Skip to main content
Article
Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods
Econometrica (1983)
  • Ted Bergstrom, University of California, Santa Barbara
  • Richard Cornes
Abstract

When is the Pareto optimal amount of public goods independent of income distribution? Subject to some regularity conditions, the answer is when preferences of every individual i can be represented by a utility function of the form U(X_i,Y)=A(Y)X_i+B_i(Y) where X_i is i's consumption of private goods and Y is the amount of public goods.

Keywords
  • public goods,
  • Samuelson condition,
  • allocative branch,
  • Richard Musgrave,
  • transferable utility,
  • Groves-Clarke mechanism,
  • utility possibility frontier
Disciplines
Publication Date
November 1, 1983
Citation Information
Ted Bergstrom and Richard Cornes. "Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods" Econometrica Vol. 51 (1983)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/ted_bergstrom/55/