October, 2013

Inequality and Regime Change: The Role of Distributive Conflict

Terence Teo
**Inequality and Regime Change: The Role of Distributive Conflict**

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In a recent article in the *American Political Science Review*, we attempted to test what we call “distributive conflict” models of regime change using a qualitative data set of transitions to and from democracy from 1980 through 2000. These models, pioneered by Carles Boix (2003) and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006) rest on complex causal chains including both structural and game-theoretic components: inequality, strategic interactions between incumbents and oppositions over the nature of political institutions, and the ever-present threat of repression from above and violence from below.


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**Rethinking Inequality and Democratization: How Inequality Divides Elites and Underpins Regime Change**

*Ben Ansell, Oxford University*

*David Samuels, University of Minnesota*

Despite the implications of Przeworski et al., the search for factors that might drive “endogenous” democratization is alive and well. However, scholarship on the political consequences of economic change has shifted from the hypothesized impact of economic growth to the question of the political consequences of different patterns of equal or unequal growth. We owe this ‘redistributivist’ turn - which draws attention to a purported tension between democracy and property - to the influence of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson and Carles Boix. These studies vary in how they formalize the


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Articles

RMDs

Carles Boix, Princeton University

Redistributive models of democracy (RMD), to use Haggard and Kaufman’s expression, have been criticized on several counts: (1) their empirical performance is weak; (2) they make unconditional predictions about the relationship between structural variables (inequality, asset specificity, organizational and information parameters) and political transitions; and (3) the parameters of the models are either too narrow and stylized or simply wrong – particularly (a) the assumption of rational, self-interested actors motivated by material interests, (b) the definition of ‘classes’, (c) the sequence of the political decision process, and (d) the tax setting model. After examining these critiques briefly here, I conclude that, broadly speaking, the idea of democracy as an equilibrium (given by the material payoffs of relevant social and economic actors) is: (1) relatively robust and (2) the best point of departure (or, in Lakatos’ terms, a core) from which to progressively build a satisfactory theory of political transitions.

Empirical Performance of the Theory

Several important empirical tests on RMD find that the association between economic inequality, asset specificity and political transitions either does not exist, is highly unstable or is restricted to democratic breakdowns. Houle (2009) concludes that inequality makes democratic breakdowns more likely but does not affect democratic transitions after 1960. Ansell and Samuels (2010) find that land inequality explains democratic transitions since the mid-19th century but that income inequality has the opposite effect. Haggard and Kaufman (2012) claim that almost half of all political transitions since 1980 are unrelated to distributive conflict.

As I have insisted elsewhere,\(^1\) the examination of the covariates of political transitions has to be systematic to the point of including all the


Democracy, Public Policy and Inequality

Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Suresh Naidu, Columbia University
Pascual Restrepo, Universidad de los Andes
James A. Robinson, Harvard University

The relationship between inequality and democracy has been theorized since at least Aristotle, but in the last decade it has been subject to intense theoretical and empirical investigation. The first formal models of democratic transitions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) suggested that there would be an inverse U-shaped relationship between inequality and democratization. Autocracies that were too equal would not democratize because there would not be enough social conflict to create an effective demand for changes in political institutions. Autocracies that were too unequal would not democratize either because democratization would be very costly for non-democratic elites who would attempt to stay in power via repression. These models also predicted that democratization itself ought to reduce inequality as the newly enfranchised would vote for redistribution and more active government policy.

These theoretical results were obviously conditional on key modeling decisions. For one, political conflict was conceived of as rich/elite versus poor/citizen with autocracy being associated with rule by the elite and democratization being associated with a transfer of power from rich to poor with a resulting change in policy from pro-elite to pro-poor. Though this set-up has a parsimonious appeal, the comparative statics are conditional on some very simple models of both types of political regime. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) showed that once one relaxed the simple poor versus rich nature of political conflict in their original models as well as the restriction of policy instruments, the nature of the comparative statics with respect to inequality in the basic model changed.\(^2\) Put simply, if the groups in conflict were not

INEQUALITY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Christian Houle, Michigan State University

Does inequality affect democracy? Recently a large literature has argued that inequality influences both the likelihood of transition to and away from democracy, often through similar mechanisms. In this note, I argue that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the effects of inequality on democratization and on democratic consolidation. As demonstrated by Przeworski et al. regarding economic development, for example, some factors may have very different implications for these two transition processes.

Building on my previous work, I argue that inequality harms the consolidation of democracies but does not affect the likelihood of transition to democracy itself. In other words, unequal countries are not more or less likely to transition to democracy, but once they democratize they are less likely to remain democratic. I extend my previous analysis in three ways. First, my previous analysis used a single measure of inequality: the capital shares of the value added in production. In this note, I show that my results are robust to the use of Gini indexes. Second, I tackle the issue of endogeneity between inequality and democracy by using a novel instrumental variable strategy.

Third, the capital shares dataset I used in my previous article ended in 2000 and about seventy countries were excluded from the analysis because of the lack of inequality data. Other recent empirical studies typically have an even larger proportion of missing observations. I use the extended version of the capital shares dataset I introduced in Houle. It covers 183 countries between 1960 and 2008, and contains more


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Obituary for Juan Linz, continued

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love and miss him terribly.

Obituary for Juan J. Linz

On Tuesday October 1, 2013, Juan José Linz Storch de Gracia died at the age of 86. Professor Linz was undoubtedly one of the finest political sociologists in the world. Legendary for the encyclopedic breadth of his knowledge, his ideas and writings deeply influenced debates surrounding a vast array of the century’s most important political problems.

Linz’s empirical and theoretical contributions to scholarly research and literature were legion. He contributed with path-breaking work on regime types, the dynamics of democratic breakdowns, transitions to democracy, democratic institutional design, presidentialism versus parliamentarism, parties and party systems, political and business elites, federalism, nationalism, and fascism. His most recent works were on inequality and political paralysis in the United States, and on “state nations” in countries like India where the effort to impose a “nation state” would be in tension with an inclusionary democracy and internal peace.

Linz’s undying passion for such diverse but intertwined subjects was largely a product of his traumatic experience growing up in interwar Europe. Born in the Weimar Republic to a Spanish mother and German father, Linz would witness first-hand over the course of his childhood and adolescence a sequence of tragic social and political events: first in Germany, the economic crisis of the Weimar Republic, its subsequent breakdown, and the rise to power and domination of the Nazis; then, after moving with his mother to Spain in the Spring of 1936, the breakdown of the country’s Second Republic and its bloody Civil War. Linz’s work would be consistently concerned to understand and therefore help avoid repeating such collective tragedies. His work on democratic breakdowns especially so, motivated as it was by a sentiment well expressed by Meinecke, the great German historian whose reaction to Hitler’s appointment as chancellor was one that Linz was particularly fond of quoting – namely, “This was not necessary.”

Linz came to New York in 1950 to pursue a doctoral degree in Sociology at Columbia University, an institution with which he would remain affiliated for nearly two decades until 1969, when he moved to Yale where he would stay for the rest of his life. Upon his arrival at Columbia, he soon gained a reputation for his extraordinary erudition and unparalleled command of comparative European history as well as social and political thought. Having already been mentored in Spain by Javier Conde, he took classes and worked very closely at Columbia with Robert K. Merton, Paul
We argued that both theoretical and methodological progress could be made by undertaking detailed process tracing of the components of these models. We examined not only the reduced-form relationship between inequality and regime change—on which there has been surprisingly little supportive evidence for the theory (Acemoglu et al., this symposium)—but also the postulated mechanisms through which inequality translated into pressures for authoritarian or democratic elites to yield power.

We distinguished in particular between distributive conflict and non-distributive conflict transitions. In the former, pressures from below appeared to directly influence decisions by elites to make democratic concessions. In the latter, pressures from below did not play a decisive role; transitions resulted from incumbent initiatives, intra-elite conflicts, and/or external pressures.

In this note, we revisit the theoretical issue of how inequality generates regime change, and the role of distributive conflict in particular. We summarize new results based on an updated version of our dataset that includes all democratic transitions through 2008. The results strengthen our earlier finding that a large share of transitions occur in the absence of significant pressure from below, suggesting that distributive conflict models are at best subject to unspecified scope limitations, including the capacity of subordinated groups to overcome barriers to collective action.

We conclude with some preliminary findings on how the nature of the transition to democratic rule may affect the prospects for consolidation. We find that the democracies that emerge from distributive conflict transitions appear more robust than those that occur through a non-distributive route.

**Distributive Conflict Models**

The work of both Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (A&R, 2006) builds on the seminal Meltzer-Richard (MR) model (1981). MR provide a formal model of redistribution under democratic rule, and thus a baseline for how the distribution of income would change as a result of a transition from authoritarian to democratic governance. Boix (p. 37) captures the general spirit of these models: “a more unequal distribution of wealth increases the redistributive demands of the population…. [However] as the potential level of transfers becomes larger, the authoritarian inclinations of the wealthy increase and the probabilities of democratization and democratic stability decline steadily.”

How this strategic interaction between elites and masses plays out depends on the level of inequality, the capacity to repress and other parameters such as capital mobility. Nonetheless, the challenge to the authoritarian status quo emanates from what Acemoglu and Robinson call de facto as opposed to de jure political power: the ability of lower class groups to challenge elite incumbents through mass mobilization, strikes, demonstrations, riots and other physical threats to elite security.

While the basic insight of these distributive conflict models is intuitive, the details are not. This can be seen in differences in the treatment of inequality, the central causal factor in these models. A&R agree with Boix that high inequality increases the incentives for authoritarian elites to repress political demands for redistribution. They also note—contrary to Boix—that at low levels of inequality there is little demand for democratization. Boix thus sees the prospects for democratic transitions to be inversely correlated with inequality. A&R by contrast conclude that the relationship between inequality and democratic transitions should exhibit an inverted-U pattern, with transitions to democratic rule most likely to occur at intermediate levels of inequality.

A&R add another layer of complexity by considering credible commitment problems; these issues are directly germane to the controversial question of how these models treat collective action. In addition to the possibility of repressing outright, A&R note that elites can maintain power by making short-run economic concessions to defuse threats from below. Yet politically and economically excluded groups are aware that elites can renege on these concessions when pressures from below subside. Lower class groups are thus likely to press their advantage during windows when collective action problems are temporarily resolved.

These credible commitment problems can generate a counterintuitive result. It might seem that transitions would be more likely when lower class groups are well-organized. Yet A&R argue that this is not necessarily the case “because with a frequent revolutionary threat, future redistribution becomes credible.” As an historical example, they cite the fact that Germany—the country with the most developed socialist movement—created novel welfare institutions without extending the franchise while political elites in Britain and France...
were forced to extend the franchise as a result of pressures from below. We are hard pressed, however, to think of contemporary examples in which a high capacity for collective action on the part of the poor was responsible for stable, redistributive authoritarian rule. The primary focus of Economic Origins is on situations in which sporadic—if unexplained—collective action drives regime change. The basic game on which all others build distinguishes between a low threat situation in which there are high costs for citizens to solve collective action problems and a high threat situation in which “citizens are able to solve the collective action problem relatively costlessly and/or elites are not well organized in their defense…” (p. 145). To what extent do contemporary transitions comport with this distinction between “high threat” and “low threat” environments?

Some simple tests

Despite their differences, these distributive conflict theories share two important assumptions that are amenable to empirical observation. First, although there are disagreements about the political dynamics of low and intermediate levels of inequality, there is agreement that democratic transitions are unlikely at high levels of inequality. Second—and more important for our purposes—it is assumed that democracy is likely to occur when lower class groups are able to overcome barriers to collective action—even if only temporarily—and mobilize “de facto power” in favor of democracy. The assumptions about collective action receive only limited attention in the two books (Boix, this symposium); in fact, A&R explicitly assume the problem away by treating “citizens” as a unitary actor in the formal models. And the role of mass mobilization is almost entirely ignored in the econometric literature, which focuses more directly on the effects of inequality and other structural variables. But if distributive conflict models are correct, we would expect to see democratic transitions preceded by mass mobilization that threatens authoritarian incumbents and forces them to withdraw.

The qualitative data set that provided the empirical base for the APSR paper looks directly at this causal mechanism. Our data set assessed the role of distributive conflict in all transitions indicated in the Polity IV (n=57) and Cheibub, Ghandi and Vreeland (hereafter CGV; n=65) datasets between 1980 and 2000. We drew a simple dichotomous distinction between distributive and non-distributive conflict transitions. We coded “distributive conflict” transitions as ones in which both of the following occurred:

- The mobilization of redistributive grievances on the part of economically disadvantaged groups or representatives of such groups (parties, unions, NGOs) posed a threat—a “clear and present danger”—to the incumbency of ruling elites, and
- The rising costs of repressing these demands appear to have motivated elites to make political compromises or exit in favor of democratic challengers. The presence of this causal mechanisms was indicated at a minimum by a clear temporal sequence—mass mobilization followed by authoritarian withdrawal—but where possible we drew on other evidence as well, including elite statements.

Non-distributive transitions, by contrast, were ones in which these elements were missing. Elite withdrawal was motivated by international pressures, intra elite conflicts, or what we call “pre-emptive” motives, in which elites initiated regime change in the belief that they could remain in office or effectively veto their democratic successors.

In coding the cases, we were deliberately permissive, writing coding rules that gave the benefit of the doubt to the theory. Unlike the extant inequality data, our coding allowed us to consider a variety of distributive conflicts that may not be captured by any single inequality measure, from urban class conflicts to ethnic, regional and sectoral ones. The economically disadvantaged or the organizations representing them need not be the only ones mobilized in opposition to the existing regime. Although mass mobilization must partly reflect demands for redistribution, it can be motivated by other grievances as well. Yet mobilization must arise around distinctive and identifiable inequalities at least to some extent.

Even with a very permissive coding, we found a large share of cases (44.6 percent of the CVG transitions and 42.1 percent of the Polity cases) in which distributive conflict played only a marginal role. Using three separate measures of inequality (capital’s share of income in the manufacturing sector, a Gini coefficient from the Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set and the Vanhanen measure of land inequality) we also found that between 29 and 34 percent of all transitions occurred in countries ranked in the upper tercile of these measures; a high share of transitions were taking place in high-inequality settings. Moreover,
Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo

a high proportion of these were distributive conflict transitions. Using the Gini as the measure of inequality, about 75 percent of the high-inequality transitions were characterized by distributive conflict; the incidence of such high-inequality transitions was 60 percent using the land inequality measure and 57 percent using capital’s share of manufacturing income. We drew two conclusions: that inequality did not appear to have the stipulated effect on the likelihood of transitions; and that distributive conflict was not a uniform driver of democratization. At best, the effect of inequality worked under scope conditions that were not clearly specified in the theory.

We have subsequently extended the Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo data set through 2008, adding 14 cases to the CGV transitions (n=79) and 16 cases to the Polity ones (n=73). The results remain essentially the same; if anything, they are even less favorable to the distributive conflict approach. Between 34 and 45 percent of all transitions were in the most unequal countries—again measured by the top terciles—and of these, between 37.5 and 55.6 percent were distributive conflict transitions. The percentage of distributive conflict transitions among the CGV coding fell from 54.4 to 53.2 percent; Polity transitions conforming to the distributive conflict model fell from 57.9 to only 49.3 percent. Boix (this symposium) argues that valid tests of the model must include the full historical record to capture the initial divergence associated with democratization in the advanced industrial states. However, this approach makes strong assumptions about the ability to control for incredible panel heterogeneity. For the Third Wave of recent democratization—when there was in fact substantial divergence in political developments across cases—a large share of transitions simply do not reflect the causal mechanisms stipulated in the theory, either with respect to the role of inequality or distributive conflict.

**Extensions**

Despite these findings, the distributive conflict approach reopens the debate about the causes and consequences of different transition paths. Do these paths arise from different causal roots? And more importantly, does the distinction between distributive and non-distributive conflict transitions have any enduring effect on the nature of democratic rule? We report some preliminary findings here.

To explore the first question, we ran separate rare event logit estimates with country-clustered robust standard errors and cubic time polynomials on the likelihood of each type of transition. Given space limitations the regressions are not presented here but are available from the authors on request.

As noted, we are particularly interested in the capacity of mass groups to overcome barriers to collective action. One factor—industrialization—has long been viewed as a foundation for mobilization along class lines. In the regressions, we use the size of the manufacturing sector to proxy for this potential. Of course, the role played in collective action by non-economic factors such as ethnicity or religion also require examination. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that manufacturing—a basis for worker coordination and organization—does have a consistently significant impact on distributive transitions and an insignificant or even a negative role in non-distributive ones.

We also find that the type of authoritarian regime appears to have a differential effect on the likelihood of distributive and non-distributive transitions. Challenges from below are less likely under authoritarian regimes with multiparty legislatures—perhaps because of their capacity to coopt opposition—and more likely under military regimes that did not typically provide such channels of representation. On the other hand, the distinction between military and multiparty regimes was not consequential in non-distributive transitions, which were driven primarily by elite actors who were either tolerated by incumbent rulers or parts of the ruling circle itself.

The likelihood of non-distributive transitions was, however, affected by economic and international factors proxied in the regressions. Low or negative growth consistently predicted non-distributive as well as distributive transitions, presumably by intensifying elite struggles over rents or diminishing their capacity to manipulate electoral support. Non-distributive transitions (but not distributive ones) were affected as well by the incidence of neighboring democracies, an indication of the relative importance of diffusion effects and other forms of external pressure.

Again, inequality had no effect on either type of transition.

**The Effects of Transition Paths**

The implicit question raised by the discussion in the preceding section is whether “non-distributive” transitions—dominated by external influences and intra-elite politics—are less likely to result in full democracies than ones driven at least in part by pressures from below. Distributive
Comparative Democratization

Vol. 11, No. 3                                                                               Oct. 2013

conflict transitions may pose dangers of destabilizing polarization for newly established democratic governments, but it is also reasonable to assume that such governments would be more responsive to a mobilized citizenry. Governments emerging from non-distributive transitions face no equivalent pressures or restraints on the abuse of power.

The fixed-effects regressions below address this issue by examining the way distributive and non-distributive CGV transitions, defined more narrowly on the basis of transitional elections, affect subsequent Polity scores, which provide a broader measure of differences in political form that includes political rights and government accountability. Both distributive and non-distributive CGV transitions have a significant impact on the Polity score, but the coefficients for distributive transitions are almost twice as large as those for non-distributive ones (4.93 versus 2.71 in model 4).

A distributive transition increases a country’s Polity score by almost 5 points relative to a “non-transition” year; a non-distributive transition by only about 2.7 points. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables, including: GDP, growth, trade openness, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and prior rule by a military dictatorship. In future work, we will consider the longer-run path of democratic consolidation in the two types of transitions, but preliminary inspection of the cases suggests that non-distributive conflict transitions are followed by democracies that are not only weaker but more prone to reversal.

Conclusion

The work of Boix and A&R has opened up new avenues of research about how conflicts over redistribution affect authoritarian and democratic rule. Yet inequality does not appear to be associated with regime change in a straightforward way, as Acemoglu et. al. note in this symposium. Core theoretical assumptions about the causal importance of distributive demands from below appear to pertain only in a subset of cases. Distributive and non-distributive transitions are driven by distinct political and economic dynamics, including differences in the potential for mass groups to overcome barriers to collective action. We also find preliminary evidence that distributive conflict transitions generate more robust democracies, at least in the short run. These results suggest the importance of revisiting the logic and consequences of different transition paths.

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Table 1. Regression Estimates of the Effects of CGV Distributive and Non-Distributive Transitions on Polity Score in the Year Following the Transition, 1980-2008

<table>
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<td>Transition</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Distributive Transition</td>
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<td>Distributive Transition</td>
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<td>Control Variables</td>
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<td>Log GDP per capita</td>
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<td>Trade Openness</td>
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interplay between economic structure and political outcomes and in their empirical approaches to testing hypotheses, but they begin from the same simple theoretical premise: the emergence of democracy is a function of the incumbent autocratic elite’s relative fear of redistribution to (and by) the poor — and the higher the inequality, the greater the fear.

This syllogism between democracy and redistribution has become conventional wisdom. It is intuitive, has deep philosophical roots, and has long been invoked on the political left and right (albeit for different reasons — to evoke hope versus instill fear). Moreover, the argument gained widespread academic credence with Meltzer and Richard’s seminal median-voter model. This model assumes that under democracy the tax system will be progressive: All citizens pay the same proportion of their income, but benefits are universal and uniform, so that everyone receives the same amount in subsidy. This means that the rich pay more than they receive while the opposite is true for the poor. Consequently, those with below-mean incomes favor redistribution, while those above the mean oppose it. Because the income distribution is always right-skewed, the median voter has below-mean income and hence desires redistribution, and this desire intensifies as the gap between mean and median income widens. The implication is straightforward: higher inequality implies greater redistributive pressures.

This same logic underpins redistributivist theories of regime change. As such, the question of “who matters” in these approaches boils down to the conflict between the rich and the relatively poor median voter, who — under majority rule — sets the tax rate. The elite wants to maintain the autocratic status quo, under which taxes are zero, while the poor prefer democracy, which entails some redistribution. The higher the inequality, the more the autocratic elite have incentives to dig in their heels, just as the poor have stronger incentives to rebel. Democracy is thus least likely when inequality is high, when the wealthy have less to fear from redistribution to the poor. (Boix and A&R differ regarding the poor’s relative incentives to push for democracy under low inequality.)

We suggest that the redistributivist approach to regime change is theoretically misleading and misses the mark empirically. In our 2010 article, we argued that this approach relies on a set of questionable assumptions — about the nature of inequality, about the relevant actors in democratization, and about those actors’ political preferences — and also finds little empirical support in cross-national analysis.

In our view democracy is not a function of the monolithic elite’s fear of the poor, it is about the emergence of splits between incumbent and rising economic elites, with the latter fearing the expropriative power of the state far more than they fear the redistributive threat from the poor.

Our argument offers a novel explanation of the political consequences of inequality. While redistributivist arguments conceive of inequality as the ratio of incomes between rich and poor, we differentiate between the political consequences of land and income inequality. We concur that land inequality retards democratization, signifying the political power of landed elites, who seek to maintain the political and economic status quo. However, counterintuitively, we suggest that income inequality — counterintuitively for the conventional wisdom — promotes democratization.

The conventional view is misleading because scholars have never properly connected social-class structures to different Gini coefficients. Redistributionist arguments assume that a relatively low Gini implies that the median voter is a member of the (relatively large) “middle” class, sociologically speaking, and likewise assume that a high Gini indicates that the middle class is relatively small, and that the median voter is poor.

In fact, this is backwards. Consider the example we provided in our 2010 paper: which country - China in 1880 or the UK in 1867 - is more likely to democratize? Everyone knows the answer to this question, but what remains less well-known is that China’s Gini at that time was .24, while the UK’s was .51. In the 19th century, the UK had a large and growing “middle” class, while China did not. These are not outliers: In poor and economically stagnant societies, a low Gini does not imply a large middle class. It means that nearly everyone is equally poor — and that the median voter is a member of the impoverished masses. In contrast, relatively poor but growing societies typically see higher Gini not because the “1%” exploits the “99%,” but because economic development brings about greater inter-group income differentials. With very few exceptions, in sociological terms high Gini coefficients in a developing country indicate a relatively large middle class, even if the majority of a country’s population remains poor, as in Victorian-era Britain.

This last point is crucial: A low Gini means that the impoverished masses comprise well over a majority of the population - 98% in 1880 China, e.g. Yet even in wealthy examples such as 19th-century Britain, the (sociological) “middle” classes (bourgeoisie and white-collar workers) are not to be found in the (mathematical) “middle” of the income distribution but in the top decile, or at most the top quintile. The working classes comprise at most the next 30% (usually much less), while incumbent autocratic


elites are (again, at most) in the top 1-2%.5 The default situation in a developing autocracy over the last 200 years is that the impoverished rural masses comprise more than a majority of the population. It is worth noting that since Moore, scholars have debated whether the working class should also be included as a relevant actor in the study of regime change, in addition to the bourgeoisie.6 No qualitative scholar has ever suggested that those below the organized working class on the income distribution represent a credible threat to elite interests.

Given this, and given that in the real world the median voter is almost always a member of the poor underclass, redistributivist arguments tend to exaggerate the political relevance of the median voter. In developing democracies, it is safer to assume that the poor majority - Marx's famous "potatoes in a sack" - is politically inert, rather than a potential threat to those who control the coercive power of the state.

Gaining proper understanding of how different class structures correspond to different Gini coefficients returns us to the question of "who matters" for regime change, and why income inequality is positively related to democratization. Our approach flips the redistributivist theoretical approach on its head in terms of who matters and why. If the median voter is poor and the poor are politically inert, then the poor cannot represent a potential threat to autocratic elites in a hypothetical future democracy. Instead, a more theoretically fruitful approach begins with the idea that the principal threat to incumbent autocratic elites comes from other relatively wealthy citizens - disenfranchised, newly-emerging economic groups who fear expropriation of their wealth and property by the incumbent autocratic elite, and who thus have powerful incentives to organize and mobilize in defense of their interests and wealth.

This dynamic - of elite competition, rather than conflict between rich and poor - is quite common historically.7 What causes elite competition to emerge? Redistributivist approaches suggest that inequality results from dividing the gains from growth in a single-sector economy. We suggest that income inequality results from the distribution of resources both within and between two different sectors of a growing economy - a stagnant agricultural sector and a growing industrial sector, for example. This allows us to explain why different types of inequality have distinct political consequences.

As Simon Kuznets famously explained decades ago,8 income inequality tends to increase with the onset of industrialization, because both urban labor and especially urban bourgeois groups benefit. Our two-sector model of endogenous political change derives from classic 'dual sector' models of economic growth, in which new economic groups appropriate most of the gains from industrialization. These models help understand why rising income inequality does not mean that an existing elite is simply growing richer at everyone else's expense, but instead signals the emergence of new, rival economic groups. Why do rising elites press for democratization? Our argument extends the logic of North and Weingast and other neo-institutionalist theories of the state9 to the study of regime change. The key political "threat" in these accounts is not that the poor will expropriate the rich but that the incumbent elite - through their control of the state - will expropriate everyone else. This view echoes Lockean themes from Enlightenment liberalism about the symbiotic relationship between democracy and property, and suggests that liberalization of an autocratic regime occurs when new outsider groups emerge who demand political power commensurate with their growing economic influence. This imbalance of power is a recipe for contestation over the nature of the political regime.

Our approach to understanding elite interests implies that the Meltzer-Richard model offers a misleading and limited notion of what the state 'does.' Acemoglu and Robinson, for example, emphasize that autocratic elites cannot credibly commit to redistribute income because when threats by the masses to revolt die down the elite have incentives to revert to zero redistribution. Yet all redistributivist analyses constrain elites to follow the Meltzer-Richard model of redistribution - a flat tax and a uniform subsidy applied to all citizens, although there is little reason to believe that elites should be so constrained, either theoretically or historically. What is to stop autocratic elites from taxing others but not themselves, or from spending money on 'club goods' rather than universal benefits, for example? The redistributivist approach precludes a predatory state that expropriates income from rising elites and the masses - and yet 9. Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment," Journal of Economic History 49 (December 1989): 803-832; Robert Bates and Donald Lien, "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government," Politics and Society 14 (March 1985): 33-70; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 567-576. On classical "dual" models, see W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," The Manchester School 22 (May 1954): 139-191; John R. Harris and Michael P. Todaro, "Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis," American Economic Review 60 (March 1970): 126-142.


the threat to life, liberty and property is central to the nature of autocratic regimes.

In short, once we understand that in a developing autocracy high Ginis indicate the presence of sizable rising middle (and working) classes, we can better understand the relationship between economic growth, income inequality, and regime change. Democracy is not about redistribution - it is about taxation without representation, a conflict between rival economic elites for control over the expropriative and coercive authority of the State. The most propitious 'structural' conditions for democracy in a developing society are when land inequality is low but income inequality is high. Democracy is less likely to emerge when both land and income inequality are low, even less likely when both are high, and least likely when land inequality is high and income inequality is low. As these conditions change, the relative power of rural and urban interests change.

The empirical analyses in our 2010 paper, and several additional tests in our forthcoming book, confirm our predictions. We find no evidence that income inequality retards democratization, either in a dataset covering 1820 to 1992 or in a different dataset from 1950 to 2004. We also find no evidence for the inverted-U relationship between inequality and democratization that Acemoglu and Robinson suggest. Instead, we find a strong positive correlation between income inequality and democratization, even as land inequality exhibits the expected negative effect. Our findings suggest that the study of regime change and "endogenous" democratization would profit from a more nuanced understanding of both inequality and the socioeconomic structure of competing elites.

In our forthcoming book we also explore our theory's indirect implications. Redistributivist approaches presume that the combination of inequality and democracy should produce higher levels of redistributive spending. By contrast, our approach implies that a triumphant rising economic elite would not redistribute to the poor. After democratization this new elite might increase taxes on the old elite to help pay for public spending, but only on club goods - services that primarily benefit their own economic class. If we are correct that high income inequality reflects the power of this rising elite, then the combination of inequality and democracy should be correlated with lower universalistic redistributive spending to the poor than in a democracy with low income inequality. Figure 1, taken from our book manuscript, demonstrates this pattern vividly. Building on work by Lindert,\textsuperscript{10} we collected original data on redistributive spending for 62 countries between 1880 and 1930. Figure 1 shows the effect of democratization (using the Boix-Rosato index) on redistributive spending (measured as a change in % of GDP at 10-year intervals) at various levels of inequality. Clearly, spending only increases after a regime change when income inequality is low — and redistributive spending actually declines at high levels of income inequality. These findings are precisely the opposite of what redistributivist theories would predict.

Our approach also generates predictions about citizens' preferences for redistribution and democracy under autocracy. The redistributivist approach predicts that the rich want low redistribution, worry more about redistribution when inequality is high, and tend to oppose democracy, largely because of its redistributive implications. We agree that richer citizens support low redistribution to the poor. However, given our findings about the relationship between inequality and public spending

\textsuperscript{10}Peter Lindert, Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
under democracy, our argument implies that wealthier citizens will be relatively less concerned about redistribution to the poor where income inequality is high, because inequality proxies for the presence of a politically and economically stronger middle class, who prefer to shift public spending towards itself and away from the poor.

Our model makes a similar prediction about preferences for democracy. Under autocracy, we expect relatively wealthier citizens - save for the relatively few members of the incumbent elite - to strongly prefer democratization, since members of this group face greater risks of losses from expropriation under autocracy, relative to the poor. Table 1, again drawn from our book manuscript, confirms this expectation. We analyzed 31 samples of individuals across 23 autocracies covered by the World Values Survey, which asks people about their preferences over democracy and redistribution. Table 1 explores how citizens answer a question about whether a democracy would be a good way to govern the country. We are interested in the combined effects of income and attitudes about redistribution to the poor. Redistributivist approaches expect high income / anti-redistribution individuals to be least supportive of democracy, yet we find precisely the reverse. As per our elite-competition model, richer citizens - indeed those who least favor redistribution to the poor - actually most strongly support democratization.

Table 1: Probability of Believing Democracy is Very Desirable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low Income</th>
<th>Medium Income</th>
<th>High Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Redistribution</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Redistribution</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken together, our empirical findings about 1) the conditions that foster regime change; 2) the relationship between inequality, regime type and public spending; and 3) the preferences of citizens under autocracy all present a serious theoretical and empirical challenge to redistributivist models. Inequality does not signify that autocratic elites fear the downtrodden masses. It instead signals the growth of new economic actors – rising elites who demand political power commensurate with their wealth. We suggest that our argument - which focuses on fear of the expropriative threat of those who control the state versus fear of the redistributive threat from the poor - offers a better approach to the comparative study of regime change and its contemporary effort to understand the complicated interplay between growth, inequality, and the politics of democratization across time and space.

Ben Ansell is professor of comparative democratic institutions and international relations and professorial fellow at...
cases since the emergence of contemporary democracy in the 19th century to generate credible results. Most of the significant (at least until the late 20th century) and lasting political change occurred during the democratization wave that started with the liberal revolutions of 1848 and concluded right after World War One. Using post-1960 data (while adding country fixed effects) only risks misestimating the true effects of economic and social change on political development since there was little within-country variance from 1960 well into the early 1990s. Empirical analyses of democratization are similar to empirical growth theory in one important regard: employing postwar data sets may be good enough to estimate convergence effects (among economies that have moved beyond the take-off stage) but it is not adequate to determine the sources of initial divergence across countries.

Finding the appropriate data to test the effects of inequality is difficult because systematic income inequality data start late in time. An alternative is to employ two correlates of income and wealth inequality: the distribution of agricultural property (the area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of holdings) and the extension of skilled or educated workers. Both variables track economic inequality relatively well. For the period after 1950, the correlation coefficient between the Gini index of economic inequality (excluding socialist economies) and the percentage of family farms is ~0.66. For countries with a per capita income below $2,000 the correlation coefficient is ~0.75. The coefficient of correlation of the index of education and the Gini index is ~0.59. To test the impact of inequality, we should not compute different types of (redistributive versus non-redistributive) transitions (cf. Haggard and Kaufman 2012) without looking at the overall underlying distribution of cases (where transitions may or may not occur). Hence, Table 1 reports the probability of democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns for different levels (estimated as actual transitions over total country-years in each category) after 1850. Higher levels of human capital equality are associated with a higher probability of transiting to democracy (except for the highest values) and a lower likelihood of democratic breakdowns. Land equality only has a democratic stabilization effect.

Table 2 examines the correlates of democratic transitions and democratic stability using a data set that spans from 1850 to 2000. Models are estimated via standard pooled OLS regression and have the following structure:

$$D_{it} = \alpha + \beta_{10}D_{it-10} + \beta_{11}D_{it-1} + \beta_{12}C_{it} + \beta_{13} + \delta_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $D_{it}$ is either the continuous Polity IV index (normalized between 0 and 1) or the Boix-Miller-Rosato dichotomous index of democracy, $I$ corresponds to the different economic inequality measures, $C$ are a stack of control variables, $\eta$ is a country specific effect, $\delta_t$ is a period-specific constant, and $\epsilon_{it}$ is an error term. In Columns 1 and 3, which examine the covariates of transitions to democracy, the value of the dependent variable is the maximum value of democracy at either time $t$ or time $t-1$: this effectively restricts the analysis to those cases in which there has been an increase in democracy. In Column 2 and 4, which estimate the impact of inequality on transitions away from democracy, the value of the dependent variable is the minimum value of democracy at either time $t$ or time $t-1$: this limits the analysis to those cases in which there has been a decline in the level of democracy. The standard estimations of political transitions employ nonlinear models to determine the effects of income. However, I here use linear models because nonlinear models do not generate consistent estimators in the presence of fixed effects.

The indices of family farms, human capital and non-agrarian employment have been normalized from 0 to 1. All models include the log of per capita income, which is systematically introduced on all democratization models. Controlling for per capita income allows us to estimate the non-income or development effect of

### Table 1: Economic Inequality and Unconditional Political Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index of knowledge distribution</th>
<th>Transition to democracy</th>
<th>Democratic breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-0.2</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>8.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2-0.4</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>5.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4-0.6</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6-0.8</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8-1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of family farms</th>
<th>Transition to democracy</th>
<th>Democratic breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-0.2</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>4.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2-0.4</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4-0.6</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6-0.8</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8-1</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Economic Inequality and Democratic Transitions


that per capita income, as employed in the modernization literature in postwar samples, behaves mostly as a proxy for other more fundamental factors. Generally speaking, the level of inequality matters for democratization. However, it is worth noting that the causes of democratic transitions and of democratic breakdowns are partly different. Democratic transitions are more likely to occur in countries with higher levels of human capital (Columns 1 and 3). Given that the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1, the effect is very substantive. In turn, democratic breakdowns are mostly conditioned by the distribution of assets in the agrarian world. A higher proportion of family farms reduces the probability that a democratic country will revert to authoritarian rule. (A positive coefficient means that an authoritarian regime is less likely to take place.) In other words, in an agrarian economy the probability of a democratic breakdown falls to 0 as one moves from concentrated land ownership (as in countries such as Russia before the Stolypin reforms and the Soviet Revolution, Spain for most of the 20th century, and most Latin American nations) to the highly fragmented property systems (as in countries such as Norway, the United States, and Canada, where family farms represented three- to four-fifths of all land) at the turn of the 20th century.

International factors matter to explain democratic transitions. The dummy variable “Soviet occupation” is statistically significant and it is associated with a reduction of 0.32 points in the movement toward more democratic institutions. An alliance with the USA boosts democratic transitions but only after the end of the Cold War. The international system seems to affect the stability of democracies too: a more pro-democratic environment reduces the occurrence of democratic breakdowns. These finding may explain why models that estimate the effect of inequality in the postwar period only get mixed results.

### Rationality and Material Interests
RMD assume (1) rational, (2) self-interested actors mostly motivated by (3) material payoffs. Questioning the assumption of rationality (defined as instrumentally-driven action to achieve certain goals) has been quite common since, at least, the work of Green and Shapiro (1994). Other than going back to detailed historical narratives, the alternative they suggest to replace the rationality assumption is unclear. In my opinion, a fruitful way ahead may consist of applying the satisficing rules of behavior that Bendor et al. (2011) use to model elections.

Most of the critiques to RMD are directed to the decision to define the payoffs of the game in economic terms. Material payoffs play a key role in a wide range of situations –

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Inequality and Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns, 1850–2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy t-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per capita t-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Family Farms t-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Human Capital t-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Population In Non-Agrarian Sector t-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied with US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance with US * Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fixed-effects OLS regressions with country dummies, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses.

Our inequality measures. The model adds four variables measuring the international system: an annual one coding the international system as anti-democratic, neutral or pro-democratic; a dummy specifying whether the country was an ally of the USA or not; an interaction between alliance with the USA and Cold war; and a dummy specifying whether the country is under the control of the Soviet Union or not.

Notice, in the first place, that the coefficient of per capita income remains positive but it declines in size and loses statistical significance in all models. This implies

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4. See Carles Boix, “Political Order and Inequality,” Unpublished manuscript, 2013, for a discussion of this classification. The international system had an “anti-democratic” effect on domestic politics till 1848, from 1933 to 1942 and from 1948 to 1990. It was “neutral” between 1849 and 1918 and from 1943 to 1947. It was pro-democratic otherwise.
as attested, for example, by a large literature on economic voting and on the class basis of political alignments. Still, they are not the exclusive cause of political action. Ethnic identity, religious preferences, political status, etc. also matter. What is central to RMD and to the “democracy as equilibrium” literature is the impact of heterogeneous preferences and capabilities on the ways in which individuals decide to govern themselves. Again, this means that non-economic heterogeneity is equally susceptible to be brought into democratization theory.

Political Actors
Critiques of RMD complain that social classes are treated as ‘objective’ phenomena rather than outcomes of social and political mobilization. In other words, RMD disregard both the literature on collection action and a rich historiographical tradition on the formation of the working class. I find this critique partly misplaced. In Boix (2003, pp. 27–30, 44–46) I indicate explicitly that both the level of organization and the extent of class (or, more precisely, group) consciousness matter—and that, because they affect the costs of each side, they affect the probabilities of different regime outcomes. It is, however, true that I treat those factors as exogenous variables. No model can endogenize everything.

Political Process
RMD are also depicted as painting a very narrow account of social conflict “as a function of a small but monolithic elite’s fear of the impoverished multitude” (Ansell and Samuels 2010, p. 1544) and of political transitions as events where “elites must confront political-cum-distributive pressure from below” to the point that if “the repression of these challenges appears too costly (…) the elites make institutional compromises as a result” (Haggard and Kaufman 2012, p. 497). This rather reductive interpretation of RMD is mistaken.

The model in Boix (2003) departs from Przeworski’s seminal treatment of democracy as an equilibrium’ extending it in two ways: it applies the idea of “equilibrium” to all political regimes and it links the actors’ payoffs to specific material conditions. To examine its implications, the model contains a game sequence with different paths and outcomes (e.g., once the ruling group widens the franchise, the unenfranchised group accepts the reform). Nonetheless, the fundamental value of the model is its comparative statistic in terms of the robustness of each outcome (e.g., that democracy and low inequality are compatible under most conditions) and much less about the particular mechanisms through which transitions take place. Transitions from authoritarian rule can occur as a result of military defeat (Argentina 1983), the death of a dictator (Spain 1975), a peaceful revolution (Portugal 1975), a “mismanaged” referendum (Chile 1989) or the collapse of the occupying power (the Baltic countries in 1991). Whether democracy emerges and survives has to be set in the context of the broad economic and organizational parameters of the model. Thus, Haggard and Kaufman (2012) is extremely informative as a study of transitional paths and is very valuable as a call to develop models that integrate the process of transition itself. But their work is less convincing as a critique of the theoretical core of RMD.

This similarity implies that, as Haggard and Kaufman (2012) acknowledge, class-based and sector-based models are not incompatible with each other. Instead, sector-based models (or what Ansell and Samuels define as “intra-elite” conflict) are an extension of the general model of democracy as equilibrium. Sectoral (intra-elite) conflict will take place when wealthy sectors are differentiated by income and type of assets (non-fixed versus fixed) and when non-wealthy strata are not mobilized. If the latter are mobilized, political conflict may be cross-class (a sector of the wealthy and all or part of the non-wealthy allied against the other, grouped into a set of discrete (normally two) representative types for the sake of simplicity. The distribution of income, which may vary from complete equality to extreme inequality, is then related to a political equilibrium. Hence, expressions such as “under conditions of equality elites have little to fear from democratization” (Ansell and Samuels 2010, p. 1547) do not make much sense: under conditions of equality, there are no (economic) elites properly speaking.

Moreover, in Boix (2003) the initial model characterizes society as having two groups. But it contains a section with three actors, defined by different levels of income and by different levels of asset specificity, and predictions about partial democracy (collinear to income or based on cross-class alliances). Limited democracy takes place when the middle class (or the industrial bourgeoisie, once we defined wealthier strata by their type of asset) grows richer. In turn, universal suffrage takes place as the lower strata get closer to the middle strata (pp. 47–57). In that sense, the models in Ansell and Samuels (2010) and Boix (2003) are extremely similar. Ansell and Samuels’ results on the growing probability of partial democracy as the process of industrialization takes off go in the same direction.
mainly depending on asset specificity) or class-based (as in the initial two-class model).

Underlying Tax Model

The choice of the median voter tax model developed by Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richards (1981) has been rather controversial. The model is much more flexible than some concede: one can amend it in multiple ways to introduce public goods spending, non-distortionary taxes, individuals having different beliefs about the effects of taxes, etc. The fact that the model is empirically wrong—in terms of predicting that taxes would be higher in unequal societies—simplifies what justifies the model.

RMD. RMD endogenize the tax rate to the distribution of income and predict that taxes will not be high in unequal societies because net payers will block them.

Ansell and Samuels (2010) point out that RMD assume tax rates will never be lower than 0. This assumption can be relaxed. In their formal exploration of the democratization of 19th-century Britain, Justman and Gradstein (1999) allow the rich to tax the poor (when the latter are disenfranchised). This may make the model too simplistic in the following sense: both assets and income become wholly determined by the power ratio (between classes). As Justman and Gradstein (p. 111) write, “preindustrial levels of inequality reflect an equilibrium in which total economic resources are stagnant and power is concentrated in the hands of an elite minority who use it to maximize their political rents.” Political liberalization then shifts the distribution of income. (What they do not endogenize, however, is the power ratio itself.) An alternative to this linear relationship between political power and income is to consider a model where the distribution of income is the joint product of economic technologies and political institutions. This is what I attempt to do in Boix (2013).

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11. Boix, “Political Order and Inequality.”
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(continued from page 2)

rich versus poor, but for example based on ethnic, religious or regional cleavages, it was not necessarily true that increasing inequality, in the sense of a higher Gini coefficient, would exacerbate conflict between groups. It might just result in increased redistribution within groups. More generally, though there is now convincing econometric evidence for the importance of the central mechanisms of Acemoglu and Robinson’s early work, still, as emphasized by Haggard and Kaufman (2012), there may be different mechanisms that lead to democratization and these can have different comparative statics from those presented in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001). For instance, in Lizzeri and Persico (2004) democratization can occur because political competition with a limited franchise leads to clientelistic outcomes that are inefficient for at least a sub-set of the elite.2 Extending voting rights can induce more efficient non-clientelistic competition over public goods that is favored by these elites. Depending on the decision structure within elites, democratization can occur for very different reasons than those developed by Acemoglu and Robinson.3

These theoretical extensions of the basic model suggested that it was unlikely that the simple comparative statics of inequality suggested by the early work would be found in the data. Moreover, even if one found these in a convincing way one would have to deal with complicated issues of identification. For example, autocracies which were unequal no doubt differ in many others ways from autocracies which are equal, and to test causal hypotheses about the impact of inequality on regime transition it is necessary to control in some way for these omitted variables. It is also necessary to control properly for common trends influencing the variables to avoid the problem of ‘spurious regression’. Since democracy tends to move in waves and many other variables such as GDP per-capita are correlated across countries, this is a potent issue here. Since this early work a great deal of research has gone into investigating empirically the factors that lead to democratization and democratic consolidation. In largely unpublished work which accompanied Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009),4 the authors found no robust evidence that inequality influences either democratizations or democratic consolidation. The innovation of this empirical work is that it adopted for the first time standard panel data econometric techniques to control for omitted variables with country fixed effects and common trends with time effects. The importance of the fixed effects methodology is that it focuses on the ‘within variation’ and asks, in this context: as a country becomes more or less unequal, does that induce changes in the extent to which it is democratic? By focusing on this variation one mitigates the biases than come from examining the cross-sectional (between) variation that is mired in unobservable differences between countries. The importance of the inclusion of time effects is that they control for common trends among the variables mitigating the danger of spurious regression. The empirical work of Acemoglu et al. showed that some of the most famous empirical results in the literature, such as the correlation between income per-capita and democratic consolidation, were not robust to controlling for omitted variables. This paper went even further than fixed effects models by providing a full identification strategy using instrumental variables, an exercise that confirmed the basic fixed effects findings. This project also revealed that there was no robust relationship between inequality and either the creation or consolidation of democracy.

Other studies have since found different things, but to do so they have deviated from the econometric approach of Acemoglu et al in significant ways. For example, Espinet et al. (2006) presented evidence that was consistent with the inverted-U shape hypothesis of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). Houle (2009) found that while inequality has no impact on democratization, higher inequality reduces the probability that a democracy will stay democratic. Yet neither paper made any attempt to control for omitted variable bias, for example using country fixed effects. Therefore, it is quite likely that these findings are driven by omitted variables and thus do not represent causal relationships between inequality and regime transition. Freeman and Quinn (2012) moved beyond studies of the average effect of inequality on regime transitions investigating whether or not there are heterogeneous effects of inequality that depend on the extent of globalization.5 They do claim to find robust effects of inequality on the change in the polity score, the sign of which is


conditional on measures of globalization. Yet, their preferred specification does not include time effects to account for common trending factors, an omission which Acemoglu et. al. (2009) showed is highly significant in this context, given that democracy tends to trend at the world level. Their paper also uses software to interpolate missing inequality data, a procedure that tends to artificially lower the standard errors of their estimations, which also pushes them towards finding significant effects. The omission of time effects is a common feature of papers that claim to find significant effects of measures on inequality on measures of democracy.7

We believe therefore that the basic though unfortunately largely unpublished findings of the Acemoglu, et. al. (2008, 2009) project, that there is no robust causal relationship between inequality and regime transition, remain substantially unaltered.

This analysis still leaves open one interesting empirical question latent in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) and indeed in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Does democratization tend to reduce inequality? A seminal paper by Rodrik (1999) claimed that it did and that the share of wages in national income was systematically higher in democracies. But a priori question would be: does democratization have in reality the type of impact on public policy that it does in these models? One much cited paper, by Gil, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004) claimed in fact that there was no significant relationship between measures of democracy, such as the Polity score, and public policy variables such as the size of government tax revenues relative to GDP, or the amount of social spending relative to GDP. Yet their paper used averaged data to examine the pure cross-sectional relationships in the data. This setup creates severe concerns both about measurement error (from the averaging) and omitted variable bias. In particular, their procedure meant that they could not examine the more interesting ‘within variation’ through examining whether or not when a country democratized, or the reverse, public policies moved in specific directions.

In Acemoglu et al. (2013) we examine the impact of democratization on public policies and inequality using the most appealing econometric model – a cross-national panel data with country fixed effects and time effects.8 Our study uses a theoretical framework that recognizes that the simple predictions of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001), that democratization decreases inequality may be influenced by mechanisms this research did not consider. This happens for some of the same reasons we discussed above when we argued that the impact of inequality on democratization is likely more complex than the initial models allowed for, but in addition we make several specific arguments.

1. Captured Democracy. Even though democracy clearly changes the distribution of de jure power in society (as argued, for instance, in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), policy outcomes and inequality depend not just on the de jure but also on the de facto distribution of power. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) argue that, under certain circumstances, those who see their de jure power eroded by democratization may sufficiently increase their investments in de facto power (e.g., via control of local law enforcement, mobilization of non-state armed actors, violence, lobbying, and other means of capturing the party system) in order to continue to control the political process. If so, we would not see an impact of democratization on public policy, redistribution and inequality.

2. Directors Law. Consistent with Stigler’s ‘Director’s Law’ (1970), democracy may transfer political power to the middle class rather than the poor. If so, redistribution may increase and inequality may be curtailed only if the middle class is in favor of such redistribution. For example, Aidt et al. (2009) showed that local franchise expansion in 19th century Britain from elites to the middle class often reduced expenditure on local public goods since the middle class bore the brunt of property taxes that financed them. In their model an expansion of voting rights from the elite, by reducing public good provision and taxes on the middle class, can increase inequality.9

3. Inequality-Increasing Market Opportunities. Autocracy may exclude a large fraction of the population from productive occupations (e.g., skilled occupations) and entrepreneurship (including lucrative contracts), as Apartheid South Africa or the former Soviet Union did both internally and in Eastern Europe after 1945. To the extent that there is significant heterogeneity within this population, the freedom to take part in economic activities on a more level playing field with the previous elite may actually increase inequality within the excluded or repressed group and the entire society. It may also lead changes in public policy


to diverge from those predicted by the simple models of democratization. In the paper we develop a new consistent definition of democratization based on Freedom House and Polity indices, building on the work by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). One of the problems of the raw indices is the significant measurement error, which creates spurious movements in democracy when none exists in reality. We attempt to minimize the influence of such measurement error by using the information from both the Freedom House and Polity datasets and focusing only on democratization (and reversals) that are not fully reversed within a year. This leads to a 0-1 measure of democracy for 170 countries annually from 1960 to 2010. We also pay special attention to modeling the dynamics of our outcomes of interest, taxes as a percentage of GDP and various measures of inequality.

Our empirical investigation uncovers a number of interesting patterns. First, we find a robust and quantitatively large effect of democracy on tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. The long-run effect of democracy, in our preferred specification, is about a 5% point increase in tax revenues as a fraction of GDP. These patterns are robust to a variety of different estimates and controls for immediate determinants of democracy such as social unrest, war, and the stock of education, yet there may still exist unobserved determinants of changes in democracy that also affect policy and redistribution. To get a feel for these results, Figure 1 plots the change in the raw Freedom House score between 1975 and 2000 (since this is clearer than our 0-1 measure of democracy) against the change in tax revenues as a percentage of GDP on the vertical axis. This figure is useful since it represents a simple way of looking at the ‘within variation’ (at least in the absence of any covariates). The figure shows that there is a clearly visible positive slope indicating the estimated relationship consistent with the hypothesis that as countries become democratic, they expand their tax revenues

Figure 2 presents an ‘event-study’ picture which shows the dynamics of taxation around democracy. Here we take the last democratization event of each country and average them. This figure is conditional on the lagged dependent variable, country fixed effects and time effect. It shows the dynamics of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP around the democratization, which we normalize so that its pre-democracy average is zero. This clearly shows that there is a sustained positive increase in tax revenues after a democratization whose magnitude

increases over time (eventually reaching 5%). By 15 years after a democratization the standard error bands exclude zero.

Second, however, and contrary to Rodrik (1999), we find no robust effect of democracy on any measure of inequality. Even though some selected specifications do show a small, marginally significant effect, these are not robust. This may reflect the poorer quality of inequality data. But we also suspect it may be related to the more complex theoretical relationships between democracy and inequality pointed out above. The absence of a relationship between the changes in democracy (Freedom House) and the change in the Gini coefficient 1975-200 is evident from Figure 3. Figure 4 is an analogous event-study figure. It shows that after a democratization there does seem to be a fall in inequality but it is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Revisiting Rodrik’s findings we show that while his results do still hold with our measure of democracy (significant at the 7% level), they are driven by several important things. First of all, the fact that he averaged the data, and second, that he used an old version of the World Bank data on wages. If instead of averaging the data we use every five years, the standard approach with a dynamic panel, his main finding disappears. It also disappears even with his own specification when we use the more complete and updated version of the data on wages (which he did not have available at the time he wrote). Third, we find an effect of democracy on secondary schooling investments and the extent of structural transformation (e.g., an impact on the non-agricultural share of employment and the non-agricultural share of output). How could it be that democracy leads to higher taxes and more education and possibly structural change but has no impact on inequality? This is an issue that requires a great deal more research than in Acemoglu et al. (2013), but all three of the above mechanisms could be at play. The fact that policy clearly changes after democratization seems less consistent with ideas about captured democracy, though it could be that while elites cannot stop taxation, they can manipulate how it is spent. The findings do seem more consistent with Director’s Law and Stigler’s claim that democracy

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**Figure 3. Change in the Gini coefficient for net income between 1975 and 2000, against the change in the Freedom House democracy index in the same period.**

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**Figure 4. Gini coefficient for net income around a democratization.**
favors the middle class and therefore does not generate the type of pro-poor or pro-median voter policies hypothesized by the early theoretical work. It could also be the case that inequality increasing market opportunities are at work with taxation and redistribution taking place but their effect on inequality being swamped.

Daron Acemoglu is Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Suresh Naidu is assistant professor of economics and public affairs at Columbia University. Pascual Restrepo is a research assistant at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, Colombia. James Robinson is David Florence Professor of Government at Harvard University and a faculty associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
than 7,000 observations. This accounts for nearly all countries during the period under study, and the dataset is (basically) complete. Once I use different measures of inequality, account for endogeneity and impute missing observations my hypothesis is supported empirically: inequality reduces the likelihood that democracy endures but is unrelated to the likelihood of democratization itself.

THEORY
In this note, I will focus on two theories about how inequality – more precisely, interclass inequality – affects regime changes. Both rest on a redistributive approach, meaning that the effect of inequality is driven by its effect on preferences over redistribution among different social classes. First, Boix, among others, argues that inequality harms both democratization and consolidation. The intuition is that when inequality increases, the ruling elite is less likely to concede democracy, because it fears redistribution under democracy. Similarly, the elite is more likely to stage coups in unequal democracies, because it wants to prevent redistribution.

Second, Acemoglu and Robinson agree that inequality harms consolidation but argue that inequality relates to democratization through an inverted U-shaped relationship. In equal autocracies, the population does not demand democracy because it has little to gain in terms of redistribution. At intermediate levels of inequality, however, the population has incentives to demand democracy. At the same time, the ruling elites are unwilling to use repression, because redistribution is relatively cheap; and so they democratize. But when inequality is high, the elites opt for repression, because the cost of redistribution is too high.

I argue that inequality harms consolidation but has no effect on democratization. There are at least three reasons why inequality is unlikely to have a substantial effect on democratization through the mechanisms described by previous redistributive theories. First, these mechanisms rest on the assumption that democratization follows a single path, in which democracy is initially demanded by the population but eventually conceded by the ruling elite, i.e. it is driven from below. However, in reality, democratization is often driven from above, for example through intra-elite competition. There is thus a large group of transitions for which these theories do not apply.

Second, even for transitions from below, their predictions are unlikely to hold. Contrary to what most scholars have claimed, inequality actually has two opposite, potentially offsetting, effects on democratization. On the one hand, inequality makes democracy more costly for the elites by increasing redistribution. On the other hand, inequality increases the demand for regime change from the population by increasing potential gains from redistribution or expropriation. The overall effect is thus ambiguous. Acemoglu and Robinson do account for both effects. However, their findings depend on specific assumptions about the discontinuity of the effect of inequality on the cost of maintaining an autocracy.3

Third, the population faces a collective action problem when mobilizing to replace an autocracy by a democracy, since democracy is a public good. Existing theories expect inequality to affect democratization by determining the likelihood of the population rising against the regime. But, if the masses are unable to mobilize, the elites have no incentive to respond to changes in inequality by adopting democracy. Even if inequality were to affect the likelihood of democratization, its effect should be weak. I thus expect inequality to bear little relationship to the probability of democratization.

Do arguments linking inequality to consolidation suffer from the same problems as those linking inequality to democratization? No. Transitions away from democracy differ in at least two fundamental ways from transitions to democracy. First, they involve different groups of actors. While democratizations may be initiated by the elite or the masses, democratic breakdowns are almost always caused by the elite or the military, not the masses.

Second, and most importantly, transitions to and away from democracies involve different processes. On the one hand, democratization from below is an interactive process between the elite and the masses, in which the former respond to the demands of the latter. On the other hand, democratic breakdown is a unilateral process, in which one group (usually the elite or the military) directly seizes power without necessarily having the approval of other groups. In the words of Acemoglu and Robinson, “the move from democracy to dictatorship is almost never consensual.”4

The asymmetry between the two transition processes has key implications for the relationship between inequality and consolidation. First of all, since most democratic breakdowns follow a single path in which the military/elite unilaterally seize power, theories trying to explain them – contrary to those concerned with democratization – can be applied to almost all cases.


4. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 225. The masses can be involved during transitions away from democracy, notably by responding negatively (or positively) to coups. However, their consent is not necessary for a democratic breakdown to occur.
In addition, whereas inequality has two opposite effects on democratization, it only has a negative effect on consolidation. The two effects of inequality on democratization are caused by the fact that democracy is demanded by the population but, in the end, conceded by the elite. By contrast, democratic breakdowns result from the direct seizure of power by the elite. Because the agreement of the masses is not required, the effect of inequality on its willingness to concede dictatorship has little impact. Inequality mainly affects democratic breakdowns by increasing the cost of redistribution to the elite. Therefore, one should expect that when inequality increases the elite are more likely to wage coups against democracies. Finally, collective action problems do not significantly reduce the capacity of the elite to mobilize, since the elite form a much smaller group than the population. Moreover, installing a new authoritarian regime provides specific benefits to those that take part in the coup. Contrary to transitions to democracy, transitions away from democracy do not pose a severe collective action problem for the group initiating the process. Therefore, I expect inequality to have a strong negative effect on the survival of democracies.

The second measure of inequality used is the income Gini coefficients of the Estimation of the Household Inequality and Inequity (EHII) constructed by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). The dataset includes more than 3,500 observations on 147 countries between 1963 and 2002. I use the same control variables as in my previous work: GDP per capita, growth, an oil exporter dummy variable, the proportion of the population that is Muslim, Protestant or Catholic, ethnic and religious fractionalization, the number of past transitions, a dummy variable for countries that did not exist prior to 1946, a dummy for former British colonies, and the proportion of countries worldwide that are democracies.

### EMPIRICAL RESULTS
I test the relationship between inequality and democracy using dynamic probit models. These models estimate the probability of countries with a certain regime (in the current period) transiting to a new regime in the next period. One advantage with this estimation technique is that it enables us to distinguish between the effect of inequality on democratization and on consolidation. Column 1 of Table 1 tests the hypothesis of a negative monotonic relationship, advanced notably by Boix, using capital shares. It shows that higher capital shares are actually associated with larger probability of democratization, though the relationship is not statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Coefficient (Capital Share)</th>
<th>Coefficient (Capital Share Squared)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Column 1</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column 2</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Dynamic Probit Estimations of the Effect of Inequality on the Probability of Transitions to and away from Democracy

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**DATA**

The unit of analysis is the country-year. The main dataset contains more than 7,000 observations and covers 183 countries between 1960 and 2008. To determine whether a country is democratic or autocratic, I use the regime type dataset of Cheibub et al., which extends the dataset of Przeworski et al. until 2006. I use two main measures of inequality. First, I use the capital share of the value added in production. This gives the proportion of the value created within specific firms than accrues to the owners of these specific firms, as opposed to the laborers. Low capital shares indicate low levels of inequality. The capital share is thus a measure of interclass inequality, and is conceptually similar to the surplus-value of Karl Marx. I use an extension of the capital share dataset assembled by Ortega and Rodriguez that I presented in Houle. I imputed the missing values for nearly all countries. For each missing observation, twenty-five values are predicted. This enables me to account for the level of uncertainty of each imputed observation during the estimation process. Three types of evidence are used to impute missing observations: previous inequality levels of the same country; levels of inequality of neighboring countries during the same year; and other indicators of inequality for the same country-year (e.g., Gini coefficients). The intuition for using the inequality level of neighbors is that the level of inequality of a country depends mostly on its factor endowments. Because countries that are neighbors are likely to share similar factor endowments they also have similar levels of inequality. Moreover, neighbors are likely to share similar colonial experiences or to have been affected by the same historical events (e.g., the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe). Most countries that remain missing after the multiple imputation are Islands (mostly Pacific Islands).


Table 1: Dynamic Probit Estimations of the Effect of Inequality on the Probability of Transitions to and away from Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Transition to Democracy</th>
<th></th>
<th>Transition to Autocracy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap. Shares</td>
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<td>-.062</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.018</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.008)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cap. Shares sq.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.0004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
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<td>-.007</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.015)</td>
<td>(.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini sq.</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP pc</td>
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<td>.015</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.095)</td>
<td>(.093)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)***</td>
<td>(.004)***</td>
<td>(.006)***</td>
<td>(.006)***</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.539</td>
<td>-.675</td>
<td>-.659</td>
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<td>(.25)**</td>
<td>(.242)**</td>
<td>(.384)*</td>
<td>(.369)*</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.005</td>
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<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
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<td>-.003</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fract.</td>
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<td>-.0003</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fract.</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Past Break.</td>
<td>.277</td>
<td>.276</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.053)***</td>
<td>(.054)***</td>
<td>(.106)**</td>
<td>(.104)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Country</td>
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<td>-.127</td>
<td>-.198</td>
<td>-.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.136)</td>
<td>(.138)</td>
<td>(.215)</td>
<td>(.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former British</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>-.061</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.132)</td>
<td>(.131)</td>
<td>(.189)</td>
<td>(.188)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
both are statistically insignificant. A Wald test demonstrates that the two coefficients also fail to reach joint significance. Columns 3 and 4 redo models 1 and 2 but with the Gini coefficients instead of capital shares. Results are unchanged.

One potential problem with the analysis presented thus far is that it does not account for endogeneity, particularly reverse causation. In fact, in inequality theories of democratization, inequality affects regime transition precisely because it affects the incentives of different social classes to control redistributive policies, and thus change the inequality level. Moreover, country-specific factors could affect both the likelihood of regime change and inequality; hence creating omitted variable bias.

Column 5 reproduces model 1 but using an instrumental variable approach. It uses the level of inequality of neighboring countries as an instrument for the domestic level of inequality. As I argued in Houle, inequality tends to be clustered across neighbors, notably because they share factor endowments. Basic tests show that the inequality level of neighbors is indeed a strong instrument for domestic inequality levels (F-statistic of 17.84). Since Houle uses the inequality level of neighbors to impute missing values, I only use the non-imputed capital shares in the estimation reported in column 5 (and column 8).

It is possible that inequality in neighboring states affect the regimes of neighbors, which in turn influences the domestic political regime. If that were the case, the instruments would not be exogenous. Therefore, in order to account for this potential mechanism I control for the proportion of neighbors that are democratic instead of controlling for the proportion of democracies worldwide as in the previous regressions. Results, reported in column 5, are unchanged.

Column 6 estimates the effect of inequality on the likelihood that a democracy breaks down and transitions to autocracy. Positive coefficients signify that the associated independent variables increase the probability of backsliding to dictatorship. As expected, inequality increases the likelihood that a democracy breaks down and the relationship is statistically significant at the five percent level.9 As shown in model 7, these results are unchanged when inequality is instead measured with Gini indexes.

Column 8 uses the same instrumental variable strategy as in model 5. Once again, results suggest that inequality harms the consolidation of democracy.

**CONCLUSION**

This note has argued that inequality does not affect democratization but harms consolidation of democracies. These results suggest that the factors that affect the establishment of democracies may be very different from those that affect their consolidation. In fact, the empirical analysis presented above finds that many factors other than inequality also seem to affect these two transition processes differently. Of course, this idea is not completely new. Already, O’Donnell and Schmitter, among others, argued that “political and social processes are neither symmetric nor reversible. What brings down a democracy is not the inverse of those factors that bring down an authoritarian regime.”10 However, such insights have yet to be fully integrated in the empirical and theoretical literatures on regime changes.

Christian Houle is assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

9. See Houle, “Does Inequality Harm,” regarding column 5. The results are unchanged when imputed capital shares are also included. Regressions using instrumental variables are run separately for democratization and consolidation, which explains the lower number of observations (e.g., only autocracies are included in column 5). This is done in order to limit the number of instruments needed and does not affect the validity of the results. The results presented in column 6 are robust to the use of only non-imputed observations (see Houle, “Inequality and Democracy”). Moreover, the results are unchanged when the regressions only cover the period from 1960 to 2000.

Linz Obituary, continued

(continued from page 3)

Lazarsfeld, Robert Lynd, and Kingsley Davis. Linz formed an especially close relationship with Seymour Martin Lipset, under whose supervision he would write a nine-hundred-plus page dissertation consisting of a systematic dissection of The Social Bases of West German Politics. Even before officially finishing the dissertation, Linz would also compile a “propositional inventory” and co-author with Lipset a two-volume manuscript The Social Bases of Political Diversity in Western Democracies in his capacity as Lipset’s research assistant. It was never published but widely recognized by Lipset and others, as a main source for Lipset’s own seminal work, Political Man.

A grant from the SSRC’s Committee in Comparative Politics allowed Linz to return to Spain in the Spring of 1958 to carry out field research for a study of the Franco regime, an experience which led to the publication of Linz’s first classic article, “An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain.” Throughout his career, Spain would command his attention as a crucial case in comparative perspective. Linz did more than any other Spanish scholar of his generation to put his country at the very center of international debates in the social sciences, especially those in comparative politics about regime types, breakdowns, and transitions, as well as nationalism, all the while challenging prevalent stereotypes and “terrible simplifications.” In the process, he directed and conducted a plethora of pioneering survey research.

Linz was an enthusiastic and influential participant in a host of professional social scientific associations. He was a founding member of the International Sociological Association’s Committee of Political Sociology (CPS), alongside Lipset, Raymond Aron, Shmuel Esienstadt, and Stein Rokkan, among others. He served as President of the CPS (1971-79), as President of the Council for European Studies (1973-1974), President of the World Association of Public Opinion Research (1974-1976), and was a member of the Executive Committee of the ISA (1974-1982) as well as its Scientific Committee (1974-1978). He was also active in the International Political Science Association and the American Political Science Association, and served for many years on the Scientific Committee for the Center for Advanced Social Studies at the Instituto Juan March in Madrid.

When he died, Linz was Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political and Social Sciences at Yale. He was much decorated, having received many of his profession’s most coveted prizes. He was elected member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1976. He was awarded honorary doctoral degrees from five universities; the University of Granada (1976), Georgetown University (1987), the Autonomous University of Madrid (1992), the Phillips-Universität of Marburg (1992), the University of Oslo (2000), and the University of the Basque Country (2002). In 1987, he was the recipient of Spain’s most prestigious Premio Príncipe de Asturias; and in 1996, he won the University of Uppsala’s Johan Skytte Prize, perhaps the closest thing in Political Science to a Nobel Prize.

From the start of his career through the very end of his life, Linz was a devoted and beloved teacher. He supervised 65 dissertations on 31 different countries spanning the entire globe. Several of his students were political scientists and sociologists who would soon become eminent in their fields, such as Richard Hamilton, Kenneth Erickson, Arturo Valenzuela, Ezra Suleiman, Jan Gross, John Stephens, Robert Fishman, Houchang Chehabi, and Miguel Centeno. The authors of this obituary both have the honor to count ourselves among this “Linzian” family. Alfred Stepan had the good fortune to first come across Linz early in his own graduate career at Columbia and to have the immense intellectual and personal reward of working as a co-author with Linz for thirty-five years on books and articles. Jeff Miley was Linz’ second to last PhD and asked to help in the selection, translation, and introductions to the sections of the seven volumes of Linz’s selected works.

Linz’s impact as a teacher stretched well beyond his official students; those who considered themselves such numbered many, many more. He and his wife Rocio de Terán were famous among students for their extreme generosity in terms of time and attention, and especially for the hospitality with which the couple opened the doors and spare bedroom, of their home in Hamden, Connecticut to so many.

Two excellent sources on Linz’s thought and writings are his sixty page interview with Richard Snyder in Munch and Snyder’s, Passion, Craft and Method in Comparative Politics, and the 50 page intellectual biography, done with Linz’s collaboration, by José Ramón Montero and Jeff Miley in their just published seven volume selected works of Linz, published in Spanish as Juan J. Linz. Obras Escogidas by the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales in Madrid.

Linz was an irreplaceable mentor and a close friend to innumerable senior and junior scholars throughout the world. He will be sorely missed, and will certainly not be forgotten.

Alfred Stepan, Columbia University and Jeff Miley, Cambridge University
Section News

2014 APSA Annual Meeting: Chris Reenock (Florida State University), our section's program chair for the 2014 annual meeting, will soon begin reviewing all the paper and panel proposals submitted by the December 15 deadline. We look forward to learning of his decisions next spring, and to seeing many of you at the 2014 meeting in Washington, DC.

Comparative Democratization Section Welcomes New Officers: Jan Teorell became the section's new president and Monika Nalepa the new treasurer at the section's business meeting in Chicago. Many thanks to Steph Haggard and Amaney Jamal for serving as president and treasurer (respectively) for the last two years!

Comparative Democratization Section Award Winners:
Juan Linz Dissertation Award: Gwyneth H. McClendon (Yale University) for her dissertation “The Politics of Envy and Esteem in Two Democracies.”

This year’s award committee included Allen Hicken (University of Michigan) (chair), Daniel Gingerich (University of Virginia), and Nic Cheeseman (Oxford University).

Committee Remarks on the Award Winners:
“This year the committee for Juan Linz Dissertation Award consisted of Nic Cheeseman, Daniel Gingerich, and Allen Hicken. We received and reviewed a substantial number of outstanding dissertations, many of which are worthy of recognition. However, the committee agreed that this year the Linz Award should go to Gwyneth H. McClendon for her dissertation “The Politics of Envy and Esteem in Two Democracies.”

Dr. McClendon’s dissertation draws on insights from social psychology and behavioral economics to explain why, under certain circumstances, individuals prefer outcomes that objectively make them materially worse off. Specifically, she focuses on three major puzzles in political science and comparative politics:

First, why do democracies sometimes fail to meet the needs of their citizens, even when there are Pareto-improving opportunities that states could readily pursue?

Second, why do citizens sometimes vote for redistribution schemes that are in conflict with their material interests?

Finally, why do certain citizens choose to participate in protests and other forms of political collective action when they could free-ride?

Dr. McClendon argues that individuals care about more than simply maximizing their material well-being. Specifically, they care deeply about their relative status vis-à-vis others within their same or similar group (for example, neighbors or co-ethnics). Envy, spite, and the desire for esteem can be powerful motivations for behavior. High-within groups status has distinct value, and in certain contexts, citizens will pursue it, even at the expense of their material interests.

The dissertation takes great care to define, both intuitively and formally, what is meant by within-group status concerns, and to distinguish this concept (theoretically and empirically) from similar concepts, such as relative deprivation, status anxiety, and last-place aversion. It builds a theory of how within group status concerns might influence political behavior. Specifically, certain contextual triggers (for example, high levels of within-group inequality) raise the salience of within-group status concerns. Within group status concerns can, depending on the context, encourage greater participation, or lead citizens to favor a “leveling down” of assets and incomes within neighborhoods and among group members.

Dr. McClendon evaluates her argument by drawing on data from both the U.S. and South Africa.

In South Africa she is able to show that where social status concerns have been triggered citizens are more likely to oppose Pareto improving provision of low-income housing, and as a result, such housing is undersupplied while resources for constructing low-income housing go unused.

Drawing on attitudinal and demographic survey data from both countries, she demonstrates that, consistent with her theory, social status concerns shape respondents’ attitudes towards redistribution. In South Africa, where inequality among neighboring co-ethnics has dramatically increased the correlation between within-group status and support for distribution is large and negative.

In the U.S. case, where status concerns are salient the degree to which the median voter is economically distant from rich group members while also close to poor group members correlates with the median voter’s support for anti-redistribution policies.

Finally, using a field experiment she finds evidence that the promise of in-group esteem induced higher rates of attendance at a rally for gay marriage in New Jersey.

In short, the committee agreed that Dr. McClendon’s dissertation represents some of the best work being done in comparative politics. It combines novel theorizing with the clever and effective use of multiple empirical strategies. This work is sure to help reshape how we think about citizen preferences over public policy and political participation.”

Best Book Award: Milan Svolik (University of Illinois) was awarded the best book award for The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press).

This year’s award committee included David Samuels (University of Minnesota)
(chair), Rachel Beatty Riedl (Northwestern University), James Melton (University College London).

Committee Remarks on the Award Winner:
“Political science has witnessed a proliferation of scholarship on authoritarian regimes over the past 10-15 years. Rather than simply categorizing all non-democracies as totalitarian, where the dictator is supreme leader with unquestionable control over the elites and masses, we have come to appreciate the heterogeneity between dictatorships and to understand that even a dictator’s power depends on a coalition of supporters. The literature upon which these realizations are based has greatly expanded both our knowledge and interest in authoritarian politics. Missing from the extant literature, though, is a theory that unifies and enhances our conceptualization of authoritarian control. This is a framework that will be built upon for years to come by scholars who seek to identify alternative ways in which dictators address the dilemmas of authoritarian power-sharing and authoritarian control first identified by Svolik.”

Michael Coppedge (University of Notre Dame) was awarded an honorable mention for Democratization and Research Methods (Cambridge University Press).

Committee Remarks on the Honorable Mention:
“This book provides a critical overview of the evolution of the scholarly study of regime change, with a focus on the interplay between different theories and different methodologies, highlighting the epistemological challenges that scholars - both qualitative and quantitative - face when attempting to make sense of this complex phenomenon. In addition to providing a most robust and yet precise conceptualization, Coppedge does more than merely summarize the democratization literature. By putting the question of regime transition in dialogue with methodologies he adjudicates between the theoretical and empirical evaluations of democracy’s causes. In doing so, he has provided a public good that will be an invaluable resource for all students of democratization, and will surely be assigned in most graduate seminars (and upper-division undergraduate courses) for years to come.”

Best Article Award: Robert Woodberry (National University of Singapore) won the best article award for his American Political Science Review piece, “The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy.”

This year's award committee included Milan Svolik (University of Illinois) (Chair), Svend-Erik Skanning (Aarhus University), and Leonardo R. Arriola (University of California, Berkeley).

Committee Remarks on the Award Winner:
“The committee unanimously decided to award the best article prize to Robert Woodberry for his article “The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy”. In this article, which came out in the May 2012 issue of the American Political Science Review, Woodberry argues that conversionary Protestants were a crucial catalyst that initiated the spread of the civic liberties and associations that ultimately resulted in the emergence of liberal democracy.

A brief version of Woodberry’s theoretical argument goes as follows: conversionary Protestants wanted ordinary people to be i) able to read the Bible and ii) actively involved in their church. Yet in their attempts to spread their faith, conversionary Protestants were in effect facilitating the spread of mass education, mass printing, and civil society. These byproducts of religious activism in turn led to the emergence of actors and conditions favorable to democracy: civic associations, political parties, religious liberties, and mass political participation.

Hence, according to Woodberry, democracy was not the autonomous triumph of modern forms of political organization and activity – like political parties, labor movements, and mass education. Rather, these modern political actors were the byproduct of a very traditional activity, namely, religious conversion and competition.

These arguments alone amount to an important and novel challenge to the standard versions of the modernization theory. Yet, Woodberry’s article is also exceptional in the way it combines historical and statistical research in order to evaluate this theoretical proposition.

First, Woodberry shows that there is a strong association between Protestantism and democracy across a number of historical and geographical contexts: in Western
Europe, in settler colonies, in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, and in the rest of the contemporary world. Then he presents historical evidence of conversionary protestants’ involvement in the spread of mass printing, mass education, civil society, and the rule of law – and thus highlights the specific mechanisms by which conversionary protestants fostered conditions favorable to the emergence of democracy. And finally, using original data on Protestant missionary involvement around the world, Professor Woodberry demonstrates that the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries explains about half the variation in democracy outside of Europe – even after controlling for most standard covariates and after accounting for endogeneity by an instrumental variable analysis.

To summarize, it is the combination of a new approach to a classic, important question and the nuanced use of different kinds of methods and evidence when evaluating his theoretical claims that led us to award this year’s best article prize to Robert Woodberry.”

**Best Fieldwork Award:** Adam Auerbach won the best fieldwork prize for his dissertation project, “Cooperation in Uncertainty: Migration, Ethnicity, and Community Governance in India’s Urban Slums.”

**This year’s award committee included**
Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton University) (chair), Oeindrila Dube (New York University), Gwyneth McClendon (Yale University).

**Committee Remarks on the Award Winners**
“This year’s committee is pleased to have selected Adam Auerbach’s dissertation project, “Cooperation in Uncertainty: Migration, Ethnicity, and Community Governance in India’s Urban Slums,” for the Comparative Democratization’s Best Fieldwork Prize. Auerbach’s dissertation project identifies a compelling research question -- namely, what explains variation in the degree of development and level of public goods provision across slums in India? To answer it, Auerbach has employed a mixed-methods approach that has involved extensive ethnographic fieldwork over 15 months, a host of interviews with political leaders, gang members, and squatter settlement residents, the collection of about 3,000 documents from community meetings, election campaigns and leadership correspondence, an original survey of just under two thousand households across 80 slums, a database of party workers characteristics, and the creation of satellite-imaging maps. His fieldwork efforts are impressive in their sheer breadth, depth, and creativity. He has collected rich data on often-overlooked communities and political activities. His innovative approach has also thus far led to intriguing and novel results. For instance, Auerbach finds, contrary to much extant research, that ethnic heterogeneity can have a positive impact on public goods provision, at least when it leads to competitive and dense patronage networks. His dissertation project promises to make a key contribution to political science literatures on economic development, ethnic diversity, public goods provision, clientelism, political competition, and research design.”

Sarah Parkinson was also awarded an honorable mention for her work on “Reinventing the Resistance: Order and Violence among Palestinians in Lebanon.”

**Committee Remarks on the Honorable Mention:** “The committee is also pleased to award Sarah Parkinson’s dissertation, “Reinventing the Resistance: Order and Violence Among Palestinians in Lebanon,” an Honorable Mention. Parkinson went above and beyond the depth and personal risk typically undertaken for dissertation fieldwork and with striking results. She spent over 19 months, over the course of 5 years, living in and near refugee camps in Lebanon in order to make sense of variation in the reorganization of Palestinian militant organizations in the decades since 1980. Her central question -- what explains the different ways in which militant organizations recover and reorganize after defeat? -- advances literatures on war, on organizational theory and change, and on social networks. Under difficult and dangerous circumstances, Parkinson won and kept the trust of her research subjects. She integrated herself fully into daily life and collected impressive archival and oral history data from both women and male officers. The committee believes that the depth, integrity, and careful design of her project will make a very important contribution to political science.”

**Best Paper Award:** Kunle Owolabi (Villanova) won the best paper award for his work on “Literacy and Democracy After Slavery?”

**This year’s award committee included**
Zachary Elkins (University of Texas at Austin) (Chair), Daniel Ziblatt (Harvard University), and Joseph Wright (Pennsylvania State University).

**Committee Remarks on the Award Winner:** “We—the selection committee—agreed unanimously in our decision. We found Owolabi’s paper to be a highly original treatment of a fascinating research question. Owolabi notes a puzzling difference in literacy rates between two sets of countries characterized two different patterns of colonization: those in which colonizers imported non-indigenous laborers to colonies (largely in the Americas) and those in which colonizers dominated indigenous populations (largely in Africa and Asia). Paradoxically, those societies characterized by forced settlement (the first mode) exhibit much higher literacy rates in the post-colonial era than do those characterized by occupation (the second mode).
Owolabi’s explanation for this paradox is compelling. He suggests that the process associated with the abolition of slavery in colonies of forced settlement led to some surprising benefits with respect to citizenship and education. By contrast, societies of occupation maintained strict administrative codes for indigenous populations that essentially denied them fundamental citizenship rights until the post-World War II era. This deprivation in membership and status in the community had a remarkable impact on educational outcomes. Owolabi tests his theory convincingly with a careful statistical analysis. The result is a highly intriguing historical paper, which we expect will be published in the next several years in a top journal.

We congratulate Kunle Owolabi heartily and wish him the best of luck in his future work in this area.”

Autocracies of the World Dataset Now Available:
On October 18, 2013, Beatriz Magaloni, Jonathan Chu, and Eric Min at Stanford University released the first edition of the Autocracies of the World (AoW) 1950-2012 dataset. Among a variety of attributes, the data tracks regime types for all countries from 1950-2012 with more specific sub-categories (monarchy, single party, hegemonic, military) for all autocratic country-years. Building on top of extant regime classification datasets, the AoW offers at least three unique contributions: removing all hybrid classifications; correcting classification errors and omissions in other datasets; and including two new measurements of personalist rule that apply in other datasets; and including two new

NEWS FROM MEMBERS

Naazneen Barma, assistant professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, has been awarded a grant from the 2013 Minerva Research Initiative, along with co-PIs Jessica Piombo and Naomi Levy. The research project is entitled “Public Service Provision as Peace-building: How Do Autonomous Efforts Compare to Internationally Aided Interventions?” and comprises comparative case study work in Cambodia, Laos, and Uganda on the relationship between peace-building and state-building.

Michael Bernhard, Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Chair in Political Science, University of Florida, and Ruchan Kaya published “Are Elections Mechanisms of Authoritarian Stability or Democratization? Evidence from Postcommunist Eurasia” in the September 2013 Perspectives on Politics, in which the authors test whether elections have functioned as a mechanism of change or of neo-authoritarian stability in the postcommunist world. Bernhard’s coedited book (with Jan Kubik), Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration, is under contract with Oxford University Press and is expected to be published in October 2014.

Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Politics, Oxford University, published the chapter on “Communism” in Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies in 2013. Brown’s own more recent book, The Rise and Fall of Communism (Ecco, 2011), has been translated in nine different countries, most recently Israel and Russia.

Matt Buehler, alumnus of the University of Texas-Austin (2013), will begin a tenure track position at the University of Tennessee’s Department of Political Science in Fall 2014. This year, he is participating in a post-doctoral fellowship at the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar to work on his book manuscript that examines the success and failure of alliances between Islamists and leftists in Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania.


Paul J. Carnegie, senior lecturer in political science, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, published “Can an Indonesian Model Work in the Middle East?” in the Summer 2013 Middle East Quarterly. Recognizing that earlier concerns over an Islamist ascendency after the fall of Indonesian President Suharto proved largely unfounded, Carnegie asks how this development was possible in the world’s most populous Muslim country and asks if it can serve as a template for the ongoing transitions in the Middle East. Carnegie was recently in Pontianak in West Kalimantan, Indonesia in late June, where he was conducting field research on the politics of decentralization reform in the country’s provinces.

Dinissa S. Duvanova, assistant professor of political science, University of Buffalo, SUNY, published Building Business in Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia: Collective Goods, Selective Incentives, and Predatory States (Cambridge University Press), in which the author shows that postcommunist business associations function as substitutes for state and private mechanisms for good governance. Please write to the author at duvanova@buffalo.edu for a discount code if you would like to purchase the book.

Todd Eisenstadt, professor of government, American University, and Karleen West of
West Virginia University have received a three-year grant from the National Science Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences Division for their work on “Collaborative Research: Identifying the Conditions Under Which Indigenous Communities Engage in Legal Mobilization.” Using a survey conducted with Ecuadorian partners, Eisenstadt and West are studying poor, rural, indigenous communities in that country - and in a comparative framework - to understand how they overcome socioeconomic and geographic barriers to launch new forms of social movements relying on Western science and international collaboration.

Bonnie N. Field, associate professor, Bentley University and visiting scholar at Harvard’s Center for European Studies, published “Resolute Leaders and ‘Cardboard Deputies’: Parliamentary Party Unity in the New Spanish Democracy” in the September 2013 South European Society and Politics, which puts forward a leadership-centered explanation of parliamentary party unity in new democracies. She also published Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain: From Zapatero to Rajoy (Palgrave 2013), co-edited with Alfonso Botti (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia). The book offers a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of contemporary Spain. Focusing on the second term of Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the dramatic defeat of the Socialists in the 2011 elections and the alternation of power to the conservative Popular Party, it underscores Spain’s deep economic and political crisis.

Julie Fisher Melton published Importing Democracy: The Role of NGOs in South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina. Published by the Kettering Foundation in 2013, the book examines the roles of NGOs in democratization by conducting hundreds of interviews in several countries across the world.

Erica Frantz, assistant professor of political science, Bridgewater State University, and Natasha Ezrow published Failed States and Institutional Decay: Understanding Instability and Poverty in the Developing World (Bloomsbury Publishing), in which the author explains how and why different types of institutions deteriorate and illustrates the impact that institutional decay has on political instability and poverty using examples from all over the world.

Vladimir Gel’man, professor of political science and sociology, European University at St. Petersburg, published (in Russian) Lz ognya da v polymya: Rossiiskaya Politika Pole SSSR (Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: Russian Politics after the USSR), which analyzes why more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian politics has not brought the country closer to political freedom. Gel’man’s article, “Cracks in the Wall: Challenges to Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia” appears in the March-April 2013 Problems of Post-Communism.

Agustina Giraudy, assistant professor at American University’s School of International Service, published “Varieties of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes: Evidence from Argentina and Mexico” in the March 2013 Studies in Comparative International Development. Recognizing the shortcomings of subnational undemocratic regimes literature, the author calls for a separation between two orthogonal dimensions: the access to and the exercise of state power.

Henry Hale, associate professor of political science and international affairs, The George Washington University, Nikolay Petrov, and Maria Lipman published “Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin” in the September 2013 Post-Soviet Affairs. The authors investigate how hybrid regimes supply governance by examining a series of dilemmas (including elections, the mass media, and state institutions) that their rulers face. A copy of the article is available by request by writing to hhale@gwu.edu.

Debra Javeline, associate professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, Jessica J. Hellmann, Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, and Gregory Shufeldt, published “Expert Opinion on Climate Change and Threats to Biodiversity” in the August 2013 Bioscience. The authors suggest policymakers consult environmental biologists on emerging and controversial issues such as climate change and use transparent, standardized metrics of expertise when deciding which scientists to consult.


Todd Landman, executive dean, faculty of social sciences, University of Essex, published Human Rights and Democracy: The Precarious Triumph of Ideals (Bloomsbury Academic Press), in which the author traces how state and non-state actors have created social, political, and legal institutions that seek to constrain the worst forms of human behavior and embraced the ideas of democracy and human rights in new ways.

Staffan I. Lindberg, association professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg and the University of Florida,

James Melton, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, University College London, Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar and Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, and Zachary Elkins, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, have launched a new website, Constitute, which uses data from the Comparative Constitutions Projects to allow national constitutions to be served by topic. Constitute can be accessed at www.constituteproject.org/#!.

Yonatan Morse has taken an appointment as visiting assistant professor and associate director of the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University’s department of government. Morse also published “Party Matters: The Institutional Origins of Competitiveness and Hegemony in Post Cold War Tanzania,” which will appear in an upcoming issue of Democratization.

Leila Piran, adjunct professor at George Washington University’s School of Professional Studies, published Institutional Change in Turkey: The Impact of EU Reforms on Human Rights and Policing (Palgrave MacMillan). The book explores the domestic reasons behind police reform in Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup and argues that, while important, the EU’s influence on democracy and human rights only began to influence police reform after 1999.

Sebastian Royo, associate dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Suffolk University, recently published Lessons from the Economic Crisis in Spain (Palgrave); “Portugal in the European Union: The Limits of Convergence” in a special issue of South European Society and Politics that focused on “Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery”; and a book chapter entitled “A ‘Ship in Trouble’ The Spanish Banking System in the Midst of the Global Financial System Crisis: The Limits of Regulation” to the book Market-Based Banking, Varieties of Financial Capitalism and the Financial Crisis, edited by Iain Hardie and David Howarth and published by Oxford University Press.

Sanjay Ruparelia, assistant professor of politics, New School for Social Research, was recently awarded a Postdoctoral Fellowship for Transregional Research to conduct fieldwork for his new project, “Demanding a Right to Basic Social Welfare: Contesting the Law in India and China,” by the Social Science Research Council. Ruparelia also published “India’s New Rights Agenda: Genesis, Promises, Risks” in the September 2013 Pacic Affairs.

Ben Ross Schneider, Ford International Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America, in which the author argues that Latin America has a distinctive, enduring form of hierarchical capitalism characterized by multinational corporations, diversified business groups, low skills, and segmented labor markets.

Holli A. Semetko, Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Media and International Affairs and Professor of Political Science, Emory University, was named a Fulbright Nehru Scholar to India for 2013-14. She is based at IIT Bombay for the fall semester. Her research on strategic communication in India focuses on business, government, and international affairs. The Sage Handbook of Political Communication, edited by Holli Semetko and Margaret Scammell, was published in 2012.

Dan Slater, associate professor of political science, University of Chicago, published a coauthored article in the September 2013 Perspectives on Politics with Joseph Wong, professor of political science, University of Toronto, entitled “The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia.”

Lahra Smith, assistant professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, published Making Citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, Gender, and National Identity in Ethiopia (Cambridge University Press). Using data from Ethiopia and developing a historically informed and empirically nuanced study of language policy and ethnicity and gender identities, the book analyzes the contestation over citizenship that engages the state, social movements, and individuals in substantive ways.

Etel Solingen was recently appointed as the Thomas T. and Elizabeth C. Tierney Chair in Peace Studies at the University of California Irvine. Solingen also served as the president of the International Studies Association from 2012 to 2013 under the theme “The Politics of Transnational and Regional Diffusion,” highlighting a large number of panels on comparative democratization, the Arab Spring, and related topics. She also published “Three Scenes of Sovereignty and Power” in Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics: Rethinking Power in the Contemporary World (Oxford University Press).
A book written by Guillermo Trejo, associate professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, entitled Popular Movements in Authoritocracies: Religion, Repression, and Indigenous Collective Action in Mexico (Cambridge University Press), received an honorary mention for the 2013 Charles Tilly Award for Best Book Published in Collective Behavior and Social Movements from the American Sociological Association (ASA).

Maya Tudor, university lecturer in government and public policy, Oxford University, published The Promise of Power: The Social Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan (Cambridge University Press), in which she suggests that the emergence of a stable democracy in India and an unstable autocracy in Pakistan is best explained by the historically-specific interests of the dominant social group which led each independence movement as well as by the varying strength of the political parties which were created to pursue those interests. Tudor also published The Historical Inheritance of India’s Democracy (Routledge Handbook on Indian Politics).

Rollin F. Tusalem was recently promoted to associate professor of political science at Arkansas State University. He recently published “Bringing the Military Back In: The Politicisation of the Military and its Effects on Democratic Consolidation” and “The Impact of Diamonds on Economic Growth, Adverse Regime Change, and Democratic State Building in Africa” (with Minion K.C. Morrison) in upcoming issues of International Political Science Review and “The Effect of Political Dynasties on Effective Democratic Governance: Evidence from the Philippines” (with Jeffrey Pe-Aguirre) in Asian Politics and Policy.

Rachel Vanderhill, visiting assistant professor of international relations, Wheaton College, and Michael E. Aleprete, Jr. edited International Dimensions of Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from Post-Soviet States (Lexington Books). The edited volume explores how international factors interact with domestic conditions to explain the persistence of authoritarianism throughout the region. The selections in the volume cover several countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, South Ossetia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the Russian Federation. The failure of democratic consolidation among post-Soviet states offers important lessons for policymakers and academics dealing with the recent wave of political transitions in the Middle East and Asia.

Michael Wahman (formerly University of Texas at Austin) started a new position as Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow at London School of Economics’s Department of Government on September 1. Wahman’s research is supported by a two-year grant from the Swedish Research Council. During his time at LSE, he will concentrate on a project studying African sub-national variation in election manipulation and electoral behavior.

Shannon Drysdale Walsh was awarded a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend for 2013 to support two months of full-time writing and research on her book project Engendering State Institutions: State Response to Violence Against Women in Latin America. This book manuscript proposes a theoretical framework to explain variation in the construction and performance of specialized state institutions that address violence against women. Drysdale Walsh compares Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras, countries that have relatively few resources and little political will to implement legal norms that aim to prevent and sanction violence against women. In part, she argues that transnational advocacy networks help overcome state resistance to advancing institutional specialization and performance by providing external pressure and international funding to support new institution-strengthening efforts within the justice system.

Kurt Weyland, Lozano Long Professor of Latin American Politics, University of Texas at Austin, won the Mary Parker Follett Prize of the APSA Politics and History section for two of his articles: “Diffusion Waves and European Democratization: The Impact of Organizational Development” and “The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?” Weyland also published “The Threat from the Populist Left” in the June 2013 Journal of Democracy’s cluster of articles on “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift.”

Matthew S. Winters, assistant professor of political science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Stanley J. Bernstein Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brown University, published “Lacking Information or Condemning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?” in the July 2013 Comparative Politics. Using an original survey experiment, the article finds little evidence of Brazilian voters accepting a tradeoff in which they support corrupt politicians who are otherwise providing public goods; instead, when voters are given information about political corruption, they express a preference for removing the politician from office.
NEW RESEARCH

Journal of Democracy

The October 2013 (Vol. 24, no. 4) Journal of Democracy features a cluster of articles on “Tracking the ‘Arab Spring,” as well as individual case studies on democracy and the quality of the state, governance, Paraguay, Malaysia, and elections in Africa.

“Democracy and the Quality of the State” by Francis Fukuyama
What is the relationship between high-quality state administration and democracy? A look back at modern Greece and Italy, along with Germany and the United States, provides some insights.

“Reflections on ‘Governance’” by Marc F. Plattner
“Governance,” once merely a synonym for government, has taken on new meanings that tend to downplay the importance of the political. But can “good governance” be achieved today without the protections of liberal democracy?

Tracking the “Arab Spring”
I. “Why the Modest Harvest?” by Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds
Popular uprisings have occurred only in some Arab states and in even fewer have authoritarian rulers been overthrown. What factors allow us to predict whether an authoritarian regime will be vulnerable?

II. “Egypt’s Failed Transition” by Nathan J. Brown
The July 2013 military takeover has squashed democratic hopes in Egypt, at least for now. How did things go so wrong, and what lessons are to be drawn from this lamentable episode?

III. “Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism” by Steven Heydemann
The Assad regime has been adapting to the new challenges posed by mass uprisings through a process of “authoritarian learning,” and at least some of its methods are being applied elsewhere in the region.

IV. “Yemen Changes Everything...And Nothing” by April Longley Alley
A long-ruling strongman president has been unseated by popular unrest and a negotiated transition is under way, but to many Yemenis this all appears to be a change more of appearance than of substance.

V. “Libya Starts from Scratch” by Mieczysław P. Boduszyński and Duncan Pickard
Qadhafi is gone after subjecting his country to a brutal dictatorship for more than four decades, but the devastated institutional landscape that he left behind bodes ill for Libya’s democratic prospects.

“The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers” by Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning
Is democracy threatened by a “reverse wave”? Examining regional patterns and distinguishing between different types of democracy gives us a new basis for assessing this question.

“Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment” by Leiv Marsteinredet, Mariana Llanos, and Detlef Nolte
The phenomenon of the “interrupted presidency” remains a key source of democratic instability in Latin America, as was demonstrated once again by the 2012 impeachment of Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo.

Research Report

“Assessing the Quality of Elections” by Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martinez i Coma
Determining whether an election has met international standards is a pressing issue for both practitioners and scholars. An important new study aims to systematize the assessment of electoral integrity.

“Malaysia’s Elections: A Step Backward” by Bridget Welsh
Despite losing the popular vote, Malaysia’s long-ruling Barisan Nasional triumphed again in the country’s 2013 elections, disappointing an emboldened opposition that had high hopes after a strong performance in 2008.

Exchange
I. “Reexamining African Elections” by Matthijs Bogaards
Do even unfair and unfair elections in sub-Saharan Africa, if repeated often enough, really contribute to democratization? A fresh look at the evidence casts doubt on the theory of “democratization by elections.”

II. “Confusing Categories, Shifting Targets” by Staffan I. Lindberg
Staffan Lindberg replies to Matthijs Bogaards’s critique, finding the latter’s methodology problematic and arguing that the evidence for association between repeated elections and democratization remains strong.

III. “Chavismo After Chávez?” by Miriam Kornblith
Can a regime built by and centered around a populist strongman survive that strongman’s death? A natural experiment is now unfolding in...
order. The old playbook of limited, manipulated events, but also a reflection of internal problems in March 2011, it was a reaction to regional joined the wider Arab world’s political upheavals. Wehrey “Bahrain’s Decade of Discontent” by Frederic order. The old playbook of limited, manipulated The Hashemite monarchy still fails to understand that had been festering for a decade. Not only did the Algerian regime survive the “Arab Spring,” it hardly deviated from its commitment to nonviolence to its key demands—a vote that counts and equality under the law.

II. “Outlawing the Opposition” by Miriam Lansky and Elspeth Suthers The Putin regime, having faced its first real challenge in the form of mass protests after the 2011 Duma elections, is responding with a series of laws intended to intimidate its civil-society opposition, if not stamp it out altogether.

“Transforming the Arab World’s Protection-Racket Politics” by Daniel Brumberg The Arab world’s old autocracies survived by manipulating the sharp identity conflicts in their societies. The division and distrust that this style of rule generated is now making it especially difficult to carry out the kind of pact-making often crucial to successful democratic transitions.

“Algeria versus the Arab Spring” by Frédéric Volpi Not only did the Algerian regime survive the “Arab Spring,” it hardly deviated from its normal methods of authoritarian governance—patronage, pseudodemocratization, and effective use of the security apparatus.

“Bahrain’s Decade of Discontent” by Frederic Wehrey When this small island kingdom in the Gulf joined the wider Arab world’s political upheavals in March 2011, it was a reaction to regional events, but also a reflection of internal problems that had been festering for a decade.

“Jordan: The Ruse of Reform” by Sean L. Yom The Hashemite monarchy still fails to understand the challenges that threaten Jordan’s political order. The old playbook of limited, manipulated reform is no longer enough, but key players fail to realize it.

Kenya’s 2013 Elections
I. “Choosing Peace over Democracy” by James D. Long, Karuti Kanyinga, Karen E. Ferree, and Clark Gibson
In March 2013, Kenyans took to the polls in what turnout to be another disputed election. Why did the peace hold this time, unlike in 2007, and what are the implications for democracy in Kenya?

II. “Technology Is Not Democracy” by Joel D. Barkan In an effort to avoid repeating the 2007 electoral debacle, Kenya’s election commission turned to technology, but its high-tech voter-registration and vote-count processes fell short. Its experience has important lessons both for emerging democracies and for international donors.

Democratic Union” by Juan Pablo Luna, Democratic Party and the Independent Democratic Union“ by Juan Pablo Luna, Democratic Party and the Independent

“Religious Parties in Chile: the Christian Democratic Party and the Independent Democratic Union” by Juan Pablo Luna, Felipe Monestier, and Fernando Rosenblatt

“Religion and Democratization in Northern Ireland: Is Religion actually Ethnicity in Disguise?” by Eoin O’Malley and Dawn Walsh

“Conclusion: Reassessing the Relation between Religion, Political Actors, and Democratization” by Luca Ozzano and Francesco Cavatorta

The August 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 4) Democratization features articles on democracy promotion in eastern Europe, elections in Tanzania and Uganda, measuring democracy, regime type and the impact of democracy assistance, institutional factors and party systems in new democracies, and the influence of external actors on democratization.

“Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy: the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood” by Gwendolyn Sasse

“Elections and Landmark Policies in Tanzania and Uganda” by Anne Mette Kjær and Ole Therkildsen

“Bringing Direct Democracy Back In: Toward a Three-Dimensional Measure of Democracy” by David Altman

“Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?” by Agnes Clark Gibson

“Religious Parties and Democratization.” by Luca Ozzano and

“Introduction: Religiously Oriented Parties and Democratization” by Luca Ozzano

“The Many Faces of the Political God: A Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties” by Luca Ozzano

“The Perils of Polarization and Religious Parties: The Democratic Challenges of Political Fragmentation in Israel and Turkey” by Sultan Tepe

“The Perils of Polarization and Religious Parties: The Democratic Challenges of Political Fragmentation in Israel and Turkey” by Sultan Tepe

“Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party” by Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone

“Refining the Moderation Thesis. Two Religious Parties and Indian Democracy: the Jana Sangh and the BJP between Hindutva Radicalism and Coalition Politics” by Christophe Jaffrelot

“Ahab and the White Whale: the Contemporary Debate around the Forms of Catholic Political Commitment in Italy” by Alberta Giorgi

“Religious Parties and Democratization in Northern Ireland: Is Religion actually Ethnicity in Disguise?” by Eoin O’Malley and Dawn Walsh

“Conclusion: Reassessing the Relation between Religion, Political Actors, and Democratization” by Luca Ozzano and Francesco Cavatorta

The August 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 4) Democratization features articles on democracy promotion in eastern Europe, elections in Tanzania and Uganda, measuring democracy, regime type and the impact of democracy assistance, institutional factors and party systems in new democracies, and the influence of external actors on democratization.

“Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy: the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood” by Gwendolyn Sasse

“Elections and Landmark Policies in Tanzania and Uganda” by Anne Mette Kjær and Ole Therkildsen

“Bringing Direct Democracy Back In: Toward a Three-Dimensional Measure of Democracy” by David Altman

“Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?” by Agnes Clark Gibson

“Religious Parties and Democratization.” by Luca Ozzano and
New Research

Comparisons” by Jørgen Møller

“When Can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Gatekeeper Elites” by Jakob Tolstrup

“Inclusive Institutions and Stability of Transition toward Democracy in Post-Civil War States” by Madhav Joshi

“Remembering Violence: the Role of Apology and Dialogue in Turkey’s Democratization Process” by Mneesha Gellman

SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

This section features selected articles on democracy that appeared in journals received by the NED’s Democracy Resource Center, June 1–June 1, 2013.

_African Affairs, Vol. 111, no. 449, October 2013_

“The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebel–Military Integration and Conflict Dynamics in the Eastern DRC” by Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen

“Resource Curse or Resource Disease? Oil in Ghana” by Dominik Kopitiski, Andrzej Polus, and Wojciech Tyholiz

“Contingency and Change in Senegalese Party Politics: Lessons from the 2012 Elections” by Danielle Resnick

_African Affairs, Vol. 111, no. 448, July 2013_

“The Roots of Resilience: Exploring Popular Support for African Traditional Authorities” by Carolyn Logan

“Democratic Revolutionaries or Pocketbook Protesters? The Roots of the 2009–2010 Uprisings in Niger” by Lisa Mueller

“When Warlords to Freedom Fighters: Political Violence and State Formation in Umbumbulu, South Africa” by Sarah M. Mathis

_American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, no. 3, August 2013_

“Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War” by Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson

“Quality of Government: Toward a More Complex Definition” by Marcus Agnafors

“Quality Over Quantity: Amici Influence and Judicial Decision Making” by Janet M. Box-Steppensmeier, Dino P. Christenson, and Matthew P. Hitt

“Empowering Women through Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan” by Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Ruben Enikolopov

“The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution” by Mark R. Beissinger

_Commutnist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 46, no. 3, September 2013_

“Continuity and Change in Russia’s Policy toward Central and Eastern Europe” by Yury E. Fedorov

“Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi” by Cyrus Samii

_Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 10, October 2013_

“The Behavioral Foundations of Social Politics: Evidence from Surveys and a Laboratory Democracy” by Benjamin Barber IV, Pablo Beramendi, and Erik Wibbels

“The Varying Political Toll of Concerns About Corruption in Good Versus Bad Economic Times” by Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga

“Mainstream or Niche? Vote-Seeking Incentives and the Programmatic Strategies of Political Parties” by Thomas M. Meyer and Markus Wagner

“When Gardens Have Their Day: The Electoral Consequences of Social Democratic Parties’ March to the Middle in Western Europe” by Johannes Karreth, Jonathan T. Polk, and Christopher S. Allen

“When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile” by Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo

“Violence Against Civilians in the Second Intifada: The Moderating Effect of Armed Group Structure on Opportunistic Violence” by Devorah Manekin

_Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 9, September 2013_

“Vote Buying With Multiple Distributive Goods” by Michael Albertus

_Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 8, August 2013_

“Competitiveness, Partisanship, and Subnational Protest in Argentina” by Moisés Arce and Jorge Mangonnet


“Attitude Variability Among Latin American Publics: How Party System Structuration Affects Left/Right Ideology” by Imke Harbers, Catherine E. de Vries, and Marco R. Steenbergen

“Campaign Spending in Proportional Electoral Systems: Incumbents Versus Challengers Revisited” by Joel W. Johnson

_Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 7, July 2013_

“Engendering Politics: The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Women’s Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa” by Tiffany D. Barnes and Stephanie M. Burchard

“Catchall or Catch and Release? The Electoral Consequences of Social Democratic Parties’ March to the Middle in Western Europe” by Johannes Karreth, Jonathan T. Polk, and Christopher S. Allen

“When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile” by Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo

Comparative Politics, Vol. 46, no. 1, October 2013
“The Left and Minority Representation: The Success of General Strikes in Western Europe, 1980–2009” by Kerstin Hamann, Alison Johnston, and John Kelly

“Striking Concessions from Governments: The Success of General Strikes in Western Europe, 1980–2009” by Kerstin Hamann, Alison Johnston, and John Kelly

Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, no. 4, July 2013
“Regime Legacies and Levels of Democracy: Evidence from Latin America” by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Scott Mainwaring

“Electing Extremists? Party Primaries and Legislative Candidates in Mexico” by Kathleen Bruhn

“Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption? When Will Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?” by Matthew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro

“Political Representation in Microstates: The Cases of St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Palau” by Wouter Veenendaal

“Perspectives on the Power and Persistence of States in Africa and Beyond” by Erin Hern

Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 21, no. 3, Summer 2013
“Patterns of Electoral Contestation in Russian Regional Assemblies: Between ‘Competitive’ and ‘Hegemonic’ Authoritarianism” by Petr Panov and Cameron Ross

“Party System Institutionalization in Ukraine” by Olena Rybly

“The Negative Consequences of Proportional Representation in Ukraine” by Serhij Vasylchenko

International Political Science Review, Vol. 34, no. 5, November 2013
“The Internet: A New Route to Good Governance” by Susan Khazaeli and Daniel Stockemer

“Why Do People Vote? Rationality or Emotion” by Ching-Hsing Wang

“A Right-to-Left Policy Switch? An Analysis of the Honduran Case under Manuel Zelaya” by Clayton M. Cunha Filho, André Luiz Coelho, and Fidel I. Pérez Flores

“Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy” by Abel Escribá-Folch

“Voting Differently across Electoral Arenas: Empirical Implications from a Decentralized Democracy” by Pedro Riera

International Political Science Review, Vol. 34, no. 4, September 2013
“Is Corruption an Enemy of Civil Society? The Case of Central and Eastern Europe” by Patty Zakaria

“Opening Pandora’s Box? Inclusive Institutions and the Onset of Internal Conflict in Oil-Rich Countries” by Tim Wegenast

“Changing the Rules of the Game: Determinants of Successful Electoral System Change in Central and Eastern Europe” by Philipp Harfst

“Second Time Around: Ex–Combatants at the Polls in Liberia” by Johanna Söderström

Middle East Journal, Vol. 67, no 3, Summer 2013
“Iran’s Basij: Membership in a Militant Islamist Organization” by Afshon Ostovar

“University under Siege: The Case of the Professors’ Basij Organization” by Saeid Golkar

Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 3, Fall 2013
“Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon’s Taif Experience” by Stephan Rosiny

“Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic Shifts?” by Beverley Milton-Edwards

“The Rise of Militant Salafism in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications” by Emil Souleimanov and Maya Ehrmann

“Turkey Today: Headscarves and Women’s Rights” by Marvine Howe

Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 2, Summer 2013
“Order, Freedom and Chaos: Sovereignties in Syria” by George Abu Ahmad

“Creating Democrats? Testing the Arab Spring” by Ashley Barnes

“Transition in the Middle East: New Arab Realities and Iran” by Mahmood Sariolghalam

Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 6, November 2013
“Analysing Multiparty Competition in Plurality Rule Elections” by Patrick Dunleavy and Rekha Diwakar

“Have the Cake and Eat It: The Rational Voter in Africa” by Staffan I Lindberg

Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 5, September 2013
“Political Parties, Independents and the Electoral Market in sub-Saharan Africa” by John Ishiyama, Anna Batia, and Angela Sortor
New Research

“Measuring Vertical Integration in Parties with Multi-Level Systems Data” by Lori Thorlakson

“Do Electoral Coalitions Facilitate Democratic Consolidation in Africa?” by Danielle Resnick

“Beyond Outbidding? Ethnic Party Strategies in Serbia” by Christina Isabel Zuber

“Do Electoral Coalitions Facilitate Democratic Consolidation in Africa?” by Danielle Resnick

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SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES


ASIA


EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION


LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN


MIDDLE EAST


COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL


New Research


APSA-CD is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the University of Florida's Department of Political Science and the International Forum.

The current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg, Benjamin Smith or Melissa Aten.

Executive Editors

**Staffan I. Lindberg** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. He is also PI (with John Gerring and Michael Coppedge) the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project; a research fellow at the Quality of Government Institute, and an associate professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. His research focuses on state building, political clientelism, political parties, legislative-executive relations, women's representation, voting behavior, elections, and democracy in Africa. He is the author of *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) and the editor of *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

**Benjamin Smith** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research focuses on ethnic conflict, regime change, and the politics of resource wealth. His first book, *Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, was published in 2007 by Cornell University Press, and his articles have appeared in *World Politics*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, the *Journal of International Affairs*, and other journals and edited volumes. Dr. Smith is currently working on a book exploring the long-term factors that shape the success of separatist movements.

Members

**Kate Baldwin** is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida. She studies state-building, clientelism, and the political economy of development with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Her current research projects seek to understand the political consequences of involving non-state actors, such as traditional chiefs and non-governmental organizations, in the provision of goods and services.

**Michael H. Bernhard** is the inaugural holder of the Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair in Political Science at the University of Florida. His work centers on questions of democratization and development both globally and in the context of Europe. Among the issues that have figured prominently in his research agenda are the role of civil society in democratization, institutional choice in new democracies, the political economy of democratic survival, and the legacy of extreme forms of dictatorship.

**Petia Kostadinova** is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC). Dr. Kostadinova’s main area of research involves the role of citizens’ preferences, and media’s transmission of these preferences, in shaping social and economic policies in the post-communist countries. A second stream of research focuses on the social and economic policies of the European Union. Prof. Kostadinova’s research has been published in *Europe and National Economic Transformation: The EU After the Lisbon Decade*, Mitchell Smith, ed, the *European Journal of Communication*, the *Central European Journal of Communication*, and is forthcoming in *East European Politics* and *Journalism & Mass Communication*.

**Bryon Moraski** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research considers the politics of institutional choice, institutional development, and the influence of short-term electoral incentives on long-term political trajectories. His first book, *Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s Regions* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) explores the origins of Russia’s sub-national legislative electoral systems. He has published numerous book chapters and articles, including works in *The American Journal of Political Science, Government and Opposition*, and the *Journal of Politics*. He is currently completing a co-authored book manuscript with William Reisinger (University of Iowa) that examines the links between federal elections and gubernatorial (s)election in Russia and their influence on the country’s post-Soviet trajectory.
Comparative Democratization

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Editorial Committee

Conor O’Dwyer is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His book Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development examines the relationship between party-building and state-building in new democracies, looking specifically at the relationship between party competition and patronage politics in postcommunist Eastern Europe. His latest research examines the European Union’s use of conditionality to promote more liberal minorities policies in postcommunist states. Specifically, it examines the EU’s role in the contentious politics of homosexuality in postcommunist societies. Looking beyond just policy adoption, it examines the impact of EU-sponsored minority-rights policies: do they lead to shifts in attitudes regarding religious difference, national belonging, and minority rights?

Leonardo A. Villalón is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research has focused on Islam and politics and on democratization in West Africa, particularly Senegal, Mali, and Niger. He is the author of Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and co-editor of The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration (Lynne Rienner, 1998) and The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions (Indiana University Press, 2005), as well as of numerous articles and book chapters on politics and religion in West Africa.

Managing Editor

Melissa Aten-Becnel is the senior research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.

Editorial Assistant

Adam Bilinski received a B.A. in International Relations at the University of Warsaw (Poland) and M.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago. Currently he is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Florida with specialization in comparative politics. His research interests include the problems of survival of democracy, electoral revolutions and democracy promotion. He is currently working on his dissertation, which evaluates how pre-democratization historical legacies (in the form of pre-democratization regime discontinuities and regime type both in independent states and colonies) conditioned the probability of survival of once-established democracies.