Skip to main content
Lobbying Legislatures
Journal of Political Economy (2002)
  • Sven Feldmann, University of Chicago
  • Morten Bennedsen, Copenhagen Business School
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress's decentralized nature allows the strategic formation of policy coalitions among high-demand districts and the exclusion of low-demand districts. This increases the incentive to provide information about districts' demand relative to a legislature in which the governing coalition is fixed.
  • Lobbying,
  • parliamentary system,
  • presidential system,
  • coalition formation
Publication Date
August, 2002
Citation Information
Sven Feldmann and Morten Bennedsen. "Lobbying Legislatures" Journal of Political Economy Vol. 110 Iss. 4 (2002)
Available at: