Review of Ziporyn, Ironies and Beyond Oneness

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Brook Ziporyn, *Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought; Prolegomena to the Study of Li* 理
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Brook Ziporyn, *Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li 理 in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents*
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Near the end of the second volume of the two books under review (hereafter referred to as *Ironies* and *Beyond Oneness*), Brook Ziporyn says that his goal has been to “provide the power to think a greater number of more greatly differing thoughts…. Truth is important, but it is important only because it makes things so much more interesting” (2/314). No one who reads these books with any charity can deny that he has achieved this goal—in fact, far exceeded it. Ziporyn takes on the deepest issues and most difficult texts from a millennium and a half of Chinese thinking, and offers exciting new ways to make sense of both individual texts and the tradition’s broader concerns. At the core of his account is an idea he labels “coherence,” a category he argues is fundamental in most Chinese thought, and from which “sameness and difference are negotiable, non-ultimate derivatives” (2/2). The term most often used to express coherence, especially in post-Han dynasty texts, is *li* 理. The fact that *li* is more prominent in later texts allows Ziporyn to divide his story into two volumes: the first looks at the idea of coherence as it emerges in Warring States and Han texts, with only tangential attention to *li*; the second recenters the discussion around *li*, repeating only a little of the ground covered in the first book as it focuses primarily on Wang Bi, Guo Xiang, and both Huayan 華嚴 and Tiantai 天台 Buddhism. Each book can thus be read independently; read together, the argument for the pervasiveness and complexity of perspectives on coherence—and for seeing Chinese Buddhism as in many ways continuous with and further developing themes in indigenous Chinese thinking—is extremely powerful. Whether read separately or together, these two volumes are
among the most provocative and tightly-argued works on Chinese philosophy to appear in many years, and richly repay the effort it takes to learn to see through the lens of coherence.

To understand and assess Ziporyn’s project, it makes sense to begin with “coherence.” Let me clear up one possible misunderstanding at the outset: Ziporyn is not primarily concerned with the question of when or if we should use “coherence” as a translation, for *li* or anything else. Indeed, he says that he is in broad agreement with P. J. Ivanhoe’s critical remarks about the “direct translation of *li* with the word ‘coherence’ in most contexts” (2/269; and see Ivanhoe’s 2011 review of Peter Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, in *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy*, 9 (4): 471-75). Rather, Ziporyn’s argument is that coherence—in a particular sense, sometimes picked out by technical uses of the term *li*—lies at the heart of much Chinese thinking. Perhaps the most counter-intuitive aspect of Ziporyn’s position is that coherence is somehow prior to or more basic than the distinct, separate items which are said to cohere.

As is well known, the question of whether things are the same or different, and how they can be the same (i.e., what makes for identity or class membership) are foundational questions in Western thinking. In particular, “sameness” is often thought to depend on two particulars sharing the same essence, no matter whether that essence is an intrinsic part of the thing itself (realism) or merely attributed to otherwise-essenceless-things by human activity (nominalism). In contrast, Ziporyn says that Chinese thinkers tend to work without a concept of essence at all, and instead every identity (as same or different) is “constitutively ambiguous” (1/7). There are multiple ways that the world can be—multiple “perforations,” as he sometimes puts it—and so what a thing is depends not just on itself but also on the ways that it hangs together with other things. This is what it means to say, in the passage quoted above, that “sameness and difference are negotiable”: what a thing is, what things there are, depend on higher-level considerations of coherence. The
coherence is thus prior, determinative (at least for now; different coherences might make for different things) of what there is.

It is easier to confuse coherence with nominalism than realism, because Ziporyn insists throughout the books that human perspectives, subjectivity, and valuing play critical roles in establishing coherence. But he also repeatedly argues that coherence is not nominalism: the perforations in the world—think of them as salient options for dividing things up—are real, not simply up to us. He criticizes David Hall and Roger Ames for leaning too far in the direction of nominalism (1/55), and rebuts Paul Goldin’s assertion that Ziporyn is articulating a position “no more and no less” than nominalism (2/351-2; see Goldin’s 2013 review of Ironies, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 74 (2):243-247). In addition to carving out space that lies between nominalism and realism, Ziporyn also aims to show how the idea of coherence allows things to be both the same (one, unified) and different (even opposite) simultaneously. Two of his tools here are harmony—coherence is harmonizing with what came before, not repeating it, so that earlier and later instances can be said both to be same and different—and the twentieth-century scholar Qian Mu 錢穆’s image of a swinging pendulum. One and the same pendulum, yet its position varies, governed by something which is not the swinging weight at all, but instead its fulcrum (or, to use a Chinese term frequently encountered in related contexts, its “center”) (1/77f). Both harmony and especially the pendulum bring in the idea of continuity: coherence is (among other things) that which is generative, continuous. Ultimately, Ziporyn says, coherence has three key dimensions: it is (1) a grouping or fitting together, which is productive of (2) value—often in the form of satisfying human desires—and (3) intelligibility.
Later on I will examine some of the ways in which this idea of coherence appears in a range of texts. First, two caveats, a look at “li” itself, and some methodological reflections. Caveat one: Ziporyn is not claiming that a standalone notion of sameness is unthinkable in early China; he considers, for example, what he calls the “isomorphic sameness orientation” of the neo-Mohists, and the related use of “whiteness” in Mengzi 6A3 (1/68; 1/116f). Such ideas were thinkable but marginal, eventually “either ignored or absorbed into the broader harmony paradigm” (1/69). Caveat two: a major feature of Ziporyn’s approach is his recognition that according to some thinkers, coherence is only available in “ironic” forms, which means that it is achievable only through denying one dimension of coherence itself. Typically this means that togetherness or unity, plus value (as continuity, joy, satisfaction of desires), must come at the cost of unintelligibility, as when the Laozi’s “Way” is unknowable, inexpressible. Coherence can thus come in many varieties, from straight-forwardly non-ironic or ironic, to many intermediary or synthetic positions. Especially as we move into the Han and beyond, these positions regularly come to be expressed through the differing relations that are asserted to exist between li and dao (Way).

The term li comes up sporadically in Ironies, and becomes the focus of attention in Beyond Oneness. In the latter volume, Ziporyn reviews a range of early uses and agrees with the twentieth-century Chinese scholar TANG Junyi 唐君毅 that even in very basic and concrete cases, there is always an element of human activity in the meaning of li. It is never simply “pattern” in the sense of a “simple fact found in an object” (2/26). It is not “law” because this implies a “heteronomous source of order” (2/31). Sometimes it is apt to translate it as “coherence” itself—that is, as a technical term that refers to the specific meaning of coherence that I have described above—but in other contexts Ziporyn feels that various other terms do as well or better at
expressing its meaning, so long as we do not over-interpret them. Especially later in the tradition, 
*li* is regularly used to mark what Ziporyn calls a second-order coherence: that is, coherence 
among “found coherences in the world and coherent clusters of human evaluation” (2/30). He 
says that the first text in which second-order coherence is explicitly indicated with *li* is the *Xunzi* 
(2/56); I will examine his extensive discussion of Xunzi in a moment. Throughout the later 
traditions that Ziporyn studies, *Li* continues to refer to coherences in the world that fit together 
with human value, even though it does not always make sense to translate it this way. For 
example, it is sometimes quite apt to translate Buddhist uses of *li* as “absolute,” though we can 
also see that it is an ironic form of coherence, in which value (awakening, enlightenment) and 
fitting together (of all things, unity) are combined with inexpressibility or unintelligibility (this is 
a Huayan version of *li*, e.g, (2/268); for Tiantai and “absolute,” see (2/210)).

Having at least sketched the idea at the core of these two books, I now turn to some 
methodological questions. I opened this review with Ziporyn’s goal of enabling us to “think a 
greater number of more greatly differing thoughts”; early in *Ironies* he makes the related point 
that he aims to lay out the idea of coherence and let people try it on (1/9). More than anything, he 
wants us to see that the traditional categories of Western thinking may not have exhausted all the 
possibilities. He thus is addressing his readers as thinkers in our own right, present-day people 
intrigued by ideas. At the same time, there is something extremely important about the careful 
reading and interpretation of historical texts, because precisely this process can push us to 
understand new possibilities. Ziporyn is in many ways a presentist, yet he favors a rigorous 
historical approach to reading texts that will “safeguard the strangeness of the text” (1/13). This 
is what he means by saying that truth is important “because it makes things so much more 
interesting.” Sometimes the books are slow going because Ziporyn very much shares this process
of reading with his readers. Both books contain extensive translation of passages—often very difficult passages—from the many texts he covers, along with careful commentary on the passages’ key points. In one extreme case, Ziporyn’s discussion of the “community words (丘里之言)” passage from Zhuangzi 25 covers more than twenty pages. He is fascinated by the interfusion of ironic and non-ironic approaches to coherence he finds in this dense passage, several strands of which portend the directions in which Xuanxue 玄學 and Chinese Buddhism will later develop.

Readers who are deeply invested in understanding later chapters of the Zhuangzi will find this discussion to be a goldmine; others, looking for accessible instances of the clarity that the idea of coherence is supposed to bring, may be temporarily stymied. But even though this is not the only instance in which Ziporyn plays a bit too long in the deep end of the pool, overall the books are actually quite readable and accessible. One reason for this is that much more often than not, his quoting and discussion of passages illustrates his points very well, tying things down for readers familiar with the many famous texts he discusses. A second reason is Ziporyn’s superb ability to invent or repurpose metaphorical ways for readers to grasp the ideas with which he is grappling. His examples are memorable and helpful. Admittedly, it is sometimes possible to wonder how these metaphors and models all relate; Ziporyn does not seem too concerned to get everything to line up perfectly, writing that “We have experimented with many motifs and models in an attempt to maximize our appreciation for the nuances of many related but distinct ways of thinking about problems of sameness, difference, [and so on]” (2/313). Given the enormous scope and novelty of the two volumes, perhaps Ziporyn can be forgiven for not being ready to provide the final word on how everything fits together. Indeed, given the role of human perspectives in coherence, I doubt he thinks there is a “last word” to be provided.
My mention of novelty leads me to a final methodological issue: Ziporyn’s engagement with previous scholarship. A reader of the remarkable “Acknowledgements” section of *Beyond Oneness* would be forgiven for expecting to find no mention of any current scholars or scholarship in the rest of the book. Ziporyn there reiterates his joy in opening up new thoughts and distaste for any narrowing of vision, expresses skepticism about whether the “cumulative advance of knowledge” is something that we in the humanities can really pursue, and proposes that we set aside the “procedures of compulsive citation” which are motivated by “a concern for base covering, professional obligation, or obsessive scorekeeping” (2/xvi-xvii). It is therefore surprising and a bit puzzling to find, in Chapter Two of *Ironies* and Chapter One of *Beyond Oneness*, exemplary literature surveys that charitably read a series of Ziporyn’s main scholarly interlocutors (in the second volume, these include Needham, Hansen, Graham, Peterson, and Hall and Ames, among others), make clear what he thinks they have gotten right, and yet also point out shortcomings of their approaches. Ziporyn is explicit that his work builds on all of this (see 2/42-44 in particular). Not only that, but he also makes clear throughout how indebted he is to major Chinese thinkers of the modern era such as QIAN Mu and TANG Junyi, both of whom he engages at length, as well as others whom he treats more quickly. Indeed, the list of scholars whom he cites and discusses is quite lengthy, including other scholars of Buddhism, early and later Confucianism, and so on. So what is going on? Certainly Ziporyn feels no compunction about rejecting a scholarly consensus if he finds it to be mistaken. But equally clearly, we see again and again that he enlists the (suitably qualified) aid of other scholars to help articulate more acceptable readings of the many texts he studies. This probably fits into the general category of relying on rigorous interpretation to “safeguard the strangeness of the text,” as I mentioned above. Ziporyn is not an obsessive citer or scorekeeper, and he may be right that such
practices can go too far, becoming the main point of scholarly endeavor rather than simply a tool. But in my judgment, both his books are models of fruitful conversation with fellow scholars.

Having summarized the core ideas in these two books and reviewed some of the methods Ziporyn employs, I now turn to the texts he considers themselves. My discussion is necessarily selective, but for two reasons it is crucial to get a taste of what goes on in the bulk of the two volumes. First, much of the proof of the value of using coherence as a lens comes from seeing in detail how individual texts and ideas look when viewed in this way. Are puzzles cleared up, confusing passages rendered clear, or intriguing new possibilities raised? Second, we will also have an opportunity to glance at some of the specific evidence that the authors of these texts took themselves to be talking about coherence or viewing the world from such a perspective.

One of the conundrums faced by interpreters of the Analects is how to square the emphasis on the tradition and rituals of the Zhou with a role for Tian 天. Viewed through Western lenses, this can look like a tension between some kind of conventionalism or nominalism, on the one hand, and a realism on the other. One of the themes of Ziporyn’s treatment of the Analects is to show that if we take coherence as our starting point, this problem evaporates. For example, he argues that when Analects 19:22 speaks of the sources of Confucius’s learning, it balances two things: the ubiquitous (although uneven) presence of the Way of Kings Wen and Wu in everyone, and Confucius’s role in focusing this Way such that it is intelligible, continuable, valuable in these latter days (1/93-4). “This Way is neither purely internal to Confucius nor existing independently outside him.” Ziporyn makes a similar move regarding Tian. He suggests that the text’s vagueness about Tian is purposeful; building on a suggestion of Ivanhoe’s (about Tian as a kind of collective personality), Ziporyn says that Tian is “those forces, personal and impersonal and everywhere in between, that are in coherence with
the particular mission of the Zhou Dynasty and its successors, Confucius and Mencius” (1/97). He also fits the text’s preference for ritual over law into his picture: “ritual is not the application of ‘the same’ rule of law to ‘different’ instances; it is a way of effecting harmonious coherence” (1/110).

That will do for a taste of early “non-ironic” coherence (though there is much more, including extensive discussion of related issues in Mengzi). For a peek at “ironic” coherence, let us turn to the Zhuangzi. Much of Ziporyn’s account here is an updated presentation of readings of the Inner Chapters of Zhuangzi he has given before, and he endeavors to respond to some of the reactions his account has elicited. (Though I do not have room to discuss them here, Ziporyn discusses several distinct themes from later chapters of the Zhuangzi elsewhere in the book.) Explicit talk of coherence only emerges near the end of Ziporyn’s discussion, though, as he summarizes the account. He says that freedom, continuity, and value come from being able to cohere with any context: this is frictionless perspective-switching, the Axis of the Daos, which he refers to metaphorically as playing a “wild card.” Dividing into an infinity of perspectives allows a kind of unity (in Zhuangzi it is called oneness, and connects it with joy) but this unity is not itself intelligible: there is no ultimate, favored perspective in which everything fits together intelligibly (1/196). Only through unintelligibility do we attain unity and value, which is precisely why this is an ironic kind of coherence: it is achieved by negating one of the constitutive dimensions of coherence. There is a sense in which this oneness can be called an “absolute,” but it is a “strictly empty absolute” rather than a God’s-eye unification of all (1/195). Finally, Ziporyn also insists that none of this shows the Zhuangzi to be advocating nominalism: all the reactions found in each perspective are real: in terms he uses later on, these are “perforations” that are always available.
Ziporyn’s reading of *Xunzi*, as a non-ironic rebuttal to the ironic coherence of the *Zhuangzi*, is a key fulcrum of Ziporyn’s project. Three things come together here: (1) the non-ironic rebuttal itself, and the way it makes sense of the relation between *Zhuangzi* and *Xunzi*; (2) evidence that the *Xunzi* position is neither realist nor nominalist, and Ziporyn’s engagement with scholars on both sides of that debate; and (3) the introduction of *li* to refer to coherence. In *Xunzi*, the maximal coherence is not *tian*, which is indeed not knowable, but “the totality of usable coherences, harmonized into systematic unity” (1/200). The sage does not speak of *tian*, which allows him to skip the broadest, unintelligible frame. The irony of the *Zhuangzi* is thus avoided.

Ziporyn considers various interpretations of *Xunzi*, focusing in particular on Kurtis Hagen’s constructivist reading, but in the end insists that neither “discovery” nor “invention” is apt for understanding *Xunzi*. The text says that we do see real coherences in nature; the problem is that there are too many. “To cohere with value, to be genuine coherences, certain of these coherences in nature must be picked out from among the others” (1/209). He provocatively suggests that in *Xunzi*, “bad (恶)” is equivalent to conflict or disorder. Since we have many competing and irreconcilable tendencies with which we are born, our human nature is incoherent (i.e., bad) (1/211). Finally, the *Xunzi*’s use of *li* and especially “greatest coherence (*dali*)” is the first time that *li* is used to explicitly mark the second-order coherence among coherences. As the text makes clear, *dali* is not just the coherence of heaven-and-earth; the sage is needed as well.

Ziporyn quotes and discusses a key passage that begins as follows: “Thus Heaven and Earth produce noble men (*junzi*), and noble men bring coherence (*li*) to Heaven and Earth…. Without noble men, Heaven and Earth would be incoherent (*buli*) and ritual and rightness would fail to form a totality…” (2/56).
I jump forward now, well into the second book, past not only considerable elaboration of Ziporyn’s reading of *Xunzi*, but also past what he calls the “Yin-Yang compromise” (best exemplified in the *Great Commentary* of the *Yi Jing*, but also seen in Dong Zhongshu and Yang Xiong), as well as various possibilities explored in ironic texts such as the later chapters of *Zhuangzi*, various chapters of *Guanzi*, and the Han Feizi’s commentaries on *Laozi*. Ziporyn spends considerable attention on Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, and I will take a brief glance there, before concluding—as Ziporyn does—our historical survey with Huayan and Tiantai Buddhism. It is difficult for any short stay with Wang Bi or Guo Xiang to be satisfying, because they are deep and complex thinkers, but a few points are nonetheless worth making. First, it is clear that both thinkers are in their own ways centrally engaged with *li* (and related ideas, especially *dao*), and that there is considerable evidence that we should think of *li* as related to coherence. Among other things, Wang Bi explicitly uses ideas like “unify (*tong* 順)” and “bring together (*hui* 會)” to describe what *li* does (2/143). Second, both philosophers are highly innovative thinkers, putting forward ways of conceptualizing the relations among *li* and *dao* that strikingly anticipate some of the famous views of Buddhists and Neo-Confucians that come centuries later. Ziporyn describes a key innovation of Wang Bi’s as follows. In contrast to some in the earlier ironic tradition who argued that an ultimately incoherent, unintelligible, but unified *Dao* was what made possible a lesser, temporary coherence (sometimes labeled *li*), for Wang Bi:

> It is not just “the” *Dao* that makes coherences; it is Daoishness, namely, whatever aspect of the situation is playing the Daoish role of being the least, the most invisible, the lowest. The entire quality of Daoishness is now fully, not partially, present in and as each situation, in all its specificity. The *Dao* is at once one and many, not just in the sense of being divided up into specific entities to which the One *Dao* remains immanent, but in
that, in a very real sense, there are many Daos, diverse and specific Daos that are nonetheless also Dao, the “leastness” per se. The many Li are now literally many Daos.

(2/146)

Ziporyn emphasizes that this way of thinking is in many ways close to Tiantai. I will reflect on what such homologies might tell us about the issue of continuity within Chinese philosophy near the end of this review.

About one-third of Beyond Oneness is focused explicitly on Tiantai and Huayan Buddhism, which also means that it makes up about one-fifth of the combined length of the two volumes. But these ratios significantly understate the importance of Buddhism—and especially of Tiantai—to the overall project of these books. With the partial exception of Huayan, all the positions Ziporyn treats in these two volumes are interpreted with a great deal of charity, but this does not mean that Ziporyn has no favorites. One way to read the entire project is as working out the full implications of the most radical strands of early Zhuangzi, as well as all the context that is needed to understand these ideas. Wang Bi and Guo Xiang play important roles here, but it is in Tiantai that we see their fullest flowering. Ziporyn repeatedly stresses the importance of full convertibility or symmetry between different perspectives—and especially, between unenlightened and enlightened perspectives—as the key difference between Tiantai (which insists on such symmetry) and Huayan (which rejects it, on Zipporyn’s reading). Over his career Ziporyn has devoted enormous energy and ingenuity to the interpretation of and engagement with Tiantai ideas, which too many prior readers had dismissed as impenetrable or merely mystical. One of the achievements of the volumes under review is to further contextualize Tiantai, showing it to be a profound and, with a bit of work, accessible extension of some of the most interesting ideas within Chinese philosophy.
Tiantai ideas like the Three Truths (rather than the more traditional Two Truths, conventional and ultimate) and the “non-exclusive Mean” allow it to claim the full equivalence of perspectives, and Ziporyn spends considerable time interpreting relevant texts and explaining how this all works. In contrast, he shows that Huayan holds onto certain distinctions (emptiness is ontologically prior to form; appearance is distinct from reality) that undermine their efforts to arrive at perfect symmetry between ultimate and conventional (or li and shi 事) (2/223-6, and passim.). A similar contrast can be seen in the Huayan commitment to an “absolute, Pure Mind that is the source and ground of all phenomenal appearances,” on the one hand, and the mature Tiantai position, which holds that there is no function of Mind above and beyond the forming of determinate thoughts (2/267; 2/277). According to the latter, the idea of a Pure Mind—found not only in Huayan, but also in Chan and in the Tiantai “Shanwai” faction—is a sham: the phenomenal mind is all there is (2/304). I hinted above that Ziporyn may not be maximally charitable to Huayan. What I mean is that he spends considerably more time and effort making sense of Tiantai than he does Huayan, and Huayan (and its allies) is the only Chinese school of thought to come in for fairly direct criticism in the books, which otherwise simply try to make as much sense as can be made of the dizzying variety of positions on offer. This is not to say that I find the criticisms of Huayan unfair or ill-grounded; Ziporyn’s argumentation is incisive. The different ways in which he treats Tiantai and Huayan rather reflect the larger goal of rehabilitating Tiantai that I have already noted.

The book ends with an Epilogue titled “Toward Li in Neo-Confucianism.” On Ziporyn’s own telling, these twenty pages only scratch the surface of the roles of li and coherence within Neo-Confucianism, but they are nonetheless rich and provocative. Indeed, a much earlier draft of this material had a major influence on my own thinking as I was writing Sagehood almost a
decade ago (see *Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucianism* [New York: Oxford University Press, 2009], esp. ch. 2). Rather than digging into Neo-Confucianism again right now, which I fear I could not do briefly, I will instead begin to bring this review to a close with consideration of a comparative issue that Ziporyn skirts and some final reflection on the significance of Ziporyn’s overall narrative of Chinese thought. The comparative issue that intrigues me is how to think about Chinese “coherence” in relation to Wittgenstein’s later thought on rule following. Ziporyn briefly mentions Wittgenstein’s idea of “family resemblance,” but sets that aside as overly nominalist to be a useful model of coherence (1/70). Possibly, but I suspect that the fuller picture of what it is, on Wittgenstein’s telling, to follow a rule (to “go on in the same way”) is much more like Ziporyn’s coherence than it is to simply depend on repeating identical instances, which is how Ziporyn tends to characterize (Western) conceptions of rules or principles. Whether a similarity (or coherence?) here helps us to understand the Chinese ideas, or instead might assist in better understanding Wittgenstein—whose writings are of course notoriously difficult—I leave to others to decide.

Taken together, *Ironies* and *Beyond Oneness* are many things. They argue for the accessibility and importance of a philosophical idea that is an alternative to standard options within Western thought, and they show that this idea lets us see many Chinese texts and terms in new, clearer ways. In addition, the two books present the most ambitious retelling of fifteen-hundred years of Chinese thinking that we have seen in many years—indeed, this is probably the most comprehensive narrative of Chinese philosophy ever written in English, if we put aside two or three now-classic works that were translated from Chinese originals. To be sure, Ziporyn did not set out to write a truly all-inclusive account, and there is much about each thinker and text that he necessarily leaves out. Still, he treats many texts over the entire period from Warring
States through Tang in considerable depth, with some glances into the Song as well. As we have seen, he gives his narrative a structure, looking at the ways that themes of ironic and non-ironic coherence play off one another, intermingle, and spark new insights over the whole period. Ziporyn gives us a history of philosophy rather than a thoroughly contextualized intellectual history; he is interested in how similar ideas are expressed or criticized in different texts, and not in precisely who influenced whom. The story he tells is nonetheless compelling, suggesting a significant continuity of concerns between pre- and post-classical thinkers as well as a strong degree of integration of both Huayan and Tiantai Buddhism into Chinese problematiques. Taken as a whole, then, Brook Ziporyn’s two volumes represent a major step forward in our understanding of Chinese philosophy, enabling readers to appreciate and engage with a distinctive range of ideas that are little explored within the Western canon.

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Bibliography


