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Contribution to Book
Time-Consistent Fair Water Sharing Agreements
Advances in Dynamic Game Theory: Numerical Methods, Algorithms, and Applications to Ecology and Economics (2009)
  • Stuart McDonald
Abstract
Scarcity of water has become a major issue facing many nations around the world. To improve the efficiency of water usage there has been considerable interest in recent years in trading water. A major issue in trading water rights is the problem of how an allocation system can be designed in perpetuity that also has desirable properties at each point of time. This is an issue of the time consistency of the contract to trade water. In this chapter we develop a model of dynamic recontracting of water rights and study time consistency properties of the resultant contracts using the ideas of Filar and Petrosjan.
Keywords
  • Cooperative agreements; time consistent shapley value; water rights; river networks
Publication Date
2009
Editor
Steffen Jørgensen, Marc Quincampoix, Thomas L. Vincent
Publisher
Springer
Series
Annals of Dynamic Games
Citation Information
Stuart McDonald. "Time-Consistent Fair Water Sharing Agreements" BerlinAdvances in Dynamic Game Theory: Numerical Methods, Algorithms, and Applications to Ecology and Economics Vol. 9 (2009)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/stuart_mcdonald/8/