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The Future of Financial Dispute Resolution in Hong Kong: Promoting a Comprehensive “Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution System” with reference to the “Lehman Brothers Mediation Scheme”

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Abstract

Recent global financial dislocation has provided an impetus for examining effective avenues for the resolution of financial disputes. Hong Kong, like many financial centers throughout the world, has been directly affected by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Its response to the collapse has included a creative mix of regulatory strengthening and government sponsored mediation and arbitration. Each of these alternative mechanisms of resolution provides a useful case study of the prospects of the use of ADR in response to financial crises. The efficacy of such interventions will be reviewed and options for the future development of a multi-tier dispute resolution system in Hong Kong will be explored.

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Introduction: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Hong Kong’s Commercial Markets

Hong Kong has long been a favored venue for international business transactions given its comprehensive legal regime, stable financial environment and geographic position as a gateway to Mainland China. However, with increased business and investment opportunities, the need for an effective system of dispute resolution has become clear. In recent years, a growing number of disputants are turning to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve their financial disputes. This is largely due to the significant financial incentives of choosing mediation or arbitration over litigation.

While dissatisfaction with the cost of litigation is certainly one of the primary drivers of this change, the dramatic increase in financial disputes and resulting pressures on the formal court system has encouraged the development of a growing number of alternative routes for dispute resolution in the East Asian region.

Mediation in Hong Kong Commercial Markets

With the establishment of the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre in 1985, local and overseas disputing parties have successfully resolved a growing number of disputes through mediation. The benefits of mediation are proven in many jurisdictions. Not only is mediation confidential, convenient and relatively less expensive than litigation, its flexible rule structure provides greater party-control over the process. The benefits of mediation are especially apparent in the commercial context, where mediation can serve as a tool for commercial entities to manage on-going relationships with business counterparts. While mediation has been extensively used in many western countries, this approach has gained momentum in Hong Kong in recent years. See: Cheng, Shing Kwong. “Let Mediation Work for H.K.” Hong Kong Mediation Centre (March 22, 2004). Print.

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disputes through both arbitration and mediation. The recent Civil Justice Reform of 2009 has further encouraged the development of alternative dispute resolution in Hong Kong.

With the implementation by the judiciary of its Practice Direction on Mediation (known as “PD 31”) on January 1, 2010, the Court amplified its efforts to familiarize parties and their legal advisors with the mechanics of the Court’s mediation regime. It is particularly noteworthy that one of the new case management powers granted the Court includes the making of an adverse costs order against a party where there has been an unreasonable refusal to mediate.

Hong Kong has incorporated the approach to mediation as defined in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002). According to Article 1, mediation is defined as a process “whereby parties request a third person or persons to assist them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute arising out of or relating to a contractual or legal relationship.” It must be noted that, in theory, a mediator will not evaluate the substance of a dispute and has no authority to impose a solution upon the parties to the dispute. Mediation is considered a consensual and confidential process conducted on a “without prejudice” basis.

The first part of this paper, following a discussion of alternative dispute resolution in the Hong Kong commercial context will present a brief overview of the collapse of the

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Lehman Brothers Group. Building on this background, the third part of the paper will focus on Hong Kong’s experience of using mediation to resolve disputes between investors of Lehman Brothers’ minibonds and banks as product distributors and recommend some areas for further reform. The concept of a “multi-tier dispute resolution system” in Hong Kong financial institutions will be discussed, and issues related to its design it will be examined.
Part II. Overview of the Lehman Brothers Minibonds Collapse

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code on 15 September 2008. Subsequently, eight Lehman companies were put into liquidation in Hong Kong, including Lehman Brothers Asia Limited (LBAL). The global financial crisis that led to the collapse of Lehman, the fourth largest investment bank on Wall Street, has been described as a “once-in-a-century” event. Hong Kong, as an international financial centre, has not escaped entirely unscathed. Although Hong Kong banks have weathered the financial storm robustly in comparison with peers in the United States and Europe, the immediate focus of public enquiry quickly shifted from large corporations to individual affected investors. Determining how best to investigate, resolve and in some circumstances, provide compensation to investors for financial losses resulting from the fraudulent or negligent selling of minibonds by respective banks became an intense focus of public inquiry. The next section will focus in particular, on the nature of the financial products known in Hong Kong as “minibonds.”

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13 Ibid
What are Minibonds?

Minibonds are structured derivative products linked to the credit of certain specified reference entities (which are generally well-known companies). The term ‘mini’ is used to indicate that these bonds are sold in smaller minimum denominations (as low as HK$40,000 in certain cases – approximately US$5,000), making them affordable to amateur investors. In return for the “investment”, the investors are paid both interest and a redemption payout at maturity linked to the credit of the reference entities. It must be noted that such structured products are commonly sold to institutional investors who are more familiar with the securities risks involved with this type of investment. However, as evidenced in the Lehman Brothers incident, some structured products were sold to amateur investors; and in Hong Kong for example, Lehman Brothers' minibonds were actively distributed as retail products to lay consumers since 2003.

Lehman Brothers’ Minibonds – How Do They Work?

As discussed above, credit-linked minibonds are connected to the credit of specified reference entities. In the case of Lehman Brothers’ minibonds, the investment products were linked to the insolvent United States investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings (LBH) issued by Pacific International Finance (the issuer). Lehman Brothers Asia, as the arranger, arranged for the minibonds to be distributed by retail banks as distributors to retail investors in Hong Kong. The proceeds of the sale of these minibonds were used by the issuer to purchase certain US-dollar-denominated underlying assets (the

15 Ibid
16 Ibid
collateral) selected by the arranger on behalf of the issuer. The complication of this arrangement arose from the swap agreement that the issuer would enter with Lehman Special Financing, so that the issuer would pay Lehman Special financing a sum equal to the interest and other income it received for the collateral; while Lehman Special Financing would pay the issuer fixed payments equal to the interest due on the minibonds, which would be subsequently handed down to individual investors.\textsuperscript{17}

There were two interrelated reasons why Lehman Brothers Holdings was the primary beneficiary of this investment arrangement. Based on the sale and purchase agreement of the minibonds, the retail investors would have to bear the entire risk of default when \textit{any} of the reference entities suffered from certain credit events (bankruptcy, failure to make payments on specified indebtedness or restructuring of specified indebtedness)\textsuperscript{18}. Therefore, while Lehman Brothers Holding was only obliged to pay minibond investors a fixed return for their investment (around 5.1%), it used invested funds to invest in high risk instruments or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) with the potential for returns far in excess of its fixed return obligations, while placing all investment risk on the minibond investors.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore when the market was doing well, Lehman Brothers Holdings would be able to make significant profits from its high-risk investments after deducting the fixed 5.1% returns. On the other hand, if and when its reference entities collapsed, Lehman, under the minibonds sale and purchase agreement, would be able to first compensate itself for financial losses while retail investors would ultimately be made to bear the entire loss.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid}
\end{flushright}
In fact, when LBH and Lehman Special Financing filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code on September 15, 2008 and October 3, 2008 respectively, this event constituted an event of default under the swap agreement, entitling the issuer to terminate the swap agreement. As a result of the termination of the swap agreement, early redemption of the minibonds took place.\textsuperscript{21} While the reference entities themselves did not suffer a “credit event”, nevertheless upon a termination of the swap agreement due to Lehman’s insolvency, holders of the minibonds were exposed to (1) the credit risk of Lehman Special Financing, as swap counterparty and (2) also exposed to the market value of the collateral, which would need to be sold to redeem the minibonds.\textsuperscript{22} When Lehman Special Financing as a key member of the swap agreement collapsed, the market value of the collateral connected with Lehman immediately plunged to a record low affecting the value of the minibonds.

\textit{Mis-Selling Investigations}

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) received various complaints from investors regarding possible mis-selling practices by Hong Kong banks.\textsuperscript{23} According to the SFC’s Enforcement Reporter (issue 60)\textsuperscript{24}, published in October 2008, mis-selling can broadly be categorized into two classes. First, an investor may be given materially wrong information about a financial product, leading him to make an investment decision that he would not have made if the

\textsuperscript{21} Supra note 12
correct information had been provided. The second type occurs when an investor ends up
investing in a product that is not suitable given his financial position, investment
objectives, expectations and risk tolerance level. In Hong Kong, thousands of Lehman
Brothers minibonds holders claimed that they bought the minibonds after being assured
by banks that they were low-risk products, only to see the value plunge after LBH and its
subsidiaries declared bankruptcy in September 2008.

The Securities and Futures Ordinance and the Banking Ordinance both place
particular emphasis on the importance of putting in place a regulatory mechanism that
provides adequate protection to investors, minimizes regulatory overlap and costs. Under
the present framework, the Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC") is the "lead
regulator" for the securities industry, while the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
("HKMA") acts as the "frontline supervisor" of registered institutions. When an entity
applies to become a registered institution, the HKMA will advise the SFC on whether the
institution is fit and proper to carry on the regulated activities for which it seeks
registration. After registration, the registered institution is supervised by the HKMA and
subject to the relevant regulatory requirements issued by the SFC and the HKMA. To
facilitate more effective co-operation, the HKMA and the SFC have a Memorandum of
Understanding setting out their respective roles and responsibilities. (Appendix one of

25 Supra note 14.
27 Securities and Futures Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances (Cap. 571).
28 Banking Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances (Cap. 155)
29 For a better understanding on the operations of Securities and Futures Commission, visit <www.sfc.hk/>.
30 For a better understanding on the operations of Hong Kong Monetary Authority, visit <www.info.gov.hk/hkma/>.
31 Supra note 12
32 Ibid
this report contains a table illustrating a brief guide to the division of responsibilities between the HKMA and the SFC).

In terms of banking oversight, the HKMA has 140 supervisory staff in its Banking Supervision Department (“BSD”) to monitor the daily operations of the bank and the SFC has issued recommendations and guidelines on bank supervision.\(^{33}\) Nevertheless, given the subsequent financial fallout resulting largely from the mis-selling practices adopted by various banks in Hong Kong, the SFC and HKMA have undergone extensive measures to reform their regulatory regime and establish new mechanism to better safeguard the future interests of investors.\(^ {34}\) According to the “Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on Issues Concerning the distribution of Structured Products Connected to Lehman Group Companies”,\(^ {35}\) a few pragmatic recommendations have been put forward, among which include the following:

1. **Recommendation 3** - Public education campaigns regarding policy objectives should be periodically undertaken, focusing particularly on the responsibilities of investors, intermediaries and regulators.

2. **Recommendation 4** – the regulatory framework should be strengthened to take into account the growth in the volume and complexity of investment products sold to the retail public by Authorized Institutions (“AIs”) and the change in public expectations and risk tolerance by investors particularly in the light of the Lehman episode.

3. **Recommendation 5** – “Health-warnings” should be attached to retail structured products with embedded derivatives or to retail derivative products generally.

\(^{33}\) Ibid
\(^{34}\) Ibid
\(^{35}\) Ibid
4. Recommendation 6 – Uniform disclosure formats such as simple “product key facts statements” and “sales key facts statements” should be required to be produced in respect of such products (and indeed other retail investment products).

5. Recommendation 7 – Consideration be given to whether there should be restrictions on the use of gifts as a marketing tool to promote financial products to investors.

6. Recommendation 9 – the HKMA recommends that coordination between the HKMA and the SFC, with the aim of setting broadly consistent standards of conduct, be strengthened.

7. Recommendation 13 – the regulatory requirements at point of sale should be reviewed with a view to introducing mandatory requirements for the audio-recording of the sales process and ancillary arrangements.

8. Recommendation 16 – the regulatory requirements at point of sale should be reviewed with a view to introducing mandatory requirements for the imposition of a cooling-off period between the provision of disclosure documents and the closing of the sale. Consideration should be given to allowing waivers of the cooling-off period subject to certain safeguards.

In addition to the recommendations above, the report also suggested implementing a “mystery shopper” program, where designated investigative investment shoppers can seek information on an investment product from selected bank branches and check the type of information provided, as well as the quality of advice offered by the relevant individual in the retail bank.36

36 Ibid. This has recently been put into place in Hong Kong.
Finally, the HKMA facilitated the establishment of a Lehman-Brothers Related Investment Products Dispute Mediation Scheme which will be examined in detail in the following section.
Part III. Remedies Available to Investors and the Process Leading to Lehman Brothers-related Investment Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme (“Lehman Brothers’ Mediation Scheme”) 

Thousands of Lehman Brothers minibonds holders in Hong Kong have claimed that they bought the failed minibonds after being assured by the banks that they were low-risk products. SFC and HKMA investigations continue to examine allegations of mis-selling by Hong Kong Banks and continue to investigate the internal regulations and sale procedures of banks in relation to the Lehman Brothers minibonds. Simultaneously, individual investors have three primary avenues to seek redress:

i. Litigation,

ii. Settlement through established institutions as third-party, and

iii. Alternative dispute resolution

i. Litigation

a. Small Claims Tribunal

Investors, whose claims do not exceed HK$50,000 (US$6,400), have the option of bringing their case to a Small Claims Tribunal (“SCT”) where investors can address the tribunal independently without the need to hire counsel. Resolving disputes through a SCT has the potential of yielding quick results with low or no legal cost.

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37 Lehman Brothers-related Investment Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme (“Lehman Brothers’ Mediation scheme”)
38 For a good discussion on common law tortuous liability and the duty of financial advisors to their clients, read the leading case of Susan Field v Barber Asia.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a group of 135 investors sought to recover their investment losses through SCTs.\textsuperscript{40} It took three months for the adjudicators of the SCT to hear all cases. Following the hearings, the adjudicators subsequently came to the conclusion that the claims should be referred to the Hong Kong District Court. The reason stated was because these claims involved claims of banks’ liability and customer risk, of which new and complex legal theories were introduced,\textsuperscript{41} the adjudicators understood that their decisions might be used to determine the liability of the banks in future cases. As there was no precedent lending guidance to the SCTs, the adjudicators considered it best if higher courts heard the cases.\textsuperscript{42}

As a result of the SCT’s decision, many investors decided to drop their cases due to the high probability of appeal and the prospect of potentially having to bear not only their own legal costs but those of the banks as well.\textsuperscript{43}

b. \textit{Litigation}

Investors in the failed mini-bond investment products also had the option of pursuing litigation, yet few chose this option in the immediate aftermath of the collapse. The most apparent reason why investors did not choose to bring their case for litigation largely centered on the high costs of litigation. As mentioned in the previous section, the chance of appeal was extremely high. If the court found in favor of the banks, the investors would not only have to pay their own legal costs, but the costs of the banks’ as

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid}
well.\textsuperscript{44} Such daunting consequence deterred many investors from attempting litigation. Furthermore, whether the banks were legally at fault was still a question of fact to be determined by regulatory bodies. Some observers noted that a leading case, 	extit{Field v Barber Asia}\textsuperscript{45} on common law tortious liability, could be examined to consider whether Lehman Brothers investors could recover damages for alleged mis-selling of the minibonds or whether they made their investment decisions with their \textit{eyes open}. Since the SFC and HKMA have yet to conclude their investigation, litigation against participating banks would have been considered hasty.

c. \textit{Class Action in the United States}

Because class action lawsuits are not yet available in Hong Kong\textsuperscript{46}, seven plaintiffs from Hong Kong and the United States filed a class action in the United States, contending that HSBC (USA) had failed to protect the interest of its investors by redeeming its collateral (i.e. securities held by both HSBC and the Bank of New York Mellon Corp.), and therefore breached its duties as a trustee. It is estimated that the

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid
\textsuperscript{45} 	extit{Field v Barber Asia} (HCA7119/2000); “Ms Field was an inexperienced investor who, at the outset, made it clear to her financial advisor, Barber Asia, that she wanted to invest her savings in a conservative way. However, Barber Asia later persuaded her to adopt a high-risk investment strategy to gear up her existing investment by borrowing a loan denominated in Japanese yen, using the existing investment as collateral, for a new investment scheme denominated in pounds sterling, intending to take advantage of the low interest rate for yen-denominated loans. Unfortunately, the yen strengthened and the corresponding liability under the yen loan (relative to the pounds sterling-denominated investment) increased, causing Ms Field to suffer a loss. In the end, the court found that Barber Asia had been negligent in advising Ms Field because it failed to heed her stated desire to adopt a conservative investment strategy and to warn her of the existence and nature of the risk involved and, as such, breached its duty of care to Ms Field.” (quoted from P.4 of Supra note 42)
\textsuperscript{46} A proposal for a Hong Kong Class Action led by Mr. Anthony Neoh SC is currently being considered by the Hong Kong courts. See: “Class Action Proposal in Hong Kong”, HKLRC Consultation Paper prepared by Mr. Anthony Neoh SC.
waiting time for trial will be 3 years and 18% of any potential remedy will be deducted to cover legal fees.  

ii. Settlement through established third-party institutions in Hong Kong

a. The Securities and Futures Commission and Hong Kong Monetary Authority

The SFC and HKMA play an important role in regulating financial institutions in Hong Kong and investigating possible wrongdoing on the part of the banking industry. Notwithstanding the power of the SFC and HKMA to investigate complaints and take disciplinary action against intermediaries pursuant to section 196 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571), individuals can not directly seek redress or direct compensation from these institutions. Rather, complainants are asked to clarify their allegations and collect background information for HKMA in order for it to conduct proper assessment on the regulated entity. While the HKMA, upon consultation with the SFC, can implement disciplinary sanctions and even de-list a registered entity; it provides no practical commercial incentive for complainants to invest personal time and resources in pursuit of regulatory sanctions.

As a result, a recent proposal is currently being considered to expand the SFC and HKMA’s scope of power in order to allow these institutions to provide compensation to

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47 Supra note 42
49 Section 196 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) discusses the disciplinary action in respect of registered institutions that can be initiated by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC).
50 Supra note 48
51 Supra note 49
aggrieved investors. The benefit of this proposal is three-fold. While it would offer an additional route of redress for future investors, it would also provide greater financial incentives for investors to assist the SFC and HKMA based on the possibility of receiving compensation. Finally, this proposal would draw on the already robust investigatory and regulatory framework of the SFC and HKMA.

b. *Financial Ombudsman Service in Hong Kong*

There is currently no financial ombudsman service in Hong Kong, but according to recent reports, the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury Professor KC Chan explained that a consultation on the establishment of a financial ombudsman will be launched by the end of 2009. Based on experience gained in other countries, such dispute resolution mechanisms provide low cost and useful investigatory and resolution services to customers and market participants in the financial sector.

The United Kingdom has established a Financial Ombudsman Service which handles disputes in the financial sector and provides free and independent dispute resolution services to consumers. According to the UK Service, consumers retain their right to go to Court if they are not satisfied with the Ombudsman’s decision. However, if the decision is accepted, then it is binding on both the consumer and the financial institution. However, the Ombudsman does not have the power to punish or fine financial institutions for non-compliance with decisions. Therefore it remains the role of

52 Supra note 12
53 Ibid
55 Supra note 12
56 Ibid
the Court to impose legal sanctions for any subsequent misconduct following the settlement decision.\textsuperscript{57} This practice is similar to the approach used in mediation. Once a mediator assists parties to formulate a legally-binding agreement, it lies with the Court to sanction parties for failure to honor the agreement.

Between April 1, 2007 and March 31, 2008, the Financial Ombudsman Service in the United Kingdom resolved 99,699 cases. In Singapore, 417 cases were resolved via Ombuds services between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008. According to statistics, 92\% of the UK cases were resolved by mediation or recommended settlements, and 83\% of the Singaporean cases were resolved by mediation.\textsuperscript{58}

A similar independent body in Hong Kong could provide an efficient means to adjudicate or settle disputes and shift some of the administrative burden away from the SFC and HKMA. If a Financial Ombudsman Service is to be launched in Hong Kong, it must draft and implement an effective roadmap outlining the distribution of work with the SFC, HKMA, Hong Kong Mediation Council (HKMC) and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC). Another possible approach may be to increase the scope of power currently enjoyed by the HKIAC and allow it to fully adjudicate or settle disputes based on the results of investigation conducted by HKMA and SFC.

Implementing a Financial Ombudsman Service or widening the power of HKMA or HKIAC appear to be beneficial approaches to the resolution of financial disputes given experience gained in the UK and Singapore. The recent proposal to develop a Financial Ombudsman service in Hong Kong reflects a growing need to enhance financial-system

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid
management and provide greater avenues for the use of appropriate methods of dispute resolution in Hong Kong’s dynamic financial sector.\footnote{Supra note 54}

c. The “Buy-Back” Proposal

On October 6, 2008, the Hong Kong government proposed a “buy-back” option, offering consumers the option of re-selling their Lehman Brothers minibonds. This proposal was subsequently agreed to by the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB).\footnote{“Banks to buy back Lehman mini-bonds”, \textit{The Standard}, 17 October 2008.} Unfortunately, the proposal failed after a cease-and-desist order was issued from Lehman’s United States counsel to HSBC Hong Kong, as a result of the ‘automatic stay’ imposed by Lehman’s United States bankruptcy filings.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}}

\section*{iii. Alternative dispute resolution}

a. Direct Settlement Negotiation

Given the significant obstacles to pursuing claims through the six possible remedies listed above -- either due to high cost (i.e. small claims tribunal or litigation), or unavailability (i.e. class action in Hong Kong, direct compensation from the SFC and the HKMA, Financial Ombudsman Service or the “Buy-Back” proposal), Hong Kong investors have been advised to attempt to directly approach banks for settlement negotiations.\footnote{Supra note 42}
Hong Kong banks have proactively identified and settled some individual cases to reduce the likelihood of successful suits against them.\textsuperscript{63} Unfortunately, for aggrieved investors who lack the resources to litigate or with weaker claims, banks have generally refused negotiation. In other words, while direct settlement negotiation may be the most “cost-effective” way to seek compensation, retail banks, without external pressure and influence, are seldom willing to negotiate with all investors seeking settlement.

\textit{b. Lehman Brothers-related Investment Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme}

On 31 October 2008, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) was appointed by the HKMA to be the service provider for the Lehman Brothers-related Investment Products Disputes Mediation and Arbitration Scheme ("IPDMAS").\textsuperscript{64} Under this scheme mediation and arbitration services are provided to aggrieved investors seeking financial redress from banks. With strong support and oversight by the HKMA, the SFC and the Legislative Council, the Scheme was successfully launched in October 2008.\textsuperscript{65}

According to the requirements of the program, only a specific group of investors are eligible for the mediation and arbitration scheme. According to the HKMA,\textsuperscript{66} a qualified candidate is one that has:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Supra note 22
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Supra note 39
\end{itemize}
1. **Made a complaint to the HKMA** against a bank that has sold him/her a Lehman-Brothers-related product (not exclusive of minibonds), and

2. The HKMA has **completed its review** of the complaint, and

3. **Either**, the HKMA has referred the complaint to the SFC for it to decide whether to take any further action, **Or** a finding (of fault) against a relevant individual or executive officer has been confirmed by either the HKMA or the SFC.

   Only individuals meeting the above requirements are eligible for the HKMA sponsored mediation arrangements. For eligible disputants, the HKMA would pay the relevant mediation fees and banks were required to support the Scheme.67 Whether the bank ultimately agreed to mediate depended on the circumstances of each case based on the underlying principle of voluntariness. If both parties agreed to settle, they then would have the option of signing a legally-binding agreement enforceable by the Court.68

   According to information provided by the HKIAC,69 the HKMA-sponsored mediation settlement amounts ranged from between HK$40,000 to over HK$5 million. The parties involved included 11 licensed banks in Hong Kong and individual investors. All of the mediation sessions, which took place within one week of the appointment of the mediators, were concluded within the time-limit provided under the rules which was not to exceed five hours. While some have questioned the short mediation duration, post-mediation interviews indicated that the parties were satisfied with the usefulness of the mediation process and the professional performance of the mediators.70

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67 *Ibid*
68 Tan, Oscar, “There’s more to mediation than talking”, *The Standard*, 22 October, 2008.
70 *Ibid*
For unsuccessful mediations, parties had the option of proceeding to binding arbitration conducted by the HKIAC. Therefore, if an involved bank was willing to arbitrate the matter with an investor after a failed mediation attempt, then the subsequent arbitration decision would be legally binding on both parties. However, because the arbitration process was optional, and because the sales and purchase agreements concluded between banks and Lehman Brothers minibond holders did not include relevant arbitration clauses, few banks were willing to proceed with this option.

**Key Features of the Scheme**

Several key features of the mediation scheme stand out and deserve additional focus. These features include the active use of a mediation “hotline,” pre-mediation briefings, and a mediation scheme office. First, a special hotline was set up to handle all enquiries in relation to the Scheme. The hotline was considered a vital channel for banks and investors to initiate mediation. Hotline staff members were trained in basic mediation skills and provided with adequate knowledge to discern whether mediation should be made available to the parties concerned. The success of the hotline indicates that mediation schemes must not only be concerned with mediator abilities, but with pre-mediation educational processes as well.

Second, pre-mediation briefings were conducted with individual banks and investors during which a practicing mediator would discuss the suitability of mediation.

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72 Supra note 42
73 Ibid
with regard to a given case. Since only a maximum of five hours were allocated for each mediation, the HKIAC made use of pre-mediation sessions to allow disputants to make informed decisions as to participation in the mediation session. Since most of the investors did not have prior experience in mediation or formal negotiation, preparation meetings were conducted to familiarize them with the mediation process.

Last but not least, the HKIAC also set up a Scheme Office to collect confidential and privileged information from disputants. Banks often had concerns regarding risk management, minimizing negative publicity and strengthening client relationships, while investors often had concerns beyond immediate financial losses. With clear guidelines and background information collected by the Scheme Office, designated mediators were equipped with a greater understanding of the underlying needs and interests of the parties involved.

*Interim Result of the Scheme*

In November 2009, more than a year since the launch of the Lehman Mediation Scheme, an interim report was conducted which indicated that a total of 334 cases were referred to the SFC by the HKMA, and around 243 cases were handled by the Scheme Mediation Office. Of the 243 cases, 85 mediations were conducted successfully while the

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74 Ibid
75 Press Release, “HKMA announces mediation & arbitration services for Lehman Brothers-related cases”, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 31 October 2008.
77 Ibid
78 Supra note 69
remaining cases were settled prior to the mediation meetings. For those who actually engaged in the Mediation Scheme, the settlement rate was 85%.\textsuperscript{79}

Drawing on the lessons learned from the Mediation Scheme, the next section will explore the prospects for the development of an “In-House Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution System for Hong Kong Financial Institutions.”

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid
Part IV. Reflection on the Lehman Brothers Mediation Scheme and the Implementation of a “In-House Multi-tier Dispute Resolution System” for Hong Kong Financial Institutions

In view of the experience of the Lehman Brothers Mediation Scheme, this section aims to discuss some of the lessons learned from the implementation of the program. At present, members of the Hong Kong public and government are considering the question of whether Hong Kong should implement a compulsory “in-house multi-tier dispute resolution system” for financial institutions in the region. In examining this question, reference will be made to the successful use of a multi-tier dispute resolution system by the Hong Kong International Airport project a decade ago.  

Lessons Learned from the Existing Lehman Mediation Scheme

It is without question that the existing Lehman Mediation Scheme has proved a helpful illustration of the use of mediation and arbitration in resolving financial disputes in Hong Kong. Given the recent Civil Justice Reform of 2009 which emphasizes case management and the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, this Scheme was supported not only by the HKIAC and HKMA but was fully backed by the HKSAR Government and the Judiciary. Although judges and practitioners have historically acknowledged the benefits of mediation in some landmark cases, mediation has always been perceived as

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81 For a better understanding on the recent Civil Justice Reform 2009, visit <www.civiljustice.gov.hk/eng/publication.html>.
82 For a reference of some recent Hong Kong decisions on mediation, read Leung Catherine v Tary Limited – HCPI 805/2007; Billion Express Industrial Limited v Tsang Hung Kong –HCA 2740/2008; Chun Wo Construction & Engineering Co Ltd v China Win Engineering Ltd; iRiver
largely restricted to family matters. It was not until the successful operation of the Lehman Brothers Mediation Scheme that the applicability of mediation and arbitration in resolving commercial and financial matters received widespread attention.

The Lehman Mediation Scheme was successful because of its careful consideration of the unique characteristics and needs of aggrieved investors and the incorporation of such considerations into the mediation procedures. Referring back to the key features of the Scheme, pre-mediation meetings were held to familiarize investors with mediation procedures. In addition, the strong support of the HKMA and SFC in gathering background case information and the HKIAC in providing the dispute resolution platform, were critical to its success.

According to the 2009 Annual Report prepared by the HKIAC, the Hong Kong Government is planning to establish a financial dispute resolution body in Hong Kong. If such a body is to be created, then it has the potential of overseeing an “in-house dispute resolution system” adopted by participating financial institutions in Hong Kong.

In looking toward the potential future development of a financial dispute resolution body in Hong Kong, the following lessons learned from the Lehman Mediation Scheme should be taken into account when designing such a system.

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83 Supra note 42
84 Supra note 76
Observation #1: Expanding the Eligibility Test for Mediation and Arbitration Services

Among the areas of potential improvement on the Lehman Mediation Scheme is the expansion of the criteria defining those eligible to participate. As defined by the Scheme, only Lehman Minibond investors whose claims were approved by the HKMA and whose claims did not involve complex questions of liability were eligible.86 Honorable Justice Fung, in the case of Leung Catherine v Tary Limited87 commented on the need to expand the scope of mediation to handle complex questions of liability. In that case, solicitors for one of the defendants refused mediation settlement attempts because the issue of legal liability was in dispute. In response, Justice Fung explained that “to say that mediation is not suitable because the issue of liability is in dispute is yet again a Catch-22. It begs the question of what mediation is, to wit, without prejudice negotiations assisted by a neutral third party to resolve disputes. Courts in England as well as in Hong Kong have observed that skilled mediators are able to achieve results satisfactory to both parties in many cases quite beyond the power of lawyers and courts to achieve (Dunnett v Railtrack Plc [2002] 1 WLR 2434 (CA); Supply Chain & Logistics Technology Ltd v NEC Hong Kong Ltd HCA 1939/2006).” In light of such observations, expanding the scope of mediation to include not only simple but also more complex cases involving issues of liability appear to warrant further investigation.

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86 Supra note 82
87 Leung Catherine v Tary Limited (HCPI 805/2007)
Observation #2: Need for a Clear Dispute Resolution Roadmap

In the few weeks after the Lehman Brothers’ Group filed for bankruptcy, the Lehman Brother’s minibond holders filed complaints to the HKMA and SFC against their retail banks on allegations of mis-selling. Once the Mediation Scheme was established, investors began to have a clear idea of how to seek compensation. Drawing from this experience, the need for a clear picture of the avenues available for redress at the outset of any financial relationship would provide investors with a clear roadmap for resolution.

Observation #3: Protecting Investors in Post-Mediation Procedures

Under the Mediation Scheme, banks are under no obligation to pursue settlement beyond mediation. One method of addressing this gap would be to make arbitration available to investors in such an event. The following section looks in greater detail at

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88 With regards to the requirement of an arbitration clause, the author is aware that Professor Norbert Horn of University of Cologne recently emphasized the “form requirements for arbitration clauses with customers” for banks to customers (B2C) transactions in his talk at the University of Hong Kong, 15 April, 2010. For details, see Horn, Norbert “Arbitration of Banking and Finance Disputes in Germany”.
90 For example, a dispute resolution clause might include the following language:
“In the event a dispute shall arise between the parties to this sales and purchase agreement of Lehman Brother’s minibonds, it is hereby agreed that the dispute shall be referred to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre for arbitration in accordance with the applicable HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules. The arbitrator’s decision shall be final and legally binding and judgment may be entered thereon. Each party shall be responsible for its share of the arbitration fees in accordance with the applicable Rules of Arbitration. In the event a party fails to proceed with arbitration, unsuccessfully challenges the arbitrator’s award, or fails to comply with the arbitrator’s award, the other party is entitled to costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee for having to compel arbitration or defend or enforce the award.”
91 Supra note 88
the design of a multi-tier dispute resolution system modeled after the structure adopted by
the Hong Kong Chek Lap Kok International Airport.\textsuperscript{93}

\textit{Multi-tier Dispute Resolution System}

The use of a multi-tiered system of alternative dispute resolution has often been
accredited for the “on-time and under-budget” completion of the Chek Lap Kok airport.
Given its sheer magnitude and the fact that the project involved more than twelve
different construction parties, the Hong Kong government used a carefully crafted mix of
alternative dispute resolution methods to avoid, manage, and resolve a wide range of
problems that could well have delayed, significantly increased the cost of, or even
prevented completion of this vast undertaking.

Clause 92 of the airport construction agreement outlined in significant detail the
Hong Kong government’s approach to the resolution of airport construction related
disputes.\textsuperscript{94}

The first formal step or tier envisaged by Clause 92 is known as a ‘decision’ of
the engineer.\textsuperscript{95} Clause 92(3)(a) provides that this decision be given within 28 days of
service of the notice of dispute. This type of resolution is aimed at resolving disputes
between employer and contractor. In this step, the engineer acts as a neutral party
empowered to exercise discretion and solve practical construction-related problems. The
engineer’s decision is subject to the oversight by the HKSAR government. If the

\textsuperscript{93}Wilson, Mark. "HONG KONG’S NEW AIRPORT AND THE RESOLUTION OF
\textsuperscript{94}Ibid
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid
government has an objection to the decision, then the dispute is removed from the
engineer’s jurisdiction and proceeds to the next tier of resolution.\textsuperscript{96}

The \textbf{second} formal step or \textit{tier} is mediation.\textsuperscript{97} Under Clause 92 of the agreement,
if either party is dissatisfied with the decision of the engineer, then that party may serve
on the other a “request for mediation.” This must be done within 28 days of receiving the
engineer’s decision. Under Rule 3.2 of the Mediation Rules,\textsuperscript{98} a valid request for
mediation must include (1) a brief explanation of the nature of the dispute, the amount (if
any) in dispute, and the relief sought, and (2) nomination of a proposed mediator with an
indication of his fee and other conditions of such appointment. If the other party agrees to
mediation, then the nominated mediator will take charge of the procedure.\textsuperscript{99} If the other
party disagrees with mediation and persists with the engineer’s decision, then according
to Clause 92, the parties then proceed to the next tier of resolution.\textsuperscript{100}

The \textbf{third} tier of this multi-tier dispute resolution model rests on the selection of
either adjudication or arbitration.\textsuperscript{101} In the Hong Kong International Airport model,
adjudication would only be available when the dispute involved simple monetary claims

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Ibid.} Clause 2(1)(b) of the airport agreement provides that:
\textit{“Before carrying out [any duty or exercising any authority conferred by the contract] the Engineer
may be required under the terms of his appointment by the Employer to obtain confirmation that the
Employer has no objection to the Engineer’s proposed course of action and, in the event of an
objection, to act in accordance with the Employer’s direction…”}

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{98} Airport Core Programme Mediation Rules (1992 Edition).

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Supra note} 98, Rule 5.2, provides that:
\textit{“Subject to Rule 7 in the absence of service of a notice of objection in accordance with rule 5.1
[i.e. within seven days of service of the request for mediation] the person nominated in the request
for mediation shall be deemed to be acceptable to the party receiving a request for mediation.”}

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Supra note} 93, Refusal or failure to respond to a request for mediation cannot be used by its
recipient as a tactic to block the appointment of a mediator. In such a case the mediation procedure
will run its course with no long-term detriment to the claimant.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Supra note} 93
and the claimant desired a speedy outcome.\textsuperscript{102} Arbitration, on the other hand, was available when the dispute involved a complex legal or design issue.\textsuperscript{103}

Under the rules,\textsuperscript{104} if the parties select arbitration, a notice of arbitration must be sent in time to satisfy the appropriate ninety-day time limit. The respondent must send a ‘Response’ to the claimant within 28 days of receipt of the notice ‘for the purposes of facilitating the choice of the arbitrator’.\textsuperscript{105} Article 3.3 of the Arbitration Rules also envisages the appointment of an arbitrator by agreement of the parties within 42 days after service of the notice of arbitration, failing which either party may ask the HKIAC to make the appointment.\textsuperscript{106}

\textit{Developing an “In-House Multi-tier Dispute Resolution System” for Hong Kong Financial Institutions}

A “multi-tier dispute resolution system” offers an avenue of recourse for retail investors who purchase faulty investment products through the banks and individual investment institutions. Such a system would need to be clearly articulated through a collaborative process between the HKSAR Government, HKMA and SFC and retail

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid}, Under Clause 92(7)(a), following an unsuccessful mediation (or an unsuccessful attempt to initiate mediation), the dispute may be referred to either adjudication or arbitration. Interestingly, the sub-clause states that either party may make the choice. A potential problem that arises out of clause 92(7) is that a party, by acting quickly could spuriously refer the dispute to arbitration in order to temporarily hijack the contractor’s hopes of earlier relief through adjudication. In response, some have suggested that the election between adjudication and arbitration be best reserved to the claimant – the party which initiated the unsuccessful mediation.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{104} For a quick reference of the rules, visit Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (<http://www.hkiac.org/content.php>).

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid}

banks. The table below represents a diagram of such a multi-tier dispute resolution framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Type(s)</th>
<th>Party-in-charge</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</table>
| First| Expert’s decision| HKMA            | • Similar to “Engineer’s decision” of the Chek Lap Kok model  
• The HKMA expert would be empowered to discern whether the banks have used any mis-selling techniques  
• Claimants must notify the HKMA within 30 days after becoming aware of the mis-selling practice.  
• The HKMA should investigate the matter and provide an expert decision on the bank’s liability within 60 days of the complaint.  
• The banks should initiate negotiations with investors within 7 days of the findings. If the negotiations fail, investors may proceed to the next tier of resolution. |
| Second| Mediation       | Nominated mediator or Hong Kong Financial Dispute Resolution Centre | • Following the negotiation stage, both parties must agree on the selection of a mediator within 30 days. If the parties fail to select a mediator, the Hong Kong Financial Dispute Resolution Centre may select a mediator on behalf of both parties.  
• If a settlement is reached, both parties may sign an agreement to make it legally binding. |

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107 The bank should also try their best to investigate the matter in a speedy manner, as timing is the key in financial disputes  
108 The deadline is 7 days after the report of finding by HKMA
The claimant may select whether to proceed with adjudication or arbitration within 60 days from the date of a failed mediation. Both parties must agree on the selection of an adjudicator. If both parties fail to agree, the Hong Kong Financial Dispute Resolution Centre may select an adjudicator for the parties. The selection of arbitration and adoption of arbitration rules must be agreed upon by both parties. If the parties fail to agree, the decision must be referred to the HKFDRC.

In order for such a dispute resolution process to take effect, a “multi-tier dispute resolution clause” must be inserted into a bank’s investment product Sales and Purchase Agreement. The Hong Kong government through the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission can oversee the inclusion of such clauses in banks Sales and Purchase Agreements with investors.

The focus of such a “multi-tier dispute resolution framework” would be to target mis-selling techniques employed by banks and investment institutions. Given such a focus, the claimant must initiate dispute resolution within 30 days of actual knowledge that he/she has been led to make an investment decision that he would not have otherwise made or invest in a product that is not suitable given his financial position, investment objectives, expectations and risk tolerance level. If the “claimant” becomes aware of the bank’s mis-selling but continues with the investment decision hoping to gain from

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109 The original claimant would enjoy 60 days to elect whether to undergo adjudication or arbitration after the failed attempt of mediation (either failed attempt in its real sense or if either party does not agree to mediation).

110 “Within 30 days of their acquisition of the knowledge” means that the claimant may not take advantage of the situation by only complaining when the investment decision results in a financial loss. Therefore, the burden is on the claimant to complain to the rightful authority within 30 days of becoming aware of the misconduct of the investment institution.

111 Supra note 24
this *mistake*, then he proceeds at his own risk because he has made such an investment decision with his eyes open.

Within 30 days, the investor must notify the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) of any alleged mis-selling. The HKMA will then investigate the matter in order to discern whether the claimant made the investment decision with his eyes open or was misled into purchasing the investment product. The HKMA would then prepare an experts report within 60 days of the complaint, and determine the question of the bank’s liability. Following the conclusion of such a report, the banks would then initiate negotiations with affected investors within 7 days. The HKMA and SFC may reserve the right to penalize banks for inappropriate investment sales techniques.

If the bank fails to approach the claimant for direct negotiations before the deadline, then the claimant may nominate a mediator within 30 days. The mediator must be agreed to by all parties. If the parties fail to agree on a mediator, then the Hong Kong Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (HKFDR) may select a mediator on behalf of all parties. A pre-mediation meeting hosted by the HKFDR covering issues such as the process of mediation and the type of information to prepare for the session would be a useful preliminary step prior to the initiation of the mediation session.

If the mediation does not result in a settlement agreement, then the claimant may choose whether to initiate adjudication or arbitration within 60 days of the *failed* mediation. The claimant may nominate the adjudicator (or arbitrator) and select the rules appropriate for the proceeding. In both cases, both parties must agree with the

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112 Read *Susan Field v Barber Asia* for an analysis on the common law tortious liability.
113 *Supra note 76* Grateful to Ms. Jody Sin for her very helpful tips for potential parties of mediation.
114 The idea is to prevent powerful financial corporations to select arbitration so as to deter investors from further proceeding with the dispute.
selection. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the Hong Kong Financial Dispute Resolution Centre may make the selection for the parties.

**Part V. Conclusion: Future of Financial Dispute Resolution in Hong Kong**

The collapse of the Lehman Brothers Group, the fourth largest investment bank on Wall Street,\textsuperscript{115} has led to greater awareness of the insufficient protection provided by many government agencies against the mis-selling techniques of various financial institutions. The implementation of the Lehman Brothers’ Mediation Scheme by the HKSAR Government and the Judiciary, has provided a useful base of experience from which to glean insights regarding the development of future financial dispute resolution mechanisms. An “in-house multi-tier dispute resolution system,” drawing on the experience of both the Lehman Brothers’ Mediation Scheme and the Hong Kong International Airport’s multi-tier dispute resolution system sets out a potential framework for future investors to seek compensation from negligent financial institutions\textsuperscript{116} first by an experts decision, then mediation, followed by adjudication or arbitration. It is hoped that such a dispute resolution system developed for Hong Kong financial institutions will assist in preventing costly and lengthy lawsuits and assist affected investors in seeking redress in the face of mis-selling practices.

\textsuperscript{115} Supra note 12
\textsuperscript{116} Supra note 42
### Appendix One

#### Division of regulatory responsibilities for Authorized Institutions’ (“AI’s”) securities business under the Memorandum of Understanding between the HKMA and the SFC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>HKMA</th>
<th>SFC</th>
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| In Institutional registration | • To consider applications for Registration by AIs for carrying out regulated activities  
  • To advise the SFC on whether the applicant is fit and proper to be registered | • To grant, or refuse to grant, Registration to AIs to carry out regulated activities  
  • To maintain a register of institutions (including details of executive officers) and to make the register available for public inspection |
| Executive officers         | • To give, or refuse to give, consent to individuals to act as executive officers of registered institutions | • The public register maintained by the SFC should include details of the executive officers of registered institutions |
| Relevant individuals       | • To maintain a register of relevant individuals (including executive officers) and to make the register available for public inspection |                                                                                                                                 |

#### Regulatory and supervisory processes

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<tr>
<th>Developing rules, codes and guidelines</th>
<th>HKMA</th>
<th>SFC</th>
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</table>
| • Responsible for establishing guidelines under the Business Ordinance  
  • To consult the SFC in the event that such guidelines apply to registered institutions | • Responsible for drafting rules and publishing codes and guidelines under the SF0  
  • To consult the HKMA in the event that such rules, codes and guidelines apply to AIs by reason of their being registered institutions |

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117 *Supra note* 12
| Exercising Supervisory functions | • The frontline supervisor of registered institutions  
• Responsible for the day-to-day supervision of registered institutions | • To consult the HKMA before exercising its powers of supervision under s.180 of the SFO in relation to an AI |
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<tr>
<td>Complaints</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complaint referral</td>
<td>To refer complaints to the SFC whenever such complaints relate to matters that can be investigated by the SFC under s.182 of the SFO or market misconduct.</td>
<td>• To refer to the HKMA complaints concerning any registered institution, or any of its executive officers or managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of regulatory responsibilities for Authorized Institutions (&quot;AIs&quot;) securities business under the Memorandum of Understanding between the HKMA and the SFC</td>
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<tr>
<td>HKMA</td>
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<td>SFC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigation</td>
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</table>
| Conduct of investigations       | For potential disciplinary cases:  
• to open a case for investigation  
• to notify the SFC  
• to keep the SFC informed of the progress  
• to forward to the SFC a copy of the investigation report, together with the HKMA’s findings  
• to report any relevant matter to the SFC before completing the investigation where appropriate | • To consult the HKMA before exercising its power to initiate an investigation under s.182(1)(e) of the SFO  
• To share the findings of its investigation with the HKMA |
| Disciplinary action             |                                                                                                         |                                                                                                         |
| Consultation prior to disciplinary action | To consult the SFC before exercising its power to:  
• withdraw or suspend consent given to executive officers of registered institutions | To consult the HKMA before exercising its power to:  
• suspend or revoke an institution’s registration  
• reprimand, fine or issue a prohibition against a registered institution, any of its executive officers, |
| Appeals | Conducting appeals | • To conduct appeals of HKMA decisions  
• To consult the SFC during the course of an appeal where appropriate | • To conduct appeal of SFC decisions  
• To consult the HKMA during the course of an appeal where appropriate |