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Article
Simultaneous Online Auctions: Decisions on Reserve Prices
International Journal of Information & Decision Sciences (2011)
  • Shu Zhou, San Jose State University
  • D. Yang, Renmin University of China
  • M. Zhou, San Jose State University
Abstract

The simultaneous nature of online auctions changes the horizon a bidder faces. A seller then has to make strategic and/or operational changes in order to adapt. In this study, a three-stage game model is constructed to analyse seller reserve price setting decision in online auctions. The decision of whether a seller should set a reserve price is shown to be a function of the covariance (between expected seller profits and expected rivals) and the expected number of bidders, where the covariance term is jointly determined by possible actions of other sellers.

Disciplines
Publication Date
2011
Citation Information
Shu Zhou, D. Yang and M. Zhou. "Simultaneous Online Auctions: Decisions on Reserve Prices" International Journal of Information & Decision Sciences Vol. 3 Iss. 2 (2011)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/shu_zhou/1/