working "just for the sake of the Co-op" (Extract 5-10), but have also been awarded Brownie points and sarcastic cheers.

The reason for having this meeting in the first place was to find ways of making changes in the Co-op so that it could continue in the face of greatly decreased sales, and a
much smaller number of people that participated than in the "Early Days." Since the Co-op at this point in the "Middle Period" was showing signs of not being a stable, effective social organization, it is not surprising that ways to integrate group and self-interest would need to be considered.

In Extract 5-13, alarm is displayed with the categorical expression, "all they have to hear...." Concern is being expressed that the talk might be heard by those it denigrates. The moral premise presumed is:

MP-Q: Good meeting-people ought not to engage in denigrating talk. (Extract 5-13)

In Extract 5-13 are suggested unfavorable consequences if others not present heard a report of this discussion. Gertrude thus attributes to the overworking coordinators a concern for how others regard them greater than their concern for keeping the Co-op going. She displays concern that moral premise D, that working members ought not to be defaulters, will be violated, as she cautions the meeting people.

"I Guess Our House Just Scrapes By On Labor"

Gertrude's perspective is not the only one displayed at the meeting on this point. She is a working member, as was Martin above who proposed the cheer. In Jim's initial utterance in Extract 5-12, he excludes himself from the collection of overworking coordinators by saying "let them score themselves" rather than "us." Then he exempts himself from the same collection in another way as the text continues.
Sheldon: Well, that's certainly true of any coordinator who doesn't come from a large house, but, you know, people like myself who come from a large enough house, I guess our house just scrapes by on labor and we coordinate... ["New Labor" 133-139]

Sheldon partitions the collection of overworking coordinators so as to exempt from the characterization the coordinators who come "from large enough houses." His is such a communal house, and he speaks for his house as he describes a different situation there. Sheldon's contribution reflects the fact that the communes were having difficulty in fulfilling requirements of working at the Co-op, that is of not defaulting, as proposed by moral premise D. Jim S., who is also from a large house shows consensus to the collection of coordinators from large houses by underlining with "yeah," in Extract 5-14. In this way, Jim S. locates himself and his commune in this collection of coordinators who, far from overworking, are having problems getting enough time in so as to complete their share.

The subset of working members and coordinators who lived in communes displayed a variety of different styles of collective living. They were in agreement however that communal living required there be some use of cooperative principles in organizing their households. Most had belonged to the original organization of communes that had established the Co-op in the first place (cf. Chapter 2). However, in their current relation to the Co-op, these commune members who are
present do not transfer their emphasis on collectivity to their current relations with the Co-op. In Extract 5-14, the communes are shown as having difficulty in mobilizing individuals within their houses in order to complete their Co-op labor requirements. Self-interests rather than Co-op interests are dominant, in terms of relations with those outside of the communes. Even Sheldon later in this segment emphasizes self by referring to what in Extract 5-14 was "our house" as "my house" (line 176) and still later talks as if the markup which the commune got was his own "and then when I want to get my lower markup I..." (180).

The emphasis of the moral premises in this section is on the overworking coordinators, and what the overworking coordinators ought not to do:

**Good meeting-people ought**

(Q) not to engage in denigrating talk. (Extract 5-13)

**Good organization-people ought**

(N) to distribute work equitably. (Extract 5-12)

**Overworking-coordinators ought**

(O) not to work solely to preserve Co-op continuity; (Extract 5-12)

(P) not to be rewarded. (Extract 5-12)

These moral premises reflect the problem presented by the overworking coordinators to the Co-op, the seeming paradox that an organization ideologically committed to the morality of cooperation and pragmatically convened to find ways of making sure the organization has continuity should have committed members mocking other members who are apparently doing
the most for the organization. Regardless of their motives, their performance is what identifies them as doing the most. Their over-conformity (which is literally an over-performance) is sanctioned, and the moral premises which emerge (O and P) show a negative sanctioning of this deviant behavior, albeit the deviancy is one that advances the organization. The problem is that it does so at the expense of the Co-op people who are made to appear inadequate for what would under any other circumstances be seen as adequate role performance for the regular workers and coordinators.

Exchange, Entitle Or Earn: The Regular Workers

The talk in the segment which particularly concerns the "regular working members" is focused upon the markup.1 The section of this chapter on "defaulting workers" introduced the possibility of using a markup as a sanction (moral premise H). From the point of view of the working members, the surcharge would then be defined as a sanction that would be invoked if any of them did not fulfill their duties as working members. It can also be seen as a surcharge leveled for the privilege of not working. Further, it might be seen as an exchange of money for services or as a right of a working member, something that working members might feel that they deserved for having done their work. Each of these possibilities-

1 "Markup" was the lexical item used to locate the talk concerning the regular job, as newly defined at this meeting. There were 16 mentions of "markup" or its equivalent in the segment, and they included 14 indicators of moral response, which are all present in the four extracts used in this section of the chapter.
ties can be found in the talk of the meeting people and
will be considered shortly. In all these cases, the markup
is describable as paying "an additional ten percent." (Ex-
tact 5-8)

"You Get The Lower Markup"/"Yeah, You Earn It"

On the other hand, if the starting collection of people
consists of the non-working people, then the markup is defined
by them as a discount offered to those who want to work. From
From that perspective then, ten percent is saved by being
a working member, and the non-working member "pays the ten
percent" (Extract 5-7) which is not seen as an addition,
but has already been included in the price of the item.1

Extract 5-15

Glen: ...if there is some problem,
well that's, something he accepts, and pays the ten
percent, I mean, or whatever it is. [Tempo Speeds up]
Jim S.: Oh, Yeah, oh that's a
better idea, in other words, in other words, each time,
each time you do your job, you get the lower markup.
Glen: Yeah, you earn it.
Jim S.: ...[Several start up] Ok, let's say you're, you're
working once every three weeks, you work once, so for
the next three weeks you get the lower markup.
"Yes," "No," Lots of hubbub.
["New Labor" 066-076]

In Extract 5-15 the lower markup is described as a result of

---

1 There is a slight dollar and cents difference in the two
perspectives. Working members paid $9.00 for the food for which
non-working members paid $10.00. If the working-member cost
of $9.00 is taken as base, and an additional ten percent
added, the non-working cost would be $9.90. For ease in
calculating the amount of money to be paid on Produce Day,
the procedure that was used was to deduct ten percent from
the posted price to get the working member price. This 90¢
or $1.00 savings was on the average 45¢ or 50¢, since the
median food order at this time was about $5.00. (cf. Chap. 2)
being a working member. The existential predication "you get the lower markup" refers to a future state where receiving the markup will be a regular feature of the Co-op procedure. In this formulation the working member is exchanging money for service, once some work is done. From the point of view of the Co-op, role performance of the status of working member is linked as an obligation to the markup.

EP: Each time you do your job, you get the lower markup.  
(Extract 5-15)

MP-R: Good working members ought to get the lower markup.  
(Extract 5-15)

The dynamic of moral response is straightforward, EP and MP matching (case I, 294). However, there immediately follows "Yeah, you earn it," which proposes another means of linking the working member and the markup. There is a second moral premise:

MP-S: Good working-members ought to earn the lower markup.  
(Extract 5-15)

In Extract 5-15 the introduction of "earn" is underlined by "Yeah" by which category consensus (p. 162) is continued to the collection of working members, although an alternative relation of the working member to the markup has been proposed. "Earn" has been noted earlier as an instance of the traditional vocabulary of moral response (as shown by indicator 3, page 270). The Concise Oxford affirms the location of "earn" as an item suggesting moral matters, defining "earn" as "obtain as reward of labour, or merit." An echo of a Puritan notion of work as requiring individual effort is being proposed here by the use of this term which indicates the presence of moral matters.
But what difference is being insisted on here? "Getting" the lower markup is consistent with "earning" it. Both predicates concern the "rights" of working members to privileges. Both predicates are consistent with an exchange of goods and services. However, there is a sense in which "getting" is an automatic procedure and "earning" is not. "Earn" implies that work has been done in order to achieve something. "Get" suggests that the declaration of a status of working member in itself warrants the individual having the lower prices. The question then is, is the "right" to a lower markup automatically obtained by assuming the status of a working member (moral premise R)? Or, is the "right" earned in compensation for performing the activities of a working member (moral premise S)? The difference is that between a "right" which exists regardless of the particular style, degree or extent of the fulfilling of obligations, and an "earned right" which exists only by dint of fulfilling of obligations. As the earlier section on defaulting workers has shown, not all Co-op people always had fulfilled all the obligations of cooperative work. Their prior experience with a Co-op in which everyone was a working member has shown that there were a variety of styles, degrees and extents by which obligations were fulfilled, up to and including not fulfilling obligations at all.

It is thus possible to characterize two parallel collections of working members projected, those for whom the lower markup is a consequence of being a working member regardless
of the performance, and those for whom the lower markup is to be tied to a recurring performance where it is earned each time. There are, however, three other ways in which people are related to markup in the talk. In the original proposition in Extract 5-1, the relationship was "to have" two levels of markup, shown in moral premise A. This also appears in Extract 5-6 as "you have a higher markup." These seem to be a neutral case, as opposed to "pay" which was introduced in Extract 5-7 and 5-8, stated in moral premise I, that defaulting workers ought to pay an additional ten percent. This also appears in the following:

Extract 5-16

Martin: ... they'll pay an additional ten percent [Loud, stressed]

Jim S.: But the point is, the point is they don't pay an additional ten percent only that Thursday, they do it for three weeks in a row, cause they're only working--

Jim G.: Even so, also you have an impossible book-keeping problem why, why not, why not, why not simply

Jim S.: Yeah that's true

Jim G.: Say that a person's entitled to his full points if he calls and gives notice, ah, but you're not entitled to the same points, you got to call and find a substitute if you're not going to be there, that's it.

["New Labor" 082-094]

A third concept of the markup is reflected in the word "entitled," which more explicitly states that the markup is a privilege. "Entitled" appears twice: "a person's entitled to his full points if he calls and gives notice, ah, but you're not entitled to the same point, you got to..."

(Extract 5-16; cited in part earlier in Extracts 5-9)

1 These extracts, which include mention of "full point" and "same point," precede in the segment the mention of "Brownie points" in Extract 5-12.
Further insight into the differences among "earn," "get," and "entitled" can be obtained by following the changes in the way in which the collection of working members is filled here.

In Chapter 3, a means of systematizing and exploiting references to people in talk was presented, with special emphasis on the location of people within collections of people and indication of the way people are being shown as good people. Any lexical or syntactic indication of people in talk was formulated as the construction of the self, where a major problem was the risk of not showing the self as good, or as the construction of others, where identity was often the major problem talkers and interactants (and analysts) faced. Beginning with the assumption that there are many more or less identical ways of referring to an individual (e.g., name, pronoun, descriptive or characterizing phrase such as "fighting" or "about 5'11"), then the construction of people in talk can be seen as governed by considerations other than or supplementary to identity, such as showing social location (the collections of people in which the individual, self or others, are shown) or social distance (the relation between individuals within such collections of people, distinguished simply here are remote or near).

In Extract 5-16, the identity of the person was not specified by the talker. The phrase "a person entitled" is a depersonal device where any of the Co-op workers could be supplied (one of the indicators of moral matters, page 275).
However, the person who is "entitled to his full points" becomes a "you" who is "not entitled to the same point."

Although the identity of the person referred to in Extract 5-16 remains unspecified, these alternative means of constructing the other reduce social distance (p. 227). "You" makes it more likely for those who are co-present to be co-involved in what is being said, even to considering themselves the people talked to. "Entitled" suggests "rights" that are not only to be given, but in a sense are also owed to the working member. This is not to say, however, that the person necessarily deserves the lower markup. In an analysis of the notion of deserving, Feinberg (1970, p. 57) proposed that in addition to being eligible ("a state of not being disqualified") and satisfying a "sufficient condition" by which the person can claim "according to the rules he is entitled to it" deserving suggests satisfying "certain conditions of worthiness," (p. 57) which are not "requirements specified by some rule," (p. 56) but rather by private standards or principles.\footnote{Here a Wertsrationalität is introduced, but not that of the Co-op, but rather a personal code.}

"Maybe That Person Would Be A Good Working Member"

The text returns to the question of "earn" and "get," in the following and nearly last mention of a "markup."

Extract 5-17

Sheldon: But the problem is that, is like somebody said, you're losing a working member, when you're maybe that person would be a good working member, you know, where if you could have a system where instead of being, it being negative, it was positively based, ah like when
The first utterance refers to an earlier utterance (Extract 5-9) but the quotation here is not quite the same. Earlier, Jim S. had said "we lose a working member" and Sheldon here says "you're losing a working member." Both formulations are evidence of the moral premise (M), that the organization ought not to lose members. Either Sheldon or Jim could speak for the organization people and could have used "we" here. Sheldon did not do so, but rather seemingly removes himself from the collection by using "you." In addition Sheldon uses the phrase "depending on the size of your house" rather than directly referring to his house by some such construction as "in the case of my (or our) house."

Since Sheldon is an individual in both collections of people (organization people and his commune), the use of "you" is an instance of "possible self" (cf Chapter 3.), by which Sheldon avoids constructions which would have shown him as unequivocally included. Why? Sheldon had in the past served as labor coordinator, and the system he describes in the lines following Extract 5-17 reflects a belief that that system was "positively based" (Extract 5-17), and would not have a result of "losing a working member." Avoiding self in Extract 5-17 then avoids the risk to self of being associated directly with a rival system.

1 In "Paid Manager" Chapter 6, another instance of the status of labor coordinator creating problems is shown.
Sheldon has introduced in Excerpt 5-17 the notion of a "good working member" (the only instance of people being characterized as "good" in the transcripts with regard to work). The use of this indicator of moral response (evaluative qualifier) is one of a cluster of indications of moral matters in this passage, including modals (could, would) depersonalized others ("you" appears 5 times; "that person" once). Here is an instance of case I of the dynamic of moral response, where the existential predication is in the same polarity as the moral premise.

**EP:** If you could have a system where instead of being, it being negative, it was positively based. (Extract 5-17)

**MP-T:** Good organization—people ought to have a system based on doing work, not on sanctioning. (Extract 5-17)

The notion of "positively based" leads directly here to "earned," not only on Sheldon's part, but also on Jim's.

The utterance of Sheldon's in Excerpt 5-17 appears collaboratively produced, as Jim G. supplied the phrase "earned your markup" to fit the subject "you" used by Sheldon. The phrase "earned your markup" is an instance of interactive repetition by which category consensus is provided to the collection of working members who earn their markup. As Sheldon repeats the phrase, the subcollection is emphasized, pointing sharply to the moral matters indicated by the term "earn." The use of "earn" here emphasizes the notion of individual effort. The system proposed by Sheldon starts with a person doing a certain amount of work. There is no mention of others working, of
this being co-operative work, and so this is again an instance of people individually achieving their own lower markup. They "earn it," rather than get it automatically. Extract 5-17 gives a less ambiguous view than the earlier discussion of how the markup is to be achieved.

Sheldon's description of how the system would operate includes the notion of storing up work, of future commitment, characteristic of a Puritan attitude to work, and consistent with the notion of "earn."

Extract 5-18

Sheldon: ...it just has to be recorded, you know, five little blocks that are filled in, and then when I want to get my lower markup, I use up those five blocks and they're crossed off [Several talk at once] and if I work-- ["New Labor" 179-183]

In Extract 5-18 Sheldon uses the phrase "get my lower markup" where he is talking of a markup which had already been earned, and hence cannot talk in the present tense of "earning the markup," since it has already been done. A break occurs as several people start talking and category consensus comes to an end. ( p.189 ) The immediate next utterance begins "we really got off here."

... ... ... ... 

The focus on markups itself has indicated that workers were expected to need additional incentives for being workers beyond that provided by the "reasonably priced" food of the Co-op. The moral premises in this section make this clear:
Good organization—people ought

(T) to have a system based on doing work, not on sanctioning. (Extract 5-17)

Good working—members ought

(R) to get the lower markup; (Extract 5-15)
(S) to earn the lower markup. (Extract 5-15)

Both moral premises R and S are consistent with the two levels as is the use of the two level markup system as a means of sanctioning default as was shown earlier by moral premise I. To favor a system based on doing work (T) can be reconciled with the use of the markup system for sanctioning default by shifting the emphasis from defaulting to working.

There is however an inconsistency in the several means adopted to bolster the cooperative enterprise. Introducing a differential markup in the first place suggests that the Co-op people recognized that a stronger appeal to individualistic motives was needed, and that the motivation to participate cooperatively previously in effect was just too weak to bring in the amount of labor needed. The earlier discussion of defaulting people again emphasized an individualistic approach in which different sanctioning arrangements were proposed, including losing the markup and being excluded from the working membership. Although the problem was never discussed as such, it would seem that the meeting people recognized that the problem of the labor shortage was that the Co-op had become less of a cooperative and more of an individualistic enterprise.
Having completed this discussion of the three collections of Co-op workers, I am ready to re-examine the initial model of cooperation set in Chapter 1.

Good a, b, c...n in C ought to Y, where a, b, c...n were individuals, C was the Co-op (consisting of cooperating people) and Y was some set of activities, attitudes, and categories which were relevant. The examples of cooperative activity in the literature and the activity of the Co-op show certain additional features that seem to characterize this concept. (1) Each of the individuals a, b, c...n know that at least another individual in the set is also so engaged. That is, one person alone does not constitute a cooperating person, unless that person assumes that others are so oriented. (2) The collection C has some recognized and serious purpose in which a, b, c...n will likely share. In the Co-op this is taken to be to provide reasonably priced food weekly. These features will play an important role in consolidating the opposition of cooperation and individualism in the Co-op.

Many of the expressions used in the segment by the meeting people portray the defaulting people as dishonest and impute to them a tendency to deceit. But this interpretation is not the only one possible for not showing up to work. Although an individual may take on a commitment to work cooperatively with others, a limitation of this obligation can be recognized in the light of the individual's responsi-
bility to self: minimizing the need to fulfill the contract when the obligation can rightly be seen as conflicting with other obligations which the individual needs to attend to. A good Co-op member (a, b, c ... n) knows that others are engaged in doing Co-op work, and expects others will continue to do the work, whether or not they themselves appear. Such an emphasis on self and self interest and de-emphasis on the obligations to other individuals provides a basis for relating cooperation and individualism.

I shall locate the Co-op and its working membership in a continuum of cooperation to individualism drawing on some of the notions already discussed in Chapter 1 (page 32). Zablocki (1971) sets out "individual achievement" as opposing cooperative activity, whereas Rigby (1974) locates the value of "competitive individualism" as counterposed to "the values of co-operation and brotherhood between people" (page 34). The "social and egalitarian ideals" considered by Kanter (1973) in studies of 19th century communes included both those in which there was a balance between individual and collective goals and those in which there was a selfless cooperation in which everything was invested in a collective goal. Collecting these insights suggests the possibility of four types of social relations which can be ordered roughly with regard to prevailing orientation to degree of individual expression. To do this I am stipulating that the emphasis on "competitive" individualism is one in which actions which are possibly detrimental to others are included, where as with "achieving"
individualism, I assume an emphasis more on self activity with no necessary concern to better others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type (1)</th>
<th>Type (2)</th>
<th>Type (3)</th>
<th>Type (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>competitive individualism</td>
<td>achieving individualism</td>
<td>ordinary cooperation</td>
<td>selfless cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "overworking coordinators" belong in this last collection (Type 4) of people, whereas the regular workers and coordinators fit in the less rigorous or more ordinary sort of cooperation (Type 3). The "defaulting members" however, do not fit in either of these two categories of cooperation, but are oriented towards individual goals (Type 2). Competition among Co-op people never was the case and (Type 1) never occurred.

The initial social organization of the Co-op was a case of (Type 3), although even at that point, the Co-op's operation was individualistic in the sense that produce went to the individuals who had ordered it. There was no suggestion that Co-op people would use the products collectively. When there was a shortage, the reputation of the Co-op suffered, but there was little awareness of the position of the Co-op as a whole. Deviancy from (Type 3) by both the defaulting workers (Type 2) and by the overworking coordinators (Type 4) is illustrated throughout the segment, but from the start, some Co-op members showed the characteristics of Type 2 quite prominently and decided individually when, if at all, they would work for the Co-op. From the start too there were always individuals who worked more than others, showing the
characteristics of Type 4 (cf. background information in Chapter 2 concerning working cooperatively p. 95 and not so cooperatively.)

Close analysis of the segment also makes clear that at least some of the Co-op people present felt that the people of Type 2 had taken advantage of them. In the "New Labor" segment, Martin expresses the fear that the new system being considered might continue the practice of workers saying "I can't do it this Thursday..." (Extract 5-8) and not appearing to do their share of work. The relevant moral premises found in the segment are these:

Defaulting-people ought

(E) not to be permitted to default without penalty; (Extract 5-4)
(I) to pay an additional ten percent; (Extract 5-7)
(K) to be removed from the working membership; (Extract 5-9)
(L) not to work for the Co-op again. (Extract 5-9)

These moral premises represent the range of attitudes shown in the segment concerning the defaulting people. By MP-E, where a penalty is predicated, the notion of dereliction is relevant, and they would seem to be being punished, as would be true of MP-K where they would be removed as workers, but might continue as non-working members and by MP-L where the extreme step of removal from the Co-op is proposed. However, by MP-I, paying an additional ten percent, an exchange framework is relevant, where those who do the extra work are compensated by the lower price, whereas those who do not do the work (the defaulting people) pay an additional ten percent.
But there is a surprisingly negative response in their attitude to the individuals of Type 4. The offering of mock rewards (during the time they are discussing real rewards) can be understood as a response to those who are putting other Co-op people in a bad light, working without apparent thought of reward, but "just for the sake of keeping the Co-op going." (Extract 5-12). As was shown earlier in this chapter, such a response of over-compliance is particularly acute for those within the same collection of people, others who are also coordinators, but whose role-performance has not been characterized along lines which emphasize the interests of the Co-op. The moral premises identified reflect this feeling of a threat:

_Overworking-coordinators ought_

(N) not to work solely to preserve Co-op continuity; (Extract 5-12)

(O) not to be rewarded. (Extract 5-12)

In the light of moral premise J, that organization people ought to preserve Co-op continuity, (which appears in the opposing surface form "that destroys the continuity" (Extract 5-8) and is readily seen as a goal which contradicts the underlying goal of the Co-op; labelled as case II earlier of dynamic of moral response) moral premise N seems contradictory. The word "solely" in (N) suggests additional motivation need be present, a more rational motivation (Zwecksrational) in addition to the moral motivation (Wertsrational) with regard to working in the Co-op. Moral premise (O) echoes the same theme, that such overconformity does not warrant approbation,
or reward of any sort, and indeed is mocked by the giving of mock-rewards, Brownie points and a "little cheer."

The meeting-people achieved a new system in which there was no stigma attached to the status of not working and everybody who worked would have to have a reward. Five moral premises which emerged concern the working members

Good working-members ought

(B) to have a regular job or commitment to the Co-op; (Extract 5-2)
(D) not to be defaulters; (Extract 5-4)
(G) to provide a substitute if they can't perform the work themselves and/or call to report their absence in advance; (Extract 5-6)
(R) to get the lower markup; (Extract 5-15)
(S) to earn the lower markup. (Extract 5-15)

At the same time as the meeting people removed the necessity of cooperative work, they replaced it with a choice of either not doing any work or of working and getting a bonus for working. They set up a system which appeals to individual self interest and ignores any concern with the collectivity. The new moral premises of (R) and (S) are two versions of how the working members are going to be rewarded; but both are for individual rewards for individual work.

The question posed at the beginning of the chapter was; how could a major change in the ideology of cooperation be accomplished without discussion of the value of cooperative work? The question can be answered in the framework of the analysis of structural changes developed in this chapter. As a result of the new system, the Co-op remained a cooperative, but it was restructured to fit the complexities of a world where not everyone had the same time, desire, interest or need.
to save money. There was no regret expressed that not everyone would be cooperatively working together at the Co-op. Although they would not all work cooperatively at getting food, they were still mutually engaged in being part of a buying club. At the same time the meeting people further refined the category of working member, discussing whether working members earned, automatically got, or were entitled to the lower markup.

The initial system of having everyone cooperatively participating as a working member, therefore, was recognized to be unrealistic. This system had relied on people signing themselves up for work and then doing it with only sporadic supervision or none at all. It was easy to get away without working as there were so many others to do the work. As Chapter 2 showed, the turnover was large during the Early Days (and a spirit of happy anarachy prevailed.) When the volume of such cooperative work declined it was more obvious that some people were not fulfilling their requirements and that others were putting in hours beyond their quota. The change in the Co-op structure legitimated what was already the case, that if the labor system were responsibly organized and people who said they would work did work, then not everybody need be a cooperating workers and legitimated status of non-working members could be part of the Co-op organization.

The proposed changes were to ensure a greater control of working members both by people having regular job assignments and by the crew system. In this system, people repeatedly
worked with the same individuals and were known to the others in the crew who would notice (as would the session coordinator) who had showed up to do the work and who was absent. It was then possible to carry out sanctions for defaulting. Those who wanted to be workers were thus safeguarded against being taken advantage of by others who might cheat. A system in which there was control over the labor supply would also make it possible to schedule sufficient workers and coordinators for each session. The need for overwork to keep the Co-op going would be eliminated, except in emergency situations where last-minute absences would result in people taking on work beyond that needed to fill their quotas.

An answer to the central question is that there was no discussion of abandoning cooperation as a principle because it had long ceased to be a feature of the Co-op morality. A change in practice had occurred as individuals used the Co-op without putting in cooperative or any other kind of labor. This change in practice set the stage for adaptations that were not explicitly recognized in the ideology. The adaptation was a structural change which legitimated people participating in the Co-op without putting in cooperative labor. The cooperative ideology of the Co-op was modified to fit the practical exigencies of everyday experience in operating the Co-op in which some people did not see cooperative work as a central part of Co-op participation.

I have made an effort to characterize this change in
ideology in terms of three of the four points in the continuing
ranging from pure individualism to pure cooperation. The or-
ganization was founded as a cooperative, but it is unlikely that
it ever operated wholly as a cooperative (Type 3). It was
never expected to be Type 4 in which selfless cooperation
was organized to a single goal, as in a monastery. People
who were said to work "just for the sake of keeping the Co-op
going" (Extract 5-12) were denigrated. The prevalence of
people who acted in terms of immediate self-interest
(Type 2) led to the need for sellers instead of having
people take their own food. It also led to chronic labor
shortages. The changes in the organization effected by the
meeting—people only legalized a type 2 situation, an individu-
alism that long existed, perhaps since the beginning.

The ideology of cooperation in Types 3 and 4 may have
brought some people into the Co-op at the outset. But it
is unlikely that the practice corresponded for long to that
initial ideology. An erosion of actual cooperative practices
led to the recognition of these changes in practice. The
changes were structurally enacted still within the initial
ideology, tempered by the actual experience of the Co-op in
which Type 2 behavior ideology was also a mode of participa-
tion.

If this conclusion is accepted, the question might still
be posed whether the same results might have been obtained
by more traditional methods of analysis. Some of the elements
of this analysis might well appear in similar form in a content-analysis or other mode of sociological analysis. For instance, the formal proposals of the meeting (Extract 5-1) are readily found. These distinguish working and non-working statuses, but the role definitions shown in the moral premises on page 5-47 (B, D, G, R, and S) are not readily assembled through any set of value terms. The I.P.A. could readily distinguish for example the interactional activities of giving opinions, requesting information, or showing solidarity (and the other categories by which the process of the interaction is surveyed), but has no means of marking moral response. Modes of conversation analysis attend to underlying interactional structure, construction of speech activity, or interpersonal relationships, but also do not distinguish moral matters relevant to the people in talk.

Besides moral premises, other elements essential to the communication of moral matters can be more readily identified through this analysis. (1) The alternation between "earning" and "getting" a markup was a feature of the talk. It did not become a focus of discussion, yet it reveals a difference between a Co-op in which a reward is an automatic feature of declaring oneself to be a working member and one in which people must exchange their efforts for a reward. (2) Criticism of the overworked coordinators appeared only in a few humorous utterances by which Brownie points and mock cheers were distributed. Although overconformity and overcompliance
have been identified in other settings by other analysis (cf. earlier in this Chapter), they have more often been associated with ritualistic behavior, not a factor in Co-op activities. The humor points to a discomfort on the part of some of those who do not qualify as good people of Type 4 (selfless cooperating people) but do so in Type 3 (ordinary cooperating people). (3) A parallel criticism of the defaulters—"Before we say you can't work" (Extract 5-4) and "Don't let them get away with it" (Extract 5-5)—was cast in ordinary language that is not easily codified in content analysis. Here both "you" and "them" refer to the defaulting people, the first hypothetically restricting their participation, and the second expressing the desire to punish them. These three elements emerged from the line-by-line analysis.

The analysis also developed a description of the value system of the Co-op, and the Co-op people that was actually employed during the period. A review of the moral premises extracted shows that several are more general in scope than the three collections of Co-op workers. Seven moral premises have as their subject the Co-op organization people. Each of these represents an aspect of the Co-op which appeared as policies and practices were changed. Only the first one is drawn from an explicit proposal of the meeting. The others represent underlying evaluations and obligations that the analysis located in the talk.
Good organization—people ought

(A) to have two levels of markup, one for working members and one for nonworking members; (Extract 5-11)
(F) not to allow more than two instances of defaulting; (Extract 5-4)
(H) not to be harmful to other people; (5-6)
(J) to preserve Co-op continuity; (5-8)
(M) not to lose working members; (Extract 5-9)
(N) to distribute work equitably; (Extract 5-9)
(T) to have a system based on doing work, not on sanctioning. (Extract 5-17)

These seven moral premises represent general features of the Co-op value system. They also might not appear in a content analysis since they are not labelled in talk as statements of values or obligation, and hence not easily recognized as statements of moral matters on first reading.

would not appear in this form in an analysis of the interaction (e.g., Bailes (1950) IPA) for they are values of organization, and are not aspects of the functional problems of the interaction. Opinions of individual Co-op people on the subject of the moral premises could have been elicited by questions posed in interviews once the subject matter was known. A surveyer might inquire if a respondent believed the Co-op ought to distribute work equitably but the surveyer would have little reason to inquire about attitudes toward Co-op continuity or to the desirability of a system of markup. I did not raise such questions in the interviews I conducted myself as I had not yet recognized this as an underlying feature of moral matters. Had I asked such questions, the answers would represent individual opinions which could not be accepted, rejected or reacted to by others in the Co-op. The mode of analysis here uses data produced within a group situation.
These data can not be automatically elevated to the position of "opinions of the group," but they have a better chance of representing such opinions than those opinions that are privately given in response to private inquiry. The moral premises represent an underlying consensus by the meeting people at some point in time, and at that time, unless contradicted or modified by others, represent the ideology of those present. The moral premises remain the reflections of moral matters which were actually used in the talk.

In the last lines of the segment, Joel defines the preceding discussion as one "on the intricacies of labor or something."

Extract 5-19

Joel: We really got off here, ah on something far beyond what we had spent an hour and a half discussing, which was a markup situation, now we're on the intricacies of labor or something, and we still got half a proposal sitting here, which I think--

Amy: It's this half of the proposal that we're talking about, how we're going to organize the labor so that the work gets done.

["New Labor" 184-192]

Amy objects to this characterization and redefines what Joel had said, emphasizing the goal of organizing "the labor force so that the work gets done." She might have added "cooperatively," but she didn't. The analysis of the talk has shown that it was no longer an expected feature of the Co-op ideology.
"NEW LABOR" Segment

Amy: Can we get a sense of the meeting now on just this as a general proposal?

Joel: Yeah, it's a two part proposal, and there, it's again that we would have two levels of markup, one for working members and one for nonworking members. Ok, vote on that by a show of hands. Let's take that much.

Amy: Show of hands, in favor, and opposed, one abstention? [Laughs] And second part, again, rather simple, um, it is proposed, it is proposed that working members are to have a regular job or commitment to the Co-op.

Sheldon: That's rather ambiguous.

Jim S.: As opposed to signing up every month on an ad hoc basis for vacant positions.

Joel: Right.

Amy: Does everyone understand everything.

Mickey: Yeah, I can stand that.

Ronnie: It's a discussion point. Maybe we should word it a little more clearly.

Ronnie: Are working members only going to be considered people who work during the hours the Co-op is open, and, you know, like I think we're going to have to define it a little, a working members more closely. [Loud footsteps; coughs]

Martin: Why is it a problem, I mean, what possible ambiguities can you run into?

Ronnie: Well, let's say somebody can't work during the Co-op hours, but volunteer to do the labor coordinating.

Martin: That's working. Several start up! What about the possibility is a working member in default, how long, I think it might be made about it saying something about problems of default, spelling out how long we can go with a default before we say "You can't work," or are a hard ma-ma.

Jim S.: Twice.

Jack: Yeah, I think twice is the maximum we should allow.

Glen: It doesn't seem to me a tremendous hardship to have it, well I guess it depends on the circumstances.

Mickey: I don't understand what you mean.

Jim S.: In other words, somebody has to make a commitment to come every Thursday morning to do this sel-
"NEW LABOR" (cont'd.)

Glen: I don't see, I mean if you have a higher markup you might want to say one time, If he has made an effort I would say then don't let them get away with it no more than twice in a row, ah [Loud, stressed]--

Jim S.: Unhuh

and then he has called the labor coordinator I mean, it isn't as if you totally screwed the guy [Fast, loud],

Yeah yeah

Glen: I mean, I mean, you could make it with more than one exception, or something like that, although I don't see why you would make it more than once, because even if the guy is just honestly, just, if there is some problem, well, that's something he accepts, and pays the ten percent, I mean, or whatever it is. [Tempo speeds up]

Jim S.: Oh, Yeah, oh that's a better idea, in other words, in other words, each time,

each time you do your job, you get the lower markup.

Glen: Yeah, you earn it.

[Several start up] Ok, let's say you're, you're working once every three weeks, you work once, so for the next three weeks you get the lower markup.

"Yes," "No." Lots of hubbub]

Martin: No, that's, that destroys, that destroys the continuity, that gives people an option simply to stop doing it once like "I can't do it this Thurs--

Jim S.: Right

and all of a sudden all the sellers find, "We can't make it this Thursday," they'll pay an additional ten percent [Loud, stressed]

Jim S.: But the point is, the point is they don't pay an additional ten percent only that Thursday, they do it for three weeks in a row, cause they're only working--

Even so, also, you have an impossible book--

keeping problem why, why not, why not, why not simply

Jim S.: Yeah that's true

Jim G.: say that a person's entitled to his full points if he calls and gives notice, ah, but you're not entitled to the same points, you got to call and find a substitute if you're not going to be there, that's it.

Ronnie: Is that in a row?

Jim S.: In other words, the second time you default, you're thrown out as a working member, and you will never work for the Co-op again, so we lose a working member. [Laughter]

Dottie: I'm confused because I'm not sure what the limits are going to be, what are the qualifications for a working member,
"NEW LABOR" (cont'd)

103 you know, like a person comes in on the Thursday,
104 and works for two hours, get the same type of
105 markup as the person comes and works for four
106 hours.

107 Jim G.: We haven't decided what should be a minimum
108 commitment, I think we have to say, each working
109 member has to put in a minimum of X, now what that
110 X is we haven't figured out yet.

111 Jim S.: What we should do is,
112 a person who works for two hours should work twice
113 as often as a person who works for four hours.

114 [Several start up]

115 Jim G.: Yeah, there's a level on which you can't do
116 that, I mean, you know, like some people are coordi-
117 nating and they're working much more than most people
118 and there's just no way we're going to be able to
119 equalize that kind of thing.

120 Jim S.: Oh well, basically, let's
121 put it this way, the people who are coordinating,
122 basically the way it works now, at any rate, are people
123 who are willing to work, you know, just for the sake
124 of keeping the Co-op going, and you know, all right,
125 fine, you know, let them score themselves some
126 Brownie points and keep going, [Woman laughs] Well,
127 I'm a little-- [Laughter] Well,
128 Martin: Let's give them a little cheer.
129 Jim S.: all right, yeah.

130 Gertrude: That's all they have to hear now,
131 that's all they have to hear, that they're scoring
132 Brownie points and they'll refuse to work.

133 Sheldon: Well, that's
certainly true of, that's certainly true of any
135 coordinator who doesn't come from a large house, but,
136 you know, people like myself who come from large enough
137 Jim S.: Yeah
138 Sheldon: houses, I guess our house just has to get by on
139 labor and we coordinate, also I think the, it seems to
140 me like really a kind of sticky point to have this
141 working member system a thing where ah, you know, Jim,
142 you're allowed to get by a couple of times, and then
143 you're kind of kicked out, you're kicked out of working
144 membership.

145 Jim G.: But Sheldon, we're talking about a level
146 of work that's, that's, you know, one sign up a month,
147 you know, one set, one trip a month, you come in and
148 you, you do it, a thing, a trip behind the counter,
149 and if a person skips out on two of those, I mean,

150 Jim S: Right
151 Jim G.: you know.

152 Sheldon: Not necessarily, for instance you know,
153 the way that you, that your house was filling was that
154 somebody had to come every week, so that is, right,
"NEW LABOR" (cont'd.)

Jim G.: Yeah, well because it was a whole house.
Sheldon: But the problem is that, is like somebody said, you're losing a working member, when you're, maybe that person would be a good working member, you know, where if you could have a system where instead of being negative, it was positively based, ah, like when you've done a certain amount of work, you earned your markup for the one week.
Sheldon: pending on the size of your house, earned your markup.
Jim G.: Earned your markup on the size of your house, earned your markup for the one week.

Jim G.: Earned your markup on the size of your house, earned your markup for the one week.
Sheldon: pending on the size of your house, earned your markup.
Jim G.: Earned your markup.
Sheldon: pending on the size of your house, earned your markup for the one week.
Jim G.: Earned your markup on the size of your house, earned your markup for the one week.
Sheldon: pending on the size of your house, earned your markup.

Glen: It's confusing again.
Martin: The problem involves bookkeeping.
Sheldon: I'm not so sure it does because now with all this bookkeeping we have now, because you don't have to correlate the work done with the week's order and all that stuff, all you have to do is, you have to keep track of how much work each household does and you have to do it very well, but say for my house, once I've done $2.50 hours of work, then that can just be recorded, it doesn't have to be correlated to this week I ordered, that week I ordered, it just has to be recorded, you know, five little blocks that are filled in, and then when I want to get my lower markup, I use up those five blocks and they're crossed off.

Joel: We really got off here, ah on something far beyond what we had spent an hour and a half discussing, which was a markup situation, now we're on the intricacies of labor or something, and we still got half a proposal sitting here, which I think--

Amy: It's this half of the proposal that we're talking about, how we're going to organize the labor so that the work gets done.
CHAPTER 6
THE PAID MANAGER

This chapter, like the preceding one, concerns a structural change in the Co-op which reduced the scope of cooperative activity. In the "Early Days" no one person was in charge of the whole Co-op operation, and a loose arrangement of changing coordinators often proved to be inadequate. Problems were discussed and policies set at a weekly meeting. However, by the fall of 1972, meetings were more irregular, often a month apart. Gradually the number of coordinators attending the meetings declined, although the meetings continued to discuss the problems of the Co-op and make decisions as to how the Co-op would be run. With less participation in the meetings, less people were available to accept Co-op responsibilities.

The idea of a paid manager had been talked about among Co-op people off and on, but met with no success until the May meeting of 1973 when it was put on the agenda. In an interview with Jim who favored the paid manager, there is a retrospective account of earlier discussions with the "over-worked coordinators" of Chapter 5.

Each time we would argue we ought to have a paid permanent staff who would work for the Co-op and each time the coordinators would reject that because they were all 'gung ho' and wanted to do it all on
a volunteer basis until they felt exploited and used by the rest of the membership and then would get angry at the Co-op because the rest of the membership just didn't care, and was exploiting them, and so they would quit, and it just happened again and again like that and, and each time we would make the same argument and each time be turned down."

[Jim IV, p. 3, 12/7/73]

The proposal to hire a managing coordinator represented two changes in the Co-op. One was that a single individual would be a manager. The other was that the person would be paid; no one had ever been paid for Co-op work before. To some people it was expected that any work done in the Co-op would be done voluntarily, and the idea of paying someone to manage the Co-op came as a shock. Others saw this as an inevitable development, even a desirable one, because it would provide paying jobs for the community, as well as giving the Co-op a more stable, systematic management.

Another thing which was opposed, ah, earlier in the Co-op's history, I thought from the outset that as soon as we could we should have a paid worker [Unhuh], but that was opposed as being uncooperative! [Joel IV, p. 12, 5/20/74]

After the change, the opposition to it could also be formulated as "uncooperative," although at the time no one did so.

This chapter, like Chapter 5, will face the problem of how such a change in the social structure could be made without discussion of the underlying moral matters. The ideological questions that one might expect to be discussed at the meeting were not discussed. During the discussion there was little objection to the change, except for the issue that the paid manager might infringe on the job of labor coordinator.
Nothing at all was said about cooperation at that time, just as nothing had been said about cooperation during the stratification change discussed in Chapter 5. In fact, there was so little objection evident that people at the meeting actually tried to piece together the past objections in an effort to understand why everyone had seemed so opposed to the idea before. A vote was then taken and the new position was created.

The new position was advertised by a notice on the bulletin board at the Co-op. Only one candidate applied—the one present at the meeting and mentioned in the segment as a candidate. He was appointed, but was unable to fill the post as he was in England when the Co-op started up in the fall (cf. Chapter 7 for a discussion of that "Starting Up"). The job was filled later in the fall and remained filled through the rest of the Co-op's existence by four successive individuals. As time went on, there was more and more evidence of careful management. The operation in the "Later Years" became more efficient and dependable, as sales reached levels that had not been achieved since the "Early Days."

The particular piece of talk chosen as the segment for this chapter is that part of the meeting where the motion was actually introduced to hire a paid manager.¹ This segment

¹ Complete text of "Paid Manager" is given at the end of this chapter. More details of the Co-op are found in Chapter 2.
contains a series of negotiations concerning what should be the proper focus of the discussion: the job or the person to fill the job. The way in which the moral matters are handled is influenced by the fact that one of these present is the likely candidate for the position.

As in the preceding chapter, the analysis of the surface talk requires some prior theoretical conception of the social structures and processes involved. Only within such a framework is it possible to take into account what was not mentioned as well as what was mentioned. One clear consequence of the new position concerns decision procedures. Meeting people would no longer be expected to solve all the problems of the Co-op and decide on new policies. Yet there is no mention of this consequence as consensus on having a paid manager was reached. Further, no attention was given to future lines and areas of responsibility of the meetings.

Given this brief summary of the content of the segment, the question may be put:

How was an extensive change made in the structure of authority of the Co-op without discussions of the loss of a cooperative managing system?

As in the last chapter, the procedure for answering this question begins with the collections of people in the talk, and then turns to the particular moral responses through which the interactional realization of the moral matters of these collections of people was accomplished.
Which Collections Of People?

In the method being used here, the first step is to determine which collections of people appear in the talk about changing the Co-op authority structure. The starting point is the presentation of the proposal to create the paid manager post, which represents the first talk on this subject in the meeting. The discussion of whether or not the Co-op should have a paid manager opens with a listing of the agenda, and the first item is the proposal.

Extract 6-1

Jim G.: ...One is a proposal, to, hire, uh, uh after we begin again in August [Caren coughs] a, ah, a manager, managing coordinator for the Co-op to, uh, for the amount of twenty dollars a week...

Two of the three collections of Co-op people in this excerpt—meeting people and organization people—dominate the segment and the analysis. However, at the surface of the text are a series of more particular collections of people in Extract 6-1:

- proposing-people
- hiring-people
- August-hiring-people
- manager-hiring-people
- Co-op-hiring-people
- $20-hiring-people

These can be seen as subsets of "meeting-people" (page 157, as shown in Figure 3.7) subsumed under that category in the moral

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1 Lines 001 to 025 of "Paid Manager" were used in Chapter 3 to illustrate the notion of "category consensus."
The predicate of the moral premise reflects at this point the specific wording of the proposal (eliminating such elaborations as "managing coordinator" which also appears, and "for the amount of"). This moral premise relates the hiring of a person to the meeting people who will do it. The action predicated of the good meeting people involves consequences for the Co-op organization, which in the future will have a new position, that of a manager. The managing coordinator is being hired "for the Co-op" (Extract 6-1), and the Co-op organization as part of its structure will have this new status. This arrangement is also reflected in an alternative formulation of the moral premise concerning the managing coordinator.

MP-B Good organization-people ought to have a paid manager. (Extract 6-1)

Once the meeting people vote on the proposal at the end of this meeting, both moral premises are achieved. Here are the characteristic consequences of actions taken by a small group of people who are representing a larger one. As the small group acts as it "ought" simultaneously it states what the larger group "ought" to do.

Throughout the segment both the meeting people and the organization people are present, as people move from within one collection of people to another in the talk. But there are many other collections of people used throughout the
segment, and the question is to locate the intermediate level collection or collections of people that the surface text suggest which have been used by the talkers to locate moral matters. Are they subcollections of meeting people or of organization people?

The meeting people until this meeting have cooperatively done the business of the Co-op, setting policies, solving problems and getting out publicity. This is what is meant by a "cooperative managing system" and this is the system that is about to be modified or abandoned. The meeting people were a self-selected subset of Co-op people, made up of somewhat different individuals each time. The Co-op meeting people managed the Co-op in a series of monthly meetings, open to whoever wanted to attend. They made motions and voted on proposals, especially those involving money (cf. Chapter 2 for additional details). A few months earlier, the meeting people were the means by which the stratification of the Co-op into an organization of workers and nonworkers had been achieved. (cf. Chapter 5).

The organization people consisted of the members of the Co-op, those who joined and expected to be participants in the activity of ordering and securing food at reasonable prices. A subset of them, two individuals who served as treasurers at this time, physically held the money which food and produce receipts produced. From the treasurers were obtained the monies needed to purchase food at the Distribution Center and from other suppliers. In one sense, the Co-op
consisted of the set of organization people, although in a collective sense, the Co-op also appeared as an organization. Both senses appear in the talk.

Some of the other sets of people which became relevant during the talk included subsets of produce day-people, such as labor coordinators and workers. There are categories of other people in the talk, sub-sets of non-Co-op people which exhaust the category set (cf. page 152) and give closure to the collections of people appearing in the talk.

The analysis will consider then the issues that interactants have made important, and by inspecting those sites find the intermediate level collections of people at which moral matters cluster. One crucial distinction that emerges in the analysis is a difference between what could be called "managing the cooperative" and "cooperative management" of the Co-op. At the same time there is a continuing effort to separate the question of hiring a person to be manager, from the question of establishing the status of manager. As in Chapter 5, I expect that a careful consideration of the moral responses in talk will be the means by which this further change in the cooperative ideology of the Co-op can be understood. As a start then I shall consider the people who would help in cooperative running of the Co-op.
The Some One Who Would Help

What reasons were given by the Co-op people to hire somebody to manage the Co-op when that was what they themselves were supposed to have been doing cooperatively all along? No reasons were given directly by Co-op people during the meetings nor on Produce Day. However, meeting people do consider in this segment the ways in which the potential managing coordinator is going to help them do the managing. This description of the help that is needed at first is intimately mixed with the description of the person who will give the help. If reasons are advanced in the meeting, they must be extracted from this discussion.

Ben, the proposed candidate for manager, is and has often been a meeting person, one who has helped in the past. It is he that is to be considered for the position.

Extract 6-2

Jim G.: ...actually, after we made that suggestion I talked to Ben to see if he'd be interested, he said he'd, he'd at least be available for, for such a thing, so it's not an empty set of people who might do it,...

Ben: [Snickers] "Paid Manager" 016-021

Although it is clear from Extract 6-2 that Jim explored the issue with Ben and that Jim can report Ben's willingness, it

1 Extracts 6-2 to 6-10 contain all the moral responses which refer to an individual who might help in the segment. Not every indicator of people in talk will be examined, nor will each feature of moral response, but only those necessary to follow the analysis.
is not clear why Jim was talking to Ben about being the paid manager in the first place. The phrase "after we made that suggestion" in Extract 6-2 it seems, it ambiguous, for the "suggestion-making-people" may be from an earlier meeting or represent another collection of people who came up with the idea during a conversation elsewhere, or perhaps this is an instance of "we" referring to the talker alone. Those at the meeting have these options of interpretation (as noted on page 171 in the discussion of the extent of category consensus present during these lines). I can rule out the first possibility since the tapes of the preceding six months show no such discussion. Before that time there had been talk about a manager, reflected in the extracts that follow. No communication of the moral matters involved in this change in cooperation is to be found here. The "suggestion-making-people" are therefore not the same as the "proposing-people" of Extract 6-1 and a break has occurred in the category consensus present (cf.p.189). Those meeting people who recognize that the Co-op people were not included within the "suggestion-making-people," might have a basis for objecting to the action of talking with Ben. Later in the segment, it will appear that not everyone feels that Ben may be the best candidate.

Although Ben is literally only "available" and "interested" according to Extract 6-2, there is an underlying assumption that all "available-people" ought to be considered, especially those who had already expressed interest. Several indicators
of moral response signal a specific underlying moral premise, that:

MP-C: Ben who is a good person in the collection of interested-and-available-people ought to be manager.

(Extract 6-2)

Ben is present, and yet no one suggests that this is improper or that Ben ought not to participate in the discussion of the position which he is already known to be a candidate for. On this conflict of interests Co-op people are curiously quiet. Yet since Ben is present, he is there to contradict or elaborate on the conversation reported about himself. In fact, Ben snickers. In so underlining Jim's remark, Ben reaffirms himself audibly as an interacting person, a "you" who can be consulted (and presumably ought to be). The snicker can be understood in several ways, as providing assent to the ideal of the empty set not being empty ("so it's not an empty set of people" Extract 6-2); or to Ben's potential availability; or to the talker's usurping Ben's location as a present person. No matter which interpretation is made, Ben's snicker shows category consensus to the collection of "available-and-interested-people." The snicker occurs at a grammatical juncture, lacks substantive content, and serves to direct attention to what has proceeded (as amplified on page 173 ). Those present know that Ben has been approached for the job (as in fact is stated in the same extract) and the snicker can be heard as reminding the meeting people that Ben is not only a candidate, but present, a fact not altogether clear from Jim's use of "he."
The talk continues directly with a description of the
difficulties of the Co-op.

Extract 6-3

Jim: ...this is a thing
that's been discussed many, many times, and ah,
I've sort of always advocated but never pushed, and
ah, I guess last month I finally decided I wanted
to push it, because I feel that it, uh, we're [Ben coughs]
ever gonna get off the ground as a Co-op and begin
just to consolidate our efforts and, uh, get off the
treadmill of running as hard as we can to stay in the
same place until we get [Sheldon: Unhuh] to a situation...

Before considering the problems of the Co-op which are hinted
at in Extract 6-3, I shall first point to the way that
Ben's continued presence is made evident, by a cough in line
four of the extract. I do not treat this cough here as a
consensus maintaining action by Ben (as I did his snicker)
since it does not occur at a grammatical juncture and is
passed without comment. A cough can be contrived and either
be produced to sound contributed or produced to sound not
contrived. The snicker lacks this possibility of not being
contrived, and hence requires interactional and analytical
attention.

Extract 6-3 shows a striking series of metaphors: "get
off the ground," "have an overall picture," and "get off the
treadmill." They work somewhat at cross purposes, since getting
off the treadmill would put one on the ground which another
metaphor seeks to get off. But their meaning is similar.
They point to a Co-op organization which is having problems
in achieving its goal of supplying good produce at reasonable
prices. The existential predication (EP) shows this unsuccessful state:

EP: We're never gonna get off the ground as a Co-op and get off the treadmill... (Extract 6-3)

The moral premise which is reflected contradicts the notion that the lack of success is desired, an assumption basic to the Co-op which those present would accept and the ethnographic description of Chapter 2 would corroborate.

MP-D: Good organization-people ought to be successful as a Co-op. (Extract 6-3)

Since this is an instance of opposing polarity of moral premise and existential predication (Case II of dynamic of moral response, page 299), a dialectic is present, a basis for change, and indeed the point of the meeting is to change the situation from that of Extract 6-3. The question of this chapter concerns two aspects of that change: (1) the extent to which a cooperative ideology is part of the change and (2) the change if any in cooperative ideology which will emerge as a result of the change in Co-op structure which is being contemplated in the meeting.

Specific moral premises might be stated that relate the Co-op organization to each of the metaphors in Extract 6-3. But the wording of MP-D reflects a more basic premise, that the Co-op organization has not succeeded as well as it might in achieving its goals. The metaphors suggest a desire to break free of a constrained operation. The treadmill for instance, pictures the Co-op people as hard working, but trapped in the operation of running the Co-op.
The text explicitly refers to the Co-op in the phrase "as a Co-op" in Extract 6-3, rather than evoking any sub-collection of the Co-op. But these are the Co-op organization people and so far only one of the four moral premises has been evoked for the subcollection, that of "interested-and-available-people," which does not reappear in the segment. The analysis so far has not succeeded in finding an intermediate level collection of people at which moral matters concerning cooperation particularly cluster.

The Kind Of Help That Is Needed

One can ask at this point, if the problems of the Co-op just described are related to difficulties caused by or associated with cooperative management? A move to abandon this system might be explicitly motivated by such a statement. But nothing in the segment refers to these difficulties. Instead the text which immediately follows mentions the kind of help that is needed.

Extract 6-4

Jim G.: ...where, at least somebody has an overall picture of the operation and can sort of trouble shoot, back up in emergencies and take responsibility for, a whole lot of things that are just sort of too long to list, that in my opinion are costing us on the average more than twenty dollars a week, but whenever you name any one thing, it's always something that can be dealt with, but ah, never does get dealt with until after it happens....

["Paid Manager" 030-039]

A person is introduced in Extract 6-4 who would help by means of the phrase "at least somebody." The text does not
explicitly state who the depersonal "somebody" is--one or more of the meeting people or specifically Ben who was mentioned earlier. Given the earlier proposal for a paid manager in Extract 6-1, it is likely that the some one would be heard as being the proposed manager, that is, as some one in a collection of "management people." With the re-introduction of "management people" as a subcollection of Co-op people, an intermediate level collection of people is presented which appears throughout the segment (is salient in the sense of p.161 ) and is found with clusters of moral indicators (showing its use by interactants as a site for moral matters.) The "management-people" will be shown in the analysis to follow to be the useful intermediate level sub-collection of people needed for the analysis.

Four moral premises can be identified in Extract 6-4 that concern this sub-collection of Co-op people. All are instances of the more usual dynamic where the existential predication and the moral premise reflect the same polarity (case I, page 294 ). The extensive clustering of indicators of moral response here (there are 19) emphasizes the force of the moral premises.

MP-E: Some one of the good management-people ought to have an overall picture. (Extract 6-4)

MP-F: Some one of the good management-people ought to trouble shoot. (Extract 6-4)

MP-G: Some one of the good management-people ought to back up in emergencities (Extract 6-4)

MP-H: Some one of the good management-people ought to take responsibility for problems costing more than $20
Throughout this part of the discussion there are a number of vague and ambiguous expressions: for the person to fill the job and for the activities of the job. What accounts for this manner of talking? One possibility is the fact that a job is being discussed in front of a person who might hold it. There are moral, tactical and reasons of etiquette to avoid too much precision. However, the development of the segment as a whole will show so much more of this behavior that it may well be a response to other pressure.

In Extract 6-4, the Co-op is portrayed as missing people who would take responsibility, and this as the reason for financial losses. Is it possible that one of the meeting people is suggesting that cooperative management is defective in this area? A consideration of the ways in which the Co-op people are referred to by the talker may provide the answer. In Extract 6-3, the talker began with explicit use of self terms, with four instances of "I," "I guess last month I finally decided I wanted to push it, because I feel..." The following metaphors are introduced with a direct reference to the Co-op organization people, "we're never going to get off the ground as a Co-op," and then "we" is used in what follows. Extract 6-4 continues the text directly and there is another insertion of self, "that in my opinion are costing us" in which the talker again deliberately

1 The subject of these moral premises is the indefinite "some one" to capture the notion implied of "at least somebody" in Extract 6-4.
speaks for the Co-op organization (in the sense described in p. 203). At this point the self is suppressed, a term used for a "possible self" in this instance "you" in the phrase, "but whenever you name any one thing" (Extract 6-4). This "you" called by linguists a "general you" appears to include everyone, but is often used for "I" (cf. p. 372). It is suggested that people were in the habit of naming things individually that in Jim's opinion as a whole were costing the Co-op more than twenty dollars a week. No one has done this, and no one does, except Jim who gives several instances later in the segment (Extracts 6-15 through 6-19).

After speaking twice for the Co-op organization people Jim says "it's always something that can be dealt with" and omits the agent altogether. Who would be dealing with the problem if not the cooperative management, which consisted of the meeting people who dealt with the problems of the Co-op organization? But no one refers to this fact, neither the talker nor anyone else during the meeting. The talker avoids blaming any set or subset of the Co-op people in this formulation, even as it is repeated, again without any agent, "never does get dealt with." The assumption about Co-op operation can be written as a moral premise, where the subject "organization-people" is supplied to reflect the fact that cooperative management was a function of the Co-op organization

1 With the exception of on-the-spot problems which produce day-people would have handled, Co-op problems were brought to meetings (discussed further in Chapter 2, page 99).
though it was usually carried out by the meeting-people.

MP-I: Good organization-people ought to deal with potential problems. (Extract 6-4).

There is next a more direct reference to the fact that the Co-op people will need help in the fall to get the Co-op operating after the usual summer suspension (cf. Chapter 2, especially Figure 2.1).

Extract 6-5

Jim: ...a good time to start would kind of be in the fall, when we'll be starting up again as a Co-op, and uh, that it, also, that's the point where we'll sort of need someone to, to help us get started up as a Co-op, uh, and, to help us get going, to help us get some literature out to to the community as to what we are, and get things organized and pull things together...

["Paid Manager" 047-054]

In this passage, Jim again appears to speak for the whole collection of Co-op people, using "we" for the organization people. Again no one objects to Jim's claim to talk for the whole Co-op organization. The "we" extends beyond those who are co-present (an inclusive "we" discussed on p. 215).

There is an appeal here that the Co-op people who do the re-organizing that starting up entails will not have it all to do themselves, but will have help. Since the Co-op people had experienced the problems of starting up, they were familiar with the particular activities listed. The moral premise is stated with "we" as the subject, the same as in the existential predication:

EP: We'll sort of need someone to, to help us get started up as a Co-op. (Extract 6-5)
The moral premise is:

\[ \text{MP-J: We as good organization people ought to have someone to help us in "starting up" the Co-op. (Extract 6-5)} \]

Although the planning for "starting up" is done by the meeting people (as Chapter 7 will show), it is the Co-op organization which is starting up. The "someone" who will help is not shown here as someone from above directing someone who is below. Rather this use of "help" projects the possibility of people cooperatively working together at the same level. Nothing is suggested here of an external or separate authority.

The earlier phrase "at least somebody" (Extract 6-4) is replaced now by "someone." "Someone" can point to a particular individual, but one who is depersonalized (p. 275) in that any Co-op person (or possibly someone not currently involved in the Co-op) could be the person who would help. All that is knowable about the individual from what is said is that the person would be helping, as no personal qualities are shown by which one of the Co-op people could be recognized now or in the future. The further point is that the individual is not shown as impersonal or unknowable (anonymous forever), but rather as an individual who is currently "remote," but expected to be "near" in terms of the notion of social distance developed in Chapter 3 (p. 227). In constructing this other in talk, the depersonalized terms select a category that goes beyond the individual, but retains a sense in which specific individuals are implicated, here Co-op people. Although Ben has been mentioned as potential
manager, the use of "someone" again avoids a reference to Ben here.

One of the things which is needed in starting up is to "get things organized and pull things together" (Extract 6-5). I shall state this as a separate moral premise, since it deals with the more managerial aspect of starting up.

MP-J(A): We as good organization people ought to have help to get things organized in starting up. (Extract 6-5)

There are several other presuppositions in Extract 6-5, such as that the Co-op organization would be (and ought to be) starting up; that August would be a good time for a manager to help plan the fall opening. The list of starting up activities that a paid manager might help with also appears in Chapter 7, which concerns the problem of starting up.

A focus on responsibility has now been added to the focus on the lack of responsibility. The question remains as to whether the meeting people saw the solution to a lack of organization as involving a loss of cooperative principles. So far, nothing has been said by which "someone" who would help would do other than cooperate with those starting up the Co-op, giving such help as is needed. The notion that the managing coordinator would be valuable in the starting up process reappears a few lines further along in the motion.

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1 The moral premise is labelled as J-A since the predicate closely resembles J. This practice (introduced on page 259) is followed wherever predicates are similar, and facilitates the location and comparison of predicates with similar or related moral matters.
which is made again, but in a slightly different form:

Extract 6-6

Jim: ...I'd like to make that as a motion, that we, ah, ah, allocate this money for a position, and, ah, to begin, ah in August, about two weeks perhaps before we start up again, if we do close, and uh, have a managing coordinator.

Fred: Is there someone to take the job? ["Paid Manager" 056-062]

Allocating money is an activity of the meeting people, and specifies the motion already introduced in Extract 6-1. In the case of an explicit motion, the moral premise is on the surface, reflecting an underlying existential predication which contradicts it.

EP: We do not (now) allocate money for a manager. (Extract 6-6)

Again this instance of case II illustrates a dynamic of moral response, where change toward the moral premise is being attempted.

MP-A-(A): We as good meeting people ought to allocate money for a manager. (Extract 6-6)

Fred's response in Extract 6-6 is not to the motion or the money or the proposed status, but rather to the assumption that there is "someone" to do it. The questioner moves to be practical, ignoring the earlier mention of Ben in Extract 6-2 as committing Ben to the job. The emphatic utterance of Extract 6-7, "Ben said he would" resolves any doubt and marks the beginning of an attempt to separate the status from the status-holder.
Extract 6-7

Jim G.: Yeah, well Ben said he would, but I'm, I'm going to make a separate motion, you know, concerning Ben because people might [Caren coughs] feel we should make the position more widely known or something before deciding [Phone rings] on someone, uhm, so the motion I want to make is we establish the position and then we can, if, if that's approved, then we can get into the question of whether Ben's the best person or whether we want to advertise it, or-- [Speeds up] "Paid Manager" 061-073

In Extract 6-7 are three interactive signals—a cough, a phone ring, and an unidentifiable male voice saying "Uhm." The first two are independent of the syntax and are not noticed by the talkers. The third, "Uhm," underlines the collection of Co-op people "deciding on someone," thereby continuing category consensus by that subcollection of meeting people who are present as meeting people that day. The motion suggested in Extract 6-7 refers back to the moral premise shown as MP-B, that the organization ought to have a paid manager.

MP-B (A): Good meeting people ought to establish the position of paid manager. (Extract 6-7)

However, the actual focus of Extract 6-7 is on the advertisement of the proposal, the surface form "that we should make the position more widely known." shows the future epistemic sense of should, that some people might feel that a certain action is likely or expected, as well as the sense that it ought to be done.

MP-K: We as good meeting people ought to make the position more widely known before deciding on someone. (Extract 6-7)
Another moral premise directed at the meeting people proves difficult for the meeting people to follow. It is violated several times before it is finally accepted.

MP-L: We as good meeting people ought to separate discussion of the position from talk of filling the position. (Extract 6-7)

The analysis has not yet found any direct exposition of moral matters that would motivate the change in Co-op structure. Instead there follows a series of "minor" issues that have to do with the conduct of the discussion. These moral matters cannot be ignored even if they seem remote from the central question, since the answer to that question, or a hint to that answer—may well be hidden in this area. It will become more and more evident that the communication of moral matters takes varied and indirect forms. Here it is in the form of a continued violation of a seemingly accepted moral premise leading to a direct conflict among the people present. The difficulty with accepting moral premise L appears to be closely related to the difficulty of formulating the need for a manager to do what the people present have been doing all along, i.e., managing.

Separating The Person From The Position

It will now appear that a central issue in this discussion of the change in the Co-op structure is the separation of the position of paid manager from the person who is apparently going to fill it. The extent to which cooperative management will persist is connected to the perception of the rela-
tions of the possible manager to the other Co-op people.
Ben has been again suggested as a candidate in Extract 6-7
with the phrase "whether Ben's the best person" which offers
the expansion of "or not the best person." The existential
predication thus shows two forms (case III of the dynamic
of moral response p. 304).

EP: Ben is (not) the best person (to be paid manager).
    (Extract 5-7)

The dual form of the moral premise is not the result of
any ambiguity. The alternative form (Ben is not the best
person) is readily supplied from the indirect question form
"whether." Two moral premises must then be stated.

MP-C(A): Ben who is a good person of the candidate people
        ought to be manager. (Excerpt 6-7)

MP-C(B): Ben who is not a good person of the candidate
        people ought not to be manager. (Excerpt 6-7)

As in other instances of case III it is not possible from
the information presented to conclude that the talker is
eliminating one or another of the possibilities, although it
seems evident he will continue to support Ben's candidacy.

In spite of the proposal for separating the discussion
of the position from talk of filling the position (MP-L in
Extract 6-7) the meeting-people do not seem to be able to turn
aside from the possibility of Ben's taking the position, and
the next 31 lines of text contain several additional mentions
of Ben as proposed manager. Not everyone agrees that it would
be ideal for Ben to do the job, however.
Extract 6-8

Jim G.: I mean it seemed like something that, that would be good in Ben's situation because he is also working for the Central and has all the experience and involvement, and he's getting kind of part-time salary from that, and this would be like additional part-time. [Bells jingle]

Ben: Yeah

Sheldon: I think, I think it might not be good to have "Lilly" to have Ben doing both jobs, you're still working for Central? "Lilly, Lilly" You're still--

Ben: Well, as far as the actual mechanics of it uh--[Mumbles] Uh, I thought we were going to talk about the job first.

Sheldon: Yeah.

"Paid Manager" 083-097

Jim's initial presentation in Extract 6-8 of the situation appears at first glance to be an objective account. But a verb of perception has been used ("seemed" allows the talker to avoid attributing to himself the source of the notion). Yet here the "possible self" (see p.210) is clearly the talker, and the opinion's are his own. The risk to self of being seen as less than good is reduced by not using a self term. A parallel structure is used by another interactant when Jim's "that would be good" is contradicted by Sheldon's "it might not be good." Sheldon first injects his self with two instances of self attribution ("I think, I think"). Curiously enough Ben has also participated in this altercation, as he has, almost at the same time as Sheldon talks, underlined Jim's final collection of people, those who do part time work, showing consensus again to his own inclusion as an active participant.

This direct contradiction in the evaluation of the proposed
hiring of Ben is first of two conflicts concerning the job by these same two meeting people. Here the point of controversy is the suitability of Ben's candidacy, given that he would also be working for Central Foods at the same time. Either a conflict of interests or a conflict of time could occur. The latter is hinted at in Extract 6-8 by "the actual mechanics" which continues beyond Extract 6-3. The moral premises reflecting the conflict are the following contradictory pair. Here case III of the dynamic of moral response is present, not as indeterminancy or ambiguity, but rather as an unresolved case in which both positions are supported by different talkers.

MP-C(C): Ben who is a good person in a collection of Central Foods people ought to be coordinator also. (Extract 6-3)

MP-C(D): Ben who is a good person in a collection of Central Foods people ought not to be coordinator also. (Extract 6-6)

There is no elaboration by either of the talkers of their positions or argument which is directed back to the other protagonist. There is also in Extract 6-8 a reminder of MP-L, that they were "going to talk about the job first." But that too is not followed in the talk beyond the underlining with "Yeah, right" by the person who objects to having Ben do both jobs. The category consensus returns once again to the talk of the "actual mechanics" (Extract 6-8), at least briefly as shown in the following lines.
Extract 6-9

Caren: ...But a lot of the job doesn't have to take place on Thursday, you know, so a lot of it is uh, sort of uh--
Ben: Yeah, right, as far as the publicity and labor coordinator goes that can be done--
Caren: Stuff, yeah.

The statement of obligation in Extract 6-9 is directed not to the position holder, but to the job, "the job doesn't have to take place on Thursday." Publicity and labor coordinating are mentioned. In the past the meeting people had attended to getting out flyers and putting up posters. Such an activity is still implied for the meeting people in the earlier suggestion that "we should make the position more widely known" (Extract 6-7) and "whether we want to advertise it (Extract 6-7) where "we" are clearly seen as meeting people. "Labor coordinator" is mentioned briefly in Extract 6-9. In 16 lines (in Extract 12) it becomes the focus of the second controversy.

The brief talk of actual mechanics has still left the position of paid manager with no lines of authority. It is still possible to view the paid manager as one who would be on the same level as everyone else, have the same perspective, the same information and be interchangeable with anyone else who is managing the Co-op. That is, cooperating as an equal with the rest of the Co-op people who comprise the cooperative management.
The problem of separating the person and the job is not over, but continues with the explicit statement of Jim.

Extract 6-10

Jim: I mean, I don't wanna get into this thing about whether Ben should or should not be the person, because I think that is a separate question from whether we should do it; and uh--

(Caren: Right. Right.
Amy: Unhuh, yeah unhuh...)

"Paid Manager" 114-120

Ben says nothing further in the segment, and no one uses his name. However, as "he" is retained as a means of referring to the status, there remains the possible ambiguity that Ben, or the status, could be referred to by any "he" used from this point on. The ambiguity is not noted by the interactants, nor does it appear to be a source of confusion. Nothing has yet been said about the impropriety of Ben's participating in a discussion about himself.

The question of hiring Ben can be reflected in a series of moral premises (especially MP-C(A) and MP-C(B)). The text of Extract 6-10 shows these two alternative possibilities again, "whether Ben should or should not be the person," where moral affect is shown in the stressing of specific words, including "person." For the paid manager status, only the positive proposition appears, "whether we should do it," again with a stress of "do." What is missing is any direct statement about not having a manager. That is, the talker and those preceding, assume there will be a position and the question is whether or not Ben will be the person to fill it. But the negative version is also implicated by the phrase "whether we
should do it," and the moral premise can be stated:

MP-A(C): Good meeting people ought not to hire a manager.

(Extract 6-10)

The separation of person and job reflected in moral premise MP-A(C) may have been difficult because it was not reasonable to establish a job unless there was some possibility of filling it. The field of available and interested (in managing) people who would work part time for $20 a week to run the Carverton Co-op might not be expected to be extensive. However, there was no point in talking about who would fill the job, unless there was going to be a job to be filled. The talk up to this point presumed there was to be a job.

As long as the talk included talk about Ben, it may have been easy for the meeting people to see the new position as one of helping them to continue as they had been doing, that is, managing the Co-op. Ben had been at meetings and was a meeting-person. There was no reason not to expect him to continue as such, and even to help more extensively since he was going to be paid for doing it. Tying the new position to Ben was a way then of emphasizing that the cooperative managing of the Co-op would be continued. Even the conflict of interests implicit in the objection earlier does not alter the fact that Ben would cooperatively help in the running of the Co-op. However, as the talk finally succeeded in excluding Ben at Extract 6-10, and focused solely on the status, there was even less communicated about cooperative activity, and more about management.

The preceding pages have clarified a differential communi-
cation of information about a status and the status holder to be. Presumably, by the original proposal of Extract 6-1, (as shown in MP-A and MP-B) the question being discussed by the Co-op is whether it ought to have a paid manager, or not. What has been taking place has assumed there would be such a status, and considered whether one particular individual would be able to fill it or not. Of the 20 moral premises states so far, five have been about the one individual. Even MP-L which would separate status from status holder presumes a status as accepted.

From this point on in the segment the talk successfully avoids Ben, but the notion that the manager would be Ben or an individual like Ben, i.e., one of the meeting people who had helped before and would continue to help, continues. As will be shown, such an image prevents or makes unnecessary or helps to avoid the Co-op people focusing on how they themselves are being supplanted. The meeting people will be helped, if not by Ben, then by a Ben-like manager, and there is no need for the meeting people to talk about how they have been the source of problems or of inadequacies in their own behavior. But the complications of avoiding talk of meeting people means in the end there is no way of relating the new status to the old system, and a lack of engagement into the old system will be a characteristic of the system which emerges.

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The Manager Who Would Help

The effort to confine the discussion to the position rather than the person now seems to have taken effect. What might have been displayed as a conflict of interest has not emerged as a moral issue, rather it has been accepted that one of the meeting people who might be the manager will join in the definition of that position. However, the discussion is far from harmonious—a much more open conflict now appears. It will be important to examine this conflict about that definition carefully to see if it contains any reference to the reduction of cooperation in the Co-op.

The Need To Be Specific.

The talk focuses more on the position now and less on an individual who will help out the Co-op.

Extract 6-11

Amy: ... do, you might want to be a little more specific about what you meant, you know, about what
Sheldon: Yeah.
Amy: this manager'd have to do.
Jim G.: OK, yeah, specifically the, the the job would be uhm ah, A, to, to kind of coordinate the coordinators, to make sure that at any given time he knew who was gonna be on duty an, at a given point, and check out that the person really shows up, ha—

['Paid Manager' 120-128]

1 Extracts 6-11 to 6-19 contain references to the status of manager, but not to the person who would do the job. "He" appears in several instances, but its sense here is "the person who is the paid manager" rather than "the person who is Ben." Although the analysis focuses on this depersonal sense, it would not be possible to exclude the possibility that at some point the use of "he" is also seen by the interactants to refer to Ben. As the data are from the early 70's, objections to a blanket use of "he" such as this do not appear.
The moral premise which begins the Extract 6-11 directs the discussion to details of the status. 1

MP-M: You as good proposal-making-people ought to be specific about the manager's duties. (Extract 6-11)

A list of duties of the status are presented in Extract 6-11, each of which can be stated as a moral premise of the "management-people."

MP-N: Good management-people ought to coordinate the coordinators. (Extract 6-11)

MP-O: Good management-people ought to know who is on duty. (Extract 6-11)

MP-P: Good management-people ought to check for defaulters. (Extract 6-11)

But these specifics of the position are heard as overlapping with another status, that of labor coordinator. The phrase "labor coordinator" had been mentioned earlier by Ben as part of the job that could be done on days other than Produce Days (in Extract 6-9). At that time no one had said anything further about that position.

The last words of Extract 6-11 are interrupted, and a second direct conflict occurs, also between Jim and Sheldon, who now claims the paid manager would be the labor coordinator.

Extract 6-12

Sheldon: I think that you should just put it in other, in other terms, just that he should be the labor coordinator. Yes. [Louder] (Louder] That's not what I have in mind for the job. Uh.--


Sheldon: Well he should, if he does that then the, he would be the labor coordinator. Well--

1 In Extract 6-11 there is a return to the use of the form "manager" in the text, which was the original term in Extract 6-1, but had given way to "managing coordinator" in the wording of the proposal there.
Sheldon: really.

Jim G.: Well not, I don't, I think you could still have a Labor coordinator who set up work crews and stuff like that...

["Paid Manager" 129-140 ]

The first utterance of Extract 5-12 (like that of Extract 6-11) directs the proposal making people to the details of the proposal. It is clear that what has been said so far is not considered adequate by Sheldon.

MP-Q: You as good proposal-making-people ought to use other terms (to describe the manager's duties).

(Extract 5-12)

Such "other terms" (Extract 5-12) have the effect of placing the proposed managing coordinator in the labor coordinator status that already exists, and is already occupied. In fact, the talker is a labor coordinator himself who is administering the crew system proposed and accepted by Chapter 5, (Two individuals volunteered for the status and so co-labor coordinators had been implementing the system for several months at this point, cf. Chapter 2 for further details).

Sheldon appears to hear Jim's description of the job as duplicating one that he is already doing. Sheldon's social location within a collection of "labor-coordinating-people" which is known by everyone present, is shown as providing a perspective (cf. 201 ) that has colored his observations of events and people, and hence of moral matters. Sheldon's response takes on added sense once his location is known in this collection of people, as does the annoyance which Sheldon displays in the interruption. The response contains several indicators of moral response: the modals, "just ." Sheldon
can be viewed as "defending" the integrity of the job of labor coordinators against what he has heard as attack.¹

In formulating Sheldon's assertions in terms of the perspective provided by being within the collection of labor coordinating people, the notion of relationism is being used here (Mannheim, 1937, as introduced in Chapter 1 and explicated p.201 ). One direct result of Sheldon's interruption is a confrontation as Jim responds with "that's not what I have in mind." In Sheldon's utterance, "just that he should be the labor coordinator", the modal "should" introduces both epistemic and root senses—that the person hired will do the labor coordinating and that the person ought to do it. The moral premise is an instance of case II (cf.p.299) in which the moral premise contradicts the existential predication, here "should be the labor coordinator."

MP-R: A good person in a collection of management people ought to be the labor coordinator. (Extract 6-12)

However, Jim introduces another moral premise, which contradicts the one already stated above since Jim maintains "you could still have a labor coordinator." (Extract 6-12) The competing moral premise of this conflict may be stated.

MP-R(A): A good person in a collection of management people ought not to be the labor coordinator. (Extract 6-12)

The talkers get louder, and a strident alternation of "No," "Yes," and "No" occurs. Category consensus on the collection of labor coordinating people persisted throughout Extract 6-12

¹ The notion of defending is discussed further on page 418.
as the talkers showed disagreements on the surface as to whether the status would be a separate one in the future or subsumed within the management people. A start has been made in defining the status, although not every feature proposed has been accepted. None of the features has been directly related to the cooperative managing activities of the meeting people, and/or the future relations of the proposed manager to the meeting people.

The Need To Limit Responsibility.

Given the duties introduced above for the status of manager, it may be the case that too much is being proposed for one person's part-time position. Some limitations of what the manger would have to do are immediately suggested. Perhaps here the meeting people will make clear what they themselves will be expected to do in the future.

Extract 6-13

Jim G:... I don't think he'd have to be responsible for every man on every crew on every hour, but I do think he'd have to make sure that, ah, that he knew who was showing up, let's say for afternoon selling, and that that person had duly gotten in touch with the people who were supposed to work with them, and, and it was all arranged, if there were any problems he could help, uh...

["Paid Manager" 140-147]

Two moral premises can be stated to summarize the responsibilities.¹

¹ The term "responsible" which appears in Extract 6-13 is amongst those terms which are indicators of moral response since they traditionally are used with moral matters, as is discussed further on page 270 in Chapter 4.
MP-H(A): A good person in a collection of management people ought not to be responsible for everything on Produce Day. (Extract 6-13)

MP-H(B): A good person in a collection of management people ought to be responsible for knowing the selling arrangements for Produce Day. (Extract 6-13)

According to Extract 6-13, the coordinators should continue to have some responsibilities, especially for their own shifts. The phrase "he could help" in the last line of Extract 6-13 is not supplied with an object: he could help whom? It appears to be the produce day-people rather than the meeting-people who were to be helped.

MP-J(B): A good person in the management people ought to help out with problems on Produce Day. (Extract 6-13)

Extract 6-13 has used the pronoun "he;" the nearest antecedent referent for the "he" is the earlier utterance of Jim's, "That's not what I have in mind for the job."

(Extract 6-12) In the statement of the three preceding moral premises, I have used "a good person" as a subject since the sense is that of "the person" rather than that of the particular person talked of earlier—Ben.1

The responsibilities which have been outlined in Extract 6-13 might prove too much for one person according to the text which follows directly.

Extract 6-14

Jim G: ...but I hope it doesn't degenerate into a situation where like all of everything begins to fall on the coordinator, because if that happens I think that it will be more than a twenty dollar a week job,

1 The same procedure was followed in the two earlier moral premises relating the status of manager to that of labor coordinator. (MP-R, MP-R(A))
A hypothetical chaotic situation is described in Extract 6-14 but no indication is given as to how it would develop. It is not made clear as to which collection of Co-op people would be at fault. However, the situation described is clear enough, as it is one in which the paid manager is expected to do everything by the Co-op people. The underlying moral premise can be stated as follows:

MP-H(C) Good organization people ought not to let everything be the responsibility of the [paid] coordinator. (Extract 6-14)

The discussion so far has considered mostly how to limit responsibility of the paid manager so that the duties would not be too extensive. The particular responsibilities that were mentioned are ones that take place on produce day and are handled at that site as they arise, such as the absence of a person who was supposed to work.

Up to this point nothing has been said of what the meeting people are to do or are not to do. It would seem there would be less cooperative enterprise, but nothing has been said about the issue. It has not been made clear to whom the manager would be responsible. Although the proposal being discussed in the segment (stated in moral premise A) is that the meeting people would hire the manager, nothing has been said as to whether they could fire one. The text of Extract 6-14 concludes with still another request to the "proposal-
making-people," but this time the focus is on additional aspects of the job.

MP-S You as good "proposal-making-people" ought to describe additional duties the job will entail.

(Extract 6-14)

As the talk now moves to additional responsibilities, two specific instances of things a manager might do are presented. Both use as examples items which can be recognized as items that the meeting people would have expected to discuss at their meetings, but no one at the meeting suggests that such is the case.¹

The Problem Of The Money Losses

The first instance of something the managing coordinator might do concerns money losses that the Co-op has recently had.

Extract 6-15

Jim G.: Right, now that's the next thing, like, ahm, like the ah, like there's many things which many times we've all said are problems that ought to be dealt with, but we've never been able to deal with them basically, because they don't really fall into anybody's domain, and uh, because it takes a certain like stick-to-it-iveness to get it done, and with, you know, different coordinators each week, they don't get done, like, the last uh, uh, well, for two weeks in a row, not last week, but two weeks in a row before that we had, ah unexplained money losses, ah, amounting to a total of about a hundred twenty dollars, now, uh, we, we can not track down how this happened,

["Paid Manager" 155-163]

In defining this problem broadly at first, the talker uses

¹ cf. Figure 2.6 for list of all agenda items discussed in one year and page 99 for further discussion of meetings.
one of the few instances of "ought" in the surface talk, "problems ought to be dealt with." In addition to "ought" other indicators of moral response are the categorical "we've all said" and quantifiers like "many things" and "many times," which do not contribute information as to what is being said. The person or people by whom problems would be "dealt with" are not stated, "possible others" including Co-op organization people or subsets of them. These problems are not here specified. A moral premise can be stated as follows:

MP-I(A): Good organization people ought to deal with problems needing attention. (Extract 6-15)

Discussion at the meeting has recognized that the cooperative meeting system has not been adequate, and there is immediately another reference to the problem that ought to be dealt with:

EP: We've never been able to deal with them (the problems). (Extract 6-15)

In this instance "we" is the surface subject which is represented within the collection of organization people.

MP-I(B): We as good organization people ought to be able to deal with problems. (Extract 6-15)

Two reasons are proposed for the fact that problems are not attended to. Neither contradicts the possibility of cooperative management where authority is shared and sharable. The reasons are (1) "they don't really fall into anybody's domain" and (2) "it takes a certain like stick-to-it-iveness to get it done." Neither the notion of a separate domain nor following through on a project necessarily require that there be a separate authority position. In the "Early Days"
especially people did accept responsibilities for following through on projects and solving problems that needed solving without being concerned as to which particular part of the Co-op operation was presenting the problem.

What follows is a direct statement of fact about some money losses, it would seem, "we cannot track down how this happened" (Extract 6-15) where stress is put on "cannot" suggesting moral affect in this use of a modal without contradiction (the more usual vernacular use in Jim's talk includes "don't," "we've" several times in the same utterance).

But who are the people referred to by "we?" What collection of people is relevant to this use of "we?" The talker speaks for a collection of treasurers (which includes himself and Caren). As the subsequent talk shows, they are the only ones who know of this happening, other than the person who brought the loss to Jim's attention when the money was brought to the treasurer's house during produce day. The coordinator who brought the money over is present (also Jim S.)

However, the moral premise here would be:

MP-T: We as good treasurers ought to be able to track down the money loss. (Extract 6-15)

The money loss is unexpected news to the meeting people, and they temporarily abandon the discussion of paid manager and assemble details of the loss. In the talk which follows several interactants ask questions to get details. In three instances "interactive repetition" appears, by which the same

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1 Three instances of interactive repetition occur at (159/162), (163/165) and (170/171); the last shown in Extract 6-16.
phrases are used by two talkers. In this way category consensus is continued by the collection of people talking about money loss. (cf.p. 189 ), as in the first two lines of the following extract.

Extract 6-16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Jim S.</th>
<th>The money's brought over separately.</th>
<th>Amy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>money's brought over separately.</td>
<td>Yeah, but we haven't sat down with the book to work out the details of where the money is missing, we only know that, that amount of money is short, uh, the, a, how, you know, that's the kind of thing which could be prevented like if we had a proper cash register, right, which is again something which we ought to do, probably not going to do...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

("Paid Manager" 196-206)

The questions asked by other interactants rehearse the sequence of the event, but none of them name people, and none suggest anyone who might be blamed for the loss. No effort is made to find out who was involved, nor why this situation was not disclosed to the meeting people before. The loss is not identified by the talker as something that was to have been talked about, for instance, as a later agenda point. It appears as an instance of something that having a manager would have prevented (although how this would be so is not explained, but glossed, "that's the kind of thing which could be prevented" (Extract 6-16)).

A presumption is shown in Extract 6-16 that a loss ought to be prevented, but the agent is again not shown. The existential predication appears as:

EP: That's the kind of thing which could be prevented. (Extract 6-16)
Who are the "possible others" who have not been shown?
A particular person, a "somebody" might be the subject of the relevant moral premise, as could some subset of Co-op people. Lacking information by which to assign any of these, the moral premise remains one in which the Co-op organization people are the subject, since a goal of Co-op operation is to remain in existence.

MP-U: Good organization people ought to prevent money losses. (Extract 6-16)

One way of preventing money loss is suggested directly in the text: have a cash register. Possibly a paid manager would have thought of a cash register, obtained one, and hence prevented a loss. But that is not said. Rather the talker uses "ought" again in the surface form, reflecting an instance of case II of the dynamic of moral response, for there is no cash register.

EP: If we had a proper cash register... (Extract 6-16)
The text, although overtly proposing getting a cash register as something "we ought to do," does not specify who "we" are. Again I am supplying the Co-op produce day people who would then have a cash register, much as the Co-op has scales and order forms (cf. Chapter 2)

MP-V: We as good produce day people ought to have a proper cash register. (Extract 6-16)
The talker concludes the example with yet another explicit formulation using "ought," but without a subject specified in any way.
Extract 6-17

Jim G.: ...and that's just one example that comes to mind from recent events of something ought to be done...
[Fast]

("Paid Manager" 211-214)

The previous formulation of moral premise U would seem to fit here also, prevent money losses.

At this point a question might be raised as to why this particular talker has used "ought" three times in this discussion of money loss, (Extracts 6-16, 6-7) representing almost all of the uses of this modal which was taken as paradigmatic for the analysis. As noted in Chapter 4 "ought" and "should" rank highest on a list of intensity of modals. This talker does not use "should," which was characteristic of Sheldon's contribution earlier in the arguments over Ben's possible candidacy (Extract 6-12). The data of this segment suggests preference for a term is idiosyncratic, but the fact of using a term of high intensity shows in both instances the same pattern. They are defending themselves: each is speaking as a person in a collection of people that is threatened, speaking in support of the collection as a whole.

As a treasurer, Jim is defending himself against the possible charge that he does not know where the money is. As labor coordinator, Sheldon would be expected to organize the schedule and supervise the workers' appearance on Produce Day. In both cases, criticism of the role performance of the speaker is indicated. The fact that a paid manager is being considered to oversee Produce Day suggests that it needs over-
seeing. The fact that the money losses can not be explained suggests the treasurers' bookkeeping needs examining. All of this information is presumably known by all those who are meeting people, as it has been presented during this meeting. In both instances Jim and Sheldon show by their moral responses a concern with what ought to be rather than what is by the most direct expression--ought and good. This may serve to deflect others from a closer analysis of "selves" which for the moment were shown as less than good. In the depersonalized arena of moral matters they associate themselves with the obligations and evaluations of the collection of people as a whole, rather than the particular happenings which show particular individuals as less than adequate. Both deflect personal criticism. In defending themselves in this way, both run another risk, that of appearing to preach or to sermonize. Yet none of the meeting people comments on this aspect or shows resentment that they have been preached to.

The Problem Of The Unsold Food

The second problem which the present cooperative management system has not solved is introduced immediately.

Extract 6-18

Jim G.: ...then a problem arises where, like where State Co-op is not accepting our vegetables anymore, so now we have a regular loss every week, ranging from three dollars on good weeks to twelve, fifteen dollars on bad weeks, now somebody's really gotta deal with this problem of what are we gonna do ah, maybe we can work out an arrangement with Hiram's or something, maybe we can find some place else here with the
vegetables, maybe through more careful tallying we can avoid any overruns, or maybe we can find a couple people in the community who would take vegetables on a contingency basis, or some system but we don't have anything right now...

["Paid Manager" 213-225]

The problem of Extract 6-18 is that food unsold after a produce day represents a loss for the Co-op unless some other outlet is found (cf. Chapter 2, page 97). Again this is a financial issue, and the relevant moral premise is closely related to the existential predication:

EP: We have a regular loss every week. (Extract 6-18)

MP-W: We as good organization people ought not to have a regular money loss. (Extract 5-18)

This instance of case II of the dynamic of moral response (p. 299) presumes Co-op people do not want a regular loss every week, and so the polarities of EP and MP are shown as opposite. The talker is once again speaking for the Co-op organization and its losses, rather than for the treasurers or for the meeting people.

But again information has been supplied which would be appropriate for a meeting, but was not on the agenda. Although the text of Extract 6-18 begins by locating the problem as one concerning "our vegetables," the specific solution is put in terms of "somebody's really gotta deal with this problem of what are we gonna do" (Extract 6-18). Once again, "we" and "our vegetables" show Jim as speaking for the Co-op organization in which this "somebody" is to be located. The text does not suggest here that somebody is a manager, paid or otherwise.
The activity of taking the food to another location for resale would be carried out by one or two individuals at the close of produce day. Negotiations with alternative places which might take the food could be done another time. The usual procedure in the Co-op would be for the meeting people to discuss together what could be done. The talk of Extract 6-18 bypasses this cooperative step of managing in which the meeting people had up till now taken part. The talker uses "we" in a series of modals in which the epistemic sense (p.264) of the possibility appear dominant to describe a series of possible solutions. The only exception is the phrase "somebody's really gotta deal ..." which was shown above stated as MP-I(C).

The last line of Extract 6-18 summarizes the current state with the existential proposition:

\[ \text{EP: We don't have anything right now, (system to dispose of left over produce)} \]

(Extract 6-18)

The segment concludes with a statement of the problem as not being solved since there is a lack of "manpower."

Extract 6-19

Jim.G.: ... nor do we have the, man power to uh, ah, to develop something so, ah, so, that's another kind of problem that arises, that in a situation where you have management you also have somebody who is sort of on top of that kind of problem and ready to deal with it as soon as it comes up.... ["Paid Manager" 225-230]

The notion of "manpower" also would appear to apply equally
well to one person or to many, and is replaced with "personnel" in the following moral premise.

**MP-Y:** We as good organization people ought to have personnel for development. (Extract 6-19)

Such "personnel" could be some of the meeting people.

The "somebody" in Extract 6-19, however, is located in management ("where you have management.") Clearly meeting people are not being considered as management at this point. Their role is not discussed. Nor is the relation between the new authority and the earlier one. Two more premises specify what the manager ought to do.

**MP-Z:** Some one of the good management people ought to be on top of problems. (Extract 6-19)

**MP-I(D):** Some one of the good management people ought to be ready to deal with problems as they come up. (Extract 6-19)

In this last formulation a manager is now shown as a lone individual dealing with problems as they arise, rather than cooperatively helping the meeting people to solve them. The separation of the function of managing from that of the Co-op meeting people has been completed, but nowhere discussed. The question still remains as to how the talk has succeeded in offering a new version of management for the Co-op, one in which cooperation is diminished once again, without ever discussing the old version.

**The Cooperative Co-op People**

Many aspects of the proposed change in the Co-op were discussed amply, but with one omission. No mention has been
made of the cooperative management system that had operated and of the changes that would need to be made in that system in order to accommodate the new authority figure. What scope would there be for cooperative management in the future? What authority will meeting people have to effect change and to institute policies in the Co-op? How will the status of manager fit into the lines of communication which existed in the past? If new definitions of cooperative activity are to characterize the future Co-op, how are they going to be written and who is going to decide on them?

At this point the model of cooperation introduced in Chapter 1 and expanded in Chapter 5 might profitably be reviewed, with the aim of specifying the relation of the manager to the Co-op people which has emerged from this analysis. Any individual who was viewed as a helping individual could be seen as one of the individuals involved in the running of the Co-op.

Good a, b, c, ..., m, ..., n in C ought to Y, where a, b, c, ..., n are individuals and one of these (m) is the paid manager, C is the Co-op consisting of cooperative people, here provisionally including the paid manager, and Y the set of activities, attitudes, and categories by which the Co-op can be characterized. This is the manager who emerged in the first section of the analysis (The Someone Who Would Help, pp. 389 to 410). As an individual who is helping, the new paid manager would seem to be integrated into the schema of cooperation expounded in Chapter 5, p. 364;
(1) Each of the individuals a, b, c, ..., m, ..., n know that some other individual(s) in the set is also so engaged.

(2) The collection C has some recognized purpose to which a, b, c, m, n are oriented.

However it is apparent that problems in these relations might well appear. Although by (1) each individual would know that others were so engaged, nothing in the description of the paid manager's job show how each would continue to know who else is involved, much less what the others were doing. Although by (2), each individual would be oriented to some recognized purpose of the Co-op, short term goals might well differ as problems arose and were solved, since the manager would have access to information which the meeting people would not, and vice versa. The eventual effect on long-term goals might be to make them quite divergent.

The model of cooperation continues to fit only if means are set up to insure that information and perspectives can be shared, even for the "helping" manager which emerged in the earlier analysis. The someone who would help was shown as a person who was also at the meetings, but took on an extra share of responsibilities, for which a person would be paid. However, there seems to be no possibility of fit if the status which emerged from the analysis in the second section ("The Manager Who Would Help" p. 411) is applied to the model. The model of cooperation continues
to fit only if means are set up to insure that information and perspectives can be shared. If so, then the authority too could be shared, and the cooperative would be fully cooperative. A further feature of the model of cooperation can be then proposed, namely that:

(3) Individuals have at least the possibility of sharing information, perspectives and authority.

It is with regard to (3) that the manager position, as established in the talk, does not fit. Although a manager creates an asymmetrical situation, the Co-op has always had asymmetrical relationships. People in the Co-op have always taken different amounts of responsibilities and had different degrees of participation. In the past, the management had remained cooperative. The loss of cooperative features results from the fact that in creating the new status, no plans were made to insure the possibility that the Co-op people would know what needed to be done, what had been done, and if they wanted, to be able to do things themselves.

In creating the new status, a further limitation has been imposed on the scope of how individuals could cooperatively participate in the Co-op. The stratification of Chapter 5 had removed the necessity for everyone to be a worker, so it legitimated a variety of individualism (called Type2 there) which had been the case for a while but not recognized as such. This second stratification limits the scope of what the Co-op people will be able to do to help solve problems.
Certain policy and procedural decisions will no longer be within the scope of the Co-op people, whether they are conceived as working cooperatively or exercising individuality in any of the forms shown in Chapter 5.

The consequences of the change can be examined in the moral premises by which the Co-op people have been defined as good, but less cooperative Co-op people. Over half of the moral premises found in this chapter (43) concern the Co-op people in two guises, that of meeting people and organization people. Do the Co-op people in either of these guises show how they have been and will be cooperative Co-op people in the future? Has anything of authority, information, or perspectives been predicated in the moral premises that were stated which reflect the moral matters which appeared in the segment?

As the meeting people discuss the possibility of having a paid manager, the moral premises which appear concern the proposal itself and the mechanics of running the meeting.  

Good meeting people ought

A:
A(A): to allocate money for a manager; (Extract 6-6)
B(A): to establish the position of paid manager; (Extract 6-7)
A(C): not to hire a manager; (Extract 6-10)
K: to make the position more widely known before deciding on someone; (Extract 6-7)
L: to separate discussion of the position from talk of filling the position. (Extract 6-7)

1 A subset of the meeting people, the "proposal-making-people' had three moral premises, all of which concerned getting further information about the manager's duties.
All but the last two of these moral premises concern the activity of the meeting people in getting a new manager. The last two concern the mechanics of advertising the position and the need to separate discussion of the position from the person who might fill it. Both of these predications are actualized and concern actions that were done during the meeting, and between this and the next meeting.

The moral premises of the organization people however, cover several different areas of problems and issues.¹

Good organization people

B: to have a paid manager; (Extract 6-1)
D: to be successful as a Co-op; (Extract 6-3)
U: to prevent money losses; (Extract 6-15)
I: to deal with potential problems: (Extract 6-4)
I(A): to deal with problems needing attention;
  (Extract 6)
H(C): not to let everything be the responsibility of the paid coordinators: (Extract 6-14)

We ought:
J: to have someone to help us in starting up the Co-op; (Extract 6-5)
J(A): to have help to get things organized in starting up the Co-op; (Extract 6-5)
Y: to have personnel for development; (Extract 6-19)
W: not to have a regular money loss; (Extract 6-18)
X: to have some way to sell left-over produce;
  (Extract 6-18)
I(B): to be able to deal with problems;
Some one ought:
I(C): to deal with the problem of unsold produce.

The first items (B through H(C)) can be viewed as goals of the Co-op organization and appeared in the text without surface indication of individuals as subject. Not so in the

¹ One for a subset of organization people, the treasurer, is not listed, as it pertained to only two of the Co-op people at that time.
case of the second items (I(B) through X), since "we" was present in the text, and for various reasons, the "we" was attributable to the organization people. The first three of the six using "we" refer to the use of additional people to operate the Co-op (J, J(A) and Y). None of these suggest that such other people would be in charge, have authority or be given powers by which they could be called managing. All are consistent with a view of the cooperative management which has been done by the Co-op people, where there was no difference in levels present.

The third section of the list contains only one item (I(C)), which has as a surface subject "somebody," stated in the moral premise by "some one." A particular person to handle the problem of the unsold produce did not need to be a manager. In the past meeting people had solved the problem of finding outlets for surplus produce and could do it again.

Nothing in these moral premises for the Co-op people show the Co-op people as more cooperative Co-op people or less cooperative Co-op people. One of the moral premises for the meeting people concerned information (L, separating discussion of the position from talk of filling the position) as did the three for the subset of proposal-making-people all of which concerned getting additional information during the meeting about the manager's duties (MP-M, MP-Q, MP-S). Nothing in these moral premises concerns a new perspective or authority coming into being, other than what had already
existed. The Co-op is still shown in these moral premises as a whole, working together to solve its problems. However as will become more apparent, the status of the new person is a superior one, and the rest of the cooperating Co-op people become subordinate to it.

Cooperative Management Vs. Managing The Co-op

The original question asked how an extensive change in the structure of authority of the Co-op was made without discussions of the loss then of the cooperative managing system in effect at that time. Evidence of a change in ideology was not found in moral premises concerning the cooperating Co-op people considered either as meeting people or as organization people. Perhaps evidence of a change can be found by consulting the moral premises which were stated for the proposed management people, who would be a sub-collection of Co-op people once the proposal was passed. As noted earlier this is an intermediate level of collections of people, the level where much clustering of moral matters has been noted in the moral responses examined earlier in this chapter.

Good management people ought

N: to coordinate the coordinators; (Extract 6-11)
O: to know who is on duty; (Extract 6-11)
P: to check for defaulters; (Extract 6-11)

Someone ought:
E: to have an overall picture; (Extract 6-4)
P: to troubleshoot; (Extract 6-4)
G: to back up in emergencies; (Extract 6-4)
H: to take responsibility for problems costing more than $20 a week. (Extract 6-4)
Here is a series of duties and definitions of responsibilities of the new position which appeared in the extracts shown earlier. Are these moral premises consistent with a Co-op in which anyone who comes to a meeting will participate in the cooperative management by which policies and decisions will be made to solve the problems in Co-op operation? Or do these moral premises suggest a separate perspective and superordinate status that would have the authority to manage the Co-op without participation by the meeting people.

The first tasks (N, O, P) have been activities of the meeting people and of the labor coordinators whom they appointed. The data presented at the meeting point to money losses and unsold food as current problems needing attention; both are particular problems related to the more general one of coordinating the coordinators (N above). No one suggests that labor has not been coordinated well, and the data of Chapter 2 would suggest that the new system implemented recently (crews and option of being a non-worker, cf. chapter 5) has been successful.

Items in the third set (R to J-B) use "person" as a
subject, reflecting the portions of the discussion where "person" referred to the status of manager, but could be interpreted as referring to the status holder, and particularly to Ben who has been mentioned many times as a candidate. Again none of the specific moral premises stated necessarily reflect a separate perspective or clear exercise of authority by one individual. None mention the perspective of the meeting people.

However, items in the second set (E to I(D)) appear with much less ambiguity. Each is presented as something that has not been done. Each reflects an individual who would have power and be able to direct what is going on. The cooperative management which had existed would apparently no longer be in effect as the new status took over the managing of the Co-op.

The model presented in the preceding section suggested that three areas were crucial in determining the extent to which cooperation persisted, sharing information, perspectives and authority. The question can be raised at this time as to whether the meeting people discussed changes in any or all three of these areas which would be accomplished by the hiring of the paid manager (as reflected in the moral premises stated from the text).

Sharing Information

The practice in the past had been for some of the meeting people, who coordinated on produce day, generally to be the ones
who would bring information to the meetings about problems and happenings which would be discussed and policies implemented at subsequent produce days (or whenever relevant) most often by some of the same meeting people. Meetings were open to everyone and people who had a particular problem or concern did sometimes attend.¹

During the course of the segment, information is presented about money losses, typical of the sort of problem Co-op meetings would discuss. However, the information is not presented for the meeting people to discuss and find solutions to the problems, but rather as evidence of the sort of problems which a manager might handle. The same is true of the need for a new source to dispose of unsold produce.² There is no discussion of whether the meeting people could expect to get such information if the paid manager were hired.

Since the meeting was the place at which information was shared about Co-op operation and problems, the meeting would seem the place at which anyone concerned with managing the Co-op would start. At his particular meeting, the candidate Ben is present, as he has been at many past meetings. As a person helping the Co-op more officially--should he become paid manager--his attendance at meetings might be presumed to continue. But the meeting people do not specify

¹ During the 36 meetings used as data for this study, 48 people attended, some for one or two meetings, some for nearly all of them. (cf. Figure 2.5.)

² During the 18 meetings in 1973, 113 different items were considered, shown by Figure 2.6. Most discussed items were problems of operating the Co-op, least were ways of making the meetings better attended. (page 104)
as one of the responsibilities of the manager that meetings should be attended. That would be a simple way of transferring information between the meeting people and the manager and assuring that the manager knew what the concerns of the meeting people were.

Having the manager attend meetings would also be a way of the meeting people knowing what the manager was doing, and of the problems that the manager was handling. It would also allow the meeting people to have some input into what the manager planned to do. Further, the meeting people would give information to the manager as well as directives of what the meeting people felt ought to be done. But articulation between the meeting people and the proposed management is nowhere considered. No plans are made for channels of communication by which information would move from the meeting to the management or vice versa. The relation between meeting people and management was never clarified, and indeed sometimes those who managed came to meetings and sometimes they did not. In practice, information that the meeting people had at times would be shared with the manager, in other instances not. For example a leaflet campaign was arranged by the meeting people in the Fall of 1973 and completed without the manager knowing anything about it. The reverse was also true. The manager in the fall of 1974 knew that the main portion of Co-op produce was being delivered to the supplier's cold-storage facilities (which were in the same building as the Carverton Co-op, cf. p.90) on Wednesday. However it was not until after Thanksgiving
of 1974 that the meeting people discovered that this was the case and that it would be possible and preferable to have produce days on Wednesdays. The meeting people organized a poll of the people shopping in December and found Wednesday would be satisfactory for the majority of those using the Co-op and the change was made in January of 1975.

The discussion in this segment and further along in the same meeting did not specify ways in which information would be transferred or shared. The result was that some unknown and unknowable part of the operation, problems and policies of the Co-op were removed from the domain of the meeting people, who nevertheless continued doing some other unspecifiable share of cooperative management.

The New Perspective

In establishing the status of management people, the Co-op people are formulizing a third strata within the Co-op. In addition to workers and non-workers introduced earlier in this Middle Period, another location with another perspective is being made possible for those who participate in the Co-op. Theoretically anyone who is within a collection of "interested-and-available" people has the possibility of having the position. But only the person chosen will be able to have the new perspective. The loss to the meeting people of this perspective is not mentioned.

Location within the collection of paid managers can be expected to color the individual's observations of events,
people, and of moral matters. Assertions of the paid managers will then have to be understood in terms of the perspective afforded by the position within the Co-op people. In the formulation presented earlier, the focus on perspective provides a way of using Mannheim's (1937) notion of "relation­ism" (mentioned on page 45 and expanded on page 201) by which sense and meaning can be assigned to the manager in terms of the perspective afforded by the new status, and by the standards which become operative vis-a-vie that position.

The first indications in the text of this emerging perspective of the managing coordinator appear in the early metaphors of the treadmill where "at least somebody has an overall picture of the operation" (Extract 6-4) occurs. The moral premise was stated as:

MP-E: Some one of the good management people ought to have an overall picture. (Extract 5-4)

Although any "overall picture" presumes some perspective from which it is seen, the talk does not establish that the perspective be from on top. However, an "overall picture" presumes that the perspective be one broad enough to include the whole Co-op operation. That also presumes that much more information is available about Co-op operation than has ever been in the hands of the meeting people, who have always moved from problem to problem, from issue to issue, going into details where a situation required that such be done. Now, theoretically whatever "overall picture" was assembled would be for someone of the managing people.
The perspective would be still sharable with any of the meeting people or other interested persons since it is on the same level as the other people and remains theoretically interchangeable with their perspectives.

Later in the segment, another formulation, also metaphoric appears as "you also have somebody who is sort of on top of that kind of problem" in which a new level appears. The moral premise was stated as:

MP-Z: Some one of the good management people ought to be on top of problems. 

(Extract 6-19)

Here the notion of "on top" is introduced, the "top" view from which the management is seen as ready and expected to act. Someone who is "on top of" has information, a lot of it, but the possibility of a shared perspective no longer exists, except for others who are also managing the Co-op. If it were the case that the meeting people had been shown in the segment more clearly in their status of cooperative management the possibility of there being room at the top for them and the paid manager would be present. But that is not the case.

Anyone who is "sort of on top of" might be expected to have authority to make changes in operation, to organize people's activities, and to arrange for solutions to emergencies which arose during the operation of the Co-op. Such arrangements are not shown. Rather in several instances the relationship of the management and the meeting people which appears in the segment is one of "helping" in which the perspective of the manager and meeting people is on the same
level. Moral premises with predication "helping" (signalled by similar lettering) were stated as follows:

**Good organization people ought**

J: to have some one to help us in "starting up" the Co-op; (Extract 6-5)
J(A): to have help to get things organized in "starting up." (Extract 6-5)

**Good management people ought**

J(B): to help out with problems on produce day. (Extract 6-13)

The first two are from the perspective of the organization people, the third from the perspective of management. All three of these show the manager as providing help in which the help could be on an equal level as the rest of the Co-op people and with the same perspective. Nothing suggests that help is from some one who as a perspective from on top. These do not show the manager as having authority either in organizing starting up or in solving problems of produce day activities. None show the meeting people as losing their position of cooperative management, reflecting the lack of discussion of the perspective of the meeting people.

**The New Authority**

The notion of authority is a new one to the Co-op and it is handled most obliquely. The meeting people do not anywhere in the segment examine what the extent of cooperative activity had been before, anymore than they did in the discussion of changes in the labor system in Chapter 5. There are therefore no direct statements in the talk by which the
actual scope of authority held by the Co-op people can be shown. Some of the evidence of a changing ideology appears then in the shift from meeting people who would find in the manger a helpful equal to the Co-op people who are coordinated from above by someone who has responsibility to do that.

Four moral premises, signalled by similar lettering, are relevant since they concern responsibility.

Good management people ought

H: to take responsibility for problems costing more than $20 a week; (Extract 6-4)
H(A): not to be responsible for everything on produce day; (Extract 6-13)
H(B): to be responsible for knowing the selling arrangements for produce day. (Extract 6-13)

Good organization people ought

H(C): not to let everything be the responsibility of the paid coordinator. (Extract 6-14)

The first three assign responsibility for problems of produce day for a person within the collection of management people. The fourth (H(C)) restricts the organization people from assigning everything to the manager, but thereby assigns some unspecified amount of responsibility to the manager. The responsibilities to be retained by the meeting people are also thereby not explicated.

What does occur several times in the segment is the notion that the paid manager will "deal with" things. In this formualtion will be found the most explicit statement of what cooperative or any other type of management would entail. Here the clearest explication of an authority relation-
ship is shown. A series of five moral premises in which the predicate uses the phrase "deal with" were stated.

**Good organization people ought**

I: to deal with potential problems; (Extract 6-4)
I(A): to deal with problems needing attention; (Extract 6-15)
I(B): to be able to deal with problems;
I(C): to deal with the problem of unsold produce. (Extract 6-18)

**Good management people ought**

I(D): to be ready to deal with problems as they come up. (Extract 6-19).

The phrase "deal with" is a way of talking about "manage," not marked as colloquial or vernacular in Webster's 2nd, but rather defined as "to handle or treat so as to dispose of or manage adequately; as to deal with a problem."

The moral premises shown for the organization people all fit the existing cooperative management, since the predications are of people who are located within the organization people. It is only with MP-I(D) that the activity proposed is predicated directly to management people. The text at this point reads "a situation where you have management" (Extract 6-19).

Authority has been given up without anyone having been informed that that was what happened. One way of looking at this is that authority was assigned to the manager without insisting that he or she share it with others. The focus of the meeting people has not been on maintaining control of the Co-op for the meeting people within the loose cooperative management which existed. The meeting people show little
awareness that they have been the managing body, that it is they who have been wholly responsible, who have dealt with most of the problems that arose, and that they will be deprived of these concerns by the new paid manager. Nor do they define in what sense the paid manager will be in charge of the Co-op, or how that authority will be coordinated with whatever authority they have retained. The Co-op people will still be free to be as cooperative or individualistic in their individual relations as workers or non-workers in the Co-op, as was established in Chapter 5. But the Co-op people will not have the possibility of cooperatively managing the Co-op in the future without somehow taking into account whatever share of managing the paid manager is doing.

In revising the structure of the Co-op by hiring a manager, the Co-op people revise again their own variety of cooperation with which they have been running the Co-op. But as in Chapter 5, they do not discuss the loss in cooperative activity. They show no awareness of the need to set up ways for information to reach the paid manager, and equally important, for the manager to report back to them.

In the text, nothing is said to show how the manager will be related to the meeting people, other than that the meeting people will hire the manager. (How the manager might be fired is not considered.) The result would seem to be that the manager would attend to problems, make decisions, and
run the produce day activities without there having been any established channels between the meeting people and the manager. That is, the manager will manage the Co-op, not help the meeting people do it. That there will be a loss in the cooperative managing system is not discussed.

An extensive change was made in the structure of authority of the Co-op by emphasizing the help that a manager would provide and minimizing the fact that the manager would necessarily take on a perspective and authority relationship which would mean a decrease if not complete loss in the cooperative managing system which had been in effect. The potential manager first appears as a person helping the Co-op to do certain things that needed being done, and some things that had not been done up until then. That is, the manager is shown in the text as continuing the cooperative management that existed, and in fact helping to make it better. However, this presentation is maintained only as long as the job is associated with a person who is one of the meeting people. As the description develops it appears that the manager will not be engaged in very much cooperative activity.

The moral premises stated in the last two sections reflect the beginnings of a more formal administration of the Co-op, and the legitimation of authority established in the segment. The meeting people were not shown seeking to maintain control of the Co-op. Most of the moral matters expressed in the talk cluster about the intermediate level collection
of management people. Many of them reflect the difficulty of separating the position from the person who would fill it. Others concern the duties already being done by the labor coordinators. Others suggest what the manager might "deal with." But none concern the relation of the managers to the meeting people or what in fact each will be responsible for, or what cooperation will consist of in the future between them.

The preceding discussion has outlined the nature of the extensive change in the structure of authority of the Co-op which was implicit in what was said at the meeting. Very little of this was stated overtly and again a content analysis might not have registered these changes in authority and the reduction proposed in the cooperative managing system. The steps that were needed to identify these structural changes also indicate the answer to the question raised in the beginning. How could the Co-op people continue to portray themselves as good persons in a cooperative and yet abandon cooperative activity to this extent? The answer lies in the absence of any clear statement of authority and information flow between the meeting people and the manager.

Cooperation or any sort of management requires ways for information to accumulate and disperse. It requires lines of authority that are known. By not setting out such things clearly, the meeting people are able to continue the impression of cooperative management of the Co-op, in which the manager is there to help them, as one of them, rather than as someone in charge.
"PAID MANAGER" Segment

Sheldon: Is, may I ask you something, is there an actual agenda made up for tonight or what?

Jim G.: Yeah, yeah, it was, it was posted at the Co-op and a--

Amy: But nothing has been added to that.

Jim G.: Let's do old business and then, ah, you know, ask if there's new business ah, ah, Yeah.

Jim G.: Well then, the--

Sheldon: Could you just go over again what the agenda is?

Jim G.: Ok, well, there's three items, one is a proposal, to hire, uh, uh after we begin again in August [Caren coughs] a, ah, a manager, managing coordinator for the Co-op to, uh, for the amount of twenty dollars a week, and uh, the uh, actually, after we made that suggestion I talked to Ben to see if he'd be interested, he said he'd, he'd at least be available for, for such a thing, so it's not an empty set of people who might do it, and a, this is a thing that's been discussed many, many, times, and ah, I've sort of always advocated but never pushed, and ah, I guess last month I finally decided I wanted to push it, because I feel that it, uh, we're [Ben coughs] never gonna get off the ground as a Co-op, and begin just to consolidate our efforts and, uh, get off the treadmill of running as hard as we can to stay in the same place until we get to a situation where, at least somebody has an overall picture of the operation and can sort of trouble shoot, back up in emergencies and take responsibility for, a whole lot of things that are just sort of too long to list, that in my opinion are costing us on the average more than twenty dollars a week, but whenever you name any one thing, it's always something that can be dealt with, but ah, never does get dealt with until after it happens, and, uh, so, for this reason, uh, this, this was the form the proposal finally took, that twenty dollars a week was something that we could afford at our present size, assuming that, and assuming that we gain the efficiency that ah, that we, ah, might be able to gain with such a system that we could foresee making back that kind of amount in the relative-ly near future, and that, ah, a good time to start would kind of be in the fall, when we'll be starting up again as a Co-op, and uh, that it, also, that's the point where we'll sort of need someone to, to

Unhuh.

Jim G.: Unhuh.
help us get started up as a Co-op, uh, and, to help
us get going, to help us get some literature out to
to the community as to what we are, and get things
organized and pull things together, so uh, for this
reason, this may be not too coherent a speech because
I'm pretty tired, but for this reason, ah, I'd like
to make that as a motion, that we, ah, ah, allocate
this money for a position, and, ah, to begin, ah in
August, about two weeks perhaps before we start
up again, if we do close, and, uh, have a managing
coordinator.

Fred: Is there someone to take the job?

Jim G.: well Ben said he would, but I'm, I'm going
to make a separate motion, you know, concerning;
Ben because people might [Caren coughs] feel
we should make the position more widely known
or something before deciding [Phone rings]
on someone, uhm, so the motion I want to

Fred: Uhm.

Jim G.: make is we establish the position and then we can,
if, if that's approved, then we can get into the
question of whether Ben's the best person or whether
we want to advertise it, or-- [Speeds up]

Ben: Plus the fact that come
September I might, you know, have some kind of other,
you know, option, not that I'm going to let the Co-op,
leave the Co-op high and dry, but that I, I.

Jim G.: Unhuh

Ben: Shouldn't be, necessarily be the definition of the
job, you know. [Sniffs]

Job, you know.

Amy: Yeah.

Caren: Yeah.

I mean it seemed like something that,
that would be good in Ben's situation because he is
also working for the Central and has all the experience
and involvement, and he's getting kind of part-time
salary from that, and this would be like additional
part-time. [Bells jingle]

Fred: I thought we

Jim G.: Yeah

were going to talk about the job first.

Ben: I think, I think it might not be good to
have ["Lilly"] to have Ben doing both jobs, you're still
working for Central? ["Lilly, Lilly"] You're still--

Ben: Well, as far as the actual mechanics of it uh-- [Mumbles] Uh, I
I thought we

Ben: work pretty much, uh, all day Thursday

well no, actually I'm through with what I do, finish deliv-
ering all the food to the other Co-ops, at that point I, I
Fred: What time do you actually finish?

Caren: But a lot of the job doesn't have to take place on Thursday, you know, so a lot of it is uh, the publicity and labor.

Ben: Yeah, right, as far as stuff, yeah.

Jim G.: I mean, I don't wanna get into this thing about whether Ben should or should not be the person, because I think that is a separate question from whether we should do it, and uh,

Caren: Right, Right.

Amy: Uh huh, yeah unhuh, do, you might want to be a little more specific about what you meant, you know, about what Sheldon: Yeah.

Amy: this manager' d have to do.

Jim G.: OK, yeah, specifically the, the, the job would be uhm ah, A, to, to kind of coordinate the coordinators, to make sure that at any given time he knew who was gonna be on duty an, at a given point, and check out that the person really shows up, ha--

Sheldon: I think that you should just put it in other, in other terms, just that he should be the labor coordinator. Yes. [Louder] that I have in mind for the job. Uh--

Jim G.: No. No. [Louder] That's not what I have in mind for the job. Well he should, if he does that then the, he would be the labor coordinator.

Jim G.: Well--

Sheldon: really.

Jim G.: Well not, I don't, I think you could still have a labor coordinator who set up work crews and stuff like that. I don't think he'd have to be responsible for every man on every crew on every hour, but I do think he'd have to make sure that, ah, that he knew who was showing up, let's say for afternoon selling, and that that person had duly gotten in touch with the people who were supposed to work with them, and, and it was all arranged, if there were any problems he could help, uh, but I hope it doesn't degenerate into a situation where like all of everything begins to fall on the coordinator, because if that happens I think that it will be more than a twenty dollar a week job,
"PAID MANAGER" (cont'd)

and, and more than one person can handle well, um

Caren: Don't you sort of mean that the job will entail things that aren't being done now?

Jim G.: Right, now that's the next thing, like, ahm, like the ah, like there's many things which many times we've all said are problems that ought to be dealt with, but we've never been able to deal with them basically, because they don't really fall into anybody's domain, and um, because it takes a certain like stick-to-itness to get it done, and with, you know, different coordinators each week they don't get done, like, the last uh, uh, well, for two weeks in a row, not last week, but two weeks in a row before that we had, ah, unexplained money losses, ah, amounting to a total of about a hundred twenty dollars, now, uh, we, we can

not track down how this happened, ah--

Terry:

Caren:

part of it was that time when Jim noticed--

Jim G.: Right, and the week, and we're checking the records a week before there was a similar large loss [Ben clears throat], but the person who coordinated in your position the week before did not compare the money he brought over with the book, as he was supposed to do, so we didn't know about that large loss until we checked over the books carefully when you reported the loss and noticed the week before there'd also been a loss like that, now this kind of thing--

Amy: Excuse me Jim, I, I don't have the sequence of events right, did the other one happen before Jim's or after Jim's?

Jim G.: Yeah, the week before Jim's, And uh- well, the week before Jim's.

Amy: That's the kind of problem--

Jim S.: The 4 to 6 shift?

Amy: Yeah the afternoon, it was the afternoon.

Jim S.: It's hard to pin down whether it was 4 to 6 or the next shift, because we don't have, you know, we--

Jim S.: The money's brought over separately.

Amy: The money's brought over separately.

Jim S.: Yeah, but we haven't sat down with the book to work out the details of where the
money is missing, we only know that, that amount
of money is short, uh, the, a, how, you know,
that's the kind of thing which could be prevented
like if we had a proper cash register, right, which
is again something which we ought to do, probably
not going to do, cause if we have a register the, you
know, money registers up and it goes into a cash
drawer which is, which is closed, except when
Jim S.: Closed.
Jim G.: a sale is being put in uh, uhm, the al-, you
know, and that's just one example that comes to mind
from recent events of something ought to be done
(Fast), then a problem arises where, like where State
Co-op is not accepting our vegetables anymore, so
now we have a regular loss every week, ranging from
three dollars on good weeks to twelve, fifteen dollars
on bad weeks, now somebody's really gotta deal with
this problem of what are we gonna do ah, maybe we can
work out an arrangement with Hiram's or something,
maybe we can find some place else here with the
vegetables, maybe through more careful tallying we can
avoid any overruns, or maybe we can find a couple
people in the community who would take vegetables on
a contingency basis or some system but we don't have
anything right now, nor do we have the, man power to
uh, ah, to develop something so, ah, so that's
another kind of problem that arises, that in a situa-
tion where you have management you also have somebody
who is sort of on top of that kind of problem and
ready to deal with it as soon as it comes up, ah, um,
those are those are just two examples, another
thing is...
CHAPTER 7
STARTING UP AGAIN

The Co-op generally closed in August as nearly everyone was away and no one was available to do the work. In July 1973, sales had reached a low of $100 a week. In general, summer closings were difficult to recover from, and it required an extra effort on the part of some of the Co-op people to start up again. One person remembered that she came close to quitting after the closing of the previous summer.\(^1\)

I thought about dropping out simultaneously that I, I thought it wasn't worth putting enough energy in to make it run again. That was at the beginning of this Fall. It had closed down during the summer [Unhuh] and it took a lot of work to get it going again, and I considered at that time whether it was worth putting the work into it. [Do you think you were right?] Ah, I, yeah, I think so.

[Amy, IV, page 3, 4/11/73]

The re-opening in the Fall of 1973 was particularly a problem since the manager who had been hired (cf. Chapter 5) to help with the Fall opening in September would apparently not be available until October. I myself wondered if the Co-op would re-open at all. There were rumors at the community auction of September 7th that the Co-op would probably not re-

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\(^1\) Figure 2.1 of the sales record of the Co-op shows both the 1972 and 1973 periods when the Co-op was closed.
open as there were too few people who wanted to work. Four
days later, a coordinator had much the same point of view
when he stopped by my house; he wondered who could be involved.
He himself had moved into a commune on the other side of
State U., and his new commune shopped at a different Co-op
closer to that location. Another person came by on the 14th
and confirmed that the coordinator would be in England for
the rest of the month.

A meeting was called for September 19th by some of
those I have designated as "meeting people" the preceding
year. Telephone calls were made to those who had been active
in the Co-op in the spring. Six people came to consider
whether or not the Co-op would resume operations. I went to
the meeting on the 19th not knowing how it would turn out,
and because it was such a problematic issue I did not
contribute to the discussion until it was clear what was
going to happen.

The transcript used for this chapter begins with talk
of "opening the doors" of the Co-op and selling "some lettuce
and tomatoes." These remarks were not heard as serious, but
rather as a joke, although the speakers had been Co-op
participants for many years. Another speaker then proposed
revisions of the system used in other years, maintaining that
such changes would make the Co-op more efficient and operate

1 Complete text of "Starting Up" is given at the end of the
chapter. More details of the Co-op are found in Chapter 2.
more smoothly.

Problems that the cooperative faced the previous year were reviewed. The level of energy and commitment of the Co-op people was an underlying issue; the problem had been discussed explicitly by Ben earlier that year in a face to face interview.

...because it's a volunteer organization and also because so many of the people involved have so many other things in their lives and on their minds, um it sort of by definition almost has to get by on kind of inspirational energy [laughs] rather than, you know, a concerted sort of commitment.

[Ben IV, page 4, 5/16/73]

The segment of the meeting continues with further talk about the Co-op and then the same person who had volunteered at first offered again to help start up the Co-op. But this time the talk of opening the Co-op was taken as serious. People then volunteered for other jobs, displaying cooperation in taking on the jobs needed to be done. Consensus on the resumption of the Co-op was achieved. Since the first display of commitment was rejected and the second accepted, the question can be put:

What were the conditions of an effective communication of commitment to the Co-op that could and did lead to starting up again?

The first chapter (p. 40) introduced the notion of commitment as the continuing investment of resources in some collective aim of a collection of people which returns to the individual(s) (minimally) the possibility of being seen as good people in that collection of people. Three identifying features of commitment can be identified in this
definition:

1. A collective aim, requiring the investment of resources, especially time and energy.

2. The notion of good people (or of a good person), as an available characterization from shared participation in some collection of people.

3. A future orientation, shown as the expectation that the relationship of the person to the collection of people will continue.

This definition and the three features of commitment provide the framework for the analysis of this segment which includes the establishment of commitment to continue the Co-op.

As will be shown, opening up the Co-op required the time and energy of more than one person. It therefore requires the commitment of a set of people who will do the opening. The analysis of the communication of commitment in the segment thus begins with a search for the collection of people who will do this opening.

Concerning Collections of People

The Committed "We"

The fundamental moral premise of the segment is one that links Co-op people to starting up the Co-op.

MP-A: Good organization people ought to start up the Co-op. The immediate question is, who will be in this collection of good Co-op people? It must be some set of committed people which any one person in the collection can refer to by the use of "we." One way of locating the set of committed people
would be to examine the uses of "we" in the segment.

"We" (or "our" or "us") is used extensively in the segment.\footnote{In 56 places in the segment "we," (or "our" or "us") is used. Five of the six people present use "we" from 3 to 25 times a piece; I was the only one present who did not. Two instances are for a couple, both present at the meeting 290, 291 and need not be examined further. Six instances of "we" did not have sufficient context for any elaboration and hence are omitted from the analysis.} Surface collections of people were generated from the 48 instances of the first person plural pronouns having sufficient context, using the formulation of "feature plus people" developed in Chapter 3 (page 139). The labels are based on the surface text but reduced to a more concise form, following the principles of Chapter 3. Though these principles do not uniquely determine the choice of a label, they restrict the choice to a small number. At the same time, the more concise labels have a wider range of possible interpretations--can apply to more collections of people--than the utterance in context, which already offers a wide range of interpretations. Many of these labels are ungraceful and at first may seem to be cluttering up the analysis. However, they are needed to represent the complexity of the interpretive work which is part of the competence of talkers, including the Co-op talkers.

The surface collections of people generated from the uses of "we" in the segment are shown in Figure 7.1. Two
Figure 7.1 Collections of People Generated from "We" (or "Our" or "Us") in "Starting Up", Classified

Meeting-people

Non-starting-up-people
voting-people [Elmer;006]
knowing-enough-people [Elmer;029]
having-been-around-people [Elmer;030]
doing-right-now-people [Fred;067]
knowing-about-the-neighborhood-people [Caren;072]
knowing-where-we're-at-people [Caren;073]
practical-people [Caren;201]
figuring-labor-needs-people [Elmer;267]

Starting-up-people
sign-making-people [Caren;203]
going-on-run-people [Caren;205]
doing-labor-and-selling-people [Caren;206]
making-telephone-call-people [Caren;207]
searching-for-commitment-people [Caren;248]
requiring-commitment-people [Caren;256]
starting-to-take-orders-people [Elmer;278]
starting-up-people [Elmer;284]

Organization-people

Non-starting-up-people
using-old-system-people [Elmer;028]
having-labor-people [Caren;065]
setting-up-things-people [Caren;161]
unknowingly-carrying-people [Elmer;162]
not-constantly-coping-people [Elmer;166]
first-starting-Co-op-people [Elmer;173]
Co-op-organization-people [Elmer;173]
having-money-to-buy-[produce]-people [Elmer;176]
getting-deposit-people [Caren;178]
not-"feeling"-people [Elmer;179]
not-forcing-issue-people [Elmer;180]
carrying-their-own-weight-people [Elmer;183]
not-getting-back-members-people [Amy;224]
having-membership-people [Amy;227]
spring-closing-people [Amy;227]

Starting-up-people
going-ahead-and-opening-people [Elmer;007]
opening-up-and-failing-people [Caren;072]
opening-up-people [Caren;213]
having-signs-people [Caren;281]

Produce day-people

filling-out-order-form-people [Fred;015]
getting-their-cucumber-people [Elmer;056]
instances offer an immediate possibility of locating commitment, as the label indicates the word was actually used in the talk of the meeting people.

\[ \text{searching-for-commitment-people Caren: 248} \]

"...unless we find two or three people that can make at least a commitment to be there..."

\[ \text{requiring-commitment-people Caren: 256} \]

"...we have to have that much [two or more people to make the same commitment]."

Neither of these instances of the uses of the word "commitment" show people committing themselves or who are committed. Both are collections of possibly committed people, but neither refer to committed people. In 248-256 Caren is asking for people who can make a commitment, rather than locating "we" within a collection of people who have made a commitment or are making a commitment. However that section of the segment is a crucial one and will be examined closely later. At this point a further look at Figure 7.1 is indicated, for the collection of committed people may have appeared without the use of such an obvious term in the surface.

The surface collections of people shown in Figure 7.1 are classified into Co-op and non-Co-op people, and further according to the three guises of the Co-op, (as elaborated in Chapter 2). A further separation is shown, at an intermediate level of generality, between those which were collections of starting-up-people and those which were not. The criteria used for the partitioning of surface collections between starting-up and non-starting-up was the presence of...
at least one of a set of activities, attitudes, and beliefs which relate to Co-op procedures being resumed in the fall. For example, the collection of "filling-out-order-form-people" [015] introduced by Fred would seem to be a collection of "starting-up-people," but that is not so, since the larger text which includes the phrase "we fill out the same order forms" refers back to the Co-op last year and not to one to appear in the fall. The surface collection was therefore classified as one of "produce-day-people." On the other hand, Elmer refers to the future as he says, "how about if we start taking orders." [278] Here the collection of "starting-to-take-orders-people" is an instance of "starting-up-people," classified in Figure 7.1 under meeting-people.

Figure 7.1 does not show the labels for the nine instances of "we" for "commune-people." "Commune-people" were responsible for the founding of the Co-op and for running it throughout the "Early Days," as described in Chapter 2 (p. 64) However, by the time of this segment the great majority of the people active in the Co-op were not part of communes, but belonged to the Co-op as individuals or as part of families (cf. Figure 2.2) Two of the individuals present belonged to communes at the time of the meeting, and each used "we" to speak for their communes (in the sense developed in Chapter 3, page 203):

Caren:...like in our house, you know, one person's job...

Pam:...I lived in a house, and...we would each week...

In the segment Caren states that her house found the Co-op
inconvenient, while Pam said that her house found that it saved money for them. These utterances will be important for a later discussion of motivation for participation in the Co-op (on page 482), but they do not introduce any "starting-up-people" nor do the other seven instances of "we" used for "commune people" between lines 101 to 132.

The cases assigned to "meeting people" are instances where the "we" refers to the people present, considered as a collection of individuals who are having a meeting. Meeting-people take actions, know things, have characteristics or states usually of individual people in the Co-op materials. Organization-people appears mostly in the sense of a collectivity, where "the Co-op" can itself be substituted for individual instances of "we." The Co-op has members and systems and importantly here it closes and may open.

The 24 instances of "non-starting-up-people" include 8 for the meeting people which reflect characteristics of the meeting people, such as voting, being practical, knowing neighborhood people, which were not in the text related to the process of starting up. The 16 which were assigned to organization people include a series of instances of "we" used by Elmer who reflects a perspective (199) of an "insider" to the collection of "Early Days" people as he speaks for the Co-op, explaining how the Co-op got funds and survived.1

1 Caren tries to interrupt using "B-b-b-b-," [177]. suggesting "But..." perhaps to dispute his information or his right to claim an insider status (199). Her commune was one of the original ones, and contributed to the initial funds Elmer
None of these subcollection of Co-op people include people committing themselves.

A more likely site would be the 13 collections of "starting-up-people" (of which 3 are for meeting-people and 5 of the organization-people) for subcollections of people who are shown as committing themselves to starting up the Co-op. Most of these give some evidence of being committed people, as "we" is shown associated with a series of activities (sign-making, going on a run, making phone calls, etc.) which occur once the Co-op is to begin. But none of these catch the act of communicating commitment, of the actual placing of Co-op people into a collection of committed people. None shows evidence of some "we" committing themselves.

If examination of "we" does not locate a subcollection of committing people some other way of representing these people in the talk was used. The most systematic way of searching for the "committed people" is to use the defining features of commitment shown above. In terms of the three features of commitment introduced earlier, there must be some people for whom it can be said that they have in this instance.

1. A collective aim--of starting up the Co-op so as to

refers to. What has become relevant here is a collection of "founding-people." (cf. page 230 where the collection of "founding-people" is shown as one that is remote, but not evaluated negatively on that basis.)
to get produce at reasonable prices.

2. The notion of good people—a means available to be seen as good people in the Co-op through a shared investment (here participation) in the Co-op.

3. A future orientation—of a continuing relationship in the Co-op of persons with the Co-op people.

The collective aim, of starting up the Co-op was stated earlier as moral premise A, which also contains evidence of the notion of what constitutes good people. A future orientation may prove to be the crucial feature in the search to find in the surface text evidence of the committed people.

The strategy to be followed next in this chapter is to search for the collections of people evoked in the segment which refer to each of these three features of commitment. The present inquiry into the communication of commitment therefore continues to focus on the actual language used. The assumption continues to be that moral matters can be most systematically located by examining the data that is available to interactants starting from the actual words used in the interaction. A great deal is involved in the interpretation of these words. By focusing on that portion of the talk in which people are embedded, I expect to find the most direct and certain route to the moral matters that are available.

A Collective Aim—"What Do You Mean Open?"

The collective aim of starting up the Co-op would seem to be a simple matter, since Fred, the first person to talk in
the segment immediately expresses interest in opening the Co-op.

Extract 7-1

Fred: Well, that's that's, I mean, I, I, uh, I am just very concretely oriented, I'm interested in opening the Co-op. You want doors, and selling some lettuce and tomatoes, and---

Elmer: to open the doors and get started, I know. Shall we take a vote? It's really against my interests to vote, because if I say we should go ahead and do it, then I'm just making more work to do. ["Starting Up" 001-003.]

However, in what collection of people does Fred place himself in Extract 7-1? This is a general question to be answered in this section for all instances in which people talk of opening the Co-op.1 Fred's utterance shows little evidence of being a moral response, but signals the fundamental moral premise of the segment, that the Co-op ought to start up, which was introduced earlier. The existential predication is:

EP: I'm interested in opening the doors. (Extract 7-1)

The surface text does not contain indicators which show a focusing on moral matters, but moral matters have been introduced and remain always available in the sense discussed in Chapter 1 (p. 13). A more specific moral premise introduces the collection of "concretely-oriented" people.

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1 In Extracts 7-1 to 7-7 are most of the instances of the use of the phrase "opening the Co-op" or its lexical equivalents. The rest are shown in this section and identified by line number in the segment. As was true in Chapters 5 and 6, the analysis will not examine every instance of moral response or means by which people are constructed, but only these relevant to the analysis.
MP-A(A): Fred as a good person in a collection of concretely-oriented-people ought to open the doors. (Extract 7-1)

Elmer shows category consensus, repeating much the same phrase "open the doors," although the existential text continues to lack evidence of moral response.

EP: You want to open the doors and get started. (Extract 7-1)

In stating a moral premise here I shall locate Fred (who is shown by "you" in the EP) in a collection of people interested in opening the Co-op.

MP-A(B): Fred as a good person in a collection of interested-in-opening-the-doors-people ought to open the doors. (Extract 7-1)

The particular label used—"interested-in-opening-the-doors-people"—has a different range of properties than "interested-in-opening," and conveys the focus of the talker on the Co-op which is continuing the weekly operation of selling produce rather than on the problem of starting up the operation once again.

As Elmer continues in Extract 7-1, he relates himself to this collection of people who favor opening the Co-op, but in a hypothetical way "if I say we should go ahead and do it," as he now turns to the problem of starting up. The hypothetical construction avoids risk in showing a self that appears less than good. (cf. Chapter 3, page 206). In this instance a cluster of indicators of moral response appear on the sur-

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1 Moral premises which contain predications about opening the Co-op are labelled as variants of "A" to show the close connections, and as an ease in collecting them later.
face of the existential predication:

   EP: It's really against my interests to vote, because if I say we should go ahead and do it... (Extract 7-1)

The EP contains stress showing moral affect, "really" an intensifier, and the modal "should." In this further form of moral premise A, the subject is shifted to "we":

   MP-A(C): We as good organization-people ought to go ahead and open the Co-op. (Extract 7-1)

Although Elmer is talking of the consequences of taking a vote, the collection of Co-op people which Elmer speaks for is the organization people, for it is the Co-op which opens.

Serious or Joking

When Elmer said earlier in Extract 7-1 "Shall we take a vote" he was then speaking for 1 the meeting people. Yet Elmer had not been a meeting person very often during the preceding year. Neither is he one of those given credit later in the segment as the "people who really made the Co-op happen." [229]. (Fred will also be omitted from this list.) This may be one of the reasons that Caren is able to characterize the proposal as a joke in the utterance that follows immediately:

Extract 7-2

   Caren: Well, it's a joke right now, then what are you talking about? What do you mean open? [Laughs] What's open--
   Fred: How about, yeah, what some, the thing that used to be running last year, just

---

1 The notion of "speaking for" a collection of people used here and in the sentence above is developed earlier as a basic feature of the analysis of people in talk. (p. 203)
like it was before it's re-organized into anything, you know, you open the doors, we fill out the same order forms and you do the same bullshit, and just do Caren: Oh yeah? Fred: It exactly the way it was, you don't have to-- Caren: You gonna be there to take orders the first night? ["Starting Up" 009-020]

The question of whether talkers are serious or not is a central problem in any study of communication. Before each response to an utterance, people have to decide this issue. Sacks (1967) has pointed out that consequences for action are determined primarily by this decision. This issue is not often brought to the surface as clearly as in Extract 7-2.

Whether or not the situation continues to be defined as serious rather than humorous, depends on more than Caren's utterance "well, it's a joke right now." As R. Coser (1960) has observed "humor relies on the collective perception of those to whom it is addressed, and is therefore defined by the social situation it occurs in." (p. 81) Seriousness too rests on collective perception of the interactants which results from a continuing evaluation of each utterance as not humorous. In Bateson's terms (1972) when a psychological frame is introduced by which a situation is defined as play rather than serious, then amongst other things "the messages or signals exchanged in play are in a certain sense untrue or not meant." (p. 183)¹ And indeed Caren shows that she is trying to determine the sense of the utterance by asking "What are you talking about? What do you mean

¹ Cf. also Emerson (1969) who considers negotiations which transform humorous to serious frame in interaction.
open?" (Extract 7-2)

Caren's introduction of the possibility of a joke leaves open the question as to whether or not she is urging that the Co-op be opened. The utterance suggests case III of the dynamic of moral response where alternative forms of the moral premise are possible (Cf. chapter 4, p.304).

Although Caren's position on opening is indeterminate here, she has located either or both Fred and Elmer (depending on how "you" in "what are you talking about" is interpreted) in a collection of "talking-about-opening-people," a collection of people who may not perhaps be those who also would take action. Moral premises may be stated to show both possibilities.

MP-A(D): You as good talking-about-opening-people ought to open the Co-op. (Extract 7-2)

MP-A(E): You as good talking-about-opening-people ought not to open the Co-op. (Extract 7-2)

The response to Caren's question is a description of the Co-op activity formulated as if it were for someone who did not know how the Co-op operated. But Caren knows, and everyone knows that Caren knows, since she has been one of the Co-op people since the "Early Days," and so her question is treated as a joke here too. A synopsis of the Co-op procedures begins with another reference to opening, "you open the doors" which is followed immediately by "we fill out the same order forms" The question arises as to whether "you" and "we" are stylistic variants, or whether they identify different collections of people. Those who fill out order forms may not be those who
work at the Co-op, but only shop on produce day. In that case, "you" might refer only to the workers. Since the talker Fred had in fact been a worker, this use of "you" would be one which includes self ("possible self" shown in Chapter 3, page 208), a way of not committing the talker as fully as terms that display the self more openly.

The moral premise which may then be stated links "you" who are the Co-op organization people, to the opening, since it is the organization which has workers.

MP-A(F): You as good organization-people ought to open the doors. (Extract 7-2)

More indicators of moral response appear at the end of Fred's utterance. In "you do the same bullshit," "bullshit" is a traditional colloquial moral term; in "just do it exactly the way it was," "just" is an empty intensifier, and "exactly" a categorical qualifier. These contrast with the absence of moral response in Extract 7-1.

Fred and Elmer have so far avoided inserting self in the extracts quoted so far. The one exception is the opening lines of the segment in which Fred says, "I'm interested in opening the doors" (Extract 7-1). This did not lead to other people placing themselves within a collection of opening up people. When Elmer shows category consensus on the collection, he only hypothetically places himself within it. Caren suggests that the matter is a joke, and when Fred next talks about opening, he avoids risking an insertion of self, and instead uses "you" (Extract 7-2).
Any ambiguity over whether people are joking is not permitted to continue as Caren immediately asks Fred if he is included or not among those who will be there "the first night." The tone of the utterance suggests that she expects "no" as an answer. Yet Fred responds, "Sure, all right, I'll volunteer anyway." In adding that he planned to volunteer Fred frees himself from an implication that he was pressured into committing himself by another.

At this point one would expect that commitment had been made and committed people identified. Surprisingly, the act of promising to be there the first night is not interpreted as a solution to the question of who is opening the Co-op. Rather it is followed by a long exposition by Elmer of how the Co-op should be organized, "rather than open it and fall back..." [026]. This discussion is depersonal and moves the Co-op further away from commitment. There is no agent expressed who would do the reorganizing. It is here however that the first use of the term "commitment" appears, as Elmer talks about the ideal way he would like the Co-op reorganized before reopening. "I'd like com-- I'd like number one a commitment..." [030]. He is focusing on those who could be persuaded to join the Co-op. This brief surfacing of "commitment" is followed by another instance later when Elmer also talks of a need for "firmer commitments" [155] and for a policy for not "carrying people" who don't work. Elmer appears to use "commitment" to mean a promise of future activity rather than for an immediate engagement in the activity of starting up the Co-op.
The talk of general alternatives is halted by Fred's return to an expression of practical concern.

Extract 7-3

Fred: ...and it seems that with Carverton and you're dealing with Prester students and stuff like that, you're going to have to open the doors, you're going to have to run it for a while--

Elmer: I wouldn't want to deal with Prester students, let them eat in their commissary and just--

Fred: All right, but you have people who just moved in, you're going to have to open the doors, let it run for a month...

"Starting Up" 040-047

Extract 7-3 contains a cluster of indicators of moral response, including three instances of "have to" (a vernacular term of obligation) and depersonalized "you" referring to some subset of Co-op produce day people. Two moral premises can be stated which concern opening the doors, each suggesting a different collection of Co-op people.

MP-A(8): You as good dealing-with-Prester-student-people ought to open the doors. (Extract 7-3)

MP-A(8): You as good dealing-with-newcomer-people ought to open the doors. (Extract 7-3)

The point is made that to get people to participate will require a Co-op that is operating. It would seem that the next step would be to plan how to achieve that end.

Fred continues in that direction, but only briefly.

Extract 7-4

Fred: Well, that's what we ought to do right now, discover exactly what we're going to need to actually open, it would seem, and if the thing falls apart as it is, then it can be organized on a family basis or whatever you want.

Caren: Well, yeah, but what's the point of opening it unless we know, we should know enough about the neighborhood to know where we're at, so we don't open, you know, and, you know, just collapse, I mean.
Fred: never do, I mean... ["Starting Up" 066-076]

Here the paradigmatic "ought" appears at the surface of the moral response, as Fred proposes what ought to be done. But instead of talking of opening the doors, as he did in Extracts 1, 2, 3 (twice) (and Elmer echoed in Extract 1), Fred uses the phrase "what we're going to need to actually open" in which "actually" an intensifier gives further evidence of a moral response. With the formulation of "actually open" Fred's focus is broadened beyond the initial opening of the doors to a Co-op that has been started up again. The moral premise is as follows:

MP-A(I): We as good meeting-people ought to find out what is needed to open. (Extract 7-4)

But the meeting people do not follow up by discussing what they would need to open. Again it was Fred who made the most direct statement of what to do to get the Co-op going, and again he avoids "I" (and possible risk to the self) by using "we." (Cf. Chapter 3, p. 215 on this use of "we.") It is again Caren who questions the practicality of opening—this time by demanding more extensive knowledge of the neighborhood.

MP-B: We as good opening-up-people ought to know about the neighborhood. (Extract 7-4)

Caren supports this argument by the implication that the absence of this knowledge would lead to the collapse of the Co-op (Extract 7-4). Note that the opening up people who need information about the neighborhood are a subset of the meeting people, but it is the organization people who would
suffer from a collapse. A second moral premise here is:

**MP-A(3):** We as good organization people ought not to have the Co-op open up and collapse. (Extract 7-4)

Caren's utterance in Extract 7-4 contains two instances of "you know"—"so we don't open, you know, and you know, just collapse"—by which both the collection of "opening-up-people" and the organization-people are underlined. These suggest that Caren is claiming interactional support for her statements which the others do not supply. Although a serious commitment has not yet been accomplished, Caren and the others have been talking about the opening of the Co-op. Although it would be fair to characterize her talk as pessimistic, Caren appears to have defined the talk as serious and not joking and the collective perception shown is not a humorous frame.

Practical Or Ideal

There is nothing further on opening the Co-op for 120 lines (nearly half the segment). The return to the issue of opening the Co-op marks a return also to the issue of practicality raised in the previous Extract, for Fred interrupts a long monologue by Elmer on an ideal Co-op by characterizing himself as a pragmatist.

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1 Caren and other's use of "you know" and "I mean" is extensive throughout much of this segment. I shall return to this issue later (cf. page 49b).
Extract 7-5

Elmer: ...because it's a collective responsibility of
everybody, that to assume that--
Fred: I rarely, I'm essentially
a pragmatist, and it's, it's awfully nice to discuss the
fine points of running the Co-op, but there is no Co-op
until the doors open and the lettuce and tomatoes are in
there, it's a question of--
Caren: Except Fred, you you know, you've said now
that you're willing to, you know, to start the first day,
I mean, let's be practical, if you want to be practical,
you said you're willing to be there one night to take
orders...

"Starting Up" 192-203

Many elements of moral response appear in the long
speech by Elmer of which the last line begins Extract 7-5.
He has been speaking for an ideal Co-op with ideal Co-op
people in which cooperative activity is prominent. Prominent
in his language are phrases rarely hard at Co-op meetings:

"it's the moral obligation of the people" [183]

"it's a collective responsibility of everyone"
[Extract 7-5]

Such talk might justify not opening the Co-op in so far as
it falls short of this ideal. It is to the practical situation
that Fred directs the talk, as he located himself in a collec-
tion of "pragmatic-people," as he interrupts. Once again
he uses "I" to display self, which he has not done since the
talk about opening the Co-op in Extract 7-1 (192 lines
earlier). Fred points again to the need for "lettuce and
tomatoes" in Extract 7-5, the same phrase he had used earlier
in Extract 7-1. With this repetition of detail he also returns
the talk to the original consideration of "opening the doors"
(Extract 7-1), but this time the existential predication is
quite different.
EP: There is no Co-op until the doors open. (Extract 7-5)

No subject is supplied in the text. Door opened by whom?
No possible others (or perhaps self) are being put on the spot.
However, the Co-op can not open itself. Only people can who
have identities even if it is only retrospectively that one
can with certainty supply names and say who it was. The people
have been depersonalized. The moral premise is stated in
active form, with "someone" as the subject.

MP-A(K): Someone of the good organization people ought
to open the doors. (Extract 7-5)

It is to the problem of finding such a someone that
Caren points to as she in turn interrupts Fred, and uses his
name to do so. As was shown on page 221, address terms are
rarely used in the Co-op. She thus appears to anticipate
difficulty in breaking into what Fred is saying and indeed
Fred continues past Caren's beginning. Caren then shows
consensus with his locating himself in the collection of "prag-
matic people," which she changes slightly to "practical-people,"
(perhaps thereby making them even more down-to-earth and
less philosophical). Caren lists people who will be needed
(to be considered more in detail in the next section). As she
ends her voice becomes louder, an indication of moral
response.

Extract 7-6

Caren: Well, I mean, where are they physically, I mean
how can we open next week if we don't [Louder]
Fred: Well, look, I think if
signs go up saying that there is an opening day, I
think they'll come,...

"Starting Up" 212-216
The question posed in Extract 7 is: "How can we open this week?" This surface form of the moral premise (A) uses "can open," (the modal indicating moral response as well as the increasing dynamics), but the problem is to decide who is this "we." As shown in the earlier analyses (cf. Figure 7.1), "we" as "organization-people" reflects the fact that it is the Co-op which would open next week. The moral premise can be stated as yet another variant of (A):

MP-A(L): We as good organization-people ought to open the Co-op. (Extract 7-6)

Fred again talks of an "opening day" in Extract 7-6, but there is again no agent, only signs which say "there is an opening day." The signs are Co-op signs, reflecting the Co-op organization. The moral premise can be stated to show this:

MP-A(M): Good organization people ought to have an opening day. (Extract 7-6)

Later in the segment people will volunteer to put signs up, and that will be clear evidence that the Co-op is to have an opening day.

Shortly Caren characterizes herself as one who "really would like the Co-op to open," a construction that also avoids saying who is to do it.

Extract 7-7

Caren: ...the reason I'm so uncertain about this business is, I don't want to be pessimistic but

Amy: Yeah

Caren: I really would like the Co-op to open but...

["Starting Up" 243-247]

Caren indicates the existence of pessimistic people, but does not place herself in this collection. To be in this
category would make her remote (in the sense developed p.227) from those who have shown themselves as "interested-people" (Extract 7-1). However, Caren uses several indicators of moral response ("really," empty intensifier; "would," modal form) in the existential predication which support a moral premise.

**EP:** I really would like the Co-op to open. (Extract 7-7)

**MP-A(N):** Caren as a good person in a collection of organization people ought to want the Co-op to open. (Extract 7-7)

But such a moral premise is an underlying formulation. On the surface there is no assertion from Caren that she is going to do anything to implement her desire. This formulation continues the theme that the Co-op is only an ideal in this talk and not yet a practical reality.

Until now there is no commitment to opening the Co-op. The succession of 15 moral premises stated here included 14 with predicates on opening up the Co-op, none of which show people who have committed themselves.

**Meeting people**

A(A): Concretely-oriented-people ought to open the Co-op; (7-1)
A(B): Interested-in-opening-the-doors-people ought to open the Co-op; (7-1)
A(D): Talking-about-opening-people ought to open the Co-op; (7-2)
A(E): Talking-about-opening-people ought not to open the Co-op; (7-2)
A(I): We ought to find out what is needed to open. (7-4)

**Organization people**

A(C): We ought to go ahead and open the Co-op; (7-1)
A(F): You ought to open up the doors; (7-2)
A(J): We ought not to open up and collapse; (7-4)
Organization people (continued)

A(K): Someone ought to open the doors; (7-5)
A(L): We ought to open the doors; (7-5)
A(M): (Organization people ought to have an opening day); (7-6)
A(N): (Organization people) ought to want the Co-op to open. (7-7)

Produce day people

A(G): dealing-with-Prester-student-people ought to open the doors. (7-3)
A(H): dealing-with-newcomer-people ought to open the doors. (7-3)

Those for meeting people include two in which the subcollections are with certain attitudes—concretely oriented and interested in opening. Another subcollection is for those who are talking about opening. The other predicates concern finding out what is needed to open the Co-op. Seemingly these collections of people will be useful for opening the Co-op, except perhaps for those who only talk, and take no action. But none gives evidence of particular people who would do the starting up, as opposed to those who are oriented to starting up. None show people committing themselves.

The moral premises that concern the organization people seem promising since all seven are positive about opening the Co-op. Here are no subcollections of Co-op people, but rather "we," "you" and "someone" as particular subjects. But here too there are no people committing themselves, or a subcollection of committed people. The two which remain concern produce day people and activities which only have meaning after the Co-op has opened. If it does not open, these subcollections remain hypothetical.
succeeded, and the Co-op opening remains a theoretical possibility at this point. In the one remaining instance of the use of the term "open," much later in the segment, Caren explains what would be needed for her to be willing to open. At that point she herself speaks of commitment and of the need that others commit themselves:

...if you would be willing to say that you would be there every week for the next month, and you could find two or more people to do it with you, you know, to make the same commitment, then, then I'd be willing to open.

(251-254)

At this point the strategy of examining all instances of talk about opening the Co-op (which was seen as the collective aim of the people at the meeting) thus does succeed in locating "committed people." These lines in which the communication of commitment occurs will be examined closely but first the strategy proposed earlier will be completed. For it may be that there are other places in the segment at which collections of committed people appear and display themselves as committing themselves to the Co-op. The second feature of commitment will be examined—the possibility of being seen as good people.

The Good People: "Where Are All The People That Are Going To Do All That?"

The people at the meeting can not run the Co-op themselves, nor do they expect to. The Co-op requires people to collect the food and set it up, as well as people to put in
orders and pay for the food. (cf. Chapter 2 for details of Co-op operation.) Committed people are needed, both those who were in the Co-op previously and others in the community who were not, but who will take the places of those who have dropped out. Some of the people who are involved must be workers, and for some being a worker is the way to be evaluated as a good person in the Co-op. For others, being part of the Co-op in itself can be seen as the way to be a good person in the Co-op. This section then involves a search for people who will be associated with the Co-op in the fall. Such a search forms a curious parallel to the analytical procedure of this work which continually seeks out for people. This section examines all overt mentions of people in the segment and any talk which shows the motivation of people in Co-op participation.

"Other" people first appear in the discussion by Elmer of the problem of getting new members, who suggests that "we know enough people." [029]. He refers to "people on this block who would probably join it" [033], but do not know about the Co-op. He characterizes the people as fearing they might be "getting ripped off by it" [035]. Elmer would deny that anyone ever was taken advantage of by the Co-op, but gives that as an outsider's perception of the Co-op, and a reason why neighborhood people did not join readily.¹

¹ Further perceptions of the Co-op by the neighborhood people are shown in Chapter 8 as details of an incident with one of the neighborhood people are presented. In so far as these an other perceptions of the Co-op people are shown as the produc-
There are also Prester students and the "people who just moved in," both referred to generally in Extract 7-3. There follows a more concrete statement of people who are not in the Co-op, but who might be persuaded to participate:

Extract 7-8

Fred: ...but you've got to at least get the people initially in under some basis which is buying their cucumber every week.

Elmer: That's one school of thought, it is difficult

Caren: [Laughs]

Elmer: to get people to, especially people who have limited imaginations to, you can say, well, um, "We can get you a cucumber for seven cents and you'd pay fifteen," but unless they actually see the cucumber it doesn't mean anything, I agree, that's the problem.

["Starting Up" 049-058]

Extract 7-8 shows a metaperspective, the self's view of the other's view of the reason others are not in the Co-op (in the schema of Laing, Philipson and Lee (1966) introduced on page 206). The people are evaluated negatively as having "little imagination" and hence needing to see the produce in order to be convinced to join. The moral premise can be stated:

MP-C: Limited-imagination-people ought to see inexpensive cucumbers [produce] in order to be convinced to join the Co-op. (Extract 7-3)

The phrase "one school of thought" in Extract 7-8 refers to the traditional notion that where there's one school of
thought there's another. Some of the Co-op people are shown as trying unsuccessfully to talk to perspective customers about the value of cooperative activity, that they would save money by joining the Co-op. But the additional motivation of seeing the cucumber present seems to be needed for them. Some people are presumably unconcerned with the ideals of cooperative activity, and of the possible virtue of being "good people" by participating in the Co-op.

"Robbing Peter To Pay Paul"

Other people are introduced into the discussion as a strategy is presented to increase participation.

Extract 7-9

Fred: ...if, if somebody's willing to coordinate labor, you could always find someone robbing

Elmer: [Laughs loudly]

Fred: You know, and work.

Caren: Well, some people have, you know, a higher level of frustration and some people just can't deal with that, you know.

Elmer: It's, it's always robbing Peter to pay Paul, it's always one of those things.

Caren: Yeah, well, I think really the ultimate question is what do you accomplish then when you do that, you see, you get cheap food, sort of,

["Starting Up" 075-090]

The strategy suggested by Extract 7-9 is that once a coordinator is found, then getting sufficient people to do the work at the selling sessions would not be difficult. Here is a second use of a traditional notion. "Robbing Peter" is men-

1 As the next extracts will show, it may be that where there's one traditional notion there's another, and perhaps even a third.
tioned first in abbreviated form (as is often the case) by Fred and later given in full form by Elmer, "robbing Peter to pay Paul."¹ The talker relies on the shared knowledge of this expression to illuminate the notion of how to assure there would be sufficient workers. This notion encapsulates the view that people who came to get their food, but were not slated to work on a particular day, could be convinced to stay and work that day, thus putting off to some future day the problem of finding people to work on that future day. Use of the proverbial expression serves to direct attention to the underlying moral premise, and consequently the "ought" interpretation (p. 264), as do three other indicators of moral response in the existential predication:

EP: You could always find someone robbing Peter who got there at 7 o'clock and could stay.

The quantifier "always" inflates the argument. Given the limited number of workers and the other pressures on their time, it is unlikely that one could "always" find someone to be a worker at the moment of need. The verb "could" is again an "obligational" form in its root sense, although not as strong as "will," but still serving to draw attention to an "ought" rather than an "is." Also there is stress on "always," indicating affect directly depersonally, suggesting moral matters are present. The moral premise here can be stated:

MP-D: You as good coordinators ought to be able to find sufficient workers at the Co-op. (Extract 7-9)

¹ According to Brewer (1393) the phrase is attributed to Viglius: Com. Dec. Denarii, i.9 (1560), "it was not desirable to rob St. Peter's altar in order to build one to St. Paul."

(p.1062)
The appeal to someone to be a good Co-op person is a likely means by which such convincing would be done, since an individual could not save any more money by working on a different day than that scheduled, or by working more than the time required. Since Fred says "always find" in Extract 7-9, he does not limit this possibility to those who were personal friends, and who might do the work as a favor (even if the phrase is heard as an exaggeration).

Extract 7-9 contains an additional reference to the motivation for Co-op participation ("the ultimate question") in terms of saving money, "you get cheap food, sort of," as Caren introduces people who would not be able to handle a shortage of workers. The existential predication contains similar indications of moral response:

EP: Some people just can't deal with that [labor shortage].
(Extract 7-9)

Caren underlines twice with "you know" supplying interactional support herself for the collection of people who are readily frustrated or who can not cope. These collections are opposed. Those presented by Fred (and underlined by Elmer with his laughter) are coordinators who are able to cope with unsettling situations that might be disturbing to other produce day people. The moral premises stated are shown as case III--indeterminate dynamic of moral response--since the surface and surrounding text do not make clear whether Caren feels such people ought to be able to handle such situations or not.
"The Shoemaker Whose Children Have No Shoes"

Caren contributes another collection of people, those who are workers yet find it inconvenient to use the Co-op and immediately locates someone from her house in that collection.

Extract 7-10

Caren: ...like in our house, one person's job is to go to the Co-op, well this person doesn't have any time to go to the Co-op, so you know, he always manages to go when it's terribly inconvenient, and what are we actually serving if we can't even use the Co-op, you know, well that [Louder] ---

Elmer: The shoe-, shoemaker whose children have no shoes, and--

Caren: Yeah, I mean, it's like that, it really is.

["Starting Up" 101-109]

As Caren speaks for her commune (Chap. 3, page 204), she refers to "one person," a depersonal term that might apply equally well for any of the Co-op people who live in her house. But this instance of constructing another does not succeed in masking the identity of the individual, or at least it does not succeed for those who know the composition of her house. The use of "he" as an alternative to "one person"
Extract 7-10 also contains perhaps a criticism of the Co-op in the phrase "what are we serving if we can't even use the Co-op..." Here Caren questions the point of a Co-op that those who create cannot use. "We" reflects Co-op organization people in the first instance "what are we serving," but not in the second. Several indicators of moral response cluster about the "we" in the second part of the phrase, treated here as an existential predication:

**EP:** We can't even use the Co-op.

In the EP there is exaggeration shown with "even use," for indeed they did use the Co-op and the modal "can" presents the possibility of oscillation between root and epistemic senses by which being able to and having permission to appear, Caren shows affect as her voice rises and the talk gets louder. This "we" would appear to be for the commune who have been shown to have problems in picking up their order. The moral premise can be stated:

**MP-F:** We as good commune people ought to be able to use the Co-op. (Extract 7-10)

Elmer contributes the third item of traditional folk wisdom in his immediate response which interrupts Caren by mentioning the "shoemaker whose children have no shoes" (Extract 7-10), referring to the expectation that children of a shoemaker would have shoes, but generally do not since the shoemaker is too busy making other people's shoes. There
is of course the expectation that the people present would also know this proverb, and be able to apply it to the Co-op. Actually the proverb exaggerates, for it suggests that there are people who do not get the benefit of lower prices from the Co-op, yet who participate in the work of the Co-op. The instance Caren describes suggests only that her commune has difficulty in their relation with the Co-op, not that they do Co-op work without getting Co-op benefits. The motivation of economic saving is not sufficient here to explain their participation in the Co-op, since their getting benefits occurs only with great inconvenience ("it's terribly inconvenient") (Extract 7-10). It is, however, the case that they get to be seen as good people for working for the Co-op, but that is not accepted here as taking the place of a comfortable and profitable use of Co-op.

The next set of people discussed in the segment is a set which is closer to the particular problem of this chapter, those needed to get the Co-op started up again.

Extract 7-11

Caren: ... now that means we need somebody to make signs, we need somebody to, you know, we need three people to go on the run the following week, we need at least five people to physically do the labor and sell the following week, you know, we need telephone calls and so, I mean, where are the people that are going to do all that? [Voice rises]

Fred: Well, I think they are there, they're just not here.

Caren: Well, I mean, where are they physically, I mean...

"Starting Up" 203-212

The long list of people in Extract 7-11 is in part a response to a much earlier utterance of Fred's (shown in Extract 7-4)
to the effect that the meeting people should "discover what
we're going to need." The collections of people listed
now are:

sign makers
people to go on the run the following week
people to do the labor and sell
people to make the telephone calls.

Caren ends Extract 7-11 with a question which I shall treat
as an existential predication with a minimum of specific
indicators of moral response (voice rises showing affect
as well as stressing shown by the use of "people" throughout
the utterance, depersonalizing the Co-op individuals who
will do the work of starting up):

EP: Where are the people that are going to do all that?
The question suggests that they are to be sought somewhere,
but they are not present. There are not enough meeting
people to do all those tasks. The moral premise I state
considers such starting up people as a subcollection of Co-op
organization people.

MP-G Good starting-up-people ought to be locatable.
(Extract 7-11)

Fred's response to Caren's question in Extract 7-11 is
crucial: the people who are "not here" but "there" enlarges
the set of people who can participate in starting up beyond
the meeting people who are present in the room at that moment.
The two sets were "hidden people" included in the locatives
"here and "there," as discussed in Chapter 3, p.132. The
"they's" make no effort to specify or personalize the people,
continuing the depersonalization used in Caren's utterance
However, Fred's response to Caren's demand to locate them is rejected, and Caren asks again, "Well, I mean, where are they physically, I mean?" Caren's use of "physically" here recurs, which extends the dimension of spatial location of people and will be examined further below. The temporal dimension is then introduced by Amy who asserts that they would get back two-thirds of the members within "two weeks." These people of the future will be considered further in the section to follow. Fred also has one further mention of people, those who can be "talked into giving some time to work" [209], echoing his earlier notion of "robbing Peter" shown above in Extract 7-9.

There is now present an explicit notion of what is needed to get the Co-op going again. Confidence has been expressed that people who are not present will be part of the Co-op once it is resumed. As Caren continues her objections, she mentions another set of possible others—those who "really made the Co-op happen" [230] in the past. If any people were entitled to be considered good people, it would be they. Caren identifies by name "you, Amy, Sheldon" and unnamed "maybe one or two other people." [229]. (Amy is present and Sheldon is not). Caren minimizes her own contribution, and does not refer to Fred, Elmer or Pam who are present. The "one or two other" clearly does not include these. Yet these are the people who take the initiative for the Co-op's starting up this time.
The most specific focus on the need for people to take on a commitment occurs as Caren asks for "two or three people" that can make at least a commitment to be there" [248] who "could find two or more people" [253] to make the same commitment. This is the same utterance mentioned at the end of the discussion of the first feature (p. 479). It will reappear in the next section which looks at indication of future orientation in the talk where it will be discussed in detail and moral premises stated. But first some conclusions can be drawn from what has been said about other people in this section. Moral premises appeared for both Co-op and non-Co-op people:

**Co-op people.**

**MP-D:** You as good coordinators ought to be able to find sufficient workers at the Co-op. (Extract 7-9)

**MP-E(A):** Good produce-day-people ought to cope with labor shortages. (Extract 7-9)

**MP-E(B):** Good produce-day-people ought not to cope with labor shortages. (Extract 7-9)

**MP-G:** Good starting-up-people ought to be locatable. (Extract 7-11)

**Non-Co-op people.**

**MP-C:** Limited-imagination-people ought to see inexpensive cucumbers [produce] in order to convinced to join the Co-op. (Extract 7-9)

**MP-F:** We as good commune people ought to be able to use the Co-op. (Extract 7-10)

These moral premises show people in a variety of ways participating in the Co-op. The field of those who are relevant to opening the Co-op has been broadened to include a
number of people who are not present. The earlier rejection of an individual's offer of commitment in Extract 7-1 was made before it was argued that more than one individual could be located for starting up (MP-G in Extract 7-11).

A general problem perhaps common to all such small groups as these meeting people who are trying to revive a larger group is that an acceptable commitment involves projections about the behavior of others who are not present. In part that behavior of others includes a notion of the possible motivation of those who are not present. The talk of the meeting people reveals perception of other people's motives in participating or not participating in the Co-op. But further, the meeting peoples' own motivations are reflected in the talk.

In this section, several different motivations for being part of the Co-op were suggested. For some people the Co-op is a place to get inexpensive produce (such as cucumbers for seven cents rather than fifteen, in Extract 7-8) and the means of getting people who do not yet participate to participate is to show them evidence of low prices, as reflected by moral premise E where people with limited imaginations are linked to seeing inexpensive produce. A further case is made for the economic motivation as the shopping practices of one commune are recounted and the formulation "we really saved money" [114] used. This is the view that was usually taken in the Co-op as all the posters and written material concerning the Co-op gave
evidence, as was documented in Chapter 2.

However, for some economy is problematic ("whether it's worth the effort" [1321]). Another speaks of the Co-op as "terribly inconvenient" as was reflected in moral premise F (Extract 7-10). Still another alternative motivation for using the Co-op appears in the segment shortly after Extract 7-9 as the Co-op is defined as "a pleasant sort of thing," [187], which receives laughter in response, suggesting it may not have been heard as serious, or at least not as a major motivation.

It is also the case that at least some of those present may be seen as good people by other Co-op people (and presumably themselves) as they take on extra work beyond that of working members in order to get the Co-op started. These extra tasks will not result in any extra financial savings, as there is no special financial benefit to those who get the Co-op going. They will eventually get reasonably priced produce and perhaps derive satisfaction from having gotten the Co-op once again into operation.

From a long-term point of view it can be said that if the extra work is done, then there will be a Co-op later—perhaps a pleasant place, perhaps not inconvenient, and perhaps money saving—but at least there will be a Co-op. Such a Co-op will, however, require the work of many more people than are present. The review of people mentioned in the segment shows that the meeting people are gradually persuaded that enough people will become involved. The next section
examines the third feature of commitment noted above, how individuals show themselves as oriented to a continuing relationship of future Co-op activity.

A Future Orientation
"You're Going To Have To Run It For A While"

If committed people are to be found then they must show that what is to be, will continue to be. In looking then for how the people in the segment orient themselves to the future, I shall consider here all talk in the segment which shows the relation of people and collections of people to the future. In contrast, the initial statement of being interested in opening the Co-op (Extract 7-1) is directed to one point in time, that of the opening. When Caren asks "You gonna be there to take orders the first night" (Extract 7-2), Fred agrees, but he soon shows in a series of remarks that he is oriented to a future beyond the opening.

"You're going to have to run it for a while..." (7-3)
"...let it run for a month..." (7-3)
"...which is buying their cucumber every week." (7-8)
"...if the thing falls apart then it can be reorganized" (7-4)

In the text, Elmer proposes that the Co-op could be run more than one day a week, which presumes that the Co-op is already running and has established a continuity:

Extract 7-12

Elmer: more than one day.
Fred: Yeah, sure you could, that's the idea, you could, I think, you could very well do anything.
Caren: I don't mean to be so

...You can always run it
In Extract 7-12 Caren locates herself within a collection of negative people. In apologizing for this location which makes her remote (in the sense of social distance developed in Chapter 3, page 227) she makes explicit her desire to be part of the Co-op. She affirms a belief in the Co-op "I really believe in it" and a desire to participate, "I want to be in it, I really want to be part of it." Both extracts use "really," an intensifier reflecting moral response and displaying further evidence of moral matters on the surface. Although Caren's utterance refers to the future, it does not commit her to the Co-op, for she qualifies the Co-op she would be part of to be one "that's alive," a state the Co-op has not yet achieved.

Further reference to the future occurs as Elmer discusses his plan to locate a "moral obligation" [187] in the Co-op people who he feels ought to pay for left-over produce, "add it on to next week." [192] This does not however concern the current Co-op dilemma of starting up, but is about the ideal Co-op which Elmer has already talked about several times in this segment.

At this point Caren reminds Fred of his promise to be there "one night to take orders" (Extract 7-5), and then proceeds to mention two sets of people who will be needed and
are specifically tied to future times:

"three people to go on the run the following week" (7-11)
"five people to do the labor...and sell the following week" (7-11).

However, her pointed question, "How can we open next week?" (7-6) refers to only one time site, although it is in the future. Fred is more specific in moving from the starting-up day to future occasions:

Extract 7-13

Fred: ...then I think they'll tell more people, then I think you'll begin seeing the same faces again, and that's the nucleus, whether you'll convince them to come out an extra night to meetings or not, I tend to agree with you there, but once they physically come to the Co-op, they can be talked into giving some time to work, doing this or that, just resuming things as they were, and perhaps there'll be a nucleus to turn to.

Amy: Is there any reason why like we wouldn't sort of get back two-thirds of the membership we had when we closed in the spring within two weeks?

Caren: No there isn't...

["Starting Up" 216-223]

As Fred recognizes the difficulty of getting people out to meetings ("whether you'll convince them to come out an extra night to meetings or not" in Extract 7-13), he presumes that people have been coming out at least one night already. Here is an extended notion of time during which people have been involved in the Co-op. By implication the people present that evening, those meeting people, are shown as not needing convincing, of being more committed to the Co-op. But it is one thing to support an operating Co-op and another thing to initiate that operation, and the first can only happen after the second. As will be shown it is talk about the Co-op which will operate in the future which leads to moves by which
the Co-op becomes opened.

Commitment Supported: "You Know" and "I Am Willing"

In Extract 7-13 is Amy's contribution to the process of commitment. Amy does not commit herself to any particular task as Fred had done, or even to be at the Co-op the first day. Nor does she suggest (as Caren did) talk of starting up is humorous or a joke. Amy is specifically oriented to a future time—the two weeks following the opening—within which she predicts that two-thirds of the membership will have returned. This provides an important set of possible others, those who are returned Co-op people, and it is the first in a series of moves by which a commitment to open up the Co-op is secured. Amy speaks here for the organization people, as she talks of getting back "the membership we had when we closed in the spring" (Extract 7-13), as it is the Co-op which has membership and the Co-op which closed.

When Caren responds, "No, there isn't" (Extract 7-13), there is the second move to commitment, for consensus is made explicit. By this exchange the basic moral premise that good organization people ought to have a Co-op, has been re-affirmed. In these lines both Caren and Amy re-affirm their commitment to the Co-op and importantly their support for opening the Co-op that fall.

But there are further moves which have to be made to assure the opening of the Co-op, and they may also be found in the talk of the future.
Extract 7-14

Caren:  ...and
Ben's going to be away, you know, for a month, and he's
another one of those, you know, maybe four people, you
know, I mean the job I did is very insignificant and
you know, of course I'll continue to do it, but that
doesn't make the Co-op run or not, because I physically
can't be there, because I have two little kids, you
know...

["Starting Up" 236-243]

In Extract 7-14 Caren gives the information that Ben, who was
hired to be the paid manager and especially had been expected
to help get things started up (cf. Chapter 6) would be away,
"for a month,"(047) probably not known to most of the
people present. This is important information, and the
implications of this include that no person will be available
to supervise the opening up, but that details and overall
direction will have to be handled by the starting-up-people.
However, another piece of information appears in this crucial
utterance of Caren's. It is Caren's almost offhand mention
that she will continue to do her job as co-treasurer-bookkeeper,
"and, you know, I'll continue to do it..." Caren's utterance
places her amongst those who have shown an orientation to
there being a future Co-op, and is the third of the moves
by which the commitment to open up the Co-op is secured.

Caren's utterance extracted in 7-14 contains five
instances of "you know" and one of "I mean," perhaps the most
she ever used in such a brief time. Her earlier extracts
also contained many instances, some of which were interpreted
as an appeal for consensus as Caren was shown underlining her
own production of collections of people. In the remaining utterances in this segment, the number of "you know" used by Caren (and by the others) is cut drastically. In fact, there is only one in the next two extracts. Why the change? The change in her production after line 242 (the last in Extract 7-14) can be accounted for in the decreased need to display signals of support for herself as the talkers soon make individual commitments to participate in opening the Co-op.

But first Caren herself becomes more specific on the commitment that is needed to open the Co-op.

Extract 7-15

Caren: ...I'm just afraid that unless we find two or three people that can make at least a commitment to be there physically every week for a while, if you could find, like if you would be willing to say that you would be there every week for the next month, and you could find two or more people to do it with you, you know, to make that same commitment, then, then I'd be willing to open,

Fred: I, I

Caren: I think we have to have that much.

Fred: I am willing to be there every week, you know, given that I have a week or two to, to free up Thursday nights.

Elmer: Yeah, I'm willing to be there every week, if it, if it, you know, if it turns out that it's physically possible for me to do it.

["Starting Up" 247-262]

Extract 7-15 contains the lines found in both of the two preceding sections. If this passage alone had been examined the various formulations of motivation for commitment would not have been found. Nor would the three moves by which the commitment was made have been uncovered.

Commitment began to be achieved (1) when Amy predicted

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1"You know" as a self underlining strategy is discussed further in Chapter 3, page 180.
that two thirds of the membership would return once the Co-op was opened; (2) then Caren displayed consensus about the likelihood of success of a re-opened Co-op; and (3) Caren mentioned that she would continue to serve as treasurer for the Co-op. These moves occur well before Extract 7-15 in which Elmer and Fred commit themselves to being at the Co-op to work each week.

Caren presents a plan in Extract 7-15 which is developed from the needs she had listed earlier in Extract 7-11. The commitment which Caren focuses on is not the ideal commitment Elmer talked of earlier, line[031], but closely related to the specific process of starting up the Co-op. The commitment shown in Extract 7-15 is heavily oriented to the future, as Caren specifies that people "make at least a commitment to be there physically every week for a while," which she then repeats as "be there _every week for the next month." The stress is applied to a depersonalized utterance (no particular Co-op people are mentioned). She concludes with an existential predication of the minimum needed to open up the Co-op.

EP: We have to have that much. (Extract 7-15)
"That much" refers to the series of commitments she has just proposed for opening the Co-op. The moral premise can be stated as another variant of the original one (A) on opening the Co-op.

MP-A(0): We as good starting-up-people ought to have _people who commit themselves in order to open the Co-op. (Extract 7-15)
Here the starting up people are a sub-collection of meeting people. Caren's utterance contains "you" directed to the people
immediately present in the room—"if you would be willing to say" and "you could find." Her use of "I"—"I'd be willing"—is an instance of self display of future direct action (Chap. 3, p. 210) rather than self insert of what the self is doing at that point (e.g., I'm just afraid") or a hypothetical one such as Caren used with regard to "you" ("If you would be willing").

In Extract 7-15 Caren specifies not only that commitment be for the future, but also that several people be involved before she would be "willing to open." Caren's projection of possible others was considered briefly in the previous section—here it is important to note that these are future others.

At this point commitments are made by Fred and Elmer. These two will be future others—at the moment they are meeting people. Each says that he is "willing to be there every week," Fred slightly before Elmer, and repeated again further along more specifically by Fred as "three hours a week." [276]. Each also uses "you know" in their utterance, showing their underlining of the collection of committed people. The moral premise which both of them reflect, can be stated as follows:

MP-H: A good person in a collection of committed people ought to be at the Co-op every week. (Extract 7-15)

Fred and Elmer's utterances in Extract 7-15 are parallel, using almost the same words, and follow each other rapidly. Both have shown by their utterance "I am willing" that they are supporters of commitment. The collection of committed people
finally has been populated with people who have identities and can be recognized.¹

Commitment Achieved: Taking Orders And Putting Up Signs

The tempo of planning increases as people suggest jobs they will do.

Extract 7-16

Elmer: How about if we start taking orders? I'm willing to be there tomorrow and see if I can get some orders.
Caren: Well, it's silly, it's ridiculous, obviously we have to have a week.
Amy: We need--
Caren: of signs, you know, somebody first of all
Elmer: Well, we have to get started, ah, how about--
Caren: has to be willing to make signs and put them all over Carverton, I mean, otherwise, I think, I think it's real silly.
Fred: Who's the old sign-maker? [Loud spoon stirring sounds]
Elmer: Well, we, we could make signs. [Spoon sounds]
Caren: Don't put them on trees, because we lose members, they get very offended if they see them. [Spoon sounds]

"Starting Up" 28'7-294]

In Extract 7-16 Elmer is specific in referring to "tomorrow" as the day to start taking people's orders and also premature so that Caren can again label the talk as "silly," "ridiculous," and "really silly" (Extract 7-16) echoing her earlier reference to a joke in Extract 7-2. However, this time her objection is not to taking the utterance seriously, but rather taking the utterance as imprudent in that other things "obviously" have to be done first, such as putting up signs. The existential predication appears as:

EP: We have to have a week of signs. (Extract 7-16)

¹ "In the last analysis, more than anything else people can move other people." (Lazarsfeld, 1963, p. 153).
The projected order-taking is now accepted as something that will occur, but as a thing that should occur only after the publicity is begun. The other people do not respond to the label of "silly" in the sense that the enterprise is silly, but rather consider how to have a week of signs. The moral premise here is stated for the subcollection of "starting-up-people," but is this a subcollection of organization people or of meeting people? Does Caren use "we" to speak for the organization people as she says "we have to have" or is she referring back to the people who will be taking orders which Elmer, a meeting person, has shown he will be part of. At least for that moment the order takers are meeting people. Caren's "we" too is assigned to this collection of meeting people making concrete plans.

MP-I: We as good starting-up-people ought to have a week of signs. (Extract 7-15)

The concrete nature of the start is reflected in Elmer's utterances in Extract 7-16. After his premature suggestion that "we start taking orders" the next day, he says "we have to get started." These utterances can be contrasted with her utterance in Extract 7-1, "you want to open the doors and get started." Perhaps even more striking is Elmer's direct insertion of self twice as he says "I'm willing to be there tomorrow and see if I can get some orders." (Extract 7-16)

The starting which is being talked about here is not the grand re-opening day of the Co-op, but rather the more specific steps to start the Co-op by necessarily prior steps as planning to take orders and put up signs. These specific preparatory
tasks are ones that the people who are present can volunteer to do. These specific actions are the ones the meeting people have to promise to do, in order to start the process of starting up. Elmer's utterance, "we have to get started" in Extract 7-16 thus linking the meeting people to the action of starting to get started.

MP-J: We as good meeting people ought to get started getting started. (Extract 7-16)

Starting up the Co-op entails getting the Co-op running for the year. But the process by which the Co-op gets started up also has its beginnings, and what has happened is that the meeting people have finally started the process of getting the Co-op started up again.

A commitment to open has not been firmly established. Legends on signs being planned will be ones which advertise the Co-op's imminent re-opening, and explain when orders will be taken. Caren's acceptance of the opening is evident in the final utterance of the segment.

EP: Don't put them signs on trees, because we lose members. (Extract 7-16)

Only after a state of affairs is assumed can conditions be added as to how it is to be managed, and others told how to do things. In this instance, Caren warns that members "get very offended" (Extract 7-16) if they see signs stapled to trees, rather than to telephone poles. A moral premise can be stated:

MP-K We as good organization people ought not to offend members. (Extract 7-16)
Here Caren speaks for the Co-op organization (in the sense developed in Chapter 3, page 203) which has members that can be lost. But it is now for an organization whose continuity has been assured.

This section assembled the utterances oriented to the future. The importance of this feature of commitment is apparent in the proliferation of future references at the point where people have committed themselves to starting up the Co-op. The moral premises developed in this section also show a progression toward such a future state.

**Meeting people**

H: Committed-people ought to be at the Co-op every week. (7-15)
A(D): (We) starting-up-people ought to have people who commit themselves in order to open the Co-op. (7-15)
J: We ought to get started getting started. (7-16)

**Organization people**

I: (We) starting-up-people ought to have a week of signs. (7-16)
K: We ought not to offend members. (7-15)

With MP-J, meeting people are shown as directly to have committed themselves. This is appreciably different from the other two moral premises of meeting people in which "we" is linked to people who ought to commit themselves in order to open the Co-op or who are getting started in getting started. Both of the moral premises for organization people presumes an on-going Co-op, one that has signs up about it and one that has members.

At this point it is clear that people have made commit-
ments to do more than open up the Co-op. People have said that they would be active in the future, thereby making it possible for the Co-op to exist again.

The three features of commitment which have been explored in this and the two preceding sections focused on the collective aim of opening the Co-op, the need for there to be several people oriented toward being good people, and the requirement of a future orientation with a continuation of the relationship of people and Co-op. The means by which commitment was requested have been shown and the strategic moves indicated by which the process of communicating commitment was begun. "Starting-up-people" appeared several times, an intermediate collection of people at which moral matters clustered, but that was not the collection which was crucial. Rather it was a collection of "committed-people" which was decisive, as people, using "I" showed they were within this collection. At this point then, the analysis turns toward this "I" to see more closely how the self was constructed as it finally became involved in the communication of commitment.

Display Of Commitment Of Self

Each act of commitment involves a self. This segment, involving as it does a series of commitments then becomes a particularly strategic site in which to consider how the self is constructed during interaction. The point of view used here is that of Mead who showed the self as social and
a product of interaction, and of Goffman who described the construction of the self as involving jeopardy. (Both Mead and Goffman are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3).

Any instancing of the self thus not only places everyone present "in jeopardy," but also might show the self being constructed as not a good self. There are dangers that some insertions of the self will result in others judging the self as less than good. With commitment, there is also another danger, that if people do not show that they are willing to commit themselves, they will appear as less than good. In the segment under consideration this might occur where the self appears unwilling to take on the job of a starting-up person. As Co-op people, each person has a variety of ways to show that he or she is a good Co-op person. As shown in Chapter 2, as a meeting day person, attend meetings; as a produce day person, take everything he or she ordered; as an organization person get and keep Co-op members. In this segment there is another such place—to be one of those in a collection of "starting-up-people."

In the dramatic metaphor of the "performed self" elaborated by Goffman (1959) he illustrates ordinary and deviant performance in which a self may be "discredited by a discripant reality" (p. 65). There are then it would seem to follow, systematic ways in which the self can be kept from being seen as less than a good person including avoiding self terms. In Chapter 3, the notion of "possible self" was introduced
to cover the ways that reference to self can be avoided. Some of these in this segment have been noted in the analysis above.

There are 55 instances of "possible self" in "Starting Up" in addition to the uses of "we" shown earlier as Figure 7.1. A "possible self" occurs with syntactic ellipsis, as well as the use of other terms for a self term. Here I am assuming that each way of locating a "possible self" is both an analytical procedure and a part of everyday conversational competence. Such an approach avoids the question, it seems, of whether or not people intend to avoid self, or whether others hear what is said as in any particular instance avoiding self. The "possible self" notion is offered here as an aspect of the interaction that is prominent in this segment, since the point of the people being at the meeting was to see if the Co-op would be revived. As the last section has suggested, commitment does appear to require some use of self terms.

One sort of "possible self" occurs when "you" is used and the "you" could be "I." In Figure 7.2 there are 29 instances in which "you" is used, where in each instance it is logically possible that "I" could replace "you" without changing the sense of the item. Other instances of "you," not shown, are interactive, where "you" refers to the person talked to, as in "you want to open the doors" (Extract 7-1) where the prior speaker has just said that that is what he wanted to do.
Caren: (n=7)
What do you accomplish then. (7-9)
When you do that. (7-9)
You get cheap food, sort of. (7-9)
When you're living in a house. [128]
But then you have couples and families. [139]
When you have to go to the Co-op between 4 and 7. [139]
Maybe you only have time on Monday at 8 o'clock. [140]

Elmer: (n=4)
You can say, well, uh. (7-3)
You can always run it more than one day. (7-12)
The longer you cater, [159]
It's just subconsciously, you know, you, we have a [160]

Fred: (n=18)
You open the doors. (7-2)
And you do the same bullshit, (7-2)
You don't have to. (7-2)
Kind of depends on your having, ah, some sort of
community. [039]
And you're dealing with Prester students. (7-3)
You're going to have to open the doors. (7-3)
But you have people who just moved in. (7-3)
You're going to have to open the doors. (7-3)
You can be in there and talk up the thing. [048]
But you've got to at least get the people in
initially. (7-8)
But I mean you're gonna. [059]
Then it can be organized on a family basis or whatever
you want. (7-4)
Well, you never do, I mean. (7-4)
You could always find someone. (7-4)
Sure you could. (7-12)
You could, I think. (7-12)
You could very well do anything. (7-12)
All of these instances of "you" where "I" or "we" could have appeared occur in the first half of the segment, (before line 152) well before commitment begins to be made. This general "you" then is dropped entirely once commitment appears.

Also early in the first half of the segment (before line 092) are three instances of the use of indefinites which appear at first to confer anonymity, but are instances of "possible self."

Fred: ...if somebody's willing to coordinate labor... (7-9)

Caren: ...some people have, you know, a higher level of frustration and some people just can't deal with that... (7-9)

The "somebody" in the first line turns out to be the talker himself, who has already volunteered to be there the first night, and during the subsequent year did serve as coordinator. The "somebody" of the second could refer to the talker as well as to others in her commune, who were noted for such a characteristic (cf. earlier discussion of Extract 7-9).

Figure 7.3 shows 21 instances of syntactic constructions without agent where expansion of the text could show a self. These occur throughout the segment. In A of 7.3 are 12 instances where expansion of the ellipsis necessarily reveals the self. Each involves a verb of perception or judgment, and assumes the self is the unexpressed subject. Some are evaluations made by the self (Fred, 7-5), others define a situation (Fred, 7-8), as seen by the talker. Each utterance is a belief of the talker expressed at that point in the inter-
Figure 7.3 "Possible Self" And "Possible Other"
In "Starting Up": Syntactic Ellipsis, (n=21)

A. Possible Self (n=12)

Verbs of perception
Fred: and it seems [to me] that... (7-3)
Elmer: why it seems [to me] there's... [163]

Verbs of judgment or evaluation
Fred: it is difficult [for me] to get people... (7-3)
Elmer: That's one school of thought [but not mine].
(7-8)
Fred: But it's a pleasant sort of thing [to me].[098]
Caren: Whether it's worth the effort [for me].[133]
Caren: But it's not always time saving [to me][139]
Pam: It's not problem at all [for me].[136]
Caren: But that means [to me].(7-5)
Caren: That it's available [for me].[232]
Terry: It begins to look [to me] more possible now. [269]
Caren: It's silly, it's ridiculous [to me]. (7-16)

B. Possible Self or Possible Other (n=9)

Inanimate verbs of change
Fred: I'm interested in [___] opening the doors. (7-1)
Elmer: How about rather than [___] open it and fall back. [027]
Caren: What's the point of [___] opening it. (7-4)
Fred: Until [___ make] the doors open. (7-5)
Fred: I think if [___ make(s)] signs go up. (7-5)

Passive
Fred: Before it's reorganized [by__].(7-2)
Elmer: If it could be organized [by__].[034]
Fred: They can be talked into giving some time [by__].
(7-13)

Nonfinite clause
Fred: There'll be a nucleus [for__] to turn to. (7-13)
action, in which expansion of the syntax could supply self-
personalization, and which if it had been used, would have
intensified the presence of the self by providing a self
display. They are used by all except Amy and occur evenly
throughout the text.

Other instances of elliptical expansion can be completed
with self or other people. They rely on different ways of
not expressing an agent, and are shown as B in Figure 7.3.
Seven are instances of inanimate verbs of change, in which
no agent of change is expressed. For instance "opening
the door" (7-1) could be done by a self, by others, or by
self and other, but it does require people to do the opening.
So too, reorganizing requires that people do the reorganizing.
If Fred had inserted self with regard to reorganizing the
Co-op, then (7-2) would have appeared as "before I reorganize
it." However, at no point is this done, and although Elmer
says he wants the Co-op to be reorganized, he avoids saying
who will do it. People are also needed to put up signs,
but Fred (7-6) does not specify who will do it, or say he'll
do it. The last two instances of agentless talk in B of
Figure 7.3 rely on two additional devices. A passive is
used by Fred "they can be talked into given some time [by
____]" (7-13), again avoiding saying who will be the agent
who will do the talking. Fred also uses a nonfinite clause,
"there'll be a nucleus [for ____]" (7-13), which allows him
to leave out who the nucleus is for.

This concludes the list of ways in which "I" was avoided,
where systematic retrieval relies on linguistic analyses. But the self is not avoided entirely in the segment. There are also extensive uses of self terms by which talkers locate themselves in a variety of collections of people. I exempt here, as is usual in this work, instances which do not discriminate part of a collection, such as "I think" or "I mean" which form such general categories as "thinking people" or "meaning people" other than where emphasis was shown. Figure 7.4 shows the overt uses of self terms, for each talker, as well as the collections of people in which that located the individual.

In Figure 7.4 Caren's list is longest of the three main talkers: Elmer, who often uses "we," is shortest of the three. Based on the list of collections realized in the use of self, there are two here that are particularly pertinent to the analysis: the "physically-present-[at the Co-op]-people" and the "willing-to-[be at the Co-op]-people." Each of these collections will be inspected to see who else in the segment has been shown as being within such a collection.

There are six instances in which the collection of people are shown as "physically" present in the text of the segment. All are in the second half of the segment.

Caren: We need at least five people to physically do the labor; (7-11)
Caren: Well, I mean, where are they physically, I mean...; (7-6)
Fred: But once they physically come to the Co-op, they can be talked by [ ] into...; (7-13)
Caren:...because I physically can't be there, because I have two little kids, you know...; (7-14)
Figure 7.4 Use of Self Terms in "Starting Up".
(Specific collections of people shown, except for non-partitioning.)

Caren
I don't mean to be so negative. [7-12] "negative-(sounding)-people"
I really believe in it. [7-12] "believing-in-Co-op-people"
I want to be in it. [7-12] "Co-op-organization-people"
But I want to be part of something that's alive. [7-12] "Co-op-organization-people"
The job I did is very insignificant. [7-14] "doing-insignificant-job-people"
of course I'll continue to do it.[7-14] "continuing-to-do-the-job-people"
I physically can't be there. [7-14] "physically-able-to-be-there-people"
I have two little kids.[7-14] "having-two-kids-people"
What I'm so concerned about. [7-14] "being-concerned-people"
The reason I'm so uncertain. [7-14] "pessimistic-people"
I really would like the Coop to open. [7-14] "liking-the-Coop-to-open-people"
I'm just afraid. [7-14] "being-afraid-people"
Then I'd be willing to open. [7-15] "willing-to-open-people"
I don't want to be pessimistic. [7-14] "pessimistic-people"

Elmer
It's against my interests. [7-1] "self-interested-people"
I'd like firmer commitments. [7-12] "liking-commitment-people"
I have strong feelings about the extras. [188] "concerned-about-extras-people"
I'm willing to be there every week. [7-15] "willing to (be-at-the-Co-op)-people"

Fred
I am just very concretely oriented. [7-1] "concretely-oriented-people"
I'm interested in opening. [7-1] "interested-in-opening-people"
I'll volunteer anyway. [021] "volunteering-people"
Reorganizing the community, I'm not interested. [023] "interested-in-reorganizing-the-community-people"
I'm essentially a pragmatist. [7-5] "pragmatical-people"
I tend to agree with you.[7-13] "agreeing-people"
I'm willing to be there every week. [7-15] "willing-to-be-there-people"
I'm not psychologically too good at finding things to do and doing them. [274] "finding-things-to-do-people"
I'm willing to say that I'll do a compulsive sort of thing.[275]
"willing-to-say-people."
I'll do a compulsive thing like being there for three hours a week. [275] "compulsive-people"

Pam
I lived in a house [a commune]. [111] "commune-people"
Caren: ...that can make at least a commitment to be there physically every week for a...; (7-15)  
Elmer: ...if it turns out that it's physically possible for me to...; (7-15)

The collection of those "physically-present-people" are shown in the six instances as including the following people:

- five people doing the labor [194];  
- people who came to the Co-op to shop [208];  
- people committed to be there every week [234];

as well as possibly Elmer [245], but not Caren [234].

Elmer is not included in this collection of "physically-present-people," since the collection he places himself in is "physically-possibly-at-the-Co-op-people." That is he locates himself there only conditionally. The collection of "physically-present-people" also excludes Caren and certain people who can't be found. On the whole then the tactic of emphasizing the physical presence of people at the Co-op has not succeeded in locating individuals who will do the starting up.

Considering next the "willing-to-be-at-the-Co-op-people," there are nine instances of text which locate people in that collection. They too all occur in the second half of the segment.

Elmer: people are not willing to assert themselves; [164]  
Caren: except Fred, you, you know, you've said now that you're willing to start the first day; (7-5)  
Caren: you said you're willing to be there one night to take orders, ok; (7-5)  
Caren: like if you would be willing to say that you would be there every week for the next month; (7-15)  
Caren: then I'd be willing to open: (7-15)  
Fred: I-I-I am willing to be there every week; (7-15)  
Elmer: Yeah, I'm willing to be there every week; (7-15)  
Fred: but I'm willing to say that I'll do a compulsive sort of thing; [275]
Caren: somebody first of all has to be willing to make signs. (7-15)

From the list it is then possible to locate two particular people in the collection of willing-people:

Fred: "you" used by Caren at 7-5 (twice), 7-15; "I" used by Fred at 7-15 and in 7-15

Elmer: "you" used by Caren in 7-15
"I" used by Elmer in 7-15

The other two instances (7-16) locate people in collections of people "willing to assert themselves" and "willing to make signs," but in neither case are specific people cited. The only instance of identified individuals placing themselves in a collection of "willing people" occurs with Fred and Elmer, as they commit themselves to be part of the Co-op that they will help start up.

Commitment as here analyzed then requires this voluntary willingness to locate the self in the future as part of the Co-op. In the segment the actual statements of commitment appear only after a direct question is put. At this point Elmer and Fred run the risk of not being seen as "good people," since someone else has spoken of continuing. The questioner has already located herself in the future Co-op by saying she would continue to do her job. Those that are being asked to commit themselves will be joining someone, and so neither of them is going to be the first one, or the only one to be involved in the future Co-op. The result is a plurality of future people connected now with opening the Co-op. They then have no way of avoiding the use of self terms. One might say that they have been backed into a corner by the
question with an interactive use of "you." It is through this combination of elements that the self is made to commit itself.

The original model of commitment introduced in Chap. 1 and used throughout this chapter can now be expanded to include an element in addition to (1) orientation to a collective aim; (2) involvement of sufficient others who could be seen as good people; and (3) the need for a continuing future relationship; (4) voluntary and deliberate inserting a self in a collection of people who give priority to collective over individual goals for a period of time. At this point it is evident that the collective component of commitment is as important as the self component. It is the presence of a Co-op in the first place that has put the people in the position of meeting and considering what to do. People are committing themselves to have a Co-op. A full answer to the question posed originally as to how communication of commitment is achieved requires then that that aspect also be explored.

Effective Commitment To The Co-op

Although it is decided that the Co-op should be opened, and the moral premise (A) reflecting this motivates much of the segment, that is not enough to ensure that the Co-op will keep going. Not only are there things to be done on the starting up day (and indeed the days before), there are also the future days of the Co-op. Commitment to starting
up the Co-op includes also a commitment to continuing the Co-op, whereas the reverse, commitment to the Co-op may not extend to ensure that the Co-op be revived at that time. That is, there may be commitment to the Co-op but it may not be extensive enough to include the extra effort needed to revive the Co-op.

One possible way to assess the commitment to the Co-op is to examine the language people use in talking about the Co-op. When all instances of reference to the Co-op are examined, changes are found in the actual terms used to refer to the Co-op over the course of the segment. In Figure 7.5 are 44 instances of the use of a term for Co-op in the segment. Only explicit references to the Co-op are given, not the full range of implied references. For instance, any use of "open" implies "the Co-op" as the object opened and these are not shown. In addition, there are a variety of phrases to which "of the Co-op" or "for the Co-op" might have been supplied, but wasn't, and these also are not shown.

The forty-four instances show a pattern of terms used to refer to the Co-op. The use of the term "Co-op" itself is nearly evenly distributed, five in the first part; two during Elmer's long speech in the middle and six in the second half. "Thing" and "it" (as well as one instance of "some-

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1 A notion of "possible Co-op" parallels "possible self" and "possible other" introduced on page 208 and used in the preceding section.
Caren: I really want to be part of something that's alive...[150]

Fred: ...the thing that used to be running last week...[013]
Fred: ...reorganized into anything...[014]
Fred: ...and talk up the thing...[048]
Fred: ...and if the thing falls apart...[069]
Fred: ...but it's a pleasant sort of thing...[098]

Elmer: ...just like it was...[014]
Fred: ...before it's reorganized...[014]
Elmer: ...who would probably join it...[033]
Elmer: ...if it could, could be organized...[034]
Elmer: ...they were getting ripped off by it...[035]
Fred: You're going to have to run it for a while...[042]
Fred: ...let it run for a month...[047]
Fred: ...falls apart as it is...[069]
Fred: ...then it can be organized on a family basis...[069]
Caren: ...but what's the point of opening it...[072]
Elmer: ...you can always run it more than one day...[142]
Caren: 'cause you know I really believe in it...[149]
Caren: ...I want to be in it...[149]
Elmer: ...I really want to be part of it...[149]

Elmer: ...let's do it in such a way that we don't have to...[166]

Elmer: ...that never even heard of Carverton Co-op...[033]
Caren: ...one person's job is to go to the Co-op...[102]
Caren: ...this person doesn't have any time to go to the Co-op...[103]
Caren: ...you have to go to the Co-op between 4 and 7 on Thursday.[139]
Elmer: ...when we first started our Co-op...[173]
Elmer: ...it's the moral obligation of the people of, of the Co-op.[189]
Fred: ...to discuss the fine points of running the Co-op...[195]
Fred: ...but there is no Co-op until the doors open...[196]
Fred: ...but once they physically come to the Co-op...[221]
Caren: ...really made the Co-op happen every week...[230]
Caren: ...but that doesn't make the Co-op run or not...[240]
Caren: ...but I really would like the Co-op to open...[247]

Caren: ...You gonna be there to take orders the first night? [019]
Fred: ...robbing Peter, who got there at 4 o'clock...[084]
Caren: ...you're willing to be there one night to take orders. [202]
Caren: ...because I physically can't be there...[240]
Caren: ...that can at least make a commitment to be there...[249]
Caren: ...to say that you would be there...[252]
Fred: I am willing to be there...[258]
Elmer: ...I'm willing to be there...[261]
Fred: ...like being there for three hours a week...[276]
Fred: ...I'm willing to be there tomorrow...[276]
thing alive") are used exclusively in the beginning of the segment. There are no instances past line [166], well before Fred's call to practicality at [194] which brings Elmer's speech ([158] to [192]) to a close. The term "thing" is Fred's idiosyncratic term for the Co-op, "it" however is used by the three principal speakers who account for 250 out of 294 lines of the transcript (no term being used at all by Pam, Amy or Terry). Six instances of "there" are in the second half, while only 2 cases occur in the first few lines. Once people become "serious" about committing themselves, then it no longer seems to be possible to refer to the Co-op by "it" or "thing." There are no people in "it" or "thing," while "there" contains hidden people.1

The phrase "but there is no Co-op until the doors open and the lettuce and tomatoes are in there..." (7-5) is a response to the previous utterance, that it is "the moral obligation of the people of, of the Co-op" [189]. This orients the people present away from considering the Co-op a remote "it" or "thing" to considering the organization of the Co-op. Also here too a moral premise (B) is re-affirmed, that there ought to be a Co-op.

Yet in the statement of (7-5) something crucial is omitted: people. Although what is said is true--there is no Co-op until the doors open--here is a large omission, for people are needed to open the doors and to get the lettuce and

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1 Procedures for locating hidden people shown in Chap. 3, page 132 include locatives, such as "there."
tomatoes in there. Further people are needed to come and work at the Co-op and to shop, not just once, but regularly for a period of future time. Further, it is necessary that some people make known that they are going to be the ones who are going to do all that; in other words, that they are making such a commitment, voluntarily. Getting the Co-op started up required commitment of several selves, who by that commitment are noted as good selves.

The orientation to the Co-op is to the Co-op organization people, for their presence is assured by the continuance of the Co-op. It is this collection of people that was shown in Amy's utterance "we would get back two-thirds of our membership" (7-13). Although Amy does not make a statement of commitment herself, her speaking for the organization people is a crucial element in people becoming involved. Her utterance use "we" which is not the case with Caren's utterance "of course I'll continue" (7-14) or Fred or Elmer's commitment with "I," "I'm willing to be there every week" (7-15). Each of these utterances using "I" also contains "you know," by which consensus on the underlying collection of organization people is asserted by the talker. On the other hand, Amy's speaking for the organization provided in the first place the possibility of a collection of organization people.

The particular problem of tracing the rebirth of commitment after a summer shutdown would have floundered if it had been tied to the appearance of "we" alone, but it was a valuable starting point. The uses of "we" served to introduce
many of the specific collections of people present at the meeting. But it became increasingly obvious that no utterance couched in terms of "we" could be accepted as establishing a commitment: the use of "I" was necessary. At the same time commitment in terms of "I" along--the isolated individual--was not heard as serious. How then was serious commitment communicated? The individual commitment must somehow be seen as inserted in a context of certain "possible others." It must be embedded in a "we" for "organization people."

The importance of the use of "we" reappears. Utterances with "we" also serve to locate the crucial places where "starting-up-people" appear. One such place is in Amy's utterance concerning the return of two-thirds of the membership in two weeks. (7-13) It is at that point that the process of commitment started. Another such place is in the final lines of the segment, as Caren says, "don't put them [signs] on trees, because we lose members." (7-16) Only the Co-op considered as alive has members who can be offended by signs stapled to trees rather than telephone poles. This is the Co-op which Caren wanted to be part of. Commitment has been communicated and changes in the language used give ample evidence of this. The subjective utterances of intent of action, seemingly matters of self, have resulted in the reappearance of the group.
"STARTING UP" Segment

001 Fred: Well, that's that's, I mean, I, I, uh, I am just
002 very concretely oriented, I'm interested in opening the
003 Elmer: You want
004 Fred: Doors, and selling some lettuce and tomatoes, and--
005 Elmer: to open the doors and get started, I know. Shall we take a vote? It's really against my interests to
006 vote, because if I say we should go ahead and do it,
007 then I'm just making more work to do.
008 Caren: Well, it's a joke
009 Fred: Right now, then what are you talking about? What do you mean open? [Laughs] What's open--
010 Fred: How about, yeah, what
011 some, the thing that used to be running last year, just
012 like it was before it's re-organized into anything, you
013 know, you open the doors, we fill out the same order
014 forms and you do the same bullshit, and just do
015 Caren: Oh yeah?
016 Fred: it exactly the way it was, you don't have to--
017 Caren: You gonna be there
to take the orders the first night?
018 Fred: Sure, all right, I'll
019 volunteer anyway, yeah, someone assign me a task, re-
020 organizing the community I'm not interested in, but I'll go and do a task--
021 Elmer: No, he-, how about, how about, I don't know
022 about, Caren and I talked on the phone a little bit,
023 how about rather than open and fall back into our old,
024 our old system [Sniffs] how about if we can, you
025 know, I'm sure that we know enough people, you know
026 our having been around for a while, that we could, you
027 know, I'd like a co-, I'd like number one, a commitment, I
028 know there are people on this block that never even
029 heard of Carverton Co-op who would probably join it, if it
030 could, could be organized in such a way that they didn't
031 feel they were getting ripped off by it, you know. [Fast] We,
032 Fred: I think the re-organization, like, that all these
033 re-organization plans kind of depend on your having ah,
034 some sort of community, and it seems that with Carverton
035 and you're dealing with Prester students and stuff like
036 that, you're going to have to open the doors, you're go-
037 ing to have to run it for a while--
038 Elmer: I wouldn't want to deal with
039 Fred: Presster students, let them eat in their commissary and just-
040 Fred: All right, but you have
041 people who just moved in, you're going to have to open the doors, let it run for a month, you can be in there and
talk up the thing or anybody who wants to organize some-
thing can do it, but you've got to at least get the people
initially in under some basis which is buying their cucum-
"STARTING UP" (cont'd)

Elmer: That's one school of thought, it is difficult [laughs]
Caren: to get people to, especially people who have
limited imaginations to, you can say, well, um, "We
can get you a cucumber for seven cents and you'd pay
fifteen," but unless they actually see the cucumber
doesn't mean anything, I agree, that's the problem.
Fred: Yeah, but I mean you're
gonna, there's gonna be some people who are perfectly
happy with the system, there's, there's a lot of
people--
Caren: Yeah, but I don't even know if we have the
labor to do the system as it was, I mean.
Fred: Well, that's
what we ought to do right now, discover exactly what
we're going to need to actually open, it would seem, and
if the thing falls apart as it is, then it can be organ-
ized on a family basis or whatever you want.
Caren: Well, yeah, but what's the point of
opening it unless we know, we should know enough about
the neighborhood to know where we're at, so we don't
open, you know, and, you know, just collapse, I mean.
Fred: Well, you
ever do, I mean, if, if somebody's willing to coordin-
ate labor, you could always find someone robbing
Peter, who got there at 4 o'clock and could stay,
Elmer: [Laughs loudly]
Fred: you know, and work.
Caren: Well, some people have, you know, a
higher level of frustration and some people just can't
deal with that, you know.
Elmer: It's, it's always robbing Peter to
pay Paul, it's always one of those things.
Caren: Yeah, well, I
think really the ultimate question is what do you ac-
complish then when you do that, you see, you
Fred: Well, I don't
Caren: get cheap food, sort of.
Fred: know what, it doesn't depend, my being
Elmer: I would abstain from voting.
Fred: here is a little silly, because I really never bought,
I placed one order last year, and I forgot to come and
pick it up, you know, [All laugh] I'm so utterly out
of the habit and I was constantly throwing out heads of
lettuce that went black, I really don't eat at home that
much, so that it matters to me, but it's a pleasant
sort of thing, and isn't [All laugh]--
Caren: Yeah, like, I mean,
like that's sort of the level it's at, like in our house,
one person's job is to go to the Co-op, well this person
doesn't have any time to go to the Co-op, so you know,
"STARTING UP" (cont'd)

he always manages to go when it's terribly inconvenient, and what are we actually serving if we can't even use the Co-op, you know, well that [Louder] --

Elmer: The shoemaker whose children have no shoes, and--

Caren: Yeah, I mean, it's like that, it really is.

Pam: Yeah, you know [Laughs] we would each week like sort of get together for five minutes and figure, you know, whether last week we didn't have enough bananas or we wanted maybe couple more heads of lettuce.

Caren: Yeah.

Pam: And it worked out really well, we really saved money, plus, plus we thought ahead so that we didn't spend, you know, say half an hour, two or three times a week in the supermarket thinking, "No, let's see, eggplant, no, I don't know," you know.

Caren: Well, yet, but it's one thing, you know, when you're living in a house, in a commune and not everybody there is working full time, but when you have couples and families and they have kids and everybody is working full time, it's just, you know, it's sort of a question whether it's worth the effort, it's really--

Pam: I know, you know, I still, I still maintain that, that you know, ten or fifteen minutes a week, you know, figuring out, after a couple of weeks it's no problem at all, it's a lot more time saving then, you know--

Caren: Yeah, but it's not always time saving when you have to go to the Co-op between 4 and 7 on Thursday, maybe you only have time on Monday at 8:00 in the evening, I mean, you know, that's sort of--

Elmer: You can always run it more than one day.

Fred: Yeah, sure you could, that's the idea, you could, I think, you could very well do anything.

Caren: I don't mean to be so negative, 'cause you know I really believe in it,

Pam: Yeah

Caren: I want to be in it, I really want to be part of it, but I really want to be part of something that's alive,

Pam: Does,

Caren: you know. Yeah

Pam: does anyone want tea coffee, tea, more tea,
would you like some more tea?

Caren: I'll have some tea.

Terry: Yeah, sure.

Elmer: I'll hold out, I'll stick with you, 'cause I-I-I-I really think that, no offense. Fred, but I-I really think that the longer you cater to that, you know, you, we have a tendency to set these things up in such a way that ah, ah, we carry people without knowing, you know, why it seems there's always that thing where, people are not willing to assert themselves and put their feet, say, look, um, let's do it such a way that we don't have to constantly be coping with, you know, each thing, and I'd like firmer commitments, in fact, I've, I've always felt, said, if you buy $30 a week worth of food, say, you're buying cheeses and you've got a big household and you only put up $5.00 in deposit, especially back in the day when, um everything was prepaid, and you had to have the money together to go down, um thank God, when we first started our Co-op, for people like Martha Martin who would put up three or four times, they put up forty dollars in deposits, because that's the only way we had money to buy, you, know, because the people didn't give us a deposit because at that time we didn't feel at that time we wanted to force the issue, and she was in a sense putting up money for those people's foods, and, you know, that's just one way that we, that we don't, you know, take into account that everybody should carry their own weight, and even just how much money you put up in order to pay for the food that you purchased, you buy thirty dollars worth of food and the money has to come from somewhere to pay for the stuff, ah, for instance, I have a feeling, I have strong feelings about the extras, I think it's the moral obligation of the people of, of the Co-op to spread the cost of these extras, maybe add it on, if it's four dollars and thirty cents worth of stuff, add it on to next week, because it's a collective responsibility of everybody, that to assume that--

Fred: I rarely, I'm essentially a pragmatist, and it's, it's awfully nice to discuss the fine points of running the Co-op, but there is no Co-op until the doors open and the lettuce and tomatoes are in there, it's a question of--

Caren: Except Fred, you know, you've said now that you're willing to, you know, to start the first day, I mean, let's be practical, if you want to be practical, you said you're willing to be there one night to take orders, ok, now that means we need somebody to make signs, we need somebody to, you know, we need three
people to go on the run the following week, we need
at least five people to physically do the labor and
sell the following week, you know, we need telephone
calls and so, I mean, where are the people that are
going to do all that? [Voice rises]
Fred: Well, I think that they are there,
they're just not here.
Caren: Well, I mean, where are they physically, I mean
HOW can we open next week if we don't-- [Louder]
Fred: Well, look, I think if
signs go up saying that there is an opening day, I
think they'll come, then I think they'll tell more
people, then I think you'll begin seeing the same faces
again, and that's the nucleus, whether you'll convince
them to come out an extra night to meetings or not, I
tend to agree with you there, but once they physically
come to the Co-op, they can be talked into giving some
time to work, doing this or that, just resuming things
as they were, and perhaps there'll be a nucleus to
turn to.
Amy: Is there any reason why like we wouldn't sort of
get back two-thirds of the membership we had when we
closed in the spring within two weeks?
Caren: No there isn't, but
I think that you and Sheldon and um, maybe one or two
other people really made that Co-op happen every week,
and I don't see that, that, and I don't see that
available, and there's only so much you can do
Amy: Yeah.
Caren: right now, I mean, you know, and there's Sheldon,
you know, I don't know whether he wants to or not, and
Ben's going to be away, you know, for a month, and he's
another one of those, you know, maybe four people, you
know, I mean the job I did is very insignificant, and
you know, of course I'll continue to do it, but that
doesn't make the Co-op run or not, because I physically
can't be there, because I have two little kids, you
know, what I, what I, what I'm so concerned about you
know, the reason I'm so uncertain about this
Amy: Yeah.
Caren: business is, I don't want to be pessimistic, but
Amy: Yeah.
Caren: I really would like the Co-op to open, but I'm
just afraid that unless we find two or three people
that can make at least a commitment to be there
physically every week for a while, if you could find,
like if you would be willing to say that you would be
there every week for the next month, and you could find
two or more people to do it with you, you know, to make
that same commitment, then, then I'd be willing to open,
I.
"STARTING UP" (cont'd)

256 Caren: I think we have to have that much.
257 Fred: I am willing to be there every week, you know, given that I have a week or
258 two to, to free up Thursday nights.
259 Elmer: Yeah, I'm willing to be there every week, if it, if it, you know, if it turns out
260 that it's physically possible for me to do it, and
261 Caren: Yeah.
262 Elmer: That's only-- I've found that every estimate of labor, that is the amount of work actually involved in doing
263 these things turns out usually to be about twice what we figure, based on what I know of Natural Foods, it doesn't
264 leave me much time.
265 Terry: Well, look it begins to look more poss-
266 sible now if two people have already volunteered to,
267 Caren: Mmmmm,
268 Terry: For a beginning--
269 Fred: Yes, I must say that I'm not, not psychologically good at finding things to do and doing
270 them, but I'm willing to say that, I'll do a compulsive
271 sort of thing, thing like being there for three hours
272 a week.
273 Elmer: How about if we start taking orders? I'm willing
274 to be there tomorrow and see if I can get some orders.
275 Caren: Well, it's silly, it's ridiculous, obviously we have to have a week
276 Amy: We need--
277 Caren: of signs, you know, somebody first of all
278 Elmer: Well, we have to get started, ah, how about--
279 Caren: has to be willing to make signs and put them all
280 over Carverton, I mean, otherwise, I think, I think it's
281 real silly.
282 Fred: Who's the old sign-maker? [Loud spoon stirring
283 sounds] Caren: You know, somebody first of all
284 Elmer: We could make signs. We could make more signs.
285 Pam: Don't put them on trees, because we lose members, they get
286 very offended if they see them. [Spoon sounds]
CHAPTER 8
THE NEIGHBORHOOD PEOPLE

Not all the moral matters concerning the Co-op were internal to the Co-op. The neighborhood in which the Co-op was situated was Carverton, and relations with the Carverton residents also gave evidence of moral matters. One such salient moral matter was the relation between white and black residents. Most of the people in the Co-op were white; blacks never accounted for more than five percent of those who were in the Co-op. However, the neighborhood was a mixed neighborhood with 38% black residents. (U.S. Census, 1970). Some residents claimed it was the longest stably integrated neighborhood in the city. (Cf. Chapter 2).

Co-op people had different explanations for the low percentage of blacks in the Co-op. Some felt it was part of the general problem of little participation in the Co-op by the neighborhood residents. They pointed to inadequate publicity: "I know there are people on this block that never heard of Carverton Co-op" (Elmer, "Starting Up," [327])

Some felt it was a particular problem of black/white relations. One Co-op member, Ben, suggested the reason was that blacks saw the Co-op as white.

But generally speaking I think the problem is, an black perception of the Co-op is of a pretty white institution, you know, however, liberal, radical or
whatever, you know, it's still a white institution, and that coupled with the fact that they recognize all of the decision making as being of white people, perhaps would dissuade them from wanting to participate, but also I think it has to do with the fact that, ah, you know, they don't have nearly the extent of a sort of community identification that most people in Carverton do.

[Ben IV, p. 3, 5/16/73]

Two polar positions characterize the relations of the Co-op people and the community.

1. A few Co-op people actively encouraged blacks to join. They distributed leaflets in the neighborhood and put up posters. A few had even promoted the use of the Co-op as a hangout for the neighborhood youth.

2. A few Co-op people feared blacks, observing that the Co-op had been robbed at least three times by black youth, and wanting to install a dog or a security guard in the Co-op. A few of them viewed with alarm each entrance into the Co-op by a black.

Most Co-op people can be characterized as liberal or radical. The Co-op—especially in "the Early Days"—included commune dwellers, Quakers, ex-flower children, radicals, food faddists along with old-time residents in the area who were more conventional. The site of the Co-op through most of its career reflected the somewhat anti-Establishment character of the Co-op people, as was shown in Chapter 2. The building used by the Co-op was a warehouse which had been taken over by a "sit-in" of some of the more militant Carverton dwellers at the time the City was attempting to condemn and demolish parts of the neighborhood.
in order that the way be cleared for Prester University to expand.

The Co-op did not operate without conflict with other neighborhood people. The data on which this chapter is based concerns a particular happening during the delivery of produce to the Co-op building early on a cold January morning. The drivers usually tried to unload the heavy food crates as close as possible to the building. To do this they had to pull the truck up the driveway onto the sidewalk at the delivery door.

On this morning, the drivers, Ben and Sheldon, returned from the food center to find that the driveway was blocked by a car, and one that had blocked it before. They pushed the car out of their way. Shortly afterwards the owner of the car, Jason Thorne, appeared and a scuffle ensued in which Ben's arm was injured. In my interview with Ben four months after the incident, he said that his arm was still painful. He gave this report of the incident, again referring to the black/white issue.

Oh, what happened was that this guy living across the street, he was kind of a, kind of a surly character, and perhaps a little bit crazy. He was sort of crashing at an RDA building across the street, I guess, or paying a very minimal amount of rent, and he had a, a very devil-may-care, derelict, 'me-first' kind of an orientation about a lot of things. [un huh] And I think that was exemplified by the fact that he, you know, he consistently and almost defiantly parked his car there, you know, [um] not perhaps as if to, you know, it wasn't really defiant as much as just completely oblivious [un huh], you know. So anyway, what happened--his car was in the way and we pushed it, and he came out and got really pissed off, you know, and came out swinging eventually, you know, and--it was really unfortunate because it was a black/white kind of thing. [Ben IV, p. 4, 5/16/73]
Neither Ben nor Sheldon made any effort to fight back, though both are tall and look reasonably strong. Another man who lived in the area (Swan Peters) appeared, and pulled Thorne off. Thorne then threatened to get a gun from his room in the house across the street. Sheldon mentions the gun as he talked of the incident in his interview.

Well, people were concerned, I think, concerned for Ben's and my sake, because, ah, because it was a pretty serious thing, and this guy Elmer Spot said--told me that that--that big guy Swan who finally came in and carried the guy off, had told him that Jason the guy who hit Ben had gone to Swan and asked him for his gun that morning, you know, and Swan had enough sense not to give him a gun, of course, 'cause it would have gotten Swan in trouble too.

[Seldon IV, p. 3, 6/29/74]

The event was reported to the police and a complaint filed by Ben and Sheldon, who subsequently went to a court hearing. Thorne was convicted of assault and given a year's suspended sentence; he left the area soon afterwards.

The segment used in this chapter includes Ben's report to the meeting of this series of events and a following discussion of how to insure that the truck could be parked in front of the Co-op for future deliveries. The segment ends with the passing of a motion that Sheldon look into procedures for getting a "No Parking" sign. He was given permission to spend up to $15 to secure this. Sheldon located the proper city agency and after a few weeks a "No

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1 Complete text of "No Parking" segment is given at the end of the Chapter. Lines 003 to 018 of the segment were used in Chap. 1 to illustrate the notion that moral matters appear in talk and that talk can be a fruitful data base. Lines 001 to 050 were used in Chap. 3 to illustrate the derivation of hidden people.
"Parking" sign was painted on the sidewalk without charge.

During the course of the segment to be examined in this chapter, Ben tells the meeting people that Thorne is black. After a bit, there is brief discussion of the fact that the Co-op has only a few blacks among its members.

Joel mentions a black Co-op member who made an issue of discrimination when she was accused of stealing at one of the produce day sessions. Joel gave a more detailed account of that event in an interview.

The most difficult day that I ever had there was at the peak of the Co-op buying, ah, when people were coming in and picking their own orders, ah, there was a black woman came in and I was told as a coordinator that day, that this woman was stealing ah, food, that she was coming in, filling her basket and just walking out without paying, and she had done this two weeks in a row and nobody ever stopped her. Well, I--checked her out [Mmmmm]. I watched her, and ah, determined that--that was the case, and she was about ready to--she just walked right past the cashier and was about to leave the door, and ah, I said, 'You're not leaving without paying,' and ah, you know, indignant balck woman shouted 'Racist: I'm gonna get my people in here,' and that type of thing. [Oh wow] And I just got up on top of one of the tables and said--there were about thirty people present in the Co-op at the time, it was very crowded--and I said, I need, I need your cooperative help, ah, in this situation. I need support here. This woman is not, has not paid for her groceries and I'm not going to let here leave, and I want your support, I mean leave without paying for it. [Unhuh] I want your support in this. She says that she will, she'll bring her people down here. Uh I don't care what she does, but she's not going to rip off the Co-op,' and I got support from the people there, ah, and she left without the produce, I don't know whether she unloaded her basket or just what, but I do remember that the Co-op supported me, and the woman never came back [Unhuh] and the situation was rectified. It was a very emotional situation and very [Yeah] racially--racial things are always difficult--and--we've always wanted to see a larger black participation in the Co-op.

[Joel IV, p. 11, 5/20/74]
The extent to which Co-op people share Joel's views of wanting a "larger black participation" can not, however, be documented in detail, although there is some evidence in the interviews and the meetings, and in this particular segment which supports his perception of the Co-op people's attitudes.

The "No Parking" segment used in this chapter illustrates a basic problem the Co-op people faced when they dealt with black residents in the neighborhood. Most of the black people that the Co-op people came in contact with in the course of Co-op operation were people who produced problems. Co-op people had to take action when problems interfered with their operation. It was sometimes the case that some neighborhood people came to view such actions (and the Co-op) as hostile to blacks.

The question can then be asked:

Since the interests of the Co-op had led to confrontations with black people, how could commitment to the Co-op be reconciled with commitment to an integrated neighborhood?

The Co-op people chose to live in the racially mixed neighborhood.¹ They seemed sincerely committed to integrationist ideals. However in the situation where problems arose with

¹ The neighborhood was not only racially mixed (38% black according to the 1970 census), but also had representatives of many non-mainstream life styles (as described in Chapter 2). Carverton, like most parts of Philadelphia had a neighborhood name and one or more civic and home owner associations during the time of this study. The extent to which a community existed or neighboring was carried out (such as is discussed by Keller, 1968) was not investigated.
black neighborhood people, support for the Co-op might entail support for actions which although directed at particular individuals who were black could be said to be directed at all black individuals. Commitment to the Co-op in some instances thus could be seen as compromising favorable black/white interrelations and making suspect any commitment to an integrated neighborhood. In the segment which concerns a particular problem the Co-op faced in black/white relations I suspected that there would be evidence in the talk of the Co-op people of moral matters as they coped with the dilemma of supporting the Co-op and the Co-op people yet did not compromise their pro-neighborhood sentiments.

In considering the communication of commitment in this chapter, I shall focus on general ideology of commitment explored in Chapter 1 rather than on the specific action of committing a self, as was the case in the last chapter.

Originally commitment was defined (p.36) as the continuing investment of resources (particularly time and energy) by people in some collective aim of a collection of people which returns to the individual(s) (minimally) the possibility of being seen as good people in that collection of people. Yet there are individual actions shown in this segment too by which people display commitment to the Co-op and the neighborhood as the meeting people talk of the incident and work out tactics by which future incidents will be prevented.
Concerning Collections of People

The first step in the analysis, as in the preceding three chapters, consists in selecting those collections of people which are most relevant to the moral matters discussed here, i.e., the conflict between commitment to the Co-op and commitment to the neighborhood people. The surface collections in the "No Parking" segment—those identified by labels which are written as close to the surface language as possible following the principles of p. 137—show an unusually large proportion of "other people" (non-Co-op collections of people) 107 of the 196. Figure 8.1 classified the surface collections and slightly less than half, (89) are collections of Co-op people. The Co-op people show a large proportion of "produce day people," (47) a category poorly represented in the preceding three chapters. The produce day people are further subdivided in order to show the incident people (37), who are the focus of the issue of the segment (using category sets, cf. page 154).

The collections of other people in Figure 8.1 are classified into collections of black people and neighborhood people since these seem the relevant intermediate collections based on the problem posed above. But these two categories account for less than half of the other people. Intermediate categories which are not specified in this table will play an important part in the analysis to follow, including such collections as "crazy-people," "hassling-people," and "threatening-people."
Figure 8.1 Surface Collections Of People In "No Parking"; Classified.  (N=196)

COOP PEOPLE  (N=89 surface collections)
  Meeting People (N=29)
  Organization People (N=13)
  Produce Day People (N=47)
    Incident People (N=37)
    Non-Incident People (N=10)

OTHER PEOPLE (Non-Coop collections of people)  (N=107 surface collections)
  Unspecified (N=54)
  Specified (N=53)
    Black People (N=17)
    Neighborhood People  (N=36)

(Numbers indicate number of occurrences in the text)
The collections of other people might have been classified into those which involve "car-people," (14 surface collections) and those which do not (as was mentioned earlier in the discussion of classifying collections of people on page 151). But in this segment, no moral matters are connected with the kind of car or color of the car, or any other details of the car, except for the problem of where the car was parked.

Since the "No Parking" segment begins with a discussion of the incident, the first collection of people to be used in the analysis of the text is the "incident people." The incident people included initially Ben, Sheldon, and Thorne, and then Swan who removed Thorne from the scene. As the text shows, a court hearing is to be held, and so court people are also later included within the "incident people." As was pointed out in Chapter 2, produce day people are not necessarily all members of the Co-op, but include all persons who were in any way involved in the event of a produce distribution. Like all collections classified under produce day or any other guise of the Co-op, each surface collection of people includes at least one person who has taken on at least in part the obligations and evaluations of the Co-op.

After the "incident-people," the analysis deals with collections of "black-people." The 17 collections of black people indicated in Figure 8.1 are those in which labels written for the surface collections contained reference to black people. But certain surface collections of people which in fact include black people are not classified here
as collections of "black-people" because the surface text locates them as collections of Co-op people. For instance, "last-week-meeting-people" [013] contains one black person, but is classified under "meeting-people." "Fighting-people" [024] contains at least one black person, but is classified under "incident-people." Further analysis of the text is indicated so as to find all collections containing black people, not only those implicated in fact, but also those indirectly indicated by the language used.

The analysis then considers "neighborhood-people." Few of the surface collections of neighborhood people appear where moral matters are evident. However, other collections of people will turn out to include neighborhood people, such as "another-incident-people" [020] which is classified under "Co-op people" and "hassling-people" [183,184] which appears under "other people." Again, the need for analysis beyond the surface collections is indicated.

The Incident People

The segment begins with the news that there will shortly be a court hearing.

Extract 8-1

Ben: Um, as far as the uh, the incident went on the 18th, ah, we're, we've got ah, I guess he m', he must be mentioned we've got a court hearing and everything

Sheldon: Yeah.

Ben: On uh, the fifth and ah, he's going to be summoned, ah, and if he doesn't show up, he'll be, you know, a warrant, you know, there'll be a warrant put out on him.

["No Parking" 001-007]

The situation which took place on the 18th is defined by Ben
in Extract 8-1 as an "incident." This neutral term which apparently limits the importance of the events will be preserved in the analysis to follow. Extract 8-1 also introduces a person connected both with the incident and with the court hearing, as "he" is without any other identification.

Ben in Extract 8-1 is speaking for the "incident-people" reflected in his use of "we." (cf. earlier discussion of the notion of speaking for a collection of people page 203). Ben is an "insider" (p.215 ) by virtue of his position inside this collection of people, and the others, except Sheldon, are "outsiders," some of whom may have heard of the incident. The sequence of "we," "I," and "he" in the second line suggests that Ben was in the midst of deciding how much to say about the incident. A feature of moral response (the use of "must") indicates a moral premise. The existential predication (EP) appears in the passive and contains two sets of "hidden people," those to whom mentioning is made and those by whom mentioning is done. 2

EP: He must be mentioned.

Here is an instance illustrating case I of the dynamic of moral response (cf page 294 ) in which the relation of the surface form

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1 As data in this section, the text of "No Parking" in which the incident is described is shown as Extracts 8-1 to 8-3, up to but not including the point at which the black people are introduced.

2 These were shown in Figure 3.2 and described in the discussion of "hidden people" by ellipses on page 133.
is shown to reflect directly the underlying moral matters. The polarity of the existential predication appears the same, therefore, in any moral premise related to it. The passive form allows the talker to avoid stating who it is that is doing the mentioning.

Two moral premises are relevant here. Both are stated in the active voice with sets of "Co-op" as the subject, since they are the focus of the analysis at this point. The first:

MP-A Good incident-people ought to mention Thorne to the meeting-people. (Extract 8-1)

In actual fact it is Ben who mentions "him," (Ben was a "possible self," one of those by whom the mentioning could be done, as was Sheldon since he had also been present). In mentioning "him," Ben gives information to the meeting, and a second moral premise relates the meeting people to things they ought to know about him and the incident. The second:

MP-B Good meeting-people ought to know about Thorne. (Extract 8-1)

A discussion of the incident is then conducted by Ben, who in performing his role as chairperson has assumed the role of report giver.

The use of "we" with regard to the court hearing [003] is ambiguous, (cf. p.215) designating "Sheldon and Ben" or other sets of Co-op people such as the meeting people, the organization people, or any subset of Co-op people who feel they belong within a collection of "court-hearing-people."
The presence of Thorne in Court is not assumed to be automatic—that is, whether Thorne will accept the obligations of that collections. People assigned by the court to this collection of people (by a summons or warrant) have obligations such as appearing before a judge by which their performance as "court-hearing-people" in Extract 8-1 can be judged.¹

Some may have known who the "he" referred to was, but Mickey apparently did not, and she asks for his identity.

Extract 8-2

Mickey: Well, who was it that did this?
Ben: It's this guy across the street named Jason Thorne who lives over at 33-what? Thorne.
Mickey: Jason Thorne?
Ben: was said last week about this guy? Did you tell about Dolly? Well-- Sheldon: I don't think it's necessary, you know, it's, this, it's really more personal business. No.
Gertrude: She got hit too?
Sheldon: she wasn't there then, it was another time.

Though "he" is here given a name, "Jason Thorne," and an address, and characterized as a "guy." (cf. p. 271). No further information is given at this point. As was noted in Chapter 3, page 221, a series of "he's" had preceded the occurrence of the name in the text. Further along in this chapter the construction of this individual in talk will be

¹ In Chapter 1 (pp 6 to 13) an initial presentation of the problem of locating moral matters in talk using lines 005 to 018 included here within Extracts 8-1 and 8-2, pointed to 3 predications in which moral matters were shown in talk: (1) the court proceedings (2) the name of the individual and (3) talk of an earlier event is inappropriate. Here and in the later discussion of constructing the troublemakers (p. 571) these themes are shown again as part of the texture of moral matters which are relevant at this time.
examined closely ( p. 5/2 ).

Ben (who was not at the last meeting) asks Sheldon (who was at the meeting) what was said about "this guy" and about Dolly. Here a new individual is immediately identified with a name. However, Sheldon's response is indirect and uses neither her name nor a pronoun, minimizing Dolly's presence in the talk. In saying that Dolly should not be discussed, Sheldon implies that she has not been talked about. He uses three indicators of moral response: the word "necessary," part of the recognized vocabulary of moral matters; an intensifier "really;" and an evaluative qualifier, "more personal business."

MP-C: Good incident people ought not to tell about Dolly. (Extract 8-2)

As Extract 8-2 shows, Gertrude asks for details anyway ("she got hit too?") suggesting Dolly belongs in the collection of "hit-people" along with Ben whose arm was hurt in the incident. Sheldon makes a claim to privacy with the phrase "more personal business." All those present know that he lives with Dolly. Nevertheless he responds to Gertrude by locating Dolly in a collection of "another-incident-people," in Extract 8-2 as he says, "it was another time."

Ben, who is chairperson and presumably determines what constitutes appropriate talk at a meeting, has himself been declared out of bounds.1 Ben explicates the moral matters of

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1 An instance of Ben declaring another person out of bounds and hence determining what is appropriate (or proper) talk at a meeting occurs in this segment after Ben asks for "Discussion?" and Martin begins talking about Thorne and is interrupted by Ben saying, "I mean on this--" [117]
the incident making it clear that neither he nor Sheldon fought.

Extract 8-3

Ben: Well, anyway, ah [Pause], well I guess we just sort of felt that, you know, that this kind of behavior is nothing we would have to take, and ah, we didn't fight back [Door slams] because of, well, two essential factors, I think, first of all because fighting's pretty distasteful to begin with, second of all because, we didn't want to sort of precipitate any kind of a gang-type fight which is, is what would have happened, and ah, third of all, you know, he said he had a gun in his apartment, and also because not only that he had a gun, but just sort of like that

Glen: Like ah--

Ben:--here was something we would have to deal with on a on-going basis, you know, and any sort of like ah, brute warfare, that we, you, you know, undertake him in

Glen: You feel that's--

Ben:--and it's going to be sort of like drawn out and, and just exacerbated, so--

["No Parking" 021-039]

Extract 8-3 introduces the "fighting-people" as well as the "non-fighting-people." Ben gives reasons ("two essential factors") for their not fighting. The reasons are pacifism ("fighting's pretty distasteful"), fear of precipitating gang-warfare, and the fact that "he said he had a gun." Though Ben is reporting to the Co-op, none of these reasons have anything specific to do with the Co-op, other than the Co-op people are the people involved. But then Ben adds a fourth reason, "here was something we would have to deal with on an on-going basis." Here commitment is shown to a future Co-op and to continuing involvement in this Co-op. "We" shows a plurality as so committed, whether Ben

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1 Surface collections of people found in these lines are listed in Chapter 3
and Sheldon, those present, or others of the Co-op organization is not specified. But such a plurality also assumes a continuance of the Co-op, and commitment extending into a future Co-op. They see themselves or some others voluntarily acting in the Co-op in a situation which would be "drawn out and, and just exacerbated."

Ben gives a series of diverse characterizations in Extract 8-3 of the incident as "this kind of behavior," "fighting's pretty distasteful," "gang-type fight," and "brute warfare," all reflecting his pacifistic views. Features of moral response ("would have to take" obligatory verb construction: "just," "sort of like," "this kind of," intensifiers; and "felt" here reflecting depersonal affect) relate the incident people (shown with "we") to the fighting.

MP-D:  We as good incident people ought not to be attacked.  

(Extract 8-3)

Moral premise (D) concerns Ben and Sheldon, those of the incident people who are also Co-op people and whose behavior is approved by the talker. The same subject appears in the next moral premise, which links them with avoiding hypothesized gang-fighting.

MP-E:  We as good incident-people ought not to have a gang-type fight.  

(Extract 8-3)

Another moral premise concerns guns. The moral responses are contained in the phrase following the initial mention of the gun, "not only that he had a gun, but just sort of like that here was something we would have to deal with on an on-going basis" (Extract 8-3), where "here" refers as a
"hidden people" designation of "gun-having-people": "sort of" and "Just" are intensifiers; and "would have to deal" uses a future quasi-modal. But this "we" refers to the produce days of the future as well as to the ones past, and to possible incident people of the future, not only those of the past. Here again commitment to the Co-op is being shown indirectly. The moral premise:

MP-F: We as good produce day people ought not to have to deal with guns in the future. (Extract 8-3)

reflects then the existential predication which is fairly explicit.

EP: We would have to deal with [guns] on an on-going basis. Here is an instance of case II of the dynamic of moral response (page 299 ) where the existential predication shows some state, activity, or characteristic which is not desired. In this case, the predication would be a continued dealing with guns, a state already shown as unwelcome in Ben's utterance. Thus the moral premise (F) is written to negate the predication--"ought not to deal with guns."

Not all of Ben's talk about the incident is responded to directly, in the sense that someone disputes his views or presents other ones. There is an apparent acceptance by the meeting people. However, there is one exceptional note: Glen tries twice to break in during Ben's report. The next section will consider his effort in detail.

The moral premises found in these first 39 lines go beyond the "incident people" themselves. They are:
Incident people ought

A: to mention him to the meeting people. (Extract 8-1)
C: not to tell about Dolly. (Extract 8-2)

We ought
D: not to have to be attacked; (Extract 8-3)
E: not to have a gang-type fight. (Extract 8-3)

Producing Day people ought

F: not to have to deal with guns in the future. (Extract 8-3)

Meeting people ought

B: to know about him. (Extract 8-1)

The somewhat conflicting character of the moral matters presented so far is evident in these moral premises. Incident people have two constraints on what is to be mentioned at the meeting: (A) "he" is to be mentioned and (C) Dolly is not to be mentioned. Three moral premises concern what the Co-op people ought not to have to expect in their relations with the neighborhood people: (D) being attacked, (E) gang-type fights; and (F) guns. The notion that certain information about "him" is to be communicated at the meeting (B) appears, but discussion of it will be postponed until the final section of the chapter. Other collections of people need to be explored first in order to present more fully the conflicting commitments of the Co-op people to the Co-op and to the neighborhood people.

A crucial issue of contemporary urban life has been put before the meeting people by this discussion of the incident people. For some of the Co-op people any suggestion of an incident in the neighborhood may have been enough to make them realize what the issue is. For others the name of the
aggressor in the incident may have established him in the crucial collections of people. For others the notion of "gang-type-people" may have implicated the same issue by a different route. One of the interactants asks for a description, and thus it is established for everyone that Thorne is indeed black.

The Black People

An interruption which Glen had tried twice to make in Extract 8-2 succeeds on the third try.¹

Extract 8-4

Glen: What I'm interested in, outside of the fact that I'm really so-, sorry you got hurt ah ah, is that if we do have to, what does he

Ben: Unhuh.

Glen: look like, for one thing, so I can avoid him [Laughter, some start talking].

Ben: He's, he's, he's about 5'11", he's black with pretty short hair. Yeah he's

Glen: He's black?

Ben: got, got a little, little mustache, pretty thin, he's slim, ah, and...

["No Parking" 040-050]

Glen asks for a description of a person; like many other kinds of factual information, this is normally considered "free goods" (Goffman, 1967). Like the request for a name, the request for a description of a person is conventionally responded to or a reason for non-compliance is given if that is the case. Glen provides a further basis for his need for

¹ Data in this section consists of Extracts 8-4 to 8-6 of the text of NP, from the first mention of black people until the introduction of the community (and the neighborhood people) in Line 077.
a description by placing himself in a collection of "avoiding-him-people," in Extract 8-4. This produces laughter, his own and others. Such depersonalized laughter (an indicator of moral response shown on page 277) is not directed to any characteristic of Glen, but rather to his locating himself as an "avoiding-him-person." Another feature of moral response is the use of "can," an epistemic form of a verb of obligation. The moral premise can be stated:

MP-G: Good produce day people ought to be able to avoid Thorne. (Extract 8-4)

Ben gives six descriptive features, only one is repeated: "he's black." This "interactive repetition" establishes category consensus for the collection of black people by which is emphasized this intermediate level collection of people which here appears in the surface as "he's black." That he was black was not known to me at that meeting until Ben's utterance, nor probably to others, perhaps including Glen, although Glen may have asked for information in order to confirm knowledge of which he was not sure. After the disclosure it was impossible for me (and I presume others) to separate the information that Thorne had fought with Ben from the physical description of Thorne supplied here, or at least with regard to this one feature.¹

The "salience" (cf. page 161) for this segment of the

¹ This is an instance of "retrospective redefining" noted (p. 225 of Chap. 3) a notion introduced by Emerson (1969) which suggests that earlier materials may be subsequently redefined in a completely different way, and not be remembered except as influenced by later materials.
collection of black people can be seen in comparison with that of "fighting people." Both of these intermediate collections of people are especially productive of moral matters.¹ Both appear in the first quarter of the segment: "fighting-people" in "we didn't fight back" (Extract 8-3) and "black people" in "he's black" (Extract 8-4). Surface collections of "fighting-people" appear from 027-037, and do not appear again in the segment. It is otherwise with the collection of "black people" in the segment. There are at least 28 instances of this collection of people throughout the segment, shown as Figure 8.2.

In the 17 excerpts in Figure 8.2, 28 instances of "black people" appear in the talk of five speakers: Ben, Glen, Mickey, Caren, and Joel. Some of these are objecting to the use of black people as an issue. As Figure 8.2 shows, the instances of the use of "black people" are not involved in any single predication, but include the description of Thorne, his car, an earlier incident at the Co-op, and the lack of black participation in the Co-op. None of those among the meeting-people that particular day are black, so none of the meeting people are included in the collections of people used. All of these instances in Figure 8.2, will appear in the discussions to follow. One particular aspect of the collections of black people appears immediately on

¹ Both of these intermediate level collection of people were first introduced on page 156 and related there to the relevant surface collections in lines 001 to 050.
Figure 8.2 - Instances Of The Use Of Collections Of "Black People" In The "No Parking" Segment.

Ben: He's he's he's about 5'11", he's black [047] with pretty short hair
Glen: He's black. [048]
Ben: ...it's like a green 1962, 1963 Valiant with a white top, it has an Afro sticker [054] on the back.
Ben: ...that generally speaking, there's practically no black participation [082] in the Coop.
Ben: ...so it seemed like he- he generally sort of identified the Coop as being pretty white...[086]
Ben: He he personally [096] is is is pretty crazy, incidentally.
Glen: ...or somebody who has a connection to uh, some sort of ah, I don't know, maybe there's a black [142] Coop around town.
Mickey: That's [147] ridiculous, that was even bullshit what she said--.
Caren: ...now you're getting into that whole [144]--that's that's... Caren: There's no reason why he's that way, except he's crazy, and it has nothing to do with his being black [148] and if he wants to bring that [150] up as an issue, that's [150] his business.
Joel: Troublemakers in the Coop who have been black [151] have always thrown this [152] up into our faces--
Caren: But you don't have to make a thing out of it. [154]
Joel: ...when we threw her out one day, she said, 'I'm going to to bring my people [159] in here.'
Caren: Yeah, she hasn't done it [161] yet.
Joel: ...it's [.163] an unfortunate situation, you know, the fact [163] that we don't have a larger black representation [164] in the Coop.
Joel: ...but I don't think we should be cowed into a corner by that [165] fact.
Caren: ...there's been a history to it [179] with this guy, it's [179] not just a one time thing [180], there's been a history to it's [181] a long term thing [191], thing that's been going on in that block and these people [182]-- this [182] is just the latest incident.

[ ] refers to lines in the segment, which follows this chapter.
inspection of Figure 8.2 indirection. Reference to "black" is accomplished indirectly either by ellipsis—generally leaving a phrase incomplete—or by pronouns such as "it," "that," and "this." For example, Caren says "now you're getting into that whole," [144] which is not completed. The utterance can be completed with "black issue," and in fact Caren's next utterance gives partial confirmation to this completion as she uses both of these terms: "it has nothing to do with his being black and if he wants to bring that up as an issue..." [149] This utterance also illustrates the use of the pronoun "that" to refer indirectly to "black" earlier in the utterance.

Figure 8.2 contains one instance of an omission which is not conventionally regarded as a type of ellipsis, but within the framework being used here is important to note. The text "he, he personally is, is, is, pretty crazy incidentally," [096] does not explicitly show any collection of people in which to locate Thorne. Conventional linguistic analysis is addressed to the antecedent reference of "he." Thorne is readily supplied as referent. The question is to make explicit the possible social location to which "he" is being assigned

1 This example was introduced briefly in the initial description of the methodology of using the appearance of people in talk as a means of getting to moral matters, page 226. The utterance occurs in the segment at the same time as Gertrude overlaps an utterance in which Gertrude responds to the information that Thorne has lived in a particular house for several years. Ben's utterance contains evidence of moral response in the term "incidentally" which is an empty intensifier; the questionable classification since he is not crazy, and the tempo changes made by the repetitions indicating affect.
in the interaction, by the talker and by the others present. The general issue of finding social location in constructing others in this segment is developed on page 223, but this specific instance will be considered further here. One possibility (which is present with pronouns) is to hear the utterance as locating the individual as a member of the collection of adults, or adults in the city, or in that neighborhood of the city. Another general possibility is to locate the individual in a collection based on gender (where that information is present), here of males or adult males. But other collections of people may have appeared in a text, and these need also be considered. Extract 3-4 showed six collections of people. One was repeated. None of the other collections of people are reused anywhere in the segment, whereas Figure 8-2 shows the many places in which collections of black people reappear.

The more general point is illustrated by the fact that of the 28 instances in Figure 8.2, only five use the word "black." Indirection would seem to be the most usual way of referring to black people. 1

After the description of Thorne is given, Ben continues with a description of the car, and includes even here a reference to black people.

1 The term "white" appears once ("identified the Co-op as being pretty white" [087].) Here is an instance of the realization of the complimentary collection of non-black people, illustrating that both parts of the category set of "black" and "non-black" are used and are productive of moral matters. (cf. page 153 re category set).
Extract 8-5:

Ben: ...his car is the, ah, green, ah, it's like
Gertrude: Green
Ben: a green 1962, 1963 Valiant, with a white top, it
Sheldon: White top
Ben: has an Afro-sticker on the back and ah, you probably
remember it cause the, back of the car has a sort of like
area where, that you can see like a tire is underneath
the trunk, and the back sort of slopes down like this,
and it's pretty low to the ground, it's a small car,
and it's usually parked right [Laughter] right there.

["No Parking" 050-060]

The car has an Afro-sticker, and this particular sticker
is mentioned, not any other stickers that were there, (such
as bumper stickers, or the fact that there were no other
stickers.) The description of the car is an instance of
category consensus by inclusion (Chap. 3, page 191) as
the three people display that they recognize the car by
contributing information about the color: "green" being intro-
duced by Gertrude and repeated by Ben and "white top" by
Sheldon, also repeated by Ben. Ben, by these two instances
of interactive repetition, continues the relevance of collec-
tions of "car-people" which differ only slightly in the details
shown on the surface.

The last line of Extract 8-5 contains "hidden people"
in the existential predication:

EP: It's usually parked right, right there.

The EP was in the passive, as the fact of the car's being
parked there was emphasized, and so the person who parked the
car is not there. People are also hidden by the temporal
"there," the "outside-the-Co-op-people." Two indicators of
moral response appear with the two uses of the intensifier "right." This is an instance of case II of the Dynamic of Moral Response, where the existential predication is in the undesired state, i.e., the car is parked in the way. The moral premise can be stated as:

MP-H: Good produce day people ought not to find the driveway blocked. (Extract 8-5)

If the moral premise had been written in the active, it would have meant locating "him" as the parker within a collection of "law-breaking-citizens," which is also valid. However, from the point of view of the Co-op people and their concerns, the moral premise written above as (H) continues a focus on Co-op people and on how or why the Co-op people appear, or don't appear, as good.

In any case, the "there" is directly outside the Co-op where the curb was cut for a driveway, in front of a larger swing-up door which easily accommodates delivery trucks. Parking is illegal in front of a driveway in Philadelphia, (as elsewhere). Not only is he a law-breaker, but he is a person who is interfering with the activities of the Co-op produce day-people who have to unload the truck with fresh produce from the distribution center. (It may be noted that at this time the interference could only occur once a week--on Thursdays--later Central Foods used the driveway almost daily.)

Ben, who introduced the collection of black people to the meeting people, also introduces the issue of black participation in the Co-op.
Extract 8-6

Ben: So, anyway, ah, from my point of view, ah, the whole scene ah sort of like brought home to the ah, basic fact that generally speaking, there's practically no black participation in the Co-op... Glen: Un-huh

["No Parking" 080-084]

As Chapter 2 showed, there were never many blacks in the Co-op, certainly never more than five percent. In the 36 meetings, there are two blacks present out of the 48 different people at the meetings; in the 4 segments used here one person of the 24 different people present (Dottie in "New Labor") is black. It is a lack of integration in the Co-op that comes to the surface at this point in the segment, and Ben defines this situation as "practically no black participation."

(Extract 8-6) Indicator features of moral response are clustered here: 5 qualifiers in this one utterance ("from my point of view," sort of like," "brought home," generally speaking," "practically") and two categorical intensifiers ("the whole scene" and "the basic fact"). The existential predication

EP: There's practically no black participation in the Co-op.

lacks any evaluative information. It is not possible to say if the state is desired. As a result, the moral premise appears with both positive and negative polarity shown ("ought" as well as "ought not"). This is an instance of case III of the dynamic of moral response (cf. page 304) which is indeterminate between a positive or negative reading, taking into account the information that is shown in the text and that may be generally posited as being present at that time.
MP-I(A): Good organization people ought to have more black participation in the Co-op. (Extract 8-6)

MP-I(B): Good organization people ought not to have more black participation in the Co-op. (Extract 8-6)

Those who knew Ben well knew his generally liberal stance, and for them the "not" reading would be unlikely, yet a close consideration of the immediate text does not rule it out. Among the people present are some who do not know Ben and Ben's views. Additional information would be needed in any case to show that for those present a larger black representation would be preferable. The text does not rule out another interpretation, one intermediate between favoring and disfavoring. This neutral position will be considered further in the next section. Looking ahead in the segment, a totally unambiguous construction does appear.

...it's an unfortunate situation, you know, the fact that we don't have a larger black representation in the Co-op...

[Joel, 162-64, fuller extract appears in 8-9 Joel evaluated the situation as "unfortunate," and "we" appears as an explicit subject. Another version of moral premise I can now be written taking into account these differences, but showing the similarities by labeling it as a variant of MP-I. Here is an instance of case II where the polarity (the EP and the MP) do not match (cf. page 299).

MP-I(C): We as good organization people ought to have larger black representation in the Co-op. (Extract 8-9)

By moral premise I(A) if not by I(C), it appears that the Co-op people do not only have few black people, but that some
Co-op people would like it to have more. In MP-I(C) the "we" appears as "organization-people" since it is the Co-op organization that has people who belong to it. It is curious and noteworthy that both Ben and Joel see themselves as presenting this situation as a fact ("sort of like brought home to the ah basic fact" (Ben in Extract 8-6)) and "the fact that we don't" (Joel shown above)), presumably a fact that is recognized by all present.\(^1\)

It is difficult to provide any systematic explanation of why talk of participation in the Co-op is so extensive in this segment which does not recognize that it is not participation in general that is being discussed, but black participation, or rather the lack of black participation. The agenda item was on the incident and the motion proposal which is accepted at the end of the segment provides a means of preventing further incidents. Ben introduces this issue in Extract 8-6, "there's practically no black participation in the Co-op." In the next section one facet and not what Ben has labelled "the whole scene" will be shown to have triggered Ben's talk as Ben reports what Thorne said of the community.

This section has introduced the collection of black people and explored the salience of this collection as it was documented in Figure 8.2. Several moral premises appeared

\(^1\) Although I see little way of proving it, I suspect that Joel's utterance appears because Ben's was possibly heard as ambiguous, the only slender proof I can suggest is this repetition of "fact," a term which occurs no where else in the segment.
in the section from the text examined, but not all of them include black people.

**Good produce day people ought**

G: to be able to avoid Thorne; (Extract 8-4)
H: not to find the driveway blocked. (Extract 8-5)

**Good organization people ought**

I(A): to have more black participation in the Co-op; (8-6)
I(B): not to have more black participation in the Co-op. (8-6)

We ought

I(C): to have a larger black representation in the Co-op. (Extract 8-9)

Moral premises G and H advocate policies which lead to separating the produce people from Thorne and his car. The policy indicated is that Co-op people would have nothing to do with him or his car in the future. On the other hand, the moral premises of I concern the opposite issue, that of integration. I(A), I(B) and I(C) reflect a significant difference in initiating point of view, which is shown by the choice of the terms "participation" and "representation."

"Black participation" (used by Ben) suggests the Co-op as a starting point. "Black representation" (used by Joel) presumes the neighborhood is the starting point, and that Co-op composition reflects the neighborhood composition.¹ Is this then a reflection of a commitment to an integrated neighborhood? How do Co-op people deal with the failure to fulfill such a commitment? What do the Co-op people say of the neigh-

¹ In Joel's account of the same woman which was in his interview 13 months later, Joel used the phrase, "we've always wanted to see a larger black participation in the Co-op," (shown more fully on page 534) suggesting that his concern at the meeting was oriented to the neighborhood people, and that both perspectives concerned him.
The Neighborhood People

The text continues directly from Ben's comment on black participation with a quotation in which Thorne refers to the "community,"\(^1\) although the occasion of his saying it is not given.

Extract 8-7

Ben: ...and as he so bluntly put it, "Fuck the community," and it seemed like he, he generally sort of identified the Co-op as being pretty white, and ah, you know, I don't know, I really felt like if we had some sort of like, had you know, some kind of show down, you know, it would have been, you know, a real bad scene for a lot of other reasons, like you sort of--

Terry: How long has he been around here?

Caren: Couple of years.

["No Parking" 084-094]

Features of moral response ("bluntly," evaluative qualifier, and "fuck," traditional colloquial disparagement) point to a moral premise which Thorne as a person living in the neighborhood (across the street from the Co-op) is violating.

MP-J: Good neighborhood people ought to favor the community. (Extract 8-7)

"Community" is a term which appears only here in the segment. Ben uses it to refer to "Carverton," the neighborhood in the City in which the Co-op was located, as can be shown by Ben's use of the term on this issue in the selection from the interview shown on page 530.

1 The text used in Extracts 8-7 to 8-10 contains all surface reference to the neighborhood people in the segment.
...they don't have nearly the extent of a sort of community identification that most of the white people in Carverton do...

According to Ben, Thorne viewed the Co-op as "being pretty white,"¹ (Extract 8-7) but Ben's evaluation of this view—and the situation it refers to—is not made explicit. The existential predication again lacks means of showing polarity.

EP: He identified the Co-op as being pretty white.

The moral premise resembles that of I, that the Co-op ought/ought not to have more black participation, which appeared in the previous section. Both are instances of case III of the dynamic of moral response. The moral premises in this instance can be stated as follows:

MP-K(A): Good organization people ought to be predominately white.  
(Extract 8-7)

MP-K(B): Good organization people ought not to be predominately white.  
(Extract 8-7)

Again this indeterminate dynamic of moral response makes available for the interaction both positions, one in which the polarity shows a position favorable to a predominately white Co-op, and the other one disfavoring it. A third position, in which the dynamic is unresolved, provides a third possibility. As mentioned in connection with moral premise I earlier, a neutral position is also possible for those who

¹ Ben's use of "pretty" to qualify also occurs with "fighting's pretty distasteful" [027]; "it's [the car's] pretty low to the ground" [058] and seems equivalent to "predominately." A similar use of "pretty" occurs in the quotation from Ben's interview cited on page 529, "black perception of the Co-op is of a pretty white institution."
are present. Such a position would mean that whatever the composition of the current Co-op, it was acceptable, as opposed to one which considered its composition a positive thing, or a third position which actively encouraged the recruitment of more black people, since the current situation was deplored. As was pointed out in Chapter 4 (page 303), the notion of a dialectic applies to instances where the polarity of the EP and moral premise are opposing (as is true automatically in case II).

On the other hand, Ben makes it completely clear that having "some kind of a showdown" (Extract 8-7) is a negative feature. The phrase "a real bad scene" in Extract 8-7 echoes the unevaluated phrase he used earlier in this same utterance "the whole scene." (Extract 8-6). The polarity of this moral premise is clear.

MP-L: We as good incident people ought not to have a showdown. (Extract 8-7)

Sheldon (along with Ben) are the "insiders" (cf. p. 203) having been two of the "incident people." As Sheldon begins to talk of the incident he locates himself also as an "insider" within the collection of "incident people" with the phrase "in this kind of situation" [127], rather than calling it an "incident" as Ben had (Extract 8-1). Sheldon too shows he opposes violence, as he speculates if the presence of the police would have made a difference in the outcome.

Shortly after this statement, Glen makes a motion that the Co-op take action on getting a "No Parking" sign, but immediately follows this by trying to find some other means
than the official court action which would prevent other incidents.

Extract 8-8

Glen: ...I think it would be nice maybe if somebody, I would still want to make a motion for a sign, but I think it would be good if somebody from the Co-op who felt they had any, some kind of good rapport with this guy-- No such thing, or
Sheldon: No, no such thing.
Glen: somebody who had a connection to uh, some sort of ah, I don't know, maybe there's ah, is there a black Co-op around town somewhere?
Caren: No, now you're getting into that
Mickey: That's
Caren: whole, that's, that's,
Mickey: ridiculous, that was even bullshit what she said--
Caren: why he's that way, because, except he's crazy, and it has nothing to do with his being black, and if he wants to bring that up as an issue, that's his business.

"No Parking" 136-150

When it seems clear that Glen wants first to explore the possibility of someone reasoning with Thorne, he is interrupted by Sheldon who displays category consensus about the collection of "having-rapport-people" but disagrees with the idea that Thorne could fit in such a collection of people by underlining with "No, no such thing" in Extract 8-8. Glen's interactive repetition of Sheldon's phrase, continues further the category consensus, this time by using a phrase which contains information which Glen did not have earlier in his utterance—that no one in the Co-op has "some kind of good rapport with this guy"—and possibly does not even believe. The moral premise suggested by Glen with "it would be nice" at the beginning of his utterance and later "it would be good" in Extract 8-8 lacks a predication, but one can be suggested based on the elements which are present in the lines, as follows:
NP-M: Somebody of the "having-rapport-people" of the good organization people ought to try to reason with Thorne. (Extract 8-8)

Glen's second suggestion is even more sketchily shown in the text, except for the specification of what appears as another subcollection of Co-op people, "having-connections-with-black-Co-op-people." Here as in the preceding text, evidence of moral response is shown through changes in the tempo as phrases are repeated and propositions left incomplete. However, as suggested in Chapter 4, page 263, another dimension of indicators of moral response is required—here evaluations "nice" and "good," as well as modal verb forms. The second moral premise can be stated:

MP-M(A): Somebody of the "having-connections-with-a-black Co-op-people" of the good organization people ought to try to reason with Thorne. (Extract 8-8)

The second suggestion is not rejected on factual ground; Caren's "no" (Extract 8-8) does not give information about the presence or absence of any black Co-op in the neighborhood. Instead the talk then focuses on the more general collection of "black people." Glen is informed that "black" is irrelevant ("it has nothing to do with his being black." (Extract 8-8); Thorne was labelled "crazy" earlier at 098.)

Here is another instance of category dissensus. Thorne has been located twice in the collection of crazy people and the relevance of other collections of people to explain Thorne's behavior put in question. In this instance, Thorne's location in a collection of black people is ruled out as irrelevant for the explanation of his behavior. The ways
that interactants do explain this behavior are explored in the next section of this chapter as an example of ways of constructing "other people." Here the focus on the "neighborhood-people" will be continued.

Thorne's location as a neighborhood person is not disputed, but given different importance by various Co-op people. Glen gives it less weight than others in suggesting a black Co-op as a means of reaching Thorne. That is, Glen sees the collection of black people as more relevant here than Thorne's position as a neighborhood person. Mickey and Caren respond to the black/white element in Glen's talk by denying that that is relevant, but they ignore the fact that Thorne like themselves belongs in a collection of neighborhood people.

The relevance of the collection of "black people" is continued by the next talker, who also redirects the talk to the neighborhood people who use the Co-op.

Extract 8-9

Joel: ...Troublemakers in the Co-op who are, have been black, have always thrown this up into our faces, there's a woman who came in the Caren: But you don't have to make a thing out of it-- Joel: who came in the Co-op week in and week out to steal Caren: Well, so what, there's no reason to get defensive, Joel: from the, from the Co-op and when we threw her out Caren: Yeah, I remember sure, this is why-- Joel: one day, she said, "I'm going to bring my people in here," and it was a bogus threat, and Caren: Yeah, she hasn't done it yet. Sure. Joel: it's, it's an unfortunate situation, you know, the fact that we don't have a larger black representation in the Co-op, but I don't think we should be, ah cowed into a corner by that fact.

["No Parking" 151-165]
Throughout Extract 8-9, both Caren and Joel talk at the same time (shown with brackets). They are not disagreeing, and Caren uses phrases which emphasize the argument Joel is making as he introduces a new collection, "troublemaking-people." They, like the earlier "crazy-people" are also part of the way in which Thorne's behavior is explained by the interactants. The construction of Thorne in the talk will be investigated more systematically in the next section.

Joel uses the phrase "throw this up into our faces" in Extract 8-9, a fairly forceful way of saying "said this," where "this" refers to the "black issue" and hence to the collection of black people. Features of moral response ("always," categorical qualifier; as well as the use of the colloquial hyperbolic use of intensifier of moral matters (cf. Chapter 4, page 281) here "throw this up into our faces") indicate that the existential predication includes a moral premise prominently:

EP: Troublemakers in the Co-op who have been black have always thrown this up into our faces [that we lack black participants] (Extract 8-9)

The moral matter is the accusation that it is not an accident the Co-op is lacking in black participation, but rather that such a lack reflects deliberate policy. In other words, that the Co-op intentionally excludes blacks. Co-op people would deny such a construction and Joel himself a few lines later in Extract 8-9 labels the fact that there are few blacks in the Co-op as "an unfortunate situation." I write the underlying moral premise here as an instance of Case II, where the
surface form of the existential predication contradicts the moral premise.

MP-N: We as good organization people ought not to lack black participation. (Extract 8-9)

Joel's use of "into our faces" proves motivation for the use of "we," and for the location as "organization people," as participation or representation are of the Co-op organization just as membership is. The phrase "an unfortunate situation" which occurs in a few lines in Extract 8-9 determines the polarity of MP-N, just as it did earlier that of MP-I(A) which favored a larger black representation in the Co-op.

The action in Extract 8-9 of throwing out the woman for stealing shows a specification of the injunction, thou shalt not steal:

MP-O: Good Co-op produce day people ought not to steal from the Co-op. (Extract 8-9)

The scene in which Joel stands on a table to rally people around him in order to get support is described more fully in the first part of the chapter (page 533) as Joel told it to me during an interview. In the extract (8-9) of the meeting, the woman is quoted as making a "bogus threat," "I'm going to bring my people in here." There is no problem in seeing "my people" as being "black people," but less obvious perhaps is that they would likely be neighborhood people also, since most people who used the Co-op lived within a few blocks,

1 According to the interview, others knew she stole "she had done this two weeks in a row and nobody had ever stopped her." (p.534). Joel quotes her in the interview as shouting, "Racist, I'm going to get my people in here," showing a greater freedom to use more direct expression of the black/white issue during the interview.
i.e., they were neighborhood people (cf. Figure 2.2, for map).

The extract concludes with another moral premise:

MP-P: We as good organization people ought not to be cowed by not having a large black representation in the Co-op. (Extract 8-9)

There is however evidence that neighborhood people have created problems in the past:

Extract 8-10

Caren: There's been a history to it with this guy, it's not just a one time thing, there's been a history, so it's a long term thing, thing, that's been going on in that block and these people, and this is just the latest incident. He's hassled a whole lot of people?

Glen: No, he's hassled a lot of people.

Caren: Lot of people.

Glen: Um, mmm, OK

Ben: Um, at least ah, we get a vote on the sign motion, fifteen dollars a year, all in favor? Opposed? OK

Caren: Minimum?

Glen: Maximum?

Ben: $15 it is. ["No Parking" 179-192]

Extract 8-10 introduces "these people," but does not specify who they are other than that they are also "in that block." That block, like all blocks in Carverton, has racially mixed housing. "That block" also includes Thorne who was established earlier (Extract 8-2) as living there. Two features of moral response (colloquially, "hassling," and the empty intensifier "whole lot") point to the moral premise written here of the Co-op people who have "hassled" the produce day people.

MP-Q: Good produce day people ought not to be hassled by Thorne. (Extract 8-10)

Earlier in the segment is another reference to troubles and another incident, ("another time" in Extract 8-2), in addition
to reference in Extract 8-10, "history to it," "long term thing," and "the latest incident." The segment concludes with a vote for a "No Parking sign." As chair person Ben formally speaks for the Co-op by using regulative rules under which meeting people operate. Once the vote occurs, the proposal is that of the Co-op organization, and becomes part of the moral matters of the Co-op. This is an instance of case I where the proposal appears directly in the text. (Chapter 4, page 294). In Chapter 2, Figure 2.7 shows this and the other 14 decisions of the Co-op people during the 36 meetings studied. The moral premise is the proposal voted on:

MP-R: Good organization-people ought to spend up to $15 for "No Parking" sign. (Extract 8-10)

... ...

Ten moral premises were found in this section on the neighborhood people. Most are for the Co-op people in two of its guises, organization people and produce people:

Good organization-people ought

R: to spend up to $15 for "No Parking" sign. (8-10)
K(A): to be predominately white; (8-7)
K(B): not to be predominately white; (8-7)
we ought
N: not to lack black participation; (8-9)
P: not to be cowed by not having a larger black representation in the Co-op; (8-9)
somebody of the
M: having rapport-people ought to try to reason with Thorne; (8-3)
M(A): having connections with black co-op people ought to try to reason with Thorne. (8-3)

Good produce day-people ought

O: not to steal from the Co-op; (8-9)
Q: not to be hassled by Thorne; (8-10)
Good produce day people ought (continued)

we

L: incident—people ought not to have a showdown. (8-7)

Good neighborhood people ought

J: to favor the community (8-7)

Only one of the moral premises as shown above in this section involved the neighborhood people, and that was written because of Thorne's expressed hostility to the "community" as conveyed to the meeting by Ben. Three moral premises concern the produce day people, two of which apply to all produce day people (not stealing, O; not being hassled, Q) and one to the subset of incident people (L) in not having a showdown.

Seven moral premises, however, are of the organization people, two of which could not be fulfilled as nobody had rapport with Thorne (M) or connections with a black Co-op (A) (if indeed there were one.) One, (R) empowers the Co-op organization people to take action to prevent future incidents by obtaining a "No Parking" sign.

The four moral premises remaining in the list link the organization people to the black issue. Two equivocally defined the Co-op as being or not being predominately white K(A and B) which could be construed as a neutral position in which the presence or absence of black people participating in the Co-op is neither applauded or bemoaned. Yet by N, the Co-op people ought not to lack black participation and by P, not be cowed by not having a larger black representation in the Co-op. The moral premises on the black/white issue which
appeared earlier presented a position like K in one and close to that of N and P in the other. The three moral premises are:

**Good organization people ought**

I(A): to have more black participation in the Co-op;  
*(8-6)*

I(B): not to have more black participation in the Co-op;  
*(8-6)*

I(C): to have a larger black representation in the Co-op.  
*(8-6)*

The fact that the Co-op has few blacks is located here as a moral matter by the three moral premises of this section and the three of the earlier section. Two of those six moral premises (I(A) and I(B)) show concern for black participation, but the existential predication did not establish whether the fact should be deplored or praised. At such a point in the meeting, the Co-op is open to the charge of not caring whether it is integrated or not.

Although the Co-op people show by their living in Carver-ton and sometimes by their expressed attitudes that they favor an integrated neighborhood, or at least one that is racially mixed, circumstances have conspired, it would seem, to make it difficult to be a Co-op person and to continue with such a liberal orientation. In this segment alone, two individuals have been reported who gave the Co-op people trouble. Both are neighborhood people and both are black. In presenting these individuals to the meeting people, the two can be shown as typical of other people who are also neighborhood people and black, or as atypical. If they are
considered as typical, then efforts to have an integrated Co-op are unlikely to succeed since the people who would participate and who were black would also be troublemakers and not fit into the Co-op. In that case, commitment to the Co-op would best be shown by an emphasis that ignored the neighborhood, did nothing to increase integration, and focused on the problems of getting produce cooperatively and economically. Instead of, for instance, an active campaign to have an integrated Co-op in what was often held to be an integrated neighborhood, (cf. Chapter 2) the Co-op people would then be wiser in focusing on an efficient distribution of food.

On the other hand, if the two individuals are atypical, then there is no inconsistency in working to insure that the

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1 In this connection compare Schutz (1967) who applies the notion of "ideal type" developed in Weber to the way in which people interpret other people's behavior. Schutz says:

The objective meaning-context defining the subjective experiences of an ideal type can be translated back into a subjective meaning whenever I apply it to an individual in a concrete situation. Thus I may say 'Oh, he's one of those!' or 'I've seen that type before!' This is the explanation for the fact that I experience my contemporary as an individual with an ongoing conscious life, yet one whose experience I know by inference rather than by direct confrontation. Therefore, even though I think of him as an individual, still he is for me an individual exhaustively defined by his type, an 'anonymous' individual (p. 136)

What Schutz appears to be saying is that we can only understand other people because we make use of the notion of "ideal types." My use of the notion of "typical" or "atypical" seems to me perfectly consistent with Schutz viewpoint, although I would hesitate to speculate on interpretative schema.
Co-op reflects the neighborhood and the generally pro-integrationist views of the Co-op people. The question to be examined then is how these two individuals were constructed by the meeting people.

**Constructing The Troublemakers**

Thorne was black. The woman who stole was black. They were both troublemakers. They were both neighborhood people. Do the Co-op people then conclude that neighborhood blacks are troublemakers? This possibly bigoted conclusion will be inspected using the methodological framework of "constructing others" introduced in Chapter 3.

In the preceding chapter the problems of constructing the self were paramount in considering how commitment to the Co-op was re-established after a hiatus. In this chapter the path to understanding how commitment to the Co-op was reconciled with commitment to the neighborhood people is found by considering how others are constructed in the talk of the Co-op meeting people as they describe the circumstances (and moral matters) of the incidents in which these people were implicated.

Constructing others and the self in talk relies on the notion that the use of people in talk involves the location of self and others as persons inside (or outside of) collections of people. As already shown in Chapter 3, constructing others involves three dimensions: identity, social location in talk, and social distancing. Each dimension uses as data
ways in which personal reference is accomplished. People are introduced and referred to in talk through a combination of names, pronouns, and classification terms. A basic assumption of the analysis is that there exist different forms which are more or less equivalent for referring to the individual, and hence interchangeable from the point of view of reference. A talker's choice of the term to be used then can be seen to supply information by which the analyst can make systematic statements about these three dimensions. Interactants' competence to complete the same or similar analyses is also assumed, since it is the basis on which the ability to make such reference rests. Implicit here is that the social location of those who do the talking (and of those who do the analysis) is taken into account.

Information about Thorne occurs throughout the 192 lines of the segment, while the woman is mentioned only in lines 151 to 165 (Extract 8-9). By considering both of these individuals throughout this section, different facets of the problems that interactants solve in constructing others in talk can be illustrated. The question of commitment to the neighborhood people by the Co-op people will also be illuminated.

Identity.

To talk of others would seem to require a way of separating those who are talked about from those who are not. Names are useful in this regard. Yet the segment begins with the use of
an unidentified "he." For Ben and Sheldon, who were at the incident, this is sufficient identification. Later, others show that they know things about "him," such as where he lives and what color his car is, but it is not possible to say that the use of "he" in itself led to their knowing who the person was. "He" had been mentioned at the preceding meeting, at which Caren, Joel and I were present. However, some of the people at this meeting display ignorance about the incident (Gertrude and Mickey), what "he" looked like (Glen) and how long "he" had lived in the area (Terry).

"He" is identified by name in answer to Mickey's question, "Who was it that did this?" (Extract 8-2) as "It's this guy across the street named Jason Thorne..." His name is repeated by Mickey, either in order to be corrected, or to be assured that the person who it was was indeed "Jason Thorne." Ben's response is another use of the name, but just "Thorne," which cannot correct the already correctly repeated name, but rather can be heard as re-affirming that it was indeed the person Thorne.

The identity is further made complete with a description, also requested by a meeting person, this time Glen. The proper name is only one of a series of identifying strategies which are possible (cf. Searle, 1969, p. 174, and the discussion in Chapter 3, page 220) and may not be sufficient for people who know what someone looks like, but not what their name is. The identifying description which is supplied is extensive, including not only a list of physical characteristics, but the identification of his car, and his residence
across the street from the Co-op.

The woman on the other hand is not identified by name, but first characterized as "a woman who came in the Co-op" (Extract 8-9). The woman is not described further, nor is her name given. Neither Joel who tells about the incident, nor Caren who talks of her at the same time, identify her further (nor does Joel in the interview material quoted at the beginning of the chapter). It is likely that they did not know her name.

Social Location.

By social location is meant the location of people in collections of people. It is shown with descriptive features and classification terms, usually expressed in the same utterance as the term indicating the individual. The description of Thorne in Extract 8-4 contains six features. These provide six collections of people which are objective, or apparently objective, in which he can be located: "thin people," "slim people," "black people," "5'11" people," "mustached people," "short-haired people" as well as "people-having-green-cars." Other features occur in the segment such as being in a collection of people having Afro-stickers on their cars (Extract 8-5) and living in a house across the street (Extract 8-2). Moral matters in the segment were attached.

\[1\] Each feature is productive of a set of collections of people using the format introduced on page 139 of feature-plus people. However, only the simplest ones are shown here in the interests of keeping the analysis as uncluttered as possible.
to the collection of "black people" shown above in that section of the chapter.

Another series of social locations of Thorne are used, all of which immediately provide information of moral matters. In each deficiencies from a full state occur: in some way Thorne is evaluated as not "good."

"He, he personally is, is, is pretty crazy incidentally" [Ben, 096]
"He should know better than that." [Gertrude, 104]
"He's not going to be, ah, stupid, I hope." [Gertrude, 125]
"There's no reason he's that way, because, except he's crazy." [Caren, 148]
"He's not a child anymore..." [Mickey, 173]
"This guy is insane, this guy is really insane." [Sheldon, 177]

These are attributes and classifications which are currently not acceptable to the individual who speaks, and presumably to those who don't object. Each of these lines expresses concern for another's behavior. Each is an indicator of moral response (a questionable classification, Chapter 4, page 271) for a category which is generally not considered good for the collection of adult rational people.

Two of the characterizations (in 125) Gertrude says he might be going to be stupid, whereas in 173 Mickey says he might be a child) define the individual by assuming the likelihood of his being in a lesser state but wishing it were not so. These seemingly charitable acts of excluding the individual from such negative states suggests that in fact the person qualifies for it in some way. Both expressions claim that Thorne as a rational adult should know and do certain things, and further imply that he doesn't.
The utterance, "he should know better than that." comments on Thorne's actions. In this expression of disapproval, Gertrude is acting as a "moral minder" (cf. Chapter 3, page 205) in making overt what is not proper for her and others who share her disapproval. By her public airing of what she feels doesn't fit, Gertrude is keeping current these norms as to what is good behavior by using them. It is not possible to say if others present share Gertrude's viewpoint, for no one comments on her utterance. Whatever those co-present feel, Gertrude's utterance minimally provides for the interaction this definition of the individual's behavior, until others at some future time show that this view is held only by Gertrude, or some other "moral minder."

Still other collections of people locate Thorne in the segment in collections which are dangerous or potentially so at least. For one, he has "hassled a whole lot of people" (Extract 8-10) "hassling-people" is not considered a desirable collection of people by those in the Co-op. Nor are "gun-having-people" (Extract 8-3) and the reports of the incident show Thorne talking of getting a gun. An intermediate level collection of "fighting-people" (Extract 8-3) is also one that Thorne establishes, and which Ben and Sheldon make clear that they are not part of. Not only are these three collections dangerous or potentially dangerous, they are ones which Co-op people, and particularly Ben and Sheldon, take a position against. Moral premises were written earlier about these positions: (D) not taking fighting behavior;
(F) not dealing with guns; and (Q) not being hassled. The text does not explicitly link any of these moral premises to his being in a collection of black people. No one says he is in those collections because he is black, or that the moral matters are relevant since he is black.

Thorne's social location can also be characterized as an "outsider," since he is a non-Co-op person. Some information as to how he is perceived as locating the Co-op people is shown in the text. Such information is not presented here to establish what Thorne's views of the world were. Thorne left the area shortly after these happenings, and I was unable to interview him directly and so that information is missing. Rather the views of what Thorne felt, said or did are primarily relevant here is so far as they illuminate the Co-op people's views of him (and also of the woman, as will be shown shortly).

In the schema for the study of interpersonal perception using by Laing, Philipson, and Lee (1966) (introduced in Chapter 3, page 190)\(^1\), the Co-op people reporting the views of others are twice removed from the perceptions of the events or evaluations of people being reported. Firstly, the Co-op people are the constructors of their own personal view of reality in which are people they have characterized as

\(^1\) Laing, Phillipson, and Lee operationalize Scheff's (1967) concept of "partial consensus" with a series of questions (what a self believes, what a self attributes to another, and what a self attributes another as attributing to self). Necessarily this procedure is static and post hoc at best, although it does provide scope for separating the individuals' opposing points of view and understandings of what is going on.
troublemakers. Secondly, the Co-op people show something of how those people they have constructed perceived the people and evaluated the events. In so doing, they give the people who listen (the meeting people) some understanding of why they are characterizing the others as they do. In the framework being used here the Co-op people are locating moral matters, but such moral matters as the Co-op people construe as being understood by those other people.

For example, Ben reported (in Extract 8-7) "it seemed like he, he, generally sort of identified the Co-op as being pretty white" and quoted Thorne as saying "Fuck the community." The moral matter here was summed up in moral premise (J), that good neighborhood people ought to favor the community. Ben shows Thorne as having a disdain for the neighborhood and for the Co-op, i.e., of not being dispassionate or unconcerned about the Co-op. Ben does not consider here however the point that Thorne was provoked by having his car pushed down the street, nor does anyone say that Thorne felt he "didn't have to take" that kind of behavior.

Caren also characterizes Thorne's perception of the issues as she says "it has nothing to do with his being black, and if he wants to bring that up as an issue, that's his business" (Extract 8-8). This shows Thorne within a collection of

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1 The notion of a person having "business" was considered an acceptable formulation when used earlier by Sheldon who excluded talk about Dolly as "more personal business." (Extract 8-2) For Caren, Thorne's "business" (Extract 8-8) is to include his being black as an issue" and this Caren has concluded is not relevant. Two different approaches to a person's business--
"using-black-issue-people," but claims that the basis for his behavior is his location within a collection of crazy people, not within a collection of black people. At this point, them, Caren, unlike Ben, does not use Thorne's location in the collection of black people as a basis for his being anti-community or anti-Co-op. She sees him as using the black/white issue to provide a social location which he can employ or not as he chooses.

A much different social location appears in the case of the woman. She is not an outsider who comes into contact with the Co-op people only during incidents, but rather she is an insider, a user of the Co-op. The woman is one of the few blacks who participated in the Co-op. She is shown in Extract 8-8 as "coming in the Co-op week in and week out." The woman is characterized as an example of the "troublemakers in the Co-op who are, have been black..." (Extract 8-9). She is also accused of stealing and is thus located in a collection of "stealing-from-Co-op-people." (Extract 3-43) This is followed by her location in a collection of people who had been thrown out of the Co-op.

It is in connection with the woman that the collection of "troublemaking-people" is actually introduced in the text. It is then possible for interactants to redefine what has been said of the incident people as also being of "troublemaking-people." In this way, Thorne and the woman one for the Co-op meeting person who is an insider and one for an outsider are being shown here.
share not only the collection of "black-people" but also that of "troublemaking-people." (Extract 8-9) Other collections of people used for Thorne later (in Extract 8-10) such as "hassling-people" can be seen as other types of "troublemaking-people."

The woman's viewpoint is also expressed and from this a further notion of how the Co-op people see themselves perceived is obtained. At this point, though, the woman drops her insider status as a Co-op person and is shown as characterizing herself as an outsider when Joel quotes her as saying, "I'm going to bring my people in here." (Extract 8-9) In threatening to bring black people in the Co-op ("my people"), the woman is shown as not locating them already in the Co-op, reflecting again a Co-op consisting of white people. Caren in adding, "she hasn't done it yet" shows the action remains a threat, which Joel concludes in Extract 8-9 was a "bogus threat," giving her an additional social location in a collection of "threatening-people" who issue threats that are not carried out.

From the point of view of both the woman and of Thorne, as shown by the Co-op people, there do not appear to exist collections of integrated people in which they can put the Co-op people. From the point of view of the Co-op people, the trouble-making people are constructed in a variety of collections of people, each of which is not exclusively composed of black people. That collections of black people appear explicitly as surface collections at only five points was
shown by Figure 8.2. In the accounts of Thorne and the woman, other collections of people are introduced which are in themselves sufficient to explain the incident: Thorne is labelled as crazy for instance, and the woman as a thief.

The two sets of perspectives, those of the Co-op people and those of troublemaking people, also illustrate the notion of Mannheim's "relationism" (1936) noted in Chapter 3 along with one of the propositions on which the analysis of people in talk rests, that location in a collection of people determines perspective. (page 201) Although all the information used here is information reported in the talk of Co-op people it is still possible to separate the perspective shown for the two troublemaking people from that of the Co-op produce day people, keeping in mind that everything is being reported by the Co-op meeting people. Information about events and people is available from these two main social locations, the troublemaking people and the Co-op people. As troublemaking people, Thorne and the woman view the Co-op as anti-black, as containing people who accuse blacks of immoral (and illegal) acts, such as attacking Co-op people or stealing from Co-op people.

From the perspective of those whom the Co-op sees as "troublemaking people" the Co-op people themselves can be seen as causing problems. (1) They push a car which does not belong to them from a place they need only once a week, and (2) they prevent food from being purchased by a Co-op participant (where the individual had carried food to the
area by the cashier, but was not in the line of people waiting to pay, the end of the line to get to the cashier perhaps being not at all obvious). Other activities of the Co-op people which are not interpretable as friendly are (1) reporting Thorne to the police (rather than trying to talk to him directly) and (2) throwing the woman out (by standing on a table and labelling her a thief and causing her to try to defend herself verbally before leaving the premises. It might be noted that "throwing her out" is itself a definition of the situation of her leaving, and does not refer to a physical act by the Co-op people.)

On the other hand, the Co-op produce day people have a series of expectations concerning the smooth running of the Co-op, including (1) they should be able to park as close to the door as possible to unload and (2) people should pay and make it clear they are going to pay for what they take.

Social Distance

There remains the question of representing the social distance between the troublemaking others and the Co-op individuals. The talk being examined is of meeting-people, and so this collection of people is often the relevant one in which Co-op people are being located. However, in talking

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1 In this connection, Figure 2.4 diagram of food distribution day locates the door, cashier and line and suggests walking to the cashier's line or to the door would be the same path most of the way.
of other times the meeting people show themselves in other collections such as "produce-day-people" or "incident-people," and so this must be taken into account. Social distance, like any distance, requires there be two locations between which distance is measured. It is then possible to use the terms "remote" or "near" to characterize distance between two individuals located in the same or different collections of people.

There are four instances in which Thorne's name is used in the segment. "Jason Thorne" is the only instance of a full name in any of the segments (it occurs twice) and "Thorne" (also used twice) one of the two instances of a last name used alone for a single individual. The other case is also in this segment, and is "Naromi" who appears in the description of the house across the street from the Co-op (Bernard Naromi is the person who was singing on the porch one day.) These people are not Co-op people. In contrast, Co-op meeting people use only first names for each other at meetings: "Glen," "Sheldon" and "Dolly." Distance is thus shown by any last name usages.

The only instance of Thorne's name beyond the introductory ones at Extract 8-4 occurs as Martin begins a discussion of

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1 The "guy that called him off" is Swan Peters, who is referred to in the segment but not named. He appears in Sheldon's interview as Swan and Thorne is referred to there as "Jason" (page 535) suggesting again the different constraints which appear in an interview situation on the form of name used.
the motion to get the "No Parking" sign, "well, regarding Thorne, or whatever his name is..." [116] Talking about Thorne is excluded as Ben interrupts saying, "I mean on this..." and there is no correction or confirmation concerning the correctness of the name. The phrase "whatever his name is" also suggests that Thorne may not have been his real name or that he may have had other names also, or that the talker is not sure of the name. However, Martin does not pause to ask further about the name, and it would seem that for Martin at least the identity of the individual is not important here, and that it is the individual regardless of his name that matters. It would not seem that Martin sees himself as interacting with Thorne, i.e., he views him as remote.

When the description is requested "what does he look like" in Extract (8-4), "he" is used and the name is not mentioned in either the request or the response. In fact, the response uses "he" in four of the first seven words: "he's, he's, he's, about 5'11" tall, he's black..." (Extract 8-4). Black people may have been a salient category for Glen before he spoke and may have motivated his request for a description, but there is no doubt that once black is introduced, it becomes, as noted above, a salient category the only one of the six characteristics which appeared throughout the segment. Retrospectively, then it is easy to assign such an interpretation as "establishing blackness" to the request for a description, but the text is an on-going
production, and it is not possible to interpret a question by what is in or is not in an answer. For the purposes here, however, it can be noted that the use of "he" by both questioner and responder shows Thorne as less important as the special individual named Thorne, and more just an individual, like any other single individual, some "he" who can be placed by the talk into a variety of collections of people, that is, "he" serves to depersonalize.

In all, 51 instances of reference to "him," "he," or "his" occur, produced by eight people, ten instances of which appear before the name is given. For some people at least, "he" is not only remote, but completely unknown during these first lines.

Social distance is also shown through the classification terms used. In this segment, and in most of the meetings, "guy" is the usual term for an adult (but not restricted to adult males today). Instances of questionable classification were shown in the preceding section on page 577. Social locations of collections of crazy, stupid and child people in the segment appear for Thorne. These did not include "boy" for "guy" or any other general term for classifying Thorne. There are, however, three different ways in which "guy" is used: "the guy," "this guy" and "guy" modified by an adjective, here "big." Are these differences idiosyncratic, or do they provide information about distancing? A first question is whether or not these ways are interchangeable in their use, and whether something different would have
been shown of social distance by the use of a different one. A second question is what is accomplished by using these instead of a name or "he" with regard to showing social distances. Both questions will be pursued here. The uses of "guy" in the segment are:

That big guy

"I know that big guy that lives upstairs: [Gertrude, 101]

The guy

"the guys were singing on the porch" [Glen, 070]
"he's the guy that called him off" [Ben, 103]
"...if I knew the guy and I had a feeling I could have a good relationship with him..." [Glen, 168]

This guy

"It's this guy across the street" [Ben, 8-2]
"...said last week about this guy?" [Ben, 8-2]
"...if somebody from the Co-op who felt they had any-
some kind of good rapport with this guy" [Glen, 8-8]
"this guy is insane" [Sheldon, 177]
"this guy is really insane" [Sheldon, 178]
"there's been a history to it with this guy" [Caren, 8-10]

All six instances of "this guy" refer to Thorne, but only Glen uses "the guy" to refer to Thorne. Glen's uses of "the guy" and of "this guy" seem like parallel instances in which "the guy" or "this guy" might be interchangeable. Both are efforts to find some direct personal way to deal with Thorne, either through already having "good rapport with this guy" and capitalizing on this, or expecting that one could establish a "good relationship" with him if "I knew the guy." There are some crucial differences. The first utterance is directed to the possibility that "somebody from the Co-op" would be in the collection of "having-rapport-people." That was discounted. The second utterance, although
counterfactual, is directed toward the possibility of including the self in a collection of "knowing-the-guy-people" and also a collection of "having-rapport-people." Thus, "this guy" is used where others are considered, and "the guy" where Glen represents himself alone. Glen seems to use "this guy" to show remoteness, but where Glen alone is involved he shows Thorne as nearer using "the guy."

In five instances which use "this guy" to refer to Thorne, the name "Thorne" (or a variant of it as "Jason") could have been used, or a form of the third person pronoun. In the first instance, however, the syntax could not take such replacements, as the utterance is completed by giving the name. In all six instances a different classifier, such as "man" or "person" or the proper noun could have been used. In all instances "he" or "the guy" would also have been a possibility. It would seem "this guy" is used to show remoteness along a social distance gradient, although it is more emphatic in pointing to a particular person.¹

As for the woman, she is variously referred to as "a woman" [153], "her" [157] and "she" [159,161]. She is hardly characterized as a particular individual, such as "the woman" or "this woman" would do, and lacking a name remains unspecifiable and fully remote.

The social distance shown for both Thorne and the woman

¹ W. Labov suggests in colloquial narratives 'this guy' does not refer to a person already know, and close to the speaker, but introduces a person unknown to the listeners and remote from the speaker. It is equivalent to the more formal 'a person.' (Private communication).
is "remote" rather than "close" and does not vary in the segment. The meeting people find them both to be "troublemaking people" whom they prefer to see as remote. In the one exception, Glen tries to find a way to locate himself within a "good relationship" with Thorne, but as Glen points out, that is impossible, since Glen does not even know Thorne.

Commitment to the Co-op becomes easier to maintain if it is clear that the problems of the Co-op with the neighborhood are not really with the neighborhood people, or at least not with most of them. Nor is it the case that the problems are with the black people, or at least most of them. The conflict is with the "trouble making-people" who happen to live in the neighborhood and happen to be black. In constructing a collection of "troublemaking-people" at line [151] the interactants create this additional category of those who have bothered the Co-op. This definition of the situation as one of "troublemakers in the Co-op who are, have been black..." [151] provides a collection of people (the troublemaking ones) in which only some of the people are black people. On the other hand locating Thorne and the woman as black people implicates the whole collection of black people shown in the earlier section, and especially by figure 8.2.

The collection of "troublemaking-people" can be used by the analyst to generalize the moral premises which were
written about the specific troublemakers (using the principles shown in Chapter 4, page 219). Six moral premises\(^1\) were shown:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{MP-A*}: & \text{ Good incident—people ought to mention troublemaking people. (Extract 8-1)} \\
\text{MP-B*}: & \text{ Good meeting—people ought to know about troublemaking people. (Extract 8-1)} \\
\text{MP-G*}: & \text{ Good produce—day—people ought to be able to avoid troublemaking people. (Extract 8-4)} \\
\text{MP-M*}: & \text{ Somebody of the having-rapport—people of the good organization—people ought to try to reason with troublemaking people. (Extract 8-8)} \\
\text{MP-M(A)*}: & \text{ Somebody of the having-connections—with-a-black-Co-op—people ought to try to reason with troublemaking people. (Extract 8-8)} \\
\text{MP-R*}: & \text{ Good produce—day—people ought not to be hassled by troublemaking people. (Extract 8-10)}
\end{align*}
\]

Such moral premises continue responsibility to the text, but allow the analyst to move beyond the specific situation here presented to more general moral matters. They also provide a notion of the retrospective redefinition that could occur once the notion of troublemakers was introduced.

Both of the troublemakers were involved in moral matters and ones which were furthermore illegal: to park in a no parking area, and to take food without paying. Commitment to the Co-op was shown in both cases by Co-op people taking action: by moving the car out of the way (and then taking the owner to court when he attacked them) and by throwing the woman out of the Co-op (after getting on a table and labelling

\[\]

\(^1\) Generalized moral premises are labelled with an asterisk (\(\#\)), as introduced on page 219.
her publicly a thief). In these ways the commitment of the produce day people to the Co-op is reflected in the talk of the segment.

**Communication Of Commitment To The Co-op**

However, as the segment progresses, commitment to the Co-op is also being shown by the meeting people, as they hear of these happenings and discuss the troublemaking people. The meeting people respond in what they do as well as what they say as they introduce and pass a motion for a "No Parking" sign (and the subsequent painting of the sign on the sidewalk by the City without charge). The fact that the Co-op was responsible for the city's action in putting the sign there was not likely to be known by the neighborhood people, and perhaps not even by the Co-op people other than those who were the meeting people. But the decision of the meeting was evidence of a response by the Co-op to an external threat. The decision was taken by a vote on a proposal at the end of the segment in which unanimous agreement was displayed by hand raising. Such agreement also reflected underlying category consensus of the meeting people operating there as voting people. The notion of category consensus was introduced (Chapter 3, page 189) for a situation where the relevance of a given collection of people had been given interactional support.

In viewing a whole meeting, it is thus possible first to see it as an instance of category consensus of the meeting people. Viewed on a less general level, certain parts of the
time spent as meeting people are more particularly associated
with each particular agenda point, during which time category
consensus occurs with various "agenda-discussing-people."
The segment represents one such period of an agenda point.
At two places during the segment the meeting people are made
dominant by the chairperson as certain activities of the
meeting people are attended to, i.e., proposal making [109]
and voting [188]. Such ritual activities connected with
the regulative rules by which meetings operate give
evidence of continuing category. At these times, the
meeting people serve as a "defining collection of people"
the sense introduced in Chapter 3, page 138 of providing
evidence here through the use of regulative rules by
a label (here "meeting") can be supplied both by those outside
the collection of Co-op people as well as those within.
However, at other times during the meeting, evidence of
category consensus for other collections of people is being
shown by the meeting people. In order to ferret out such
places, it is necessary first to consider evidence on the sur-
face of category consensus.
The most specific level of category consensus occurs
on a phrase-by-phrase level as each surface collection of
people which appears is shown to be related to preceding ones
by the meeting people through various interactive strategies
such as the reappearance of the "same" collection of people
or by techniques of "underlining," (cf. Chapter 3, page 180).
"Breaks" in sequences of collections of people occur--places
where two adjoining collections of people are not the "same" and no underlining is shown. Such breaks locate the ends of temporal periods of category consensus. The passages with category consensus can then be labelled, and these labels constitute an intermediate level designation of category consensus.

The fact of a "break" in sequences of collections of people thus provides the basis by which the extent of ongoing category consensus is shown. Category consensus does not rule out the use of a wide variety of collections of people appearing within a person's utterance. Surface collections that appear in the phrase-by-phrase analysis of the segment include collections of people of many sizes or scope, such as "incident people" on line [001] and "crazy-people." [148]

Figure 8.3 shows the progression of category consensus at an intermediate level of generality for the whole segment. It was made by determining the extent of phrase-by-phrase category consensus in the segment, and then supplying labels for the areas which were located as having category consensus. (In Figure 3.3, a small section of this segment is shown with such a phrase-by-phrase category consensus shown.)

In Figure 8.3 are shown 16 areas of category consensus where labels assigned were selected from six possibilities: meeting people, organization people, incident people, black people, neighborhood people, and troublemaking people. These
### Figure 8.3  Category Consensus for "No Parking" (at an intermediate level).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>CO-OP PEOPLE</th>
<th>NON-CO-OP PEOPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>001-002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. &quot;he must be mentioned&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. &quot;who was it&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>013-018</td>
<td>013-018</td>
<td>019-056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>050</td>
<td>019-056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>073-079</td>
<td>073-079</td>
<td>076-090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>076-090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>078-097</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>108-123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154-159</td>
<td>124-131</td>
<td>131-153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160-172</td>
<td>131-153</td>
<td>140-149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>140-149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. &quot;I guess what I'm&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177-4</td>
<td>14. &quot;I guess what I'm&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. &quot;He's not a child&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A, B, C are places in which more than one layer of category consensus is shown, as explained in the text.

#9 and #16 are places where meeting people is a defining collection of people, and the regulative rules for the meeting are operative.
six collections of people will be recognized as including
the three intermediate collections of people used in the dis-
cussion of the segment earlier (incident-people,
black people and neighborhood people): the intermediate
collection of people used in the analysis of how the others
were constructed (troublemaking-people) plus the guises
of the Co-op people. One guise of the Co-op people (produce
day-people) appears only with the subcollection of incident
people.\(^1\) At three places (A, B, C) more than one layer of
category consensus is shown by indicating more than one
collection of people. In each instance, the collection of
black people was shown as involving category consensus. At
\#9 and \#16, meeting people appear as defining collections of
people (cf. earlier). At \#13, "troublemaking people"
appears and replaces the collection of "black people."

Also on Figure 8.3 are 16 quotations from the segment
which highlight the changes in category consensus. Many of
these lines were found in the extracts given earlier as the
moral matters were indicated and moral premises written for
the segment. Such moral matters were shown in each case as

\(^1\) The classification scheme used and the procedures by which
surface collections were subsumed under intermediate collections
was done so as to continue responsibility to the text and to the
category sets which are implicated at each level. (cf. Chap.
3, page 151). The overall headings (Co-op vs. non-Co-op people)
do exhaust the domain at that level, as do the three guises
making up the Co-op people. The categories listed under non-
Co-op people are exhausted by collections of neighborhood
people and black people through \#12. At that point, a new
collection of people is introduced--troublemaking people--
which replaces that of black people, and so from \#13 on the
collection of non-Co-op people is exhausted by that collec-
tion alone.
linked to the collections of people which appeared in the text. In each case the collections of people govern what information was communicated as well as the moral matters which appeared. Such moral matters include attitudes and beliefs the meeting people held as Co-op people as well as those they held as neighborhood people. The moral matters reflect the underlying values by which choices were made and by which commitment is displayed.

Category Consensus in "No Parking"

The segment can be viewed processually then as a series of sites at which certain lines of talk were pursued and others not. Category consensus to collections of people which are shown by Figure 8.3 provide the bases by which what was talked about occurred. They will be examined now for the way in which information in the Co-op was communicated to and by the meeting people. At each point, the question can be asked how was commitment being communicated to the various collections of people which were shown within these periods of category consensus. The quotations shown on Figure 8.3 are a means of locating specifically the different aspects of information which were shown and the moral matters which were implicated at each point. In the following list, the

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1 Interactants show concern with the act of saying things in 13 places throughout the segment, two places in which they are quoting themselves, "I'd like to say" [127] and "I guess what I'm saying" [166] and two places which quote other people, "as he so bluntly put it" [085] and "she said 'I'm going to'" [159]. The other nine instances of reference to talk are the following;
quotations shown in Figure 8.3 are each followed by the label for category consensus being shown at that point. The lines following do not rehearse the events of the segment but are limited to making clear the import of the information supplied in terms of the commitments which were being displayed.

1. "He must be mentioned." (Ben 8-1, "incident people"). Co-op people need to know about one particular incident person since they are going to be told about the hearing (and a hearing requires there be some person and some action on which the hearing is to be conducted.) News of the hearing may be reported in a newspaper, mentioning him, or the meeting people may hear of it from other people in the neighborhood. Yet the meeting people would have expected to have heard about it at the meeting, as it concerned Co-op operation. Also at the Court it may be that Ben or Sheldon may want to (or need to) show that the Co-op knows of (and approves) of whatever it is they say. Greater importance presumably would be attached to what two Co-op people say, rather than two individuals who are neighborhood people and happen to be part of a fighting situation early in the morning. Also, as a result of what is said at the meeting, some action may be taken which prevents another incident or trouble with the Co-op.

"Mentioned" [003], "was said" [015], "he said he" [030], "generally speaking" [082], "generally identified the Co-op" [086], "what she said" [147], "thrown this up into our faces" [152], "go to talk to him" [170], "what you're saying" [175].
operation.

2. "Who was it that did this?" [Mickey 8-2, "incident-people"] Having the name available makes it possible to talk about an individual, now or later. It also makes it possible for some one to see if they know who it was, or know who it wasn't.

3. "How much was said last week about this guy? Did you talk about Dolly?" [Ben 8-2, "meeting-people"] A claim of personal business by one of the incident people prevents meeting people from hearing details of incident people and of a person named Dolly, who is not actually shown as one.

4. "This kind of behavior is nothing we would have to take!" [Ben 8-3, "incident-people"] The actions of two of the incident people in not fighting are subjected to explanation so as to make clear the moral matters for the meeting people. (In the terminology of Scott and Lyman, 1968, p. 46, this is an "account," a "linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to value inquiry.")

5. "What does he look like?" [Glen, 8-4, "incident-people"] Description of the aggressor of the incident people includes the information that he was black, overtly introducing to the meeting people the collection of black people. (A, on Figure 8.3 shows concurrent category consensus here). Description of his car, including where it was parked, which was a moral matter, is also given (taking twice as long as the description of Thorne).

1 The notion of an account was also applied here in Chapter 3, page 128.
6. "He lives in the big stone house directly across the street from the Co-op." [Glen, 062, "neighborhood-people"] Moral matters are not realized in the text associated with neighborhood people, but rather the layout of the houses across the street from the Co-op provides an opportunity for six meeting people to demonstrate that they know the street and are themselves neighborhood people (taking three times as long as the description of Thorne).

7. "There's practically no black participation in the Co-op." [Ben 8-6, "organization-people"] The collection of Co-op organization people is inspected from the perspective of the incident people and found lacking in black participation. This admission is not overtly evaluated.

8. "And as he so bluntly put it, 'Fuck the community.'" [Ben, 8-7, "neighborhood-people"]. The talk continues within the category consensus on neighborhood people, (but also that of organization people and black people persist, shown as B on Figure 8.3) Thorne is shown as contemptuous of the community and as viewing the Co-op as composed of white people, Thorne's behavior is explained by showing him as within a new collection of people in this segment, "crazy-people."

9. "...if anyone has motions or points..." [Ben, 106, "meeting-people"] Category consensus of meeting people is reactivated as Ben performs his role as chairperson, thus ending the "report-hearing-people" and beginning the "motion-considering-people." The meeting people begin a discussion on Thorne which is labelled out of order, a ruling which is
violated continually throughout the segment.

10. "I'd like to say in this kind of situation..." [Sheldon, 127, "incident people"] The second co-present incident person confirms the nonviolence shown to Thorne, presenting the same moral matters again to the meeting people, and wonders, if the police had been present, would the outcome have differed.

11. "I think it would be good if somebody from the Co-op..." [Glen, 8-8, "organization-people"] An alternative to the police approach to neighborhood peace is suggested by which someone of the Co-op organization people would try to relate directly to Thorne, such moral matters being labelled impossible.

12. "I don't know, maybe there's a, is there a black Co-op around town?" [Glen 8-8, "black people."] A second alternative approach is labelled "ridiculous" as the inappropriateness of introducing the black/white issue is emphasized. Thorne also is again located within the collection of "crazy-people."

13. "Troublemakers in the Co-op who are, have been black..." [Joel, 8-9, "troublemaking-people"] The new collection of "troublemaking-people" is introduced in addition to continuing category consensus to "black-people" (shown as C on Figure 8-3) People stealing from the Co-op is the moral matter described, as is the response of the black woman to being thrown out. She is shown as translating her expulsion as an alleged thief to an expulsion as a black person.
14. "I guess what I'm saying..." [Glen, 166, "meeting-people"] This third approach to relating to Thorne is presented directly to the meeting people to find a way to have a "good relationship." The talker, a meeting person, personally is "volunteering" himself, but since he does not know Thorne, the moral matters remain hypothetical.

15. He's not a child anymore." [Mickey, 173, "trouble-making-people"] A series of characterizations are used of Thorne, "child," "insane," "really insane," "hassled a lot," and "hassled a whole lot," all of which can be classified by the analyst within the collection of "troublemaking-people." The efforts to approach Thorne cease.

16. [Long pause] Um at least, ah, we get a vote..." [Ben 8-10, "meeting people"] Voting on the proposal is the final action by the "meeting-people," initiated by the chairperson. The vote is unanimous and a new item of moral matters (that the Co-op shall get a sign put up) is officially adopted.

In this series of 16 quotations, moral matters have been located as they appeared in the talk of the meeting people. The processual aspect of the interaction was documented in the changing labels of the category consensus areas from those in which some would not care to be included to ones which might appear more acceptable. The argument of the segment developed through this series of collections of people to which category consensus was shown, and which were available for both talkers and hearers to locate themselves as "insiders"
or "outsiders."

Knowledge About "No Parking"

An assortment of information and moral matters was presented. This assortment is of course documented as having been presented at that particular meeting, in so far as people who were meeting people that night would agree on what had been said. The version of the incident given there is warranted as having been given at that meeting. It can be attributed to that meeting. It may be the case that few people refer to Co-op meetings, but anything said at them could be repeated later and legitimated by reference to having been part of the Co-op meeting.

The activities of Ben and Sheldon were as insiders to the produce day people at first. In the terminology of Co-op operation they were the "buying coordinators" that week and they were making a "delivery." Such a delivery consisted of unloading boxes from a truck, and was not unusual as it occurred each week. The talk which occurred at the meeting was a report of a delivery except that the report concerned the particular happenings of the "incident" and the moral matters attached to it. They are the two Co-op people who are the "incident people," and remain the only "insiders" at that meeting, although the meeting people can be seen as "insiders" within a collection of "knowing-about-the-incident-people."

A different selection might have been made of what was said of the incident. For instance, the interview with Ben
(quoted on page 532) adds an appraisal of Thorne's probable attitude. In the quotation from Sheldon's interview (p. 533) there are further details about how it was they suspected that Thorne might have a gun. Further details of the trouble-making woman are shown in Joel's interview (p. 534) including that Joel stood on a table asking for support of the other Co-op produce day people.

The information available for the meeting people is a composite of what was volunteered, what was requested, and even to some extent of what is known to have been excluded (for example, #5, talk about Dolly). Each of the 16 sites shown above represents a place at which the talk was channeled so as to provide for additional information or moral matters.

The segment may be retrospectively defined as a report and discussion of the problem of someone blocking the delivery area outside the Co-op, leading to a motion and discussion and passing of a motion to get a "No Parking" sign. However, as it was produced it consisted of layers of moral matters in which were reflected commitments of people both to the Co-op and to the neighborhood people. The segment also showed attitudes concerning black/white relations as they were used in talk as part of the information and moral matters of which the segment is comprised. Although the talk of the meeting people concerned actions, reports of actions themselves are also in a sense reports of moral matters which the talkers see as related to the people who did the actions.
Yet the initial action of the Co-op incident people in pushing the car away directly invited trouble. The people knew who's car it was, and that their action is pushing the car away was illegal. A public accusation of stealing also asked for trouble. It was alleged that the woman had been stealing regularly, and it could be expected that the action of "throwing" her out might lead to further trouble. People showed commitment to the Co-op in these actions, although the actions can be seen as unfriendly, even hostile to the neighborhood people. Being a good person in a collection of Co-op people puts the individuals in a situation of showing lack of commitment to another collection of people and of appearing thereby as not a good person in that collection of people. But is that necessarily the case?

The original question focused on confrontations with black people and asked how could commitment to the Co-op be reconciled with a commitment to an integrated neighborhood. Such a problem in conflict of commitments is implicit in many of the studies discussed in Chapter 1, page 36, even where it is not explicit, since commitment to any one group or idea generally occurs in a context where there are many other possible commitments. In terms of the original model of commitment introduced in Chapter 1 and expanded in Chapter 7 (page 517) the Co-op people's commitment to the Carverton neighborhood was shown by (1) a positive orientation to the neighborhood which is (2) jointly shared, and (3) expected to
persist. However, there was little evidence of giving the collective (neighborhood) needs priority over the individual (Co-op) needs in this case. Only Glen showed concern for Thorne's needs or the needs of the other neighborhood people. And even here it is for the black neighborhood people that Glen expresses concern, not for the neighborhood as a neighborhood.

The meeting people are faced with a number of individuals in the neighborhood who have caused them trouble. They place these people in the collection of troublemaking people rather than neighborhood people (or black people) and so avoid a conflict of commitment. At the same time these meeting people communicate their commitment to the Co-op by (1) a positive orientation (2) which they jointly share and (3) show that they plan to continue. They give evidence too (4) of putting Co-op needs ahead of other ones, for they are spending the evening talking of Co-op problems rather than pursuing other interests or activities. One person, Joel, does condemn the lack of black representation in the Co-op, but there is no talk on how to change matters and to find ways to get more black participation.

The Co-op was not an integrated Co-op, and was identified as a white institution by both of the "troublemaking people." More precisely, two reports by Co-op people of the blacks' perceptions of the Co-op show that they see the Co-op as a white organization. Co-op people were sensitive to the black/white issue. They would deny that anything the Co-op people
said or did was anti-black. Nothing in the talk shows individuals to be opposed to black people, but there is evidence of a position which accepts the lack of integration without a commitment to change the situation. An ideology which favors a harmonious relationship between blacks and whites is coextensive with a practical situation which has almost no interrelations between blacks and whites. The existence of a Co-op that was mostly white in the Carverton neighborhood could be interpreted by blacks as the result of anti-black feeling. It was so interpreted. But in the framework of the meeting people any possible conflict of commitment was resolved in favor of commitment to the Co-op, rather than commitment to the neighborhood. This resolution was accomplished without damage to the fundamental aspect of commitment, the possibility of being seen as a good person in so committing oneself. This is done by an appropriate selection of collections of people. A framework of discourse was constructed in which the moral premises applied to collections of black people were declared to be irrelevant.
"NO PARKING" Segment

001 Ben: Um, as far as the uh, the incident went on the 18th, ah, we're, we've got ah, I guess he m', he must be mentioned, we've got a court hearing and everything.

004 Sheldon: Yeah.

005 Ben: On uh, the fifth and a, he's going to be summoned, ah, and if he doesn't show up, he'll be, you know, a warrant, you know, there'll be a warrant put out on him.

008 Mickey: Well, who was it that did this?

010 Ben: It's this guy across the street named Jason Thorne who lives over at 33- what? Thorne.

012 Mickey: Jason Thorne?

013 Ben: 33-what? Sheldon? 3303. Apparently, well, how much was

014 Sheldon: 3303.

015 Ben: said last week about this guy? Did you tell about Dolly?

017 Sheldon: I don't think it's necessary, you know,

018 it's, this, it's really more personal business. No.

021 Ben: Well, anyway, ah, [Pause], well I guess we just sort of felt that, you know, that this kind of behavior is nothing we would have to take, and ah, we didn't fight back [Door slams] because of, well, two essential factors, I think, first of all because fighting's pretty distasteful to begin with, second of all because, we didn't want to sort of precipitate any kind of a gang-type fight which is, is what would have happened, and ah, third of all, you know, he said he had a gun in his apartment, and also because not only that he had a gun, but just sort of like that

022 Glen: Like ah--

023 Ben: Here was something we would have to deal with on a on-going basis, you know, and any sort of like ah, brute warfare, that we, you, you know, undertake him in

027 Glen: You feel that's--

028 Ben: and it's going to be sort of like drawn out and, and just exacerbated, so--

030 Glen: What I'm interested in, outside of the fact that I'm really so-, sorry you got hurt ah, is, that if we do have to, what does he

033 Ben: Uh huh.

034 Glen: Look like, for one thing, so I can avoid him [Laugh-ter, some start talking].

036 Ben: He's, he's, he's about 5'11", he's black with pretty short hair. Yeah, he's

039 Glen: He's black?

042 Ben: got, got a little, little mustache, pretty thin, he's slim, ah, and his car is the, ah, green, ah, it's like
Ben: a green 1962, 1963 Valiant, with a white top, it
Sheldon: White top.
Ben: *has* an Afro sticker on the back, and ah, you probably
remember it cause the, back of the car has a sort of like
area where, that you can see like a tire is underneath
the trunk, and the back sort of slopes down like this,
and it's pretty low to the ground, it's a small car,
and it's usually parked right [Laughter] right
there. Pennsylvania.

Terry: What kind of plates does he have?

Glen: He lives in the big stone house directly across the street
from the Co-op? Where?

Ben: A little to the corner.

Sheldon: No, to the right.

Caren: 3303, one house.

the one square across is 5.

Mickey: The one where Naromi lives?

Glen: You know, the guys were singing on the porch--

Sheldon: No, no, no--

Gertrude: Oh the big double house, left hand, the big double house on the right.

Caren: The corner house, but the second one on the left side.

Gertrude: Oh, I get you, I thought it was from out of state, but, he's from Pennsylvania.

Ben: So, anyway, ah, from my point of view, ah, the whole scene ah sort of like brought home to the ah, basic fact that generally speaking, there's practically no black participation in the Co-op, and as he so bluntly put it, "Fuck the community," and it seemed like he, he generally sort of identified the Co-op as being pretty white, and ah, you know, I don't know, I really felt like if we had some sort of like, had, you know, some kind of show down, you know, it would have been, you know, a real bad scene for a lot of other reasons, like you sort of-- I don't know.

Terry: How long has he been around here?

Caren: Couple of years.

Gertrude: Couple of years? Couple of years?

Ben: He, he personally is, is, is

Gertrude: I've never seen him, in that house, he's been pretty crazy, incidentally.

Ben: *living* there?

Gertrude: living there? Yeah, you don't see him much.

Sheldon: *that* big guy that lives upstairs.

But, ah--
Ben: He's the guy that called him off.

Gertrude: He should know better than that. [Fast]

Ben: Well, anyway, if anyone has any motions or points to make he should make them quickly, you know,

can---

Glen: Yes, I have a motion that that that the meeting, the meeting allow Sheldon to spend up to 15 dollars to buy the sign, 15 dollars for the, ah, ah, to get, in other words, so that if you do have the opportunity, or get the way, that you'd be cleared to do that.

Ben: Discussion?

Martin: Well, regarding Thorne, or whatever his name is, I think-- Well, right, well, I think, I mean

Ben:-back on this--

Martin: the fact that you have the sign and you're legally entitled to tow his car away, I don't think is going to prevent the same kind of scene, ah, ah, that, ah, ensued that morning.

Ben: Yeah, well, hopefully, you know, what happens on the fifth will--

Gertrude: Well, if he's gonna go to the court, ah, he's not going to be, ah, stupid, I hope, and not--

Sheldon: OK, I'd like to say in this kind of situation I think that that is exactly the thing that you do, I think, that when anybody gives you that kind of trouble in the streets....

[Tape ends; tape starts]

...not the fault of the police, if you didn't do anything and the police were backing you up, what, what would the police have done if you had called them right then?

Glen: I, I, uh, I think, yeah, that's important, I think it would be nice maybe if somebody, I would still want to make a motion for a sign, but I think it would be good if somebody from the Co-op who felt they had any, some kind of good rapport with this guy--

Sheldon: No, no such thing.

Glen: Somebody who had a connection to uh, some sort of ah, I don't know, maybe there's ah, is there a black Co-op around town somewhere?

Caren: No, now you're getting into that whole, Mickey: That's

Caren: that's, that's, Mickey: ridiculous, that was even bullshit what she said--

Caren: why he's that way, because, except he's crazy, and it has nothing to do with his being black and if he wants to bring that up as an issue, that's his business.

Joel: Troublemakers in the Co-op who are, have been black, have always thrown this up into our faces, there's a woman who came in the
"NO PARKING" (cont'd)

154 Caren: But you don't have to make a thing out of it--
155 Joel: who came in the Co-op week in and week out to steal
156 Caren: Well, so what, there's no reason to get defensive,
157 Joel: from the, from the Co-op and when we threw her out
158 Caren: Yeah, I remember, sure, this is why--
159 Joel: one day, she said, "I'm going to bring my people in
160 here," and it was a bogus threat, and
161 Caren: Yeah, she hasn't done it yet.    Sure.
162 Joel: It's it's an unfortunate situation, you know, the
163 fact that we don't have a larger black representation
164 in the Co-op, but I don't think we should be, ah,
165 cowed into a corner by that fact.
166 Glen:    Well, now, I guess what
167 I'm saying is something not necessarily to make an
168 official move at the meeting, but if, if I knew the guy
169 and I had some feeling I could have a good relationship
170 with him, I just would want to go to talk to him, uh,
171 to ah, to try to, so that the police were not the only
172 kind of handle on control, I do think that it's--
173 Mickey:    He's not
174 a child anymore, you know, the--
175 Joel: What you're saying--
176 Caren:     Glen, Glen, it's [Louder]--
177 Sheldon: This guy is insane, this
178 guy is really insane [Several start up].
179 Caren: There's been a history to it with this guy, it's
180 not just a one time thing, there's been a history, so
181 it's a long term thing, thing, that's been going on in
182 that block and these people, and this is just the latest
183 incident. He's hassled a whole
184 Glen: He's hassled a lot of people?
185 Caren: lot of people.
186 Glen:    Um, mmmm, OK
187 Ben:  [Long pause] Um, at
188 least ah, we get a vote on the sign motion, fifteen
189 dollars a year, all in favor? Opposed? OK
190 Glen: Minimum?
191 Caren: Maximum?
192 Ben: Fifteen dollars a year it is. Let's see, the next
193 point is...
CHAPTER 9

THE PLACE OF MORAL MATTERS IN TALK

The original question asked in this study was whether it would be possible to locate evidence of moral matters in the talk of the Co-op people. The term "moral matters" was introduced to refer generally to issues and problems of social life that involved both obligation and evaluation which construct what a person ought to do or be or have in order to be defined as a good person for a collection of people. Changes in moral matters might be alterations in the relationship of the Co-op people to the Co-op, of different sub-collections of Co-op people to each other, or of the Co-op to its neighborhood in the City. An important aspect of moral matters is the overarching ideology, the collection of beliefs and values by which the Co-op as a whole can be characterized, and evidence of changes in ideology was also a concern in so far as changes in ideology might be reflected in the talk of Co-op people.

The most obvious changes in moral matters were the result of active decision making of the meeting people, and these were easy to locate through an analysis of the decisions made in the course of the meetings recorded: Figure 2.7, p. 108, summarizes these findings. Other moral matters of the Co-op were found by observing and participating in the Co-op as a
Co-op person: the ethnographic materials included flyers and other Co-op writings. Another source of background information about moral matters was found by interviewing most of the active Co-op people, providing further insight into why the Co-op people felt the Co-op had developed as it had over its history. Still another source of data was a survey I made of all Co-op participants on two consecutive produce days. Such data gave census information and also tapped opinions on what the Co-op should be.

However, none of these means of getting information about moral matters focused directly on the Co-op people as they went about the business of being Co-op people. In order to do this, I chose as data segments of Co-op meetings. During meetings, Co-op people were maximally being Co-op people, focusing on Co-op problems and happenings, along with other Co-op people. I rejected produce day as a site for recording talk of Co-op people, as there were seldom situations in which more than three people were talking together, most people being involved in picking up food or in making food available to others. Although the produce day people might reflect on problems and happenings, their talk was not oriented to making decisions or finding solutions.

1 For instance, people stopped using the Co-op for a variety of reasons, and I asked Co-op people if they knew people who had left, and what reasons they gave for leaving. In some instances, the responses included condemnations of people leaving, suggesting good people did not do such things. Such data were intriguing, but produced for me, and lacked the feature of being produced in a Co-op situation.
to Co-op problems. There was no mechanism by which produce
day people could effect change in Co-op policy or structure,
other than by attending Co-op meetings, i.e., appearing as
Co-op meeting people.

A systematic analysis was evolved in order to be able
to study the talk of the Co-op meeting people. Using talk
as a source of data on moral matters, the analysis considered
first the ways in which people were represented in talk, with
particular attention both to the location of all the people
in talk who could serve as the focus of moral matters and
to the identification of all collections of people in which
individuals could be placed (Chapter 3). An essential element
of the representation of people was the way in which self
or other could be shown as a good person or people.

The notion of a moral response was introduced to dis­
tinguish certain parts of talk in which clusters of indicators
of moral matters were present. An abstract formulation of
specific moral matters was written as a moral premise which
specified both evaluation and obligation. Such a formulaic
representation made it possible for me to distinguish the
same and different moral matters regardless of surface form.
The sense in which moral matters are held to be always
available was elaborated through consideration of the dynamic
of the moral response which found regular differences between
surface and underlying forms. (See Chapter 4).

It might seem that moral premises were tied to the level
of specificity of their occurrence in a particular segment
where they reflected the particular problem or policy being
talked about. Such a limitation would greatly reduce the value of the methodology proposed in Chapters 3 and 4, (and summarized on p.308). Generalization that is limited but controlled by the talk is possible, however, by two routes:

1. Generalizing people. An individual or individuals can be located within collections of people which then supplement the particular one found in the talk. Such nesting may involve subcollections of people which are shown by the text to be included within one of the guises of the Co-op people, and then, it follows, of the Co-op people as a whole. Such a generalizability of collections of people makes it possible to show more clearly their social location. For example, in "No Parking" the particular collection of "incident people" is a subcollection of "produce day people" as the surrounding text makes clear, and produce day people is of course a guise of Co-op people. However, the predications attributed to incident-people are not transferred to Co-op people (cf. page 257).

2. Generalizing predications. A statement of a particular activity, characteristic or state, e.g., "allocating money for a manager" (moral premise 6-K) could be re-stated as "allocating money for purposes deemed valuable to the Co-op" considering that "having a manager" is shown in the text to be "valuable." Such a more general statement extends the scope of predication and requires the availability of knowledge in depth about the situation. These specifications require the use of such ethnographic information as
was given in Chapter 2, or in the text which itself may reflect revisions and redefinitions through a passage of talk.

Much of the work of the analyses of the segments in Chapters 5 to 8 was directed to finding evidence of moral matters and of changes in them in order to answer a specific question which was introduced on problems of cooperation and commitment. Before discussing the communication of these aspects of moral matters, I want to focus on the notion of evaluation of Co-op people as good Co-op people which was an essential part of this study.

Construction Of Good Co-op People

From the moral premises stated, it is possible to present a view of what constituted good Co-op people. Nearly half of the moral premises found in this work are predications which directly reflect the values and norms of the Co-op people. These are moral premises in which the subject was Co-op people in one of its guises, in some cases referred to by "we."¹ The subjects of these moral premises are not the

¹ In the four chapters a total of 112 moral premises were stated which were distributed as follows: Chapter 5, 20; 6, 43; 7, 27 and 8, 22. Of the total, 8 were for collections of non-Co-op people. If the collections of people shown by the moral premises are generalized to the level of the guises of the Co-op people, the following distribution of the moral premises can be shown: meeting-people, 21; organization-people, 47; produce-day-people, 36.
result of generalizing the people of subcollections shown in the text, but are drawn from talk which was originally at this level of generalization. The predications, however, represent all degrees of specification, tied as they are to the peculiarities and varying degrees of abstraction of the talk.

These moral premises do not reflect overt talk in the segments about what constituted a good Co-op person or made a good Co-op. This striking absence of overt moral discourse will be the topic of a later section of this chapter.

A preliminary statement of a Co-op value system was given in Chapter 5 based on the materials found in that segment. Eight moral premises were stated for the Co-op organization people in the course of searching for talk of cooperative ideology. The predicates of these moral premises presented the things that Co-op people were expected to do, be or have. No claim was made that they comprised a complete statement of values. Rather the point was made that they had been used in the interaction, and so represented actual moral matters that were found in talk.

An expanded statement of these moral matters can now be made based on the moral premises for Co-op people in all four preceding chapters. The same limitations and virtues of the data apply here. The segments do not represent a systematic sample of the meetings, other than having been selected as sites to study problems of commitment and cooperation. The virtue of the data is that these statements
linking predicates to people shown within collections of people were part of the fabric of the talk which was used in achieving action on the problems.

The notion of "good Co-op people" contains both the notion of the individuals who participate in the Co-op and the Co-op considered as a collectivity. Both distributive and collective sense were introduced in Chapter 2, and the statement made that the difference would be blurred as it was not necessary for the analysis concerning cooperation and commitment. At this point, though the moral premises stated about the Co-op people can be separated generally into those which predicate activities, states or characteristics of individual people, and those which predicate activities, states, or characteristics of the collection. In this way values and norms of the Co-op individuals will be separated from those for the Co-op collectivity.

Some of the moral premises found in the preceding chapters were for subsets of Co-op people which recurred often, such as working members, coordinators, management people or incident people. They are not included in the corpus of moral premises I examine here, although it may be the case that certain predications of such subsets would hold true for the collection as a whole. For example, "not having gang-type fights" appeared for the incident-people (8-E), but is equally applicable to any collection of Co-op people. However, it is not included as there is no basis present for generalizing the "incident-people" into the produce day
people. I have however included moral premises which were written for ephemeral collections of Co-op people, where the whole collection was included. I omitted moral premises found for "other people," the non-Co-op collections of people, such as "neighborhood people" or "candidate-people" although persons who are also Co-op people appear, but not as Co-op people.

The notions of both the "good Co-op person" and the "good Co-op" reflect values and norms which were used in talk of situations and problems of the Co-op by the meeting people as they established policies and tried to find answers to problems. These moral matters were not displayed to me to answer questions I asked as a researcher, but occur in the talk used by Co-op people during the time in which they were being Co-op people.

The Good Co-op Person

Moral premises for the good Co-op person are shown in Figure 9.1. Each of the three guises of the Co-op has distinctive moral matters by which a good Co-op person can be defined for the collection of people. It will be remembered that the predications in each case were written to reflect particular situations talked of by Co-op people.

Figure 9.1 shows 24 moral premises with Co-op people as subject which appeared through the analysis of the four segments (Chapters 5-8). Generally here the distributive aspect of Co-op people was dominant over a collective one.
Figure 9.1 Moral Premises For The Good Co-op Person. (n=24)

**Good meeting people ought**

5-Q: not to engage in denigrating talk;
8-B: to know about Thorne (8-B*: to know about troublemaking people);
some
one 5-C: to make an additional motion for problems of default.

**Good organization people ought**

5-H: not to harm other Co-op people;
5-J: to preserve Co-op continuity;
6-I: to deal with potential problems;
6-I(A): to deal with problems needing attention.
some
one 6-I(C): to deal with the problem of unsold produce;
7-A(K): to open the doors; (and 7-A(F));
7-A(N): to want the Co-op to open.
we
5-N: to distribute work equitably;
6-I(B): to be able to deal with problems;
6-J: to have someone to help us in "starting up" the Co-op;
6-J(A): to have help in getting things organized in starting up;
7-K: not to offend members;
8-P: not to be cowed by not having a larger black representation in the Co-op.

**Good produce day people ought**

7-E(A): to cope with labor shortages;
7-E(B): not to cope with labor shortages;
8-G: to be able to avoid Thorne (8-G*: to be able to avoid troublemaking people);
8-H: not to find the driveway blocked;
8-Q: not to steal from the Co-op;
8-Q: not to be hassled by Thorne (8-Q*: not to be hassled by troublemaking people);
we 8-F: not to have to deal with guns in the future.
In other words, people individually acting as Co-op people could be expected to do, be or have such predications, as they individually appeared as people in the Co-op. In four instances on Figure 9.1 the specific subject is shown as "some one" reflecting the text which showed an individual (in one instance a particular named person) as linked to the predication.

The moral premises of the meeting people in Figure 9.1 reflect things they should do (make a motion) not do (engage in denigrating talk) and know (about Thorne). In addition to Thorne, a more general form of "troublemaking-people" reflects the fact that in that segment Thorne is shown to be a collection of troublemaking people, and hence the inference is expressed here that the meeting people would be expected to get information about such a collection. And indeed in that segment information about another person who is labelled a troublemaker, is also presented.

Over half of the moral premises listed in Figure 9.1 are not tied to situations in which Co-op people perform as meeting people or produce day people. Rather they are prescriptions, prohibitions, or descriptions of Co-op people which are distinctive of people as they are being Co-op people. They appeared in each of the four segments, reflecting the notions of the meeting-people about what essentially constituted a Co-op person. These predications are direct products of the specific issues and problems which were talked about. Yet the predications include basic assumptions of the
Co-op people such as not to be harmful to other Co-op people; to preserve Co-op continuity; and to distribute work equitably. Furthermore, Co-op people are not expected to be defensive about the fact that there are few blacks in the Co-op.

The moral premises of produce day people in Figure 9.1 include not finding the driveway blocked or being hassled by troublemaking people, or dealing with guns in the future. On the other hand, the injunction not to steal from the Co-op is recognizable in a far more general form as "thou shalt not steal."

In seven instances on Figure 9.1, "we" is shown as the surface subject, reflecting instances in which some one of the meeting people was speaking for all the Co-op people. These cases have the additional feature then of being predications in which a person used his or her knowledge and perspective to speak for the whole collection of people. These predications are then the closest to ideological pronouncements since the talker is taking it upon him or herself to speak for the others present and even the Co-op people not present, for the organization people extend beyond any particular set of individual Co-op people.

A portrait of good Co-op people has been assembled here from the moral premises discussed here. It is not internally consistent as it contains contradictory moral premises (coping \((E(A))/not coping (E(B)) with labor shortages) and seemingly conflicting ones (ability to handle problems \((6-IB)/ need for help (6-J))

Such ambiguities reflect the unresolved state character-
of talk at times. How broadly does this apply? Some people who
attended produce day viewed the Co-op mainly as a place to
get inexpensive food. Being less interested than the meeting
people in the Co-op as an organization, they would be less
likely to come to meetings, to have occasion on which to
talk for the Co-op people. Represented here are four different
sets of meeting people, in which some individuals are repre­
sented more than once, but which does not include at all
other individuals who attended meetings over the 36 meetings
studied (cf. Chapter 2 for details.)

The sketch of good Co-op people is not offered as
a finished portrait, reflecting as it does only a small part
of the talk of the Co-op people as Co-op. However, support
for this partial picture is found in the ethnographic
material described in Chapter 2. It has the further advantage
of having been derived directly from its situation of use,
rather than from a response created for someone outside of the
Co-op situation. As such it represents moral matters which
had been current and in use at that time.

The Good Co-op

Similarly, a picture of the good Co-op as a collectivity
can be assembled from moral premises for Co-op people in
which a distributive sense was less prominent than a collective
sense. Moral premises for the good Co-op are shown in Figure
9.2. As was the case with the good Co-op person, each of the
three guises of the Co-op has distinctive moral matters by
which the good Co-op people can be defined, and all four seg-
Figure 9.2 Moral Premises For The Good Co-op, (n=32)

Good meeting people ought

6-A: to hire a manager at $20 a week;
6-A(C): not to hire a manager;
6-B(A): to establish the position of paid manager;
6-A(A): to allocate money for a manager;
6-K: to make the position more widely known before deciding on someone;
6-L: to separate discussion of the position from talk of filling the position;
7-J: to get started getting started;
7-A(I): to find out what is needed to open.

Good organization people ought

5-M: not to lose working members;
5-T: to have a system based on doing work not on sanctioning;
6-B: to have a paid manager;
6-D: to be successful as a Co-op;
6-H(C): not to let everything be the responsibility of the paid coordinator;
6-U: to prevent money losses;
7-A: to start up the Co-op;
7-A(M): to have an opening day;
8-I(A): to have more black participation in the Co-op;
8-I(B): not to have more black participation in the Co-op;
8-K(A): to be predominately white;
8-K(B): not to be predominately white;
8-R: to spend up to $15 for "No Parking" sign;
5-A: to have two levels of markup, one for working members and one for non-working members;
5-F: not to allow more than two instances of defaulting;
6-W: not to have a regular money loss.
6-X: to have some way to sell left-over produce;
6-Y: to have personnel for development;
7-A(C): to go ahead and open the Co-op;
7-A(J): not to have the Co-op open up and collapse;
7-A(L): to open the Co-op;
8-I(C): to have a larger black representation in the Co-op;
8-N: not to lack black participation.

Good produce day people ought

6-V: to have a proper cash register.
ments are represented. Again well over half of the 32 moral premises were written with the Co-op organization people as the subject, suggesting that both here and in the case of the Co-op person this more general way of viewing the Co-op has greater salience than either of the other guises.

The moral premises of the meeting in Figure 9.2 reflect the regulative activities of the meeting which were used by the Co-op people in making motions such as to hire a manager (6A), organizing discussion (6-L), as well as in allocating money (6-A(A)) and arranging for publicity, (6-K). In each instance the predication of the moral premise shown in the figure reflects the particular situation which meeting people were encountering in the talk during the segment, but at the same time gives evidence of the more general.

During the course of all the four segments, the formal regulative rules for voting were relevant, actual votes being taken twice as motions were passed for the stratification into working and non-working members (Chapter 5) and funds made available for a "No Parking" sign (Chapter 8). The proposal for a paid manager is presented during the segment, but the voting occurs later in the meeting (Chapter 6). In the discussion of "Starting Up" there is reference to taking a vote, but the focus of the talk is on getting individuals to commit themselves to open the Co-op (Chapter 7). In each instance a product of the activity of the meeting people is an important part of the ideological core of the Co-op
organization. Each is shown by a moral premise in Figure 9.2.

The policy of having working and non-working members (5-A);
The policy of having a paid manager (6-D);
Re-affirmation of having an open Co-op by re-opening it (7-A);
Increasing the ease and safety of being a Co-op person by reducing the possibility of future incidents with troublemaking people in the neighborhood (by taking steps to secure a "No Parking" sign.) (8-R).

The talk of the meeting people at each of the segments produced these statements (or re-statements) of constitutive aspects of the Co-op.

Other facets of the good Co-op organization shown by Figure 9.2 include the general instruction to be successful (6-D); of having certain systems and sanctioning (5-T); and of having a larger black representation from the neighborhood (8-I(C). At the same time, moral premises appear concerning black participation and the lack of whites (8-I and 8-K), reflecting what I characterized in Chapter 8 as a "neutral position," one in which blacks are neither encouraged or discouraged. At the same time there are prohibitions against the Co-op's losing working members, controlling defaulting, and not letting coordinators be overworked.

Again there are a large number of predications which are signalled by "we," indicating instances in which the talker was speaking for the meeting or for the organization people.

1 In Figure 2.7 a complete list of moral premises from the meeting decisions is shown for the 36 meetings in the data, as well as voting procedure, number of people at the meeting, and presence or absence of a chairperson. (page 108).
Here the unequivocal statements about black participation are found, both 8-I(C) and 8-N show definite polarity, as opposed to those which were characterized above as neutral and occurred without the structural element of having an individual talk for the Co-op.

The two moral premises in Figure 9.2 in which produce day is the subject are for obtaining a cash register. It appeared during a discussion of the need for a paid manager. However, produce day was organized as a food distribution situation, and lacked any mechanism by which policies could be set or equipment obtained, other than through the activities of the meeting-people. Once the meeting agreed to hire a manager, then the subset of produce day people who were the managing people were expected to exercise greater control over money than the subset of produce day people who had taken the responsibility earlier, i.e., the coordinators. No general formulations of the Co-op produce day appeared in the segments, other than regards equipment or relations with neighborhood people.

The definition of the good Co-op which was assembled from the moral premises does not exhaust the predications of moral matters which might be made or even were made at other times in talk. The picture shown, however partial, is again one that bears the stamp of having been used by Co-op people in Co-op activity. A logical extension of this procedure would be to extract all the moral premises from all of a series of meetings, to a point where perhaps the same
ones began to re-appear, so as to approach an approximation of what constituted a Co-op value system used in talk.

Communication Of Cooperation And Commitment

Two specific aspects of moral matters—cooperation and commitment were selected as concepts to guide the study of obligation and evaluation in the Co-op, and they rather than good Co-op people were the focus of the four preceding chapters. Both involve the link of the good person to a collection of people. Both concern aspects of what it meant to participate in the Co-op. Both were central concerns in the Co-op.

Yet neither cooperation or commitment were the focus of discussions of the Co-op meeting people. People there were generally concerned with Co-op problems, not Co-op ideology. In selecting parts of meetings to be used as data, I looked for places where the concrete issues facing the Co-op people implied the underlying concepts of cooperation and commitment. I raised a specific substantive question about one concept for each segment in order to see how the ideology of the Co-op was being molded or altered, called into question or accepted at these points. My concern in each instance was with the Co-op ideology expressed there: Had it changed? Were people's activities, beliefs and attitudes already at another stage of ideology? Was there a sense in which the talk of the Co-op people was only a reflection for changes that had already taken place? I shall return to
these questions below, but first there are some things which can be said of the communication of these moral matters more generally than in the particular discussions of cooperation and commitment in Chapters 5 to 8.

Cooperation

In selecting "cooperation" as an organizing concept, I could focus on the joint or shared activities, categories or attributes of participation, or any shared feature of the Co-op, stemming from the fact that more than one person was involved. Cooperation was defined in Chapter 1 as an activity (category or attribute) done (or held) with others which is directed to a collective aim. In the case of the Co-op, such a shared goal was to get produce at low prices ("Zweckrational"), although the goal of being seen as a good person by Co-op participation was also shown to be a factor at times ("Wertrational"). Cooperation was contrasted with individualism in Chapters 5 and 6.

In the segments used as data for the study of cooperation, the problems center on people who do not cooperate, but rather default, or do not contribute to the planning and coordination of Co-op activities from one week to the next. Both segments are discussions of proposals to make changes in the structure of the Co-op.

The moral matters which arise in the segments of Chapters 5 and 6 give evidence of a decrease in the amount of individual activity possible for a person participating in the Co-op. In the first segment, greater room for individuality was
shown by the officially adopted stratification which allowed for non-workers to participate in the Co-op. This increased option for the status an individual could occupy in the Co-op meant that those who wanted to continue to participate within a cooperative working system could do so whereas those who did not, had the option of continuing participation in the Co-op without putting in working time. In the second segment, a separate and paid management removed the responsibility of coordination and planning beyond the immediate day-to-day operation, but left the option that anyone who wanted to could apply for the new status.

The moral matters found in the talk of the people were stated as moral premises. The meeting people were expected to consider motions to establish the two levels of membership and to establish a paid manager. Although the manager's duties were specified to some extent, there was no mention of a most important consideration, the way in which management would communicate with the meeting people, and make possible a continuing cooperative coordination. Once the possibility of being a non-working member became a reality, the difficulties of coordinating the individuals who elected to work increased, for records were needed of who was a worker and who was not, in addition to insuring that people put in the amount of time required.

The move toward allowing people to participate and not to put in a share of the work was viewed as a recognition by the meeting people of an ideology which had already
changed, which was reflected in the fact that people were no longer all cooperatively supporting the Co-op with their labor. Although founded by an association of communes (cf. Chapter 2) and staffed initially by people from the communes, it is not clear how long people felt the Co-op ought to be run cooperatively. However, by the time of the meeting, far less labor was being given to the Co-op than the number of people participating would have led one to expect. Clearly people had other conflicting commitments which made it difficult for them to fulfill their quota of Co-op hours, and the Co-op was suffering. More and more it seemed that the cooperative ideal was being challenged by practical everyday living.

Management of the Co-op had always been a cooperative enterprise, in which the meeting people set policy and tried to solve problems. An impression of cooperative management was continued even after the paid manager was hired, by the absence of any clear definition of the pathways for information and authority. Yet in the segment in which the needs for a paid manager are outlined, a main consideration is to make the Co-op operation more efficient, so that one person would have a view of the Co-op as a whole. The free and easy approach of the "Early Days" where everyone cooperatively put in work in exchange for getting reasonably priced food was replaced by a system which set up an equation between an individual's work and the markup the individual received in buying food.
Although founded as a cooperative, the morality reflected by the moral matters found in the segments show extensive compromises which reflect the realities of a system which was to a large degree individualistic. As time went on the Co-op became for many nothing more than a food store, perhaps a little less reliable than others in the neighborhood, since food could only be obtained if sufficient orders were put in and the distribution center had the produce at a price the buyer would pay. The possibility that individuals could share information, perspectives and authority for the Co-op operation gradually disappeared. The segments show that people had indeed become reluctant to take responsibility, and that many did not want to share in the operation of the Co-op.

The two changes in stratification received formal approval at meetings, representing proposals which had been discussed and accepted by the meeting people. In these discussions moral matters surface which made it clear that the Co-op people who succeeded in altering the formal Co-op structure were reflecting the needs and practices of the Co-op people that were already in effect. The original cooperative model for the Co-op was no longer realistic, and so the formal ideology was repaired to conform to what had already become the case.

This finding presents one of the more general answers to the question set at the outset. The change was not accompanied by discussion of cooperative ideology since it
had long since occurred. The general implication is that if changes in ideology precede changes in social structure, overt discussion will rarely be appropriate. It could be argued that by the time an issue becomes overt, it is already decided, whether the talkers realize it or not.

Commitment

In selecting commitment as the second organizing moral matter for this study I was able to focus on motivations for participation in the Co-op, and to look at the attachment of individuals to the Co-op ideology. From the start this study has assumed that economic motivation would not completely explain Co-op participation, and that moral matters were also motivating. Evidence for the pull of both moral and economic forces was suggested during the analysis of cooperation in Chapter 5. There some of the coordinators were ridiculed for over-working to preserve Co-op continuity by others whose role performance was adequate, but did not extend beyond the hours required. In Chapter 6 the case for hiring a paid manager was made by showing that no one was willing to take on responsibility for running the Co-op. Being seen as a good person for managing the Co-op was not adequate motivation for continuing to supply stable management, and so again economic motivation had to be supplied by the Co-op people.

Commitment was defined in Chapter 1 as the continuing investment of resources (particularly time and energy) by

\[1\] Again an indication that wertsrationalitate is needed.
people in some collective aim of a collection of people which returns to the individual(s) at least the possibility of being seen as good people by others and themselves in that collection of people (cf. p. 38). The notion of commitment was expanded and amplified in Chapters 7 and 8 along three lines: (1) collective investment of resources in the Co-op through individual voluntary activity; (2) the possibility of appearing with others as good people; and (3) orientation to a continuing relationship of people and the Co-op.

A crucial aspect of the original aim and the ideology of the Co-op was to locate a cooperative food activity in the neighborhood that would be readily available to the neighborhood people. What developed and was reflected in the talk of the Co-op people was that for some of the neighborhood people this intention did not reflect the way in which the Co-op was perceived.

One problem area was that of initiating commitment so as to revive the Co-op after a summer shutdown. Different considerations were relevant as the Co-op people moved from a situation in which it was clear people were committed to the Co-op to some degree, but even so were not at first willing to make the initial effort needed to ensure that the Co-op would start up again. In the second problem, Co-op people found themselves in a dilemma between their commitment to the neighborhood and that to the Co-op once conflict erupted between some of the Co-op people and the neighborhood people.
How then do notions of commitment appear in the talk of the Co-op people? Moral premises were stated in the analysis of the segments and were useful in finding evidence of the features suggested above of commitment in the talk of people. Co-op people expected to be able to use the Co-op. In one case commitment was expressed by having the Co-op open and by protecting it against troublemakers, especially those who were in the neighborhood. In another commitment was expressed actively with regard to starting up the Co-op, which required an act of the self.

Commitment assumes some continuance of the Co-op, and of Co-op activities. However, the notion that continuing the Co-op is itself sufficient basis for Co-op participation was decried as the overworking coordinators were criticized for working solely to preserve Co-op continuity. The orientation of management people to take on responsibility to deal with problems includes not only current problems, but a commitment to those that will come up in the future.

It was not generally the case, however, that a person was automatically perceived as a good person by being in the Co-op. It remains a possibility that an individual does find satisfaction in being part of the Co-op, seeing the status of being a Co-op person as somehow better than not being a Co-op person.

As originally established, good working members were defined as those having a regular job in the Co-op or commitment to the Co-op. No one suggested that not to be a
working member would be a bad thing. Non-working members could view themselves (and be viewed by others) as good Co-op people, who supported the Co-op by using it (hence increasing the volume of food ordered, and often making possible lower unit prices for the produce). What is not good in Co-op working members is spelled out in the segments as defaulting, overworking, or not dealing with problems that arise.

Situations did appear in which an extra circumstance was present, some special basis for appearing as a good Co-op person. For instance, the Co-op needed to be protected from troublemaking others, and this made it possible to be the good Co-op person who prevented a showdown or avoided trouble by excluding people who were troublemakers.

Commitment to the Co-op was not the only commitment Co-op people had. Competition with commitments to other interests and other people resulted in the need to introduce the status of non-workers, to hire someone to manage. Co-op people were also neighborhood people, with commitments to the neighborhood. For some Co-op people locating the Co-op in the neighborhood was a means of bringing a needed service to the neighborhood, in which cooperative activity could be translated into economic advantage. These moral premises reflect the point that the Co-op people consider themselves as neighborhood people, perhaps even as experts on the neighborhood. They were certainly aware that many of the neighborhood people were black. Yet the charge appears in
talk of the neighborhood people who are shown as trouble-making others that the Co-op was practically a white organization. One moral premise reflects a desire to encourage black representation in the Co-op of the neighborhood people. Another moral premise suggests blacks are not to be excluded, and that Co-op people are not to be cowed by a lack of black participation. Two further moral premises concern the black/white issue, presenting what I characterized as a "neutral position," one in which blacks were neither encouraged or discouraged from participating.

Commitment to the Co-op is communicated effectively when Co-op people volunteer to do Co-op activity essential to its continuance. It is also communicated when they tell of their confrontations with troublemaking people who are also neighborhood people and black people. This second aspect of commitment is less evident on the surface, but is brought into relief by the process of identifying moral responses and stating the underlying moral premises.

**Communication Of Morality In Talk**

Generally I have preferred to write here of moral matters, rather than of a normative morality so as not to find myself limited to considerations of "what is good" and "what ought to be." These predicates were basic to all moral matters and were used to construct the notion of the good Co-op people just explored above. But for the most part, the notion of "moral matters" was used
because of the much wider spectrum of activities, characteristics and states which might be predicated, and to take into account the variety of ways in which people are evaluated as good or not good.

The philosophical literature on morality does revolve around "ought" and questions of what is "good." Although not limited to prescriptive pursuits, an ethical focus necessarily considers the "ideal" implicitly, if not explicitly. Studies of moral language illuminate my concerns but do not exhaust them. The values of the Co-op person and the ideology of the Co-op people shown above were derived from talk of the Co-op people which often shows no trace of this overt moral language. They are consistent with the details of the Co-op given in Chapter 2 which were assembled from participant observation and survey data.

This study is descriptive rather than normative. Opinions and attitudes on what ought to be which appeared in my interview data were placed in the background1 to help interpret the primary data--talk used in actual situations as problems were discussed and policies established. The problems and policies were those of a small group, faced with the need to change its ideal cooperative structure, to co-orient activities, to revitalize itself after a hiatus, and to resolve conflicting commitments to the Co-op and the surrounding society.

1 Excerpts are quoted in Chapter 2 and in the introductory materials of Chapters 5 through 8.
The Empirical Study Of Morality

I began this work with a general question as to whether there could be an empirical study of the communication of morality. Moral actions do not look different from any other actions, but rather talk makes them so. The question was how to study such talk. If actions were to be interpreted with regard to morality, it would not be my interpretations that were of interest, but rather those of the interactants.

In the data used here people do not explore their morality in general terms or question the content of their ideology. It is indeed perhaps possible to view morality as irrelevant to changes which have already occurred. A different point of view is to see morality as an essential element present as problems get solved and changes made.

Morality reflects an underlying consensus. The meeting people show this in an obvious way as they adhere to regulative rules of the meeting, including rituals of voting and making proposals. They also reflect the consensus of focused gatherings, employing its rules. Consensus is presented in this work as a shared set of categories established in the production and interpretation of talk as co-interactants ratify the use of collections of people. Such a consensus goes on beneath specific disagreements, and may be shown by scarcely perceptible behavior.

Yet the social situations studied here involve conflict. In some instances it is a disagreement that arises to the surface as underlying consensus is continued for the
relevant collections of people. Underlying dissensus is shown through breaks in the progression of collections of people which are below the surface. Such breaks may barely be noticeable as people continue their talk, showing surface agreement to the continuing collections of people. People who are not talking can not generally show where they stand, except for the unusual circumstances of a vote.

Co-op people do not readily present themselves as not moral, nor do they appear as willing to expose themselves to the charge that in the past they were not moral. They supply "accounts" (Scott and Lyman, 1968) or "motives" (Mills, 1948) by which their past action is interpreted. For instance, Ben explains in "No Parking" why the incident people did not fight back by presenting a pacifist viewpoint. In the same segment Joel explains why the troublemaking woman was thrown out, describing her actions as stealing from the Co-op. In each instance some others are shown as less than good, and their defects are the basis for showing that the Co-op people were good people.

An empirical study of morality is then brought to consider how the self and especially others are constructed in talk and evaluated along a dimension of good/bad. Such evaluations are not always overtly present, but may be implicit, relying on what is presumed to be shared knowledge.

To consider people with reference to morality requires that the people be considered as within some collection of people. From collections of people come the basis of the
notions of what is good or what ought to be. Talk is the resource in which such collections are reflected.

Morality As A Product Of Talk

I have entered a study of empirical morality at the level of talk, arguing that that is a necessary place to be. Talk of a situation may attribute morality to an action, characteristic or quality, and it is this social product that I have focused upon. An initial assumption of the analysis is that the presence in talk of anything predicated of people becomes available to the interaction as a site for moral matters. As this study has demonstrated, not all utterances show the interactional realization of moral matters. Clusters of indicators of moral response may be present in one instance, and scarcely any or none in another.

The use of the tape recorder provided a means for making a literal transcription at the level of words. Yet this literal transcription contains more than talkers may remember or recognize as what they have said, such as the use of "you" for "I," omission of a subject entirely, intrusion of "you know," hesitations, categorical exaggerations, repetitions, etc. I have not hesitated to use these elements of talk in the analysis, arguing that interactants used them also to interpret and that they are accessible to me within the corpus of data in a form that is easily used.¹

¹ If paralinguistic materials such as head nods, glances etc. such that video tape supplies, were also as easily available, I would have used those also, though some linguists have argued that such materials are generally redundant with the literal text.
Where interactants do single out moral matters, this product of interaction can be reported on later, to the extent that interactants remember it. Such reports are at the level of the word, a level at which a repetition of the situation can be made. Who looked at whom, whose fingers drummed on the table, and who nodded during pauses in talk on a particular issue may indeed be important as people interpret what is going on from minute-to-minute. But such information is not what people hold themselves later to be accountable for. Rather, a word-by-word representation of what was said would seem to be most relevant.

Here the focus on talk is therefore on the words used. As a social product, people's talk shows which options for communication of moral matters were used and which not. What is not used are those individual imputations of moral matters which remained a private matter and were not part of the interaction product. The talk reflects the competence of the interactants to supply a moral interpretation in so far as interactants give some evidence of it.

The starting point of the investigation of morality in talk is the initial sociological insight that the self and others are located in collections of people, and that it is such collections of people that define what is moral. Participation in the Co-op is but one of the many collections of people in which Co-op people were located. The difficulty of dealing with talk may seem at first that collections of
people do not seem to be present. But once techniques for finding hidden collections are shown, the problem becomes quite the reverse, for the possible collections of people are enormous. The problem then is one of selection, where some compromise between surface forms and some amount of abstraction is made.

Even with some immediate selection and abstraction, moral matters prove to be dense once a close look at talk is taken. This can only be contrasted with the seeming absence of moral matters on the surface of talk.

The Apparant Lack Of Morality In Talk

An initial concern of this study was the apparent lack of moral matters in everyday talk. In general the language used in everyday life does not seem to revolve about moral matters other than in occasional gossiping, indignant outbursts at perceived injustice or directives to action where clear status differences are present (such as law enforcer to deviant, or parent to child). Discussion of ideology does not seem a feature of ordinary interaction and yet Co-op people give continuing evidence of ideological change. For example, at the time of the Co-op meetings studied here, people spoke of "his job" where today the same people automatically say "his or her job."

Has this study contributed to an understanding of the apparent reluctance of people to talk about moral matters? The segments analyzed were selected because each found the
Co-op people at a point where some action was about to be taken which seemed necessarily to involve moral matters. In "New Labor" a new system was devised to cope with the seemingly uncooperative behavior of some of the Co-op people. "Paid Manager" introduced a system of management to the Co-op because a number of serious problems were no longer being solved cooperatively. At the time of "Starting Up" the Co-op was closed, and the problem of the meeting was to get people to make commitments to the Co-op and revive the organization once again. The agenda item for "No Parking" is an incident involving neighborhood people as the Co-op people devise a strategy to minimize further conflict with the racially mixed neighborhood and strengthen commitment to the Co-op without conflicting with the commitment of the Co-op people to the ideal of an integrated neighborhood.

Each of the segments marks a successful event in the Co-op history. In each instance action was taken and the Co-op prospered. It can be argued that this success required the successful handling of moral matters. Close study of the talk of the Co-op people in these segments does find evidence of communication of moral matters, including an underlying ideology. The methodology constructed here provides a means of discovering the moral matters that are present in the talk of the Co-op people although they are not evident at first.

Several distinct processes have been identified in this study which may be useful for the analyst trying to disengage underlying moral matters. All of these processes share a
certain degree of indirection, i.e., they represent the interactional realization of moral matters that is much less apparent than overt statements such as "everybody ought to work." The processes can be distinguished by those that focus on people and those that concern the predicates.

Avoiding People

Four processes are particularly relevant to the way people are constructed in talk and evaluated. All are ways in which people who are referred to in the talk are shown less distinctly than could be done. The self may be missing where it is most expected; references to others may appear hopelessly vague; relevant collections of people may be hidden; alternative collections of people proposed to redefine them more remotely.

1. **Omission of possible self.** Many instances in which the self is repressed or shown indirectly may be explained by the notions of jeopardy and risk to the self of being seen as less than good (presented throughout Goffman's work). Here the notion of "possible self" was developed to encompass a variety of lexical and syntactic means by which the self might be masked, which reduced the risk of being seen as less than a good person.

2. **Submergence of hidden people.** The collection of people of whom moral matters are predicated may at first appear to be absent. Chapter 3 demonstrated the absence of representations of people in talk where they would be most expected. A fight was talked about, but not the collections
of people in which the individuals were implicated. The list of possibly relevant statuses, social categories, groups would be staggering. Were the combatants being shown as instances of "neighborhood people," "black people," "Co-op meeting people," or some combination of these? None were present in the initial description. Indirection was found to be particularly characteristic of the way blacks were presented (as shown in Figure 8.2 page 550).

3. Depersonalization. One of the most common indicators of moral response was depersonalization, the technique which concerns the way other people are referred to in talk. Yet these individuals may be present. If not present they are probably known to at least some of the interactants, for they are insiders. Yet they may be referred to by "person," "someone," or "they," as in "Where are the people who are going to do all that?" ("Starting Up" 208-211). The strategy of depersonalization was used extensively in the segments considered in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 where the issues concerned subcollections of Co-op people, and depersonalized others were constructed which avoided personalities and possible conflicts.

4. Redefinition with alternative classification. Another device which diminished the impact of specific individuals on the interactants also operated upon collections of people as individuals were relocated in different collections of people. Just as depersonalization was a technique especially applied to insiders, redefinition was applied to outsi-

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1 Labels were stated using the form feature-plus-people to emphasize the partitioning aspect of these collections.(p. 139).
ders. In Chapter 8 the use of the collection of "black people" was apt to show the meeting people as less than good; this was less likely with the collection of "troublemaking people." At one point the relevance of the collection of black people is directly called into question, "It has nothing to do with his being black." ("No Parking" 149). Further, the individual is defined as "crazy." Each of these alternative classifications is an indirect way of presenting to the interactants the moral matters associated with each additional collection of people.

Transforming Moral Matters

A similar indirection is often met when predications are examined. Four processes were found in the analysis by which predications are systematically treated so that the moral matters are shown less directly: polarity may be reversed, surface forms embroidered, humor introduced to avoid serious import, or moral matters dismissed as impractical.

1. Reversal of polarity. A surface form (the existential predication) often has the opposite polarity from the moral premise (case II in the dynamic of moral response, discussed on page 299). In many such reversals the talker appears to believe that the reverse of the surface formulation is the case. For instance, an individual was criticized by saying, "he should know better than that" ("No Parking" 104). The existential predication is that he does not know better, the moral premise that he ought to know better. The dynamic of moral response often suggests an imbalance or
dialectic where action to resolve the disjunction of existential and moral premise can be anticipated. The only way to know whether the surface and underlying forms have the same or different polarity is for the observor to be in touch with the social situation. And even so, the polarity remains indeterminate in some cases, either because those who listen lack information or the talker's evaluation is in fact not determinate. In some instances such an indeterminate case was judged to be effectively neutral, where neither state was preferred. The possibility of ambiguity exists though.

2. Embroidery of the surface form. An existential predication is often elaborated with the use of hyperbolic forms including empty intensifiers and absolute categorization, or variations in tempo or dynamics suggesting affect. Such predications are then less sharp. Although the more elaborate and generally longer utterances would seem at first glance to give more information, closer inspection shows that this is not so. For instance, one person says, "my being here is a little silly, because I really never bought." ("Starting Up" 97) This is followed shortly by the same person saying "I placed one order last year" and "I was constantly throwing out heads of lettuce that went black." The term "never" in the first quotation is an exaggeration with little relation to the facts, but it is a moral response like the other hyperbolic and categorical phrases, all of which appear to do no more than reflect an underlying "I ought not be here."

3. The use of humor. Treating an utterance or action as less than serious was another way interactants trans-
formed predications which might present moral matters directly to the talk. Morality remains a serious matter and interactants make use of this circumstance. In one instance an offer of action is not taken as a commitment but is treated as a joke. An effort to establish a humorous frame does not succeed however and the collective perception of the situation as serious continues. However, the offer is not then repeated, and that line of talk deflected for a while as other talkers pursue a different line of talk. In another instance, ridicule is used to defuse a threat presented to some of the people by coordinators who were said to work "just for the sake of the keeping the Co-op going" ("New Labor" 124). Here a contribution to the Co-op was being shown as larger then that expected of Co-op workers and consequently made those who did a more usual share seem less than good. It is even possible that some of those present themselves had the same motivation and resented their contribution being ignored, yet would have been embarrassed had it been known. In each instance of the use of humor, moral matters are deflated if not lost entirely.

4. Attribution of impracticality. Another mechanism is to treat what is said as impractical, and therefore not relevant to the practical concerns at hand. An exposition of an ideal Co-op is given at a meeting in which there is talk of "moral obligation" and "collective responsibility" and "firmer commitment." The speaker is interrupted and characterized as presenting "the fine points of running the Co-op" ("Starting Up" 196). The individual who interrupted defined himself as a "pragmatist" and proposed more immediate con-
cerns as he said "there is no Co-op until the doors are open and the lettuce and tomatoes are in." In another segment an examination of reasons why the Co-op ought to have a manager is stopped with the practical question, "Is there someone to take the job?" ("Paid Manager" 062) In both instances the interactants are prevented from pursuing abstract ideas.

If one of the meeting people had raised the issue of cooperation vs individualism during the discussions of work and the best Co-op structure within which to ensure that the Co-op operate well, would the reception have been similar to that described in the last paragraph? Or would the individual have been ridiculed, treated as less than serious, or shown that the characterizations applied to a different collection of people, not those present? Possibly such an individual would be seen as lacking the qualifications to speak for the Co-op people, either that the individual felt such a lack or that others might attribute it. Given that such moral matters were not discussed, and had not been in previous meetings, it is not clear that an individual would know what others might feel to be a fair description of the ideology of the Co-op with regard to the extent of individualism or cooperation.

Such moral matters concerning ideology, the beliefs and values which can be attributed to the Co-op as a whole, remain unformulated. Is that to say that they are non-existent? If participation in the Co-op can be explained
wholly by the desire of the Co-op people to get reasonably priced food and the administration and organization of the Co-op entirely within rational procedures of efficiency and expedition, then there is no need to search for moral matters. Clearly this is not the case. But there are further aspects of the seeming lack of moral matters and the extent of ambiguity and indirection.

Given that talk in the meetings contains few statements of ideological import, a consequence is that ideology can undergo change without surface evidence. When changes in procedures are needed to make Co-op operation match the evident but unstated ideology, which is evident in peoples not cooperatively working, there is no need to do extensive re-writing of the formulation of the ideology. No earlier formulations are present to haunt the people making the operational changes. If they are ignored, they need not be admitted to. No revisions and re-writings of the past are required and the current ongoing ideology is not shown as different from what existed earlier. The ideology of the day retains its seeming immutable and stable character and its relation to earlier versions need not be an embarrassment.

The communal origins of the Co-op presumed an ideal cooperative structure which soon was altered in the stresses and competing commitments of the lives of the Co-op people. They saw the Co-op first as a place for inexpensive food and only slightly if at all as a cooperative ideal structure in
which interrelations between people would operate because of communal concerns and cooperative resources shared. The end result of the lack of ideological talk was a situation in which change in ideology could continue without the need for people involved to confront and explain or try to reconcile variations of the ideology from the past.

Further Study Of Communication Of Morality

Once the processes are noticed by which indirection is accomplished, it is no longer possible to speak of the absence of moral matters in ordinary conversation. I have made some suggestions in the preceding section as to why such expression of moral matters as is made takes such indirect form in ordinary talk at the Co-op meetings. But I have only studied Co-op talk in meetings of one particular Co-op and do not know what other sites might add or detract from this formulation. In addition there are many more questions which this study raised which could not be covered but which future empirical studies of morality might profitably consider.

One theme I emphasized was that of depersonalization as one of the mechanisms by which talkers construct others who are linked to moral matters. There is an intriguing similarity here to the theme of disinterestedness proposed by Ranulf (1938, 1964) to characterize a lower middle class desire to sanction others who did wrong. Is there a distinction between morality directed at those within a
collection of people and one directed at other people that parallels a distinction between "depersonal" and "disinterested," or do these notion jointly explain or characterize morality of both sorts?

What have been called moral emotions--indignation, smugness, selfsatisfaction, envy--have been little studied and only touched on here. What explains the affect which is displayed when for example the price of onions is stated to be 50¢/lb. The term "Outrageous!" is immediately applied. What collections of people are implicated here? Further study of the communication of morality need be directed to these emotions and the structures in which they occur, the basis by which they are initiated, continued or dismissed.

Closer study need be directed to finding further evidence of how people are shown as good people (or not good), and of the extent of evaluation of people in ordinary concerns. How sensitive a means for social control is the use of such mechanisms as questionable classification--where the individual is said to be in a collection he or she would not want or feel he or she fit? Insults, labelling of social types, even up to the larger question of who people are shown, gives information of evaluation which needs more close study.

No systematic study was made here of the predications which were shown as obligatory to some degree or another. What are the limits to what can be linked to people and predicated as something expected or anticipated, or in some way linked to people or persons. The field was broadened here
to include links which went beyond actions to include states and characteristics. However, the traditional focus of norms on actions and statuses on duties does represent a fair share of the sorts of predications which were looked at via moral premises. Nothing was done about how expectations were known or the limits to which statement might be made. The search for violation in the spirit of Durkheim would no doubt pay off, perhaps even beyond the area of moral laws so as to include the broader scope looked at here.

Since collections of people are being found in talk it can be asked if reference and membership groups (and classes) can also be found and so articulate with reference group theory. The sense then in which some such collections of people which appear in talk are those by which the individual measures him or her self could link then relative deprivation. So too the collections of people shown in talk to which future interest is being shown suggests a means of specifying anticipatory socialization mechanisms and directions.

In this work, individual instances of moral matters were pointed out, and to some extent the progression through a stretch of talk were followed, e.g., the rebirth of commitment. However, what was not done was to trace the path of personal influence throughout the group either in terms of the group structure (and even the seemingly amorphous Co-op meetings had interactional leaders and followers) to see whether communication flow is from equal to equal or whether
it involves two stages (or more), from interactional
star outward or from lower level up and then down again.

A constant theme in the study of moral matters here has
been ambiguity, vagueness, and even indirection in what can
be shown or known. What are the boundaries to such haziness?
Are there structural constraints on the undeterminacy inter-
actants will accept with regard to moral matters?

A wide range of moral matters might profitably be
explored both to see when they appear and when they do not.
In this study I focused on only two particular concepts—
cooperation and commitment—and how these figured in Co-op
problems and policies. Although the study was of a small
food buying club in the first half of the seventies in a
neighborhood of Philadelphia, the problems of the Food club
which relate to these concepts reflected changes in the
ideology and of the re-organization of the group to meet
competing and sometimes conflicting values and interests
of its members. The problems and issues of the group were
shown in talk, but are documented by the other data I
collected. The problems of the group were specific, but
perhaps typical of problems groups face with ideologies
changing (or being changed) to fit with changing times.

I have assumed in this work that in talk every predication
of people is potentially moral, that it is "always available"
for interactants to use to show morality. I have argued that
people must use talk if they want to communicate to others
that what is going on is moral. The contribution of this work
is to examine in a systematic way how the interactants as they participate in the Co-op went about communicating morality in their talk.
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