From early to mid-November 2005, many French urban suburbs experienced riots.  In the affected areas the government declared a state of emergency which gave the police extrajudicial powers.  It remained in place until January.  I investigate whether the riots generated criminal spillovers, whether the emergency powers deterred criminal activity, and whether the police used those powers opportunistically to bust crime unrelated to the riots.  I supplement linear regressions with a non-parametric bounded-variation assumptions framework combined with a synthetic control approach, and interviews I conducted with two of the events’ key actors.  Criminals did not take advantage of the riots to commit more crimes requiring planning.  However, the riots triggered a surge of violent thefts.  The state of emergency did not result in a decrease in delinquency.  Several clues suggest a strategy of appeasement.  Meanwhile, some serious crimes increased immediately after the riots ended, suggesting an emboldening effect.  Evidence of police opportunism is scant.