Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment RuleUF Law Faculty Publications
AbstractCourts love the so-called business judgment rule. It dispenses quickly and easily with derivative actions against corporate directors and officers, and other challenges to corporate conduct. Unfortunately, the business judgment rule has come to mask its underlying premise, i.e. that there must have been a business judgment made. This article examines the dominance of the business judgment rule over the underlying requirement of the duty of care and suggests reform measures that will bring the duty of care back to its appropriate role in determining the merits of management decision-making processes.
Citation InformationStuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 591 (1983), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/427