Constituting Folklore: A Case for Critical Folklore Studies

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This article argues for the development of a critical folklore studies through an interweaving of folklore and rhetorical theory. Following paths set by Roger Abrahams, Kenneth Burke, and Antonio Gramsci decades ago, and drawing upon more recent contributions by Ernesto Laclau and rhetorical critics, it considers folklore as a constitutive rhetoric, the act of which establishes a “folk”—and their adversaries—as a political category. Identifying three articulations of critical folklore studies, it calls upon folklorists to intervene against (rather than strictly analyze) oppressive power formations through the production of overt criticism and related counterhegemonic practices.

In her contribution to the special issue of the Journal of American Folklore, “Common Ground: Keywords for the Study of Expressive Culture,” Dorothy Noyes suggests for folklorists a remarkable task. “We must still deal with that problem,” she writes, “of how an ‘imagined community’ can be worth dying for; unhappily, we must also understand how it can be worth killing for” (1995:466). More than a decade later, and with the global stage no less fraught with confrontation, her call remains strikingly relevant. If folklore—its performance, exhibition, and analysis—faces a crisis today, it may lie not simply in questions of its academic survival but in its critical contribution to the politics of interpretation and in addressing issues of conflict and power. And while many folklorists have urged our community in the recent past to move toward a deeper examination of the communicative maneuvers by which folklore informs political identities and hegemonic and hierarchical social orders, we have not done so by drawing a significantly closer relationship with a related field of research that has long addressed these concerns: rhetorical studies. This article will pursue such a collaboration in order to take seriously Noyes’s lament, and Giovanna P. Del Negro and Harris M. Berger’s exhortation to “embark upon a critical inquiry into the ways in which everydayness, expressivity, and practice itself are constructed by us and by the people and texts we study” (2004:22).

Forty years ago, Roger Abrahams (1968a, 1968b) first presented an argument for an alliance between folklore and rhetorical studies. He renewed this position in his latest book, Everyday Life: A Poetics of Vernacular Practices, which analyzes and makes a case...
for fostering goodwill in “culture as animated by our making and doing things with style” (2005:1). Rhetoric permeates this work, from revisions of those early statements about the rhetoric of everyday forms to contemporary admonitions against the “killing rhetoric of nationalism” (2005:255). Yet if recent comments by Kathleen Glenister Roberts (2004) and Robert Glenn Howard (2005) are telling, this alliance has yet to be realized in a substantive way. Roberts, writing in *Communication Quarterly*, laments that communication scholars have “not fully explored connections with folklore” (2004:130); Howard, writing in *Folklore*, posits the reverse to an audience of folklorists. To forge a path of robust convergence would, as I discuss, promote folklore as critical praxis by addressing its socially and politically constitutive nature.

A serious collaboration warrants moving beyond restricted notions of rhetoric. In contemporary theory, “rhetoric” usually denotes aesthetic communication that is strategic or tactical and that is performed for persuasion and identification, thereby contributing to the constitution of the social order. Rhetoric is not exclusively political oratory or deceptive linguistic acts but embraces wide-ranging forms of communicative action and public discourse. Recent, cutting-edge conceptualizations depict rhetoric as the articulation of power, rather than the production of knowledge or argumentation. Rhetoric so conceived signals a commitment to agency (Charland 2003:119), particularly the manipulation of communicative resources in practical and public judgment (Hariman 1998; cf. Young 2002) and identity construction (Gordon 2006; cf. Wakefield 2006). Rhetoric engages the flow of power, a notion that has evolved in rhetorical studies from one grounded in liberalism, then to one based in the work of Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser, to approaches rooted in the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau (Anderson 2005; Rufo 2003). It has been coupled with a reconsideration of Sophistic and Isocratean traditions of classical rhetoric that regard human society as a field of both competition and collective action. In all of these perspectives, rhetoric forms the connective tissue between discourse and power, and it is fundamentally concerned, as Kenneth Rufo posits (resembling Abrahams in folklore studies), with the authority of naming practices to privilege certain meanings and aspects of reality (2003:82).

A more intimate relationship between folklore and rhetorical studies would foster a deeper appreciation of folklore’s political investment, a charge Jay Mechling (1997) advised as imperative for the field. A rhetorical perspective, as I detail, provides a reminder that folklore is not something that a folk does; rather, it is something that, in its doing, constitutes a folk, as both an immediate audience and a political category. Further, that doing constitutes antagonists or enemies to that folk—a people to kill and a people to kill for. This is more than a recapitulation that the institutional exists only through creation of the marginal, or the extraordinary through the ordinary, or the sacred through the profane. It is, rather, a recognition of folklore’s central role in the formation of hegemonic and naturalized orders of the social world.

It is also an assertion that folklore bears the capacity for pivotal contributions to critiques of power and dominant or oppressive moralities. This assertion certainly is not new; it is a core component for feminist and public sector folklorists, whose work this article echoes supportively. The additions here are critical and analytic apparatuses that rhetorical studies has developed and can lend for new perspectives in folklore.
In this article, I overview two orientations that dramatically reshaped such studies in the past three decades: constitutive rhetoric and critical rhetoric. I depict folklore as rhetorical practice, an active memorial of common sense and its accompanying pieties, the performance of which constitutes both a “folk” (although not necessarily named such) and its enemies as political categories. I conclude by considering the development of a critical folklore studies. My hope is that this article will provoke a discussion concerning the revitalization of folklore performance, exhibition, and study in which active critical work serves as part of the “political face of folklore” (Conrad 1998).

**Constitutive Rhetoric, Common Sense, and the Everyday Life of Piety**

Among the perennial questions that have informed—perhaps haunted—folklore studies from its inception is the status of the communal identity defined by the notion of “the folk.” Whether the folk are regarded as a nonelite *vulgus* in the nineteenth century or as “any group of people whatsoever who share at least one common factor” (Dundes 1980:6) in the twentieth, their description usually begins with actual people, a collectivity of social agents. Today, as Noyes notes (1995:452), the term “folk” is so laden with negative, essentialist associations that it is often ignored in favor of terms regarded as more neutral, such as “group.” Patricia Sawin (2002) likewise indicates that, throughout the history of folklore studies, inflections of “folk” have functioned to exempt women as performers and scholars. In solidarity with these accounts, I would nevertheless contend that avoidance of the term “folk” does not dismiss the ethical problems underlying its usage, that substitutes do not solve the quandary, and that the very essentialism predicated by the term is itself often used as a political resource, something that rhetorical analysis and criticism might address. In short, I uphold that we ask ourselves, yet again: Who are the folk? It would be a timely discussion, given Ernesto Laclau’s recent work on populism, in which he argues for a restoration of “the people” not as ultimate core of datum to study—an idea he labels an “emotionally charged fetish” (2005:250)—but rather as a political category that emerges from discursive practices. Adapting Laclau, I propose we treat folklore as a rhetorical act of instituting a people.

It would be impossible, of course, to review every development in rhetorical theory over the past thirty years. Paralleling folklore, rhetorical studies is a highly contested arena, one with no fixed corpus (Charland 2003:120) and one that often straddles the boundary between an academic subject and a “real world” event (Hariman 1986:39). One group of loosely allied perspectives has emerged, however, deeply sympathetic to folklore. Following the concatenated (and no less controversial) developments of the “performance turn” in folklore studies, and equally inspired by the insights of Kenneth Burke, this body of work moved rhetorical studies away from analysis of the composition of institutional, oratorical texts toward a deeper interaction with social theory, an attention to historical and cultural contexts, and a concern for the production and reception of a wider range of texts. Generally, these contributions regarded rhetoric not as revelation of social knowledge but as a way of carving out audiences to ratify particular visions, collectivities, subjects, and ideologies embodied in textual and sym-
bolic formations, with material significance for those who experience them. They advanced rhetorical action as a fostering of identification-in-performance, rather than as disembodied persuasive force; many examined, for example, myths in the Barthean sense, ideographic terminology (empty and floating signifiers in everyday language that become sites of political battle, such as “liberty” or “freedom”), the influence of desire upon form, metaphorical (rather than representational) dimensions of language use as it is employed for the control of power, and hegemony as a collusion of rhetoric and ideology. Renewed discussion concerning the practice of criticism accompanied these contributions, a point I address in the next section.

Primary among these orientations is the notion of constitutive rhetoric, which fosters a translation of questions about “the people” to questions about “the folk.” For the sake of space, I present only an abbreviated account. Michael McGee (1975; cf. McGee 1987; McGee and Martin 1983) offered an early analysis of “the people” as a rhetorical fiction and argued that this fiction often entails troubling consequences. He emphasized two aspects in particular. First, “the people” may serve as a “linguistic phenomenon introduced into public argument as a means of ‘legitimizing’ a collective fantasy” (1975:239). This is a common rhetorical act, and politicians today still are wont to ascribe partisan policies or limiting ideological positions to the collective will of “the people.” Second, “the people” are themselves a collective fantasy shared by masses of individuals. Drawing especially from Burke and Ernest Bormann, McGee demonstrated the communicative means by which a political rhetor (such as Hitler, McGee’s example) uses the idea of “the people” in such a manner that “[t]he audience, essentially a group of individuals, reacts with a desire to participate in that dramatic vision, to become ‘the people’ described by the advocate” (1975:239–40). McGee does not view such practice as inherently deceptive but rather as the result of normal socialization and “collectivization” processes, what he sees as “intensive and continual exercises in persuasion” (242).

From the vantage point of folklore studies, McGee’s emphasis on the individual may seem extreme; he attributes remarkable power to the individual advocate’s ability to control the situation through seductive rhetoric and to the individual person as subscriber to undergo a “metamorphosis” into a “people” (1975:243) by such seduction. In this early statement, McGee generally ignores other social practices and preexisting structures that interpellate individuals into groups. Indeed, he claims that, since “the only human reality is that of the individual; groups, whether as small as a Sunday school class or as big as a whole society, are infused with an artificial identity” (242). As individuals respond to a rhetor’s vision (what McGee designates as political myths), “they give up control over their individual destinies for sake of a dream” (243). And since “the people are the social and political myths they accept” (247), he admonishes rhetorical critics to pay close attention to—and occasionally interrupt—many aspects of their performance: a politician’s particular employment of such myths, the specific content and structure of competing myths, and individuals’ response to and acceptance of those myths, all of which require continual management for sustained political life. Revolutionary for its time, McGee’s article advocated that rhetorical studies depart from strictly analyzing devices within texts to an expansive embrace of the construction of social order and collective identities through
rhetorical acts and documents. While it understated the importance of other social practices, McGee’s contribution forged a way to understand the rhetorical constitution of groups.

A decade later, Maurice Charland (1987) expanded this theme in a case study of the rhetorical creation of the peuple québécois (Québécois people) in the struggle for Quebec sovereignty. Therein, Charland introduced the notion of a constitutive rhetoric, an interpellative “process of identification in rhetorical narratives that ‘always already’ presume[s] the constitution of subjects” (1987:134) and that positions people “towards political, social, and economic action in the material world” (141) within a “textualized structure of motives [that] inserts them into the world of practice” (142); put simply, constitutive rhetorics are oriented toward action (143). Charland’s analysis of the Parti Québécois’s White Paper of 1979 appraised its articulation of “the people” as both a legitimizing principle for a literal constitution and as a participatory fiction by which to constitute such a people in discourse, a people who did not exist prior to such rhetorical action. “The ideological ‘trick’ of such a rhetoric,” Charland maintains, “is that it presents that which is most rhetorical, the existence of a peuple, or of a subject, as extrarhetorical” (137). Thus, acts of essentialism serve a political purpose, constituting a people and simultaneously claiming and advancing their power. Analogous to the arguments in performance studies that audiences are made and not given (Kattwinkel 2003), Charland contended that such rhetoric positions and constrains individual embodiments and bodies (1987:140). As he explains, “rhetoric both addresses and leads to come to be” (148), thus observing the repercussion of the immediate performance into the social. But the White Paper did more than call a people into existence: it called their antagonists and enemies into being. Fundamental to its rhetoric is the division between two different and competing collective subjects, Québécois and French Canadians; the White Paper demands sovereignty only for the former (136). In his conclusion, Charland affirmed that such a practice is not limited to public address but extends to “a range of aesthetic practices, including music, drama, architecture, and fashion” (148). I would add folklore and folklife to this list.

Still later, John Louis Lucaites (1997) applied a related approach to a visual rhetoric. Akin to Charland, Lucaites focused on the level of the nation-state, the “American people” as represented by Franklin Roosevelt in the New Deal and especially by the “coming to age” of photojournalism in the 1930s in works such as James Agee and Walker Evans’s Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (1941). Lucaites’s essay was in part a response to the then hotly vocal reports of the death of the public sphere by writers such as Robert Putnam (1995); against these, Lucaites warned that “when we mourn the demise of the public, however constituted, as part of our golden past . . . the public then risks becoming reified nostalgically as a utopian standard against which the present is marked and measured” (1997:272). By examining photojournalism rather than political oratory, he demonstrated how any aesthetic form might concretize “the people” in an individual particularity (e.g., the photo) and simultaneously reveal a disunity in such formations of “aggregated individuals” (278). Comparing the handling of “the American people” by Agee and Walker with that of Erskine Caldwell and Margaret Bourke-White’s documentation of the southern tenant farmer as “the aver-
age American,” Lucaites demarcated a critical line between representations of the people as human subjects in need of a public voice versus those treated as essentialized objects manipulated for partisan politics (280). After detailing the constitutive operations of Agee and Walker’s images, Lucaites advocates a critical turn, “a call to identify, interpret, and evaluate the full range of ways in which our rhetorical culture gives tenuous presence to the public and to consider how best to engage and employ that culture as a critical, rhetorical praxis that might help us to rearticulate the radical potential of liberal democracy for the world in which we live” (283).

These three gestures contributing to a theory of constitutive rhetoric implicate several concerns relevant to academic and public sector folklore. First, such an orientation adds to the perennial discussion about the definition of the folk by suggesting that they do not necessarily preexist rhetorical expression; often it is the discourse that names a folk and not vice versa. Moreover, any rhetorical act of folklore (verbal or visual) serves as an invocation of a given folk as a political category, corresponding with and reinforcing other social practices defining that group. Attention to constitutive rhetoric advances cases in which “the folk” serves as a political fiction that advocates persuade individuals to accept for the purpose of collective action; in this way, such attention will involve a renewed and recalibrated analysis of folklore and the calling forth of a “folk” within contexts of power. This kind of work will extend theories of constitutive rhetorics of the nation-state to those of “the folk,” but such a rhetorical practice may further be localized. For whether the term “folk” or a marked substitute—“we Jews,” “we Cubans,” “we goombahs”—is employed, the rhetorical action positions individuals through ascription of political identity. Folklorists attuned to constitutive rhetoric not only may examine the immediate success or failure of such performance but also may address the political dimensions of such action: the ends and means of who is included or excluded by such casting, for what political purposes, and against which other constitutions. (In some cases, for example, two localized distinctions may draw sharper antagonisms, while in others the sharpest division may exist between the national and the local.) Further, such an approach will pave a path for critical intervention. It also suggests that the abandonment of the term “folk” is unnecessary, even premature, since close attention to its usage as a rhetorical position is an important contribution to critical work, especially when the term mediates between local and national political identities.

Second, constitutive rhetoric posits that disunity is as fundamental to the construction of collective subjects as is the unity of shared participation in the fiction of “the people” (cf. Bauman 1972). Any “folk” is an embodiment of aggregative individuals—diverse, disparate, and often dissenting from one another. This implies that any number of partisan rhetorical elements may be introduced to claim the folk’s core and that such competition might be essential for the adaptive longevity of a folk. Practices claimed as authentic, traditional, or otherwise representative of “the folk” as a whole may be implicated in political motives to exclude and include participants by allowing or punishing certain expressions of disunity. This does not mean that manifestations of culture (or heritage or tradition) do not exist but that they too are often employed for rhetorical purposes of power articulation. This point is not new to folklore studies, but a closer alliance with rhetorical studies emphasizes not only questions of who may per-
form and who is silenced, but also questions of how any discourse of “the folk” both includes and excludes simultaneously, and how individuals maneuver social hierarchies by maintaining or violating these fictions. Comparably, the recognition of disunity’s role accounts for the seeming contradictions of collective action and identity. When individuals desire to be part of a folk, they are not necessarily concerned about logical consistency between the constituting elements of that fiction of “the people,” but they may well act to protect the survival of the fiction itself.

Third, attention to constitutive rhetoric encourages folklore scholars to consider what kind of folk a specific performance or chain of performances establish and how they go about doing so. If folklore is regarded as a rhetorical practice instituting a folk, it easily aligns with the populism Laclau identified as the “royal road” to understanding the ontological construction of the political (2005:67). Such a construction of popular identity, he continues, is the very basis of hegemony (95) and the means through which a particular assumes the role of an “impossible” universality (115). That is, Laclau asserts that discursive representations of universality are used strategically; interacting with other social forces, they become hegemonic, for there is no escape from hegemony in this paradigm. Indeed, hegemony, Laclau contends, is “the investment, in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us because it is purely mythical” (116). Critical address of hegemony thereby requires analysis of discursive particularities taken as universalities—and also analysis of the advancement of alternative particularities. To extend Laclau’s point, those who seek to understand folklore’s role in the constitution of hegemony must examine how it strategically depicts particular instances as examples of universal categories, such as that of “the folk.”

This is all the more pressing when a “folk” is not identified as a dominant category but rather as a populist one. Populism is not, in Laclau’s estimation, a particular ideology. Rather, it is a form of expression and performance—a “political logic” (2005:117)—that pits “the people” against an authority, a dominant group, or an elite; it entails the creation of a category of the oppressed in order to claim sovereignty for its participants against those in power. On the one hand, recognition of this practice may aid folklorists in political action, demonstrating ways to assist the disenfranchised by tying folk practices and identity to populist rhetoric. On the other hand, this issue returns to a concern raised by Noyes: Laclau’s analysis of populist “antagonistic frontiers” sheds light not only on the practice of identity construction but also on the politics of enemy creation, as the enemy “is located on the other side of the frontier” (231). This emphasis is one of Laclau’s major contributions, an understanding of power not only as an articulation of dominance that obscures and naturalizes social differences, often through a “common language,” but also as articulations of “heterogeneous social demands” that determine adversaries (231). A rhetorical appreciation of folklore focuses attention on its participation in the inevitable antagonisms that constitute political reality. And while we folklorists have made an admirable case for the overlooked and the marginalized, I contend that what is most lacking—and pressing—in our discipline is to discern folklore’s role in the creation of enemies. To extend a phrase from Burke, if folklore studies is to contribute to critiques and correctives of power and to promote good-
will (a key concept in his work and that of those inspired by him), it is imperative that we reconcile with ways folklore might be employed not just as equipment for living but as equipment for violence.6

I would be remiss to insinuate that some folklorists are not already addressing these concerns. Certainly, feminist folklore studies and related work on identity politics have contributed to this discussion by describing who is erased from performance and from the social order (cf. Wander 1984). Phillip Henry McArthur’s recent analysis of a traditional narrative in the Marshall Islands, a narrative “intertextually referenced and enacted in contemporary social contexts that permit the reproduction and contestation of traditional meanings about power” (2004:78), provides a model of folklore research that is attentive to constitutive rhetoric; allied research on nationalism, imagined communities, and folklore performances have likewise detailed the discursive constitution of power. What I am advocating is a move beyond the recognition of the social construction of “the folk” and the relationship between texts and social power to an overt critical intervention in the process, through which folklore might influence other political manifestations of “the people.” Following Laclau’s assertion that “the political operation par excellence is always going to be the construction of a ‘people’”—what he cites as Gramsci’s hegemonic game, a war of position (2005:153)—I submit that we folklorists participate in such construction and deconstruction of spaces of representation by complementing analysis with criticism. Overt attention to the ways that folklore constitutes a folk and in return creates opportunities to employ that folk as a social and political category encourages academic and public sector folklore to address machinations of power, dominance, and the partisan use of popular moralities. Indeed, we folklorists might be in a unique position to criticize oppression and suggest means to abolish it without scripting new oppressions, especially if we work with and lend assistance to the activists of oppressed groups.

A turn to the rhetorical production of a folk through folklore performance requires attention to everyday experience, where such fictions are rehearsed and ratified continuously. Del Negro and Berger identify everyday life as a central component of folklore studies and resist definitions that emphasize the everyday strictly as “a phenomenon, domain, or process in the social world” (2004:4). They prefer instead to see this notion as “an interpretive framework [existing] in dialectical opposition to the notion of special events” (4)—an interpretive framework that is used to attach particular meanings and valences to social practices. Further, they emphasize that everyday life is not merely (or essentially) composed of instrumental activity; it includes expressive behavior as well (14). They do not deny that everydayness is often treated as a unique dimension of social life, but they seek to move beyond the limitations of that perspective. Their position is in sympathy with ethnographic accounts, noting “the diverse and culturally specific ways in which genres of expressive culture may be taken up into discourses of everydayness” and vice versa (17). In contemporary American undergraduate culture, for example, podcasts are more likely to be everyday experiences than live narrations of Märchen, whereas in other places in the world, viewing television broadcasts might still be a rare event; the distinction relies upon the individual’s perception vis-à-vis informing sociocultural contexts. In this
view, performances themselves are not essentially mundane or special but are situated on a continuum of experience bound by the interpretive features of the everyday/special events distinction.

While I agree with Del Negro and Berger’s revisions favoring the expressivity of the everyday and the liberation of everydayness from a presumed domain of routinization and banality, I would like to develop their definition of interpretative frameworks toward a notion of constitutive rhetorical practice and at the same time maintain one notion of the everyday as a unique domain of the social. This requires some subtlety in terminology. For Del Negro and Berger, the “everyday” is in a dialectic with the “special”; this is largely a distinction between mundane and marked experience. But there is another, closely related sense of the everyday present in both folklore and rhetorical studies, namely “common sense.” This is no less contentious a term, but in order to build on Del Negro and Berger’s insights without competing over the meaning of “everyday,” I will utilize “common sense” to represent a naturalized domain of social life that is associated with everyday and local experience—what Abrahams (2005) and Howard (2005) both recognize as the “vernacular,” a term with considerable rhetorical power and one that might be identified with elements of the _Lebenswelt_, Bourdieu’s “habitus” (1977), and Toelken’s (1996) “educative matrix.” As Clifford Geertz details, common sense is usually not conceptualized as an ordered realm of considered thought, but such denial is partially what grants it authority as a cultural system (1983:75) that is both a historical construction and an “everywhere-found cultural form” (85). His attributed core constituents—“naturalness,” “practicalness,” “thinness (literalness),” “immethodicalness (inconsistency),” and “accessibleness”—all add to its _ad hoc_ quality and rhetorical efficacy. Common sense is both an interpretive framework and a constitutive rhetorical practice, placed in tension in contemporary Western thought with any number of other frameworks and practices, such as science, religion, philosophy, and administration.

The trap of essentializing lurks here, and that is not my aim. Rather, I wish to conceptualize common sense as a kind of primary, practical experience with the world, as a way of learning how to be socialized as well as what to be socialized in: communication as rhetoricity and also as language acquisition; ways of demanding and desiring; ways of performing competencies; ways of practicing and apprehending norms, from how to walk in a locale to how to look upon things; and ways of participating in friendly relations and hostilities. In this manner, common sense creates the conditions for all other constitutive rhetorical practices and interpretative frameworks. Put dramatically, children are not born scientists or philosophers or administrators, and certainly not enemies, but they are born rhetoricians and first engage the rhetorical in learning a common sense. Common sense is the initial ground for identity construction, and as a constellation of received ideas and ways of living in tandem with individual practical experience of self, it ties to the fictions of “tradition.” Rather than attempt to define that slipperiest of terms, I instead offer for analysis the missing link, one conjoining identity and tradition, common sense and hegemony, and rhetorical studies and folklore studies: piety.

I borrow again from Burke. For him (following Santayana), piety is not exclusive to
the religious. It is, rather, “a sense of what goes with what” (1984a:74) and a “yearning to conform with the ‘sources of one’s being’” (69). Beth Eddy identifies the Burkean notion of piety as an attitude toward history that “involves a person’s relation to his or her past” (2003:27); Jordynn Jack similarly describes it as an attitude that “leads us to write our lives according to our sense of the appropriate” (2004:450).8 In Burke’s own apt phrase, there is a piety of a ball game just as readily as there is a piety of a religious ceremony (1984a:76). Thus, the urge to piety is one for system building, the “act of creating linkages” (Hawhee 2004:19) and therewith forging shared participation in the confirmation of common sense. For Burke, we cannot experience a sense of self without a set of pieties, and part of being human (as the symbol-using animal) is learning—just as we learn language and learn with language—how and why to be pious.

Burke also describes impiety (a breaking of older linkages) as a critical rupture, which is a point that I will discuss later. For now, let me refine the concept of folklore as rhetorical practice that actively and aesthetically recalls our memories of the need for pieties that culminate in shared and differential identities. Folklore is not simply the content of these memories, the pieties themselves; its significance lies in a reperformance of the very need for pious action, the emergence of common sense and with it the possibility for other frameworks and constitutive rhetorical practices. We learn the need to participate in a constitution of a folk before we learn the specifics of our various constituting invocations; a folkloric performance not only reconstitutes a folk but also recalls the commonsensical need to do so. When folkloric performance introduces innovation—a Burkean impiety—it does so in relation to those pieties constituting what is humanly possible up to that moment and then transgresses them, contesting for and often forming a new piety. Folklore, so conceptualized, is a rhetoric that draws lines between piety and impiety, confronting humans with the desire for an ultimate piety while demonstrating its impossibility, a condition that, for Burke, lies at the root of human confrontation. Folklore does so through its mode of performativity, a reflexive display of catachrestical operations (operations that rely on figural rather than literal language to name the unnameable; cf. Laclau 2005:71–2) at the rhetorical base of common sense and of heightened attention to rhetoricity on both generic and ideological levels in the processes of identification.

As Abrahams demonstrated long ago, the proverb affords a sense of control by naming the situation—what Burke christens a kind of medicine (1974:253). But the proverb (or any specific folkloric performance) likewise hearkens to the formation of common sense while fulfilling or transcending it. This is rhetoric not merely as adornment but as constitutive power, a remembrance of the need to articulate demands as well as an articulation of them, a reminder of the need to name the unnameable as well as a strategy for doing so. Folklore is a rhetoric whose power lies in recalling the reasons we develop common sense, namely to learn how to identify with constitutions of “our” folk and, with it, constructions of those who are not “we folk.” If folklore is understood thusly, it is difficult to challenge folklore’s authority not simply because it is traditional—a perspective that only explains why those who esteem tradition obey its dictates—but rather because violation of folkloric authority bears all the risks to identity associated with impious action against our initial education. Violation of common sense risks exile from the collective, political iden-
tities in whose fictions we participate. If folklore studies adopts ideas from rhetorical theory, it would be able to move beyond the conundrum of tradition. It would be able to confront the everyday life of piety. And it would then be able to move into a more overtly critical endeavor, one that often involves the shattering of pieties and popular moralities and that deals with the ramifications of participation in a “folk” as a model for other political constructions.

Critical Rhetoric and the Critique of Vernacular Culture

If social order and collective identities are arbitrary, why would anyone accept them? This question has loomed over social and political theory, taking a shape in both Nietzsche and Gramsci that continues to inform the present day. Those who have contributed to a theory of constitutive rhetoric have often passed quickly over this point; McGee attributes it to socialization, for example, and Charland to the nature of language among language-using animals (1987:147) and to aesthetic pleasure (148). This issue came to a head in another debate in rhetorical studies that was, in many ways, an extension of constitutive rhetoric that went beyond notions of “the people” to “reality” itself.

It began with an article by Steve Whitson and John Poulakos on Nietzsche’s aestheticism “as an alternative to the ill-fated project that sought to link rhetoric with epistemology” (1993:132). Against this notion that rhetoric primarily serves as revelation of knowledge or a means to understanding, Whitson and Poulakos argued that rhetoric “is not an epistemological undertaking but rather part of a greater artistic act—the act of ordering the chaos of life” (136). Knowledge and truth are, in such a view, rhetorical fabrications—doxa treated as episteme, accepted by others because they grant the pleasure of the illusion of stability, a confirmation of common sense and the need for pieties. Whitson and Poulakos survey what they call “aesthetic rhetoric” (as opposed to “epistemic rhetoric”) to argue not only that we humans seek veils to obscure from ourselves the terror of existence and the unknowability of objective (or absolute) reality but also that, as artistic creatures, we delight in these veils that “endow existence with beauty and . . . make us forget that behind this fabricated beauty lies only chaos” (136). Accordingly, aesthetic rhetoric “focuses on the human body as an excitable entity, an entity aroused by language” (141). Such aesthetic veiling allies with notions of constitutive rhetoric in that power relations flow, in part, from successful acts of veiling (such as catachrestical naming of groups through aesthetic actions); those who are skillful in a given culture’s privileged artistic resources gain power by providing such pleasure (cf. Bauman 1977:43–5).

A wave of reactions followed this article, ranging from supportive extensions to accusations of moral indecency. I will not review all of these charges here, nor will I document Whitson and Poulakos’s response, but I do wish to draw out several implications of this debate for the study and exhibition of folklore. Let us assume that Whitson and Poulakos (and Nietzsche) are on to something in asserting that knowledge of objective or absolute reality is impossible, as “reality” is always mediated through language or other communicative—and competitive—action, a point resonating with the cultural relativism at the heart of folklore studies. First, this suggests
that what we folklorists study are veils as constitutive aesthetic actions made popular, and that such veiling is not incontrovertibly deceptive; we humans cannot escape rhetoric, but we can utilize and debate its social purposes and articulations in constituting a folk. Second, it suggests that new veils could be introduced and old ones destroyed, changing the nature of social reality and value systems, although such critical action is not easily accomplished, especially when the veil is dominant and treated as venerable (one thinks of the success of Nietzsche’s attack on Christian morality and conscience). Third, folklore—and folklore studies itself—may be regarded as a rich expression of aesthetic veiling and the will to power, and it may be criticized or advocated as such.

What, then, of the nature of critique? In addition to the developments outlined above, the 1980s and 1990s saw a heated transition in the nature and purpose of rhetorical criticism (see Cyphert 2001). The earliest manifestation emphasized what Philip Wander (1983) called the “ideological turn,” an address of rhetorical constitutions of the political with the aim of critiquing dominant ideology.9 Raymie McKerrow (1989, 1991, 1993) and McGee (1990) then advanced a “critical rhetoric” as an alternative to traditional rhetorical criticism, the latter of which at the time postulated neutrality, disinterest, and objectivity. For McKerrow, critical rhetoric would seek “to unmask or demystify the discourse of power” (1989:91) via a Foucauldian critique of both domination (power/knowledge) and freedom (advancing perpetual skepticism and self-criticism). In McGee’s conception, it would impart a performance of rhetoric, not just an archaeology of power/knowledge; a critical rhetor would not simply figure out how a text works or what it “does” but would assume the task of constructing texts for critical interventions.

A number of scholars responded to the advent of critical rhetoric. Two articles written by Kent Ono and John Sloop (1992, 1995) are most relevant for folklore studies. The first aimed to prevent a solipsism and political inaction that could be derived from the deconstructive emphases of critical rhetoric. In response, they refined the rationale for doing critical work, which they reinterpret here as a temporary fixing of meaning that admits the need to effect change and makes clear the critic’s purpose (1992:48). Criticism, thusly defined, is “work to initiate new relationships, to imagine new ways of constructing the world, and to replace the logic of dichotomies with alternatives” (50). It necessarily addresses power, defined as a “force that flows, circulates, and defines relationships among subjects” (50). A critic must, therefore, relinquish skepticism during the act of criticism and make a case for “an end which could guide us in attempting to effect social change” (52). For Ono and Sloop, a critic must take a stand when writing criticism, but then the critic must return to skepticism (even of oneself) the moment that the work is finished and hence remain in the domain of contingencies. They make clear that the critic is not an autonomous agent detached from society, and they recommend that “criticism should be moved nearer to the social and cultural communities from which [it] derives” (51) and be located within a cultural context. Such a criticism opposes traditional academic critique of artifacts for the sake of knowledge and speaks to specific audiences. It would especially concern “traditions outside of mainstream Western history” (58). To advance the telos of a rearticulation of homosexuality, for example, they propose that
the critic must begin by envisioning how a “better world” would constitute homosexuals. Drawing upon Foucault, they endorse a project by which the excluded are seen through “consulting a particular community for descriptions of their own constitution” (56) and finding routes to move homosexuality rhetorically from a position of a “they” to one of a “we” (55) for a given audience. Thereupon, the critic would seek out and critique texts that reveal dominant homophobic articulations of homosexuality. In this manner, a critic “dons the persona of one who has raised questions about culture and who has attempted to understand them” and “simulates, through an involved empathy, the attitude of those who have spoken before her in order to create the world in which, once again, ideas of the present sustain life through a contemporary past and a utopian future” (59).

In their second article, Ono and Sloop recommend a critique of vernacular discourse, by which they mean expressions of historically oppressed communities. Such discourses are, they explain, the source of “important texts that gird and influence local cultures first and then affect, through the sheer number of local communities, cultures at large” (1995:19). They note, rightfully, that rhetorical criticism—critical rhetoric included—tends to scrutinize the discourse of the empowered and of widely disseminated documents that “shape history,” such as presidential speeches or mainstream media events. Their aim is to explore not simply how domination forms subjects but additionally the “discussions of people struggling to survive” (20). They argue for the need to examine local media and the everyday talk of those most ignored by society, including Asian, African, Latin, and Native Americans; gays and lesbians; and feminists. They do not include folklore and folklife in their description of vernacular discourse, but their comments are applicable. Ono and Sloop contend, for example, that cataloguing the vernacular alone is not an emancipatory practice, which arises only within a critical framework. They recommend critiques that attend to two particular characteristics of vernacular discourse: its cultural syncretism (a simultaneous affirming of the marginalized community and protesting of the dominant) and its reliance upon pastiche as an inventive practice. Critics are admonished to be cautious, so that any critique of a vernacular discourse does not replicate marginalization strategies from the dominant, and the best way to accomplish this, they claim, is by noting carefully how vernacular discourses are always in process (26) and by attending to the ways and reasons that individuals construct themselves as a group outside the hegemonic (27). The goal of such critique is to “upend essentialisms, undermine stereotypes, and eliminate narrow representations of culture” (25).

Ono and Sloop are explicit that vernacular discourse in itself is neither “positive” nor liberatory. Their own analysis, for example, observed the various ways in which the Pacific Citizen, a World War II Japanese American newspaper, constructed women as passive subjects. And although he is only mentioned in a footnote in their article, Ono and Sloop’s concern with domination and critique of the vernacular is informed by the work of Antonio Gramsci, who has contributed significantly to the contours of this issue but whose name rarely appears in American folklore studies. Gramsci is not an easy figure to wrestle with; his views on folklore, especially within the context of political emancipation, are complicated and challenging to the field, critical or otherwise. As Alberto Cirese’s careful reading of Gramsci illustrates, Gramsci believed that one must not too hastily celebrate folklore, for while he felt that
folklore is characteristic of “the people” and in opposition to the official, this view did not add up to an endorsement of folklore as necessarily valid or useful in politico-cultural ways (1982:214). In brief, Gramsci aimed to promote a Marxist conception of the world that would initially ratify progressive elements in both folklore and official ideology, then ultimately replace both. For Gramsci, reactionary folklore is not more advantageous than progressive bourgeois thought, and while folklore “may introduce new qualities or aspects” (Cirese 1982:227) useful in the struggle against hegemony, it does not automatically do so and certainly not in any absolute sense. It is fundamental for the rhetorical expression of hegemony, however, for as James Aune notes in summarizing Gramsci, any party seeking control “must build on the moral unity of a social order, expressed in popular forms by representative symbols, myths, and folkloric wisdom, and must guide that moral unity to a new, more sophisticated level” (Aune 2003).

Gramsci (and following him, Laclau; cf. Laclau 2006) is important to this conversation because he calls for the need to establish a new worldview and a new collective subject, as he posits no liberation from hegemony. He illuminates critical work as a way to address the uneven and oppressive distribution of material and symbolic resources within a society. Gramsci’s challenge demands that the critic be willing to criticize, to face the risks and demands of such labor and take responsibility for its ramifications. Moreover, he recognizes the relation between civil society and political society, sutured together as they are through education and common sense.10 While Gramsci (1985) often stands critical of folklore (and vernacular culture) itself, he makes clear its high stakes: the constitution of a folk through folkloric practice, no matter how seemingly innocuous, always relates to the constitution of the state as its reflection or its counterpoint. The private and the local, while influenced by the public and the official, likewise influence and are influenced by the state and its organization of violence.

All of these contributions to critical rhetoric suggest three avenues for critique that are applicable to folklore. The first is a critique of domination as it maintains and oppresses a vernacular or subaltern. The second is a critique of the dominant through critical address, perhaps even affirmation, of alternative practices of the vernacular or subaltern. The third is a critique of the vernacular or subaltern practices as they might contribute to, imitate, or even initiate structures of domination. Together, these and like accounts present an extended range of communicative action for critical address in folklore, from those that reveal “power-laden rhetorical strategies through which [a dominant discourse] masks and presents itself as the norm” (Shome 1996:515) to those through which marginalized groups “establish self and group autonomy because the individuals and groups name themselves” (Flores 1996:146; cf. Dicochea 2004).

Toward a Critical Folklore Studies

Concurrent with the development of critical rhetoric, Robert Ivie espoused a broadly “productive criticism,” an extension of rhetorical criticism into social critique, for the purpose of “enriching the social imaginary” and “enhancing human relations” (2001). In Ivie’s conception, the critic’s role is not cartographic but intercessory; specifically, in returning to rhetoric’s classical canon of invention, criticism is an
intercession into social life that opens, widens, and perhaps even combines frames of reality that are kept separate for the purpose of domination. These approaches resonate with the Burkean concept of comic criticism, which shares with Gramsci an emphasis on critique serving and debating the nature of emancipation. For Burke (1984b), a comic criticism aims at challenging the conceptualization of reality as a pure competition and replacing it with a dramatistic and charitable vision of participation; this counsel itself is a response to what he takes to be human nature’s desires for hierarchy, which is the correlate to our condition as symbol-using animals. Comic criticism is juxtaposed with the tragic and the latter’s ascription of blame and purgation of perceived threats to a social order through victimage rituals, scapegoating, mortification, and the ultimate annihilation of beliefs (and believers) in opposition to a given ideological ordering. Instead, the comic gesture aims to encourage frames of acceptance, to recognize the commonality of human endeavors and imperfection, and to complicate those rhetorical maneuvers of simplification and categorization of human existence. Comic criticism aims to move “towards a better life,” as Burke himself promoted, a way of living with others with whom we do not share an identical vision of the social world or set of pieties, so that we might coexist without needing to be constituted under the same rubric of “a folk” or “the people.”

The thrust of these reworkings of critical activity are by no means universally embraced in rhetorical studies. Still, at a time when rhetorical studies and cultural studies—the oldest form and the newest form of political criticism, as Thomas Rosteck contends (1999:vii; cf. Charland 1990; Eagleton 1999)—have initiated collaboration, it seems poignant to urge a similar meeting between rhetorical criticism and folklore studies for the same critical purpose. There is a viable reason to do so within the history of folklore studies itself. While Burke had a strong influence on the ethnography of communication (Hansen 1996; Jordan 2005), he himself was a critic, not an ethnographer—first a music and literary critic, then a rhetorical critic, then a social critic. In his own contributions to the *Journal of American Folklore* (1960a, 1960b), he turned to the mythologist Joseph Fontenrose’s magnum opus, *Python*, a study of the “combat myth” in antiquity. While much of the main article reviews aspects of the myth, Burke admits that his “use” (1960b:306) of this book is to examine the nature of language itself (1960a:271). As he winds his way through the text, he reviews fundamental aspects of his own theories of rhetoric—noting, at one point, that poetics alone (the explanation of rules and aims intrinsic to an art; 1960b:303) cannot describe myths, which must be understood as rhetoric (1960b:297).11

Burke regards myths as a system of governance, a way to influence believers and stipulate a particular order of the social world (1960b:295); he compares their role to magic, which he describes as “bad science” but “good rhetoric” (296). In the closing pages, he describes how myths sanction principles of victimage and “perfect” answers to social threats, notes that gods are terms for order, and examines the role of tragedy and comedy in mythic constitutions. But Burke does not end with analyses of mythic form. Instead, he champions the “worthy cause” of criticism (303)—one that is not “too thorough” (304) in emphasizing description but that confronts the problems of human existence raised by myths—and he concludes with a startling possibility for a criticism that would emerge from folklore studies: “If peace is ever
to be attained in this world, it will be attained through an educational system that can systematically study the principles underlying precisely the ways whereby man, the symbol-using animal, makes his peculiar contributions to the ‘combat myth,’ in all its variations” (306).

Around the same time of this contribution (in the period between his 1950 *A Rhetoric of Motives* and his 1961 *The Rhetoric of Religion*), Burke had become concerned with the problems of education, contributing a lengthy discussion on a “linguistic approach” to it (Burke 1955). Although inspired heavily by Marxism, Burke himself generally remained committed to liberalism. His emphasis on an educational program, however, resonates more closely with a Gramscian conception: namely, that educational institutions and curricula are sites for hegemonic struggle. To counter what he regarded as the dominant American educational system’s alliance with capitalism and cold war ideology, Burke advocated “admonitory” education, imagined as “a sophisticated and methodized set of parables or fables” to aid “a divided mind” that had become “at home in such divisiveness” (1955:271); such a design opposed “promissory” education, the sort that strictly offers the individual the chance for a better-paying job. Such pedagogy was part of his efforts to “purify” war (as he named his overall project); the educational program he recommends is a kind of critical labor, as it would aim to replace “a pious fear of God” with “a partially impious fear of symbol-using” (272), an awareness of and response to how we humans create the very institutions that transform ourselves into enemies and thereby advance new constitutions of human relations.

Burke’s hope was that a comic criticism and an admonitory education would lead us to reject violence and war, or at least to stall them by keeping our combat myths at the symbolic rather than material level. Folklore and folklorists, as Burke proposed nearly five decades ago, have much to contribute to this project. John McDowell, in his review of Abrahams’s latest book, similarly portends “the outlines of a grand project in . . . [Abraham’s] earlier summons to action” (McDowell 2006:81–2), namely to “search out places of resistance to these overwhelmingly powerful cultural forces” of “capitalist, industrial, and bureaucratic excesses” (Abrahams 2005:148). Abrahams seeks to rally folklorists to follow in the spirit of Burkean comic criticism—not only to study goodwill but also to pursue it—and so confirms the benefits of connecting with rhetorical studies.12

I wish to be clear that I am not advocating a single method for criticism but that folklorists write criticism and discuss the ways and implications of doing so. (I very strongly believe that rhetorical studies has much to learn from folklore as well, but that is a subject for a different audience.) To round out this argument, I would identify three initial constituent acts of a critical folklore studies:

2. Criticism of folklore practices themselves.
3. Production of folklore studies (and folklore) as a critical act.

Recent contributions by Ray Cashman (2006) and Lisa Gilman (2004) offer forays into the first and second possibilities, respectively. Neither were written to be critiques,
but both open paths toward critical ethnography (Madison 2005). The following comments on their work are not meant to be negative but to demonstrate certain conceptual roadblocks that folklorists would need to overcome to engage a critical paradigm in alliance with a rhetorical theory that resists positivist legacies of discoverable facts and liberal assumptions of preexisting guaranteed rights for equal participation in society. Such a new approach would conceptualize politics as the never-ending securing of needs by sustained rhetorical performance and populist constitutions of social life leading to political action.

Cashman examines “critical nostalgia” as represented in the Derg Valley community of Northern Ireland. He takes issue with scholarly condemnations of nostalgia as necessarily reactionary and oppressive, and he envisions nostalgia instead—and only in particular circumstances—as a critical resource, both for informed evaluation of a group’s social circumstances and as an inspiration for moral action (2006:137). Cashman asserts that community members use nostalgia as “raw materials to revise memory and present identities” and to critique modernity (154). His analysis is a form of ethnocriticism, and it resonates with Charland’s (2003) discussion of rhetoric’s gesture to tradition as a generative basis for new statements. Cashman concludes with an admission of his own sympathies, revealing a motive and telos for discussing nostalgic practices put to use as “guideposts for a better future” (2006:154). In many ways, this contribution bears the components for critique, except one significant piece is overtly bracketed: power. In his analysis of a historical society that provides a (plausibly comic) location for interaction between Protestants and Catholics, Cashman asserts that “power (pace Foucault) may not be the primary concern” of this organization (153). Such an assertion alone is, of course, a rhetorical maneuver, a cast upon an interpretation of social order. And whether as critic or as ethnographer representing a critical position of community members, one cannot simply dismiss power carte blanche. Cashman suggests that those who identify power in all social maneuvers might not be doing good ethnography, but there lies the rub of his approach: he aims to demonstrate how community members act critically through performances of nostalgia, but somehow they are not concerned with—or caught in the web of—power relations. The point is not to ask Cashman to do something he does not want to do but to make clear that a folklore studies drawing from the rhetorical theory outlined above would find this divorce impossible; one cannot be both critical and not invested in power, especially when starting from the political act of constituting a folk.

Gilman examines the strategic construction of the tradition of women’s dancing as a political tool in both dictatorial and democratically elected regimes in Malawi. Although her article is an analytical rather than overtly critical document, Gilman’s points do take aim at a hegemony constituted in part by these folkloric acts and a traditionalizing process used to oppress people. She identifies the rhetoric of traditionality as a central aspect of this hegemonic process (2004:36) and demonstrates how routine performances and the “affective investment” in such dances (53) contribute to a constitution of everyday life that underwrites domination. She reveals in detail the mechanisms by which Bakili Muluzi’s 1994 electoral victory in Malawi continued the oppressive policies and performances (and the creation of enemies) first established by the dictatorship of Hastings Banda while asserting liberation from
them. Implicit in her study is a criticism of these practices as tools of hegemony. She invokes the problem of women who participate in their own domination (52), while noting the rampant sexism and the cultural determinants that position women in sorely compromised circumstances. As with Cashman’s argument, her contribution opens space to critique this order and to confront directly those in power in Malawi today—an approach that soundly attunes to the kind of rhetorical criticism identified above. Gilman establishes, however, a problematic binary between activists and politicians in Malawi, identifying only the latter with rhetoric, itself very nearly defined as a “propaganda campaign” (37). Gilman asserts, for example, that Banda’s claim to traditionality was only “rhetorical and strategic” and that this was evidenced by “the contradictions that existed between the party’s discourse and the reality of its actions” (40); Muluzi’s party operates with an affiliated rhetoric about liberating women (46), and hence both share a rhetoric that masks strategic intentions (49). In short, rhetoric is treated throughout as adornment or deception. Activists are not described in the same rhetorical manner, as attempting to construct a social reality according to their ideological conceptions of the world.

Thus, while both Cashman and Gilman are on the path of a comic criticism, they both proceed with an uncomplicated division between rhetoric and truth, an inheritance from Enlightenment rationalism.14 Both presume a ground of truth that can be known through (ethnographic) analysis, and neither imagine the social world as a competition of veils (their work included). Again, I wish to stress that analysis, not criticism, was their identified endeavor. I am focusing on these two studies not as representatives of a failed critical attempt but as very recent adjustments in folklore studies that have moved closer toward rhetorical theory and criticism. The point is to catch at an early stage two problems that would not go away for a collaboration with rhetorical studies—namely, power constituting and constituted by forms of symbolic action such as folklore and an appreciation of the competitive nature of the rhetorical in the creation of pieties and a folk.

This point also indicates that the development of a critical folklore studies would involve exploring possible gaps of cultural logic and asking questions of possible articulations of power unattended by the immediate constitution of a folk. Following the examples above, one might wonder if the expressions of nostalgia in the Derg Valley tend to mythologize a past favoring male dominance in tandem with a code of neighborly cooperation, and, if so, one might rethink the connection between nostalgia and dominant masculinity. One might question the motivations of the activists in Malawi as maneuvers to gain—and then potentially abuse—political power and make a case for how such transformation would not result in another oppression, thereby strengthening the case for revolutionary action.15 If written by folklorists who are close to the community by participating in its constitution of a folk, such critiques would not be a passing of judgment from afar; if done in respectful address to the folk community (but secondarily also engaging others, academic and otherwise), they may herald an act of friendship and comic solidarity, thwarting the paternalism that Del Negro and Berger (2004:20) caution folklorists against.

Such address would accomplish the work of criticism: calling things into crisis and calling audiences to judgment and action about the future. As Gramsci, Burke, Laclau,
and the critical rhetoricians reveal, one can both sympathize and critique. To forward a critical folklore studies, we folklorists cannot deny power or the ubiquitous rhetorical veiling in our desires for new political constitutions. To build on the work that Abrahams, Howard, Roberts, Cashman, Gilman, and others have done would be to move toward the third position discussed above—a fully developed critical folklore studies in which folklorists publish overt criticism and encourage folklore performances that build toward the educational systems that Gramsci and Burke envisioned, maximizing reflection and conversation on why we die and kill for the imaginary and advancing critical pedagogies for counterhegemonic action. Whether the discipline of folklore (and the allegiances it has forged to maintain its existence as an order of homo academicus) is prepared for such a turn remains to be seen.

### Conclusion: A Rhetorical Theory of Folklore Revisited

In this article, I have attempted to establish a case for the collaboration between the fields of folklore and rhetoric and for the development of a critical folklore studies. I have argued that rhetoric is not exclusively bound to adornment or deception; rather, it involves the articulation of power through forms of communicative action, such as those found in folklore. A performance of folklore, as an active memorial to common sense and the need for pieties, constitutes “the folk” as a political category; accordingly, such constitutions may be critically engaged for the sake of the emancipatory, impious, and comic advance of new social imaginaries or the reduction of violence. Rather than summarize every aspect of my argument, I would like to conclude by deriving two major points of departure for further collaborations and investigations.

First, a fully developed rhetorical theory of folklore would extend beyond tropological and functionalist analyses of folklore composition and would abandon the notion of rhetoric as inherently deceptive. It would recognize that the competitive conditions of rhetoricity and the constitution of political order suggest that webs of manipulation are very much part of the nature of human social life; this in turn implies that folklorists cannot discover “truth” or preexisting “truths,” but they can investigate how folklore, as an organization of aesthetic expressions, is taken to be truthful by the participants who ratify its order. A critical folklore studies might investigate and critique the reasons why one formation of hegemony prevents other meaningful fictions that constitute realities, collectivities, and paths for identity construction and that legitimize configurations of the political as a lived, material expression of belief. Following Gramsci and Burke, it would move from a notion of rhetoric as persuasion to rhetoric as identification, not in order to examine only the rhetorical aspects of folklore, but to view folklore as a viably competing rhetorical practice in the struggle for control over the political.

Second, it requires appreciation of “the folk” as a discursive category and as a specific constellation and articulation of demands produced through a constitutive rhetoric recognized as salient by its audiences. Instead of claiming to present facts objectively, a critical folklore studies might take as its first item of business the demonstration of a specific and actualized interweaving of rhetorical expressions that
produce a folk as a “contingent and particular [form] of articulating demands, not an ultimate core from which the nature of the demands themselves could be explained” (Laclau 2005:250). Since folklore studies is yet one more way to participate in a fiction of a folk, folklore analyses may be read as rhetorical acts in themselves. Awareness of this suggests neither that all folklorists become critics nor that consensus be forged on what constitutes the emancipatory and the comic. It does, however, ask folklorists to consider their work with regard to the veiling rather than to the revelation of knowledge and thus brings with it a series of ethical considerations. Further, it warrants ample work to develop a responsible and sound critical folklore studies that does not adhere to a dogmatic line but that allows and encourages active dissent and agonism within the field.

In his conclusion to Everyday Life, Abrahams encourages folklorists to “confront even more dark and important subjects, leading ethnographers and other social scientists into subjects of great moral and political importance” (2005:260). This is no simple task. Folklorists have long noted the “neglected centrality” of the subject of their work, the penchant to dismiss folklore as a phenomenon of the “mere” category, as insignificant. Abrahams’s call is one not only for academic relevance but also for broadening the civic value of engaging with others through folklore and folklore studies. In this mission, folklorists should not dismiss the most ancient of “meres,” rhetoric. This article has attempted to make a case for a close collaboration between the two and argues that until a fully theorized critical folklore studies emerges, those who perform, exhibit, and study folklore will never achieve the capital they deserve. We might wonder if folklorists will follow Abrahams’s lead or, forty years from now, still be waiting to move beyond introductory remarks toward a comic emancipation.

Notes

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1. Following Angus (1993), I distinguish between restricted rhetoric and general rhetoric; the former emphasizes (arguably classical) notions of rhetoric as specific tropological devices, and the latter emphasizes (arguably postmodern) understandings of rhetoric as discursive practice. Folklore studies has taken recourse to restricted rhetoric in two manifestations: as oratory and as persuasive function and compositional technique. Indeed, referencing restricted formations, it is plausible to assert that rhetoric never left folklore. Considerable studies exist dedicated to folkloric oratorical practices (Bauman 1970, 1983, 1986; Dargan and Zeitlin 1983; Duranti 1992; Yankah 1989) or rhetoric as a device in folklore performance (Briggs 1988; Knuutila 1993; Prahlad 1996). General rhetoric unfolds a comparable division: as rhetoricty, the relation of linguistic devices and communicative expression to the constitution of political subjects, and even more broadly as discursivity, the “architectonic principle of language linking action to symbol systems” (Howard 2005:173), or more simply, any act of discourse. For other uses of “rhetoric” in folklore studies, see Bar-Itzhak (1999), Bronner (1988), and Rudy (2002).


4. Charland (1987:147) remarks that constitutive rhetorics are not always successful and often require artistic means for acceptance.

5. For a recent study on folklore and enemies, see Yelenevskaya and Fialkova (2004).

6. Goodwill is a central concept in ancient rhetorical theory, particularly in Isocrates, whose notion
of a *logos politikos* (“political discourse”) aims to develop citizens by moving from personal goodwill (*eunoia*) to civic goodwill (*homonopia*); in contemporary rhetorical theory, Isocrates is often regarded as a forerunner of Burkean ideas (McGee 2001).

7. See Colebrook (2002)—and related articles in the special issue of *New Literary History* in which her article appears—for a detailed discussion of other political aspects of the everyday. The comparison with *Lebenswelt* or habitus is not immediate and would require a consideration of Bourdieu’s critique of phenomenology adapted for folklore studies.

8. For studies of piety (as religious experience) in folklore, see Brückner (1968), Lawless (1987), and Mitchell (1988).

9. This movement was closely associated with studies of the everyday. Wander, for example, wrote the introduction to the reissue of Lefebvre’s *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (1984). For a critical review of these developments, see Cloud (2001).

10. For his views on hegemony and common sense, see Gramsci (1971). For a relevant debate on the nature of education and common sense in Gramsci that engages his concerns with folklore, see Entwistle (1979) and Giroux, Holly, and Hoare (1980).


12. It is important, of course, not to overstate a lack of attention to criticism in folklore studies. There are a number of critical analyses of the folklore-politics relationship, from overt studies of folklore and the public sphere (e.g., Muthukumaraswamy and Kaushal 2003) to feminist and Marxist contributions (e.g., Berger 1999; Hollis, Pershing, and Young 1993; Limón 1983) to those entailing the interests of the marginalized (e.g., Goodwin 1989; Paredes 1970). The extension proposed here is for the development of a critical folklore studies in restoration of the Burkean impulse to put folklore and folklore studies to “use.”


15. For the record, I should note that I find both the account of the KDHS and the Malawi activists as justifiable and moving toward the comic in the Burkean sense. The aim here is to illustrate certain ethical demands of rhetorical theory and criticism and how they might differ from ethnography or folklore studies as currently practiced.

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