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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HUNT:
NEW RECOGNITION OF AN OLD LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA

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Introduction

The Constitution of Virginia was amended effective in 2001 to provide: “The people have a right to hunt, fish, and harvest game, subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law.”¹ Currently, eleven States recognize hunting as a constitutional guarantee, and proposed amendments are pending in other States.² The oldest, dating back to the American Revolution, sought to guard against royal privilege as practiced in

²See Appendix infra.
England, while the newest, adopted in recent decades, seek to preempt hunting bans sought by “animal rights” zealots.

Unlike the British tradition of privilege which denied hunting rights to commoners, in America the right to hunt was deemed universal, albeit not explicitly expressed in most constitutions. Toward the end of the twentieth century, with increasing urban and suburban encroachment over rural life, and the advent of anti-hunting activism, a trend arose to adopt guarantees of the right to hunt in State constitutions.

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3 See *Cabot v. Thomas*, 147 Vt. 207, 211, 514 A.2d 1034 (1986) (noting that colonists in what became Vermont “were well aware of the history of abuses that had occurred in England under authority of fish and game laws,” and quoting Vt. Const., Ch. II, § 39 (1777) as recognizing: “The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not enclosed, and in like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters (not private property) under proper regulations, to be made and provided by the General Assembly.”).


5 *Sterling v. Jackson*, 69 Mich. 488, 527, 37 N.W. 845 (1888), captured the American view as follows:

We can borrow no light, in this discussion, from the English game and forestry laws, which are not a part of our common law, and which are repugnant and hostile to the theory of our institutions. The wild game and fish abounding in our woods and waters have never been the property of the general government or of the state, in the sense that they were held the property of the crown in England. No man here is granted special permission by the national or state government to kill game or catch fish exclusively at certain times or in certain places. Our game and fish laws are general, and apply to and govern the whole people. The fish of our waters, and the game of our woods, and the wild birds of the air, belong to the people, and not to the crown, and should always, when they can be captured or killed without detriment to private rights, be preserved to the people.
A survey of the guarantees that have been adopted by different States reveals that very little case law has been generated. While the wording varies, the guarantees assume that the State legislatures and game departments will regulate hunting consistent with the principles of sound conservation and game management, and the regulations they adopt are generally upheld.\(^6\)

To what extent will the usual rules of constitutional interpretation be applied to the right to hunt?

As a case study, this Article will focus on Virginia’s right-to-hunt guarantee. Debates in the General Assembly over the proposal reveal policy arguments pro and con. While no reported judicial decision on the meaning of the guarantee has been generated, a case called *Orion Sporting Group v. Board of Supervisors of Nelson County* went to trial and resulted in a thoughtful circuit court opinion on the guarantee. This Article expands on the jurisprudential issues raised in that case as a means of exploring the potential contours of the right to hunt.

### I. THE RIGHT TO HUNT, THEN AND NOW

**A. A Historical Perspective**

\(^{6}\text{E.g., Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 270 Wis.2d 318, 354, 677 N.W.2d 612, 629 (2004) (“the 2003 constitution amendment was intended to codify the common law right to hunt that existed prior to its adoption. . . . The 2003 amendment does not impose any limitation upon the power of the state or DNR [Department of Natural Resources] to regulate hunting, other than that any restrictions on hunting must be reasonable.”); Alabama Dog Hunters Ass’n v. State, 893 So.2d 1224, 1227 (Ala. Civ. App., 2004) (approving as constitutional “the Department’s interpretation of those statutes as permitting it to limit, in the public interest, how certain animals in portions of Alabama may be hunted to certain methods, in connection with its general regulation of hunting seasons”); Hunters, Anglers & Trappers Ass’n of Vermont, Inc. v. Winooski Valley Park Dist., 181 Vt. 12, 15-16 (2006) (right not implicated where legislature delegated regulatory function to ban hunting in a district); Hartley Hill Hunt Club v. County Commission of Ritchie County, 220 W.Va. 382, 388-89, 647 S.E.2d 818, 824-25 (2007) (right to bear arms for lawful hunting held consistent with ban on hunting on private land on Sundays). The last cited case was a challenge supported by the State ACLU, whose executive director humorously said: “Our state motto may say, ‘Mountaineers are always free,’ but in Ritchie County they are only free Monday through Saturday.”\) ACLU Press Release, http://www.acluwv.org/Newsroom/PressReleases/10_03_05.htm (visited Nov. 20, 2009).
Historically, the English game laws made hunting a monopoly of those privileged to do so by the Crown, and imposed draconian penalties – sometimes including the death penalty – on commoners for hunting. William Blackstone wrote that “the right of pursuing, taking, and destroying [game] . . . is vested in the king alone, and from him derived to such of his subjects as have received the grants of a chase, a park, a free warren, or free fishery.” He noted that “a reason oftener meant, than avowed, by the makers of forest or game laws” was “for preventing of popular insurrections and resistance to the government, by disarming the bulk of the people.”

European feudalism was founded on conquest, and the rulers wanted to keep the subjects “in as low a condition as possible, and especially to prohibit them the use of arms. Nothing could do this more effectually than a prohibition of hunting and sporting . . . .” By contrast, the American colonists were free to hunt. The accurate marksmanship exhibited by the provincials at the Battle of Bunker Hill “had been derived from hunting, and the ordinary amusements of sportsmen. The dexterity which by long habit they had acquired in hitting beasts, birds, and marks, was fatally applied to the destruction of British officers.” Pennsylvania declared in 1776 “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of

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82 Blackstone, Commentaries *410-11.

9Id. at *412.

10Id. at *413.

themselves, and the state,”\textsuperscript{12} and also: “The inhabitants of this state shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all other lands not inclosed.”\textsuperscript{13} This was a reaction against the English practices, under which “the freeholders of moderate estates [are] deprived of a natural right. . . . . [T]he body of the people kept from the use of guns are utterly ignorant of the arms of modern war, and the kingdom effectually disarmed, except of the standing force . . . .”\textsuperscript{14}

When the federal Constitution was proposed in 1787 without a bill of rights, Antifederalists from Pennsylvania demanded a declaration in part: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game . . . .”\textsuperscript{15} They also proposed: “The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on all other lands in the United States not enclosed, and in like manner to fish in all navigable waters, and others not private property, without being restrained therein by any laws to be passed by the legislature of the United States.”\textsuperscript{16} Virginia Federalist Alexander White argued against these provisions, which were “clearly out of the power of Congress” and were proposed “to induce the ignorant to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12}Pa. Declaration of Rights, Art. XIII (1776).
  \item \textsuperscript{14}\textit{Pennsylvania Evening Post}, Nov. 5, 1776, at 554, cols. 1-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{16}\textit{Id}. at 624.
\end{itemize}
believe that Congress would have a power over such objects . . . “\(^{17}\) The modern regulatory state was not anticipated.

After proposal in 1789 of what became the Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear arms,”\(^ {18}\) Samuel Nasson of Massachusetts wrote his congressman about its effect: “Then there will be no Dispute Between the people and rulers in that may be secured the right to keep arms for Common and Extraordinary Occasions such as to secure ourselves against the wild Beast and also to amuse us by fowling and for our Defence against a Common Enemy.”\(^ {19}\)

Writing the first commentaries on the Constitution, Virginia jurist St. George Tucker said about the Second Amendment and how the right guaranteed therein was denied by the English game laws:

This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty . . . The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction. In England, the people have been disarmed, generally, under the specious pretext of preserving the game: a never


\(^{18}\) “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const., Amend. II.

failing lure to bring over the landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though calculated for very different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to a penalty.\(^{20}\)

Keeping and bearing arms for hunting was seen as supportive of the “well regulated militia” the Second Amendment declared as “necessary to the security of a free state.”

Dismissing an action for trespass against a deer hunter, the South Carolina Constitutional Court in 1818 explained:

> The right to hunt on unenclosed lands . . . [is] clearly established . . . . Large standing armies are, perhaps, wisely considered as dangerous to our free institutions; the militia, therefore, necessarily constitutes our greatest security against aggression; our forest is the great field in which, in the pursuit of game,

they learn the dexterous use and consequent certainty of firearms, the great and
decided advantages of which have been seen and felt on too many occasions to be
forgotten, or to require a recurrence to.\textsuperscript{21}

In \textit{District of Columbia v. Heller} (2008), which invalidated the District’s prohibition on
possession of handguns, the Supreme Court observed that “the Second Amendment’s prefatory
clause announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the
militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason
Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-
defense and hunting.”\textsuperscript{22} The above historical background demonstrates the interrelatedness of
these reasons, particularly that hunting facilitates the potential for a militia.\textsuperscript{23}

While the militia may have fallen into disuse today, hunters and gun owners remain a
reserve force that could be mobilized in an emergency. At the beginning of World War II, the
National Guard was drafted and sent overseas, and State protective forces were called out to
guard against sabotage and repel possible invasion. The Virginia Reserve Militia, for instance,
consisted of self-armed sportsmen organized locally by the Advisory Council of Fish and Game

\textit{See} William H. Sumner, \textit{An Inquiry into the Importance of the Militia to a Free Commonwealth
in a Letter . . . To John Adams . . . With His Answer} (Boston: Cummings & Hilliard, 1823), at
39-40 (“it is better that the arms should be kept by the men themselves, at their own dwellings,
than in the public arsenals. They thus learn to take care of them, at least; and as opportunities for
hunting and practical shooting offer, they improve as marksmen.”).


\textsuperscript{23}\textit{This theme was commonplace in the early Republic. See} S. Halbrook & D. Kopel,
“Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1787-1823,” \textit{7 William & Mary Bill of
Conservation. “The accepted plan was to interest the sportsmen, trap and skeet shots, the hunters and members of the Izaak Walton League . . . .”

Today, hunting is a regulated sport which promotes conservation of wildlife under the public trust doctrine. Little thought is given to hunting’s contribution to a republican polity as conceived by the Founders. A new elite with the agenda of “animal rights” who abhor hunting has replaced the Crown as the political force seeking to repress hunting by the average person. In addition, increasing urban and suburban encroachment on rural life has led to further restrictions on hunting, encouraging the overpopulation of deer. Localities seeking to remedy such overpopulation by allowing bow hunting have been challenged.

Some states have responded to the above by adopting constitutional recognition of the right to hunt. Virginia did so by popular vote in the year 2000.

B. Adoption of Virginia’s Right to Hunt Amendment


27 See *Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Hodel*, 1988 WL 236545, *1 (D. D.C. 1988) (“With hunting for deer occurring all over the United States, and having occurred in the past in the Supawna Refuge as well, the Court cannot find that plaintiff – which relies almost exclusively on the aesthetic affront from hunting to its members – would be sustaining irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction.”).

During the 1997 race for Attorney General of Virginia, the suggestion arose for an amendment to the Virginia Constitution that would protect the citizens’ right to hunt. Democrat candidate William D. Dolan III of Arlington proposed the following:

The citizens have a right to hunt, fish, and take game in a safe manner, subject only to the rights of the owners of affected real property and to reasonable restrictions related to harvest, licensure, seasons, limits, and methods, times, and locations of taking game, and to the health and safety of the citizens of the Commonwealth, as prescribed by law. 29

Dolan accused his Republican rival State Senator Mark L. Early of Chesapeake of not supporting the right to hunt because Early’s law firm represented People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). Early’s campaign responded that Dolan was trying to deflect attention from his prior support for gun control and the National Rifle Association’s poor rating of his voting record. Moreover, Early had supported legislation making it unlawful to interfere with hunting and fishing, and had not in fact represented PETA. 30

Early would win the race for Attorney General, but the idea had caught on. Delegate A. Victor Thomas (D., Roanoke) asked the General Assembly’s Division of Legislative Services to draft two proposals for a constitutional amendment. 31 The first alternative stated:

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30 Id.

31 Letter from Mary Spain, Senior Attorney, Division of Legislative Services, to Hon. Mark L. Early, Attorney General of Virginia 1 (Dec. 18, 1997) (on file with Division of Legislative Services for Commonwealth of Virginia). This letter is in the legislative file for the amendment, which is referred to as the legislative “jacket.”
The people have a right to hunt, fish, and take game, subject only to reasonable restrictions, as prescribed by law, related to the rights of the owners of affected real property, to the methods, times, and locations of hunting, fishing, and taking game, and to the health and safety of the people of the Commonwealth.

The second proposal, which was similar to a constitutional amendment passed in Alabama, stated: “The people shall have the right to hunt and fish in this Commonwealth in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth.” In comparing the two proposals, their drafter said:

Alternate A is, I think, the stronger proposal because it used the phrase “subject only to reasonable restrictions” and would give a basis for challenges to laws that are “unreasonable.” Alternate B states the concept, but leaves to statute the expression of specific rights to hunt and fish.

During the 1999 General Assembly, Delegate Creigh Deeds (D., Bath County) proposed “Alternate A” as an amendment to the Constitution of Virginia. The House Committee on Rules modified it to read: “The people have a right to hunt, fish, and harvest game, subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law.” The amended proposal was agreed to by the entire Assembly, at the Regular Session of 1999, and referred to the 2000 Session.

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32 The Alabama amendment states: “All persons shall have the right to hunt and fish in this state in accordance with law and regulations.” Ala. Const. amend. 597 (1996).

33 House Joint Resolution No. 523 (1999).

34 In 2000, the proposed amended was introduced as House Joint Resolution 124.
When the amendment was brought to the Senate floor in 2000, Senator William Mims (R., Loudoun County) moved to strike the phrase “and harvest game,” and insert, after the clause providing for regulation by the General Assembly, the additional clause “and any city or town may prescribe by charter.” The Senate rejected both amendments. Regulations would be made by the General Assembly, not localities.

Additionally, Senator Janet Howell (D., Fairfax County) proposed an amendment that would protect the rights to “golf and shop,” which the Senate rejected. This appeared calculated to depict a declaration of the right of hunting, fishing, and harvesting game as frivolous. Yet golf and shopping were not activities that special interest groups wished to ban, and humans had engaged in hunting since the dawn of humanity.

Howell also proposed inserting after “right” the phrase “to food and shelter and”, which was offered by the Senate but did not survive. She also proposed adding: “The right set out in this section shall not take precedence over any law, currently in effect or enacted in the future, for the prevention, deterrence, or prosecution of family abuse or stalking.” This floor amendment was withdrawn by the Senate.

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35 The rejected amendment can be viewed on the General Assembly’s Legislative Information System website, http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001+amd+HJ124ASR.

36 Id.

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Id.
The proposed amendment, being agreed to in separate legislative sessions,\textsuperscript{40} was submitted to the citizens of Virginia. It was apparently supported by the Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, the state agency that regulates hunting.\textsuperscript{41}

The Fund for Animals filed suit against the State Board of Elections, describing it as a “trivialization of the Constitution of Virginia.”\textsuperscript{42} It argued that the ballot must include the full text, not just the summary by the Board, which read: “Shall the constitution of Virginia be amended by adding a provision concerning the right of the people to hunt, fish and harvest game?”\textsuperscript{43} The Fund predicted that “local authorities would lose the ability to regulate the possession and use of firearms,” “the validity of protective orders in domestic relations cases restricting the use and possession of firearms would be called into question,” and that “the constitutionality of firearm possession and use will be at issue which will lead to any number of conflicts between state and federal restrictions on hunting.”\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40}Va. Const., Art. XII, § 1.

\textsuperscript{41}See Board of Game & Inland Fisheries Meeting Minutes, Nov. 29, 2005 (noting that new Board member Ward Burton “has donated time to the Department to work for House Bill 38, the constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right to hunt and fish, and other initiatives beneficial to sportsmen and women.”).


\textsuperscript{43}Id.

\textsuperscript{44}Id.
The Circuit Court denied relief, holding that the Board may summarize a constitutional amendment and need not print the full text.\textsuperscript{45} Denying injunctive relief against use of the ballot as printed, the court dismissed the lawsuit.\textsuperscript{46}

By popular vote on November 7, 2000, the amendment was ratified and became effective on January 1, 2001. The amendment has not been mentioned in any reported judicial decision in Virginia. The following analyzes the unreported decision in \textit{Orion Sporting Group v. Board of Supervisors of Nelson County} and the issues raised therein as a means to exploring the dimensions of the right.\textsuperscript{47}


The Orion Sporting Group, LLC, operated a hunting preserve licensed by the Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries on its 450-acre estate in a rural part of Nelson County which was zoned agricultural. Orion also wished to operate a sporting clays facility on the estate. Sporting clays, including trap, skeet, and helice, consists of shooting at clay pigeons thrown by machines which mimic the flight patterns of game birds and the movements of small game animals. Orion previously operated such a facility in the county without any controversy.

\textsuperscript{45}Id. at *2.

\textsuperscript{46}Id. at *3.

\textsuperscript{47}The issue has been raised in at least one other unreported decision. The use of archery to cull overpopulated deer populations in suburban areas has led to opposition by persons who object to hunting of any type. In \textit{James G. Lewis, et al. v. Reston Association}, Cir. Ct. of Fairfax Co., VA, CL-2007-550, landowners challenged a prohibition imposed by an association under a restrictive covenant against deer hunting with archery equipment on their own land. A preliminary ruling found that no claim existed under Virginia’s Right to Hunt guarantee because no state action was involved, but that enforcement by the court of the restrictive covenant would be state action, and unreasonable restrictions were not enforceable. Order, Dec. 15, 2007, citing, \textit{inter alia}, \textit{Shelly v. Kramer}, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948). After trial, the court ruled that plaintiffs were grandfathered under the covenants and thus could continue deer hunting, and awarded them attorney’s fees of $42,235. Final Order, Jan. 11, 2008.
The Nelson County Board of Supervisors approved the hunting preserve, but denied Orion’s application for a conditional use permit for the sporting clays facility. Orion appealed this decision to the circuit court, and also filed a separate action seeking a declaratory judgment that operation of a sporting clays facility, *inter alia*, is protected by the constitutional right to hunt.48

The case was assigned to Circuit Court Judge J. Michael Gamble. This author had the privilege of being engaged by the plaintiff as part of its legal team. From the beginning, the issue focused on whether sporting clays may be protected by the right-to-hunt guarantee. At a motions hearing, one of the County attorneys made the humorous remark: “Your honor, if sporting clays is hunting, I’d like to know what their recipe is for clay pigeons!” This attorney asked him off the record: “So what’s your recipe for crow? Crow hunting is hunting.”

At a three-day trial on the merits, Orion put on evidence from hunting, conservation, and shooting witnesses, lay and expert, concerning how sporting clays promotes proficient, safe, and humane hunting. The Board argued that persons can learn to hunt on live game, while conceding that sighting in a gun at the beginning of the season is part of hunting.

The parties disputed the meaning of the term “hunting.” While the Board called no witnesses, the County’s Director of Planning and Zoning Administrator testified that hunting is limited to the taking or killing of live animals and birds.49

Orion’s thirteen witnesses described a diverse array of hunting forms practiced in Virginia. Hunting may include the use of simulated and artificial game, and does not always

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48 Circuit Court of Nelson County, Virginia, Chancery Nos. CH04-0019, CH04-0020.

49 Deposition of Fred Boger, Ex. 12, p. 8, 22, 26.
involve the direct pursuit of live animals. Moreover, sporting clays enhances a hunter’s proficiency, safety, and humaneness.

Fox hunts involve chasing a real fox or, where there is loss of habitat, pursuing a scent left by dragging a bag.\textsuperscript{50} Falconry involves hunting live or simulated prey, such as a lure.\textsuperscript{51} Hound hunting involves pursuit of a live animal, or pursuit of the trail left by a scent bag.\textsuperscript{52}

Wing (bird) shooters had abundant game birds to hunt in Virginia in the 1960s, but game birds in the wild have declined.\textsuperscript{53} Wing shooters may now hunt at preserves, where pheasants are tossed into the air by handlers, or placed in fields to be flushed by dogs.\textsuperscript{54} Sporting clays offers similar targets which replicate the flight patterns of live birds.\textsuperscript{55} The hunting experience is virtually the same.\textsuperscript{56}

An environmental psychologist testified that as man has evolved, today hunting is characterized by anticipation, a sense of pursuit, a weapon, and a goal, which “does not require the killing of an animal to be hunting.”\textsuperscript{57} A hunting journalist found no significant difference between sporting clays and live dove hunting.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{50}Trial Trans., Vol. III, p. 456-72 (James Crawford).
\textsuperscript{51}Trial Trans., Vol. II, p. 428 (Michael Garcia).
\textsuperscript{52}Trial Trans., Vol. III, p. 445-48 (Robert Troxell).
\textsuperscript{53}Trial Trans., Vol. II, p. 396, 401 (Jim Brewer).
\textsuperscript{54}Trial Trans., Vol. I, p. 60-63, 68-70 (James Slaughter).
\textsuperscript{55}Trial Trans., Vol. I, p. 43-47.
\textsuperscript{56}Trial Trans., Vol. II, p. 387-89 (Cindy Kaiser).
\textsuperscript{58}Trial Trans., Vol. II, p. 416-17 (Jim Brewer).
Morris Peterson, Orion CEO, testified that “my preference in hunting today are clay targets and helice because, one, I don’t enjoy cleaning birds and I will not kill anything that we’re not going to eat.”

The Board’s policy was that one can learn to hunt by practicing on wild animals. As stated by the County’s Director of Planning and Zoning Administrator: “Generally, you can learn out in the field to hunt during hunting season.” However, the Board did consider sighting in and practice to be hunting during a brief time period each year. Asked whether the County would “allow both sighting in of rifles and hunter safety training to be conducted on property as part of a hunting use of property,” he responded: “If it’s at the beginning of the hunting season.”

An expert who trains state game departments on the use of sporting clays to make wing shooters more proficient and reduce the incidence of wounded birds addressed “the ethical question of practicing on live game. . . . This is just so beyond the evolving ethic of hunting that we couldn’t even begin to suggest that. There is no way you can shoot enough live game birds to develop that level of proficiency without an incredible wing loss.” An instructor for the Virginia Hunter Education Program and the 4-H Shooting Education Program testified about the need to teach youngsters safe and proficient shooting skills before hunting live game.

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60 Deposition of Fred Boger, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12, p. 18.

61 Trial Trans., Vol. I, p. 143-44 (Fred Boger).


An expert who had insured just under a thousand shooting preserves testified that sporting clays are found at 80-90% of game preserves. Becoming a competent bird hunter required far more than the safety warmup with sporting clays that Orion conducted before pheasant hunts.

At the end of the trial, the circuit judge viewed the Orion Estate. He observed demonstrations of simulated hunting with sporting clays, and live hunting in which pheasants flew in patterns similar to those in sporting clays. In one scenario, clay pigeons were thrown from a ridge and shot from positions below the ridge. Then pheasants were released from the ridge and shot from the same positions. In another scenario, clay pigeons were thrown upward from a corn field and shot, after which hunting dogs were released to cause pheasants in the field to fly, and the pheasants were then dispatched.

Circuit Judge Gamble issued a letter opinion ruling in favor of the Board and against Orion. The court recognized that “the constitutional right to hunt, fish, and harvest game under the Constitution of Virginia is a fundamental right.” However, it relied on criminal cases which gave the term “hunt” a narrow definition, and held that “the word ‘hunt’ in its plain, obvious, and common sense means the pursuit of game. Shooting sporting clays is not the pursuit of game.”

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67 Id. at *2.
68 Id. at *4.
The court rejected the concept that the hunting of “simulated game,” to learn to hunt real game properly, is implied in the constitutional right to hunt. “This argument fails because the commonly understood definition of the word ‘hunt’ does not include proficiency, safety, or the humane hunting of game.” 69 Contrariwise, the court found that under the Zoning Ordinance, “the use of sporting clays for warm-ups and safety tests in conjunction with hunts of live animals on the hunting preserve is an accessory use.” 70

Orion filed a petition for appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court, which declined to review the decision. 71

The following explains the circuit court’s thoughtful opinion in more detail and sets forth the arguments Orion made in that court and in seeking review by the Virginia Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court denied the appeal, the opinion and these arguments remain untested by appellate review. In the absence of precedent on the right-to-hunt guarantee, this analysis seeks to contribute to a jurisprudence of that right by applying ordinary principles of constitutional interpretation to the subject.

II. IS OPERATION OF A SHOOTING FACILITY PROTECTED BY
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HUNT AND HARVEST GAME?

A. As a Constitutional Right, the Right to Hunt Must Be Broadly Construed

It is well established that “the constitution ought to receive not a strict and narrow, but a liberal and reasonable construction.” 72 The Constitution must not be construed with “such rigor

69 Id.
70 Id. at *7.

71 Orion Sporting Group, LLC v. Board of Supervisors of Nelson County, Supreme Court of Virginia, Record No. 052233 (Feb. 24, 2006) (order denying appeal), (May 4, 2006) (order denying petition for rehearing).
and inflexibility” that “we not only violate accepted principles of interpretation, but we destroy
the rights which the Constitution intended to guard.”

Does the right to hunt protect activities which promote hunter safely and proficiently? As in other contexts, “This constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or
niggardly spirit.” “To view a particular provision of the Bill of Rights with disfavor inevitably
results in a constricted application of it. This is to disrespect the Constitution.”

The Orion opinion recognized that “the constitutional right to hunt, fish, and harvest
game under the Constitution of Virginia is a fundamental right.” That recognition reflected
precedent: “A fundamental right is one explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”
The right to hunt, being explicitly protected by the Constitution, is a fundamental right. The
“least restrictive alternative” must be followed when “state action impinges on the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights or liberties.”

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72 In re Broadus, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 779, 786 (1880).

73 Moore v. Pullem, 150 Va. 174, 194, 142 S.E. 415, 421 (1928) (citation omitted).

74 Just the day before oral argument before the Virginia Supreme Court on the petition for
appeal in the Orion case, a tragic fatality was reported from Stafford County in goose hunting
before that, Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally wounded another hunter. “Cheney


76 Id. at 428-29.


78 Ballard v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 213, 216, 321 S.E.2d 284 (1984), citing San

omitted).
“When . . . a statute affects a fundamental right . . ., its constitutionality will be judged by the ‘strict scrutiny’ test.”  

Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must show that (1) it has a “compelling interest in restricting” the activity, (2) “the restrictions further such an interest,” and (3) “a more narrowly drawn restriction will frustrate its interest.”  

While this test may not apply to action by the Commonwealth – the right being “subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe”— it would seem to apply to action by counties and cities, not to mention litigious “animal rights” activists.

By analogy, the right to free speech protects much more than words; it protects expression of all kinds. Such expression may range from flag burning to theater to video games.  

Similarly, the right to hunt protects a broad range of activities.

**B. Is the Right to Hunt Broader Than the Right to Pursue and Harvest Game?**

The Constitution recognizes that “the people” have a “right to hunt,” a right to “fish,” and a right to “harvest game.”  

The “right to hunt,” unlike the right to “harvest,” is not restricted to game. Not only are those activities listed separately, but their separation by the term “fish” makes clear that the term “game” refers only to the term “harvest.” The term “game” does not

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relate back to or limit the “right to hunt,” which may include activities besides the taking of game. In short, the people have a “right to hunt,” and not just a “right to hunt game.”

Use of the terms “hunt . . . and harvest game” indicates that these words have meanings that are divergent. 85 Since the right to pursue game is implied by the right to harvest game, limiting the “right to hunt” to that activity would render its separate mention meaningless.

“Under settled rules of statutory construction, legislative enactments ‘should be interpreted, if possible, in a manner which gives meaning to every word.’” 86

The above distinction is illustrated by a historian’s comment that, as a youngster, Thomas Jefferson was taught both how to “fire his gun” and to press through the hills “in pursuit of deer and wild turkeys.” 87 Had an explicit right to hunt been needed in those days, presumably it would have accords protection to learning how to shoot proficiently and safely. Otherwise no one would have ever harvested any deer or turkeys.

Narrowing the general term “hunt” to nothing more than the specific term “harvest game” would “restrict the meaning of the general words by the more specific and particular description

85 For an example of the usage of the term “harvest,” see Va. Code § 28.2-226(B) (“No license shall be required of an oyster grounds leaseholder, or other person authorized or employed by a leaseholder, to harvest oysters or clams from the leasehold”).

86 Roberts v. Bd. of Sup’rs, 249 Va. 2, 7, 453 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1995). “It would be absurd to conclude that the legislature would say the same thing twice in one statutory provision . . . . The rules of statutory interpretation argue against reading any legislative enactment in a manner that will make a portion of it useless, repetitious, or absurd.” Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 180-81, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984).

which follows,” the effect of which would be “not to restrict the meaning of the general words, but to render them mere surplusage, or without any meaning.”

The legislative history of the constitutional amendment further clarifies that the right to “hunt” was not intended to be limited to the right to “hunt game.” When the proposal was brought to the Senate floor in 2000, Senator William Mims moved to strike the phrase “and harvest game,” so that the opening clause would have read simply: “The people have a right to hunt and fish . . . .” The Senate rejected the motion. This episode in the Amendment’s drafting history again reinforces that the right to “hunt” and the right to “harvest game” are separate and distinct rights.

A constitutional guarantee that “the people have the right” to hunt guarantees the broad right to engage in activities associated with hunting, which extend beyond merely the taking of live game. Focusing only on the literal act of harvesting live game ignores the right of hunters to enjoy the activities, interests and values involved in the hunting experience, including the right to hunt simulated game.

Moreover, the existence of a right also includes the option not to exercise that right. Some wish to exercise the right to hunt but not the right to harvest game. A narrow view prevents persons from exercising the right to hunt unless they are pursuing and harvesting live game.

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88 Stephen Putney Shoe Co. v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co., 116 Va. 211, 81 S.E. 93, 97 (1914).

89 See the General Assembly’s Legislative Information System website, http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001+amd+HJ124ASR. Exhibit D to Orion’s Post-Trial Memorandum.

The right to hunt is in Article XI of the Constitution, which concerns “Conservation.” While § 4’s guarantee of hunting as a “right of the people” makes that activity an individual right just like other such liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, its placement in the article on Conservation highlights the policy of the Commonwealth to promote and regulate hunting and the harvesting of game for conservation purposes.

The circuit court characterized the right to hunt as a “grant of interest in the land itself” or a “profit a prendre.” While not decisive to the issues here, the right to hunt should be analyzed under the public trust doctrine, having roots in Roman law and the Magna Carta. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court over a century ago:

While the fundamental principles upon which the common property in game rest have undergone no change, the development of free institutions had led to the recognition of the fact that the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good.

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91 See Va. Const., Art. XI, § 1 (conservation policy), § 2 (natural resources and historical sites), and § 3 (preservation of oyster beds).

92 E.g., Va. Const., Art. I, § 12 (“the right of the people peaceably to assemble”) and § 13 (“the right of the people to keep and bear arms”).

93 See A.E. Dick Howard, II, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia 1151, 1154 (noting that Article XI establishes a public trust in the natural resources of the State).


Sporting clays offers a hunting experience which promotes conservation by advancing ethical hunting and harvesting of game. A narrow view discourages practice and proficiency, and encourages hunters to pursue and shoot at live game without adequate preparation and training. To the contrary, the constitutional guarantee must be understood in a manner to further its dual purposes of protecting a broad “right of the people” and of promoting conservation.

III. DOES THE RIGHT TO HUNT INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO HUNT PROFICIENTLY, SAFELY, AND HUMANELY?

A. Constitutional Rights Include Both Core and Auxiliary Rights

Sporting clays enables the hunter to become proficient, safer, and more humane when hunting and harvesting live game. A constitutional guarantee protects activities that are ordinary and necessary to exercising the core right. A “right” would be meaningless if one could not take the steps necessary to exercise it in a substantial manner. The “right to hunt” describes a continuum of activities that may, but need not, lead to the actual harvesting of game.

The Orion court decided that learning to hunt proficiently, safely, and humanely, such as through sporting clays, is not implied in or incident to the right to hunt. It stated: “This argument fails because the commonly understood definition of the word ‘hunt’ does not include proficiency, safety, or the humane hunting of game.”

Thus, the court narrowly equated the “right to hunt” with the specific act of hunting live game, ignoring that a constitutional right is an umbrella for exercise of activities that are necessary to exercise the core, primary activity. If the right to hunt “does not include

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we adopt in this case makes ample allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of state ownership.” *Id.* at 335-36.

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*Orion Sporting Group, 2005 WL 3579067, *4.*
proficiency, safety, or the humane hunting of game,” then this “right” may be exercised only in its most minimal, crude form – incompetent, unsafe, and inhumane hunting.

Every constitutional right includes incidents which are fairly implied in the right expressly recognized.97 “Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.”98

This principle was well recognized by Blackstone, who stated about “the principal absolute rights which appertain to every Englishman”:

But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no other method to secure their actual enjoyment. It has, therefore, established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.99

An analogy may be gleaned from the incidents protected by the right to keep and bear arms, which is closely related and essential to the right to hunt.100 In an 1871 decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court explained:

97 See Robert v. City of Norfolk, 188 Va. 413, 427, 49 S.E.2d 697, 704 (1948) (invalidating ordinance which “permits the punishment of incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of a free press”) (emphasis added).

98 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (holding that free speech and press include “the right to distribute, the right to receive, . . . and freedom to teach”). “[The] specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” Id. at 484.

99 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *140-41.

100 Va. Const., Art. I, § 13, provides in part “That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state,
What, then, is involved in this right of keeping arms? It necessarily involves the right to purchase and use them in such a way as is usual, or to keep them for the ordinary purposes to which they are adapted; and as they are to be kept, evidently with a view that the citizens making up the yeomanry of the land, the body of the militia, shall become familiar with their use in times of peace, that they may the more efficiently use them in times of war; then the right to keep arms for this purpose involves the right to practice their use, in order to attain to this efficiency.\textsuperscript{101}

In 1964, the Virginia General Assembly resolved that “many citizens of this Commonwealth who own and enjoy the use of firearms are greatly disturbed by the proposals of certain groups to regulate and restrict gun ownership,” and noted the necessity of “proper training in the safe and effective use of firearms . . . .”\textsuperscript{102} Training in safety and proficiency are inherent in any firearms-related activity and thus are within protected rights.

\textsuperscript{101}Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. 165, 179 (Tenn. 1871) (emphasis added). Similarly, Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 480-81 (1874), noting the objective of a “well regulated militia,” explained: To acquire this skill and this familiarity, the words “bear arms” must include the right to load them and shoot them and use them as such things are ordinarily used, so that the “people” will be fitted for defending the state when its needs demand; and when the constitution grants to the general assembly the right to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne, it grants the power to regulate the whole subject of using arms, provided the regulation does not infringe that use of them which is necessary to fit the owner of them for a ready and skillful use of them as a militiaman. Any restriction which interferes with this is void, whether it relates to the carrying them about the person, or to the place or time of bearing them.

\textsuperscript{102}Journal of the Senate (Va.) 250-251, 472 (1964).
A similar issue arose in a prosecution in Arizona of a licensed hunter for trespassing on state land. The prohibition did not apply to a person “lawfully taking wildlife.” An Attorney General Opinion stated: “A license issued by Game and Fish carries with it the State’s permission to access State trust land for the purpose of hunting and fishing but does not include any other ‘recreational’ uses.”

In the prosecution, the defendant testified that he relied on his hunting license while shooting on such land. The Arizona Superior Court reversed his conviction on the following basis:

“Hunting” involves more than the moment in which an animal is killed by a hunter. Sighting in a rifle for accuracy before seeking game is an integral part of safe and responsible hunting, as is scouting for game, and various other activities in anticipation of taking wildlife; these activities are not “other recreational uses.” To limit hunters’ access to the specific act of shooting at an animal would be to discourage safe and humane hunting. The license held by Appellant essentially granted him an easement for the purpose of hunting. Though “other recreational uses” are excluded, the law recognizes that any easement encompasses activities reasonably necessary and appurtenant to accomplish the purpose of the easement.

As a possessor of a valid Arizona hunting license, Appellant was lawfully and with right shooting on state trust land.

In *Orion*, the Board of Supervisors argued that the view that activities preceding the actual hunt are protected would “extend constitutional protection to shopping for shotgun shells


and hunting clothing, and leafing through Cabela’s magazine.”105 While the court did not opine on that argument, it could be noted that if those activities are not protected, then the Board could ban shotgun shells and other items necessary for hunting, as long as it did not ban the actual pursuit of game. Hunting would be impossible without ammunition and commercial sources for hunting products.106 As held about a related right, “the right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase and provide ammunition suitable for such arms . . . .”107

The constitutional guarantee protects activities that are ordinary and necessary to hunting and harvesting game. If a locality banned buckshot, dove loads, or other shotgun shells, would that not violate the guarantee? Given the right to hunt, could a locality ban hunting clothing, such as blaze orange or camouflage coats? Could it ban hunting catalogs without violating the right to hunt, not to mention the right to a free press?

For the above reasons, the right to hunt and to harvest game includes the right to offer and receive training and practice which makes one proficient, safe, and humane in the hunting and harvesting of game. The constitutional right includes incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee.

B. The Public Policy of the Commonwealth Promotes Firearm Safety and Shooting Facilities for Hunting Purposes

105 Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Memorandum, 10 (June 3, 2005).

106 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965), held that one has a right to “shop for” and acquire the objects necessary to exercise a primary constitutional right: The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read . . . and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach . . . . Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. (Emphasis added.)

The right to hunt is “subject to such regulations” as the General Assembly may prescribe.\textsuperscript{108} The General Assembly has enacted laws which promote firearm safety and training, shooting ranges, and game preserves. While the infrastructure for hunting activities is left primarily to private initiative, these enactments indicate that the public policy of the Commonwealth recognizes that the right to hunt includes activities which make hunters proficient, safe, and humane.

The functions of the Board of Game and Inland Fisheries illustrate the close relation between shooting facilities, hunting, and conservation. The Board is directed to “[c]onduct operations for the preservation and propagation of game birds, game animals, fish and other wildlife,” as well as to “acquire lands and waters for game and fish refuges, preserves or public shooting and fishing . . . .”\textsuperscript{109}

To obtain a hunting license, one must either complete a hunter education program or have had a prior license.\textsuperscript{110} The Department of Game and Inland Fisheries “shall provide for a course of instruction in hunter safety, principles of conservation, and sportsmanship,” and shall


\textsuperscript{110}Va. Code § 29.1-300.1.
cooperate with organizations with such objectives. Hunter education may involve shooting practice.

The right to hunt justifies not just the minimal hunter education course required by law, but also more advanced training. The Department itself sponsors hunting workshops which include shooting practice. The hunter education program is just a beginning, and practice and proficiency are necessary to learn to hunt live game. The Commonwealth is not expected to provide facilities and training to a hunter to learn to hunt any more than it hands out a free shotgun to every hunter. Shooting facilities serve the Commonwealth’s public policy objectives to promote hunter safety, principles of conservation, and sportsmanship. This would particularly be the case for a shooting preserve licensed by the Department of Game and Inland Fisheries. A shooting facility would allow hunters to practice the efficient and humane taking of game.

The fact that the hunting preserve is a commercial venture does not change the use as a hunting use protected by the right to hunt. Status as a licensed shooting preserve means that “the licensee and such other persons as he may designate, because of payment of fees or otherwise,

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112 E.g., Va. Code § 29.1-300.3 (cost of instruction may include range fees and ammunition).


114 See Avery v. Beale, 195 Va. 690, 703, 80 S.E.2d 584, 592 (1954) (game law “enacted for the conservation of waterfowl, the protection and safety of those engaged in shooting them, and for the promotion of better sport and recreation.”).

may hunt on the licensed premises, and shoot . . . any game birds or animals of the species licensed.”

Similarly, the right to hunt includes the right to train hunters to hunt, and the right to be so trained.

In sum, the public policy of the Commonwealth is to promote shooting activities and facilities which make hunters proficient, safe, and humane. The pertinent regulations enacted by the General Assembly demonstrate that the right to hunt protects such activities and facilities.

C. The Constitutional Right is Not Confined to Narrow Definitions in the Game Code Which Create Crimes and Which Must be Narrowly Construed

To define the word “hunt,” the Orion court relied on criminal cases involving hunting without a license. The court also relied on dictionaries in support of the same restrictive definitions. The court then held that “the word ‘hunt’ in its plain, obvious, and common sense means the pursuit of game. Shooting sporting clays is not the pursuit of game.”

However, the words of a criminal statute are defined narrowly, while constitutional rights are construed broadly. The Commonwealth has an interest in defining hunting as the pursuit of live game for conservation purposes only. Moreover, a bare definition of the word “hunt” is not dispositive of the meaning of the “right to hunt” and of the incidental or auxiliary rights it protects.

In Commonwealth v. Bailey (1919), which involved the crime of hunting fox without a license, the Virginia Supreme Court quoted definitions of hunting such as “the act of pursuing

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118 Id. at *3-4.

119 Id. at *4.
and taking wild animals; the chase.”  But Bailey involved the meaning of “hunt” under a criminal statute, and “it is a cardinal principle of law that penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the [Commonwealth].” The full scope of a constitutional guarantee may not be limited to the narrow use of terms in a criminal statute.

The game code does define “hunting,” but the definition is restricted as follows: “As used in and for the purposes of this title [Title 29.1] only, or in any of the regulations of the Board, unless the context clearly requires a different meaning . . . .” In language identical to what existed when the right-to-hunt guarantee was adopted, that section provides:

“Hunting and trapping” includes the act of or the attempted act of taking, hunting, trapping, pursuing, chasing, shooting, snaring or netting birds or animals, and assisting any person who is hunting, trapping or attempting to do so regardless of whether birds or animals are actually taken; however, when hunting and trapping are allowed, reference is made to such acts as being conducted by lawful means and in a lawful manner. The Board of Game and Inland Fisheries may authorize by regulation the pursuing or chasing of wild birds or wild animals during any

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120 Commonwealth v. Bailey, 124 Va. 800, 802, 97 S.E. 774, 774 (1919).

121 Id.


closed hunting season where persons have no intent to take such birds or animals.  

The definition is narrow as it applies to the criminal prohibition on hunting without a license and other crimes, reflecting the Commonwealth’s interest in the conservation of wildlife. Because wildlife is not harvested while hunting simulated game, it is not included in the definition of “hunting” for purposes of defining crimes.  

The game code recognizes that hunting need not involve the taking of live game and is an art that can be practiced. As seen above, the statutory definition itself refers to the pursuit of game in the closed season when persons have no intent to harvest game. Field trials with dogs need not involve the shooting of game. Foxes may be hunted on horseback without

124Id. See Acts 1990, c. 371; Acts 2002, c. 157. As noted, hunting includes “assisting” another who “is hunting,” in the present tense. In a broader sense, and not for purposes of the criminal provisions regarding hunting, a person operating a shooting facility would be “assisting” a person who “will be hunting,” in the future tense, by enhancing the hunter’s proficiency. The constitutional right to hunt is broad enough to include activities which directly assist hunters.

125See Va. Code § 29.1-300 (“It shall be unlawful to hunt . . . without first obtaining a license”); § 29.1-335 (hunting without license a Class 3 misdemeanor); § 29.1-519(F) (hunting with unauthorized weapons unlawful); § 29.1-521 (unlawful to hunt on Sunday, to hunt over the bag limit, or to hunt other than as permitted by law); § 29.1-521.1.A (unlawful “to willfully and intentionally impede the lawful hunting . . . of wild birds or wild animals”).

126“Hunting” is defined differently for various statutory purposes. E.g., Va. Code § 29.1-52 (“For the purpose of this section, the terms ‘hunt’ and ‘trap’ shall not include the necessary crossing of highways for the bona fide purpose of going into or leaving a lawful hunting or trapping area.”).


128See Va. Code § 29.1-422 (Board may “grant permits to bona fide field trial clubs and associations to hold field trials with dogs . . . . If wild game is to be shot over or in front of dogs engaged in such field trials, the person actually shooting must have a license”).
firearms.\textsuperscript{129} The law prohibits shooting at live pigeons as a form of target practice,\textsuperscript{130} obviously preferring the shooting of clay pigeons for target practice. Hunting is not restricted to pursuing game.\textsuperscript{131}

Finally, constitutional rights, especially the auxiliary rights that may be necessary to exercise core rights, may not be reduced to bare dictionary definitions. As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court:

The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic, living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words in a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.\textsuperscript{132}

No court would hold that the government could ban electronic media on the basis of the argument that the First Amendment guarantees only a right to a free press, and the dictionary definition of the term “press” is “short for printing press.”\textsuperscript{133}

In sum, the right to hunt provides an umbrella of activities such as shooting practice which make it possible to hunt and to harvest game proficiently, safely, and humanely.

\textsuperscript{129}The hunter-education requirement for a hunting license “shall not apply to persons while on horseback hunting foxes with hounds but without firearms.” Va. Code § 29.1-300.1(C).

\textsuperscript{130}Va. Code § 3.1-796.126 provides in part: “Live pigeons or other birds or fowl shall not be kept or used for the purpose of a target, or to be shot at either for amusement or as a test of skill in marksmanship. . . . Nothing contained herein shall apply to the shooting of wild game.”

\textsuperscript{131}\textit{E.g.}, Va. Code § 18.2-56.1(B) (punishing reckless handling of firearms “while the person is engaged in hunting, trapping or pursuing game”) (emphasis added).


\textsuperscript{133}Webster’s New World Dictionary, 3\textsuperscript{rd} College Ed. (1991), at 1066.
Constitutional rights are not and have never been limited to definitions found in criminal codes or dictionaries.

IV. IF WARM-UP SHOOTING AND SAFETY CHECKS ARE ACCESSORY USES TO HUNTING, DOES THE RIGHT TO HUNT INCLUDES PRACTICE SHOOTING?

The extent to which practice shooting may be considered as an adjunct right to the primary right to hunt is suggested in the Orion court’s analysis of whether sporting clays is an accessory use in an agricultural district under the zoning ordinance. While the court ruled that sporting clays is not generally an accessory use, its discussion bears on the issue of whether sporting clays are what could be called an “accessory” right to the primary right to hunt.

Specifically, the court recognized that practice shooting for safety and warmup are part of a specific hunt. That raises the issue of whether a basis exists to limit safety to the time period just before an actual hunt, or to allow a warmup just before a hunt only but not to allow practice at other times.

As the court noted, “John Long, an insurance agent who specializes in insurance for hunting preserves, testified that approximately 80 to 90 percent of hunting preserves nationally

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134 Nelson County Zoning Ordinance § 4-1-12 permits, by right, “accessory uses” on land that is zoned as an Agricultural District A-1, like the Orion property. An “accessory use” is defined as “a subordinate use . . . customarily incidental to and located upon the same lot occupied by the main use or building.” Nelson County Zoning Ordinance § 2.2.

have a sporting clays facility.” The court remarked: “At first blush, it seems that the sporting clays facility is a subordinate use customarily incidental to the hunting preserve.”

However, the court decided that sporting clays would be the main activity, and hence Orion was not entitled to engage in that activity as a matter of right. First, it noted that the shooting preserve license allowed hunting game only eight months of the year, but the clays facility could operate all twelve months. However, year-round practice would seem to make the actual hunting of game safer and more proficient.

Second, the court noted evidence that sporting clays was useful for attracting women shooters, and offered an alternative to those who did not wish to engage in the “blood sports.” Yet presumably some such persons would eventually engage in the hunting of live game. Some persons practice an activity more than others before engaging in the actual activity.

Third, the court noted testimony that the sporting estate would not be feasible without the sporting clays course. Yet the court had recognized previously that hunting preserves generally have sporting clays. It would be no surprise that a hunting preserve with inadequate facilities for practice and safety training would not be a commercial success. A sporting clays facility is an integral part of a hunting preserve.

\[136\textit{Id.}\]
\[137\textit{Id.}\]
\[138\textit{Id.}\]
\[139\textit{Id.}\]
\[140\textit{Id.}\]
\[141\textit{Id.}\]
\[142\textit{Id.}\]
An Indiana appellate court held that a skeet range and shooting range were accessory uses to a recreational country home with 40 acres. The Orion court sought to distinguish that case because the recreational use there occurred primarily on weekends. Yet the Indiana court held that the result would be the same even if the skeet range was used every day, as the issue was “the nature of the use, not the degree of intensity with which the use is pursued.”

An instructive analogy may be made between sporting clays as an auxiliary right to the primary constitutional right to hunt, and sporting clays as an accessory use to the main hunting use under a zoning ordinance. The Orion court itself found that a limited amount of sporting clays is an accessory use to hunting as follows:

I do find that the use of sporting clays for warm-ups and safety tests in conjunction with hunts of live animals on the hunting preserve is an accessory use. The facts establish that this limited use of sporting clays is customary to allow a hunter to warm-up prior to engaging in a hunt of wild game, and for the staff and guides to evaluate the proficiency of the hunter for safety purposes. Thus, and for this limited purpose, the shooting of sporting clays is allowed as an accessory use. Accordingly, while a sporting clays facility is not an accessory use under the Nelson County Zoning Ordinance to a hunting preserve, shooting of sporting clays, or for that matter skeet or trap, is subordinate and incidental to the hunting preserve for purposes of warm-ups and safety evaluations.

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145 560 N.E.2d at 696 n.2.
If shooting sporting clays to warm-up for a hunt and to allow a safety check are part of hunting at the time of a specific hunt, so too, it would seem, are practice and safety training at other times. One is playing basketball not just during the warm-up before a game, but also on practice days. And if safety is a legitimate part of hunting just before an actual hunt, it is equally legitimate at other times. In short, given that proficiency and safety are proper components of a specific hunt, promotion of these same objectives at other times appears to be encompassed in the right to hunt.

V. DO LOCAL RULES RUN AFOUL OF THE GUARANTEE’S RESERVATION OF REGULATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY?

A. The Right to Hunt is Subject to Regulation by the General Assembly, Which has Authorized Counties to Regulate Only in Narrow Circumstances

The right-to-hunt guarantee includes no authorization for regulation other than by the General Assembly. In Orion, the County’s Director of Planning and Zoning Administrator testified to the Board’s restriction that one must “learn out in the field to hunt during hunting season.” However, the Board allowed “both sighting in of rifles and hunter safety training to be conducted on property as part of a hunting use of property,” only “if it’s at the beginning of the hunting season.” Sighting in at the beginning of the season is allowed because it is “ordinarily, customarily part of a hunting use,” i.e., “of the hunting of live game,” but not so “if you’re shooting at targets outside the hunting season . . .”

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147 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12, p. 18 (testimony of Fred Boger).
148 Trial Trans., Vol. 1, p. 143-44.
149 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12, p. 40-41.
The constitutional guarantee includes the proviso that the right to hunt is “subject only to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law.”\textsuperscript{150} This negates any local power to regulate the right. Indeed, the declaration of the right to hunt with this proviso squarely prohibits local regulation.\textsuperscript{151}

The legislative history of the Amendment demonstrates the rejection of any local power to restrict the right to hunt. Senator William Mims moved to insert at the end, “allowing regulation as any city or town may prescribe by charter.” As reworded by Mims, the Amendment would have stated: “The people have a right to hunt and fish, subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law and any city or town may prescribe by charter.” The Senate rejected the amendment.\textsuperscript{152} The proviso that the right is subject to regulation only by the General Assembly was carefully chosen to prohibit restrictions based on local ordinances or local land use decisions.

Where counties have no power to pass ordinances restricting certain activities, restricting the same activities through land-use decisions cannot be considered reasonable exercises of the county’s police power. “In determining the constitutional scope of the zoning police power

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\textsuperscript{150}Va. Const., Art. XI, § 4. Even before ratification of the amendment, it was held that “absent specific authority to the contrary, county boards of supervisors are not authorized to pass ordinances regulating hunting.” 1993 Va. Rep. Atty. Gen. 157, *3 n.1 (locality may not prohibit bow hunting on private property).

\textsuperscript{151}“...The proviso . . . is generally intended to restrain the enacting clause, and to except something which would otherwise have been within it, or in some measure to modify the enacting clause.” Commonwealth v. Ford, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 683, 688 (1878) (citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{152}See the General Assembly’s Legislative Information System website, http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001+amd+HJ124ASR.
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delegated to local governments in Virginia, we look first to our own enabling statutes.”\textsuperscript{153} The Virginia Court of Appeals has explained:

In Virginia, the boards of supervisors of the counties do not have broad general authority to adopt whatever ordinance they deem appropriate or desirable. The power of a county, like that of a municipal corporation, is controlled by Dillon’s Rule, which authorizes the locality to exercise those powers or adopt ordinances that the legislature expressly authorizes by statute or that are conferred by necessary implication.\textsuperscript{154}

The General Assembly has authorized counties to pass ordinances to prohibit hunting only pursuant to strict criteria. Hunting may be prohibited in or within a half mile of a subdivision or other heavily populated area if it would be dangerous.\textsuperscript{155} Hunting may be prohibited on or within 100 yards of a highway,\textsuperscript{156} school, or park.\textsuperscript{157} A county may prohibit hunting with a shotgun loaded with slugs or a rifle larger than .22 caliber rimfire.\textsuperscript{158} A county has no authority to prohibit hunting with a shotgun loaded with shot, which is used in sporting clays.

Similarly, the General Assembly has authorized counties to pass ordinances to prohibit the discharge of firearms only pursuant to clearly-defined criteria. A county may prohibit the

\textsuperscript{153}Board of Sup’rs v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 137, 216 S.E.2d 199, 208 (1975).


\textsuperscript{155}Va. Code § 15.2-1210.

\textsuperscript{156}Va. Code § 29.1-526.

\textsuperscript{157}Va. Code § 29.1-527.

\textsuperscript{158}Va. Code § 29.1-528(A).
shooting of firearms in areas of the county which are “so heavily populated as to make such conduct dangerous to the inhabitants thereof.” 159 A county may not circumvent this provision through a land use decision rather than an ordinance. 160

159 Va. Code § 15.2-1209. Section 15.2-1209 provides:
Any county may prohibit the shooting of firearms in any areas of the county which are in the opinion of the governing body so heavily populated as to make such conduct dangerous to the inhabitants thereof.
Any county that prohibits the firing of firearms shall provide an exemption for the killing of deer pursuant to § 29.1-529. Such exemption shall apply on land of at least five acres that is zoned for agricultural use.

160 Similar policies are explained in Duff v. Township of Northhampton, 110 Pa. Commw. 277, 532 A.2d 500, 507 (1987), aff’d, 520 Pa. 79, 550 A.2d 1319 (1988), as follows:
The problem of hunting wild game with weapons must be uniform and comprehensive, else chaos, confusion and danger to the public would result. . . .
To permit each municipality to pass its own version of the Game Law would prevent the Game Commission from freely utilizing its experienced decision-making powers in determining the appropriate balance between the rights of hunters to hunt, the control of wild game and the safety of the citizens of this Commonwealth.

See also Kaluszka v. Town of East Hartford, 46 Conn. Supp. 588, 760 A.2d 1282 (1999) (ordinance permitting police chief to close area to hunting preempted by state hunting statutes).
by prohibiting shooting of firearms in areas which are not so populated as to make shooting dangerous to the inhabitants. 161

The General Assembly has also preempted localities from adopting any ordinance or taking any action governing the purchase, possession, transfer, ownership, carrying or transporting of firearms or ammunition except as expressly authorized by statute. 162 Even aside from preemption statutes, localities do not have power to regulate firearms use absent specific authority. The Virginia Attorney General has summarized the familiar rules as follows: 163

Virginia follows the Dillon rule of strict construction concerning the powers of local governing bodies. 164 Under that rule of construction, local governing bodies have only those powers that are expressly granted, those that are necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted powers, and those that are essential and indispensable. 165

161 See Bd. of Sup’rs v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 144, 216 S.E.2d 199, 212 (1975) (“Nor is there any evidence that such uses are noxious, dangerous, or otherwise inimical to the public health, safety, or welfare”).

162 Va. Code § 15.2-915.


... [W]hen a statute creates a specific grant of authority; the authority exists only to the extent specifically granted in the statute. The mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another.\textsuperscript{166}

Applying the above rules, Attorney General opinions have consistently opined that local regulation of firearms is invalid unless explicitly authorized.\textsuperscript{167} In short, if a county is not empowered to pass an ordinance prohibiting certain activity, it may not achieve the same result through a land-use decision.

\textbf{B. A County May Not Restrict the Right to Hunt For Other Constitutionally Impermissible Reasons}

Shooting facilities may be opposed based on the objection of neighbors citing various reasons – noise considerations, lead pollution, safety, and simple dislike of activities involving firearms. They may say that shooters should go someplace else to practice and pursue their sport. However, where noise ordinances are not being violated, environmental standards are being met, safety is not an issue, and the area is rural or otherwise consistent with such use, a shooting facility should not be prohibited. Not only is shooting an essential aspect of the right to hunt and pursue game as well as the right to keep and bear arms, restrictions thereon must not be based on constitutionally impermissible reasons.

\textsuperscript{166}Moreover, any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the municipal corporation, and the power is denied. \textit{County Board of Arlington County v. Brown}, 229 Va. 341, 344, 329 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1985).

The “negative attitude of the majority of property owners” is not a legitimate reason to deny a zoning permit.\textsuperscript{168} “Denial of a permit is arbitrary where the decision to deny was not related to any substantial zoning interest, but was instead motivated principally by the heavy opposition of neighbors expressed at a public hearing.”\textsuperscript{169} Zoning officials may not rely “on public distaste for certain activities . . . .”\textsuperscript{170}

In making zoning decisions, counties must be cognizant of and respect constitutional rights. “As the Board says, the police power is ‘elastic.’ But its stretch is not infinite. If it were, no property right, indeed, no personal right, could co-exist with it.”\textsuperscript{171}

In the Orion case, although the Estate complied with the county noise ordinance, noise was the reason given by the Board for its denial of the permit.\textsuperscript{172} One neighbor testified that he is opposed to ever hearing \textit{any} gunshot sound.\textsuperscript{173}

A reasonable level of sound is inherent in the constitutional rights to hunt and to keep and bear arms, as both necessarily involve the discharge of firearms at targets,


\textsuperscript{169}Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 1989) (citation, brackets and internal quote marks omitted).

\textsuperscript{170}Id.

\textsuperscript{171}Bd. of Sup’rs v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 139, 216 S.E.2d 199, 209 (1975).


\textsuperscript{173}Trans. of Planning Committee Meeting, Nov. 19, 2003, at 50, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1A.
whether game or non-game. A right may not be suppressed because someone objects to a characteristic inherent in the exercise of the right.\textsuperscript{174}

As the U.S. Supreme Court asked in a First Amendment case, must a person’s ability to use a sound truck “depend on the whim or caprice of the Chief of Police,” and on his ability to “prove to the satisfaction of that official that his noise will not be annoying to people?”\textsuperscript{175} To the contrary, “Noise can be regulated by regulating decibels” and “by narrowly drawn statutes.”\textsuperscript{176}

A permit to conduct a constitutionally protected activity cannot be denied because the right might be exercised someplace else. As held in an analogous situation, “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”\textsuperscript{177} In the Orion case, the Estate sat on a rural 450 acres zoned agricultural, in Nelson County – one of Virginia’s most rural counties which is renowned for hunting.\textsuperscript{178} The sporting clays facility was essentially banned from the entire county.

\textsuperscript{174}Virginia does not encourage noise reduction for firearms. \textit{See} Va. Code § 18.2-308.6 (felony to possess unregistered firearm muffler or silencer).


\textsuperscript{176}\textit{Id}. at 562.

\textsuperscript{177}\textit{Schneider v. New Jersey}, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).

\textsuperscript{178}Shooting facilities have been upheld on far smaller tracts. \textit{E.g.}, \textit{Oak Haven Trailer Court, Inc. v. Western Wayne Defendant Conservation Ass’n}, 3 Mich. App. 83, 86, 141 N.W.2d 645 (1966) (a 62-acre tract with shooting facilities, zoned agricultural with the community surrounding the gun club not highly developed, in an area in which deer hunting was carried on in season – gun club clearly appropriate); \textit{Evergreen State Builders, Inc. v. Pierce Defendant}, 9 Wash.App. 973, 974, 979-80516 P.2d 775 (1973) (70-acre wooded tract with shooting facilities in an area that, over the years, had become a suburban residential zone – urbanization of society should not be permitted to destroy such kinds of recreation).
In sum, given the proviso that the right to hunt is “subject only to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law,”\textsuperscript{179} a locality may not relegate to itself the power to define to what extent shooting activities constitute “hunting” and are or are not allowed. Recognition of the activity of sighting in a gun as a hunting activity only at the beginning of the hunting season is beyond the purview of a locality.

**Conclusion**

The definitive precedent on the nature of the emerging constitutional right to hunt has yet to be written in any State. Indeed, virtually no court at any level has so much as opined on the issue, due perhaps to the recency of adoption of the guarantees and the lack of any legislative onslaught against hunting in the States that have guarantees. The single exception is Vermont, which has recognized the liberty to hunt since 1777 and whose highest court has had occasion to speak to the issue.\textsuperscript{180} States without such guarantees are perhaps most likely to ban hunting, or at least specific kinds of hunting, based on reasons that some may allegedly arise out of politically-correct, “Bambi” views of nature.\textsuperscript{181}


\textsuperscript{180}See *Cabot v. Thomas*, 147 Vt. 207, 211, 514 A.2d 1034 (1986) (hunt guarantee “offers a general delineation of not only the respective rights of landowners and sportsmen but also the authority of government to regulate those rights in the context of hunting and fishing”); *State v. Norton*, 45 Vt. 258 (1872) (“The numerous statutes which have been passed for the protection of game and fish have been deemed necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the constitutional right”).

\textsuperscript{181}See *New Jersey Animal Rights Alliance v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection*, 396 N.J. Super. 358, 934 A.2d 52 (2007) (animal rights groups challenged black bear management policy by the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Fish and Wildlife, after which the Commissioner withdrew her
At least in those States where hunting is or may become a constitutional right, it remains to be seen to what extent the right will be taken seriously by the courts. The guarantees themselves explicitly recognize the legitimacy of general regulation of hunting pursuant to State law, including delegation of regulation to game and fish commissions and departments. What is certain is that animal-rights activists and other opponents of hunting will continue to pursue their agendas, localities will occasionally overreach by prohibiting hunting or activities like shooting that promote proficiency, safety, and humaneness. In the inevitable courtroom conflicts, eventually a jurisprudence of the right to hunt will evolve.

approval of the policy; sportsmen clubs challenged the withdrawal, but court invalidated the original policy).
APPENDIX: STATE CONSTITUTIONS

GUARANTEEING THE RIGHT TO HUNT

The following States have constitutional guarantees of the right to hunt or have amendments pending to do so.


All persons shall have the right to hunt and fish in this state in accordance with laws and regulations.

Arkansas. Language that will be on the 2010 General Election Ballot:

SECTION 1. (a)(1) Citizens of the state of Arkansas have a right to hunt, fish, trap, and harvest wildlife.

(2) The right to hunt, fish, trap, and harvest wildlife shall be subject only to regulations that promote sound wildlife conservation and management and are consistent with Amendment 35 of the Arkansas Constitution.

(b) Public hunting, fishing, and trapping shall be a preferred means of managing and controlling nonthreatened species and citizens may use traditional methods for harvesting wildlife.

(c) Nothing in this amendment shall be construed to alter, repeal, or modify:

(1) Any provision of Amendment 35 to the Arkansas Constitution;

(2) Any common law or statute relating to trespass, private property rights, eminent domain, public ownership of property, or any law concerning firearms unrelated to hunting; or

(3) The sovereign immunity of the State of Arkansas.

Georgia Constitution, Article 1, § 1, Para. XXVIII (2006).
The tradition of fishing and hunting and the taking of fish and wildlife shall be preserved for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good.

Louisiana Constitution, Article I, Section 27 (2004).

The freedom to hunt, fish, and trap wildlife, including all aquatic life, traditionally taken by hunters, trappers and anglers, is a valued natural heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people. Hunting, fishing and trapping shall be managed by law and regulation consistent with Article IX, Section I of the Constitution of Louisiana to protect, conserve and replenish the natural resources of the state. The provisions of this Section shall not alter the burden of proof requirements otherwise established by law for any challenge to a law or regulation pertaining to hunting, fishing or trapping the wildlife of the state, including all aquatic life. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to authorize the use of private property to hunt, fish, or trap without the consent of the owner of the property.


Hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good.


Preservation of Harvest Heritage. The opportunity to harvest wild fish and wild game animals is a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual citizens of the state and does not create a right to trespass on private property or diminution of other private rights.

Hunting, trapping, and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage and will be forever preserved for the people and managed by law and regulation for the public good.

Oklahoma, adopted by the voters in 2008:

All citizens of this state shall have a right to hunt, fish, trap and harvest game and fish, subject only to reasonable regulation as prescribed by the Legislature and the Wildlife Conservation Commission. The Wildlife Conservation Commission shall have the power and authority to approve methods, practices and procedures for hunting, trapping, fishing and the taking of game and fish. Traditional methods, practices and procedures shall be allowed for taking game and fish that are not identified as threatened by law or by the Commission. Hunting, fishing and trapping shall be the preferred means of managing game and fish that are not identified as threatened by law or by the Commission. Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify any provision of common law or statutes relating to trespass, eminent domain, or any other property rights.

South Carolina. Language that will be on the 2010 General Election Ballot in South Carolina:

Section 25. The traditions of hunting and fishing are valuable parts of the state’s heritage, important for conservation, and a protected means of managing nonthreatened wildlife. The citizens of this State have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife traditionally pursued, subject to laws and regulations promoting sound wildlife conservation and management as prescribed by the General Assembly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate any private property rights, existing state laws or regulations, or the state's sovereignty over its natural resources.
Tennessee: passed the legislature in 2008, must pass again in 2010 to be on the 2010 Ballot.

The citizens of this state shall have the personal right to hunt and fish, subject to reasonable regulations and restrictions prescribed by law. The recognition of this right does not abrogate any private or public property rights, nor does it limit the state’s power to regulate commercial activity. Traditional manners and means may be used to take non-threatened species.

Vermont Constitution, Chapter II, § 67 (1777).

Hunting, fowling and fishing. The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not enclosed, and in like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters (not private property) under proper regulations, to be made and provided by the General Assembly.


Right of the people to hunt, fish, and harvest game. The people have a right to hunt, fish, and harvest game, subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law.


Right to Fish, Hunt, Trap, and Take Game. The people have the right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game subject only to reasonable restrictions as prescribed by law.

RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS TO HUNT

Delaware Const, Art. 1, § 20 (1987)
A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and State, and for hunting and recreational use.


All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof. To secure these rights, and the protection of property, governments are instituted among people, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.


Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes.

New Mexico Const., Art. 2, § 6 (1971, 1986)

No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. No municipality or county shall regulate, in any way, an incident of the right to keep and bear arms.


All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness; and to keep and bear arms for the defense of their person, family, property, and the state, and for lawful hunting, recreational, and other lawful purposes, which shall not be infringed.

West Virginia Const. Art. 3, § 22 (1986)

A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use.¹⁸²


The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose.

¹⁸²In addition, W. Va. Const., Article VI, §55, provides in part:

Revenues and properties applicable to fish and wildlife conservation. . . . Nothing in this section shall prevent the Legislature from reducing or increasing the amount of any permit or license to hunt, trap, fish or otherwise hold or capture fish or wildlife or to repeal or enact additional fees or requirements for the privilege of hunting, trapping, fishing or to otherwise hold or capture fish or wildlife.