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"Black knight checks white king": The conflict between Avery Brundage and the African nations over South African membership in the IOC

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**"BLACK KNIGHT CHECKS WHITE KING"
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AVERY BRUNDAGE AND THE AFRICAN NATIONS
OVER SOUTH AFRICAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE IOC**

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During the 1960s, the conflict within the International Olympic Committee (IOC) over South African participation and representation in Olympic affairs reached such heightened stage that tension existed for the greater part of this decade. The intensity and significance of the debate directly related to the power struggle within the IOC during this time. The IOC's conservative hierarchy, led by the organisation's president Avery Brundage, was the leading force seeking to restrain the larger movement to expel the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC). While the Brundage led group was initially able to ward off this challenge the newly admitted black African nations, and their Olympic allies, gradually chipped away at this power base. By the start of the 1970s the tide of the battle had turned in favour of "the new kid on the block."

This paper examines the power struggle within the IOC during the 1960s over the South African question. Whilst such a conflict is obviously the result of a network of complex factors, the intent in this instance is to examine a small, yet significant component of a much larger issue. Specifically it focuses on the two major protagonists of the conflict, IOC president Avery Brundage and the African nations. Such an examination will reveal that an inverse relationship existed between the rise of African and Third World representation within the IOC and Brundage's decreasing influence. The struggle over South Africa marked the final stage in a shift of power within the IOC from the ideology of Brundage, to that of aligned blocs. Although it was a process that would prove to be unavoidable and irreversible it was not uni-directional. The conflict had moments of rapid advancement, pivotal incidents and periods of relative calm. As such they serve to highlight critical stages within the on-going struggle.

A variety of factors were instrumental in creating the context for the battle between Brundage and the African nations over the South African issue, and by extension control of the IOC. In the years following World War II, the rising tide of African nationalism had created an awareness of the possibilities and rights which European imperialism had previously obscured. To facilitate their mutual objectives African countries often aligned themselves with other Third World countries resulting in the establishment of power blocs. This in turn provided an avenue for collective bargaining and influence. Similarly, African nations recognized that athletics offered a rapid way to achieve international prestige when compared with the slower gains possible in the fields of commerce and trade. With television magnifying sporting developments to an observant global community, by the 1960s sport had become an important vehicle through which pressure groups could attain goals external to the sporting arena. Yet, even prior to this period, the aspirations of African nations and their sporting policy found a sympathetic ear amongst communist countries who attempted to use sport as part of their foreign policy.¹ Consequently it was to be the Eastern bloc allies who initially championed the African cause against the SANOC.²

The IOC had not kept pace with the profound social and political changes of the twentieth century and it was viewed by many as an archaic, redundant organization in need of modernization. By the start of the 1960s, the voting system in the IOC ensured the maintenance of control by a select few and heavily favored

Western interest. Of the sixty-six members with voting rights, the sole representative from the African nations was Reg Alexander, a white from Kenya.

IOC president Avery Brundage was also devoted to a traditional concept of Olympism. Throughout his athletic and administrative career, Brundage clung passionately to his concept of the amateur code and to what he perceived to be the Olympic ideal. He continually demonstrated an unflinching commitment to this entity which he deified. He fervently sought to place Olympism beyond the grasp of human influence and politics, although in his quest for Olympic purity; he often failed to adopt the more benign attitude necessary for the successful integration of diverse global cultures. Brundage often viewed moral and humanitarian issues as retardants to his quest for Olympic purity. His support of South Africa is hardly surprising given the former British colony's long involvement with the IOC and, more importantly, its position as an ally in maintaining the status quo. Such allies became even more valuable to this professed anti-communist as the Soviet Union gained strength and importance within the Olympic movement.³

The existence of such influences within the IOC, many of them highly inflammatory, coalesced to create a conflict which permanently changed the face of this organisation. The newly emerging African nations, which for nearly a century had been subjugated by the same Western culture that instigated the restructuring of the Olympic festival, found in the international sports movement an outlet for their nationalistic passions and a target for their resentment after decades of Western indifference and neglect. For the African bloc the conflict was not only an issue of human rights, it was also a stepping stone in their bid for global acceptance and recognition.

Although concern over South African participation in the Olympic Games was first expressed formally in 1959 by Soviet delegate Alexei Romanov, references to the issue within the Olympic movement were made at least three years earlier at the Games in Melbourne.⁴ From the outset Brundage was a central character in the issue. His concern regarding the question of representative participation from South Africa is gleaned from a letter from SANOC Secretary, Ira Emery. Obviously Brundage had already made preliminary inquiries regarding opportunities for black athletes in South Africa for Emery referred to an interview Brundage gave him in Melbourne, "re the non-European position in our country." Emery stated that it was "quite impossible for non-Europeans and Europeans to compete with each other in South Africa and if International Federations were to demand we accept non-whites in our teams, we could not possibly do so."⁵

In April 1958, Brundage voiced his concern about the issue and his allegiance to the SANOC was obvious. He wrote Emery that he did not know "how long we can defer action on this matter as we are receiving letters from all over the world." He further advised separate tryouts arguing that the blacks could eventually be excluded on one pretext or another yet SANOC would still be complying with IOC rules.⁶ Such correspondence indicates that while the South African issue was not officially tabled before the IOC until 1959, attempts were already underway to avert confrontation within the movement prior to this time.⁷ Similarly such correspondence would seemingly contradict the universality posture publicly adopted by Brundage in regard to Olympism. Furthermore such intercourse was not a unitary phenomenon. Although the conflict resulting from the SANOC membership was still in its infancy, several groups including the Norwegian and USSR NOCs had already become involved in dialogue concerning the issue. By the end of the 1950s both Norway and the USSR expressed their discontent within the IOC at continued South African participation at Olympic festivals,⁸ while external to the IOC, ad hoc groups such as the South African Sports Association and the Welsh

based Campaign Against Racial Discrimination in Sport added their voice to the anti-apartheid protest.⁹ Yet the IOC refused to take any meaningful action on the issue. Such inactivity conceivably could be interpreted to be the result of the IOCs continual refusal to acknowledge the relationship between sport and politics, especially at the international level.

The meeting between the IOC and National Olympic Committees (NOC) in Rome on May 19, 1959, finally placed the issue in an open forum. The initial dialogue was between Romanov, Brundage and the IOC delegate to South Africa, Reg Honey. While Brundage at this stage would only acknowledge that attention of the IOC had been engaged by this matter, Honey considered gratuitous the allegations Romanov made. He replied, "I would like to state firmly and straight out that I object and my country objects to general allegations that South Africa displays racial discrimination, there is no evidence, none at all." The following day *The New York Times* reported that Brundage was satisfied with the official statement from the South African delegate.¹⁰ Such a comment was hardly surprising given his pro-South African stance and his statement was possibly an attempt to defuse growing dissension rather than the result of his naivete.

This initial phase of the conflict witnessed pressure on Brundage from both internal and external sources, yet both he and the SANOC refused to make any concessions. Emery, commented to Brundage in December 1959:

Coloureds, Indians and Bantus will never mix. . . . We are doing our best to educate these non-whites to the standard of education and living which would warrant them being mixed with competition from other nations at the Olympic Games and when that time comes, and when this has been successfully organised, S.A. will gladly consider discussing the matter again with the I.O.C.¹¹

By the end of the 1950s the anti-apartheid sports movement started to gain momentum yet Brundage was still reluctant to enforce the SANOC compliance with the IOC Charter which forbade discrimination on the basis of race, religion or politics. However, Brundage was uncharacteristically unable to effectively deal with the IOC agitation regarding South African membership. Despite his continual attempts to subvert the issue the intensity of the situation only increased.

The ruthless massacre of blacks by South African police at Sharpeville in 1960 sent shock waves around the world, stirring an international conscience and highlighting racial discrimination in that country. Yet it is clear that the SANOC had no intention of adopting a conciliatory posture or even "low profile" during this volatile period. Frank Braun, president of the SANOC, commented to the radical, independent English journal, *New Statesman* on March 20:

One man, one vote, there is a lot of talk about it these days. Let me tell you if it comes about in South Africa, politically or in sport, then the whole country would be down the drain in six months. We [whites] are determined to retain control. If we don't the whole thing would disintegrate.¹²

Such comments only facilitated the hardening of opinion against South Africa in the international sports community.

The IOC considered the South African position at its Rome meeting in August and concluded that SANOC had made every reasonable effort to choose its team

based on merit. Brundage had already intimated the possible lack of success any action against the SANOC would have. In a July letter to IOC members he expressed complete confidence in the SANOC and reiterated his familiar postulation of the IOC being concerned only with the Olympic movement and not other fields.¹³ The August meeting was also notable since Brundage was re-elected president for a second consecutive term despite Soviet opposition. The USSR endeavoured to muster support for their own candidate, the Marquess of Exeter. Seemingly some IOC members were of the opinion that Brundage's unyielding approach to the presidency was no longer appropriate, but the loaded voting system in operation within the IOC, which favoured Western and traditional interests, ensured the continuance of Brundage's leadership.¹⁴

Rapidly polarisation occurred within the IOC over South African membership as support for the Third World from the USSR and its satellite countries only served to strengthen the resolve of Western nations. In 1961 South Africa altered its constitution and became a republic. This move resulted in IOC members envisaging conditions becoming worse for South African blacks as the new Republic immediately reinforced their racial policies.¹⁵ Throughout the early 1960s, pressure continued to mount against the IOC and its president yet there was still no overt acquiescence on the part of Brundage toward the voices of dissent.

The first official suggestion of removing South Africa from Olympic festivals was articulated at the 59th session of the IOC in Moscow in June 1962. Even though the Soviet proposal for expulsion received only five votes, the IOC warned that continued lack of respect for its rules would result in suspension. SANOC was given until October 1963 to eliminate the practice of racial discrimination from sport. The conflict between opposing factions had reached the stage where Brundage, in an attempt to placate the growing body of internal dissent, was forced to issue a formal warning. But it also clearly demonstrated Brundage's ability to selectively apply Olympic rules and regulations. The mere fact that he issued such a warning indicates his acknowledgment of the SANOC's violation of the Olympic Charter. Further exemplification of Brundage's desire to assist the continuation of South African participation can be gleaned from a letter to Ira Emery on August 3, 1962:

I hope that a solution may be found because if we are forced to exclude the South African team we are penalising one hundred white athletes for the sake of a handful of colored athletes. This does not seem quite fair.¹⁶

Obviously Brundage's notion of what was fair was contrary to a large section of world opinion. The voicing of such opinions only gave credence to suggestions that his concerns with purity extended beyond the fields of athletics.

In October 1962 the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) was established with the specified mandate of satisfying IOC requirements in full. Their intent was to replace the SANOC and represent South Africa within the Olympic Movement. However, any initial success the organisation had quickly vanished in the face of its questionable involvement in subversive activities unrelated to the Olympic Movement.¹⁷ This action tends to suggest that the group may have been politically rather than athletically motivated and was simply using sport as a vehicle for public awareness and global recognition.

The birth of SAN-ROC signifies the end of the initial phase of the conflict, a phase characterised by growing disenchantment with Brundage and his coterie due to their reluctance to take a definitive stance on the issue at hand. The inability of nonracial interest groups to make meaningful inroads into the IOC reflected the

effective power base of Brundage as well as the system that had evolved to ensure the maintenance of that power. However, external to the IOC a rapidly increasing commitment to the African cause continued and verbal attacks intensified.

By 1963 African nations adopted a united stand in discontinuing relations with South Africa and declared at an Organisation for African Unity session that they would boycott any conference anywhere in the world if South Africa was present.¹⁸ Even in the face of such intense opposition, the IOC was not easily swayed, and there is evidence of collusion between Emery and Brundage to ensure the continuance of SANOC membership in the IOC. In January 1963, Emery stated in a letter to Brundage:

It would be far better if South Africa was told emphatically that unless the SANOC changes its attitude regarding segregation of sport, suspension will follow. The set will be, as far as you are concerned, that South Africa will select one or two non-whites, whether they are up to standard or not, if South Africa is permitted to take part in the games at Tokyo. This will of course be a blind, as the whites and non-whites will not travel together nor compete against each other in the same events.¹⁹

Unfortunately, a recorded reply from Brundage to Emery regarding this proposal is not available.

The efforts by Brundage and fellow South African supporters to win time for the SANOC were severely dented in September 1963 when the South African special police shot SAN-ROC president, Dennis Brutus. The *New York Times* described the incident as "questionable at best."²⁰ It could be argued that the South African government was prepared to take any steps thought necessary in an attempt to reduce anti-apartheid agitation.

By the time of the IOC meeting in Baden-Baden the attitude toward South Africa had hardened even further and a resolution was passed that unless the SANOC complied with IOC regulations by the end of the year the country would be debarred from entering its teams in the Tokyo Games.²¹ The resolution was significant as it represented the first official IOC policy regarding possible SANOC suspension. It also established a time frame for compliance with IOC rules which, if not met, would lead to further sanctions. The likelihood of the SANOC complying with such an ultimatum, even if it so desired, was extremely remote. When the due date of December 31 was not met, the IOC extended the deadline until January 15, 1964. On January 27 at the Innsbruck meeting of the IOC the South African invitation to compete at Tokyo was withdrawn; however, it was noted, that the withdrawal of the invitation did not constitute loss of membership. At the same meeting the IOC granted full recognition to the NOCs of Algeria, Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Inadvertently, the IOC contributed to the SANOCs demise by such recognition as the full impact of such a decision would be realised in the not too distant future.

Meanwhile, South African sports leaders believed the setback to be temporary and minor. According to Frank Braun the action was taken as a 'face-saving' device for the IOC.²² By June optimism regarding the rescission of the resolution had waned prompting the following statement from the South African Athletic Association:

The union wishes to make it clear that politics are being brought into sport and that this is being countenanced by International bodies. As politics have never played a part in the activities of the Union, it is felt that they should not be allowed at this stage.²³

The SANOC was surprised by the IOC decision and regarded it as a combination of the shooting of Brutus four months prior to the Innsbruck meeting, and the growing strength of the African nations in the IOC. It continued to be impervious to the growing global concern with the racist policies of its government, policies which would eventually force the IOC to adopt a more humanitarian stance.²⁴

Richard Lapchick has described the year following the Tokyo Games, a relatively tranquil one for the IOC, the "lull before the storm."²⁵ SAN-ROC momentarily lost all effectiveness and apart from the question of South African attendance at IOC meetings very little existed that provided consternation for Brundage or the IOC. Correspondence between Brundage and Emery continued even though Brundage was fully aware that the SANOC would neither renounce government policy nor resign its IOC position. Brundage's knowledge of this hard line stance did not result in him ceasing to advocate the maintenance of links between the SANOC and IOC. In January 1966, Otto Mayer, now ex-Chancellor of the IOC granted an interview to *Die Welt* at which time he discussed possible reasons for the crisis engulfing the IOC at that time. In response to a question concerning the main reason for the dilemma, Mayer responded that Brundage wanted to do everything himself.²⁶

At the April 1966 meeting of the IOC in Rome, the SANOCs eligibility was sustained pending an investigation to be conducted the following year. The minutes of the meeting clearly indicate Brundage's pro-SANOC stance.

Avery Brundage suggested that apartheid is a law of the country and the SANOC risks sanctions if it violates the law

... The question needs to be re-examined for if we expel them we will never see them again . . . If they are suspended immediately it could cause the arrangement they are trying to make with their government miscarry . . . No decisions should be made this year.²⁷

Following much debate the IOC decided to defer the question of South African participation at Mexico until the Teheran session in 1967. Brundage had temporarily succeeded in halting the drive against the SANOC within the Olympic movement, but any success he had proved fleeting.

External to IOC events took place that had great implications for the governing body. Expatriates re-established SAN-ROC in London and once again lobbied international sport federations and conferences throughout the world. Even more consequential than the reformation of SAN-ROC, was the formation of the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa (SCSA). After 1966, the SCSA became the harshest critic of racial discrimination in sport. The Council evolved from a meeting of thirty two African nations at Bamako and was designated the sporting arm of the Organisation of African Unity, an organisation established in 1963 to address common concerns.²⁸ A resolution was passed inviting its members "to subject their decision to partake in the 1968 Olympic Games to the reservation that no racist team from South Africa take part, and to ask all National Olympic Committees to support the attitude of

SCSA."²⁹ With the passage of the Bamako resolution, boycott options became a reality which forever altered South Africa's sport relations. The conference marked the first significant occasion that African nations were united in their focus. Their collective strength increased even more in the coming year. The creation of SCSA was the single most important factor in wresting the initiative over South Africa away from the IOC.

The end of 1966 marked the conclusion of the second phase of the struggle and the lines of demarcation were now clearly drawn. The African nations were in a position where they could collectively exert pressure against the IOC instead of being totally reliant on support from Eastern European powers, although they continued to prove to be valuable allies. Meanwhile South Africa provided rhetoric but little else in regard to the issue of non-discrimination in sport and Brundage had clearly indicated his preference for continued South African participation in Olympic festivals. With the power base of the African nations expanding steadily, a major conflict was imminent.

The South African issue dominated the meeting in Teheran with the stance of the African nations abundantly clear. They refused to accept any South African team, mixed or non-white unless the SANOC complied fully with the Olympic Charter. This stance was taken despite SANOC concessions in an attempt to gain acceptance for its participation at Mexico. The effect any such concessions would have had on domestic sport in South Africa was nonexistent and it appears they were little more than a cosmetic cover designed to win international approval. The supposed retreat from apartheid in sport took place not for the benefit of non-whites but for the sake of whites who no longer wished to be barred from Olympic competition.³⁰

Although the IOC demands had not been fully met the majority of IOC members were prepared to allow South Africa back into the fold. However, in the face of considerable opposition a decision on future South African participation was delayed until reviewing the report of the three man fact-finding Commission to South Africa, headed by Lord Killanin. Brundage instructed Killanin that the committee was only to make a report.

Our concern is with the N.O.C. and what it is doing to comply with Olympic regulations. . . We must not become involved in political issues or allow the Olympic Games to be used as a tool or weapon for extraneous causes.³¹

Brundage again exhibited his reluctance to acknowledge that sports in general and the Olympic Games in particular were inextricably linked to the social norms in South Africa. The Commission to South Africa was little more than a device to secure additional time for the IOC and SANOC. Its conclusion provided little in the way of new or relevant information and reaffirmed that the South African government's attitude was steadfast.

By 1968 Brundage had become the object of increasing attacks from sources both internal and external to the IOC which were linked in focus and purpose. To gain greater representation on the IOC an organisation was established that became the source of great frustration for Brundage. Such frustration often resulted in bitter personal attacks by Brundage on Guilio Onesti, the IOC representative to Italy who led the way in the formation of the organisation. Although initial meetings were held in Rome in 1966 the NOCs did not establish the Permanent General Assembly (PGA) until 1968. The organisation was comprised mainly of Third World and communist countries who were striving for increased IOC recognition and

representation. But also represented were Great Britain, Australia, the United States and Japan. Soviet delegate Andrianov felt that if the IOC had paid greater attention to the concerns of the Third World, especially Africa, the need for such an organisation would have been non-existent.³² Brundage's initial enthusiasm for the PGA waned quickly as he was not prepared to relinquish IOC power to a semi-autonomous body. Furthermore he perceived in the PGA's suggestions, "a spectre of domination by what is loosely referred to as the third world."³³ At a time of serious division within the Olympic community over the issue of South African membership, the IOC was also being wracked by an internal power struggle. By the end of 1967, the IOC was sitting on top of a time bomb waiting to explode. At Grenoble in the new year the IOC itself lit the fuse.

After considering the report of the Killanin Commission which indicated that the SANOC had not subscribed to Olympic rules, the IOC voted to allow South African participation on the grounds that it was doing its best given the existing circumstances. The decision further polarised the IOC and enthusiastically suggested that "only the power of the Olympic Movement could have secured such a change."³⁴

The decision to readmit South Africa stunned the sporting world. The *New York Times* denounced it as senseless and commented, "If pragmatism is to prevail how can the IOC support racism, the world's greatest problem?" On February 27, 1968 the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa approved an Olympic boycott and the sporting community waited with bated breath for the response of the Soviet led Eastern bloc. Brundage, stubborn as ever, suggested the Games would go ahead even if only he and South Africa were in attendance. The rising number of countries announcing boycott intentions was not viewed by all with the same degree of concern. SANOC president, Frank Braun, happily contemplated the possibility of absent states and observed that the boycott would restore the old prestige of the games.³⁵

In March the Organising Committee for the Mexico Games requested a meeting with Brundage to discuss the issue. The three man delegation was vitally concerned that anything less than outstanding success at Mexico would result in economic devastation for a country already experiencing severe internal fiscal problems. Both the Italian and Soviet NOCs called for special meetings of the IOC to discuss the dilemma and numerous NOCs urged the IOC to reconsider.³⁶ On March 12, five of the nine members of the Executive Board called for a full meeting of the board to reconsider the issue in light of a forty plus nation boycott. Intransigent as ever, Brundage refused to accede to the request. The IOC president made one last defiant stand in the face of overwhelming opposition. However it also marked the start of the decline of his voice being the most significant within the IOC.

On the weekend of April 21-22 the nine members of the Executive Board congregated at the Chateau de Vidy in Lausanne in an attempt to circumvent the massive boycott underway. The *New York Times* stated:

The Olympic Games went on trial today, at stake was not only the survival of the Games as a world wide movement, but the very structure of the organisation itself. The Games future rests in the hands of nine men - most of them elderly aristocrats.³⁷

Brundage flew back to Lausanne from South Africa leaving Frank Braun with his assurances that he would press the IOC to go ahead with the readmission of South Africa.³⁹ However, members of the Executive Board were able to agree on only one

point - it would be unwise for a SANOC team to compete in Mexico. A cable sent to all IOC members stated:

In view of the information on the international climate received by the Executive Board at this meeting, it is unanimously of the opinion that it would be most unwise for a South African team to participate in the games of the XIX Olympiad. Therefore the Executive Board strongly recommends that you endorse their unanimous proposal to withdraw the invitation to these games.³⁹

In the space of two short months the pendulum of influence has swung from Brundage at Grenoble to the African NOCs at Lausanne. The February reinstatement of the SANOC had resulted in Brundage momentarily reversing the power shift that had been slowly taking place throughout the 1960s. However in the face of both intense internal and external opposition to the IOC, he was forced to reverse the Grenoble decision. The rescission of the Grenoble resolution denotes the most critical point in the conflict between Brundage and the African bloc since the vote was a shattering personal defeat for the IOC president. He had entered the meeting openly opposed to any change in the original Grenoble vote and emerged a broken man. It was a major victory for the African nations and their allies and one that encouraged similar tactics in other international bodies including the United Nations.

Opinion on both sides of the globe regarding the capitulation was consistent. *The Times* (London) argued that the IOC had bowed to the political realities of the day and that the Olympics may just as well be governed by the United Nations. *The New York Times* commented that idealists, guided by Utopian dreams, had been running the show ever since its revival, yet when faced with the rude alternative of surrendering their ideas or risking the extinction of Olympic movement, they bowed to expediency and chose survival.⁴⁰

The hostility over the issue did not wane following the results of the meeting of the Executive Board. As the 1960s ended it realistically appeared to be only a matter of time before the terminal expulsion of South Africa from the IOC. In 1968, Brundage was re-elected for a fourth consecutive term as IOC president but this must be placed in perspective. His re-election was the result of three diverse yet equally important reasons. First, his position as the pre-eminent power within the IOC had been significantly reduced by the African NOCs, aided in their quest by the Soviet bloc and the PGA. The boycott threat only had to succeed once for all to realise it was virtually an invincible weapon in the Third World armoury. Second, the action against Brundage was not personal but rather at what he represented. Finally, Brundage was possibly still the most efficient administrator available within the IOC.

The African nations, not content with their achievements of 1968, relentlessly pursued the total exclusion of South Africa from all international sports organisations. The arrival of the new decade marked the departure of the SANOC had not been obvious by this stage, his thoughts were now recorded for all to see.

The conflict that raged in the Olympic movement throughout the 1960s was essentially the result of a quest for power by newly emerging African nations. Such a quest was aided by the moral and practical support afforded them by many non-western interests. The assistance offered to many Third World countries, including the African nations, was far superior to that offered by Western nations and this was most evident in the world of sports. While the Soviets and their satellite countries provided coaches, administrators and financial aid to the newly emerging nations,

international bodies such as the IOC responded with minimal assistance and subservient status in the ensuing relationship. With non Western support in the IOC it did not take long for the black African nations to reach a position of greater influence, a position from where their concerns could no longer be ignored.

Opposing the newly created nations was Avery Brundage who exhibited a passionate desire to maintain control and did not willingly accede to the requests of lobby or pressure groups. He regarded the acquiescence to any such demands as facilitating the erosion of IOC deals and his power base.

The issue of South African participation at Olympic festivals was the battleground upon which the struggle was waged. The conflict was not just an issue of human rights, it was also a stepping stone in the black African's bid for global acceptance. Although Brundage blocked their path in the bid for recognition he was constantly on the defensive throughout the conflict. His inability to negotiate, arbitrate or compromise accelerated the erosion of his power. Had he been willing to act in a conciliatory manner in the embryonic stage of the conflict he may well have been remembered for his humanitarianism and wisdom. Instead he fervently and persistently clung to the concepts and ideas of a bygone age. In the face of such seemingly overwhelming opposition it is remarkable that Brundage was able to maintain power within the IOC for as long as he did. Unfortunately in the maintenance of that control there ensued what was perhaps the most bitter conflict in Olympic history.

FOOTNOTES

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¹For an extensive treatment of the antecedents to the conflict see, Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On - Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1984); Richard Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon, *The South African Game* (London: Zed Press, 1981); Sam Ramsamy, *Apartheid The real Hurdle* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Richard Lapchick, *The Politics of Race and International Sport* (London: Greenwood Press, 1976).

²Representation by the Eastern bloc was necessary due to the lack of response on the part of the Western nations to the concerns of the anti-apartheid groups and by the inability of the African nations to express their concerns directly to the IOC due to membership restrictions. Parenthetically it must be remembered that participation at Olympic festivals did not automatically mean representation on the IOC.

³For information regarding this issue see John Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral Order* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986); Benjamin Lowe, David (Champaign, Ill.: Stipes, 1978); David B. Kanin, *A Political History of the Olympic Games*, (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1981); Espy, *Politics*; Lapchick, *Politics*; Gerald Redmond ed.; *Sport and Politics - 1984 Olympic Scientific Congress Proceedings* 17 (Champaign Ill.: Human Kinetics, 1986).

⁴Sam Ramsamy "Apartheid Boycotts and the Games," *Five Ring Circus - Money, Power and Politics at the Olympic Games* (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 45.

⁵Letter from Ira Emery to Avery Brundage, 27 November 1957, *Avery Brundage collection* Box 144. A Microfilm copy of the *Avery Brundage Collection*, hereafter referred to as *A.B.C.*, is housed in the Spencer Room of D.B. Weldon Library at the University of Western Ontario.

⁶Letter from Avery Brundage to Ira Emery, 27 April 1958, *A.B.C.* Box 144.

⁷Both the NOCs of Norway and the USSR contacted Brundage prior to 1959 requesting action on the non-racial composition of the South African Olympic team, The Norwegian concern was in response to a public outcry in that country.

⁸Letter to Otto Mayer from O.C. Ditley-Simonsen Jr., 26 October 1956, *A.B.C.* Box 144; Minutes of the I.O.C. Executive Board Meeting with the N.O.C.s - Rome, 19 May 1959, *A.B.C.* Box 78.

⁹As the major thrust of this paper is directed at the internal machinations of the IOC it does not focus on anti-apartheid representations to other international sport governing bodies and the proliferation of such groups at this time. This is not meant to deprecate their importance in the wider movement against South Africa. For treatment from this perspective consult the following works. Archer and Bouillon, *The South African Game*; Ramsamy, *Apartheid*; Lapchick, *Politics*; Chris de Broglio, *South Africa: Racism in Sport* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1970); Mary Draper, *Sport and Race in South Africa* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1963); Peter Hain, *Don't Play With Apartheid* (London: George Unwin Ltd., 1971); Richard Thompson, *Race and Sport* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1964); Susan Burrows, "The Growth of the International Sports Boycotts Against South Africa," (M.A. Thesis, Carleton University: 1978).

¹⁰Minutes of the I.O.C. Executive board, *A.B.C.* Box 78. *New York Times*, "Sport Bias Denied By South Africa," 20 May 1959, 34.

11 Letter from Ira Emery to Avery Brundage, 28 December 1957, *A.B.C.* Box 147.

12 *New Statesman*, "The Olympic Swindle," 26 March 1960, *A.B.C.* Box 70.

13 Lapchick, *Politics*, 35; Letter to I.O.C. members, Olympic Committees and International Federations, 5 July 1959, *A.B.C.* Box 70.

14 The IOC had developed a voting system which ensured the maintenance of control by a select few. During the early 1960s the voting system in the IOC heavily favoured traditional Western interests. In 1960 the IOC had sixty-six members. The African continent had one representative, Reg Alexander, a white from Kenya. By 1965 African representation, including Kenya, had increased to four. At the same time numerous countries had multiple representation, all with voting rights. They were the United States (4), France (2), United Kingdom (2), Australia (2), Japan (2), Greece (2), India (2) and Italy (2). Between 1965 and 1970 African representations on the IOC increased by three bringing the number of African delegates with voting rights to seven.

15 Lord Michael Killanin, *My Olympic Years*, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1983), 35.

16 Letter from Avery Brundage to Ira Emery, 3 August 1962, *A.B.C.* Box 142.

17 Louw, Eric. "Sport and Social Relations in South Africa," (Ph.D. diss.: University of Alberta, 1977), 158; In July 1964 John Harris, leader of SANROC was arrested on charges of murder and espionage. He was eventually tried, found guilty and executed. For a more complete account of this incident see, Lapchick, *The Politics*, 63-4.

18 Espy, *Politics*, 86.

19 Letter from Ira Emery to Avery Brundage, 14 January 1963, *A.B.C.* Box 165.

20 *New York Times*, 22 September 1963, 6.

21 Minutes of the 60th Session of the IOC - Baden Baden, October 16-20, 1963; *A.B.C.* Box 146.

22 *New York Times*, 29 January 1964 25.

23 *Ibid.*, "Statement by South African Athletic Association on the I.O.C., ban," 28 June 1964, V: 5.

24 South Africa was not the only country to feel the wrath of the IOC in 1964. Indonesia was expelled indefinitely from the IOC for refusing to issue visa to athletes from Israel and Nationalist China thus depriving them of the opportunity to attend the Fourth Asiatic games in Djarkarta. In a move regarded as unprecedented, Brundage stated that the IOC decision was final and did not require approval from the IOC congress. Yet such a stance was in direct violation of Article 15 of IOC rules which noted that any action taken by the Executive meeting or the president alone is subject to ratification at the next congress. Swanpo Sie," in Lowe, Kanin and Strenk, eds., *Sport*, 287.

25 Lapchick, *Politics*, 72.

26 "The IOC Crisis and its Reasons," Interview with ex-Chancellor Otto Mayer, *Die Welt*, January 28 1966, *A.B.C.*, Box 81.

27 Minutes of the 64th Session of the I.O.C. in Rome, April 1966, *A.B.C.* Box 81.

28 Brundage expressed concern over the formation of the new organisation in a letter to Reg Alexander of Kenya. "... It was good that you were able to attend the meeting in Bamako, of the All African Games Committee. We must be very careful with organisation or the politicians will take complete control ... " Letter from Avery Brundage to Reg Alexander, 14 January 1967, *A.B.C.* Box 101.

29 S.C.S.A. Collection, as cited by Lapchick, *Politics*, 80.

30 Prior to the Tehran meeting the Chairman of the Broerderbond stated that if the price of participation in sport was political integration, it was too high a price for South Africa to pay. Laurence, *Seeds of Disaster* 235-241.

31 Letter from Avery Brundage to Lord Killanin, 31 August 1967. Report on the Commission to South Africa, *A.B.C.* Box 87.

³²Espy, *Politics*, 40; Guttman, *Games*, 186.

³³*Ibid.*, 178.

³⁴I.O.C. Newsletter #5, February 1968, as cited by Lapchick, *Politics*, 111.

³⁵*New York Times*, "Sport of the Times," 17 February 1967, V: 3; Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten, "The Olympics - Keep South African Out," *New Republic*, 158 (13 April 1968): 14.

³⁶Not only did the NOCs of the Third World and the Eastern Bloc voice their disapproval but traditional IOC allies such as Saut Eyer of Iraq also requested reconsideration of the move.

³⁷*New York Times*, 21 April 1968, 41.

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹Meeting of the I.O.C. Executive Meeting, 21-22 April 1968, Lausanne, A.B.C. Box 83.

⁴⁰*The Times* (London), 23 April 1968, 1; *The New York Times* "A Question Of Survival," 23 April 1968, 53.

⁴¹*The Times*, (London), 29 November 1972, 5.

⁴²James Riordan, "Soviet Sport," in Lowe, Kanin and Strenk, eds. *Sport*, 318-333.