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Article
Public Goods and the Value of Product Quality Regulations: The Case of Food Safety
Journal of Public Economics
  • Stephen F. Hamilton, University of Arizona
  • David L. Sunding, University of California - Berkeley
  • David Zilberman, University of California - Berkeley
Publication Date
3-1-2003
Abstract

The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food. Results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods influence support for the product quality regulation. The results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor predictor of political behavior, and have implications for methods that use voting and market behavior to value public goods.

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Citation Information
Stephen F. Hamilton, David L. Sunding and David Zilberman. "Public Goods and the Value of Product Quality Regulations: The Case of Food Safety" Journal of Public Economics Vol. 87 Iss. 3-4 (2003) p. 799 - 817
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/shamilto/22/