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Merkel Says Iran poses Threat Not to Israel but to Whole World, Amid More IAEA Talks

Monday, 17 September 2012
By Al Arabiya with Reuters

A political solution in the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program is still possible, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said on Monday, but she added Tehran posed a threat not just to Israel but to the whole world.

“I support a political solution ... and I believe that we are not at the point where the search for political solutions has been exhausted,” she told a news conference in Berlin.

The U.N. atomic watchdog chief said earlier that the agency will hold further talks with Iran aimed at clarifying concerns about its nuclear program, despite the lack of progress so far.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is “firmly committed” to intensifying dialogue with the Islamic state, Yukiya Amano told the IAEA’s annual member state gathering.

He gave no date for a possible new round of talks that began in January between IAEA officials and Iran aimed at allaying concern Tehran may be developing nuclear weapons capability, a charge Iran denies. The last meeting was in August.

Iran’s atomic energy chief, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, was due to address the IAEA meeting later on Monday. Abbasi-Davani was also expected to meet Amano.

The IAEA has been trying to reach a framework accord with Iran that would allow the Vienna-based U.N. agency to resume a long-stalled investigation into suspected atom bomb research in the Islamic Republic.

“We will continue negotiations with Iran on a structured approach to resolving all outstanding issues,” Amano said, referring to such an accord.

“I hope we can reach agreement without further delay, to be followed by immediate implementation,” he said.

Meanwhile, Iran’s chief negotiator held talks with Turkey’s foreign minister on Monday about Tehran’s disputed nuclear program and may meet EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton on Tuesday, a diplomatic source said.

Iran’s chief negotiator Saeed Jalili met Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in Ankara to brief him on last week’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting in Vienna, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official said.

A diplomatic source said Jalili may travel to Istanbul to meet Ashton on Tuesday. Ashton’s office had no immediate comment.

The 35-nation board of the U.N. nuclear watchdog censured Iran last Thursday for defying international demands to curb uranium enrichment and failing to address mounting disquiet about its suspected research into atomic bombs.

http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/17/238533.html
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Der Spiegel – German Republic

Syria Tested Chemical Weapons Systems, Witnesses Say

The Syrian army is believed to have tested firing systems for chemical weapons in the desert at the end of August, according to witness reports. The tests apparently took place near the country’s largest chemical weapons facility at Safira.

September 17, 2012
The Syrian army is believed to have tested missile systems for poison gas shells at the end of August, statements from various witnesses indicate.

The tests took place near a chemical weapons research center at Safira east of Aleppo, witnesses told SPIEGEL. A total of five or six empty shells devised for delivering chemical agents were fired by tanks and aircraft, at a site called Diraiham in the desert near the village of Khanasir.

Iranian officers believed to be members of the Revolutionary Guards were flown in by helicopter for the testing, according to the statements.

The Safira research center is regarded as Syria's largest testing site for chemical weapons. It is officially referred to as a "scientific research center."

**Hoping for US Troops**

Scientists from Iran and North Korea are said to work in the expansive, fenced-off complex. According to Western intelligence agencies, they produce chemical agents such as sarin, tabun and mustard gas and test them on animals.

In recent months, the guards have been replaced and reinforced by more than 100 elite troops from the 4th Tank Division. In addition, power generators and large supplies of diesel have recently been brought to the plant to safeguard the supply of electricity in the event of an attack by rebels, reports say.

But the rebels don't plan to take the site. "We hope American troops will secure the plant," said one former army officer who deserted and joined the Free Syrian Army. "We don't want the regime to be able to use the weapons, but neither do we want them to fall into the hands of radicals after the downfall (of the regime)."

Syria is believed to have one of the world's largest arsenals of chemical weapons.


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Xinhua News – China

**EU, Iran Agree to Hold New Round of Nuclear Talks**

September 19, 2012

ISTANBUL, Sept. 19 (Xinhua) -- Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili said here Wednesday that Iran and the European Union (EU) have agreed to hold a new round of nuclear talks in the near future.

Jalili made the statement at a press conference after he had talks with EU foreign affairs representative Catherine Ashton in Istanbul on Tuesday.

The Iranian official said the time for the upcoming nuclear talks will be decided when Ashton goes back and submit report to the P5+1 -- the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.

An Iranian diplomat told Xinhua that it would take at least one month to start the new round of nuclear talks.

On Tuesday, Ashton met with Iranian officials in Istanbul in a bid to end the standoff over the Iranian nuclear program. The two sides had a 40-minute close-door meeting in Conrad Hotel on Tuesday afternoon, and then moved to Iranian consulate general for 3-hour talks during dinner.

The meetings were closed to the press, while a spokeswoman for Ashton said earlier that the meeting was "part of continuing efforts to engage Iran." Jalili, on the other hand, said the two sides were satisfied with what they had agreed during the talks.
Iran has insisted that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, and warned that it will retaliate if it comes under attack.

Iranian nuclear talks in June ended without a breakthrough, while the P5+1 are expected to discuss with Tehran on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York later this month.

As for the Syrian crisis, Jalili said that no outsiders' intervention under the name of Syrian people could solve the ongoing crisis.

"No arms or terrorist activities could end the war in Syria; no military intervention could end the war in Syria. Syrian's problem should be solved by Syrian people themselves," Jalili stressed at the press conference held in Iranian Consulate General in Istanbul.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-09/19/c_131860954.htm

London Daily Telegraph – U.K.

Syrian Regime 'Will Deploy Chemical Weapons as Last Resort'

The Syrian regime plans to deploy chemical weapons against its own people "as a last resort", the former head of Syria's chemical arsenal has said in an interview with a British newspaper.

19 September 2012

Major-General Adnan Sillu said he defected from the Syrian army three months ago after being party to top-levels talks about the use of chemical weapons on both rebel fighters and civilians.

"We were in a serious discussion about the use of chemical weapons, including how we would use them and in what areas," he told The Times, referring to a meeting held at Syria's chemical weapons centre south of Damascus.

"We discussed this as a last resort – such as if the regime lost control of an important area such as Aleppo."

Speaking from Turkey, General Sillu said he was certain President Bashar al-Assad's regime would eventually use chemical weapons against civilians, adding that the discussion had been "the last straw" which triggered his defection.

His comments come after German press reported on Tuesday that the Syrian army had tested a chemical weapons delivery system.

In his first interview since his defection, General Sillu said the Syrian regime had also considered supplying chemical weapons to the Lebanon-based militant group Hizbollah.

"They wanted to place warheads with the chemical weapons on missiles – to transfer them this way to Hizbollah. It was for use against Israel, of course," he said.

He suggested that the regime now had "nothing to lose" in sharing the weapons and added: "If a war starts between Hizbollah and Israel it will be only good for Syria."

Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard also attended numerous meetings to discuss the use of chemical weapons, he said.

"They were always coming to visit and to advise. They were always sending us scientists and bringing our scientists to them. They were also involved on the political side of how to use the chemical weapons."

The German magazine Der Spiegel, citing "witnesses, reported Monday that the Syrian army has tested a chemical weapons delivery system, firing shells at a research centre in its northwestern desert region.

"Five or six empty shells devised for delivering chemical agents were fired by tanks and aircraft, at a site called Diraiham in the desert near the village of Khanasir," east of the city of Aleppo, Der Spiegel reported.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-09/19/c_131860954.htm

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The Safira research centre in question is regarded as Syria's largest testing site for chemical weapons.

Source: agencies


(Jordan Times – Jordan)

**West Warns Iran Time Running Out for Nuclear Accord**

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

September 20, 2012

UNITED NATIONS — The United States, Britain and France warned Iran on Thursday that time is running out for a negotiated settlement to the showdown on its nuclear programme.

“Time is wasting,” US ambassador Susan Rice told a UN Security Council meeting on nuclear sanctions against Iran.

Iran is “at a crossroads”, Britain’s UN envoy Mark Lyall Grant told the meeting at which western nations also slammed Iran for its arms deliveries to Syria and alleged links to terrorism.

The meeting was held amid mounting speculation that Israel is planning a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is to speak at the UN General Assembly of world leaders next week.

A series of reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear watchdog, have said Iran is stepping up uranium enrichment and not providing proof that its nuclear activities are peaceful.

The western powers say Iran is seeking a nuclear bomb but the Tehran government says its drive is peaceful.

No Iranian diplomat spoke at the meeting where Rice said the international powers — Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and United States — cannot pursue their nuclear talks with Iran “indefinitely”.

“We will not engage in an endless process of negotiations that fail to produce any results. We must therefore remain clear and united in seeking resolution of the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. Time is wasting,” the US envoy said.

Top officials from the six international powers are to meet in New York next week to discuss Iran. But Russia and China have spoken against tightening the four rounds of UN sanctions already imposed.

Rice said “Iran’s approach remains to deny, to deceive and distract”.

She called on UN members, particularly neighbours of Iran, to step up action to halt Syria’s arms shipments to President Bashar Assad’s forces in Syria. UN sanctions experts have uncovered evidence of shipments and diplomats said that Iran is sending some weapons by air across Iraqi territory.

States in the region must “redouble their efforts to deny, inspect and seize illicit Iranian shipments, including transfers by air corridors,” Rice said.

The US government has asked Iraq to ensure that Iranian planes flying over its territory land and face cargo inspections, amid concerns that arms are being shipped to the Assad government.

Britain’s UN ambassador called the arms exports to Syria “a reminder of Iran’s hypocrisy in claiming to support freedom in the Arab world”.

“The Iranian regime is at a crossroads,” said Lyall Grant.
“It can continue to ignore the international community’s concerns over its nuclear programme, or it can negotiate a settlement that will help to realise the benefits of a civil nuclear programme.”

“It can support the oppressive regime in Syria in suppressing freedom, or it can play a constructive role in its region. It can be an exporter of terrorism or a responsible member of the international community. But it must make these choices soon,” Lyall Grant said.

France’s UN ambassador Gerard Araud said: “We are asking Iran to negotiate, but Iran is not negotiating.”

http://jordantimes.com/west-warns-iran-time-running-out-for-nuclear-accord

Payvand.com – San Francisco, CA
September 21, 2012

Iran Gives Spies False Info: Nuclear Chief

The head of Iran’s Atomic Agency says it has fed false intelligence to British spies about Iran’s nuclear advances in order to protect Iran’s nuclear sites.

Source: Radio Zamaneh (the Netherlands)

Haaretz reports that Fereydoon Abbasi said in an interview with Al-Hayat on Thursday, September 20, that Western intelligence services, and the British in particular, have been gathering information about Iran’s nuclear program, including details about Iran’s nuclear scientists, whom Iran alleges were killed by Israeli agents.

“We presented false information sometimes in order to protect our nuclear position and our achievements, as there is no other choice but to mislead foreign intelligence,” he said. Abbasi was also quoted as saying that “sometimes we present a weakness that we do not in fact really have, and sometimes we appear to have power without having it,” Abbasi reportedly said.

He added that these issues were clarified when members of the International Atomic Energy Agency inquired about them.

Abbasi accused the IAEA of taking a hostile approach toward Iran and acting as if Iran is guilty and must prove its innocence.

“This is the same tactic used against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and now they are trying to find a legal way to isolate Iran and impose more severe sanctions,” Abbasi claimed.

He denied that Iran has barred IAEA inspectors from visiting its nuclear sites and said: “Each time they asked to visit the sites, we approved it within two hours, but we will not allow them to enter other sites which they claim are nuclear sites. These sites, such as Parchin, are for military operations and have been there for more than 90 years. In these sites we produce military weapons for defence against aerial attacks.”

He went on to say that Iran has made arrangements that these sites are safe from satellite monitoring, and the demand for the Western insistence on having IAEA inspectors visit these sites could be a way of trying to get sensitive information about Iran's military capabilities through these inspections.

Abbasi has already accused the IAEA of allowing the information it receives about Iran’s nuclear program be exploited by saboteurs.

He stressed once more that Iran’s nuclear program is only targeted toward producing fuel for its reactors and aiding medical research.


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The current war on Syria is a war on Iran, an Iranian top military official was quoted as saying on Friday by the semi-official ILNA news agency.

The comments by Iran’s Chief-of-Staff Maj. Gen. Hassan Feiruzabady followed the statements by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during his meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi in Damascus earlier in the week. “Syria is not the only target, but the target is to put an end to the whole axis of resistance,” Assad told Salehi.

“What Mr. Bashar al-Assad has said is true, because Syria represents the front line for resistance facing the occupiers of Jerusalem. It has remained in that frontline for years,” the Iranian top official said. He was referring to the Israeli occupation by the “occupiers of Jerusalem.”

Feiruzabady, known for his close ties to the Iranian Supreme Guide Ali Khamenie, said that as long as “facing the Israeli aggression is considered one of the main goals and ambitions of the Iranian Islamic revolution, then both Iran and Syria should join hands in achieving this goal.”

The Syrian opposition has often accused Tehran of supporting the Syrian regime with weapons. The last few days have witnessed several statements by Iranian officials regarding means of Iranian interference in Syria.

Western members of the U.N. Security Council blasted Iran on Thursday for providing Assad with weapons to help him crush an 18-month-long uprising by rebels determined to topple his government.

“Iran’s arms exports to the murderous Assad regime in Syria are of particular concern,” U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice told the 15-nation council during a meeting on the world body’s Iran sanctions regime.

The allegation, reported by Reuters on Wednesday, said arms transfers were organized by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

British Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant echoed Rice’s condemnation of arms transfers to Syria.

“This is unacceptable and it must stop,” he said. “It is in stark contrast to the will of the Syrian people and a reminder of Iran’s hypocrisy in claiming to support freedom in the Arab world.”

German Ambassador Peter Wittig said worries about Iranian support for Assad “are aggravated by unsettling recent reports indicating that Iran is shipping arms to Syria under a humanitarian pretext.”

Neither Russia nor China, which have joined forces in vetoing three resolutions that would have condemned Assad’s assault on the opposition, mentioned the allegations about arms shipments to Syria.

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/21/239384.html
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Yonhap News Agency – South Korea
September 17, 2012

S. Korea Urges U.S. to Allow 'Peaceful' Nuclear Enrichment

SEOUL, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- South Korea called for the United States to approve it undertaking "peaceful" enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, a government think tank said Monday, as little progress has been made in bilateral negotiations to revise the countries' nuclear accord.
Under a 1974 accord with the U.S., South Korea is banned from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. The allies have held five rounds of formal negotiations since 2010 to rewrite the bilateral nuclear coopeation treaty, which expires in 2014.

South Korea, a major nuclear energy developer, wants the U.S. to allow it to adopt a proliferation-resistant technology for enriching uranium and reprocessing spent atomic fuel from its 22 nuclear power plants, but Washington has been reluctant to do so.

"The U.S. nuclear cooperation policy towards restricting South Korea's peaceful enrichment and reprocessing is contradictory to the bilateral partnership built on mutual respect under the Korea-U.S. strategic alliance," said Jun Bong-geun, a senior professor at the Korean Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, in a report.

"Given the fact that South Korea has been actively working to strengthen a global non-proliferation regime, the U.S. needs to fully change its policy on nuclear cooperation with South Korea," Jun said in the report. The institute is affiliated with Seoul's foreign ministry.

In the face of growing nuclear waste stockpiles and its ambition to become a global power in the civilian nuclear industry, South Korea hopes to adopt the so-called pyroprocessing technology, which leaves separated plutonium, the main ingredient in making atomic bombs, mixed with other elements.

South Korea wants the U.S. to allow it to use the new technology because it has to deal with more than 10,000 tons of nuclear waste at storage facilities that are expected to reach capacity in 2016.

Some nonproliferation experts say pyroprocessing is not significantly different from reprocessing, and pyroprocessed plutonium could be quickly turned into weapons-grade material.

Reflecting Washington's firm stance to keep restricting South Korea from having uranium-enrichment technology, Gary Samore, arms control coordinator at the White House National Security Council, told reporters in July that there is no need for Seoul to enrich uranium.

Samore said South Korean can continue to buy enrichment services from the U.S., France and others rather than having its own uranium-enrichment technology.

"So there is no danger that Korean industry will not be able to get access to low enriched uranium," Samore said.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/09/17/38/0301000000AEN20120917002600315F.HTML

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Washington Times

U.S., Japan Agree to Deploy Ballistic Missile Radar System

By Kristina Wong, Washington Times
Monday, September 17, 2012

TOKYO — The U.S. and Japan have agreed to begin coordinating the deployment of a surveillance radar designed specifically for ballistic missile defense, the Pentagon announced Monday.

It will be Japan’s second deployment of the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control, or AN/TPY-2, which can track all classes of ballistic missiles and identify small objects at long distances, according to a Missile Defense Agency fact sheet.

“The U.S. has been committed to the collective regional security in the Asia-Pacific region for decades, and to that end we cooperate with our partners on a broad range of capabilities including missile defense, which this is all about,” said a defense official Monday. “The second radar in Japan will enhance the alliance’s ability to defend Japan, our forward deployed forces, and the U.S. homeland from a ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea.”
The announcement comes as Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta is visiting Japan on a 10-day tour of the region to advance the Pentagon’s “pivot to Asia.”

According to the Missile Defense Agency, the AN/TPY-2 is a transportable X-band, high-resolution, phased-array radar.

“What this radar will enable us to do is to spread out the posture of ships that were previously used in the region where we believe the radar will be placed. This only increases our ability to track that threat,” a defense official said.

The official said the radar’s deployment is not directed against China: “The radar would be focused on addressing the growing North Korean missile threat to the U.S. homeland, as well as well as U.S. citizens, our deployed forces, allies and partners in the region.”

An AN/TPY radar already is deployed at Shariki, Japan.

A U.S. team landed this week in Japan to work with officials on deploying the second radar.

Officials did not say when the radar would be deployed, who would maintain it and how much it will cost.


Yonhap News Agency – South Korea
September 18, 2012

**S. Korea Develops Guided Missile Targeting N. Korea's Underground Artillery Bases**

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Sept. 18 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has developed a short-range ballistic missile aimed at destroying underground artillery bases in North Korea, a lawmaker of the parliamentary defense committee said Tuesday.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed committee members in a closed-door meeting Monday that the military has succeeded in developing the guided missile with a range of 100 kilometers and successfully conducted test-firing in May, according to a lawmaker who attended the briefing.

The missile is designed to be fired from a multiple launch rocket system and uses a ground-based navigation system, which is resistant to GPS (global positioning system) jamming signals, to fly to targets.

"The JCS briefed that it has succeeded in developing a guided-missile designed to destroy underground artillery bases and plans to enter into mass production," the lawmaker told Yonhap News by phone.

According to another committee member, the JCS reported the missile’s guiding system needs improvement, but other core technologies, such as the capabilities to penetrate underground bunkers and locate tunnel entrances, have been completed.

The JCS also showed committee members a video of the test-firing, the lawmaker said.

The project was launched by President Lee Myung-bak after the North shelled the front-line island of Yeonpyeong near the tense western sea border in November 2010, killing four South Koreans, including two civilians.

The project is in line with the military’s move to beef up its missile defense. The defense ministry earlier this month submitted a revised mid-term budget plan, which set aside 2.7 trillion won (US$2.3 billion) to secure hundreds of tactical weapons in the next five years.

Pyongyang unsuccessfully tried to launch a rocket in April, which was seen as a long-range missile test in disguise. The international community remains concerned about North Korea’s development of ballistic missiles, especially those that can carry nuclear bombs.
Engaging NK only Option to Resolve Nuclear Program: Ex-US Envoy

A policy of engagement with North Korea is the only viable option to resolve the North's nuclear weapons programs, but Seoul and Washington must set "strict standards" to prevent Pyongyang from backsliding and repeating its nuclear hide-and-seek, a former U.S. point man on North Korea said Tuesday.

Stephen Bosworth, the Obama administration's first special envoy for North Korea, also expressed skepticism that China, the North's key ally and economic benefactor, would wield an enough leverage to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambition.

Washington's policy of deterring North Korea did not work, as Pyongyang conducted its second nuclear test in 2009 and revealed a uranium enrichment program in 2010 that could give it another means of producing fissile material for nuclear bombs. In 2010, North Korea launched two military attacks on South Korea.

"So, I think we have no choice but to re-engage ourselves (with North Korea)," Bosworth told a forum in Seoul.

To bring about positive changes in Pyongyang's behavior, Bosworth said Seoul and Washington need "a very careful diplomacy, patience and willingness, not simply to give to North Korea, but to set strict standards."

Bosworth was the top U.S. envoy for North Korea from March 2009 to October 2011. He also served as U.S. ambassador to South Korea and is now dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Diplomatic efforts to resume the six-party talks on ending North Korea's nuclear ambition have been frozen since April, when North Korea defiantly launched a long-range rocket that failed moments after lift-off.

The defiant launch drew strong condemnation from the U.N. Security Council as a disguised test of ballistic missile technology, and led to the collapse of the so-called "Leap Day" deal with the U.S., under which Washington would resume food aid to Pyongyang in return for a monitored shutdown of the North's nuclear activities.

Although North Korea reneged on the deal, Bosworth expected Korea and the U.S. to resume their engagement with Pyongyang after their presidential elections this year.

U.S. President Barack Obama has been in a tight race for re-election in November against Republican rival Mitt Romney, while South Korea is set for its presidential vote in December.

"I'm assuming that after our elections are over, we'll have newly elected governments in place here in South Korea and the United States. Then, attention will turn again to the question of how we will deal with North Korea," Bosworth said.

Bosworth warned that destabilizing North Korea could have serious consequences for the global economy.

"Northeast Asia is now becoming the center of the global economy," he said. "A severe disruption of stability in Northeast Asia will have profound consequences not just for this region, but the global economy." (Yonhap)
SEOUL - North Korea on Thursday lashed out at a US plan to build a new radar base in Japan, saying it would escalate an arms race and leave Pyongyang no option but to develop "more powerful nuclear weapons".

During a visit to Tokyo on Monday, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta said an agreement had been reached on deploying another US missile defence radar in Japan.

The radar will enhance the ability of US troops to defend Japan and protect the United States from North Korea's ballistic missile threat, Panetta said.

"This will only strain the regional situation and escalate the arms race," the North's foreign ministry said in a statement published by the official Korean Central News Agency.

"What should not be overlooked is that Panetta openly declared the new radar is targeted against the DPRK (North Korea), not China," it said.

According to US officials, the additional radar frees up the country's naval Aegis ships, which have been operating near Japan to help detect any potential incoming missiles.

"Given the fact that the US, the world's biggest possessor of nukes and missiles, is stepping up its arms build-up against the DPRK, it is quite natural for (North Korea) to steadily bolster up its nuclear deterrent," the North's foreign ministry said.

"The US attitude requires the DPRK to become a more powerful nuclear weapons state as befitting the 'rival' of the US," it added.

About 47,000 US troops are stationed in Japan, many of them on the far southern island chain of Okinawa. Japan already has one X-band radar, at Shariki base in Tsugaru City, in the far north of the main island of Honshu.

North Korea carried out a failed rocket launch in April in what it said was an attempt to put a satellite into orbit. But the UN Security Council strongly condemned the exercise as breaching a ban on the testing of ballistic missile technology, and tightened sanctions.

http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20120920-372780.html
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Pakistan Today – Pakistan

PPP Rebuts Nuclear Proliferation Claim

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)
Sunday, September 16, 2012

ISLAMABAD - The ruling Pakistan People's Party on Saturday rebutted a claim by Abdul Qadeer Khan that he transferred nuclear technology to other countries on the orders of its slain prime minister.

Khan, whom many Pakistanis regard as a hero for building the Islamic world's first nuclear bomb, admitted in 2004 he ran a nuclear black-market selling secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

He had offered a public apology but later retracted his remarks and in 2009 was freed from house arrest, although he was asked to keep a low profile.

On Saturday he said in an interview published in the mass-circulated Urdu language newspaper daily Jang and sister publication The News that he transferred nuclear technology on directives of slain prime minister Benazir Bhutto.
Khan did not name the countries, nor did he mention when Bhutto, the twice elected woman prime minister, issued the orders. Bhutto ruled from 1988 to 1990, and then from 1993 to 1996.

"At least 800 people are used to supervise the process. The then prime minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto summoned me and named the two countries which were to be assisted and issued clear directions in this regard," Khan said.

"I was not independent but was bound to abide by the orders of the prime minister, hence I did take this step in compliance with her order.

"The prime minister would have certainly known about the role and cooperation of the two countries, mentioned by her, in our national interest."

Bhutto's party spokesman Senator Farhatullah Babar described Khan's assertion as "a belated and desperate attempt to wash the guilt of proliferating nuclear weapons" by associating Bhutto's name.

It is an attempt "to lend a semblance of respectability to a crime that brought huge embarrassment and inflicted incalculable damage on Pakistan", Babar said in a statement.

"It is disgusting that almost a decade later Dr Khan should be seeking to restore his image by seeking to lay the blame at the door of the martyred Bhutto when she is no longer alive," he said.

Khan "now owes another public apology, after 2004, to the soul of Bhutto and her followers for levelling baseless and unfounded allegations against her", Babar added.

It can carry nuclear and conventional warheads. The test was witnessed by Strategic Plans Division Director General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, National Engineering and Scientific Commission Chairman Muhammad Irfan Burney and officers of the armed forces and strategic organisations.

The test was appreciated by the President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who congratulated the scientists and engineers.

Pakistan has conducted the tests of a wide range of nuclear-capable missiles this year.


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The Hindu – India
September 19, 2012

Agni-IV Scores a Hit yet Again
By Y. Mallikarjun and T.S. Subramanian

HYDERABAD: India on Wednesday successfully test-fired nuclear weapons capable Agni-IV for its full range of 4,000 km from the Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast.

The missile lifted off from a road mobile launcher at 11.48 a.m. and after zooming to an altitude of over 800 km, it re-entered the atmosphere and impacted near the pre-designated target in the Indian Ocean with remarkable degree of accuracy following a 20-minute flight.

Carrying a payload of explosives weighing a tonne, the missile re-entered the atmosphere and withstood searing temperatures of more than 3,000°C.

The developmental trial of the long range ballistic weapon system was conducted by missile technologists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which designed and developed it.

Talking The Hindu from Wheeler Island, Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister V.K. Saraswat said “we had an excellent launch”. He said the two-stage solid-propelled missile performed as per the normal parameters right from the lift-off till the terminal event when it impacted the target point with a “two-digit” accuracy. He said the data showed that the missile followed pre-determined path with an accuracy of less than 100m. Two naval ships located down range recorded the trajectory of the missile and the terminal phase and transmitted the data in real time. He said the success of the mission reinforced the robustness of the design and various subsystems.

Dr. Saraswat said Agni-IV would be inducted into the services next year after undertaking one more developmental trial. He said, “The mission confirms reliability and robustness of the missile. It demonstrates India’s missile technology has become highly mature and we can now design any missile for any mission, depending on the threat profile. Technologically, today we are at par with the best in the world. We have complete industrial infrastructure which helped us to realise Agni-IV”.

He said the series of successful missions — Agni-V, followed by Agni-I, Agni-II, Prithvi-II and Agni-IV now showed that these missiles could be launched on demand in a very short time.

Avinash Chander, Chief Controller (Missiles and Strategic Systems), DRDO said Agni-IV was tested in its full operational scenario and the missile fully proved itself in all respects. He said the deliverable road mobile launcher configuration was also validated in this mission. Observing that it was one of the lightest long-range missiles of its class, he said it would be a potent addition to the strategic forces.

Tessy Thomas, Project Director for Agni-IV, said it was an excellent flight and met all the parameters up to the final event. It was a text-book launch for the second consecutive Agni-IV mission, she added.
Meanwhile, the Strategic Force Command personnel will launch nuclear weapons capable Agni-III surface-to-surface ballistic missile on September 21, 2012 as part user training.

http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/article3914340.ece

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia Revamps Missile Defenses Around Moscow

17 September 2012

Russia will reactivate mothballed ballistic missile silos around Moscow as part of deep modernization of a missile defense network protecting the Russian capital, former chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Col. Gen. (Ret) Viktor Yesin said on Monday.

The A-135 (NATO: ABM-3) anti-ballistic missile network is deployed around Moscow to counter enemy missiles targeting the city or its surrounding areas. It became operational in 1995 and consists of the Don-2N battle management radar and two types of ABM missiles.

“The A-135 system is being thoroughly modernized,” Yesin told RIA Novosti. “The missiles and other elements, including detection and tracking components, are being upgraded.”

Two launch sites with long-range 51T6 (NATO: SH-11 ‘Gorgon’) exo-atmospheric interceptor missiles were deactivated in 2007 as the missiles became obsolete. They will be equipped with new long-range missiles and reactivated during the modernization.

“There are no plans to build new launch sites as the mothballed ones will be reactivated,” the general said.

The A-135 system is compliant with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty from which the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2002.

MOSCOW, September 17 (RIA Novosti)


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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russian 'Super-Holding' to Build Hypersonic Missile - Rogozin

19 September 2012

Russia will set up an aerospace "super-holding" company consisting of missile makers NPO Mashinostroyenie and Tactical Missiles Corporation to develop hypersonic weapon technology, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said on Wednesday.

"Initially, we are talking about a big 'super-holding' based on Tactical Missiles Corporation and NPO Mashinostroyenie," said Rogozin, who oversees Russia's military-industrial complex.

Discussions on the creation of such a super-holding have been underway at least six months, Rogozin said.

"We have found an acceptable solution on how to form this super-holding," he said. "The main idea for this holding is hypersonic technology."

Development of hypersonic weapons - meaning those capable of flying at several times the speed of sound, generally with scramjet engines - has been a pet theme of Rogozin.
In May, during a visit to Tactical Missiles Corporation's NPO Raduga missile design bureau, Rogozin called on Russia's defense industry to develop hypersonic air-breathing weapons as a future strike system.

He picked out American development work in the X-51, Falcon, HiFire and HyFly programs as examples of what he described as the perspective threat posed by U.S. hypersonic development work.

"The undertaking of this work allows us to lay the basis for the creation of a national competitor in hypersonic weapons," he said.

He has since frequently repeated his call for hypersonic weapons to be developed as a replacement for the Russian Air Force's existing long-range bomber fleet.

"I think we need to go down the route of hypersonic technology and we are moving in that direction and are not falling behind the Americans," he said on Rossiya 24 TV in August. "We will use this technology when developing a new bomber."

"The question is whether we will copy the Americans' forty-year experience and create a [Northrop] B-2 analog...or will we go down a new, ultramodern technology route, looking to the horizon, and create a machine able to penetrate air defenses and carry out a strike on any aggressor," he added.

Aerospace analysts contacted by RIA Novosti say hypersonic technology is more likely to be relevant to an air-launched weapon itself, rather than a manned aircraft.

Tactical Missiles Corporation, based in Korolyov, Moscow Region, was formed in 2002 by amalgamating a number of defense design and production enterprises, of which the main ones were Korolyov-based Zvezda-Strela (tactical air-to-surface missiles), Moscow-based Vympel (tactical air-to-air missiles), NPO Raduga (cruise missile design), and Region (tactical air-launched weapons).

NPO Mashinostroyenie, based at Reutov just east of Moscow, has designed and produced most of the Russian Navy's submarine-launched cruise missiles as well as satellites and other space systems, and has previously conducted extensive research into hypersonic weapons technology, including making a prototype hypersonic air-launched missile called GELA.

NPO Mashinostroyenie is also the Russian partner in the BrahMos joint venture with India to develop the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, based on the Russian 3M55 Oniks. BrahMos has said it is developing a hypersonic successor system to its existing supersonic missiles in partnership with India.

TULA, September 19 (RIA Novosti)


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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

**Russian Warship Tests Missile Defense Capability**

20 September 2012

The flagship of Russia’s Northern Fleet, nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky, has carried out missile defense drills during the current patrol-and-training mission in the Arctic, Izvestia newspaper said on Thursday.

Pyotr Veliky is the only Russian warship with sufficient capability to thwart massive attacks by cruise and ballistic missiles.

“During the current mission on the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast, Pyotr Veliky conducted tests of its missile defense capability as part of the sea-based segment of the national missile defense shield,” Izvestia cited a defense ministry source.
“The missile defense drills in the Arctic are very important because they cover the trajectories of potential strikes by land-based U.S. ballistic missiles,” the source said.

Pyotr Veliky is armed with 48 S-300F Fort and 46 S-300FM Fort-M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) medium-range surface-to-air missiles (with effective range of up to 200 kilometers), 128 3K95 Kinzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) short-range SAMs, and six CADS-N-1 Kashtan gun/missile systems.

Its radars are capable of detecting and tracking aerial targets at an altitude of 30 km and a range of 300 km.

As part of the plan to develop the sea-based segment of national missile defense network, the Russian military intends to overhaul and reactivate three mothballed Kirov class nuclear-powered missile cruisers by 2020.

MOSCOW, September 20 (RIA Novosti)


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Herald Scotland – U.K.
Monday, 17 September 2012

SNP Nuclear Tangle Grows
By Michael Settle, UK Political Editor

MORE pressure has been piled on the SNP leadership over its controversial proposal to keep an independent Scotland in Nato after a top Scottish defence analyst claimed this would lead to nuclear weapons staying on the Clyde for longer.

Dr Phillips O'Brien from the Scottish Centre for War Studies at Glasgow University, appearing before the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, was asked if being in Nato would make it more likely nuclear weapons would stay in Scotland longer.

"I would say yes," he replied. "I would say if Scotland were to go independent and leave Nato, both the domestic pressures within Scotland to get them out and the strategic need of the rest of the UK to rebase them would be raised."

Dr O'Brien suggested Nato membership was central to the independence debate. He explained: "It would be easier for the rest of the UK to negotiate the security arrangement if Scotland remained in Nato - If Scotland is outside Nato, a lot of bets are off."

"That's why no-one in the US State Department and Defence Department will go on the record about this. They are very worried about a non-Nato Scotland."

Professor William Walker from the School of International Relations at St Andrews University told the committee the Americans would be involved in defence discussions should Scots vote for independence.

He referred to the 1958 US/UK Mutual Defence Agreement, which still provides the defence co-operation framework for deals such as replacing Trident.

"The missiles going up and down the Clyde are American missiles - So the Americans would be part of this discussion; you can't keep them out. I'm not saying they would drive it, but they would nevertheless be involved in the discussion and have a position on it."

Alex Salmond is facing a growing revolt over his plans to drop the SNP's historic opposition to Nato, with several of the party's MSPs campaigning to keep the current policy. The First Minister is expected to face a showdown when the issue is addressed at the Nationalists' conference in Perth next month.

Issue No. 1025, 21 September 2012

United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL
Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530
Current Scottish Government policy is that an independent Scotland would seek to get rid of nuclear weapons from Faslane "as quickly as possible".

However, Professor Walker told MPs: "The immediate expulsion of Trident from Scotland is untenable and would be regarded internationally as unreasonable. On the other hand, if Scotland did gain independence, the idea of a UK base being permanently based in Scotland would also be untenable."

"My conclusion is that you are talking about phase-out and the debate should be about the terms of the phase-out: how long it would take, who would pay for it and exactly how to manage it."

While Mr Walker accepted denuclearising weapons at Faslane could happen within two years, he stressed that replicating the facility on the Clyde south of the border could take at least 20 years.

And he said denuclearising Scotland could mean the whole of the remaining UK abandoning nuclear weapons.

"If Scotland leaves the rest of the UK, that opens up the whole debate whether the rest of the UK wishes to continue as a nuclear power - at certain times in last 30 years there's been a lot of pressure against them, a lot of people in the military who believe we don't need nuclear weapons," he said.

Writing in The Herald today, Angus Robertson, the SNP's defence spokesman and author of the proposed new policy on Nato membership, insists an independent Scotland could stay part of the alliance while removing nuclear weapons.

He says: "Like the majority of Nato members, Scotland would not possess or host nuclear weapons. Indeed, we would join both Canada and Greece as Nato members who have removed them and would take the same position as our neighbour Norway that has a strong non-nuclear policy."

http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/referendum-news/snp-nuclear-tangle-grows.18889152

Washington Post

**Aging U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Slated for Costly and Long-Delayed Modernization**

By Dana Priest  
September 15, 2012

The U.S. nuclear arsenal, the most powerful but indiscriminate class of weapons ever created, is set to undergo the costliest overhaul in its history, even as the military faces spending cuts to its conventional arms programs at a time of fiscal crisis.

For two decades, U.S. administrations have confronted the decrepit, neglected state of the aging nuclear weapons complex. Yet officials have repeatedly put off sinking huge sums into projects that receive little public recognition, driving up the costs even further.

Now, as the nation struggles to emerge from the worst recession of the postwar era and Congress faces an end-of-year deadline to avoid $1.2 trillion in automatic cuts to the federal budget over 10 years, the Obama administration is overseeing the gargantuan task of modernizing the nuclear arsenal to keep it safe and reliable.

There is no official price tag for the effort to upgrade and maintain the 5,113 warheads in the inventory, to replace old delivery systems and to renovate the aging facilities where nuclear work is performed. A study this summer by the nonpartisan Stimson Center, a Washington think tank, estimated costs would be at least $352 billion over the coming decade to operate and modernize the current arsenal. Others say the figure could be far higher, particularly if the work is delayed even longer.
The timing does not fit with the nation’s evolving defense posture, either. Over the past decade, the U.S. military has moved away from nuclear deterrence and major military interventions in favor of more precise tactics rooted in Special Operations forces and quick tactical strikes deemed more effective against today’s enemies.

Federal officials and many outside analysts are nonetheless convinced that, after years of delay, the government must invest huge sums if it is to maintain the air, sea and land nuclear triad on which the country has relied since the start of the Cold War. Failing to act before the end of next year, they say, is likely to mean that there won’t be enough time to design and build the new systems that would be required if the old arsenal is no longer safe or reliable.

“I’ve been doing this for 20 years, and I haven’t seen a moment like this,” Thomas P. D’Agostino, who leads the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the federal agency charged with managing the safety of the nuclear arsenal, said in an interview.

The debate over the future of the nation’s nuclear arsenal is playing out in Congress and within the administration. Public reports, interviews with government officials and outside experts and visits to nuclear facilities rarely seen by outsiders provided a portrait of the scope and cost of maintaining and refurbishing the nuclear stockpile underlying the debate.

Expense has loomed for years

At the heart of the overhaul are the weapons themselves. Renovating nuclear bombs and missiles to keep them safe and ready for use will cost tens of billions of dollars. Upgrading just one of the seven types of weapons in the stockpile, the B61 bomb, is likely to cost $10 billion over five years, according to the Pentagon. The next two types of bombs in line for modification are estimated to cost a total of at least $5 billion. By comparison, the operating budget for Fairfax County government next year will cost about $3.5 billion, including its vaunted school system.

Replacing the aircraft, submarines and ground-launch systems that carry nuclear payloads will be the most expensive budget item. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated it would cost up to $110 billion to build 12 replacements for the aging Ohio-class submarines first launched in the 1980s. The Minuteman III ballistic missiles are undergoing a $7 billion upgrade even as a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles is under consideration. Meanwhile, a nuclear-capable fleet of F-35 strike aircraft is being built to replace existing aircraft at a cost of $162 million an airplane.

Finally, there are the buildings and laboratories where the refurbishment of weapons and development of new technologies take place. Modernizing those facilities is expected to cost at least $88 billion over 10 years, according to the NNSA, which is part of the Department of Energy.

The need to spend heavily to modernize the nation’s shrinking nuclear stockpile has been apparent for at least two decades. President George H.W. Bush reduced the stockpile by nearly 40 percent and imposed a ban on nuclear testing. President Bill Clinton extended the ban while reaffirming the importance of maintaining the arsenal’s safety and performance.

President George W. Bush came into office in 2001 planning to shrink and modernize the vast and deteriorating nuclear complex. Although he cut the stockpile by almost 50 percent and made some progress on renovating the complex, the effort was largely derailed by the costs and complications of two wars. All the while, the backlog of urgent repairs accumulated, and the hidden costs increased steadily.

To catch up, the Obama administration’s budget for refurbishing the nuclear stockpile went from $6.4 billion in 2010 to a $7.5 billion request for next year — a 17 percent increase at a time of budget constraints. To help pay the bills, this year the Defense Department agreed for the first time to contribute $8 billion over five years.

“We came in thinking it had been taken care of and were shocked to hear how poorly it had been treated,” said Jon Wolfsthal, who worked on nuclear weapons issues for the Obama White House until March.
While the administration was surprised by the state of the stockpile, the decision to spend heavily on modernization was also driven by a deal cut with Senate Republicans in late 2010. As part of negotiations to win ratification of the New START accord and reduce the nuclear weapons maintained by the United States and Russia, the administration agreed to increase money for modernizing the nuclear-weapons complex. Some Republicans say the administration isn’t spending enough.

Los Alamos in disrepair

Situated on a remote mesa in the Jemez Mountains of northern New Mexico, Los Alamos National Laboratory was built secretly in early 1943 for the sole purpose of designing and building America’s first atomic bomb. In the decades since, the lab has emerged as one of the nation’s premier nuclear weapons design and research facilities, with 11,000 employees.

But parts of Los Alamos are in serious disrepair. Inside one critical building, pipes carrying dangerous wastewater are duct-taped together at the joints to plug leaks; plastic bags have been wrapped around the tape to trap seepage.

The building, called Wing 5, is part of the 50-year-old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research plant, which performs research on plutonium cores, the explosive “pits” for nuclear weapons. Sometimes liquid accidentally splashes under the ill-fitting doors and spills into the hallway, Bret Knapp, who heads the lab’s weapons program, said during a rare visit by an outsider. When a spill occurs, the building must be evacuated until inspectors can make sure that the liquid is not radioactive.

On other occasions, when the lights in the dilapidated structure flicker, electricians struggling to restore power pry open dozens of fuse boxes and expose brittle wiring far out of compliance with modern building codes.

The aging facility was slated for replacement 20 years ago. But in 1998, designers identified a fault line beneath the structure. The discovery pushed the price of reconstruction so high that no administration was willing to sign off. The Obama administration says safety requires its replacement — at a cost of $6 billion. Critics in Congress and among anti-nuclear groups, however, say the expensive new plant is unnecessary and would still present environmental dangers if built on the fault line.

The metallurgy facility at Los Alamos isn’t even the most pressing example of neglect and deterioration among the 40 buildings nationwide that the NNSA says need repair. That dubious honor goes to Building 9212, a uranium-processing facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex near Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Known in its heyday as the “Secret City,” Y-12 produced highly enriched uranium for “Little Boy,” the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. Today, Y-12 is the primary facility for processing and storing weapons-grade uranium and developing related technologies.

The 150-acre complex was in the news in late July when three peace activists, including an 82-year-old nun, cut the outer security fence, slipped past the perimeter and reached a building where highly enriched uranium is stored. They splashed blood on the outer walls and carried banners denouncing nuclear weapons. Though they never got inside the facility, the incident sparked a two-week shutdown at the plant and a security review across the nuclear complex. Several officials have been fired or reassigned.

Nearby is Building 9212. Protected by layers of razor wire two stories high and monitored by surveillance cameras and motion sensors, technicians inside process enriched uranium for civilian and naval nuclear reactors. Armed guards greet the few authorized visitors allowed into the structure.

The operations inside Building 9212 are deemed so vital that an unplanned shutdown could cause critical problems across the nuclear supply chain. An extended stoppage would disrupt the weapons safety work and could force the closing of domestic and foreign civilian reactors that rely on low-enriched uranium from the facility, according to the NNSA.
No reporter had been allowed inside Building 9212 before The Washington Post’s visit. Because of the radioactivity, visitors and workers must wear multiple pairs of yellow rubber gloves, socks and booties, an overcoat, goggles, a head covering and thermoluminescent dosimeters that measure possible radiation exposure.

Conditions inside belie the significance of the work and the danger of the radioactive material.

The building is made of clay tile and cinder blocks and looks its age. Darrel Kohlhorst, the general manager at the time, pointed out large patches of rust and corrosion on interior walls. He said the walls and roof leak when it rains.

“If water hits the floor, we treat it like a contaminated spill,” he said, adding that workers must mop the floors three times a day — and incinerate the mop heads afterward.

The floors themselves are stainless-steel panels bolted together at thick seams. With age, they have become uneven and warped. Control panels resemble props on a 1950s sci-fi movie set, with oversize black-and-white dials and big red “start” and “stop” buttons.

Plant officials said the outdated equipment has not caused a major safety problem only because they halt operations even when minor things go wrong. For instance, when one of the giant, half-century-old exhaust fans goes on the blink, the repair time idles 30 people “for a $15 part,” said Daniel Hoag, then deputy manager of Y-12. Two years ago, the vacuum system that keeps air flowing broke down, and the facility was closed for two weeks.

Nuclear experts say the building should have been replaced years ago. But successive administrations decided to fund less costly renovations and purely scientific endeavors instead. In the meantime, the replacement cost has risen from $600 million in 2004 to $6.5 billion today.

Explaining the huge increase, NNSA spokesman Joshua McConaha said that initial cost estimates are always “speculative” and that final figures can’t be determined until most of the design work is finished.

Other factors push up costs. These nuclear facilities are one-of-a-kind plants, and the expertise and equipment needed to build them often doesn’t exist anymore, so it has to be invented.

“We’re facing questions that have never been asked or answered, and we’re doing it 20 years after the urgency of the Cold War,” McConaha said. “We’re building rare, incredibly complex nuclear facilities that nobody has had to build in decades.”

Some 640 people are designing the new uranium processing plant at Y-12. It will use 10 experimental technologies still being invented. There will be elaborate air filtration systems, duplicative electrical and fire control systems, redundant security barriers, earthquake-proof concrete floors and impenetrable vaults — all required to maintain and work with highly radioactive material.

The construction requirements for new nuclear facilities can be seen not far from the 9212 site. The storage facility for highly enriched uranium where the July break-in occurred was completed in 2010 with 90,000 square feet of concrete. Its walls are 30 feet thick and two stories tall, with hidden gun ports. Inside the concrete box, every scrap of radioactive waste is carried to its eventual tomb by a series of mechanical arms and lifts requiring no human touch. Databases and computers track every trace of radioactive material continuously in this paperless, sterile world.

Chronic poor planning

Much of the blame for the soaring costs has fallen on the National Nuclear Security Administration, the division of the Department of Energy responsible for managing and modernizing the nuclear stockpile. For years, the Government Accountability Office, the Pentagon and some lawmakers have cited the NNSA for chronic poor planning and bad management. The GAO has had the NNSA on its “high-risk list” for fraud, waste and abuse in contracting and management since 1990.

Government reports show that the NNSA has blown budgets across the board. For instance, the projected cost of a new weapons conversion facility at the DOE’s Savannah River Site in South Carolina rose to $5 billion from $1.4 billion.
It was eventually scrapped — after $700 million in planning costs. The cost of building a new fuel fabrication facility at Savannah River also has tripled to $5 billion, and it is scheduled to open in 2016, a decade late.

The George W. Bush administration’s solution to NNSA’s chronic problems was to transfer management of the national laboratories to profit-making corporations in 2008. Privatization was supposed to cut costs and boost efficiency, but GAO investigators and lawmakers say it is not clear that either has happened.

One concern is unexplained increases in administrative costs, which have reached about 40 percent of the labs’ budget, according to figures provided by NNSA. In fact, the annual contracts to run the facilities are among the largest in government — nearly $2.6 billion a year to operate Los Alamos and $2.4 billion for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque.

The Defense Department became so alarmed by NNSA’s construction record that it recently embedded a team at the agency to examine books and management practices and come up with more realistic cost figures for projects under consideration.

Republicans say they support increased spending on the nuclear arsenal, but last year they were unable to muster the votes to fund the president’s entire budget request. Some worry, though, that costs are out of hand. Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), ranking member of the Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee on strategic forces, said the NNSA management approach “perpetuates the status quo mentality that everything nuclear has to be expensive.”

**Nuclear Posture Review**

In an April 2009 speech, President Obama outlined his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Acknowledging that his goal might not be accomplished in his lifetime, Obama laid out an agenda for forging new partnerships to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, ending production of fissile material for weapons and ratifying new treaties to reduce their numbers.

Since then, though, the president has taken few steps to implement his objective. On the contrary, his 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which lays out the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy, promised to maintain the triad of nuclear weapons favored by every president since Dwight Eisenhower.

In December 2010, the Senate approved ratification of the New START accord with Russia, which limits both sides to 1,550 warheads. But no progress has been made on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would curb development of new nuclear weapons and impose a permanent ban on nuclear tests by signatories.

Over the past year, the president has been calculating his next nuclear step. Civilian and military advisers have presented him with countless options as he sets more precise guidelines that military planners will translate into intricate targeting plans.

The White House declined to comment on the president’s strategic direction, but some government officials and outside experts said they believe he favors renewed talks with the Russians to drop the warhead total from 1,550 to 1,100. Few, however, expect any announcement until after the presidential election in November.

All of the president’s decisions, from the broad nuclear structure to the number of warheads and the top-secret target list, cascade through the nuclear establishment, affecting the types of weapons and delivery systems that must be available to meet the objectives.

For their part, many anti-nuclear activists favor disarmament by atrophy, which would mean not repairing or extending the life span of the current arsenal. For now, the administration and its supporters argue that the country must maintain its nuclear assets as long as other nations are nuclear-armed.

Still, a growing number of former senior administration officials from both parties argue that more substantial cuts would encourage nonnuclear states to abandon their nuclear ambitions, making the world safer from political miscalculations and saving money for defense items that are actually used.
Among the members of this eclectic group are former Reagan administration officials George Shultz, Robert “Bud” McFarlane and Frank Carlucci; Clinton’s former defense secretary William Perry and ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering; and retired Marine Gen. James Cartwright, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Obama and a former commander of U.S. nuclear forces.

“There are a growing number of my peers on the uniformed military side, and especially among civilian analysts and those on the policy side,” who believe a smaller and more modern force is appropriate, Cartwright said in an interview. “What we have is way more than what we need.”

**Spending limits**

The nuclear arsenal has not entirely escaped cuts. To comply with the new Budget Control Act spending limits, the NNSA decided this year that it could not afford to replace both the crumbling plutonium testing facility at Los Alamos for $6 billion and the deteriorating uranium processing facility in Building 9212 at Oak Ridge for $6.5 billion.

The NNSA chose to rehab Building 9212 because there was no alternative site where the critical work carried out there could be performed.

So, after 250 contractors moved into Los Alamos last year and tractors dug out 160,000 cubic feet of volcanic tuff rock from the side of a hill, NNSA and the administration decided that building a new plutonium-testing site would be delayed five years. The crews stopped work. The tractors were idled. A new reality sank in.

That new reality means some of the plutonium will be shipped to other facilities. Every couple of days, a UPS truck will deliver a dime-size slice of plutonium to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 45 miles east of San Francisco. Larger quantities of plutonium will be carried by secure vans to the Nevada National Security Site northwest of Las Vegas. Plutonium remaining at Los Alamos will be hand-delivered via an underground tunnel from one building to another.

The tunnel is being upgraded, and renovations are underway at Livermore and the Nevada site to handle the plutonium. Officials estimate the changes in the three locations will cost an additional $650 million over the next five years.

*Julie Tate contributed to this report.*


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Times of India – India

**US Declassifies Cold War Nuclear Plan**

By Indo-Asian News Service (IANS)

September 18, 2012

WASHINGTON: The US National Security Archive has fully declassified the most controversial nuclear policy document of the Cold War, the Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), which focused on a possible nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

The full text of the document, available on the US National Security Archive page at George Washington University's website, provides insights about the thinking of key US officials about the state of nuclear planning and the possible progression of events should war break out.

In a surprising reverse from previous policies, PD-59 called for pre-planned nuclear strike options and capabilities for rapid development of target plans against such key target categories as “military and control targets,” including nuclear forces, command and control, stationary and mobile military forces, and industrial facilities that supported the military.
A key element of PD-59 was to use high-tech intelligence to find nuclear weapons targets, strike them with "pinpoint" precision, and then assess the damage.

The architects of PD-59 envisioned the possibility of protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union that avoided escalation to all-out conflict.

The archive's annotation emphasises the fact that the US nuclear doctrine has not been altered much since PD-59 became effective, and "while President Obama has set a nuclear-free world as a policy goal, it is unlikely that nuclear planning arrangements will change significantly in the foreseeable future".

Highly classified for decades, PD-59 was signed in July 1980 by President Jimmy Carter "during a period of heightened Cold War tensions due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, greater instability in the Middle East, and earlier strains over China policy, human rights, the Horn of Africa, and Euromissiles".

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-09-18/us/33924778_1_nuclear-doctrine-nuclear-war-targets

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Al Arabiya – U.A.E.

Al-Qaeda Says Attack on U.S. Consulate in Libya ‘Revenge’ for Death of its 2nd Man
Saturday, 15 September 2012
By Al Arabiya with Agencies

Al-Qaeda said the deadly attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya was in revenge for the killing of the network’s number two Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Libi, SITE Intelligence Group reported Saturday, as Libyan authorities have identified 50 people who were involved in the attack.

“The killing of Sheikh Abu Yahya only increased the enthusiasm and determination of the sons of (Libyan independence hero) Omar al-Mokhtar to take revenge upon those who attack our Prophet,” al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula said in a statement, quoted by the U.S.-based monitoring group, according to AFP.

Al-Qaeda’s Yemen-based offshoot did not claim direct responsibility for Tuesday’s attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi that killed the U.S. ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, and three other Americans.

But it stressed that “the uprising of our people in Libya, Egypt and Yemen against America and its embassies is a sign to notify the United States that its war is not directed against groups and organizations ... but against the Islamic nation that has rebelled against injustice.”

The statement comes four days after al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a video eulogizing Libi, his late deputy and propaganda chief who was killed in a drone strike in June.

Mohammed al-Megaryef, the head of Libya’s national assembly, said on Saturday that the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi was planned and “meticulously executed.”

Tuesday’s attack by armed men in the eastern city of Benghazi came amid a wave of protests in the Muslim world against a U.S.-made amateur Internet film deemed insulting to the Prophet Mohammed.

Suspected Islamic militants fired on the consulate with rocket-propelled grenades and set it ablaze on the anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States claimed by al-Qaeda.

Meanwhile, Libyan authorities have identified 50 people who were involved in the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, a security official said on Saturday, Reuters reported.

So far four people have been arrested and are being questioned, Libyan officials have said.
“We know of 50 people who were involved in the attack, we have names and we know who they are, but there could be more,” Abdul-Moniem al-Hurr, spokesman for Libya’s Supreme Security Committee, said.

“Four have been arrested. Some of the others may have escaped via Benghazi airport, maybe to Egypt, but this not confirmed. We have given their names to all of the Libyan border entry points.”

A spokesman for President Barack Obama said on Friday officials had no evidence the attack was pre-planned, an assertion which has added to confusion over the incident.

Immediately after the attack, U.S. officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, were quoted widely in the media saying they believed the attack was well-planned and organized.

http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/15/238197.html

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Herald Scotland – U.K.
OPINION/Commentary
Monday, 17 September 2012

We Must Stay in Nato but Ditch Trident

IN a month’s time delegates will assemble in Perth for the annual national conference of the SNP.

By Angus Robertson

Unlike previous meetings when independence seemed far off, this year’s conference comes only two years before the independence referendum. For that reason the debates and decisions matter as never before because they will influence the independence prospectus being prepared by the Scottish Government. The conference will also be watched by voters in Scotland, observers from the rest of the UK and further afield. It will make an important impression about the kind of nation a sovereign Scotland can be domestically and also how we will work with our neighbours and friends.

For the first time in a decade SNP delegates will debate a substantive motion on defence and security. In drafting this motion I have received substantial encouragement and advice from throughout the SNP and from external experts. At the heart of the proposal is that our defence and security arrangements should always be determined in line with the wishes of people in Scotland. Never again should servicemen and women be sent into conflicts we oppose. Never again should we be home to nuclear weapons when the overwhelming majority of people don’t want them here. In contrast we should have the appropriate capabilities for our foreign, defence and security policy priorities. We should also say loud and clear that we will co-operate with our allies.

Delegates will be able to debate these priorities and my detailed proposals for the appropriate role, size, cost and capabilities of defence arrangements an SNP Government would pursue in a sovereign Scotland. A key area of the policy proposal is that Scotland should only have conventional defence capabilities. We need the naval facilities at Faslane to fulfill our maritime obligations and it would make an excellent national command and control centre. This means that Trident will have to leave Scotland.

I am also proposing that Scotland should be prepared to work with our neighbours and allies, including Nato. Our friends around the world should not be under the impression that we will turn our backs on them. Scotland is currently in Nato as part of the UK and I believe that if we reach agreement on the withdrawal of Trident we should remain within Nato after independence. Like the majority of Nato members Scotland would not possess or host nuclear weapons. Indeed we would join both Canada and Greece as members who have removed them and would take the same position as our neighbour Norway that has a strong non-nuclear policy.

Scotland is in a crucial geo-strategic location in northern Europe. This will only become more important following environmental changes to the Arctic. At present together with all our North Sea neighbours, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and the rest of the UK, we organise our conventional air defence and sea patrol through Nato. In addition Nato is
critical for co-ordination, training and operations. It is in Scotland's interests to continue in Nato and our neighbours should understand that we will work with them as today. In fact we will do better than the UK Government, which has imposed damaging conventional cuts in Scotland, including the entire maritime patrol aircraft fleet.

That a sovereign Scotland should remain within Nato is also overwhelmingly supported by Scottish public opinion. In a recent YouGov opinion poll 75% of respondents wished an independent Scotland to remain within Nato and only 11% wanted to withdraw. Nearly two-thirds of respondents thought that Scotland would be safer by remaining within Nato while only 5% believe Scotland would be safer if we left.

Like many I joined the SNP because I am an internationalist and want to see Scotland play its direct part in the world. I also joined because I want to rid Scotland of nuclear weapons. The motion before the SNP conference aims to fulfill both these ambitions and Scotland will only remain within Nato if agreement is reached to withdraw Trident. It also sends a strong domestic and international message that we are getting ready for independence.

Angus Robertson MP is Westminster SNP leader and defence spokesman.

http://www.heraldscotland.com/comment/columnists/we-must-stay-in-nato-but-ditch-trident.18891755

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Washington Times
OPINION/Commentary

LIONETTI: Iran Continues Uranium Enrichment Program

U.S. failure to act not an option
By Lt. Gen. Donald M. Lionetti
Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Iran's refusal to back off from its uranium enrichment program, which could usher in a nuclear-armed Iran, has dramatically heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf region. The regime’s oft-stated threats of missile attacks against American and allied interests in the region, stated plans to block the Strait of Hormuz and military maneuvers to test new Iranian missiles increase the level of brinkmanship with each passing day.

The United States’ response so far addresses the tactical dimension of potential Iranian military action. The U.S. Navy has enhanced its mine clearing capabilities with the deployment of additional mine sweepers and submersible drones capable of detecting and destroying Iranian mines threatening shipping lanes. Additional warplanes, including F-22 stealth fighters and F-15s, have been deployed in recent months. American troop levels in Iraq have been steadily reduced, but the U.S. Army maintains a brigade of soldiers in Kuwait, and an ever-present carrier battle group steams off shore, ready to respond if needed.

Iran’s missile threat is very real and even more lethal than when I provided a risk assessment of the Gulf region in the Winter 2004 Issue of Defense Procurement Analysis. I asserted that Iran’s regional conduct would destabilize Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members’ economic growth and discourage outside investment. With high oil prices and a booming economy, GCC countries were encouraged to invest in regional missile defenses to reverse a perception of continuing risk, which could hurt the willingness of foreign companies to invest or operate in the Persian Gulf. Recent testing of Iran’s longer-range missiles underscores the continuing validity of these observations.

Continuing its aggressive posture, Iran declared as recently as last month its willingness to unleash its arsenal should the country feel threatened. “The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the Iranian army’s missiles can target and destroy any threatening target in the region,” according to Mansour Haqiqat-pour, who sits on Iran's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission.

Key among our missile defense assets in the region is the Patriot system. Continuously refined and improved since its introduction in the 1980s, Patriot batteries in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provide a missile defense ring around western Iran. This battle-tested system — Patriot’s technology has been combat-proven in two
wars — is also part of the Israeli defense package. Because Patriot is a mature system, it is ready to deploy on a moment’s notice. This combination of land, air, naval and missile defense forces allows us to confront traditional and asymmetrical attacks from Iran should it come to that.

Maintaining commerce through the Strait of Hormuz is equally critical. Nearly 40 percent of the world’s oil moves through this strategic sea lane, and the U.S. Navy will be at the tip of the spear in keeping it open. To that end, the USS Ponce, an amphibious ship previously slated for decommissioning, has been refurbished and is now supporting Fifth Fleet operations in Bahrain. It represents the sort of thinking that meets the needs of military missions while conserving budget resources at a time when Americans are weary of war, Congress is confronting serious budget questions and our economy is fragile. Appropriate as this response has been, it is no less important that U.S. policymakers take a longer view — one that provides the defense infrastructure required to ensure continued success should Iran become an active or chronic aggressor.

Iran’s early-July missile drill, code-named Great Prophet 7, demonstrated the regime’s capability to strike at American and allied targets across the entire Middle East, and high among our priorities should be adequate funding for continued Patriot development and acquisition. Many of the system’s engineering costs were spread across its dozen international partners, and Patriot’s open architecture provides interoperability with a variety of missile and air defense systems. It is a cost-effective, operationally potent and immediately ready response to the Iranian threat.

No right-thinking person wishes for a confrontation with Iran, but their threats are neither idle nor trifling. Iran has the means and possibly the will to engage in a shooting war of significant proportions. Terrible as that would be, we must stand vigilant or face the even more dangerous consequences of failure to act. That means maintaining the readiness of our high-performance aircraft squadrons, credible in-theater troop levels, versatile and well-purposed naval assets and adequate funding for continued Patriot modernization.

Lt. Gen. Donald M. Lionetti was commanding general of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

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Pakistan Observer – Pakistan
OPINION/Commentary
Thursday, September 20, 2012

Pak Nukes: Frenzy in Western Media
By Shams uz Zaman

Pakistani nuclear programme is again in the eye of a storm in the western media. The latest stir came from an essay published in the Foreign Policy magazine and on Pulitzer Centre website by Tom Hundley. The overall theme of the article examining the prospects of nuclear arms race in South Asia after introduction of Battlefield nuclear weapons remains splendid, but Hundley misleadingly projects India as a victim of Pakistani irresponsible and aggressive behaviour, while completely ignoring Indian militarization frenzy and blatant human rights violations in disputed region of Kashmir. This usual approach by some scholars dealing India and Pakistan differently on the nuclear non-proliferation issue is becoming counterproductive for the nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

Tom Hundley’s essay also reflects of paranoiac syndrome widely prevalent among some Western scholars regarding Pakistani nuclear programme. While it criticizes China for cooperating with Pakistan on nuclear energy issue, it just make a passing comment on the Indo-US nuclear deal which remains at the heart of the new nuclear apartheid controversy. The report highlights the threat of fissile material being stolen in tens of kilos from Pakistan, which actually remains in highly classified and secure facilities, but on the other hand completely blacks out known incidents of radiological material theft in India. Hundley also presumes Indian nuclear doctrine containing an unconditional “No First Use” clause, which indicates that the author failed to assimilate the “catch of conditions” in the doctrine.
Indian 'no first use' clause is not applicable against states which are either allies of nuclear weapon states (NWS) or launches a biological/chemical attack against India or Indian forces anywhere in the world. In this globalized world where every state trades with other, the explanation of the ‘ally of NWS’ has been left out to the imagination of the Indian policy makers. Hundley regards Indian nuclear capability serving as a sign of Indian power and prestige rather than projecting nuclear war fighting capability but doesn’t use the same logic against Pakistani low yield nuclear weapons, terming them as war fighting mechanism rather than for deterrence purpose against wide spectrum of threats.

Timing of such rhetoric towards Pakistani nuclear programme in the western media has repeatedly coincided with the pressure from Washington to expand the sphere of ongoing war on terror thus intriguing an introspection for some kind of connection. Most analysts would find it difficult to establish a direct link between diplomatic salvos fired from Washington against Pakistan for do more mantra in war on terror, followed by a spate of terrorist incidents against Pakistani strategic installations thus causing apprehensions in the media regarding safety and security of Pakistani nuclear weapons. This pattern however, provides sufficient evidence for general masses to believe in the shady reports regarding US intentions to denuclearize Pakistan.

These reports do contain some facts besides fiction and hold a strong probability of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy in future. A conservative and a hardliner regime in Washington may view of the Pakistani nuclear capability a direct threat thus indulging in some sort of nuclear brinkmanship in future.

Such cynical reports with or without collusion of US policy making institutions would further sour Pak-US relations, which already are in a volatile state besides giving meanings to the rhetoric of militants and insurgents portraying themselves as symbol of resistance against the US imperial designs. Consequently, Pakistan military would also face an extremely paradoxical situation in acting as a vanguard state in the US led global campaign against terrorism while at the same time remaining sceptical of the US designs towards its nuclear capability. Thus, such reports would not only undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime but could also affect the perceptions of some other states at feeling vulnerable from the NWS thus scraping the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and move in the direction of weapons capability. The sooner these scholars realize this the better it would serve the purpose of NPT.

The writer is an MPhil scholar at NDU and writes regularly for newspapers.

http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=174620

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Ottawa Citizen – Canada

OPINION/Blog

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reliable and Inexpensive, According to General

September 20, 2012
Posted by: David Puglie

From the U.S. Air Force:

WASHINGTON — As intercontinental ballistic missiles gain prominence in the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise, service officials related the importance of maintaining the system during the 2012 Air Force Association Air and Space Conference and Technology Exposition here Sept. 18.

Panelists included Maj. Gen. William Chambers, assistant chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration; retired Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, senior fellow for strategic studies and arms control council on foreign relations; and Elbridge Colby, global strategic affairs principal analyst, CNA.
“The ICBM is stabilizing, lethal, responsive, survivable and highly credible,” Chambers said, adding that he sees ICBM as a homeland-based force that maintains strategic stability and supports conflict resolution below the nuclear threshold. “It does this by imposing great costs on any would-be aggressor and denying any adversary a nuclear coercion option,” he explained.

Chambers also noted that ICBMs are among the most reliable and inexpensive strategic systems to operate and maintain.

“In fiscal year 2011, the Air Force provided an ICBM capability to the nation for one percent of the overall Air Force budget,” Chambers said. “That’s not a lot of money for the overall global stability that this force provides America.”

While some advocates of deep reductions have called for total elimination of ICBM, the panel assured that the ICBM is essential to deterrence and strategic stability.

“If the ICBM were eliminated, the number of strategic targets an adversary would have to attack to seriously undermine or even destroy the U.S. nuclear deterrent force would be reduced from more than 500 to perhaps a dozen,” Klotz said.

The panel underscored the importance of maintaining the ICBM in the 21st century.

“It’s very important to think about new capabilities and maintaining the same fundamental approach to deterrence — putting the fear into your opponent so you don’t ever have to go to war,” Colby said.

The panelists acknowledged that though opinions may vary about ICBM’s future, the system must continue to progress.

“The most pressing task is to work toward a broad, national consensus on the steps that need to be taken to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal in the years ahead and to demonstrate real purpose in achieving them,” Klotz said.


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Eurasia Review – Spain
OPINION/Analysis

India Reconfirms Its Entry Into Elite Missile Club – Analysis

By Keshav Prasad Bhattacharai
September 20, 2012

India said that it has successfully test-fired its nuclear-capable strategic ballistic missile Agni-IV with a strike range of about 4000 km with the help of a mobile launcher from a test range at Wheeler Island off the eastern coast of an Indian state Orissa on September 19.

Quoting a defense official leading Indian daily Times of India (TOI) said that the Agni IV is equipped with modern and compact avionics to provide high level of reliability.

TOI further referring defense scientist says that the “sophisticated missile is lighter in weight and has two stages of solid propulsion. The payload, with a re-entry heat shield can withstand temperature of more than 3000 degree Celsius”.

Two days earlier Pakistan had also successfully test-fired its Hatf-VII Babur missile with a range of some 700 kilometers and capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
In last April, India had successfully launched its first indigenously developed three staged long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ‘Agni V’ from the same launching station. This had placed India ranked among the other handful of nations: China, U.S., U.K., France and Russia, having ICBMs in their arsenal.

The Agni V is the all solid fuel powered, 17-metre tall nuclear capable ballistic missile that weighs 50 ton and has two meter diameter. It has a range of more than 5000 km that can target almost all important cities of China.

It also has the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead weighing over a ton. This capability in due course can be upgraded to carry Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) that can deliver up to ten nuclear warheads in a single launch assigned to multiple targets. Alternatively, with Agni V two or more warheads can be assigned to a single target. According to knowledgeable sources this is being developed to provide a credible second strike capability.

ICBMs are the most complicated weapon system that can be compared with ancient “BRAHMASTRA” and its targeting cannot be changed after it is launched, nor can it be recalled or destroyed in flight. They are guided with infallible higher level of accuracies. These kind of weapons although are developed in regional context, have global implications.

India had launched its first satellite into orbit in 1980. That was followed by missile program of Agni series in 1983. Just in last November too it had successfully launched ‘Agni IV. The others in this family are Agni-I Agni-II and Agni-III from 700 to 3,500 kilometers in ranges.

As quoted by Defense analyst Rahul Bedi Dr. V.K. Saraswat , Chief of Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) said that Agni V was “Fired from a canister-launch system to provide it greater operational flexibility of being either rail- or road-launched, the Agni-V compares favourably with ICBMs in use by nuclear weapons states like Britain, China, France, Russia and the US,“ Mr Saraswat also claims that while missiles available to other nuclear weapons states employ relatively older technology, the technologies incorporated into Agni-V are far ahead of other countries except the U.S.

BBC has quoted another defense expert – former Brigadier Arun Sahgal – the joint director of the Institute of National Security Studies in Delhi, that “Agni-V will provide India with much-needed dissuasive deterrence against China which at present it lacks”.

Indian military strategist is said to have developed this missile to meet the threat posed by China’s nuclear-capable DF21 series of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) ranging from 1,500km-2,250km -that are deployed across Tibet and South-West China with capacity to strike major Indian cities, including Delhi.

Experts say that the shorter-ranges Agni-I and II were developed to meet the defense threats posed by Pakistan and while other missiles of Agni family (Agni III to Agni V) were developed aiming at major Chinese cities including Tibet – strategically significant to both India and China.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh earlier at the successful launching of Agni V had congratulated the entire scientist and other officials involved in the mission. Speaking with Dr. Saraswat Premier Singh exclaimed “You made the nation proud.” Similarly Defense Minister A K Antony described the successful test flight of Agni V as a flawless success that as a major milestone in national history helped the nation stand tall among the elite club of nations.

India, which for long has been the biggest weapons importer in the world is said to have introduced the most innovative and advanced technology in its missile system.

**Response From China, US and Nato**

According to Wall Street Journal and Hindustan Times, during the Agni V test, China officially was more careful and guarded in its reaction on India’s missile test. At a daily briefing, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin said – as emerging powers “India and China are not rivals but cooperative partners.” When asked about the missile launch and its security implications for China Liu replied “the two countries have a sound relationship” and expressed his hope that Asian countries can contribute to regional stability and peace.
But the real mood of China was reflected by the Global Times, an English language daily owned by Chinese Communist Party. It published an article entitled “India being swept up by missile delusion”. The tone it articulated and the language it used sharply contradicts the official Chinese position.

Commenting acerbically on India’s $480 million project of Agni V test, Global Times says “India is still poor and lags behind in infrastructure construction, but its society is highly supportive of developing nuclear power”. Snapping a heavy sarcasm against the Western countries Global Times commented “the West chooses to overlook India’s disregard of nuclear and missile control treaties” but “remains silent on the fact that India’s military spending increased by 17 percent in 2012 and the country has again become the largest weapons importer in the world”.

Global Times had also threatened India not to overestimate its strength even though Indian missiles could reach most part of China. India can gain nothing with its missile arrogances as China’s nuclear power is stronger and more reliable than India’s and for “the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China”. While claiming this, Global Times must have reflected on China’s massive nuclear arsenal including the 11,200 km long range Dong Feng-31A missiles capable of hitting any part of India from any place however deep inside China. Further it directed its ire and warned India not to “overstate the value of its Western allies and the profits it could gain from participating in a containment of China. If it equates long range strategic missiles with deterrence of China, and stirs up further hostility, it could be sorely mistaken”.

On the other hand, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen had earlier commented that NATO does not consider India as a threat despite the country’s advanced missile development program. Similar was the response from the Spokesperson of U.S. Department of State Mark Toner who when asked about India’s new missile launch commented – “They have a solid nonproliferation record and that they’re playing a significant role internationally on the issue”. Toner reminding the questioner further said that India has participated in the nuclear security summits, the one in Washington and the other in Seoul most recently; however he reiterated U.S. position that they urge “all nuclear-capable states to exercise restraint regarding their nuclear and missile capabilities”.

**Nuclear Missiles: Are They Weapons Of War Or Weapons Of Peace?**

In May 1998, just three days before the nuclear tests Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had a top secret meeting with three army chiefs and his National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra to assess whether the United States could carry out a pre-emptive strike against India’s nuclear installations and after such a possibility was ruled out, the tests was carried on. (Raj Chengappa : Weapons of Peace)

But after a fortnight of India’s tests Pakistan retorted with six nuclear tests, Vajpayee was convinced that the tension between the two countries would now be reduced and he told an aide ‘when we both have nuclear weapon we cannot afford to go to war. We will come closer and it will open the road to cooperation’ (Chengappa). After this although India and Pakistan fought a limited war on Kargil, they refrained from staging an all out war.

The greatest irony of human history is that the invention of nuclear weapon – with the most destructive capacity, has led the world witness the longest period of peace among major world powers. And it is equally true that billions of dollar used in developing and deploying nuclear weapons if were used otherwise could have resulted the more sustainable peace and prosperity around the world –an issue that perhaps remains the biggest moral challenges to nuclear weapons today.

However these weapons do have no combative values but have worked as an excellent deterrent in major power relations. A veteran U.S. security strategist- Brent Scowcroft, who has served from President Gerald Ford to President Barrack Obama in different capacities, has said “Nuclear weapons are like fire insurance; you buy them even if you don’t want to use them”.

India has always maintained that its missiles development is aimed to maintain deterrence parity with other military power especially against Pakistan and China. To increase its deterrent ability it is also closer to complete a nuclear submarine to defend its long coast lines. In a recent report – “Assuring Destruction Forever – Nuclear Weapon Modernization around the World”, M.V. Ramana, a nuclear-energy expert in Princeton University has stated that India
would soon have an operational triad of aircraft, land based missiles and nuclear powered submarine – launched missiles for delivery of nuclear warheads.

Margherita Stancati of Wall Street Journal has quoted Bharat Karnad, a security expert at the Center for Policy Research, a New Delhi-based think tank, saying that “India has finally reached deterrence parity with China.”

People may go into war as they are going now, but for their deterrent capacities nuclear power countries are unlikely to go into an all out war. Therefore nuclear weapons system have worked as a weapon of peace, however the moral question remains the same.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

OPINION/Op-Ed

The Astonishing National Academy of Sciences Missile Defense Report

By George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol

20 September 2012

Just a few weeks ago, on September 11, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report titled "Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for US Boost Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives." It is an astonishing document, given that it purports to be the product of a respectable scientific institution. It contains numerous flawed assumptions, analytical oversights, and internal inconsistencies. It also contradicts basic, scientific results from other published studies that have already been independently reviewed and verified. These serious problems lead to fundamental errors in many of the report’s most important findings and recommendations, ultimately undermining its credibility as science-based analysis.

The National Academy concluded that the United States could not field a workable boost-phase missile defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched from North Korea or Iran. This conclusion is totally incompatible with the findings of earlier science-based reports on this defense system and the ballistic missile threat.

In particular, the National Academy report heavily depends on results from an American Physical Society study on boost-phase missile defenses published in 2003. That study discussed boost-phase interceptors that have speeds up to 10 kilometers per second, while the National Academy report only considers the interceptors that have speeds of 4.5 and 6 kilometers per second. Even though the National Academy report frequently cites the American Physical Society study, it provides no justification for neglecting the higher-speed interceptors considered in that study.

Moreover, the National Academy of Sciences report ignores the vast amount of new information that has become publicly available about missiles under development by both Iran and North Korea in recent years. A boost-phase defense attempts to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles after they are launched and before they complete powered flight; these missiles cannot release warheads and countermeasures until this powered phase ends. Nations with limited technical and industrial capacities are incapable of implementing effective countermeasures against such a boost-phase defense, giving it an inherent advantage over midcourse defenses that seek to intercept missiles at high altitudes, where a wide range of potentially highly effective countermeasures is available.
It is now known, thanks to recent comprehensive studies by the EastWest Institute and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, that the only vehicle Iran or North Korea might eventually be able to convert into an ICBM in the next decade or two has a powered flight time of a little more than eight minutes. Yet the National Academy of Sciences assumes, as if there were no data to the contrary, that North Korea and Iran could build a much more advanced ICBM that finishes powered flight in half the time the North Korean launch vehicle requires.

The two assumptions we have just described -- an arbitrarily slow interceptor and an unreasonably fast-burning ICBM target -- reduce the ranges at which boost-phase defenses could operate by a factor of three to four. This totally erroneous set of assumptions is the source of the National Academy of Science report's incorrect conclusion that a boost-phase ballistic missile defense of the United States is not technically achievable.

Similarly, the National Academy report reaches erroneous conclusions about both the nation's Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system and the European Phased Adaptive Approach by basing the conclusions on greatly overestimated radar ranges. The report proposes deploying new X-band radars alongside existing early warning radars in order to address the midcourse defense system's inability to discriminate actual warheads from debris or decoys. The new radars proposed by the National Academy, however, are far too small to be able to discriminate between missiles and decoys at the ranges needed. In fact, the National Academy's approach exactly mirrors one proposed by the Clinton administration, which would also have deployed new X-band radars alongside existing early warning radars -- except that those suggested radars were nearly 400 times more powerful in terms of the signal-to-noise ratio obtained against a given target.

The excessive radar ranges assumed by the National Academy also directly contradict technical findings in an important Defense Science Board report released by the Defense Department last year. The report found that the ranges of the radars in the European Phased Adaptive Approach were too short to provide even basic tracking data for missile defense purposes. Our own calculations also demonstrate this to be the case. Yet the National Academy of Sciences report simply states that the radars currently in the European Phased Adaptive Approach are sufficient to make it work, without showing any evidence of how this contradictory conclusion was reached.

The Defense Science Board also reported that neither the European Phased Adaptive Approach nor the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system can reliably tell the difference between warheads and decoys or rocket debris. The board's report showed how such an inability to discriminate meant that the systems would not work in combat. The National Academy of Sciences report mentioned ways to improve discrimination, but offered no specific technical insight about how such capabilities could be made workable during hostilities.

In 1999, the CIA published an unclassified National Intelligence Estimate that enumerated very simple countermeasures against missile defense systems that, the agency concluded, could be implemented by any adversary able to build an ICBM. Yet the National Academy's report has nothing specific to say about how their proposed systems could be used by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense and European Phased Adaptive Approach systems to defeat such countermeasures. Instead, the National Academy, without any evidence to support its claims, states that its approach to discrimination "offers the greatest probability" of success against countermeasures. This claim is remarkable -- particularly because the radars that the National Academy points to as essential for such discrimination have ranges that are far too short to collect the basic data that would be needed to discriminate between decoys and warheads.

The National Academy of Sciences report contains serious inconsistencies that become obvious when it is compared with last year's Defense Science Board report and the earlier American Physical Society Boost-Phase Study. The National Academy also has no answer to how the defense systems it recommends could cope with countermeasures that could be deployed by adversaries that build ICBMs. In addition, the National Academy's report has serious internal contradictions that are inconsistent with the underlying physics of its own recommendations.

Given these problems, this report cannot serve as a basis for formulating national policy on ballistic missile defense. Prior to the publication of the report, we communicated our concerns to the National Academy of Sciences, only to be told that it had no bureaucratic mechanisms for taking them into account. (For additional information, see the two
letters we wrote to the chair and ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee on August 20 and Sept. 4.)  
It is clear that there is a need for a comprehensive, scientifically based, and open review of the technical foundations of the National Academy of Sciences report. Such a review is essential if the National Academy is to fulfill its role as the government’s chief science advisor in this important matter of national security.

George N. Lewis is a senior research associate at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. A physicist, Theodore A. Postol is professor of science, technology, and national security policy at MIT. His expertise is in ballistic missile defense technologies and ballistic missiles more generally.


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Council on Foreign Relations – New York, NY
OPINION/Interview

Iran's Nuclear Program and the Red Line

Interviewee: David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor
September 20, 2012

Debate is growing on curbing Iran's nuclear development as the Israelis ratchet up pressure on the United States on a so-called "red line" on what would constitute the need for military action. Though Iran has made considerable progress on developing "a fairly robust nuclear weapons capability," David Albright, a leading expert on Iranian nuclear issues, says, "The key issue is that they haven't made a decision to do that." Albright says that even though Israel has concerns about Iran's uranium enrichment program, he believes an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear enrichment sites would not eliminate the Iranian ability, but would push them further toward nuclear weapons. "I think the Israelis, by attacking, could make the situation much worse, whereas if the United States makes it clear to Iran, 'don't cross that line or else there will be horrendous consequences,' that strategy may be able to keep Iran from building the bomb over the next year or two."

What is the latest on Iran's nuclear program?

Iran has made considerable progress at developing a fairly robust nuclear weapons capability, so that if it decided today to enrich uranium up to weapons-grade for making nuclear weapons, it could do so. There's nothing standing in their way, technically, anymore, and they could produce quite a bit of weapons-grade material. But the key issue is that they haven't made a decision to do that.

And how would they do that, by upgrading this 20 percent enriched uranium?

They have large stocks of 3.5 percent, enough for several nuclear weapons. They also have a fairly large stock of 20 percent. They don't have enough 20 percent if used alone to enrich to weapons-grade uranium, but if you use both the 3.5 percent and the stock of 20 percent, then in a facility like Natanz, where there's 9,000 centrifuges operational, they could produce a significant quantity, which we define as 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium in two to four months. Once they get a sufficient stock of 20 percent enriched uranium--and that could be sometime next year--then if they wanted to break out of Natanz, they could do it in little more than a month.

Now they can run into problems, and they do. They always run into problems, and so these time frames could get longer, and probably would get longer. But if you look back a year or two, the time to breakout [when they would have all the components necessary to assemble a weapon] using the 3.5 percent enriched uranium with the number of centrifuges they had at the time was measured in a half a year, a year, and so as they've produced more enriched uranium, particularly 20 percent material, and gotten more centrifuges operational, the breakout times have come down fairly substantially, and will continue to come down as they produce more 20 percent enriched uranium.
Over the weekend, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was on U.S. television saying that Iran would have the capability to produce nuclear weapons in about six to seven months. So you're not disagreeing with that?

No. But what I took from his comments is that there are some scenarios that Israel is worried about, and some that it's not so worried about. I gave the example of breaking out at Natanz. Now, at ISIS, we don't believe Iran is likely to do that, because the breakout involves kicking out the inspectors and taking the enriched uranium out of safeguards. All those things are very noticeable. Therefore, if Iran broke out of Natanz, it would be discovered, and there would probably be a pretty draconian response from the United States and Israel. We at ISIS think that Iran is deterred from breaking out at Natanz over the next year or so.

Now, the other site at Fordow, which is deeply buried, even with 20 percent enriched uranium in sufficient quantity that you can enrich for a bomb, we think is going to take them at least two months. If and when the Iranians have enough 20 percent enriched uranium, the United States will get plenty of warning time about that breakout and could respond in an incredibly aggressive manner toward Iran. So I think Iran would be deterred from trying over the next year to break out at Fordow.

But Israel is in a different situation. Israel has announced that it can't destroy the centrifuges deeply buried in Fordow. It's clear it can shut down Fordow for some number of months through just a bombing, because the site needs electricity, water, and there are tunnels that are operational where the centrifuges are located. So Israel can shut it down, but it can't destroy it. So if Israel attacks, and if whatever is down in the hole is protected and the plant becomes fully operational, which it very well could in six months, then Israel is faced with this real fundamental problem: It attacks Iran, and Iran's plant at Fordow survives, and in about two months, the Iranians could have their first significant quantity of enriched uranium, which they could then try to, over successive months, turn into a nuclear weapon and keep enriching.

Could the United States take out Fordow?

I think so, because what the United States can do that Israel can't do is it can do much more destruction at the site. Again, it may not be able to collapse the roof in the deeply buried cavern that holds the centrifuges, but it can certainly collapse the tunnels. The United States can also keep hitting the plant. We have the capability to launch multiple strikes over a long period of time, if necessary, to keep the plant shut down, and to raise the costs to Iran.

In fact, what this argues for is that perhaps Israel shouldn't attack, because it's quickly reaching a point where an Israeli attack could be counterproductive. What it means is that if Israel can't destroy Fordow, then it's going to motivate Iran to go for the bomb, and certainly before that to kick out the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and withdraw Iran from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So I think the Israelis, by attacking, could make the situation much worse, whereas if the United States makes it clear to Iran: don't cross that line or else there will be horrendous consequences, that strategy may be able to keep Iran from building the bomb over the next year or two.

Talk about all this from Iran's point of view. What is it that Iran seems to be doing? Its public posture is it's developing enriched uranium for power plants. Is that a feasible project for them?

They have an ambition of being able to produce enough enriched uranium for a commercial nuclear power program. That's a dream. The Iranians are far from being able to realize that dream. And they've kind of gotten sidetracked into saying: "Okay, now we'll make fuel for a tiny little research reactor," and they've made plenty for that reactor already and don't even need to make any more. And so the civilian side doesn't really need an enrichment program, and they could stop their enrichment program today, and their nuclear power program wouldn't suffer at all. But since the 1980s, we've seen evidence that they have been developing a nuclear weapons program, and my view is that they would've had nuclear weapons by now if the world hadn't intervened at several points and stopped them from crossing that line.

The big outside intervention was in 2003?
The intervention in 2003, after the invasion of Iraq and the discovery of all these secret centrifuge sites, laser enrichment sites, and even military nuclear sites, so unnerved the Iranians that they decided the best thing was to shut down the nuclear weaponization program, or at least reduce it greatly in size, and to suspend their uranium enrichment program and try to outlast the pressure, which was immense in 2003 and 2004. Since then, most of their effort has gone into getting their centrifuge program working, because in the end, that's the long pole in the tent. The IAEA evidence says by the end of 2003, they knew how to build a crude nuclear explosive device, and they were working on a deliverable nuclear warhead. They weren't finished when this abrupt shutdown supposedly happened, but they had gotten fairly far, and the IAEA assessed, in internal documents, that if they spent time on this, they would succeed in building deliverable warheads for a missile.

Iran currently is focused on making weapons-grade uranium. And therefore, it's not so critical that it works on the nuclear weaponization side, but the IAEA has gathered evidence that some part of that weaponisation work has continued. The U.S. national intelligence estimate, from what we understand, felt the structured program was not restarted, and certainly everybody we talked to agrees that Iran hasn't made a decision to actually build nuclear weapons in the sense of making weapon-grade uranium, making bomb components.

But from a technical point of view, they're not at the point where they can do that safely, because they're going to be detected, and they have to worry about us striking militarily and probably putting together an international coalition that would support the United States in what it's doing. I think Iran's probably working on some aspects of nuclear weapons, but principally is trying to develop a much greater centrifuge capability so that it could find a way to make nuclear weapons and get away with it without having their country devastated.

There have been negotiations on and off now for several years between the Security Council permanent five and Germany and the Iranians. Are these talks just a total bust or have they accomplished something?

I think they've demonstrated that Iran is not really that serious as a regime about making significant concessions. They've been handed all kinds of ways to make this problem go away and for them to get all kinds of sanctions lifted, and they have chosen not to do it, and we don't know why.

I don't think it's necessarily because they want a nuclear weapon. I see them as ambivalent. If they could, they would build a weapon, but they understand there's tremendous forces arrayed against them, that if they build that weapon, their regime may end before they get the weapon. The reasons are not always, "We want a weapon, and therefore negotiations are just a tool for us to buy time." I think they also have internal problems in their regime where they can't seem to agree on what to do in the negotiations. There are some concessions Iran could make, they can't seem to agree. And we went through this for a couple years where Iran would send out its enriched uranium and get research reactor fuel in return, and they agreed to a deal and then they said no, and then they wanted to do it again. Then the Iranians agreed to a deal with Brazil and Turkey but it was a very bad deal, and it had aspects Iran would've known the West could never accept.

http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program-red-line/p29095#

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