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Counting Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Via Degree Theory
Journal of Mathematical Economics (1983)
  • Ted Bergstrom, University of California, Santa Barbara
  • Carl Simon, University of Michigan
  • Charles Titus, University of Michigan

A Nash equilibria of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is Pareto optimal. But this may not be much use if there are many distinct Nash equilibria, since it is not clear that the mechanism would converge on any one of them. This paper shows that if preferences are quasi-linear, the Groves-Ledyard mechanism has a unique Nash equilibrium, but even in the simplest class of preferences in which demands for public goods are affected by incomes, the number of equilibria increases exponentially with the number of consumers. The paper makes use of some pretty mathematics and even sports a drawing of Whitney's umbrella.

  • Groves-Ledyard mechanism,
  • Nash equilibria,
  • degree theory,
  • multiple equilibria,
  • Whitney's umbrella
Publication Date
February, 1983
Citation Information
Ted Bergstrom, Carl Simon and Charles Titus. "Counting Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Via Degree Theory" Journal of Mathematical Economics Vol. 12 (1983)
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